A/HRC/39/CRP.2 in Word


1 /HRC/39/CRP.2 A September 2018 17 only English Human Rights Council Thirty ninth session - 10 28 September 2018 – Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact * Finding Mission on Myanmar - Summary Fact I - inding I The Human Rights Council established the nternational F ndependent M ission M ission on Myanmar in its resolution 34/22. In accordance with its mandate, the focused on the situation in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States since 2011. It also examined the ression, infringement of fundamental freedoms, including the rights to freedom of exp assembly and peaceful association, and the question of hate speech. ission established consistent patterns of serious human rights violations and The M abuses in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, in addition to serious violations of international umanitarian law. These are principally committed by the Myanmar security forces, h particularly the military. Their operations are based on policies, tactics and conduct that consistently fail to respect international law, including by deliberately targeting civilians. Many violations amount to the gravest crimes under international law. In the light of the pervasive culture of impunity at the domestic level, the mission finds that the impetus for accountability must come from the international community. It makes concrete recommendations to that end, including that named senior generals of the Myanmar military should be investigated and prosecuted in an international criminal tribunal for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The present document contains the detailed findings of the Mission. Its principal findings and recommendations are provided in document A/HRC/39/64 . * of the The information contained in this document should be read in conjunction with the report Finding Mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/39/64). - Independent International Fact 

2 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 s Content Page Introduction ... ... ... ... 6 I. ... Mandate and methodology ... ... ... and legal framework 6 II. Mandate ... ... ... ... ... 6 A. B. Methodology ... ... ... 7 ... C. Legal framework ... ... ... 11 ... III. Context... ... ... ... ... ... 2 1 A. ... ... ... Military domination in politics 2 1 B. Ethnic and religious diversity ... ... .. 25 ... History of human rights violations ... ... C. 27 ... IV. 1: Kachin and Shan States ... ... ... 30 Emblematic situation A. Patterns of violations commit t ed by Myanmar military and security forces ... 32 Conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property ... 32 1. Unlawful killings ... ... ... ... 3 7 2. ... Torture and other ill - treatment ... 3. ... 4 2 4. Sexual and gender - based violen ce ... ... 5 0 ... 5. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance ... ... 5 6 6. Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children ... ... 6 4 7. Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and denial of humanitarian assistance ... ... ... 7 0 ... ... 8 8. Emblematic incidents 7 ... ... ... Patterns of violations and abuses committed by non - State armed actor s ... . 8 2 B. Legal framework ... ... ... ... 8 3 1. 2. Findings ... ... ... 8 3 ... Impact of conflict, violations and abuses on civilians ... ... C. 9 1 1. Fear, trauma, displacement a nd humanitarian impact ... ... 9 1 2. Landmines ... ... ... ... 9 4 5 3. Lack of recourse ... ... ... ... 9 Emblematic situation 2: Rakhine State ... V. ... 99 ... A. Human rights violations against the ethnic Rakhine ... ... 10 0 1. Forced or compulsory labour ... ... ... 10 1 2. Forced evictions ... ... ... ... 10 4 ... 3. Confiscation of food and livestock ... ... 10 6 ... 4. Sexual and gender - based violence ... ... 10 7 5. Emblematic incident: shooting in Mrauk - U on 16 January 2018 ... ... 10 8 ... 6. Conclusion ... ... ... 1 09 B. Systemic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya ... ... 11 0 ... 1. Denial of legal status and identity ... ... 11 0 1 19 2. Denial of the right to freedom of movement ... ... ... 2

3 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Restrictions on access to food, livelihoods, health care and education ... 12 7 3. Restrictions on humanitarian access ... ... ... 13 6 4. 5. Restrictions affecting private life ... ... 13 8 ... 6. Oppression through arbitrary arrest and detention ... 14 3 ... 7. Other forms of oppression ... ... ... 14 4 8. Conclusion ... ... ... ... 14 7 ... Violence in 2012 ... ... ... 14 7 C. 1. Emblematic incidents ... ... ... 14 7 ... 2. Kaman Muslims of Rakhine State ... ... 15 6 ... 3. Torture and ill - treatme nt at Buthidaung prison ... ... 15 6 4. Government response to the 2012 violence ... ... ... 1 59 ... Spreading hate ... ... ... 5. 16 6 6. Overall analysis ... ... ... 17 2 ... 7. Conclusion ... ... ... 1 7 6 ... D. 25 August 2017 and the “clearance operations” ... ... ... 17 7 1. A human rights catastrophe ... ... ... 1 78 ... 2. A foreseeable and planned catastrophe ... ... 25 5 3. An enduring catastrophe ... ... ... .. 2 7 8 ... 4. Perpetrators ... ... ... 30 8 3 31 5. Viola tions of international law ... ... ... VI. Emblematic situation 3: Democratic space and the exercise of f undamental freedoms ... 31 5 ... Silencing of critical voice s ... ... ... 31 5 A. 1. Legal toolbox for restr icting fundamental freedoms ... ... 31 6 2. Intimidation and reprisal for engagem ent with the United Nations . 3 19 ... 3. Curta ilment of peaceful protests ... ... ... 32 0 The issue of “hate speech” ... ... ... ... 32 0 B. ... 1. Legal f ramework ... ... ... 32 1 2. Findings ... ... ... ... 32 2 ... C. Conclusion ... ... ... 34 4 ... V II . Hallmarks of Tatmadaw operations ... ... . 34 5 Targeting civilians ... ... ... ... 34 5 A. ... Sexual violence ... ... ... 34 7 B. C. Exclusionary and discrim in atory rhetoric ... ... 3 48 ... D. Command climate and i mpunity ... ... 35 0 ... VIII . Crim es under international law ... ... ... ... 35 1 Genocide ... ... ... ... .. 35 1 A. ... Crimes against humanity ... ... B. ... 36 4 C. War crimes ... ... ... ... 38 0 ... X . Responsibility ... I ... ... ... 38 2 2 38 A. Tatmadaw and other security forces ... ... ... 3

4 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 B. Civilian authorities ... ... ... ... 3 88 ... Non - State armed groups and individuals ... ... 3 89 C. D. Non - exhaustive list of alleged perpetrators ... ... ... 39 0 E. International community ... ... ... ... 39 1 X Impunity and ac countability ... ... ... 39 3 . ... A. Legal framework and international standards on accountability ... 39 3 ... 6 B. 39 History and climate of impunity in Myanmar ... ... ... ... Way forward ... ... C. ... 41 0 XI . C onclusions and recommendations ... ... ... .. 4 19 ... A. Conclusions ... ... ... 4 19 ... Recommendations ... ... B. ... 42 0 Annexes ... Map of Myanmar ... ... I. ... 43 0 1 43 II. Correspondence with the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar ... 4

5 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Acronyms AA Arakan Army Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army ARSA Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN CAT Convention against Torture Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CEDAW CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Int ernational Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced CPED Disappearance CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities EAO Ethnic Armed Organization FPNCC and Consultation Committee Federal Political Negotiation General Administration Department GAD International Criminal Court ICC ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICERD International Convention on the Eli mination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICESC International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IHL International Humanitarian Law International Labour Organization ILO KIA Kachin Independence Army Light Infantry Battalion LIB Light Infantry Division LID Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army MNDAA NLD National League for Democracy O HCHR Office of the United Nations High C ommissioner for Human Rights SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council SPDC State Peace and Development Council SSA - N Shan State Army North SSA - S Shan State Army South TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNITAR UNOSAT UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party UWSA United Wa State Army WFP World Food Programme MaBaTha Association for the Protection of Race and Religion MaHaNa Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee NaSaKa Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters NaTaLa Ministry for Development of Bor der Areas and National Races “model villages” Myanmar Intelligence Office SaYaPa 5

6 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 I. Introduction The Independent International Fact - Finding Mission on Myanmar (hereinafter “the 1. Mission”) was established by Human Rights Council resolution 34/22, adopte d on 24 March 2017. The President of the Council appointed Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia) as chairperson and Radhika Coomaraswamy (Sri Lanka) and Christopher Sidoti (Australia) as members. A secretariat was recruited by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The core team was composed of a coordinator, fact - finding team leader and five human rights officers, legal adviser/reporting officer, military adviser, sexual and gender - based violence adviser, security officer, two language assistants and administrative support. 2. The Mission presented an oral update at the Human Rights Council’s thirty - sixth session (19 September 2017) and an oral interim report at the thirty - seventh session tatement at the twenty (12 March 2018), and delivered a video s - seventh special session of the Council (5 December 2017). In its decision 36/115, the Council requested the Mission to - ninth session. The main findings and recommendations of submit its final report at its thirty the Mission are cont ained in document A/HRC/39/64. A/HRC/ 39/ CRP.2 contains the full factual and legal analysis, with supporting information, underpinning document A/HRC/39/64. It also includes recommendations directed more broadly than the accountability recommendations in th at document. The Mission deeply regrets the lack of cooperation from the Government of Myanmar, 3. despite repeated appeals from the Human Rights Council and the Mission. The Mission requested in - November 2017 and 29 country access through letters of 4 September 2017, 17 January 2018. It sent a detailed list of questions on 27 March 2018. Each time its members travelled to Geneva, the Mission requested a meeting with the Permanent Mission of the d Other International Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations an Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland. The Mission had some limited informal contact with Government representatives but received no official response to its letters requesting formal - country access or information. The Mis sion’s draft main findings and meetings, in recommendations were shared with the Government prior to their submission and public release, providing an opportunity to comment or make factual corrections. No response was received. The Mission’s letters to the Government are in annex 2. II. Mandate, methodology and legal framework A. Mandate 4. Resolution 34/22 mandated the Mission “to establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanm ar, in particular in Rakhine State, including but not limited to arbitrary detention, torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings, enforced disappearances, forced displacement and unl awful destruction of property, with a view to ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims”. In the interpretation of this mandate, the Mission considered the resumption of 5. hostilities in Kachin State and escalation in Shan Stat e in 2011 and the outbreak of major violence in Rakhine State in 2012 as key recent turning points that generated renewed violence and further allegations of serious human rights violations and abuses. The Mission situation in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States since therefore determined that focusing on the 2011 would allow it to fulfil its mandate in a contextualised manner. The Mission selected several significant incidents for in - depth fact - finding, aiming to make findings on specific allegations of human rights violations and abuses while revealing broader patterns of conduct. The Mission considered that the types of violations and abuses listed in the Council 6. s resolution were illustrative, and that it was mandated to consider the full range of violation 6

7 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 of international law as appropriate. In line with the Council’s request to examine alleged human rights violations and abuses, the Mission decided to examine allegations against both State actors. Finally, considering the objective of the m andate (“with a view to State and non - ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims”), the Mission endeavoured to identify perpetrators, as well as to make findings about responsibility and recommendations on accountability. 7. The Mission notes with concern that allegations of human rights violations and abuses - occurring in other parts of Myanmar also merit in - finding. Time and resource depth fact constraints led the Mission to limit itself to Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States, particularly in t of the events that unfolded since August 2017 that required significant attention. The ligh Mission is comfortable, however, that its geographic, temporal and subject matter focus allowed for solid overall findings and recommendations. B. Methodology 8. The Mission was acutely aware of the complexity and sensitivity of the situation it was mandated to examine, as well as of allegations from all sides that the spread of false information about events has been commonplace. This awareness reinforced its commitme nt - to meticulously follow established methodologies and best practices for human rights fact finding, as developed by the United Nations. In doing so, the Mission strictly adhered to the principles of “do no harm”, independence, impartiality, objectivity, transparency and integrity. 9. In particular, the Mission followed the best practices established for commissions of inquiry and fact - finding missions, outlined in the 2015 OHCHR publication, International Commissions of Inquiry and Fact Finding Missions on International Human Rights Law and - 1 – Guidance and Practice. International Humanitarian Law 1. Standard of proof finding bodies, the Mission - Consistent with the practice of United Nations fact 10. employed the “reasonable grounds” standard in making fa ctual determinations on individual cases, incidents and patterns of conduct. The standard was considered met when a sufficient and reliable body of primary information, consistent with other information, would allow an ly conclude that a case, incident or pattern of conduct ordinarily prudent person to reasonab occurred. This standard of proof is lower than that required in criminal proceedings. 11. credible Individual cases or incidents contained in the report are based on at least one source of first - hand information, which was independently corroborated by at least one other credible source of information. Specific major incidents, such as those set out in chapter V on Rakhine State , are based on multiple accounts from eyewitnesses and victims, allowing fo r in - depth fact - finding and detailed event reconstruction. Where the report describes patterns of conduct, these are based on multiple credible sources of first - hand information, which are consistent with and corroborated by the overall body of credible in formation collected. In the few instances where this standard was not met, but the Mission still considered it appropriate to include the information, this is stated explicitly. 12. - based violence, where a second in dependent In cases of torture or sexual and gender source of information was often unavailable, the Mission considered the case or incident - hand account which it assessed as credible and was corroborated when it obtained one first consistent with what was known about the incident or the establish ed patterns of similar incidents in the area, and in line with the interviewer’s own observations (for example, scars or signs of trauma) . 13. The Mission considered the following to be sources of first - hand information: • confidential interviews conducted by the Mission or its staff with victims, witnesses, victim’s close family members, perpetrators or former Myanmar officials with direct 1 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf Available at: 7

8 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 knowledge of the issues brought before the Mission, where it was assessed that the source was credible and reliable; s atellite imagery from reliable sources, authenticated video and photo material as well • - hand information from a reliable source; as documents containing first publicly available admissions of relevant facts by Myanmar officials; • • ectives of Myanmar as well as internal Myanmar documents, laws, policies and dir provided that they were received from a credible and reliable source and their authenticity could be confirmed; and statistics, surveys and other quantitative information generated by Myanmar or t he • United Nations, to the extent that the data was based on an apparently sound methodology and the inputs underlying the data were considered originating from a credible and reliable source. 14. corroborate first - hand The Mission relied on the following types of information to information and providing overall context to violations: • confidential interviews conducted by the Mission or its staff with witnesses who received the information directly from a person known to them (and not as a rumour), provided that the Mission assessed the source to be credible and reliable; • summaries of witness accounts contained in publications or in submissions from the United Nations, research institutes and human rights organizations, where the Mission assessed the sourc e to be credible and reliable; • summary descriptions of patterns of conduct contained in expert interviews, public reports, submissions, academic research publications, documentaries and similar materials, where the Mission assessed the source to be credi ble and reliable. hand sources, the Mission endeavoured to interview the - In its assessment of second 15. researcher or author of the publication, submission or text to assess its credibility and the methodology used. each source was carefully assessed. The Mission 16. The reliability and credibility of considered whether the source was trustworthy, consistently probing the veracity of their statements. Such assessment took into account, among other considerations: • the witness’ political and personal inter ests, potential biases and past record of reliability, where known; • the witness’ apparent capacity to recall events correctly, considering his or her age, trauma, how far back the events occurred, and so on; • the position of the witness in relation to t he subject of the information; • where and how the witness obtained the information; • the reasons for which the witness provided the information. 17. - finding work, its The Mission also considered the information’s relevance to the fact consistency and coherence, and its consistency with and corroboration by other internal information, among other factors. Assessment of the validity of the information was separate hat a from the assessment of its reliability and credibility. The Mission did not assume t credible and reliable source would necessarily provide accurate and valid information. 18. Where this report refers to an account of a witness, the Mission has accepted the statement as assessed and described to be truthful and relevant, unless stated otherwise. Direct references to specific witness statements in the report should not be taken as an indication that it was the sole basis of judgment in relation to the issues under analysis. These direct references and citations were included to pr ovide an example or illustration. 2. Collection of information 19. The Mission obtained a vast quantity of primary and secondary information. It - conducted 875 in depth interviews with victims and eyewitnesses. The Mission took care to 8

9 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 s of information. It interviewed individuals from different ethnic and diversify its source 2 religious backgrounds (including Bamar, ethnic Rakhine, Rohingya , Kaman Muslims, Hindus and individuals from Kachin and Shan ethnic groups). It also interviewed a number non - of members of State armed groups, as well as some former officials of Myanmar State institutions. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Government of Myanmar, it was unable 3 to interview any serving government officials or members of its military forces. 20. The M ission used various methodological approaches to select persons for interviews. This included random selection, for example by visiting different areas of a refugee camp or - arrangement. Specifically in relation to the situation in different refugee centres without pre Rakhine State, each visit to southern Bangladesh also prioritised interviews with persons who had most recently arrived from Myanmar to ensure the receipt of “fresh” information. Additionally, the Mission targeted interviewees to corroborate s pecific incidents or patterns. The Mission ensured that it did not rely on any single organization or individual to assist. To the extent possible, the Mission also strove to only speak with persons who had not previously spoken with any other organization or media outlet, and confirmed this ahead of the interview. 21. Nearly 40 per cent of interviewees were female. While the majority of interviews predominantly pertained to the situation in Rakhine State, more than 200 interviews were related to the situat ion in Kachin and Shan States, with further interviews relating to both situations, or to the country as a whole. Interviews were mostly conducted in person, in a safe and private setting and in the presence of a trusted, professional interpreter where req uired. Some interviews were conducted remotely, through secure channels of communication and taking additional precautions to ensure reliability (for example, a visual link or a known and trusted intermediary). 22. The Mission obtained a large body of sat ellite imagery and analysis with the support 4 , of UNOSAT and received a vast amount of documents, photographs and videos – some clandestinely recorded or obtained by the source. It only used those materials that it was able to authenticate. All information was checked against secondary information assessed as credible and reliable, including organizations’ raw data or notes, expert interviews, submissions and open source material. The Mission’s internal expertise included human rights and law, sexual and ge nder - based violence, psychology and child psychology, military affairs and forensics, and specialist advice was sought in digital verification. 23. To collect information, the Mission members travelled to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Requests to visit China and India did not receive a response. Mission members visited the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh) at the start of the mandate, shortly after the arrival of vast numbers of Rohingya refugees, and once again near the end of the mandate in July 2018 to take stock of the situation prior to the finalization of their report to the Human Rights - n missions betwee Council. The Mission secretariat undertook numerous additional field September 2017 and July 2018, of several weeks at a time, primarily to interview victims and o the unfolding events after 25 August 2017 in Rakhine witnesses. Specifically in relation t sons who had just fled State, a team was deployed immediately to conduct interviews with per Myanmar. The Mission also held over 250 consultations with other stakeholders, including governmental organizations, researchers, and diplomats - – intergovernmental and non in person and remotely. It received written submissions, incl uding through a public call. The Mission further engaged with a number of United Nations entities and other humanitarian actors. It is particularly grateful to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to other United Nations officials and entities that provided relevant 2 The Mission is conscious of the sensitivity concerning the term “Rohingya” in Myanmar, where the group is generally referred to as “Bengali”. The Mission uses the term in line with the concerned group’s right to self - identify. 3 The Mission did, however, undertake an extensive analysis of public statements made by government and military officials. 4 UNOSAT is the Operational Satellite Applications Programme of the United Nati ons Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). 9

10 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 information and support. It regrets that a number of United Nations entities did not provide similar support. 24. - The Mission further regrets that it was not able to visit Myanmar and undertake in country fact - finding. The Mission was nevertheless able to gather the information necessary to establish facts and draw conclusions in accordance with its mandate. As is apparent from the preceding paragraphs, the Mission accessed a large volume and wide variety of sou rces, mostly outside but also inside the country. Importantly, it had access to victims and eyewitnesses who left Myanmar throughout the period under review, including very recently. Moreover, considering the severe risk of intimidation and reprisals again st individuals who engage with independent human rights bodies (see below) and the restrictions imposed on other international actors operating inside Myanmar, the Mission is convinced that access to the country would not necessarily have generated more re liable or valid information. The Mission is confident that it spoke with victims and witnesses in a safe environment, where they could speak freely and without fear of reprisals. 25. ceived from a The Mission expresses its deep gratitude for the invaluable support it re number of non - governmental organizations and all the persons who agreed to be interviewed. Their dedication to the betterment of the human rights situation in Myanmar is truly . admirable 3. Protection of victims and witnesses 26. The Mission paid specific attention to the protection of victims and witnesses. Its initial protection assessment indicated that persons who speak out about the human rights situation in the country and who engage with United Nations mechanisms have been subject eprisals. The Mission was therefore extremely cautious in all interactions with victims to r and witnesses, making constant assessments of the need to establish contact with persons protocols to who may be placed at risk as a result. The Mission established strict security guide these interactions and to ensure that they were conducted through means to mitigate the risks. Contacts were not pursued if the Mission could not ensure the safety of the h, or if the Mission did not cooperating person, if the risk of harm was assessed to be too hig have sufficient information to make an informed determination on the level of risk. In line with this policy, the Mission has not pursued multiple leads. The most significant challenge for the Mission therefore arose from t he fear of 27. reprisals. For the Myanmar population, this fear is well founded. The Mission received information and verified incidents of reprisals against persons who have interacted with international actors. Numerous potential witnesses were afraid to spe ak with the Mission, even on a confidential basis, because they feared for the repercussions on themselves or family members. The Mission did not pressure anyone to speak with it. 28. Many international actors operating in Myanmar, including aid workers, j ournalists, diplomats and other foreign visitors to Myanmar, were also unwilling to share knowledge and information with the Mission from fear that this would negatively affect their access if it became known to the Myanmar authorities that they had cooper ated with the Mission. The Mission is gravely concerned at the intimidation and threats faced by Myanmar 29. nationals cooperating with Human Rights Council mechanisms mandated to examine the situation in Myanmar. It urges Myanmar to guarantee the protecti on of victims and witnesses, and everybody who engages with the Mission and with other international human rights mechanisms, and to undertake that no one shall suffer harassment, threats, intimidation, ill - use of such contact. treatment, arrest or other forms of reprisal beca 4. Storage of information 30. A secure, confidential electronic database was created to enable the Mission to securely record and store information. It contains the summary records of all interviews and lectronic copies of relevant materials collected. As a fully meetings conducted as well as e searchable tool, the database facilitated the organization and retrieval of information for analysis and report writing. 10

11 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The Mission systematically sought the informed and specific consent of all 31. interviewees to use and/or share the information given, ensuring confidentiality as appropriate. The consent of every person interviewed and any conditions attached to it were recorded in the database, as were any potential protection risks. The d atabase will be kept as part of the Mission’s archives, along with all its physical 32. records and in line with United Nations requirements regarding the archiving of materials. cess to The OHCHR will be the custodian of these archives. It is authorised to provide ac competent authorities carrying out credible investigations to ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar in line with international norms and standards. Access will be be granted to information only in accordance with t he terms of the sources’ informed consent and only after any protection concerns are duly addressed . C. Legal Framework 33. Facts were assessed in light of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, as a pplicable in Myanmar. The Mission also considered the human rights guarantees under the domestic law of Myanmar . International human rights law 1. 34. Myanmar is bound by the United Nations Charter and the pledge to take action for the achievement of “uni versal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 5 freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. Regardless of the extent to which States have ratified specific human rights treaties, they must respect inte rnationally recognised human rights. Human rights are not limited to citizens of the State, but must be guaranteed to all individuals within the territory or jurisdiction of the State, 6 irrespective of their nationality or lack thereof. pe of Myanmar’s The content and sco international human rights obligations are articulated in treaties ratified by Myanmar, in customary international law and in various instruments of soft law. (a) Treaty Law 35. As of August 2018, Myanmar has ratified four of the core Unit ed Nations human rights treaties: the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol - SC); the thereto on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC - OP ion against Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminat the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); and the International 7 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC). In doing so, Myanmar consented to be bound by the obligations articulated in these treaties and accepted that 8 domestic laws and practice cannot be invoked to justify a failure to comply. It agreed to engage with the United Nations treaty bodies established to monitor the implementation of the treaties and to duly consider their finding s and recommendations. Myanmar has also 9 indicated that it is actively considering acceding to other core human rights treaties. 5 United Nations Charter, arts. 55(c) and 56 . 6 Only a limited number of rights can be limited to citizens, under strict conditions ( see para. 68 ation to Treaty to Custom to below). B. Ramcharan, “The Law - Making Process: From Declar The Oxford Handbook on International Human Rights Law, Prevention”, in Shelton ed. (Oxford, D. Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 511; D. Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non - Citizens (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). See also A/HRC/19/43, para. 2. 7 Dates of accession or ratification by Myanmar are: CRC (15 July 1991), CEDAW (22 July 1997), CRPD (7 December 2011), CRC - OP - SC (16 January 2012), ICESC (6 October 2017). Myanmar signed the ICESC on 16 July 2015, meaning that it had to refrain from actions contrary to the object or purpose of the Covenant from that date. 8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27. 9 A/HRC/31/13/Add.1, para. 7. Myanmar has not yet ratified the International Covenant on Civil and tical Rights, and its Second Optional Protocol aiming to the abolition of the death penalty; the Poli Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and its 11

12 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Myanmar is obligated to 36. guarantee children, meaning all persons under the age of 18 years, the rights to life, survival, development and preservation of identity; to be registered at birth and to acquire a nationality; to protection from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury and abuse, including sexual abuse ; to the highest attainable standard of health; to education; and not to be tortured, 10 sentenced to the death penalty nor suffer other cruel or degrading treatment or punishment. Children also enjoy the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and 11 Children belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic association, and freedom of religion. minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 12 and to use their own language. Under the CRC, gover nments must do everything they can 13 Importantly, the CRC puts to protect and care for children affected by armed conflicts. States parties under an explicit obligation to respect and ensure these rights to each child within their jurisdiction without discr imination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or their parents’ or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 14 national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. 37. he Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination As a party to t against Women, Myanmar is committed to undertake measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, including by abolishing discriminatory laws and ensuring the elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises. Violence against women and girls, including sexual and gender based violence, is a form of - 15 discrimination prohibited by the Convention and is a violation of human rights. The oblig ations of States parties do not cease in periods of armed conflict or in states of emergency resulting from political events or natural disasters, and they apply without 16 - citizens, including stateless persons. discrimination to both citizens and non States parties have a due diligence obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish acts of sexual 17 and gender - based violence. 38. Under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, States parties undertake to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of 18 disability. Persons with disabilities include those who have long - term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder 19 their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 39. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires State parties to undertake s teps, to the maximum of their available resources, with a view to rsons from Enforced Disappearance; Optional Protocol; the Convention for the Protection of All Pe the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. It has signed, but not yet ratified, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (28 September 2015). Myanmar has also not accepted any of the individual complaints procedures under these conventions. 10 CRC, arts. 1, 4, 6, 7, 19, 24, 28, 34, 37. 11 CRC, arts. 13 - 15. 12 CRC, art. 30. 13 38(4). CRC, art. 14 CRC, art. 2. 15 “General United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (CEDAW/C/GC/28), para. 9; “General recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post - conflict (CEDAW/C/GC/3 situations” “General recommendation No. 35 on gender - based 0), para. 34; violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19” (CEDAW/C/GC/35), para. 21. 16 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation N - 12. o. 28, para. 11 17 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General E.g. United Nations Recommendation No. 30, para. 15, 23. 18 CRPD, art. 4. 19 1. CRPD, art. 12

13 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. These include the right to work, the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, the right to form trade unions, the right to social security, the right to adequate standard of living including adequate food, clothing and housing, the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to education, and the right - nationals, such as to take part in cultural life. These rights apply to everyone including non 20 Complaints of violations stateless persons, regardless of legal status and documentation. should be promptly, impartially, and independ ently investigated and adjudicated, providing 21 the complainant access to an effective remedy where appropriate. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights further considers that the Covenant ive approach to eliminating systemic discrimination and requires States parties to adopt an act segregation in practice: Tackling such discrimination will usually require a comprehensive approach with a range of laws, policies and programmes, including temporary special measures. States parties should consider using incentives to encourage public and private actors to change their attitudes and behaviour in relation to individuals and groups of individuals facing systemic discrimination, or penalize them in case of non - compliance. Public leadersh ip and programmes to raise awareness about systemic discrimination and the adoption of strict measures against incitement to discrimination are often necessary. Eliminating systemic discrimination will frequently require devoting greater resources to tradi tionally neglected groups. Given the persistent hostility towards some groups, particular attention will need to be given to ensuring that laws and policies are implemented by officials and others in 22 . practice 40. ions human rights treaties, Myanmar is also In addition to these four core United Nat a party to a number of other international conventions that are relevant to the protection of human rights. They include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (obliging Myanmar to prevent and punish the crime of genocide) and the International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) (obliging Myanmar to suppress the use n all its forms within the shortest possible period, and to take of forced or compulsory labour i immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst 23 forms of child labour as a matter of urgency). (b) Customary international human rights law 41. On 10 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), with Myanmar voting in favour. Although the UDHR was not intended at the time to be a legally binding document, it is generally considered as uthoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions in the (binding) United Nations an a Charter. The UDHR is considered a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and 24 and it sets out the fundamental human rights that are to be unive rsally protected. all nations” are reflective of – It is accepted that many of its provisions – if not the entire document 25 customary international law. This means that States are bound by the norms captured in these provisions, regardless of whether they are codified in a binding treaty and ratified by the State concerned. 20 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United Nations “Ge neral Comment No. 20: Non - discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights” (E/C.12/GC/20), para. 30. 21 Ibid. para. 40. 22 Ibid. para. 39. 23 Dates of accession or ratification by Myanmar are: Genocide Convention (14 March 1956), Forced Labour Conve ntion (4 March 1955), Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (18 December 2013). 24 UDHR, Preamble. 25 See H. Hannum, “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparat ive Law , vol. 25 (1995/6) 287 - nd 397; O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law , 2 ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University 63 (and references listed there). Press, 2014), p. 13

14 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 26 Specific relevant examples of these norms are the right to life and the right to 42. 27 - discrimination is set equality and the prohibition of discrimination. The principle of non out in article 55(c) of the United Nations Charter and further detailed in article 2 of the latter provision states that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set UDHR. The nguage, forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, la religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. Article 7 of the UDHR further stipulates that “[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”. At its first session, the General Assembly declared that it was in the higher interests of humanity to put an immediate end to religious and racial persecution and discrimination, suggesting these were contrary to the 28 Non - discrimination and equality are also fundamental, letter and spirit of the Charter . crosscutting norms in all major international and regional human rights treaties and texts. - discrimination underpin the entire human rights system. The principles of equality and non Some human r ights provisions have not only attained the status of customary 43. jus international law but are also considered peremptory norms of international law, or cogens . This means that these norms are accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation or limitation is 29 permitted. While there is no exhaustive list of recognised peremptory norms, it is commonly accepted that these include the prohibitions of the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, enforce d disappearance, slavery and forced labour, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination and apartheid, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 30 (including hostilities directed at a civilian population). (c) Other instruments 44. In addition to the human rights norms articulated in treaties, a range of other instruments assist in understanding and delineating human rights obligations of States, even if these texts are not binding as such. These include, for example, the Declara tion on the 31 Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearances , the Guiding Principles on Internal 33 32 , the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners , the Body of Displacement 34 , Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detent ion or Imprisonment 26 nd International Human Rights Law (2 N. Rodley, “Integrity of the Person”, in ed.), D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran, eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 185. 27 - At minimum on the grounds of race, religion and sex. See D. Moeckli, “Equality and Non nd Discrimination”, (2 International Human Rights Law ed.), D. Moe ckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. - 160 eds. 161. T he International Court of Justice has erga omnes : ICJ, described the prohibition on racial and ethnic discrimination as an obligation Barcelona Traction (Belgium v . Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970. 28 A/RES/103(I). 29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53. 30 International Human Rights Law See N. Rodley, “Integrity of the Person”, in (2nd ed.), D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran , eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 185; ICJ, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) , Judgment of 20 July 2012, Why the Prohibition of Enforced Disappearance ICJ Reports 2012, para. 99; J. Sarkin, “ Has Attained Jus Cogens Status in International Law”, Nordic Journal of International Law , Vol. 81(4), 2012, pp. - 537 584; International Law Commission, “Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversi fication and Expansion of International Law” A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), para. 374; E. De Wet, “Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes”, in The Oxford Handbook on International Human Rights Law , Dinah Shelton ed. (Oxford, Oxford p. 543 - University Press, 2013), p 547; M.C. Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes”, Law and Contemporary Problems , vol. 59(4), 1996, p. 68. 31 Declaration on the Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearances, adopted by General resolution 47/133, 18 December 1992. Assembly 32 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2). 33 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were initially adopted by the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955, and approved by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1957. On 17 December 2015, a revised version was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly (A/RES/70/175). 34 Adopted by General Assembly r esolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988. 14

15 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through 35 Action to Combat Impunity , and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to ational Human Rights Law Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Intern 36 and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. In November 2012, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Myanmar, he controversy unanimously adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights. Despite t surrounding its drafting process and the narrow formulation of some of its provisions in 37 comparison with international norms and standards , it remains a useful instrument to further tates themselves accept as delineate the human rights obligations that ASEAN member S binding on them. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 45. Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities is one of the main reference documents for 38 It recognises that per sons belonging to minorities have the right to the minority rights. protection by states of their existence and their national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity (art. 1), the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their and to use their own language in private and in public (art. 2.1), the right to own religion, participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life (art. 2.2), the right to participate effectively in decisions which affect them on the nationa l and regional levels (art. 2.3), the right to establish and maintain their own associations (art. 2.4), and the freedom to exercise their rights, individually as well as in community with other members of their group, without discrimination (art. 3). Stat es are also to protect and promote the rights of persons belonging to minorities by taking measures to ensure that they may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality befor e the law (art. 4.1). In its 2005 Commentary, the United Nations Working Group on Minorities observed that “minority protection is based on four requirements: protection of the existence, non - exclusion, non - discrimination and non - 39 assimilation of the groups concerned”. 46. The 1979 United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms for Law Enforcement Officials 40 provide guidance to States on the use of force and firearms by any law enfo rcement official. The Code of Conduct stipulates in article 3 that law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty. The Basic mine the lawfulness of use of force by law Principles set out the core parameters to deter enforcement personnel and establish standards for accountability and review. Any use of force by law enforcement officials should be in accordance with the principles of legality, d necessity, proportionality, non - iscrimination, precaution, and accountability. These instruments, and in particular the provisions regarding the use of force in relation to the right 35 Recognised in a consensus resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2005 (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1). 36 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005. 37 See e.g. M. Davies, “An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs , vol. - 129; A. Bloed and N. Girard, “ASEAN – Background and Human Rights 33(3), 2014, 107 Mechanism s”, in The United Nations Declaration on Minorities – an Academic Account on the th Occasion of its 20 Anniversary (1992 - 2012), U. Caruso and R. Hofmann, eds. (Leiden, Brill/Nijhoff, 2015), pp. 311 - 313. 38 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 (18 D ecember 1992). 39 E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, para. 23. 40 The Code of Conduct was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979, and the Basic Principles were th adopted at the 8 United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1990. On 18 December 1990, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 45/166 welcoming the Principles and inviting States to respect them. 15

16 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 41 to life and physical integrity, are generally considered authoritative. States must investigate 42 of lethal force by their agents. the use Responsibility (d) States are the primary duty holders of international human rights obligations, whether 47. assumed through ratification of human rights treaties or acquired by virtue of applicable international customa ry law. States can be held responsible for human rights violations committed by their organs (for example, legislative or executive branch) or by their agents 43 (for example, civil servants, the police, the army). States have the duty to respect, protect d fulfil human rights. The duty to means that States themselves must refrain from an respect interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights, including through their servants protect , States must actively ensure that persons within their or agents. Under the duty to jurisdiction do not suffer from human rights abuse committed by others. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take action to facilitate and enhance the enjoyment of human rights. This has been understood to include not only t he adoption of appropriate laws, but 44 also “judicial, administrative and educative and other appropriate measures”. Inherent in these duties is a State’s obligation to ensure that individuals have 48. 45 accessible and effective remedies. States have a duty to investigate and prosecute gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, in particular those that amount to crimes under international law (in nd genocide), and to provide an effective particular war crimes, crimes against humanity a remedy. States’ investigations into allegations must be carried out by independent and 46 impartial bodies and be prompt, thorough and effective. The Mission concurs with the view that, in addition to the State, some non - State actors 49. have human rights obligations under customary international law, in particular when they exercise effective control over territory and carry out government - like functions. They are obliged to respect human rights norms when their cond uct affects the human rights of the 47 individuals under their control. This is particularly so for peremptory norms of international law . 2. International humanitarian law 50. International humanitarian law is the body of law that regulates the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. In situations of armed conflict, it applies concurrently with international international armed conflicts existed in Myanmar during the human rights law. Several non - period under review. 41 See OHCHR and Un ited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Resource book on the use of force and 7 and references there. firearms in law enforcement” (New York, United Nations, 2017), p. 42 See e.g. the United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra - Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989 by the Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65, paras. 9, 10, 17. 43 See c hapter IX, Responsibility. 44 For an overview of these concepts, see F. Mégret, “Nature of Obligations”, in International Human nd Rights Law (2 ed.), D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran, eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 102 - 103. 45 - Making Proce ss: From Declaration to Treaty to Custom to Prevention”, in B. Ramcharan, “The Law Shelton ed. (Oxford, Oxford , D. The Oxford Handbook on International Human Rights Law 512. University Press, 2013), p. 46 See chapter X, Impunity and accountability. 47 E.g. A/HRC/8/17, para. 9; A /HRC/10/22, para. 22; A/HRC/12/48, para. 305. See also e.g. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimi nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (CEDAW/C/GC/28) , para. 11: “ Under international human rights law, although non - State actors cannot become parties to the Convention, the Committee notes that, under certain circumstances, in particular w here an armed group with an State identifiable political structure exercises significant control over territory and population, non - actors are obliged to respect international human rights.” 16

17 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 A non 51. exists “whenever there is protracted armed - international armed conflict violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 48 This definition is widely accepted and is understood to encompass groups within a State”. two cumulative criteria, which distin international armed conflict from internal guish a non - tensions or disturbances: the intensity of the armed violence and the level of organization of the armed group(s) involved. Assessing whether these criteria are met in a particular situation is a factu al matter to be decided on a case - by - case basis. In their jurisprudence, the United ad hoc international tribunals have, for each of the two criteria, articulated a number Nations 49 of indicators. (a) Kachin and Shan States The Mission is satisfied that these two criteria are fulfilled for the conflicts between 52. the Shan the Government forces, on the one hand, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), 50 51 – South (SSA - S ), the Ta’ang National the Shan State Army – North (SSA - N ), State Army 52 the Arakan Army (AA), and the Myanmar National Democratic (TNLA), Liberation Army Alliance Army (MNDAA), on the other hand. This was the case for the period under review in this report. , These non - State armed groups 53. in Myanmar referred to as “ethnic armed 53 - organizatio are long ns”, established and, although they each have their own characteristics, they all have a clear leadership and command structure; headquarters; regular recruitment efforts and training; uniforms; a demonstrated ability to procure arms; an ability to plan, 54 coordinate and carry out military operations (jointly or separately); and an ability to exercise some level of territorial control in their respective operational areas. These elements all confirm a level of organization sufficient to consider th em party to an armed conflict. The hostilities between each of these groups and the Government forces have also reached the required level of intensity: clashes have occurred at regular intervals over a long period of eaponry and landmines, as well as military aircraft, time; have involved the use of heavy w attack helicopters and heavy artillery; are often marked by extensive destruction of property and displacement, resulting in casualties; and lead to shifting frontlines and control over territory. 48 Prosecutor v Tadic , IT - 94 - 1 - AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal ICTY, on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70. 49 Indicators relevant to an assessment of the intensity of violence include, for example, the number of incidents and the level, length and duration of the violence; the de aths, injuries, and damage caused by the violence; the geographical spread of the violence; the mobilization of individuals and the distribution of weapons to them; the weapons used by the parties; the conclusion of ceasefire and peace agreements; and the involvement of third parties, whether the UN Security Council or other outside entities. indicators that may assist in assessing the requisite level of organization of the armed group have been grouped into those that indicate a command structure; that sug gest that the group can carry out organized military operations; that indicate logistical ability; that relate to the implementation of obligations of international humanitarian law; and that demonstrate the ability to 49 Specific speak with a unified voice. indicators include the existence of an official command structure; headquarters; uniforms; discrete roles and responsibilities of differing entities; the modes of relations communication used; whether military training is afforded to members of the group; external such as negotiations with third parties; the ability to operate within designated zones; control of territory; procure, transport and distribute arms; recruit new members; ability to co - ordinate actions; and the existence of internal regulations and disciplinary procedures. See S. Sivukumaran, “The Law - International Armed Conflict” (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 167 - 172. of Non 50 Armed wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). 51 Armed wing of the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP). 52 Armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF). 53 - This report uses the term “ethnic armed organization” when referring to non State armed groups operating in northern Myanmar (Kachin and Shan States) in opposition to the Governme nt. The term “non - State armed group” ordinarily refers to such organizations, as well as other armed actors operating in these and other states (e.g. militia groups, or ARSA in Rakhine State). 54 lliance”, which has engaged in E.g. the KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA have formed the “Northern A joint operations against the Myanmar military. 17

18 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 e Mission is also satisfied that the violence between the SSA - S/RCSS and the 54. Th TNLA amounts to a separate non - international armed conflict, since at least November 2015. (b) Rakhine State 55. te, involving the A more difficult question was whether the violence in Rakhine Sta 55 and the Myanmar government forces, amounted Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) - international armed conflict at any point in time. ARSA is commonly regarded as a to a non poorly armed and poorly trained group, with a small number of pa rtly trained members but principally relying on untrained villagers to conduct attacks with sticks and knives. In comparison with the long - standing and well - armed non - State armed groups active in northern Myanmar, ARSA’s level of organization and military capacity appears more limited. 56. However, the situation must be assessed on the facts, based on the information that 56 finding work. emerged during the Mission’s fact - The Mission considered the following elements as pointing at a certain level of organiza tion within ARSA: a command structure allowing instructions to pass from decision makers to members and supporters at ground level, who complied with them; an ability to coordinate between an operational group in Rakhine State and groups based abroad; an a bility to stage coordinated or simultaneous attacks across different locations in a tightly - controlled environment; an ability to mobilise widely among the Rohingya community at the time of attacks; the organization of village roles and responsibilities; an ability to provide at least a core cells according to different group of members with some military training and others with basic defence training, albeit limited; an ability to obtain some firearms and produce some improvised explosive devices and othe r hand - made weapons; an ability to articulate and communicate its positions and demands in a seemingly unified manner; and at least a stated willingness to abide by international law. On the other hand, the Mission also found elements that point towards th e opposite view, chiefly ARSA’s apparent inability to raise significant funds and to procure and distribute firearms or other weaponry, and an overwhelming majority of those who participated in the attacks not having had any meaningful military training. 57. On balance, considering that international jurisprudence and legal scholarship emphasize that “some degree of organization will suffice” and that the requisite level of 57 the Mission considered that ARSA meets t he organization “should not be exaggerated”, requisite threshold of organization. The main factor that swayed the Mission was ARSA’s ability to stage up to 30 coordinated attacks on Government security posts in August 2017 (although some of these attacks were very limited in scale) in a tightly co ntrolled environment and despite the earlier “clearance operations” of the Myanmar security operations following the October 2016 ARSA attacks. 58. The second criterion, the intensity of the violence, cannot be in doubt, especially since August 2017. The number of incidents, the geographic spread of the violence, the military equipment and weaponry brought in and used during the operations, the duration of the security operations, the number of casualties and injuries, and the extent of the destruction cau sed, are of a nature and scale that cannot be regarded as a mere internal disturbance. The question of whether the use of such tactics by the Myanmar security forces was warranted, appropriate and commensurate with the threat faced is valid, and will be di scussed in this report, but has no bearing on the factual determination of the intensity of the violence itself. In this regard, the Mission also notes that ARSA was involved in multiple attacks on mants and the burning of at least one Myanmar security posts, as well as in the killing of infor 58 village. 55 The name “ARSA” came into existence only later, but is used for ease of reference. 56 See chapter V, section D.1.c. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, for a full overview of ARSA based on the information obtained by the Mission. 57 See S. Sivukumaran, “The Law of Non - International Armed Conflict” (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 170 and the references listed there. E.g. ICTY, Prosecutor v Limaj et al., IT - 03 - 66 - T, Judgm ent, 30 November 2005, para. 89. 58 . See chapter V, section D.1.c. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 18

19 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The Mission therefore has reasonable grounds to consider that the conflict between 59. international armed conflict - the Myanmar government forces and ARSA amounts to a non 59 The Mission consequently examined the use of force in the at least since 25 August 2017. context of the August 2017 attacks and the resulting allegations of human rights violations and abuses in light not only of the relevant rules of international human rights law but also of international humanitarian law. Applicable rules of international humanitarian law (c) 60 It is also a 60. Myanmar is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 61 party to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons , the 1993 62 Convention pr , as well as to the Hague Convention and ohibiting Chemical Weapons 63 Additionally, all parties to non - Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property. international armed conflicts in Myanmar are bound by the relevant rules of customary applicable in such conflicts. international law 61. Of particular relevance is common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This article contains protections for civilians and other persons not taking direct part in hostilities. It obliges all parties to respect, as a minimu m, that persons taking no active part in hostilities shall be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It prohibits violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, taking of hostages, outra ges upon personal dignity as well as the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, respecting the generally recognized principles of fair trial and due process. Furthermor e, parties to armed conflicts must, at all times, abide by the principles of distinction, 64 This means that parties must distinguish between proportionality and precautions in attack. 65 s, on the other. civilian persons and objects, on the one hand, and lawful military target Attacks are prohibited where they are expected to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 66 relation to the concrete and direct military advantage Parties must also take all anticipated. feasible precautionary measures to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of 67 civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 62. Myanmar is responsible for all violations of international humanitarian law committed 68 by its armed forces or those acting under its direction or control. International criminal law 3. 63. In its efforts to appropriately characterize the human rights violations and abuses it established, the Mission has had regard to international criminal law. This body of law governs the situations in which individuals can be held individually criminally responsible for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international itarian law that amount to crimes under international law. The principal crimes human considered by the Mission were genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In doing 59 The Mission notes that this conclusion is in line with public statements made by the International Committee of the Red Cross. See e.g. “Rakhine: Returns must be safe, dignified and voluntary - Speech by the ICRC President at the Shangri La Dialogue”, Singapore, 2 June 2018. - 60 Since 25 August 1992. Myanmar has not ratified the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions. 61 Since 1 December 20 14. 62 Since 8 July 2015. 63 Since 10 February 1956. 64 Beck, “Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald - Rules” (Cambridge, ICRC/Cambridge University P - 24. (here after ress, 2005), rules 1 ICRC/Customary IHL”). 65 Ibid. rule 7. 66 Ibid. rule 14. 67 Ibid. rules 15 - 24. 68 Ibid. rule. 149; International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility (General Assembly 8. resolution 56/83), art. 19

20 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 revention so, the Mission referred to the definitions of these crimes in the Convention on the P and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and customary international law, as well as the interpretation of these definitions in the 69 jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. 64. As mentioned above, the prohibitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes amount to peremptory norms of international law ( jus cogens), meaning that no derogation from the rule is allowed. The recognition of a crime under international law as j us cogens gives rise to a duty of the State to prosecute and punish perpetrators, the non - applicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes, and the universality of jurisdiction over 70 ainst whom. such crimes regardless of where they were committed, by whom, or ag Moreover, under various sources of international law and under United Nations policy, amnesties are impermissible if they prevent prosecution of individuals who may be criminally responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or other gross violations of 71 human rights. 4. Domestic law 65. Where relevant, the Mission also considered human rights guarantees under Myanmar’s domestic law, in particular the 2008 Constitution and the Penal Code, and the extent to which these are in li ne with international human rights norms and standards. (a) Constitutions of the Union of the Republic of Myanmar of 2008 The 2008 Constitution of Myanmar, in its Chapter VIII (“Citizen, Fundamental Rights 66. and Duties of the Citizens”), guarantees a nu mber of human rights, including the right to equality and non - discrimination, the right to life, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement, the right to privacy, the right to education, the right to he alth care, and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. These constitutional human rights provisions are problematic for at least two reasons: most are reserved for “citizens” only, and several are accompanied by broad and often impermissible qualific ations or limitations. In addition some fundamental human rights are absent from the list (for example, the prohibition of torture). 67. Section 21 of the Constitution provides that “every citizen” shall enjoy the rights to equality, liberty and justice. S ection 348 further elaborates that the Union “shall not discriminate any citizen of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar based on race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth”. Other examples of rights limited to “citizens” are the rights to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful 72 assembly and association, freedom of movement, privacy, education and health care. In light of the arbitrary deprivation of nationality of a large segment of the population (in 73 particular the Rohingya), resulting in their statelessness, de facto these constitutional 74 provisions exclude large segments of the population from basic human rights protection. The Mission recalls that every person, by virtue of their humanity, is 68. entitled to enjoy all human rights. Under international human rights law, the State is – as a matter of principle – under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all persons within its territory or under its jurisdiction, without d iscrimination. Distinctions between citizens and non - citizens can only be made if they serve a legitimate State objective and are proportional 69 See chapter VIII. Crimes under international law. 70 E.g. M.C. Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes”, Law and , vol. Contemporary Problems 59(4), 1996, p. 66. 71 Conflict States: Amnesties See e.g. OHCHR, Rule - of - Law Tools for Post - (New York and Geneva, 11 . United Nations, 2009), p. 72 Constitution of Myanmar, sections 34, 354, 355, 357, 366 and 367. 73 See chapter V, section B.1. Denial of legal status and identity. 74 Note, however, section 347 of the Constitution, which provides that the Union “shall guarantee any person to enjoy equal rights before the law and shall equally provide legal protection”, which appears (emphasis added). in contradiction with the provisions limiting certain rights to citizens 20

21 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 75 States may, for example, narrowly draw a distinction to the achievement of that objective. with respect to polit ical rights (such as the right to vote or stand for election) and freedom of 76 movement (limited to those who are “lawfully within the territory of a State”). Any other citizens is in violation of international human rig hts distinction between citizens and non - 77 Importantly, any limitation to the enjoyment of human rights to nationals must meet law. 78 discrimination. stringent conditions to comply with the principle of non The denial of - human rights cannot be based on an arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Second, the Constitution of Myanmar includes significant limitations on several 69. fundamental rights, often on vague or impermissible grounds. Section 34, for example, provides for the freedom of religion for every “citizen” (freedom of conscience and th e right to freely profess and practise religion), but subjects this to “public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Constitution”. Section 360(b) then expressly states that the ate from “enacting law for the purpose freedom of religious practice shall not prevent the St of public welfare and reform”. Similarly, the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association are guaranteed for every “citizen” but only if “not contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquillity or public 79 order and morality” and artistic expression is guaranteed if “not detrimental to national 80 solidarity”. Whereas international human rights law permits limitations on certain human ust be determined by law, be necessary in a democratic society and meet the rights, they m strict tests of necessity and proportionality. Broad and vague terms such as “public welfare and reform”, “tranquillity” and “solidarity” open the door for abuse . (b) Penal Code 7 0. Myanmar’s Penal Code criminalizes certain acts that could constitute violations or abuses of human rights. Such provisions include those concerning homicide and murder (section 299 and following), torture (section 330 331), rape (section 375 and followi ng), - kidnapping, abduction, slavery, and forced labour (section 359 and following), and the defiling of places of worship (section 299 and following). However, the Penal Code dates from 1891 and has seen minimal amendments since then. Several of its provis ions are too 81 narrow and inconsistent with international norms and standards , and others are too broad and used oppressively . III. Context Military domination in politics A. 1. History of military rule Myanmar’s political history has been heavily - powerful military, 71. dominated by an all known as the Myanmar “Tatmadaw”, which has ruled the country for most of its existence. Myanmar (then still Burma) was already under heavy military influence during the 1950s but it was a parliamentary democracy until the military coup of General Ne Win in 1962. General Ne Win argued that a military take - over was necessary to protect the territorial integrity of 75 D. Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non - Citizens (Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press, 2008), p. 45 The Rights of Non - Citizens (and references there); OHCHR, (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2006), p. 7. 76 See ICCPR, arts. 12(1) and 25. 77 See also A/HRC/19/43 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23 78 See A/HRC/19/43, para. 4; Unite d Nations Human Rights Committee, “CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant” , paras. 2 and 7. 79 Constitution of Myanmar, Section 354. 80 Constitution of Myanmar, Section 365. 81 S E.g. on rape/sexual violence and on torture and ill - treatment. ee Chapter X. Impunity and accountability. 21

22 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 82 had flared s oon after the country. Insurgencies from “ethnic armed organizations” “in independence and were protest against the centralising and Burmanising tendencies of the Union government, the heavy - handedness of the army, and Prime Minister U Nu’s 83 persistent promotion of Buddhism as the state religion”. The Tatmadaw has used the alleged “ethnic” threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity as the excuse for its control of the country ever since. 72. When the “Union Revolutionary Council”, chaired by Ne Win, took power, it was solely comprised of members of the armed forces and sought to transfo rm Myanmar into a self - sustaining socialist state. It suspended the 1947 Constitution. The regime placed significant restrictions on political and union activities, suppressing demonstrations through military force and arresting political opponents. It als o used military force to attempt to suppress “ethnic” insurgencies. 73. By 1988, there was increasing resentment towards Ne Win’s regime, exacerbated by widespread human rights violations, high levels of corruption and economic mismanagement. Widespread an ti - regime protests took place between March and September 1988, predominantly led by students calling for an end to one - party rule. Military force was used to suppress the demonstrations throughout Myanmar, resulting in thousands of deaths. Ultimately, the se protests led Ne Win to resign as leader of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the Tatmadaw’s vehicle for governing, on 23 July 1988. The sitting President, San Yu, also resigned. A general strike across much of Burma, beginning on 8 August 1988, was a ccompanied by further significant protests attended by hundreds of thousands of people. This became known as the 8888 Uprising. Riot police fired upon protestors, killing and ral wounding thousands. On 18 September 1988, the military, under the command of Gene Saw Maung, replaced the old military regime with a new one. It established the State Law 84 and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and seized control of government operations. With a view to establishing a multi 74. - party system, the SLORC briefly allowed the registration of political parties. Parties registering included the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Major General Aung sinated San, the Burmese independence leader and founder of the Tatmadaw, who was assas in 1947, shortly before independence. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had come to prominence during the 8888 Uprising. However, in 1989, the authorities placed her under house arrest. lar vote and, In the general election of 27 May 1990, the NLD won 60 per cent of the popu 85 under the electoral system in place, 80 per cent of parliamentary seats. The SLORC refused to recognise the result and maintained governmental control, refusing to allow the legislature to assemble. Those who had been elected to parliament e ither were arrested and imprisoned or fled. The 1990s remained a period of tight military control where political dissent was stifled. Throughout the 1990s, Western nations imposed increasingly strong sanctions against Myanmar. In 1997, the military junta changed its name from SLORC to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Following a sharp rise in the cost of basic commodities, at the end of 2006, and the 75. removal of oil and gas subsidies in August 2007, widespread protests occurred in urban areas 86 throughout Myanmar. Buddhist monks played a prominent role, leading to international 82 “Ethnic armed organizations” is a term used in Myanmar to refer to non - State armed groups operating predominantly in northern and eastern Myanmar that maintain political opposition to the State . For example, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015 is “between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the ethnic armed organizations”. This report will use the term as such. 83 first Century” D.C. Williams, “A second Panglong Agreement: Burmese Federalism for the Twenty – in Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar, A. Harding, K.K. Oo, eds. (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017), p. 61 84 D. Steinberg, Myanmar: The Anom alies Of Politics And Economics, The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series - Working Paper #5 (1997). 85 , A. J. Badgley and I. Holliday, “Democracy” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar Simpson, N. Farrelly, I. Holliday eds. (London and New York, R outledge, 2018), p. 38. 86 (BBC News, 2 October 2007). J. Head, “ The hardship that sparked Burma ’ s unrest ” 22

23 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 media referring to the protests as the “Saffron Revolution”. The SPDC used lethal force to 87 disperse the largely peaceful protests, garnering international condemnation. 76. In February 2008, the Government published a proposed new Constitution and announced that it would be subject to a referendum on 10 May 2008. The process had begun r in 2004 after a national convention was convened to work on a draft under Prime Ministe General Khin Nyunt’s “Roadmap to Democracy”. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest and the NLD refused to participate in the national convention. Days before the referendum on the draft, on 2 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis made landfall in Myanmar, causing significant destruction in the Ayeyarwady Region and killing an estimated 138,000 people. The SPDC went ahead with the referendum nonetheless and claimed that more than 90 per 88 A key point of contention concerning cent of the voters had approved the draft constitution. the draft was the continued role of the military in the political process. The draft also provided that the President of Myanmar could not be the spouse or parent of a foreign national, a provision designed to exclude Daw Aung Sang Su u Kyi. The NLD alleged that State authorities had frustrated their efforts to campaign against the draft constitution. It rejected 89 the alleged results, noting significant voting irregularities. 77. y (USDP) won the 2010 The military - backed Union Solidarity and Development Part general election, which was boycotted by the NLD and other pro democracy parties, - objecting to what were perceived as unfair electoral laws. Retired General Thein Sein, the leader of the USDP, became President, taking over from Than S hwe who had led the junta since 1992. At the national level, the Thein Sein Government implemented a number of important 78. reforms, including freeing most political prisoners, relaxing censorship and restrictions on the media, and permitting greater poli tical and labour union activity, including in relation to freedom of assembly and of association. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest shortly after the 2010 elections. After negotiations between President Thein Sein and Daw Aung San - elections and won Suu Kyi, the NLD contested parliamentary by parliamentary seats in April 2012. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi entered parliament as leader of the new NLD group. As a result of the liberalisation, 2011 and 2012 also saw the relaxation of sanctions b y Western States and increased foreign investment. In 2014, efforts to amend the constitution to allow Daw Suu to become President and to reduce the role of the military in governing the country were unsuccessful. vestment, which more than tripled from USD 901 79. The significant increase in foreign in 90 , and the significant levels of foreign aid allocated million in 2010 to USD 3.2 billion in 2016 to Myanmar, with some USD 13.7 billion committed to new projects between 2011 and 2015 (not including Chinese as sistance), demonstrate the high level of international goodwill 91 toward Myanmar following its initial steps toward democratization. This contributed to Myanmar’s economic growth rates of approximately 7 per cent per annum since 2015. litary in government after the 2015 elections 2. The role of the mi In the November 2015 general election, the NLD won a sweeping victory, claiming 80. - military seats in the Assembly of the Union ( Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) , 86 per cent of the non cent of the total number of seats. On 10 March 2016, U Htin which is effectively about 60 per Kyaw and U Henry Van Thio, the chosen candidates of the NLD, became President and Second Vice - President respectively. The military’s candidate, Myint Swe, became First - President. In March 201 8, U Htin Kyaw resigned from the position of President. He Vice was replaced by U Win Myint on 30 March 2018. Constitutionally barred from the position 87 A/HRC/6/14, paras. 27 - 28, 30, 38. 88 A/HRC/8/12, para. 15. 89 A/HRC/8/12, para. 24. 90 World Bank, World Development Indicators database, Myanmar ( http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile& Id=b 450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=MMR ) 91 The Asia Foundation, The contested areas of Myanmar – Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development (2017). 23

24 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 of President, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed to the position of State Counsellor, created for her, on 6 A pril 2016, and acts as the de facto head of the country. The powers of 92 the State Counsellor are not clearly delineated in the law establishing the position. The State Counsellor herself told a news conference just prior to the 2015 elections that, “if we win and 93 the NLD forms a government, I will be above the president. It’s a very simple message.” She has enjoyed overwhelming popular support and moral authority and an absolute majority in both houses of parliament. 81. Despite the elections and the NLD b eing in power, the Government remains a quasi - civilian one at best. The 2008 Constitution was designed by the military to retain its dominant role in politics and governance. It instituted a system of government with military and civilian components. Under the Constitution, 25 per cent of the seats in each house of parliament and in the state and regional assemblies belong to unelected members of the military, who are 94 appointed by the Tatmadaw. This is significant because the Constitution requires 75 per c ent of votes in both houses of parliament for a constitutional amendment to be adopted, giving the Tatmadaw, through its appointed members of parliament, effective veto power. Furthermore, Parliament elects the President from among three proposed candidate s, one nominated by each legislative body and the third by the military appointed members of parliament. This effectively guarantees the Tatmadaw at least one vice - presidential position. Additionally, the Tatmadaw selects candidates for (and effectively co ntrols) three key ministerial posts: Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs. This is sufficient to control the National Defence and Security Council and the entire security apparatus. The Commander - in - Chief of the Tatmadaw, Senior - General Min Aung Hl 82. aing, is the 95 This deviates from the practice in Supreme Commander of all armed forces in Myanmar. most constitutional systems, where the head of state is usually the Supreme Commander to whom the highest - ranking military officers and institutions are subo rdinated. The Constitution also stipulates that the Tatmadaw has the “right to independently administer and 96 adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces”, effectively removing it from any civilian oversight or control. 83. Current or former military officer s occupy p ositions of authority across all branches of government, within the civil service and the judiciary, and in many State - owned 97 enterprises. This is notably so in the powerful General Administration Department (GAD), r state and regional governments and is often the first, which runs the civil service fo 98 The GAD is sometimes only, contact people have with government officials or agencies. responsible for many basic administrative tasks, including registration of births, deaths and marriage, land and property ownership issues and other registration issues, such as livestock. 92 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar – President Office, “President signs State Counsellor Bill into law” (6 April 2016). Copy of the State Counsellor Bill on file with the Mission. 93 ’ A. Marshall, T. McL aughlin, “Myanmar s Suu Kyi says will be above president in new government” (Reuters, 5 November 2015). 94 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 109(b), 141(b) an d 161(d). 95 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 20(c). 96 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 20(b). 97 The major productive sectors are dominated by over 30 State - Owned Enterprises, which are headed by senior members of the military or people closely affiliated with them. They operate in many sectors, from transport to textiles and banking to natural resources. Also, Myanmar holds significant amounts of natural resources. It is, for example, the world’s single largest source of jade. It has been 1990s, the then small - scale industry has been transformed by the military’s alleged that since the moves to grant the right to operate jade mines to government approved companies who are allegedly - owned and operated by the military itself, by individuals that hold senior positi ons in the military, by armed groups with whom ceasefires have been conclude d, or by other officially licens ed enterprises. See: National Resource Governance Institute, State - Owned Economic Enterprise Reform in Myanmar: the Case of Natural Resource Enterpr (2018); Global Witness, Jade: Myanmar’s Big ises State Secret (2015). 98 See Kyi Pyar Chit Saw, M. Arnold, Administering the State in Myanmar – An overview of the General Administration Department (Myanmar Development Resource Institute's Centre for ic and Social Development & The Asia Foundation, 2014). Econom 24

25 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Significantly, it is also responsible for the collection of taxes. The GAD falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs, one of the three ministries controlled by the Tatmadaw . Et B. hnic and religious diversity Ethnic diversity and insurgencies 1. The territory of present - day Myanmar is inhabited by a large number of groups with 84. various ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds. The largest group are the are believed to comprise 60 to 70 per cent of the total population. They are Bamar, who predominantly Buddhist and most live in the central lowlands of the country. Many other live ethnic groups, with their distinct cultures, languages, traditions and sometimes religions, mainly in the peripheral areas, near the borders with Bangladesh, China, India and Thailand. Before Burma gained independence, General Aung San and a number of ethnic leaders agreed, at the Panglong Conference in 1947, on a constitutional framework t hat recognised 99 . The the distinctive identities of minorities and granted them a high degree of autonomy Panglong Agreement has never been implemented. Several of these groups hold deep 85. rooted grievances, struggling for greater autonomy - and an equitabl e sharing of natural resources. Since independence, the incessant ethnically based armed conflicts have been used by the Tatmadaw to justify its power, presenting itself as the guarantor of national unity. While successive Governments have made overtures t owards negotiated peace agreements, hostilities have continued, in recent years building - predominantly in Kachin and Shan States. These conflicts indicate that the nation 100 there is no unifying “Myanmar” national identity, efforts of the military have failed: Buddhist domination has grown, and the Tatmadaw has failed to - resentment against Bamar end the insurgencies by military or negotiated means. Notably, under military rule, the s gradually become the key criterion for membership in the concept of “national races” ha 101 country’s political community, creating a common “other”. The military regime has constructed eight major ethnic groups (Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Bamar, Mon, Rakhine and Shan), broken down furt her into 135 “national races”. There is no scientific basis for this division, which contains both gaps and overlaps. The arbitrary list defines those who they have lived in “belong” in Myanmar; all others, regardless of how many generations onsidered outsiders or immigrants. This includes the Rohingya. According to Myanmar, are c 102 the Tatmadaw, “Despite living among peacocks, crows cannot become peacocks”. - Since 2016, the NLD overnment has led a peace process, the “Union Peace 86. G Conference - Panglong”; sessions have been held in August 2016, May 2017 and 21st Century In the run up to the third July 2018. session in July 2018, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar expressed concern that “ the peace process appears to be losing its “ethnic armed organizations” pointing to a failure by the Government and momentum”, with 103 the Tatmadaw to take steps to earn the trust of stakeholders, and through their blocking of 104 internal consultations by parties to the Conference. Nevertheless, all members of the Fed eral Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee, who had previously not been 99 See 1947 Panglong Agreement (available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.or g/files/ MM_470212_Panglong%20Agreement.pdf ). 100 M. Walton, “Nation - Building” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar , A. Simpson, N. Farrelly, I. Holliday eds. - 403. (London and New York, Routledge, 2018), pp. 393 101 N. Cheesman, “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (2017), 47:3, pp. 461 - 483. 102 Tatmadaw, Directorate of the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, “Myanmar Politics and the Tatmadaw” (2018), p. 115. Hard copy on file with the Mission. 103 A/HRC/37/70, para. 40. 104 . Ibid 25

26 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 invited, were invited to and attended the third session of the Conference. This has been 105 identified as a positive development. Place of Buddhism in society 2. 87. Accordi ng to the 2014 census, 87.9 per cent of the population of Myanmar is 106 Buddhist, 6.2 per cent Christian and 4.3 per cent Muslim. While the Bamar are predominantly Buddhist, many other ethnic groups contain large numbers of non Buddhists. - on recognizes the “special position” of Buddhism in Myanmar, while The 2008 Constituti 107 acknowledging other religions. 88. Buddhism and the Buddhist monkhood have and retain a central place in Myanmar society and are a driving force within the politics of Myanmar. The monkhoo d has acted as a counterpoint where the State is perceived to act against the interests of its people. This is 108 exemplified in the role of the Sangha in opposing colonial rule and, more recently, military rule. Since reforms began in 2011, a vocal comp onent of the monkhood has perceived 89. threats to Buddhist culture and responded through increased nationalist and anti - Muslim rhetoric. Myanmar has witnessed episodes of violence between Buddhists and Muslims ate. The 969 Movement, led by vocal across the country, although mainly in Rakhine St Buddhist monks, was especially forthright in establishing a narrative in which Muslims sought to “take over” Myanmar through the marriage and conversion of Buddhist women. Perceptions around illegal immigration from Bang ladesh and the dominance of local capital by Muslims have also been identified as concerns, notwithstanding that the Muslim population in Myanmar as whole is estimated only at around 4 per cent, and has not 109 drastically increased in recent decades. 90. In 2013, the Sangha prohibited the 969 Movement based on its unauthorised use of Buddhist symbolism. While the authority of the 969 group subsequently waned, its ideology was carried forward, notably through a successor group, the Association for the Prote ction of Race and Religion (known also as “MaBaTha”), established in June 2013 and rising to One of its most prominent and radical leaders is controversial prominence in January 2014. monk Ashin Wirathu. 91. hile international attention focused on the gro up’s anti - Muslim rhetoric, MaBaTha W developed widespread grassroots support for its activities, promotion of cultural values and the provision of essential services, including social care, disaster , education, legal aid relief 105 L. Weng, “All Members of Northern Alliance Invited to Attend Panglong Peace Conference” (The Irrawaddy, 4 July 2018). Previously, only those groups with cea sefire agreements in place had been invited to participate. 106 According to the 2014 Population and Housing Census, the first census undertaken in Myanmar in three decades, the total population of Myanmar is approximately 51.5 million. The census was contr oversial as it only allowed participants to identify as belonging to one of 135 officially recognised ethnic groups (under eight major ethnic races: Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Bamar, Mon, Rakhine and Shan) or as “other”. It did not include “Rohingya” and participants were not allowed to self - identify as such. This led to a significant part of the population in Rakhine State not participating in the count. Widespread fears that the release of data on the ethnic and religious composition of the population wo uld lead to violence, initially led the Government to release the outcome of the census without data on ethnicity and religion. See International Crisis Group, Update Briefing: Counting the Costs: Myanmar’s Problematic Census (2014). 107 nmar, s. 361 - 362. Constitution of Mya 108 Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (MaHaNa) is the Government - appointed body that regulates the Myanmar Buddhist clergy. 109 In 2016, the Government released the census data related to religion. It showed that Buddhism remained the main relig ion in the country, with 87.9 per cent of the participants identifying as Buddhist in 2014, compared to 89.4 per cent in 1983. 2.3 per cent of the enumerated population identified as Muslim, a drop from 3.9 per cent in 1983. However, the census report note d that, assuming that the entirety of the more than 1 million estimated non - enumerated residents of Rakhine State were Muslim, the percentage of Muslims would increase to 4.3 per cent. The number of Christians rose slightly, from 4.9 per cent in 1983 to 6. 2 per cent in 2014. 26

27 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 110 cal level. MaBaTha has thus been perceived to be responsive and dispute resolution at a lo 111 Further, the leadership of the MaBaTha is to local community needs and concerns. comprised of popular members of the monkhood. On 23 May 2017, 92. the Sangha issued a statement declaring that Ma BaTha was not formed in accordance with the Sangha Organization Law and the Sangha Organizational Procedures, that neither the group nor individuals associated with it can use the full Myanmar language name it was using and that all of the organization’s s ignboards across the country 112 On 20 July 2018, the Sangha reportedly banned the Dhamma had to be taken down. 113 Regardless of their Wunthanu Rakkhita Association, the successor of MaBaTha, as well. come accepted in many circles formal status, the narratives spread by these groups have be across Myanmar. C. History of human rights violations 93. Today, the Tatmadaw enjoys considerable popularity among the Bamar - Buddhist majority. The violence, particularly the “Rohingya crisis” in Rakhine State, has been used by the military to reaffirm itself as the protector of a nation under threat and to cement its political role further. This is remarkable considering its appalling human rights record and the long struggle of the democracy movement against its rule. Du 94. the military dictatorship (1962 - 2011), Myanmar was considered one of the ring most repressive countries in Asia. The main concern of the rulers was to maintain power and to attain and preserve “ national unity in the face of ethnic diversity”. Human rights were 114 “subordinate to these imperatives”. In 1997, the then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar observed that “the absence of respect for the rights pertaining to democratic governance is at the root of all the major violations of human rights in Myanmar in so far as this absence implies a structure of power which is autocratic and accountable only to itself, thus inherently resting on the denial and repression o f 115 fundamental rights”. Reports of serious human rights violations were pervasive, affecting the entire spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 1988), reports of serious human rights issues arose - During Ne Win’s rule (1962 95. l argely in two contexts: the suppression of critics and the security forces’ operations against insurgencies in ethnic areas. Types of human rights violations frequently reported included the arbitrary deprivation of life (including through excessive use of force), arbitrary detention and torture, sexual violence, forced labour, violations of land and housing rights (including through mass expulsions), and violations of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Following the violent repression of anti - Government protests in 1988 and the 1990 96. elections, Myanmar became a country of concern at the United Nations. The General Assembly adopted its first resolution on the situation in Myanmar in 1991, noting with concern the “substantive av ailable information indicating a grave human rights situation in 116 Myanmar”. Similar resolutions were adopted most years thereafter. The Commission on Human Rights created the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in 117 Myanmar in 1992. The United Nations Secretary - General appointed a Special Envoy to 110 International Crisis Group, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar (2017). 111 M. Walton, “Misunderstanding Myanmar’s Ma Ba Tha” (Asia Times, 9 July 2017). 112 Ibid. 113 The Irrawaddy, “Nationalists Rally in Yangon to Denounce New Ban on Ma Ba Tha” (13 August 2018). 114 C. Renshaw, “Human rights under the new regime”, in Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017), p p . 215 and 218. , A. Harding, K.K. Oo, eds. 115 E/CN.4/1997/64 , para. 102. 116 A/RES/46/132 117 E/CN.4/RES/1992/58 27

28 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - door briefing Myanmar in 1997. In 2005, the Security Council decided to hold a first, closed on the situation in Myanmar. 97. The four Special Rapporteurs serving between 1992 and 2011 all c oncluded that the patterns of human rights violations they had identified were widespread and systematic and linked to State and military policy. Special Rapporteur Rajsmoor Lallah, in 1998, stated that human rights violations “have been so numerous and co nsistent over the past years as to - and suggest that they are not simply isolated or the acts of individual misbehavior by middle - lower rank officers but are rather the result of policy at the highest level, entailing political 118 Special Rapporteur Tomas Ojea Quintana, in 2010, similarly and legal responsibility”. concluded that, “[g]iven the gross and systematic nature of human rights violations in Myanmar over a period of many years, and the lack of accountability, there is an indication that those human r ights violations are the result of a State policy that involves authorities in the executive, military and judiciary at all levels”. He added that “the possibility exists that some of these human rights violations may entail categories of crimes against hu manity or 119 - All four Special Rapporteurs also noted serious abuses committed by non war crimes”. 120 State armed groups. 98. The Special Rapporteurs identified the following contexts in which these patterns of abuse mainly occurred: suppression of calls for de mocracy and voices critical of the regime; imposition of oppressive measures towards minority groups; security forces’ responses to (ethnic) insurgencies, often directly targeting and impacting on the civilian population; the in ceasefire areas; and the Government and military’s role in military’s continued presence large - scale development projects. Specific types of human rights violations frequently reported included the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and inhuman treatment, forced labour, sexual a nd gender - based violence, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced displacement, restrictions on the freedoms of expression and association, and various oppressive measures policies directed in particular at ethnic and religious minorities. The impact of the regime’s on the realization of economic and social rights was also frequently highlighted. 99. The Special Rapporteurs have often highlighted large - scale internal displacement and significant refugee movements into neighbouring countries, mainly Banglades h and Thailand, as a consequence of armed conflict, human rights abuses and lack of protection. Special Rapporteurs noted that between 1996 and 2010 up to 1 million people had been 121 – displaced, half of them in the eastern part of the country, that in and – for exam ple November 2006 the total number of internally displaced persons who had been forced to leave their homes and had not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society was 122 estimated to be at least 500,000. teurs identified several main The various Special Rappor causes of this displacement: counterinsurgency operations, the practice of forced labour and 123 They emphasized portering, restrictions placed on farmers, and land confiscation policies. 124 paramount to understanding the issue. In 2010, that the role and conduct of the army was Special Rapporteur Quintana stated that humanitarian and human rights groups had documented the destruction and forced relocation of over 3,500 villages and sites in eastern 125 Myanmar since 1996. ted Nations Special Rapporteurs who have held the mandate, as well as other 100. All Uni human rights mechanisms, have expressed grave concern at the situation of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. On 16 October 1992, then Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belie f informed the Government that he had received information that “since late 1989, the Rohingya citizens of Myanmar ... have been subjected to persecution based on their religious beliefs involving extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention, forc ed disappearances, 118 A/53/364, para. 59. 119 Ibid., para. 121. 120 64. E.g. A/65/368, para. 121 See A/HRC/13/48, paras. 61 - 63; for similar figures, A/HRC/4/14, para. 54. 122 A/HRC/4/14, para. 54. 123 E.g. E/CN.4/1997/64; E/CN.4/1999/35. 124 E/CN.4/1997/64; E/CN.4/1999/35; A/HRC/13/48, para. 61 - 63. 125 A/HRC/65/368, para. 49; for similar figures, A/61/369, para. 44 and A/HRC/4/14, para. 54. 28

29 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - intimidation, gang rape, forced labour, robbery, setting of fire to homes, eviction, land confiscation and population resettlement as well as the systematic destruction of towns and 126 He noted that approximately 300,000 Rohingya mosques”. had reportedly fled to Bangladesh by April 1992, and that a similar campaign in 1978 had also led to a reported 200,000 Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh. He added that these violations were alleged to be primarily committed by the armed forces, mentioning al so that he had received numerous reports of security officers confiscating or tearing National Registration Cards of Muslims. He further stated that, according to his sources, there appeared to be a government policy of moving non - Muslim Burmese into north ern Rakhine State in an effort to displace the people the Government called “foreigners”, and that Muslims were said to have been virtually prisoners of their provinces since 1964, not being allowed to travel even between villages 127 within a single township. 101. In 1993, Special Rapporteur Yozo Yokota also reported that his information strongly indicated that the “Rakhine Muslims” had been singled out for human rights violations, which 128 had resulted in approximately 250,000 persons being forced to flee into Bangladesh. In nearly all subsequent reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteurs, the issue was raised as a continuing source of grave concern. In this context, all Special Rapporteurs assessed that the 1982 Citizenship Law was discriminatory, in vi olation of Myanmar’s obligations under international law, and created conditions that promoted statelessness, in particular for the 129 Muslim population of Rakhine State. 102. In 2007, Special Rapporteur Sergio Pinheiro, together with five other special proc edures of the Human Rights Council, publicly called on the Government of Myanmar to take urgent measures “to eliminate discriminatory practices against the returnees in northern 130 Rakhine State”. In 2008, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the Rohingya w ere “subject to systematic discrimination and abuse ..., especially with regard to the restriction of movement, arbitrary taxation, forced labour, confiscation, forced eviction and arbitrary n custody and sexual arrest (including harassment and violence by police forces, death i violence). In addition, people are often harassed (house searches, confiscation of assets) or beaten by police forces, mainly during controls or at checkpoints. Cases of rape of young 131 women and children, perpetrated by different police Special forces, have been reported.” Rapporteur Quintana, in 2010, similarly stated that, based on his assessment of the situation during a mission to northern Rakhine State, he was “deeply concerned about the systematic 132 and endemic discrimination faced by the ... Rohingya” , also specifically noting that the Myanmar authorities had refused to issue birth certificates to many Muslim children since 133 He identified the “problem of statelessness” 1994 which had led to further discrimination. 134 as the “root of chr onic scourges endured by [this] population”. 126 E/CN.4/1993/62. 127 The Government of Myanmar responded that there was no discrimination based on relig ion, that the allegations were “fabricated by some big countries and certain foreign news agencies”, that “among those who fled were mostly poor people who were lured by stories that relief food and goods were being distributed on the other side” and that “some left because they were threatened by terrorist insurgents to burn down their houses”, that the issue was one of “illegal immigration” which had also been the cause of the “outflow of people of Bengali stock back in 1978”, that the “Rohingya do not ex ist in Myanmar either historically, politically or legally”, that the Tatmadaw was a “methodically and systematically organized institution made up of highly trained and disciplined personnel”, and that the “grotesque allegations made against the Tatmadaw were totally false.” See E/CN.4/1993/62. 128 E/CN.4/1993/3, para. 235. 129 57. Early on, one of the Special Rapporteurs pointed out that these Ibid, para. 226; A/62/223, para. discriminatory laws would in the short term produce serious violations of the righ ts of both minorities and other persons living in the country as well as a sense of not belonging to Myanmar. In the long term, he forecast, the situation was likely to encourage and exacerbate secessionist movements likely - eth nic and multi - religious nation (A/52/484, para. to be destructive of a multi 151). 130 A/62/223, para. 55. 131 A/HRC/7/18, para. 78. 132 A/HRC/13/48, para. 86. 133 Ibid . , para. 88. 134 A/64/318, para. 72. 29

30 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 103. Importantly, for nearly three decades all Special Rapporteurs have stressed that systemic impunity for human rights violations and abuses was a critical obstacle to the realization of human rights in Myanm ar and had contributed to or compounded recurrent 135 patterns of violations. 104. Allegations of serious human rights violations and abuses have continued in the period since 2011. These are the focus of this report . IV. Emblematic situation 1: Kachin and S han States 105. The Mission focused its fact - finding work on three emblematic situations: the hostilities and other military conduct in Kachin and Shan States and their human rights impact; the crisis in Rakhine State in all its facets; and infringements o n the exercise of fundamental freedoms. In the context of the latter issue, it also examined the prevalence of “hate speech” . 106. Since 2011, the decades old conflicts in Kachin and Shan States have escalated, with episodes of intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and “ethnic armed organizations” (EAOs), as well as incidents of non State armed groups fighting each other. In June 2011, a - - 17 year ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Tatmadaw broke down. In Shan State, the conflicts ha ve been characterised by a complex patchwork of armed actors and shifting territorial control. The Mission has amassed information regarding the conduct of hostilities in the context of several of these conflicts and their human rights and act on the civilian population. It verified a number of incidents in the humanitarian imp context of these armed conflicts and confirmed consistent patterns of violations of international law. 107. Despite attempts to sign peace agreements with some of the EAOs since 1961, several groups have been ostracized from the peace process, and hostilities have continued even with some parties to the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The NCA was signed on 12 October 2015 with eight EAOs. Groups that have not signed include the Kac hin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), 136 the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA). Among the groups currently involved in hostilities in Kachin and Shan States, only the Shan State Army - 137 South (SSA - S) signed the NCA but clashes continue between it and the Tatmadaw, parallel 138 North (SSA has not yet signed the NCA. to the peace process. The Shan State Army - - N) - The NLD - 21st Century Government has led a peace process, the “Union Peace Conference Panglong”; sessions have been held in August 2016, May 2017 and July 2018. The Federal Political Negotiation and Consultati on Committee (FPNCC) is currently the most powerful 139 umbrella coalition of EAOs, attempting to unite these groups in their negotiations with the central Government. Progress has been slow. All EAOs operating in Kachin and Shan States share a common op ponent, the 108. Tatmadaw. Most EAOs have forged cooperative links with each other. The AA, the MNDAA, the KIA and the TNLA collaborate as the Northern Alliance (and are all member of the FPNCC). The Tatmadaw is fighting with the KIA, TNLA, SSA - - N and S, SSA AA and with the Northern Alliance. Since November 2015, the SSA S and the TNLA MND - - have also been fighting each other with the level of intensity rising to a non international armed conflict. Various militia groups are also involved in the conflicts, mostly al ongside the Tatmadaw. 135 3), in which he E,g. reports of Special Rapporteur Sergio Pinheiro, including A/61/369 (para. 27 - 3 discussed several manifestations of impunity. Also E/CN.4/1999/35, para. 78; A/62/233, para. 30. 136 Armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF). 137 Armed wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). 138 Armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) . 139 The FPNCC is comprised of seven member - organizations including the six armed groups active in Shan N, and the United Wa and Kachin States: AA (United League of Arakan), KIA, MNDAA, TNLA, SSA - State Army (UWSA). 30

31 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The populations of Kachin and Shan States comprise various ethnic and religious 109. 140 Many of these minorities have struggled for decades for greater autonomy and minorities. Buddhists - has favoured Bamar against what they perceive to be a central government that politically and economically. These grievances have been aggravated by the Tatmadaw’s historic use of counterinsurgency tactics that directly affected the civilian population. The ically targeted the civilian population Tatmadaw intentionally, frequently and systemat because the Tatmadaw identified all civilians of an ethnic group as members of the EAO of that particular group or in retaliation for attacks by the EAO against the Tatmadaw. Villages . were cleared and land was burned 110. The conflicts in Kachin and Shan States are also fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources; land use and major infrastructure projects; and narcotics trading. Indeed, many the region and that interviewees informed the Mission that the drug trade had “taken over” ordinary people were left with few economic opportunities: “either they trade drugs or engage 141 Most parties to the conflicts are involved in illicit in war by joining armed groups”. ecting the human rights situation, economic activity, contributing to insecurity and aff 142 including by the appropriation of civilian land to conduct such activities. Many reported violations have been committed within the context of the exploitation 111. rties to the armed conflicts, of natural resources or development projects by some pa 143 predominantly the Tatmadaw. For example, an expert witness mentioned that the locations 144 of fighting in Kachin State follow the development of a national highway. Other interviewees asserted that the Tatmadaw targeted them be cause they had witnessed illegal 145 timber exploitation or that they were tortured because the Tatmadaw wanted information 146 controlled amber exploitation zones. Victims and witnesses of hostilities - on access to KIA d 2018 said that the overall objective of the in Tanai Township, Kachin State, in 2017 an Tatmadaw operations was to “destroy the KIA’s economy by appropriating amber and 147 mining resources under their control”. Violations against ethnic and religious minorities in northern Myanmar are committe 112. d in a context of severe discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds, often with persecutory intent. This manifests, for example, in the destruction or ransacking of churches and religious objects during military operations (and sometimes subsequent ere cting of Buddhist 148 but also in the use of ethnic or religious slurs during the commission of gross pagodas) 150 149 human”. human rights violations - and in treatment of people as inferior or even “sub For reat us like humans, they treat us example, a victim reported, “The Tatmadaw soldiers don’t t like animals. They look at us as if we should not even exist. Even though the name is Kachin 151 State, they don’t think Kachin should be there and exist.” Another victim reported that the 152 Several interviewees also reported re like our penis”. Tatmadaw said, “You Kachin people a that they experienced discrimination in the educational system. They claimed that in government - controlled areas education was provided in Myanmar language and that they 153 “did not understand much” that they could hardly identify or fully participate in the or 140 The p eoples of Shan State include the Shan, Pa - O, Intha, Lahu, Lisu, Taungyo, Danu, Ta’ang, Ahka - Chinese (Han), Shan - Ni and Kokang. The peoples of Kachin State and Jinghpaw (Kachin), Shan include the Jinghpaw, Shan, Ruwang, Lisu, Zaiwa, Lawngwaw, Lachyit, Rakhi ne and Bamar. Many of the ethnic minority groups have substantial numbers of Christians among their members. Some groups are predominantly Christian. 141 PI 031, QM - 014. - 142 - - PI 003. 022, QI - 089, SI 143 PI - 013, PI - 022, PI - 026, PI - 032, PI - 039, PI - - 054, P I - 061, PI - 077, PI - 103, QI - 080. 048, PI 144 018. QM - 145 PI - 039, PI - 048. 146 PI - 054; see this chapter, section A.8. Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 147 049, PI PI - 043, PI - - 054; see this chapter, section A.8. Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 148 032, PI PI - - 049, PI - 104, SI - 003. 149 DI - 063, DI - 064, DI - 066, PI - 003, PI - 007, PI - - 026, PI - 069, QI - 090, QI - 0 96. 004, PI 150 PI - 087, QI - 094, PI - 031, DI - 061 . 151 QI - 094 . 152 PI - 028. 153 - 040. DI - 040, PI 31

32 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 154 educational curriculum because the teachers did not speak their language. The systemic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion that underlies the human rights violations by the Mission warrants further investigation. identified While the Mission focused its work on the situation in Kachin and Shan States, it also 113. received information on other areas, such as Kayah or Kayin States. For example, the Mission on 20 December 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers killed three Karenni was able to verify that, National Progressive Party (KNPP)/Karenni Army members and one civilian at a KNPP 155 checkpoint in Kayah State. The Tatmadaw soldiers held the men at the checkpoint and ne KNPP member managed to escape and is now in hiding. The executed them on the spot. O Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that the victims were unlawfully killed because they observed the Tatmadaw transporting illegally logged timber. The human rights situation in Kayah and K ayin States and in other areas, as a consequence of the presence of Tatmadaw troops and the militarisation of areas, warrants specific investigation. 114. The continuation of conflict and prevailing insecurity in Kachin and Shan States provide strong reaso ns to conclude that the kind of violations and abuses outlined in this chapter are still occurring, warranting further monitoring and investigation. A . Patterns of violations committed by Myanmar military and security forces 1. Conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property 115. Since 2011, numerous reports have drawn attention to policies, tactics and conduct of the Tatmadaw and associated security forces that have resulted in serious violations of international law committed in the context of their operations in Kachin and Shan States. These reports invariably point at the devastating impact of military operations on the civilian population. The Mission is able to confirm patterns of attacks directed by the Myanmar military ag ainst civilians and civilian or other protected objects, as well as indiscriminate attacks. These have often been carried out in civilian populated residential areas and in the absence of an apparent military objective justifying the use of these tactics, in flagrant disregard of life, property and the well - being of the civilian population. Attacks resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians. Widespread looting, as well as the destruction and burning of homes and property, have often accompanied milita ry operations. The picture that emerges is one of a military that systematically fails to apply the fundamental international humanitarian law principles of distinction and precaution, and shows sheer contempt for affected areas, especially in - ved in most conflict basic human rights. This conduct was obser or around territory under the control of ethnic armed organizations, and throughout the period under review. Due to the non cooperation of the Myanmar authorities, the Mission was unable to 116. - conduct si te visits or to hear the Tatmadaw’s version of events. While it would have been information about some of the military operations and their preferable to collect in situ istent broader context, the body of information collected is sufficiently comprehensive, cons and credible to enable the Mission to make solid findings. (a) Legal framework 117. During armed conflict, international humanitarian law applies alongside international ect the victims human rights law. The key purpose of international humanitarian law is to prot of armed conflicts and to regulate hostilities, in an effort to limit the humanitarian 156 consequences of armed conflicts. It restricts the means and methods of warfare that parties to a conflict may employ and endeavours to ensure the protec tion and humane treatment of persons who are not, or no longer, taking a direct part in the hostilities. The cornerstone of 154 DI - 040, PI - 024. 155 - K - 135, PI 039, PI - 048. 156 N. Melzer, International Humanitarian Law – A Comprehensive Introduction (ICRC, Geneva, 2016), p. 17. 32

33 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 international humanitarian law is the principle of distinction: the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between ci vilians and combatants (fighters) and between civilian 157 objects and military objectives. Attacks may therefore only be directed against combatants (fighters) and never against civilians. A corollary of the principle of distinction is the duty of parties to the conflict to avoid or, in any event, minimize the infliction of incidental death, injury and destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack. This is the aken to spare the principle of precaution: in the conduct of hostilities “constant care shall be t 158 civilian population, civilians and civilian objects”. This requirement applies to the 159 attacking party and the party that is attacked. A third cardinal principle of international humanitarian law is the principle of proportionality. This means that it is prohibited to launch an attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 160 the concrete and direct mili tary advantage anticipated. 118. It flows from the above that direct attacks against civilians are absolutely prohibited and so are acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among 161 the civilian population. Indiscriminate attacks are also prohibited. These are attacks of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction because: (1) they are not directed at a specific military objective, (2) they employ a method means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or (3) they or employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by 162 international humanitarian law. 119. Violations of these cardinal rules of inte rnational humanitarian law may amount to war crimes. For instance, it is a war crime to make the civilian population or individual civilians, not taking part in hostilities, the object of an attack. Other war crimes include: making civilian objects the obj ect of attack; launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in death or injury of civilians or an attack in the knowledge that it will cause excessive incidental civilian loss, injury or damage; seizing property of the adverse party not required by militar y 163 necessity, and pillage. (b) Findings 120. Based on the body of information and material amassed, the Mission concludes that there is a pattern of Tatmadaw military operations, connected to the armed confl icts in Kachin and Shan States, that are in viol ation of the core principles of international humanitarian law. The following key factual patterns were established. Attacks directed at the civilian population or civilians, and indiscriminate attacks 121. The Tatmadaw intentionally, frequently and syst ematically directed attacks against the civilian population or individual civilians. The Tatmadaw has also systematically engaged in attacks that were indiscriminate, either because they were not directed against a specific military objective or because th ey employed a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective. A regular and systematic occurrence, for example, is the attacking of villages in 122. Kachin and Shan States for the apparent sole reason that the residents belong to the same ethnic group as a particular enemy “ethnic armed organization” and so are considered members or supporters of that organization simply because of their ethnicity. Villages are 164 also attacked in retaliation for attacks by such groups again This pattern st the Tatmadaw. is noted across villages and towns in conflict affected areas. The Mission received consistent - 157 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 1 and 7. 158 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 15. 159 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 15 and 22. 160 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 14. 161 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 1 and 2. 162 ICRC/Customary IH L, rule 12. 163 See ICC Statute, art. 8. 164 002 . PI - 026, PI - 043, PI - 045, PI - 046, PI - 087 , PI - 101, SI - 33

34 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 accounts of Tatmadaw soldiers entering villages, going to civilians’ homes, or gathering men (often including the village administ rator) at the centre of the village to question them on their affiliation with armed groups or the whereabouts of such fighters, or any other 165 information regarding these groups. If villagers did not answer, they were beaten and/or 166 ll treated or tortured. For example, a witness gave the following up, and otherwise i tied - - account of an instance in 2012 when Tatmadaw soldiers entered her village, Nung Ong, in Mongkaung Township, Shan State: The Tatmadaw always wanted to gather information on the Shan armed gr oups. If villagers did not have any information, the soldiers would tie people up and threaten them. When they came to our houses, Tatmadaw soldiers would ask “Do you know anything about the Shan army? If you do not answer, we will kill you!” I saw this ha ppen with my neighbours. Soldiers used a rope to hit my neighbours and they tied 167 up their hands while pointing their guns at them. Multiple accounts received indicate that the Tatmadaw does not specifically or 123. - non State armed groups are based or active, but rather necessarily target locations where launches attacks on villages because residents are of the same ethnic background as the fighters, or because the villages are in the nearest location to a recent operation from the 168 ample is of a Tatmadaw operation in Man Lan village in Namhsan armed group. One ex 169 The TNLA and the Tatmadaw Township in northern Shan State on or around 24 June 2017. had been fighting in the area, but not close to the village. Tatmadaw soldiers bound, beat, and threatened civilians with death, accusing them of supporting the TNLA. Soldiers arrested about 20 villagers and it was reported that they deprived those who were captured of food, water, and access to toilet facilities. It was also reported that the Tatmadaw soldiers 170 confiscated the civilians’ mobile phones. Residents of Man Lan village later found the 171 All of those taken by Tatmadaw body of one of the men who had been taken by the soldiers. soldiers were Ta’ang. In another example, a victim reported that the T atmadaw used firearms and mortar 124. directly at a group of 13 women escaping from the fighting between TNLA and the Tatmadaw in a village of Namkhan Township, in Shan State on 2 May 2017. The victim’s mother, her sister and another child were hit by bullets a nd fragments from mortar explosions. She said, “Even though we were all women fleeing, the Tatmadaw considered us as TNLA 172 and shot at us.” 125. Another type of intentional attacks on civilians is the practice of Tatmadaw soldiers, in the course of their m ilitary operations, deliberately shooting at or otherwise targeting the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities. In many d instances, the Tatmadaw has shot directly at civilians fleeing or seeking shelter, or launche 173 In Shan State, for instance, a witness reported that mortar shelling on a group of civilians. the Tatmadaw twice attacked the village of Manwing in Namhkan Township, the first time on or around 5 January 2016 and a second time around 25 February 2016. T he witness said: The Burmese soldiers entered the village, and they were shooting at the villagers who were trying to run. They were not shooting at KIA armed men but at civilians. There 174 . were no KIA men in the village, as their post was two hours away by f oot 126. On many occasions, the Tatmadaw launched attacks on villages under the apparent of EAOs assumption that fighters were present at such locations but without seemingly 165 101. - DI - 068, PI - 065, PI - 074, PI - 087, PI 166 DI - 066, DI - 068, PI - 074; see this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill treatment. - 167 DI - 068. 168 067, PI K - 136, DI - 057, DI - 065, DI - - 065, PI - 074, PI - 087, PI - 101. 169 - K - 137, PI - 074, V 093. 170 V - 093. 171 K - 137, PI - - 093. 074, V 172 PI - 073. 173 DI - 057, DI - 069, PI - 043, PI - 044, PI - 047, PI - 073, PI - 087, QI - 094; see this chapter, section A.8: E mblematic incidents. 174 - 087. PI 34

35 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 making any efforts to establish this ahead of initiating the attack or further assessing it in the course of the attack. This is in violation of the rule that parties to the conflict must do 175 During subsequent everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives. ot attempt to distinguish civilians operations in villages and towns, the Tatmadaw did also n from military objectives. Such indiscriminate attacks resulted in civilian men, women and children being injured or killed, with large numbers of civilians being driven away from their 176 homes and villages. ttacks reported, the Tatmadaw did not have a specific military objective 127. In many a when targeting the villages. Sources informed the Mission that, in many cases, the EAOs’ 177 For example, a witness posts or bases were located far outside the villages under attack. at Gar Yar Yang village sta ted that the Tatmadaw had fired mortar shells in Mansi Township, Kachin State, in February 2013. He stated that there was no KIA base near the village, that there was no fighting with the KIA or efforts on the part of the Tatmadaw t o target members 178 As a further example, Nam Ha village in of the KIA: they merely shot at the villagers. Muse Township, Shan State, was reported to have been attacked on or around 14 December 2016, both by mortar shelling and airstrikes by four jet fighter planes. The village was composed of nearly a hundred households and had a population of over 500 villagers, with no members of EAOs present during the attacks and with no other military assets in the rmy just came and attacked the “There were no rebels in my village. But the a village: 179 people.” 128. Information therefore strongly indicates that airstrikes and shelling were used indiscriminately as a more general tactic in the context of “clearance operations”, in essence as a whole as opposed to being used against specifically attacking the civilian population 180 identified military targets. Failure to take requisite precaution in attacks Even in cases where information indicates that the Tatmadaw attack was in pursuit of 129. a specific military objective, for example, the capture or weakening of an EAO’s base, the 181 This is especially the case attack often still failed to respect the principles of precaution. when the attack occurred in densely populated civilian areas. Attacks were launched which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination of the three, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. For example, on the morning of 14 January 2013, two artillery rounds landed near the 130. 182 centre of the city of Laiza in Kachin State, killing three civilians, all of whom were men. While the KIA headquarters are located in Laiza, a city densely populated by civilians, there was no apparent specific military objective near where the shells impacted. The Tatmadaw fired artillery from Hkang Hkai Bum military base, with the first round landing in front of a civilian home, killing two civilians and injuring others. The second rou nd of artillery landed in front of another house close to the first, killing a child. In addition to the three persons killed, at least four civilians were injured in the incident, including two women and two hit one of the children, a young girl, and that children. A witness mentioned that the shrapnel 183 Credible information received indicates that the round she was paralysed as a consequence. impacted near a busy street, deflecting most of the blast towards the house, and away from 184 the many people walking on the sidewalks nearby. 175 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 16. 176 101. DI - 057, DI - 066, PI - 043, PI - 044, PI - 049, PI - 050, PI - 053, PI - 065, PI - 074, PI - 087, PI - 177 DI - 057, PI - 026, PI - 073, PI - 101 178 PI - 026. 179 DI - 057. 180 See this chapter, section A.8: E mblematic incidents (Tanai). 181 - D I - 066, PI - 024, PI - 026, PI - 050, PI - 054, PI - 065, PI 072. 182 . K - 136, SI - 002, V - 096 183 SI - 002 . 184 096 . K - 136, SI - 002, V - 35

36 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 This incident, as well as most other incidents involving the use of explosive weapons 131. in or around civilian areas examined by the Mission, did not show a pattern that would 185 ilitary objective. indicate a legitimate attempt to target a specific m For example, to be used with accuracy against a specific military target, artillery needs to have its fire planned and directed. Initial rounds fired by artillery are often not on target, so adjustments need to be made in order to “fire for effect” on the identified military target. However, this pattern was not discernible in the cases examined. Apart from the fact that explosive weapons ordinarily area effect and are therefore likely to have indiscriminate effects in densely have wide - populated areas, their use in such areas also commonly causes a widespread and predictable pattern of harm. In Kachin and Shan States, the Tatmadaw’s airstrikes and shelling into populated residential areas have repeatedly caused the death and injury of ci vilians and 186 significant damage to civilian buildings. Opting to use bombs or shelling in such areas, in particular where specific military objectives are unclear and civilian areas are densely populated, will therefore often be indiscriminate and in viola tion of the principle of precaution in attacks. 132. Similarly, on 5 August 2017, in Maw Saung village in Kutkai Township in Shan State, the Tatmadaw launched explosives from the air that landed on a tree next to a woman’s house. 187 Shrapnel hit the woman in According her stomach and she died on her way to the hospital. to the witness, the Tatmadaw had attacked the village because on the previous day the TNLA had come to the area in the context of a drug elimination programme. The TNLA left the ashed with the Tatmadaw on the outskirts. Subsequently, the Tatmadaw shelled village and cl 188 the village. 133. Furthermore, information collected by the Mission also indicates that the Tatmadaw te warnings to has systematically engaged in hostilities with EAOs without providing adequa civilians to allow them to evacuate the area targeted for military operations, or to take feasible 189 precautions during the course of the attacks. For example, in June 2017, the Tatmadaw dropped leaflets warning civilians to evacuate prior to airstrikes on Nganga village, Tanai Township, Kachin State, but Tatmadaw soldiers then partly prevented civilians from leaving 190 the area, shutting down most routes. Destruction, appropriation or looting of civilian property and other protected objects 1 34. The Mission collected multiple accounts and other information regarding the Tatmadaw’s widespread practice of attacking, destroying and looting of civilian property or 191 Witnesses consistently other protected objects as part of its military operations. reported that the Tatmadaw systematically pillaged villagers’ belongings, including livestock, food 192 In addition, the Tatmadaw destroyed and ransacked civilian homes, supplies and money. 193 and sometimes schools, health clinics and churches, including by set ting them on fire. In many cases, the attacks were seen as targeted against particular individuals or entire villages based on their perceived affiliation and allegiance to armed groups, seemingly merely 194 because they share the same ethnicity. 135. For ex ample, a witness reported that Garayang village, Waingmaw Township, Kachin State was entirely burnt by the Tatmadaw during an offensive attack against the KIA on 16 185 - DI - 061, DI - 062, PI 042, PI - 043, PI - 045, PI - 072, PI - 101, SI - 002 . 186 - 073. DI - 057, DI - 061, DI - 066, PI - 043, PI - 045, PI - 046, PI - 049, PI - 054, PI - 072, PI 187 PI - 072. 188 K - 137, PI - 072. 189 - PI - 042, PI - 049, PI 103. 190 PI - 049, PI - 103, V - 062; see this chapter, forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and denial of humanitarian assistance section; see this chapter, section A.8: E mblematic incidents (Tanai). 191 046, PI 050, D - 066, DI - 068, DI - 069, PI - 024, PI - 026, PI - 042, PI - 043, PI - 045, PI - - 047, PI - 049, PI - PI - - 065, PI - 073, PI - 087. 054, PI 192 PI - 073, PI - 074. 193 K - 134, PI - 024, PI - 043, V - 116. 194 - DI - 062, DI - 066, DI - 068, DI - 069, PI - 02 4, PI 026, PI - 042, PI - 043, PI - 045, PI - 046, PI - 047, PI - 049, 087. - PI - 050, PI - 054, PI - 065, PI - 073, PI 36

37 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 June 2011. She fled to an IDP camp because of the fighting and, when she returned to her vi llage in 2012 to gather some belongings, she found: Nothing was left in our village. There were parts of my village that were entirely burned down. The school was destroyed and so were most of the houses. I was not 195 able to recuperate any of our belongings from our village. Similarly illustrative, although falling outside the reporting period, a victim reported 136. that her village, Hoktai in Mongkaung Township, Shan State, was completely destroyed in in search of members of the Shan 2009 by the Tatmadaw who had made a foray in the area ethnic armed groups. As they could no t find any armed men, they burned all huts in the 196 village, starting with the village administrator’s home. She said: gasoline all For the houses that could not burn easily, Tatmadaw soldiers poured around the house and then set it on fire. They used a stick with dry grass on the top, poured gasoline onto it, set it on fire, and then threw the burning stick onto the houses. There were 50 to 60 homes in my village, and these were all set o n fire. It took the soldiers only two to three hours to burn the entire village. Some villagers died in the 197 fire. 137. Another victim reported that the Tatmadaw attacked his village near Waingmaw, Kachin State in June 2011, and more specifically that: no one has lived there since. I The Tatmadaw attacked and destroyed the village - heard from other villagers that the inside of the houses are a mess after the soldiers ransacked them. I also heard that our village was burned down and there were many oles in th , and there are landmines in the bullet h e houses. Some houses were burned village. Villagers had to leave everything when they fled, including the livestock. These were probably eaten by the military. We had only taken a few items when we left, as we tho ught that we would leave only for a short while. But now all our 198 possessions are gone or destroyed. 138. The Mission received credible accounts that over 200 churches have been attacked, ransacked or destroyed since June 2011 in Kachin and Shan States. While some of these churches may have been used by EAOs, thereby losing their protected status, it was not possible to verify whether this applies to all 200 churches. The subsequent erecting of pagodas on compounds of some churches suggests that the motiv es of these attacks may have 199 been different. 2. Unlawful killings 139. The Mission amassed a consistent and credible body of information establishing a pattern of violations of the right to life, with numerous unlawful killings. These mostly occur in th e context of military operations, as a consequence of indiscriminate attacks, attacks directed at civilians, or the murder or extrajudicial execution of persons in Tatmadaw apparent custody. Unlawful killings also occurred in other contexts, without an immediate or link to hostilities, for example in the context of forced labour. (a) Legal f ramework Under international human rights law, the right to life is a non derogable right which 140. - 200 customary The prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of forms part of international law. jus cogens . This right protects individuals against killings by security forces. life is a rule of It is a violation of the right to life when State officials deliberately kill a person when it is not 195 PI - 024 . 196 DI - 069 . 197 DI - 069 . 198 QI - 094 . 199 - K - 134 , PI - 039, PI 104, SI - 003 , V - 116 , V - 125. 200 The right to life is protected under ICCPR, art. 6(1); CRC, art. 6; CRPD, art. 10; as well as in UDHR, , art. 11. It is also protected under the Constitution of Myanmar, s. 353. Declaration art. 3 and ASEAN 37

38 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 life. This includes extrajudicial killings or executions, whereby strictly necessary to protect a person is killed by, at the behest of, or with the acquiescence of State agents in the absence State actors - of a judicial process. The State is responsible for violations committed by non 201 operating in support or as agents of State authorities. 141. Life is also protected under international humanitarian law. Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds” . A person of civilians an is anyone who is in the d persons hors de combat hors de combat party; who is defenseless because of unconsciousness or injury; or who opposing power of an 202 The intentional killing of civilians or pers clearly expresses an intention to surrender. ons hors de combat , if the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with the armed conflict, constitutes the war crime of murder. However, not all killings of are unlawful under international humanitarian civilians 142. law. Civilians lose t heir protection for such time as they take direct part in hostilities 203 (although, in case of doubt as to a person’s status, s/he should be considered civilian) A . is unlawful if it is as a result of violations of the rules on the conduct of hostili ties, for killing example, from a direct attack against civilians, from an indiscriminate attack, or from an attack against military objectives causing excessive loss of civilian life. Findings (b) Unlawful killings in the context of hostilities The Mission amassed a body of consistent information drawing the considerable 143. pattern of the Tatmadaw unlawfully killing civilians, including men, women and children, operations or incursions into villages and towns in during their numerous military Kachin 204 Shan States. These result from the Tatmadaw’s disrespect for the fundamental and humanitarian law principle of distinction between civilians and fighters, the international systematic Tatmadaw’s failure to respect the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, and its failure to take precautions in attacks to protect the civilian population. The manner in which - populated areas necessarily results in the Tatmadaw conducts military operations in civilian civilian casualties. 144. w routinely targets civilians and conducts As presented above, the Tatmada indiscriminate attacks. In many of the instances verified by the Mission, these have led to unlawful killings. In none of these cases was there any indication that the civilians were ilities, that the attack was directed at a military objective, or that directly participating in host sufficient precaution had been taken to minimize the impact on the civilian population. For example, the Tatmadaw has shot at or shelled mortar directly at civilians, 145. 205 including wom while they were fleeing and seeking shelter, resulting in en and girls, 206 reported civilians being killed or injured. that on 11 August 2017 in the village A witness of Kasung, Mogaung Township, in Kachin State, the Tatmadaw shot and killed his friend as 207 e was trying to run away from approximately 200 Tatmadaw soldiers entering the village. h , a 14 - year old girl , Another example is the killing of Ja Seng Ing by Tatmadaw soldiers on 13 September 2012 in Sut Ngai Yang village, Hpakant Township, Kachin State. She had sought shelter with her classmates after hearing an explosion detonated by the KIA. Tatmadaw soldiers stationed in the village started shooting as a response to the explosion. Soon after, two Tatmadaw soldiers standing close to where she was hiding shot directly at 201 See A/HRC/14/24, para s . 46(a) and (b). 202 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 47. 203 , E.g. ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, para. 4789, and ICRC /N. Melzer Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC, Geneva, 2009), pp. 75 - 7 6. 204 - DI 057, K - 131, PI - 043, PI - 044, PI - 047, PI - 073, PI - 087, QI - 094. 205 K - 131, PI - 044, PI 047, PI - 073. - 206 - DI 057, DI - 069 (2009), PI - 043, PI - 044, PI - 047, PI - 073, PI - 087, QI - 094. 207 - 044. PI 38

39 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 her and she was hit in the hip. She was severely injured and died as a consequence of the 208 shooting and the denial of timely access to medical care. The Tatmadaw has also repeatedly launched mortar shelling and airstrikes on civilian 146. residential areas across northern Myanmar, throughout the reporting period. Explosives have civilian homes, in populated residential areas, including in IDP camps, landed on or near killing and injuring villagers and destroying property. These attacks als o resulted in burning 209 these of property and civilians fires. were killed in Unlawful killings of persons while in Tatmadaw custody M any killings reported to the Mission were committed while the victims were in the 147. 210 211 and then custody of the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw often apprehended and detained men, questioned them regarding their occupations and possible affiliations with armed groups, the EAOs whereabouts of members or bases of , or related matters. The questioning was often 212 - treatment, undertaken using and the men were subsequently killed. torture or ill For example, at the end of June 2017, in Man Lan village, Namhsan Township, Shan 148. State, the Tatmadaw detained and tortured a man suspected of being a member of the TNLA. this, he was repeatedly beaten. His corpse was found the next day with a When he denied 213 TNLA uniform on. Similarly, on 26 May 2017, in Mansi Township, Kachin State, the Mission corroborated that Tatmadaw soldiers executed three civilian displaced persons in their custod y. According to information received, the three men were killed because they 214 were Kachin and as such suspected of being KIA members. The Mission received further credible and consistent accounts of civilian men, who 149. by the Tatmadaw, being found dead days or weeks have been apprehended and detained 215 later. on For example, a witness explained how his father was detained by the Tatmadaw - the suspicion of supporting the in 2011 in Loilen Township, Shan State, and was SSA S rest: found dead a week later in the fo In October or November 2011, at about midnight, the six Tatmadaw soldiers came to detained my father. They also wanted to detain me, but I managed to our home and escape. My father was accused of provid ing food and shelter to the SSA S , although - was not true that . They tied my father’s hands with a rope and took him away. A week , so we searched for him in the jungle. him later, we had not received any news from We found his body at the bottom of a mountain. I did not see any bullet wounds; it appeared that he was beaten to death. His hands were still tied with a rope. I also wo more next to my father’s . All the people found other bodies that day; there were t 216 killed were just regular farmers. Similarly, the Mission received credible reports of the 150. killing of two residents of the Maing Hkawng IDP camp in Mansi Township, Kachin State, last seen on 31 January 2018 in the custody of the Tatmadaw. Their bodies were found in a grave on 8 March 2018 by 208 ack of recourse. section C.3: L K - 131, PI - 105, V - 126; see this chapter, 209 DI - 057, DI - 061, DI - 062, PI - 044, PI 045, PI - 053, PI - 065; see this chapter, conduct of hostilities section; - see this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 210 - DI - 067, K - 139, K 140, PI - 034, PI - 040, PI - 041, PI - 053, PI - 054, PI - 062, PI - 074, PI - 082, QI - 086, QI - 095, V - 019, V - 020. 211 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance. 212 PI - 062, PI - 074, QI - 089; see this chapter, orture and other ill - treatment; section A.8: section A.3: T E mblematic incidents (Tanai). 213 K - 134, PI - 074, V - 093. 214 K - 140, PI - 040. 215 139, PI K - - 040, PI - 082, PI - 106, V - 019; see this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance . 216 082. - PI 39

40 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 n were civilians, but they were found i n local residents. Reports received suggest that the me 217 were recovered. KIA uniforms when their corpses The Mission also received credible reports of the Tatmadaw capturing or detaining 151. 218 fighters of women. and subsequently killing them. EAOs Those killed included men and on 16 July 2018, Tatmadaw soldiers arrested six For example, reliable reports suggest that , TNLA female medics and three TNLA fighters following clashes between the parties in Namkham Township, Shan State. It was reported that one TNLA male fighter was shot dead on the spot while two others were wounded and managed to escape. The bodies of the six Material examined by the Mission women were found in a ditch nearby on 14 July 2018. corpse with a devastating head injury. The Mission’s forensi c analysis points to shows o ne massive blunt force trauma or high velocity gunshot wound. Given the two possible causes : Multiple victims with single gunshot wounds to the head . context the latter seems more likely suggests execution style killings. The Mission also received reports of the women being raped 219 before being killed but was unable to verify these allegations. Unlawful killings in Tatmadaw custody are also widespread in areas where there is 152. 220 no active fighting. For example, one witness described the killing of his 25 - year old brother on 15 July 2012, in a village near Myitkyina in Kachin State. He said: , I went to the church service with my brother. A group of five On that Sunday evening d us, and asked, “Where are you going and are you Tatmadaw soldiers stoppe Kachin?” When we answered that we were Kachin, the soldiers started beating me. They punched me in the face . They confiscated our student IDs and asked where the ters KIA post was located, and where the KIA were. We said that we did not know, figh but the soldiers did not believe us and took us to the military camp. There they tortured my brother with a heated knife, and they also tortured me. We were beaten with rifle butts. I was crying and screaming. They repeatedly asked us where the KIA post was. with a knife in front of me and he died . I closed my eyes Then they stabbed my brother because I could not watch my brother die. They told me to remain there and they carried my brother’s body out of the room. I do not know where they took his body. 221 The soldiers told me that if I ran away, I would be killed. Similarly, on 26 May 2017, in a government controlled area in Mansi Township, 153. Kachin State, where there was no fighting, Tatmadaw soldiers exec uted three Kachin 15 to 20 civilian internally displaced persons . The three bodies were found of about 25 to 30 years old a few days later, buried together in a small shallow pit. These men were reportedly suspected 222 of being KIA members. On 29 May 2017, the three bodies were brought to Mansi Township hospital for post mortem analysis and were returned to the families in the Force afternoon. The Myanmar P at Mansi Township opened a murder case. According olice to information received, the post mortem results show sev ere injuries on all victims, including multiple gunshot wounds, deep cuts on body parts, skull fractures and damage to eyes and th ears. In January 2018, a Myanmar military tribunal sentenced six 319 Light Infantry 223 224 soldiers to 10 Battalion for the killing of these men. years in prison Killing of civilians during forced labour 154. The Mission also received many consistent accounts of men and women killed by the 225 Tatmadaw in the context of forced labour. Tatmadaw soldiers have intentionally killed 217 K - 139, V - 019, V - 020. 218 - .8: Emblematic K - 141, PI - 053; see this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill treatment; section A incidents (Tanai) . 219 K - 141. 220 - 040, PI - 052, PI - 070. PI 221 05.2 PI - 222 K - 140, PI - 040. 223 One of the organic units of the Northern Command. 224 140, PI K - - 040; see this chapter, section C.3: Lack of recourse. 225 section A.6: Fo rced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children. See this chapter, 40

41 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 duals for trying to escape for refusing to participate, or simply because they were indivi or 226 unable to continue working. The following examples are illustrative: A witness described the events in December 2016 that led to the killing of one of his • neighbours 15 Tatmadaw soldiers in a village near Myitkyina in Kachin State. approached the plantation where he was working, together with three other villagers: The soldiers asked for our names, identification documents and some other basic e situation did not seem too worrying. But then the soldiers information. Initially th told us that we needed to go and work for them. One of the men, my friend who was 28 years old, said he couldn’t go because he had to look after his family. The soldiers became angry and threaten ed us. My friend tried to run away, but one of the senior officers shot him in the back and he fell. My friend died. Later, I saw the soldiers throw his body into the river. The soldiers threatened us that, if we did not do as they 227 shoot us like they had shot my friend. requested, they would Another witness explained that he saw how another individual was killed while they • - O Township, Kachin State: were both engaged in forced labour in May 2012, in Puta We were forced to put up a fence, and to clean th e surrounding area at a new military camp. Another villager found the work very difficult. He could not walk, was very tired, and he fell. The soldiers were very angry and told him to get up. Although he 228 begged them not to kill him, he was shot in the head from close range and died. In another case, in January 2017 in Muse Township, Shan State, a witness described • an account of two villagers who were killed when they were no longer able to carry the heavy materials: 20 More than he military for portering, to carry things for villagers were taken by t them. I heard after some returned 12 days later that they were not properly fed. Two villagers were taken for about one month. One villager who was not able to carry what he had been asked to, was beaten to de ath. Another villager who had become 229 weak was shot and killed. I saw their bodies when I had to retrieve them. Commonalities 155. In nearly all reports of unlawful killings received by the Mission, Tatmadaw soldiers 230 militia groups were also involved. For example, on were the perpetrators. In some cases, 1 March 2017, the Kachin Defence Army (KDA), working alongside the Tatmadaw, in Kutkai Township, Shan State, allegedly killed a 24 year old Ta’ang man and injured a - number of others, apparently on suspi cion of their membership in an armed group. The victim the house, was shot in the back as he attempted to flee when the Tatmadaw and KDA entered and was then stabbed. Other men were also wounded. The victim’s body was found by his 231 few days later . family at Lashio morgue a 156. Victims and witnesses consistently describe how the Tatmadaw repeatedly targets 232 individuals of the same ethnic background as specific armed groups. W hen the Tatmadaw eeds no proof beyond believes an individual belongs to or sympathizes with an EAO, it n sharing the same ethnicity of that EAO . This specifically affects men between the ages of 18 233 and 40 years old, considered of fighting age. In addition to the cases cited above, a witness year old husb - recounted and was killed by Tatmadaw soldiers at the for example that her 21 226 - DI - 057, DI - 063, PI - 077, PI - 078, QI - 086, QI - 095 . 090, QI 227 DI - 063 . 228 QI - 078 . 229 DI - 057 . 230 PI 004; V - 070; PI - 054; PI - 053; SI - - 018; see this chapter, section A.8 : Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 231 PI - 070 . 232 040, PI DI - 067, PI - 034, PI - - 041, PI - 053, PI - 054, PI - 065, PI - 074, PI - 090, QI - 095; see this chapter, section A.8 : Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 233 095. - PI - 040, PI - 053, PI - 054, PI - 062, PI - 065, PI - 074, QI 41

42 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 end of March 2016 in Manton Township, Shan State after the Tatmadaw intentionally shot multiple times at her house. She said her husband, who was Ta’ang, was suspected of being 234 house was targeted for that reason. a member of the TNLA and that their The importance of counter - insurgency justification for its actions against civilians 157. the to be borne out by the care taken by appears victim s as the Tatmadaw to disguise civilian EAOs when killing them . W many cases where the bodies of members of itnesses reported 235 . civilian men were later found in uniforms of an In one case, a source attested that EAO was her father, accompanied by another villager, taken by the Tatmadaw on the way to their farm in Bhamo Township, Kachin State, in late January 2018. A month later, their corpses 236 , showing signs of bullet wounds and in KIA uniform were found in a ditch . s 237 Tatmadaw killings are often brutal . 158. For ex ample, a witness reported that Tatmadaw soldiers beheaded his father and then burned his body, apparently on suspicion of collaborating with the KIA during the Northern Alliance offensive in Muse Township, Shan 238 State on 6 December 2016. Other witnesses re ported that the Tatmadaw killed civilians in 239 public and/or in front of their family members. said that , For example, a witness on 18 September 2014, the Tatmadaw beat her father and the village administrator to death, because they were suspected of suppor ting Shan ethnic armed groups. The beatings occurred in the centre of their village, in Mong Hsu Township, Shan State, in front of villagers and the 240 families of the victims. Another witness reported that her father was killed by the in Puta O Township, Kachin State, because he refused to agree to - Tatmadaw in June 2011 her marrying a Tatmadaw officer who she did not want to marry. Her father was beaten in 241 front of his family so severely that his stomach burst and he died as a result of his injuries. ther of another victim reported that , while her son was being tortured and The mo subsequently killed by Tatmadaw soldiers in a village of Namhsan Township, Shan State in 242 ing out her name for help. late June 2017, she could hear her son cry 159. ved credible reports of the Tatmadaw committing mass killings in The Mission recei conflict prone areas in northern Myanmar. In one reported incident, the Tatmadaw detained at least six women and five men on 25 June 2016 in Long Mon village, near the sub T ownship - of Mong Ya w, Shan State, after hostilities erupted between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA. Seven bodies were later found in shallow graves. In July 2016, a Tatmadaw senior general admitted publically that five villagers had been killed by the Tatmadaw during interrogatio n 243 and that the perpetrators would be brought to justice. Similarly, reports suggests that a mass grave containing the remains of 18 villagers, including a two - year old boy, was discovered ekoe Township, in a forest near the Kokang village of Mung Lung Nam Hkye Ho in Mon Shan State, on 20 December 2016 during fighting between the Northern Alliance and the 244 Accounts indicate that the bodies were badly burned before they were buried. Tatmadaw. 245 The 18 villagers were reportedly detained by the Tatmadaw on 28 Nov ember 2016. 3. Torture and other ill - treatment 160. Similar patterns emerged for cases of torture and other forms of ill - treatment, often against women and children, not only men, to obtain information or confessions regarding as punishment for perceived sympathy for the Tatmadaw’s the activities of EAOs, or 234 PI - 065. 235 093, V K - 137, K - 139, PI - 074, PI - 106 , V - - 019, V - 020. 236 PI - 106. 237 PI 041, PI - 034, PI - - 062, PI - 074, PI - 090. 238 PI - 041. 239 - PI - 034, PI - 052, PI 074, PI - 090. 240 PI - 034. 241 PI - 090. 242 PI - 074 243 021, V V - - 022; see this chapter, section C.3: Lack of recourse. 244 From the 88th and 99th LIDs. 245 - 132. V - 131, V 42

43 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - opponents. Torture and ill treatment were also used to coerce individuals into forced labour. Conditions of detention often amounted to ill - treatment. (a) Legal framework 161. Torture and cruel, inh uman and degrading treatment are prohibited under international 246 247 and under international humanitarian law. human rights law The prohibition of torture is absolute: as a peremptory norm of international law ( ), it can never be subject to jus cogens 248 derogation or exception, that is, it cannot be limited or repealed. Under international human rights law, torture is defined as acts that cause severe pain 162. or suffering, whether physical or mental; are inflicted intentionally; are committed for a 249 cific purpose; and involve a public official, either directly or indirectly. spe Acts considered to amount to “severe pain or suffering” for the purpose of the definition include: severe beatings, punches and kicks; rape, attempted rape and other forms of sex ual violence; electric shocks; deprivation of sleep, food or water; and administration of substances against the will 250 of a person deprived of liberty. Examples of treatment causing mental suffering includes: mock executions, abuse of specific personal pho bias, prolonged solitary confinement and 251 To constitute torture the acts must be committed directly by threats of death or violence. public officials or other persons acting in an official capacity, or be ordered or tolerated by 252 them for a specific purpos e, such as extracting a confession, obtaining information, 253 punishment, intimidation, humiliation, coercion or any reason based on discrimination. Acts which fall short of this definition may still constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading 254 - treatment), which is also prohibited under international law. treatment or punish ment (ill The absence of the element of purpose is the key distinguishing factor between torture and treatment. - ill 163. Under international humanitarian law, the definition of torture does not require that the pain or suffering be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. (b) Findings Principal victims 164. The Tatmadaw tortured men suspected of being members or supporters of EAOs, or who had participated in military operations. Torture victims were usually men between the 255 ages of approximately 18 and 40 years, considered able to participate in fighting. However, older men, often village admi nistrators or community leaders, were also accused of 256 associating or collaborating with EAOs and subjected to torture. Torture victims usually belonged to the same ethnic group as enemy fighters with whom the Tatmadaw was engaged 246 Declaration , art. 14. Torture is UDHR, art. 5; ICCPR, art. 7 and 10; CAT; CRC art. 37(a); ASEAN 331), although the definition is not fully in also prohibited under the Myanmar Penal Code (s. 330 - line with international law. 247 Common Art icle 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” of civilians and persons hors de combat . See also ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 90. 248 ICCPR, art. 4 (2); CAT, arts. 2(2) and (3). 249 CAT, art. 1; see also A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras. 30 39. - 250 For further examples, see A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, para. 51. 251 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 10 March 1992, para. 6; Torture, or Other Communication No. 74/1980 Estrella v Uruguay , Views adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 29 March 1983, paras 1.6, 10; see also A/56/156, para. 8. 252 CAT art. 1; United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, para. 2. 253 These purposes of torture are expressly listed in CAT, art. 1. See also A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras. 35 and 58 - 71. 254 ICCPR, art. 7; CAT, art. 16; see also E/CN.4/2006/6, para. 35. 255 PI DI - 066, - 062, PI - 079, PI - 109, QI - 089. 256 - 111. DI - 067, PI - 035, PI - 038, PI 43

44 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 257 also targeted by the Tatmadaw, and raped or subjected to other in conflict. Women were 258 forms of sexual violence as a method of torture. In a typical example, a 23 - year old male victim reported that he was tortured by 165. Tatmadaw soldiers for three days at a military camp in Ma rch 2016 in Kutkai Township, Shan State. He was Ta’ang and was accused of being a member of the TNLA, who are of the same ethnic group. He was detained with 18 other Ta’ang men. He was repeatedly beaten all over his body with a rope and a piece of firewood , and was burned with cigarette stubs. Tatmadaw soldiers also poked his neck with a knife, making small cuts. The other detainees 259 were also tortured. While most torture victims were adults, the Mission also received information on the 166. 260 dren. One individual stated that, when he was 14 years old, in 2013, two torture of chil Tatmadaw soldiers beat him inside the monastery where he lived in Kyauyme Township, Shan State. They used rifle butts to beat him, and interrogated him on the whereabouts of his her. The brother had deserted the Tatmadaw after he had been forcibly recruited by brot 261 them. Information was also received of elderly persons being subjected to torture and ill 167. - treatment. For example, Tatmadaw soldiers tortured a man over 60 years old on 9 August 2017 in Kutkai Township, Shan State. The man, who was living in a camp for internally 262 displaced persons, was suspected of being a messenger for the TNLA. The victim was ilitary base near tortured for more than 24 hours at his place of employment, and later at a m his village where he was transferred blindfolded. The Tatmadaw soldiers asked him where the messengers for the TNLA were, and beat him severely, causing the victim to lose some - up with rope and had h ot wax poured on him. The of his teeth. The victim was also tied soldiers made the man kneel for hours on small sharp stones during questioning, broke his 263 arm and forced him to sleep on the injured arm overnight. Similarly, reliable sources have confirmed that a community leader in his si xties was 168. tortured at a military camp near Muse town before being transferred to a prison in Shan State in late 2017. At the military camp, the elderly victim was offered little food for several days ll to terrify him. The Tatmadaw and severely beaten. Soldiers also placed dogs in his ce 264 soldiers wanted the victim to admit that he was a KIA supporter. Village administrators and community leaders were also tortured because they were 169. 265 often the only individuals able to speak Myanmar language. For example, on 10 January 2016 in Kunhing Township, Shan State, a victim reported that Tatmadaw soldiers detained him with another civilian and the village administrator in a monastery. The Tatmadaw and the TNLA had been fighting in the area. Their hands were tied behind their backs, and the Tatmadaw soldiers slapped them on the face and hit them on their chests. They also poked them in the neck with a sharp knife. They were interrogated about the whereabouts of the TNLA. One Tatmadaw soldier also threate ned them: “if you do not tell us where the TNLA 266 men are, you will die and dig your own grave”. Perpetrators 170. Tatmadaw soldiers were identified as perpetrators in most of the accounts of torture 267 in northern Myanmar verified by the Mission. cases, they were accompanied by In some 257 - 066, PI - 062, PI - 079, PI - DI - 111, QI - 089. 109, PI 258 See this chapter, section A.4: S nd gender - based violence . exual a 259 PI - 109. 260 QI - 079, QI - 094. 261 QI - 079. 262 PI - 035. 263 PI - 035. 264 K - 147. 265 DI - 067, PI - 035, PI - 038, PI - 111. 266 PI - 111. 267 - 090. PI - 038, PI - 044, PI - 054, PI - 079, QI 44

45 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 268 militias (Pyi Thu Sit), or the Myanmar Intelligence Office (commonly referred to by its 269 the branch of the Myanmar armed forces tasked with Myanmar acronym SaYaPa), intelligence gathering. All accounts of sexualised torture reported in the context of detention 270 were perpetrated by the SaYaPa. Most torture cases were committed by Tatmadaw soldiers during military operations, 171. patrols or forced labour. For example, a victim said that soldiers tortured him in Shan State in 2012. He was taken by Tatmadaw soldiers to their military camp along with three other men. They were beaten and questioned about their connections with Shan EAOs. The soldiers 271 requested money for their release which was paid by the victim’s family members. 172. Another victim described how the Tatmadaw detained and tortured him while he was fishing at a river next to his village in Tanai Township, Kachin State in December 2017. At that time, the Tatmadaw had arrived at the victim’s village in large number s. The victim was later taken to the military camp for the purpose of forced labour. He said: Ten Tatmadaw soldiers suddenly surrounded me and asked, “What are you doing in the forest?” I answered that I was a simple villager and wanted to fish. They did n ot believe me because I am young, 26 - years old. They beat me with a bamboo stick, and also rolled the stick on my thighs which really hurt. They asked, “Are you a rebel?” I answered again that I simply work for my daily wages to survive, and that I had nev er joined the KIA. They took me to their army base where I was held captive for over a month. We moved from one base to another, and I was beaten regularly. Every morning, the Tatmadaw soldiers woke me up very early, beat me and forced me to do various tas ks. I slept on the ground in the jungle without a blanket, I was always cold 272 at night . 173. - treatment were also perpetrated by the SaYaPa. For instance, a victim Torture and ill described how he was tortured by the SaYaPa in June 2012, for approximately a week, at the SaYaPa office in Myitkyina, Kachin State. He was subsequently accused of associating with the KIA, pursuant to the Unlawful Association Act section 17(1). He said that the SaYaPa tortured him, and forced him to say that he was a KIA member: aYaPa agents tortured me for about a week. They insisted that I was a KIA member. S I kept on repeating that I wasn’t, but they tortured me more. They burned me on the stomach with a hot knife, and poured hot wax from a candle on my face. They made me eat st ones and burned my arms with cigarette butts. They also made me kneel on top of small stones for hours. They took two bamboo sticks and tied them in between my legs. They stabbed me in the thighs with a knife. I have 15 scars on one leg and five scars on t he other. They took turns to kick me in the chest. They tied me to a chair, and beat me with a bamboo stick. I felt numb from the pain at some point. My vision was blurred because I was beaten repeatedly. They also pushed on my eyeballs for a long time – I felt like they would pop out. I really thought I was going to be killed. They dug a hole behind the SaYaPa office and I thought they would throw my corpse 273 in it, So, I finally said that I was a KIA soldier. Purposes 174. Torture and ill - treatment were used either to obtain confessions that the victim was a member of an EAO, or to elicit information related to hostilities, for example about the 274 Some victims were tortured while in the locations, weapons, and movements of fighters. custody of Tatmadaw so ldiers or the SaYaPa prior to, or frequently after, being detained 275 under the Unlawful Association Act, section 17(1). 268 - PI - 053, PI - 054, PI - 056, SI 004; see this chapter, section A.8: E mblematic incidents (Tanai). 269 - PI - 052, PI 055, PI - 056. 270 055; see this c PI - 052; PI - 056; PI - hapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender - based violence . 271 QI - 090. 272 PI - 079. 273 - PI 055. 274 - PI - 059, PI - 074, PI 075, PI - 109, PI - 111. 275 . A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty PI - 038, PI - 052, PI - 055, PI - 056; see this chapter, section 45

46 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 175. For instance, a victim reported that he was detained and tortured by Tatmadaw soldiers an explosive on behalf of the TNLA in on 2 December 2016 on suspicion of detonating Namhsan Township, Shan State. He said: I was collecting wood in the forest when the Tatmadaw detained me. They beat me until I was bleeding from the nose and ears. They asked, “Why are you here, what are answered that I was collecting wood. The soldiers then tied you doing?” I up my - hands behind me with a rope. I was taken with other villagers to a small hut in the village, used as an army post. They kicked me in the head and accused us of collaborating with the TNLA a nd to have detonated an explosive. The Tatmadaw commander said that all people of Ta’ang ethnicity were TNLA. I told him I was just 276 . an ordinary man, a tea farmer 176. Another victim gave an account of being tortured by Tatmadaw soldiers, along with 15 ot her civilians including four village administrators, on 15 December 2015 in Sumprabum Township, Kachin State. The Tatmadaw and KIA were fighting in and around his village when the civilians were apprehended by soldiers on suspicion of being KIA members and taken to the military camp located nine miles away from his village. They were kept in the - military camp for one week, tortured and ill treated. The torture included death threats and beatings. He said: We were tied - up with our hands behind our backs and we had to stand outside the military tents. We were interrogated repeatedly and accused of being KIA members. They insulted us constantly. The Tatmadaw said, “We are questioning you, and if you do not answer, we will kill you”. I responded that I was not a KIA member and we were simple villagers. They retorted, “You have to be a KIA soldier!” Every day, for a week, they asked us the same questions and we responded in the same manner, and 277 . we were beaten In other instances, torture and ill - treatment we re instrumental in punishing and 177. dehumanizing members of ethnic minorities in Shan and Kachin States. The Tatmadaw 278 verbally denigrated their religions and ethnicities during torture sessions. For example, one victim who was detained for a month from 16 Ju ne 2012 said: The SaYaPa agents asked constantly if I was responsible for explosives that were planted in the Myitkyina area. Because I am Christian, they made me imitate Jesus on a cross like the crucifixion. We were treated like animals because they look down on 279 Kachins. 178. In some cases, the Tatmadaw tortured civilians as retribution for battlefield casualties 280 inflicted against them by the EAOs. Many civilians were also tortured or ill - treated to force them to work for the Tatmadaw. This included children. Many victims reported that the 281 Tatmadaw apprehended them in or near their village in Shan and Kachin States. They were eated and thereafter forced to work for the Tatmadaw. Other forms of tr - tortured and/or ill 282 torture or ill - treatment were also perpetrated while they were detained for forced labour. - year old child at the time of the incident reported that he was 179. For example, a 16 d and ill - torture treated by Tatmadaw soldiers and then coerced into forced labour during three days in June 2011 in Waingmaw Township, Kachin State. Most civilians from his village had fled from the fighting, while he remained behind with approximately 10 other v illagers. The child mentioned that soldiers questioned the men and when they were not satisfied with the answers the victims were beaten more. One soldier hit the child with the butt of his gun and he lost a tooth. Tatmadaw soldiers forced the 10 men and c hild to dig holes and carry heavy packs. On the first day, they were not given food or water to drink. They were given small 276 PI - 075. 277 DI - 067. 278 PI 056, PI - 038, PI - - 074, PI - 075. 279 PI - 056. 280 - DI - 066, PI - 044, PI - 086, PI 088, see this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 281 - QI - 085, QI 094, QI - 098. 282 children. forced recruitment of adults and See this chapter, section A.6: F orced labour and 46

47 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 283 portions of food and some water only in the middle of the second day. Another adult victim gave an account of how the Tatmadaw ill - treated and subjected him to forced labour for three days at the beginning of August 2011 in Kunhing Township, Shan State. He stated that the Tatmadaw arrived at his village and asked the residents if they had seen members of the Shan ations. The Tatmadaw subsequently detained and beat the victim, along ethnic armed organiz with other civilians, and forced him to carry heavy material. He was not fed properly and he 284 was kicked and punched when he did not walk fast enough. Methods and techniques 180. The M ission received accounts of the Tatmadaw using various torture techniques. The following techniques have been corroborated: 285 • beating with a bamboo stick or metal rod; 286 • laying bamboo across the shins of the victim, and standing or jumping on it; 287 • tying up hands and/or feet with ropes; 288 beating on several parts of the body; • 289 • hitting on the head with the butt of a firearm; 290 pointing a firearm at their temple; • 291 • blindfolding; 292 using death threats, instilling a justified fear of being killed; • 293 killing other detainees in front of victim; • 294 performing sexual violence, including rape; • 295 • using insults of an ethnic or religious nature; 296 • burning the skin with a hot knife or cigarette stubs; 297 pouring hot wax on skin; • 298 • and partially; forcing nudity, fully 299 forcing to kneel several hours on the ground, sometimes on stones; • 300 • jabbing the skin with a needle or sharp knife; 301 and • making victims dig their “own” graves; 283 QI - 094. 284 PI 083. - 285 - - - 055, PI PI 056. 053, PI 286 - 056, V - 133 . PI 287 DI - 066 , PI - 035 , PI - 044 , PI - PI - 054, PI - 074 , PI - 075, SI - 004 . 053, 288 - DI 109, - 066, PI - 035, PI - 038, PI - 044, PI - 053, PI - 054, PI - 055, PI - 056, PI - 074, PI - 075, PI QI - - 004 . 090, SI 289 044, PI PI - 035, PI - 038, PI - - 056. 290 DI - - 086. 066, PI 291 054, V PI - 035, PI - - 137. 292 - DI - 068, PI - 035, PI - 038, PI - 054, PI - 055, PI - 059, PI 062, PI - 111. 293 062, SI PI - - 004. 294 - 066. S PI - 052, PI - 055, PI 056, PI - ee this chapter, section A.4: S exual a nd gender - based vio lence . 295 PI - 038, PI - 056, PI - 059, PI - 074, PI - 075. 296 PI - 055, PI 056, PI - 109. - 297 PI - 035, PI - 055. 298 DI - 066, PI - - 056. 052, PI 299 - DI - 066, PI 035, PI - 055. 300 - PI - 056, PI 109, PI - 111. 301 133. - PI - 055, V 47

48 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 302 • placing dogs inside or outside a cell to terrify the victim. Mission received credible reports of other torture techniques, requiring further 181. The investigation. Perpetrators often used many of these torture techniques simultaneously. For example, 182. at a monastery in a a victim mentioned that he was detained and tortured on 12 June 2012 village near Myitkyina in Kachin State. He was suspected of being a KIA member: I was questioned by many Tatmadaw soldiers from L ight Infantry Division 37. They asked me my ethnicity and where I was from. The soldiers said that villager s from my native village are all members or supporters of the KIA. I responded that I was never a KIA member. They insisted and wanted me to admit by force that I was with the KIA. The soldiers kicked me in the stomach and on the chest, and slapped me in t he face. I was beaten on the head with the butt of their guns. I was hit so many times on the head and on my ears that I could not hear anymore and my face was very swollen. They hit me on the head with a wooden stick until the stick broke. They took my le gs and placed them in between two bamboo tree trunks and then jumped on my legs attached to the trunks until I could not walk anymore. I had to be dragged out by soldiers. I spent two 303 nights and three days at the monastery being tortured. Locations 183 . Victims reported that the torture and ill - treatment took place in various places, 304 including in the SaYaPa office in Myitkyina, but mostly in their own towns or villages in 305 306 307 monasteries, locations including houses, forest areas, military camps, as well as 308 official places of detention. Most torture took place in or near villages and towns. 184. Usually, the torture ceased when the victims were transferred to official detention 309 locations. For example, a victim mentioned the torture stopped when he was t ransferred to 310 Myitkyina prison from the SaYaPa office in Myitkyina, Kachin State in July 2012. Torture also often took place in military camps. A victim reported that he was tortured 185. , in August 2017 while detained at a military camp in Mogaung Township, Kachin State shortly after the Tatmadaw’s incursion in the Kasung region. The victim reported that he was apprehended by the Tatmadaw under suspicions of being part of the KIA. He said: I was taken to the military base and tortured by two soldiers for t hree days. We were a group of ten civilians detained together, and there were 20 soldiers surrounding us. I was beaten all over my body, especially on my back and chest. The Tatmadaw tied my hands together behind my back with a rope. They also laced a rop e around my neck. They asked me, “Are most people in the village KIA members?” I answered that there were simple farmers. They repeatedly asked who in the village was KIA and beat me more. The soldiers who were beating me told me that all Kachin men are KI A. The Tatmadaw did not want to understand that we were villagers. They also beat me with the butt of their guns and showed me a sword to scare me. They took a KIA uniform and forced me to wear it. I never admitted that I was a KIA and kept on repeating th at 311 I was an ordinary man. 302 - 037, PI 038. PI - 303 - 056. PI 304 PI - 052, PI - - 056. 055, PI 305 088. D I - 066, PI - 035, PI - 074, PI - 075, PI - 086, PI - 306 - 056, PI - 074, PI - 111. PI 307 PI - 035, PI - - 044, PI - 052. 038, PI 308 PI - 038, V - 133. 309 - PI 052, PI - 109. 310 PI - 052. 311 044. - PI 48

49 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Ill treatment while in detention - The detention conditions in which civilians, including men, women and children, were 186. - treatment. Detention conditions in held, while in the custody of the Tatmadaw, amount to ill 312 - informal detention locations were sub Victims systematically standard. formal and reported that they were given very little food, had no contact with their families and had no 313 access to health care. 187. The Mission also received a reliable and consistent body of information pertaining to inhuman conditions in forced labour settings, either at military camps or while the Tatmadaw was moving their base of operations. Victims included children. Victims mentioned that they were beaten when walking too slowly as porter s, or because they were too weak. In addition, civilians in the custody of the Tatmadaw for forced labour consistently stated that they ate insufficiently and felt hungry, rarely had access to adequate drinking water, slept on the ground with no blanket an d felt cold, and received death threats. Victims were also subjected to sexual violence, including rape, gang rape and threats of being raped, while being detained 314 for forced labour. The following are illustrative examples: • A survivor reported that 12 Tatmadaw soldiers came to her house in Myitkyina Township, Kachin State, in 2012 and threatened to take her mother away if she did not go with them. She spent six to seven months performing forced labour in a military camp near her village. On one occasion, she was raped by a senior officer with another soldier watching. On another night, soldiers told her to drink juice that caused her to lose consciousness. She woke up without underwear next to a sleeping soldier, with her back, anus, vagina and thighs. A week later, she was taken to the same pain in 315 senior officer but escaped before another rape was committed. • A girl who was 14 years old at the time of the events reported that the Tatmadaw three or four days at a military camp near her village detained her for forced labour for in Mongkaung Township, Shan State in 2011. She had to carry heavy bags and was not properly fed nor had access to enough drinking water. One day she was beaten on 316 for water. her legs because she asked a soldier Another victim reported that in October 2011, in Waingmaw Township, Kachin State, • he was taken by the Tatmadaw to forcibly work as their porter. He reported: They chained our ankles. We walked for five days carrying very heavy packages. The T atmadaw told us to walk faster and they slapped us, kicked us from behind. When we were thirsty, we were not given enough water, and sometimes we could not drink at 317 all. We were often beaten with rifle butts and punched. • Another victim reported the humi liating and dehumanizing ill - treatment inflicted on him by the Tatmadaw while in their custody for forced labour. He was apprehended on 15 November 2014 in Kutkai Township, Shan State. He said: We walked the entire night. We stopped and rested for breakfas t the next morning, although I remained tied - up. After breakfast, the Tatmadaw poured the inedible two other civilians were detained leftovers on a plate and asked us if we were hungry – as well. The soldiers said to eat and “since you are a rebel, you do not have to eat”. The soldier said, “Oh, this disgusts you?” I said yes, and the soldier said, “Even a rebel won’t eat this?” And then they started beating me again. One of the soldier s t my head and spat on the food and then so did the others. Then they pointed a gun a said “If you don’t eat, we will kill you.” So, I ate the food. The Tatmadaw laughed at 312 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance . 313 DI - 060, PI - 035, PI - 052, PI - 055, PI - 056, PI - 013. 314 - 067, PI DI - 063, DI - 065, DI - 071, PI - 001, PI 021, PI - - 068, PI - 077, PI - 080, QI - 079, QI - 080, QI - 085, 097, QI QI - 095, QI - 096, QI - 094, QI - 098; see this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender - ba sed - violence; section A.6: Forced labour . 315 PI - 068 . 316 DI - 071 . 317 097 . QI - 49

50 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 me as I ate. After breakfast, they packed up and moved on. One soldier said, “Let’s also get this rebel to carry our things”. Later, we stopped and rested by a narrow stream and one of the soldiers made me drink muddy water. He said “You are a rebel, 318 not a human, you should do what the animals do.” • Another victim provided a detailed account of the ill - treatment he suffered while taken for forced labour by the Tatmadaw in late May 2014 in Manton Township, Kachin State: We were all required to carry very heavy burdens. We walked for three hours and then reached a village on a hill. Those who didn’t do this well were beaten by the soldiers. We were kicked and slapped on the head. They hit me from behind with a rifle butt, and pushed me to walk faster. We spent the night in that village and we were chained up by our legs. We were not given any food. We could just use our hands to 319 , but that night we were not given water . drink from streams on the route 4. Sexual and gender - based violence 188. The Mission found that the Tatmadaw has targeted civilians, especially women and girls but also men. Women have been subjected to abduction, rape, including gang rape, and other sexual violence. There are also credible reports of forced marriage and sexual slavery. In many cases, sexual violence was accompanied by degrading behaviour, including insults search for them, and spitting. When women did escape, Tatmadaw soldiers would frequently threaten and physically abuse their family, and destroy or steal their property. Sexual violence against men has been inflicted as a means of torture, including to obtain information or 320 confessions from detainees. The findings in thi s section are based on 38 interviews with survivors, families of 189. and expert witnesses . The prevailing context of insecurity in survivors, eyewitnesses, northern Myanmar, combined with culturally based stigmatisation and ostracism of sexual violence survivors, and the continuing presence of the military and armed groups, suggest 321 nt underreporting. significa Legal framework (a) 190. Sexual violence is conduct of a sexual nature that is perpetrated without a person’s consent, often by force or coercion . Under international human rights law, such conduct may violate the right to security of the person, the right to be protected from torture and other ill - treatment, and other rights enshrined in international treaties. Rape, which consists of sexual penet ration without consent, is one form of sexual violence. Acts falling within the category of other sexual violence include: attempted rape; forced prostitution and trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation; sexual slavery; forced marriage or cohabi tation; forced pregnancy; forced abortion or sterilization; violent acts against the sexual integrity of a person and other acts of a sexual nature that cause offence or humiliation (for example, forced 322 exual harassment). public nudity, demanding sex in return for favours, s 191. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are also prohibited under international 323 humanitarian law. Depending on the circumstances, such acts may constitute war crimes, 324 crimes against humanity or genocide. Violence against wom en and girls, including sexual and gender - based violence, is also 192. nvention on the Elimination of A ll Forms of a form of discrimination prohibited by the Co 318 QI 096 . - 319 098 QI - . 320 See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill - treatment. 321 See also A/HRC/31/71, para. 48 . 322 . See e.g. ICC Elements of Crimes, art . 7(1)(g) 323 See Common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions (prohibiting “violence to life and person” including cruel treatment and torture and “outrages upon personal dignity”), and ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 93. 324 (6)(b) para. 1. See ICC Statute, arts . 7(1)(g), 8(b)(xxii) , 8(c)(ii) , 8( e)(vi); ICC Elements of Crimes, art . 50

51 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 325 Discrimination against Women and is a violation of human rights. The obligations of States 326 States parties have including Myanmar, do not cease in periods of armed conflict. parties, a due diligence obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish acts of sexual and 327 gender - based violence. A limited number of legal protections from sexual an d gender - based violence exist in 193. 328 Myanmar domestic law. The Constitution guarantees equality before the law, freedom 329 and a prohibition of trafficking and from discrimination on grounds of gender, 330 The Penal Code, enacted in 1860, prohibits ra enslavement. pe and other forms of sexual assault, though the definition of rape is outdated and legally vague and does not meet Code provisions criminalising “k idnapping, international best practice standards. Penal abduction, slavery and forced labour” are piecemeal. For example, the prohibition of the importation of women for the purposes of sexual exploitation is only applicable if the woman is under the age of 21. (b) Findings Abductions, rape and sexual violence by the Tatmadaw of individual Tatmadaw soldiers or groups of them 194. The Mission found a pattern abducting women and girls and raping, attempting to rape, or gang raping them in forests. Parents, relatives and neighbours reported that they saw women and girls being forcibly taken 331 by the Tatmadaw and, i n some cases, saw or learned from others they had been killed. 195. For example, a female victim recounte d that in 2017, when she was 15 - years old, she was sexually assaulted by a Tatmadaw soldier while cutting grass near her home in Tanai Township, Kachin State. She stated that other girls experienced similar sexual assault, 332 including a friend who told her that she was raped. 196. On 20 February 2018, one woman reported being abducted near Nam Byu village in the amber mining area in Tanai Township b y five soldiers on her way, and forced to walk two hours into the forest to meet with a more senior officer. When she refused to take off her clothes, three soldiers forcibly undressed her while two soldiers stood guard. The senior officer raped her while insulting her, telling the other officers, “I will take her first and then you can have her” and telling the victim, “I will fuck you to death”. The victim believed she was targeted because she was Kachin and the Tatmadaw soldiers look down at the Kachin 333 p eople because of their different history, religion and language. A survivor in Kutkai Township, Shan State, was abducted with her mother from her 197. farm and raped in the forest in 2011. Two Tatmadaw soldiers guarded her while another soldier took her inside an abandoned hut and raped her. During the abduction and rape, the survivor was also accused of supporting TNLA soldiers: They pointed their guns at our heads, and they said that we had told the TNLA about the position of the soldiers, and because of that, the TNLA had taken their horse. There were about five or six Burmese soldiers. Then they took me to their military base. On the way there, three soldiers took me to a small hut in the jungle. They asked me, 325 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General - conflict situations” recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post a. 34; - based violence against “General recommendation No. 35 on gender (CEDAW/C/GC/30), par women, updating general recommendation No. 19” (CEDAW/C/GC/35), para. 21. 326 “General United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on recommendation No. 28 the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (CEDAW/C/GC/28), paras. 11 - 12. 327 E.g. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 30, para. 15, 23. 328 Constitution of Myanm ar, s. 347. 329 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 348. 330 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 358. 331 - PI 003, PI - 004, PI - 007, PI - 029, PI - 067, PI - 069, PI - 089, PI - 096. 332 PI - 063. 333 - 069. PI 51

52 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 “Why did you pass the message to the TNL A?” I told them that I did not, but they didn’t believe me and slapped me. One soldier told the other two to wait outside. He then raped me on the floor on a dry grass mattress. He ripped all my clothes off, so I 334 was completely naked. or from Kutkai Township, Shan State, was abducted from her farm in 198. Another surviv September 2012 by five Tatmadaw soldiers bearing guns. She was forced to work as a porter and cook for the soldiers during the day. One night the senior officer asked her for a massage then took his clothes off and attempted to rape her. The survivor was able to push him and 335 off and escape even though soldiers fired guns in her direction. Another survivor from Kutkai was abducted from her house in 2011 by Tatmadaw soldiers who destroyed her shop before forcing her to carry heavy items to a military base. She and another woman were able to escape that night after the soldiers had told the women they would have to have sex with 336 them. 199. saw sexual abuse and rape Several witnesses across both Kachin and Shan States 337 338 or in the jungle. committed in military bases One witness described seeing 20 soldiers 16 years old in the jungle in December 2017, in Tanai surrounding two girls aged about 15 to Township, Kachin State: The soldiers were punchi ng and slapping them. They pulled their hair. They pushed them on the ground and tore off their clothing. The girls were naked on the ground. 200. The witness ran from the scene in fear and later learned that villagers had found the 339 . bodies of the two girls 340 201. Other witnesses personally knew women who had been taken away by the military, 341 and women who had women who had been raped, sometimes by several soldiers at once, 342 343 or had been killed after the rape. fallen pregnant as a result of the rape, For ex ample, in 2011, one source who was forcibly recruited for labour by the Tatmadaw in Kunhing Township, Shan State, witnessed three Tatmadaw soldiers force a husband to work as a porter 344 while they took his wife to the forest and raped her. Rape and sexua l violence in the home 202. There are consistent accounts of Tatmadaw soldiers, either individually or in groups, 345 attempting to rape women and girls in their homes. Women who were raped in their homes 346 a and the military uniforms. One or following abduction recognized the Tatmadaw insigni survivor in Lashio Township in Shan State described how, in 2012, when there was fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw in her area, a group of soldiers entered her house, killed her parents and raped her: 334 - 066. PI 335 QI - 084. 336 PI - 023. 337 PI - 025, PI - 029. 338 099. - PI - 029, PI - 083, PI 339 - 069. PI 340 - 096, QI - 078. PI 341 PI - 068, QI - 07 2, QI - 082, - 086 , QI - 089. QI 342 PI - 069, QI - 082, QI - 098. 343 PI - 069, QI - 079. 344 - PI 083. 345 - PI - 005, PI - 037, PI 057, PI - 110, PI - 117; see also Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), Update by the Shan Human Rights Foundati on ( April 2016); SHRF, Update by the Shan Human Rights n Foundatio November 2015 ) ; Ta’ang Women’s Organiz ation, Trained to torture: Systematic war ( crimes by the Burmese Army in Ta'ang areas of Northern Shan State (March 2011 - March 2016) ; SHRF Summary of HR violations committed by Burma Army troops during military offensive in Tang , Yan, Shan State, from 14 - 15 April 2013 ( April 2013 ); Kachin Women's Association Thailand, State of Terror in Kachin Hills (February 2013) . 346 082. - PI - 003, PI - 004, PI - 005, PI - 007, PI - 067, PI - 068, PI - 069, PI - 089, QI 52

53 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 with belts and knives. Both my parents were killed. They were tied up I was beaten burned . Their house was set on fire by five soldiers. They took me outside the and house to rape me. I was taken by one man with three stars on his badge to the back of t me with the butt of his gun and a belt. They wanted money and the house. He bea were not happy because my family was Christian. The soldier ripped my shirt and cut my trousers with a knife. Under the banana tree, he raped me on the ground. He inserted his penis in my vagi na and my anus. He inserted a banana leaf in my mouth to make me stop screaming. I heard, “If you don’t keep quiet, I will shoot you with my 347 ” . gun 203. In another case, on 16 March 2016 in Kutkai Township, Shan State, a Tatmadaw soldier grabbed a victim w hen visiting her home to buy a chicken. She told him she was three months pregnant and asked him not to rape her. She escaped but he threatened to return the following day. She reporte but she later learned that d the incident to the village administrator 348 T atmadaw soldiers had beaten him to prevent an official report being filed. 204. The Mission verified a well - publicised case involving two volunteer Kachin teachers, Kawng Kha Maran Lu Ra, and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin, who were attacked at home in Shabuk Shan State on 19 January 2015, the night that over 40 village in Kutkai Township, Tatmadaw soldiers arrived in the village. A couple staying nearby heard shouts at 1am in the morning, but there was no response when they knocked on the teachers’ door so the y left. Other villagers saw several Tatmadaw officers picked up by a vehicle and leave the village approximately four hours later. The two teachers’ bodies were discovered later that morning, ls of blood, with blood naked from the waist down, lying on the bed in their home in poo flowing from their vaginas. A military badge was found on the bed, but no forensic evidence of the crime scene was collected by authorities. Later that day, the Tatmadaw Major staying in the village threatened to “use machine guns o n the school” and “burn down the village” if 349 the Tatmadaw was accused of the crimes. 205. According to a source interviewed by the Mission, the doctor who examined the two bodies at Muse hospital provided two contradictory medical reports. The first repo rt concluded that approximately four perpetrators were involved in the rape and murder of the two teachers. The second report concluded that there were only two perpetrators, only one of 350 the women was raped, and the military were not involved. Forensic an alysis conducted by the Mission however suggests that the first victim was attacked with a knife initially and raped, then or simultaneously stabbed, after which she was bludgeoned as a final act . The isted and was repeatedly stabbed and second victim was initially assaulted with a knife, res cut leading to death from haemorrhage; there is no disturbance of clothing from the material analysed to indicate a completed rape. 206. The police investigation stalled before any court proceedings were initiated. The Tatmadaw has prevented any questioning of its officers and has publicly declared it will take 351 legal action if its officers are accused by representatives of the victims. Sexual violence against men in interrogation or detention contexts 207. In additi on to other forms of torture during interrogation and/or detention, the Mission found credible accounts supporting a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated as torture or ill - treatment against men from Kachin and Shan States. All accounts of sexualised tort ure reported in the context of detention were perpetrated by the Myanmar Intelligence Office 347 . PI - 117 348 PI - 057. 349 PI - 037, K - 133a; Also, Shan Human Rights Foundation, Burma Army kill villager in front of his parents, then force over 1,200 villagers to demonstrate against “insurgents” for killing civilians in Murng Yawng (1 January 2 015); Legal Aid Network and Kachin Women’s Association in Thailand, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: Seeking Truth about Sexual Violence and War Crime Case in Burma ( 2016) pp.3 - 14; Aye Nay, Kachin church ‘powerless’ to investigate teachers’ murders (7 July 2015) ; US State Department, (2015), p. 2. Burma 2015 Human Rights Report 350 PI - 037; A/HRC/28/72, para.59. 351 Ibid. 53

54 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (commonly referr ed to by its Myanmar acronym Sa YaPa), the branch of the Myanmar armed 352 forces tasked with intelligence gathering. 208. For example, the Mission rec eived consistent reports regarding two survivors who iolence, in June 2012 by the SaYa were tortured, including through rape and sexual v Pa in Myitkyina Township, Kachin State. The survivors were physically tortured in other locations while being questioned, including about membership of the KIA, before they were transfer red 353 Ya Pa . During the cou , both to and detained by the Sa Ya Pa rse of questioning by the Sa survivors were forced to undress u ntil they were nude and then penetrate each other anally. The SaYaPa agents were watching the men as they raped each other, humiliating and laughing at them. They asked, “ Are you enjoying yourselves?” The survivors were begging 354 ey were forced to continue. for the rapes to stop but th 209. In a separate incident, a s urvivor reported attending a SaYa Pa office in Myitkyina Township, Kachin State, on 17 June 2012 to answer questions about a bombing in the area. He was then arrested, detained and tortured until he confessed to KIA membership because he thought he would be killed otherwise. This included sexual torture such as rubbing his penis until the skin was torn, peeled and bleeding: “my penis was bleeding, I was really 355 hurting. I don’t know how long this l asted; I was numb from the pain at some point.” 210. Typically, for reasons of fear of stigma, emasculation and shame, reports of sexual violence by male survivors are exceptional, but may not accurately reflect rates of incidence. In northern Myanmar, th e use of sexual torture as a documented technique by authorities in 356 combined with the more widespread practice of physical torture perpetrated certain cases, along with forced nudity, requires further research and investigation to accurately identify the full scope of the use of sexual violence as a form of torture. Sexual slavery and forced marriages accounts 211. The Mission received two credible relating to sexual slavery and forced marriages in northern Myanmar. These are consistent with pri or United Nations accounts 357 reports and suggest both practices may be more widespread than is currently documented. In such circumstances, further investigation is required to determine the scale and nature of both sexual slavery and forced marriage. 212. In one ca se reported , a teacher in Bhamo Township in Kachin State said that she was abducted in 2012 on her way to school and taken to a military base for forced labour. One night a soldier took her to the tent of a senior Tatmadaw officer. When she fought this her arms with cigarette stubs , hit her with the butt of off icer’s attempt to rape her, he burn ed his rifle, knifed her neck and arms, and ultimately punched her so she lost consciousness. She regained consciousness during the rape, and was again knocked uncon scious by the survivor was kept in the senior officer’s tent for five to seven days and perpetrator. The penetrated repeatedly in the vagina, anus and mouth. She was threatened with gang rape if After being raped, she was not allowed to bathe she resisted. and had to sleep with other She observed other girls kept in similar conditions detainees on the ground with no blanket. by soldiers at the base, and said that three or four girls were repeatedly raped while she was 358 there. The limited information on sexual slavery in northern Myanmar available to the 213. Mission does not lead it to conclude that its incidence is low, especially considering its 352 PI - 052, PI - 056, PI - 055. 353 A/HRC PI - 052, PI - 056; /67/383, paras. 15 - 16; United Nations Human Rights Council Worki ng Group on Arbitrary Detention, “ Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its sixty - - ninth session (22 April 1 May 2 014) No. 6/2014” (1 July 2014); S. Martov, “Burma’s New Political Prisoners in Kachin State” (The Irrawaddy, 17 July 2012); see section A.3: T orture and this chapter, - treatment. other ill 354 PI 052, PI - 056. - 355 - PI 055 . 356 See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill - treatment. 357 60; S/2018/250, paras. A/HRC/32/18, para . 57 - 58. 358 - 067. PI 54

55 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 359 prevalence in Rakhine State. There are good explanations for the limited information. The restricted movement of sexual slavery victims and the physical injuries close monitoring and caused by the frequency and severity of abuse they experienced lowers the rate of successful escapes and thus of information becoming available. Further, victims confined to officers’ private quarters are less likely to be seen by others or identified as sexual slaves. The survivor’s observation of other sex slaves at the base in the above account suggests that sexual slavery was not an isolated practice of the Tatmadaw forces at least in that base. 214. There are also credible reports of Tatmadaw soldiers attempting to abduct women to forcibly marry them, including to more senior officers. These instances have been f family members of accompanied by intimidation, serious physical violence and the killing o 360 the targeted woman. June 2011, Tatmadaw soldiers visited one For example, in interviewee’s home in Puta - O, Kachin State and asked her father if they could take her away so that a g eneral could marry her. When her father refused, the so ldiers beat him so severely 361 that he died. There is information to suggest that certain Christian Kachin women are targeted for forced marriage, but also that such women are covertly forced to convert to Buddhism when they marry higher - icers, or when their husbands are ranking Tatmadaw off 362 promoted above a certain rank within the Tatmadaw. Threats and retaliation for escape 215. Women who either attempted to escape or fight, or whose rape was interrupted by 363 364 other events, were threatened by their including with death. perpetrators, The Mission found a consistent pattern that when women successfully escaped either during an attempted rape or after rape, the perpetrator soldier/s subsequently went to the survivor’s home 366 365 searching for her, g with his superior officer. In two cases, the survivor’s relative includin 367 at home was told to return the survivor to the military camp as soon as she returned home. Such visits were accompanied by physically abusing the survivor’s relatives and confiscatin g 368 per sonal property including identification In one case, Tatmadaw soldiers destroyed cards. a survivor’s parents’ kitchen, beat her parents and took them away for forced labour for a 369 week. uction of victims from 216. This pattern further reinforces the systematic character of abd 370 their homes by Tatmadaw soldiers. The involvement of senior officers to forcibly return women to lower - ranking soldiers reinforces the likelihood this is a widespread practice endorsed implicitly or explicitly by senior Tatmadaw com manders. Persecutory and cruel nature of the sexual violence 217. The investigation found a pattern of persecutory and derogatory behaviour accompanying perpetration of sexual abuse by Tatmadaw soldiers against Kachin women, 371 One survivor recounted she was called a including insults, spitting, and physical abuse. 372 Another survivor said her perpetrators “Kachin bitch” and “children of the fucker”. 373 compared Kachin people to dogs. A further witness to the gang rape of two teenage girls 359 Patterns of serious human rights See c hapter V, section D.1.b: A human rights catastrophe – violations by the Myanmar security forces. 360 PI - 068, PI - 090. 361 - 090. PI 362 - 134, PI - 007. K 363 DI - 065, PI - 005. 364 - PI 00. 365 - PI - 003, PI 005, PI - - 067, PI - 068 , QI - 084. 007, PI 366 PI - 005. 367 PI - 005, PI - 007 . 368 - PI 007, PI - 023. 369 PI - 063. 370 PI - 005, PI - 023, PI - 057, PI - 110, QI - 084. 371 PI - 003, PI - 004. 372 PI - 004 . 373 - 023. PI 55

56 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 orest heard the soldiers call the girls “witches” and tell them “we will by 20 soldiers in a f 374 torture you Kachin bitches until you are extinct”. The brutality and cruelty of the sexual violence committed by the Tatmadaw is not 218. erns of accompanying extreme physical violence only present in reports of persecution. Patt and torture, including by groups rather than individual Tatmadaw soldiers, reflect a widespread culture of tolerance, if not an explicit policy, towards humiliation and the deliberate infliction of suffering o n civilians. Both the opportunistic and more calculated commission of sexual violence against women and their relatives in their homes reinforce the Tatmadaw soldiers’ confidence in, and enjoyment of, absolute impunity for such violations. Sexual violen ce facilitated by insecurity 219. The Mission received credible reports of opportunistic and isolated sexual violence facilitated by the prevailing context of insecurity that were not directly connected to armed 375 conflict. In these cases, sexual violence i s a violation of international human rights law when committed by public officials, at their instigation or with their consent or acquiescence, but also when the State does not demonstrate diligence to protect persons from sexual - State agen ts and entities, including by investigating such acts and punishing violence by non 376 perpetrators in accordance with national law. 5. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance 220. es amounting The Tatmadaw has engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention, in many cas to enforced disappearance. Men and women, and in some cases children, were taken from their villages and detained for forced labour or because of suspected links to EAOs. Victims been held incommunicado in unofficial places of detention f or periods between a day have and two years. Most were not informed of the reason for arrest, nor brought before a judge. Legal framework (a) 221. International human rights law enshrines the right to liberty and security of the person 377 trary arrest and detention, and to freedom from arbi as well as the State’s obligation to ensure that people arrested or detained are informed of the reasons for arrest or detention, brought before a court promptly, regardless of whether this right of challenge is and are 378 exercised or not. Freedom from arbitrary detention is a rule of customary international law; it is even considered peremptory law ( jus cogens ), that is, it cannot be limited or der ogated 379 from. An arrest or detention violates international human rights law if it is unlawful, meaning that is not imposed on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 374 069. - PI 375 PI - 007, PI - 093, PI 110. - 376 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, art. 4 (c), (d) and (o); ICCPR, art. 2; United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31 - The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Co (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. venant” 13), para. 15 and 18; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (CEDAW/C/GC/28), para. 17, and “General recommendation No. 35 on gender - based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19” (CEDAW/C/GC/35), paras. 24 - 25. 377 CRC UDHR, art. 9; I CCPR , art. 9(4 ); , art. 37(b ); CAT , art. 11 ; ICRMW , art. 16(1), (4) and (9); , CRPD art. 14 ; CPED art. 17 . , 378 ICCPR , art 9(3 ). 379 See e.g. United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant” (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6), para. 8; “General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency” 11. (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11), para. 56

57 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 380 appropriate, unjust, established by law, or is otherwise arbitrary in the sense of being in 381 unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances. 222. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is also prohibited under international humanitarian 382 Detention of civilians or other protected persons, other than for reasons and in law. tances permitted by international law, is considered unlawful confinement. While circums international humanitarian law does not explicitly address security detention of civilians in international armed conflict, its requirement of humane trea tment of the context of a non - persons implies freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty and comparable protection of procedural rights (for example, to be informed of the reasons and given an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of the detention). Under the nation 223. al law of Myanmar, both the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure 383 Code prohibit detention of civilians for more than 24 hours without a court’s permission; with a constitutional exception if such detention is a matter for “precautionary measures taken f or the security of the Union or prevalence of law and order, peace and tranquillity in accord 384 with the law in the interest of the public”. The Criminal Procedure Code allows judges to - extend the 24 offences punishable hour custody period to 15 days, or 30 days in the case of 385 by more than seven years imprisonment. Under Myanmar domestic law, the powers of arrest principally lie with the Police. 224. However, under the Criminal Procedure Code, Tatmadaw officers may also arrest or confine t of an assembly that manifestly endangers public security when no persons forming par magistrate can be communicated with, but they must communicate with a magistrate when it 386 becomes practicable to do so. Furthermore, the State Protection Act, in force from 1975 until its r epeal in May 2016, allowed Tatmadaw officers to arrest and detain any person when 387 ordered to do so by the “Central Board”. Anyone taken into custody by the Tatmadaw must be swiftly handed over to police authorities. 225. earances is a norm of peremptory law ( jus cogens ) . The prohibition of enforced disapp Enforced disappearances violate the right to liberty and security of the person and violate or constitute a grave threat to the right to life, along with several other rights. International 388 w also prohibits enforced disappearances. An enforced disappearance is humanitarian la constituted by three elements: (1) a person is detained or otherwise deprived of liberty; (2) the deprivation of liberty is carried out by State agents or by persons or groups of perso ns a refusal acting with the to authorisation, support or acquiescence of the State; and (3) acknowledge the deprivation of liberty , or conceal ing the fate or whereabouts of the 389 w. outside the protection of the la disappeared person, which place such a person 380 United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General comment No. 35 - Article 9 (Liberty and security of person)” (CCPR/C/GC/35), para. 11. 381 Ibid. para. 12: “The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law”, but must be reted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predicta interp bility and as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. due process of law, 382 See common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions, requiring that all civilians and persons hors de combat are treated humanely. Arbitrary detention is considered incompatible with this requirement. See also ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 99. 383 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 21(b); Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 61. 384 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 376. 385 Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 60 - 61, 81, 167. 386 Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 131. 387 State Protection Act (1975), s. 15; Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 21. As per s. 8 of the State Protection Act, a Central Board is formed by the Cabinet and chaired by the Minister for Home and Religious Affairs, and includes the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 388 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 98 and 150. 389 CPED, art. 2. 57

58 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (b) Findings Arbitrary deprivation of liberty The Mission received widespread and consistent accounts of individuals being 226. arbitrarily arrested and then detained by the Tatmadaw throughout the reporting period, and from across Kachin and Shan States. Many individuals were detained for the purpose of forced labour. The Mission also received reliable and consistent accounts of individuals being arrested and detained after the Tatmadaw were attacked by EAOs, or during military operations, because they were suspected of being a member or supporter of the 390 organization. Individuals were seemingly arrested simply because they were in the vicinity of a recent attack, or because they were from a village near to the incident, and of the same dividuals of ethnicity as the group in question. This appeared to reflect a mentality that all in 391 For example, one victim from Mogaung a given ethnicity supported the associated EAO. Township, Kachin State, who was detained for three days in August 2017, reported that village was a soldiers from the Tatmadaw repeatedly questioned him about who from his member of the KIA, refusing to believe him when he responded that the villagers were simply “ordinary people”, with one of the members of the Tatmadaw insisting that “all Kachin men 392 are members of the KIA.” 393 394 rest and detention included men and women. The victims of arbitrary ar In some 227. 395 396 Children were also detained, and village leaders were selectively targeted. cases men because they were themselves suspected, were subjected to forced labour, or were detained 397 with their mothers. 398 - arrests and detention. 228. For example, during The Mission received accounts of mass intense fighting between the Northern Alliance and the Tatmadaw in Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State, more than 100 people were arrested on 20 November 2016 and 399 detained by the Tatmadaw in a military base. The Mission also received credible information indicating that the Tatmadaw has 229. 400 detained individuals, primarily or partially, in order to extract bribes. For example, one male victim reported that he was arrested a t a checkpoint while travelling from Hpakant to Myitkyina in 2016 and asked for jade or money. He was kept overnight in a , Kachin State 401 - tent serving as a makeshift lock up before being released. Duration and perpetrators 402 230. In most of the accounts re ceived, individuals were detained for several days. However, in some cases, individuals were detained for longer periods, of one month or 403 more. One victim from a village in Kyethi Township, Shan State, reporting being detained 404 abour camp from 2015 to 2017. for two years in a forced l 390 DI - 060, DI - 0 66, DI 067, PI - - - 044, PI - 047, PI - 058, PI - 086, SI - 004. 035, PI 391 DI - 066, PI - 054, PI - 059, PI - 074, PI - - 086. 075, PI 392 PI - 044. 393 075. - DI - 067, PI - 059, PI - 062, PI 394 PI - 058, PI - 066, PI - 086. 395 - DI - 063, PI - 074, PI 084. 396 DI - 067, PI - 035, PI 111 . - 397 - DI 071, PI - 047, PI - 063, QI - 094, SI - 003, V - 055 . 398 DI - 066. See this chapter, section A.8: E mblematic incidents (Tanai). 399 DI - 058, DI - 060, V - 056. See this chapter, section A.8: E mblematic incidents (Monekoe). 400 072, PI - DI - 064, DI - - 011, PI 022 . 401 DI - 064. 402 - One day or less: PI - 029, PI 054, PI - 058, PI 081. Two days; PI - 033, PI - 047, SI - 004. - Three days: PI - 044 PI - 092, PI - 083, PI - 061. Four days: PI - 021, PI - 084, PI - 095. 067, PI Six days: PI - 077.1 week: DI - 006, PI - 080. - 403 - 15 days: DI - 060.1 month: PI 011, PI - 019, PI - 079 , PI - 111. 2.5 months: PI - 085. 6 - 7 months: PI - 068. 404 013. - PI 58

59 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 In nearly all accounts, Tatmadaw soldiers were identified as the perpetrators of 231. 405 The Mission also received credible accounts of militias arbitrary arrests and detention. 406 members of the Tatmadaw. participating in arrests and detention alongside Accounts were 407 officers being responsible. intelligence also received of the SaYaPa Lack of compliance with procedural safeguards 232. The Mission amassed a consistent body of information drawing a pattern of civilians being d etained in locations not officially recognised as places of detention, both in the context of forced labour and because they were suspected of links with ethnic armed organizations. 408 sometime s in makeshift Detained individuals were often kept in military bases or camps, 410 411 409 Other places of detention included houses and and in SaYaPa offices. lock ups, 412 monasteries or in multiple locations in forest areas for example during forced labour 413 In some cases, victims were initially held in the location where they were portering. 414 arrested and then moved to military camps or SaYaPa offices. 233. The Tatmadaw also systematically detained individuals in these unofficial places of with procedural safeguards. Victims consistently told the detention without compliance 415 For example, a female victim Mission they were not informed of the reasons for their arrest. reported how she was arrested, together with her two children, without being given reasons, ownship, Kachin State, in August 2017: in Mogaung T There was fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA. We ran away and when we came back to the village there were soldiers everywhere. I was arrested with my two children. I was taken to a primary school and put in a They classroom with a guard. did not give us any reasons, they just locked us in all day. In the evening they took us 416 . to the forest, and two days later they let us go 234. Most victims were held incommunicado without being able to inform their families 417 o f their location, had no access to a lawyer and were not brought before a court. In some cases, individuals arrested and detained for suspected links to armed groups 235. ns were eventually brought to court and charged, usually under the Unlawful Associatio 418 Act. However, in these instances this was after a period of being detained incommunicado 419 For example one individual from Waingmaw Township, in unofficial places of detention. Kachin was arrested and held on a farm befo re being State, reported how her relative transferred to a Police Station: In 2016, was on the way to farm crops when he was arre sted by the my relative - up with guns pointed at him. The told me they saw him tied Tatmadaw. A friend y brother was denying soldiers were saying that he was a member of the KIA and m this. The soldiers asked for 3,000 Kyat in exchange for his release. We tried to gather the money but they said it was taking too long so they took him to a farm nearby. Then 405 PI - 006, PI - 011, PI - 020, PI - 021, PI - 026, PI - 062, PI - 068, PI - 074, PI 089, PI - 096. - 406 PI - 054, PI - - 004 . 056, SI 407 . 056 052, PI PI - - 055, PI - 408 - 067, DI - 058, DI - 060, PI - 006, PI - 020, PI - 061, PI - 062 , PI DI 066, PI - 067, PI - 068, PI - 078, PI - 079, - - 084. PI 409 DI - 064, PI - 011. 410 PI - 052, PI - 055, PI - 056. 411 PI - 053, PI - - 004 . 075, SI 412 - PI - 056, PI - 074, PI - 076, PI 111 . 413 PI - 047, PI - 080, PI - 085, PI - 095, PI - 096. 414 PI - 035, PI - 052 , PI - 056. 415 PI - 011, PI - 019, PI - PI - 054, QI - 080. 047, 416 PI - 047. 417 035, PI DI - 067, PI - 006, PI - - 044, PI - 077, PI - 080. 418 See this chapter, section A.C: Lack of recourse. 419 - 109. PI - 022, PI - 052, PI - 055, PI - 056, PI 59

60 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 r one he was moved to a district police station and held there fo month. Now he is in 420 . prison 236. The Mission received information that, in some instances, individuals, including children, who were transferred to recognised places of detention were still not afforded full procedural safeguards, including: not • being provided with information about the charges against them in a language 421 which they understand; 422 • being held incommunicado; and 423 being denied access to legal counsel until after their hearing. • The Mission received accounts of Tatmadaw soldiers or SaYaPa officers forcing 237. written statements during detention. Victims reported different issues in victims to sign pre - en statement relation to these statements, including not being aware of the contents of the writt 424 - or document; the statements wrongly asserting the individual had not been subject to ill 426 425 For example, one victim from a treatment; or the statements being admissions of guilt. village in Kyaukme Township, Shan State, who was arrested in Aug ust 2017 and held for more than 24 hours, was made to sign a document with his thumb which stated that he was “the enemy”, was involved in political activities and would “not be involved with political 427 activities in the future”. Detention in inhuman co nditions 238. Victims consistently gave accounts of inhuman conditions in unofficial places of 428 - treatment including being held for periods: detention which could amount to ill 429 in inadequate accommodation, including in the open air without bedding; • 430 thout access to adequate sanitary facilities; wi • 431 receiving • without adequate food being provided, including being denied food, 432 insufficient food or food of poor quality; without access to safe drinking water when needed, including being denied access t o • 433 water entirely or being allowed only a limited amount or only water that is unsafe; and 434 435 • without access to health care, in one account leading to death. 239. For example, a male victim from a village in Puta - O Township, Kachin State, who for six days in 2017 reported poor conditions and his friend dying in detention: was detained I was arrested by the Tatmadaw during a church festival with nine other people. We had to carry rice between a military base and our village. We were given only a small port ion of hard rice to eat each day and felt hungry all the time. We could only drink one cup of water per day and were not allowed to drink from the stream nearby. One 420 - 022. PI 421 V - 055. 422 - 052 V PI - 118. 423 V - 055, V - 112. 424 046, PI PI - - 056. 425 PI - 044 . 426 PI - 035, PI - 052. 427 PI - 035. 428 See this chapter, section A.3: T orture and other ill - treatment. 429 - DI - 058, DI - 060, PI 079, PI - 095 . 430 060, PI . DI - 058, DI - - 109 431 DI - 060, PI - - 096. 038, PI 432 - DI - 058, DI - 060, PI - 019, PI - 020, PI - 044, PI - 080, PI - 083, PI - 085, PI - 092, PI 095. 433 - DI - 060, PI - 019, PI - 020, PI - 077, PI - 083, PI - 084, PI 085, PI - 095. 434 - PI - 035, PI 077, PI - 080. 435 077. - PI 60

61 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 day one of my friends was very sick with stomach problems and could not walk. One of the s oldiers kicked him in the stomach making it worse. We carried him but before reaching the village my friend died. The soldiers said we were responsible for his death and would be placed in jail and tortured because we had killed him. We ut afterwards Tatmadaw soldiers came to my house to look for managed to escape b 436 me and said they had opened a case against me for the death of my friend. 240. The Mission was able to collect only limited information on conditions in official e reports indicate that individuals detained there were also places of detention, but credibl held in inhuman conditions, including in inadequate accommodation in overcrowded cells 437 with an insufficient number of beds. The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission ainees are kept in overcrowded conditions in several detention has acknowledged that det 438 facilities including in Lashio and Myitkyina prisons. Torture, ill - treatment, sexual violence, and killings in unofficial places of detention Detained individuals were frequently subjected to torture and ill 241. treatment while in - unofficial places of detention, in particular where the individual was being questioned on 439 or for either walking or working too slowly during forced suspected links to EAOs, 441 440 ted to racist, ethnic or dehumanizing insults. One victim labour. Victims were also subjec from a village in Sumprabum Township, Kachin State, described how 16 villagers were arrested, detained and questioned during a period of fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw in 2015: Tatmadaw. Soldiers In Decem ber 2015, there was fighting between the KIA and the entered my village and six villagers were arrested including two village administrators. Soldiers also arrested 10 people from another village called Hka Garan including two village ad ministrators and took us all to a military base. The soldiers interrogated us; they threatened to kill us if we didn’t answer properly and accused us of being KIA soldiers. We told them that we are not soldiers and have ust villagers but they said we had to be KIA nothing to do with the KIA, we are j soldiers and hit us with the backs of their guns and insulted us. Every day for a week, 442 we received the same questions and every day we gave the same answers. 443 The Mission also verified that victims were k and subjected to illed in detention, 242. 444 sexual violence while in detention. End of unofficial detention In some cases individuals detained for forced labour or because of suspected links to 243. 445 armed groups were released by the Tatmadaw including follow ing an intervention by 446 village administrators or upon payment of a sum of money. However, victims also seized 447 For example, one female victim from Waingmaw Township, opportunities to escape. , reported how, after being detained for several mon Kachin State ths on a military base in 436 - 077. PI 437 PI - 038, PI - 109. 438 - “Statement Republic of the Union of Myanmar Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, e.g. regarding visit to Mandalay, Naung Cho, Thi Paw and Lashio Township Prisons and Work Stations and Statement No. (8/2015)” “Statement by the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission on its http://www.mnhrc. visit to the Kachin State (13 December 2011)” - , available at org.mm/en/statements 2/. 439 DI - 066, DI - 067, PI 004, PI - 054, PI - 059, PI - 074, PI - 086. See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and - other ill treatment. - 440 See this chapter, section A.6: Forced labour. 441 DI - 066, PI - 004, PI - 059. 442 DI - 067. 443 section A.2: Unlawful killings. See this chapter, 444 - PI - 006, PI 067, PI 068. See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender - based violence. - 445 - PI 044, PI - 053, PI - 058, PI - 081, SI - 004 . 446 - PI - 035, PI 075, PI - 081. 447 - 085. PI - 006, PI - 029, PI - 033, PI - 066, PI - 077, PI - 079, PI - 084, PI 61

62 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2012, she managed to escape one night, when the soldiers were drunk, and run away through 448 the forest. The Mission received consistent reports of Tatmadaw soldiers shooting at individuals 244. 449 Two victims further reported being left behind to die in the forest by fleeing detention. 450 Tatmadaw soldiers because they were unable to walk. In some cases, those initially held in unofficial places of detention were subsequently 245. 451 transferred to official places of det ention. Enforced disappearance 246. The Mission received credible accounts of disappearances, many amounting to 452 In some cases, enforced disappearances carried out by the Tatmadaw and SaYaPa. individuals who were arrested and disappeared were later confirmed to have been in the 453 Active efforts were made to conceal the fate, or custody of the Tatmadaw or SaYaPa. whereabouts, of these individuals. For example, Dumdaw Nawng L 247. at, President of the Kachin Baptist Church in Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State, and his nephew and assist ant pastor Langjaw Gam 454 December 2016 and then disappeared. In early Seng, were called to a military base on 24 journalists around their damaged church, which they December 2016, the pastors had shown alleged had been hit by a Tatmadaw airstrike. News articles featuring pictures of the church had been released in the weeks prior to their disappearance, with one article explicitly 455 A missing person’s alleging Tatmadaw resp onsibility, published on 23 December 2016. report was filed with police on 4 January 2017. On 10 January 2017, Presidential Spokesperson Zaw Htay reportedly denied that they were detained by the military and 456 suggested they may have been On 19 January 2017, the Commander - in - taken by the KIA. General Min Aung Laing, confirmed in a Facebook post that the men were - Chief, Senior 457 It was later confirmed that they had been detained in a military detained by the military. nsferred to Muse police station on 24 January 2017, a month after they camp, before being tra 458 had first been detained. During their detentio n they were coerced to sign confessions. The Mission received credible examples of individuals who were searching for 248. 459 ctims being given conflicting information on their fate by the authorities. disappeared vi For instance, an individual searching for Laphai Gam, a villager from Muse Township who disappeared in December 2016, was reportedly told by the police that he had been arrested y the Tatmadaw and would be released in a few days. When he did not appear a few days b later, the individual went to a Tatmadaw base and was told by a soldier that the victim had heard through been seen talking to the KIA and that the KIA may be responsible. Later, they an intermediary that a Tatmadaw commander had indicated that the victim had been detained 460 and then released. The whereabouts of the victim remains unknown to date. 249. Tatmadaw Another case involves Sumlut Roi Ja, who was reportedly arrested by the on 28 October 2011 from a field and detained in a military camp near Hkai Ban village, Moemauk Township, Kachin State. She was reportedly arrested alongside two other an Army individuals who managed to escape. She was later seen in the military camp, and 448 068. - PI 449 DI - 067, PI - 026, PI - 029, PI - 084. See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings. 450 PI - 021, PI - 080. 451 Ibid. 452 - DI - 059, K - 138, K - 139, PI - 037, PI - 038, PI - 052, PI 069, PI - 106, V - 056, V - 057, V - 121, V - 122. 453 PI 038, PI - 037, PI - - 052. 454 PI - 037, PI - 038, V - 057. 455 L. Weng, “Bishop Says Mong Ko Church Damaged by Government Air Strikes” (The Irrawaddy, 23 December 2016). 456 J. Zaw, “Concern mounts for two missing Baptists in Shan State” (UCA news, 10 January 2017). 457 Mission. Post on file with the 458 PI - 037, PI - - 058. See also this chapter , section C.3: Lack of recourse. 038, V 459 138, K DI - 059, K - - 139, V - 056. 460 056. - K - 149 , V 62

63 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Commander stated she was detained and would be released the next day, but she did not appear. Letters were sent to the Kachin State Chief Minister, copied to several other 461 and a habeas corpus petition brought before the Supreme Court in 2012. The authorities, Supreme Court rejected the petition based on a case file from an investigation carried out by the Northern Regional Command’s Base Strategic Operation Command located in Moe 462 Meik. Special The Myanmar Government responded to a communication from the Rapporteur on Myanmar and other special procedures mandate holders in 2013, stating that personnel from the military post “did not carry out any activities whatsoever outside their 463 camp”. However, in a documentary film released in 2015, a soldier from the military camp in question, who was detained by the KIA, stated that the soldiers had left their camp looking for food and had encountered Sumlut Roi Ja, and that their commanding officer had falsely 464 their camp. No new investigations have told the Northern Command that they had not left 465 been conducted and her fate remains unknown. 250. The lack of compliance with procedural safeguards for detention which should protect against disappearances (see above) meant family members were frequently unawar e of the whereabouts of their detained relatives until they escaped, were released or were transferred 466 to official places of detention, which in some cases was weeks or months later. In other their families do not know cases, individuals arrested by the Tatmadaw never returned and 467 their fate. For example, one woman from a village in Tanai Township, Kachin State, reported that her husband disappeared after he went gold mining in January 2014. She was told by witnesses that he was detained by the Tatmadaw i n April 2014 and taken to do forced 468 A victim arrested by the Tatmadaw in labour, but he has not been heard from since. Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State in November 2016, and later released, told the 469 would not even find my body”. Mission, “I was worried that if I die here, my family Other individuals reported being arrested alongside family members, but leaving them behind when 470 they managed to escape detention and never hearing from them again. ividuals were detained by the 251. The Mission also received accounts of cases where ind Tatmadaw and, after family members searched for them, were found dead, often buried, and 471 sometimes with ropes binding their wrists. In two cases reported to the Mission, Tatmadaw 472 onsible for the killings. The Mission has also solders were reportedly later found to be resp received credible reports killings of multiple individuals at the of the Tatmadaw committing 473 and the discovery of graves containing the remains of a number of individuals. same time These and other accounts received by the Mission point to a pattern of intentional concealing 474 of the remains of individuals who are killed during detention. 252. In some cases family members or persons associated with disappeared individuals 475 submitted complaints to the However, others did not. authorities about the disappearance. One individual told the Mission of being too afraid to complain, and it is likely that many in 476 this situation shared the same fears. These fears are not unfounded given the numerous cases veri fied by the Mission where the Tatmadaw threatened or brought legal charges 461 K - 138.3. 462 138.2. - K 463 Letter from the Permenant Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nat ions z Office andother International Organi ations in Geneva, 16 March 2013, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=82270 464 K. McLeod/ The Disappearance of Roi Ja” ( DVB Multimedia Group, “ ). 2015 465 V - 332. 466 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings. 467 PI - 004, PI - - 099. 069, PI 468 PI - 069. 469 K - 148. 470 - 099. PI 004, PI - 471 K - 139, K - 140, PI - 082, PI - 106, V - 021, V - section A.2: Unlawful killings. 022. See this chapter, 472 K - 140, V 021, V - 022. - 473 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings. 474 DI 063, PI - 062. See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings. - 475 - DI - 059, K - 139, PI 037, PI - 038, PI - 052. 476 - 057. DI 63

64 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 477 Some said they did against individuals reporting or alleging its involvement in violations. not see any point in filing a complaint with the police or Tatmadaw, and instead they 478 th emselves searched for the missing person. One individual from Loilen Township, Shan State, told the Mission he did not file a complaint concerning his missing father as “the government does not care about us and the Tatmadaw are abusive - there is no just ice for the 479 Shan”. His father was arrested by the Tatmadaw in 2011 and was then missing for a week before his body was found in the forest with his hands tied. The Mission also received sing in Mansi credible information that in one case, where two individuals were mis T ownship, Kachin State in 2018, the Tatmadaw denied villagers permission to search for 480 them. In another case, an individual told the Mission how she had to persuade her village admi nistrator to look for her a relative who had been arrested b y the Tatmadaw in Bhamo Township, Kachin State in January 2018: My relative us that went to check the cattle and didn’t come back. Some people told they had seen him tied up and with Tatmadaw soldiers. We asked the village rmission to go an d look for him , but he said it was too dangerous. administrator pe sted and eventually we were allowed to go. We found his body one month later, We insi see bullet wounds in his back facing down in a ditch. We could – it looked like he had 481 also been beaten . 6. Forced labo ur and forced recruitment of adults and children 482 253. Forced labour is a common feature of life for many in northern Myanmar. The Mission verified a pattern of continuing systematic use by the Tatmadaw of forced labour, enches, guiding or cooking. Soldiers routinely arrived in including for portering, digging tr villages without warning and took people for forced labour, often for weeks at a time. Some of those taken were required to fight for the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw recruited children throughout the rep orting period, although it has undertaken some efforts to address this issue. (a) Legal framework 254. The International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No. 29), which Myanmar acceded to in 1955, defines forced or compulsory labour as “ all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”. Under this Convention, Myanmar is obliged to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period. Myanmar has also acceded to the International Labour Organization Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 (No. 182), under which it is obliged to take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibitio n and elimination of the worst forms of child labour 477 See this chapter, sect ion C.3: Lack of recourse. 478 PI - 069, PI - 082. 479 PI - 082. 480 K - 139. 481 PI - 106. 482 In 1998, a Commission of Inquiry of the International Labour Organization (ILO) published a report concluding that Myanmar violated its obligation to suppress the use of force d or compulsory labour “in a widespread and systematic manner, with a total disregard for the human dignity, safety and health and basic needs of the people”. The Commission found that there was abundant evidence showing “pervasive use of forced labour im posed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by the authorities and the military”. It concluded that “it is a story of gross denial of human rights to which the people of Myanmar have been subjected particularly since 1988 and from which they find n o escape except fleeing from the country”. See, “Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma). Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Force d Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)” (ILO, Geneva, 1998). Some moderately positive improvements in the use of forced labour were reported from 2002 onwards, after greater engagement with the ILO began, suggesting the central authorities no longer requisitio ned labour for major national infrastructure projects (e.g. A/HRC/4/14, para. 44; A/HRC/7/18, para. 33). However, systematic forced labour by the military reportedly continued unabated. See e.g. ILO Report on ILO Activities in Myanmar, 20 February B. 320/INS/6(Rev.); A/HRC/16/59, para. 93. 2014, G 64

65 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 as a matter of urgency. Forced or compulsory labour is also prohibited under international human rights law. Provisions to that effect feature in several human rights treaties ratified by ESC (art. 6.1), the CRC (art. 32) and the CRPD (art. 27.2). Myanmar: the IC The definition of forced or compulsory labour comprises three basic elements: work 255. or service, which is exacted under the menace of a penalty, and undertaken involuntarily. “Work or service” refers to all types of work, service or employment, occurring in any activity, industry or sector (both public and private). “Menace of any penalty” refers to a wide range of penalties used to compel someone to perform the work or service, including penal sanctions and various forms of direct or indirect coercion, such as physical violence, - payment of wages. Involuntariness refers to the free and psychological threats or the non informed consent of a worker to enter into an employment relationship and the f reedom to 483 leave the employment at any time. 256. International law permits some exemptions to the general prohibition of forced labour. In addition to compulsory military service, prison labour and work in the context of emergencies, the exemptions includ e normal civic obligations and minor communal service. Examples of civic obligations include compulsory jury service and the duty to assist a person in danger. “Minor communal service” means service performed by the members of the community in the direct i nterest of the community. It must be “minor”, that is, related primarily to maintenance work and, in exceptional cases, to the erection of certain buildings intended to improve the social conditions of the population of the community itself; The service mu st also be “communal”, that is, in the direct interest of the community (and not related to the execution of works intended to benefit a wider group). Importantly, the members of the community which has to perform the services, or their direct representati ves, 484 must have the right to be consulted in regard to the need for such services. 257. Section 359 of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar prohibits forced labour but allows for exceptions (“hard labour as a punishment for crime duly convicted and duties assi gned thereupon by the Union in accordance with the law in the interest of the public”). Although the formulation is somewhat unclear, these exceptions appear to exceed the permissible 485 exceptions under international labour law and international human rights The Towns law. Act (1907) and the Village Act (1908), which gave broad powers to local authorities to requisition labour from villagers, were repealed in 2012 and replaced with the Ward and Village Tract Administration Law. This Law explicitly sanctions the use of forced labour 487 486 does the Myanmar Penal Code (art. 374). (art. 27) as (b) Findings 258. The Mission found a pattern of systematic use of men, women and children for forced labour across Kachin and Shan States, throughout the reporting period, in cluding in areas of the States not subject to active conflict. In many instances the Tatmadaw arrived in a village and arrested many people who were then detained for forced labour, without warning or 488 489 consultation. Sometimes, villagers were taken directly In some cases from their homes. 483 International Labour Organization, “ILO Standards on Forced Labour - The new Protocol and See Recommendation at a Glance / International Labour Office, Fundamental Principles and Rights at ” (ILO, Geneva, 2016). Work Branch 484 See, “Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma). Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by n, 1930 (No. 29)” (ILO, Geneva, 1998), paras. 205 - 213. Myanmar of the Forced Labour Conventio 485 See e.g. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 99th Session, 2010, p. 253, para. 11. 486 at or use force for his own interest that infringe anyone’s interest such as “Whoever commit any thre forced labor shall be fined either less than one year imprisonment or 100,000 Kyat or both.” 487 “Whoever unlawfully compels any person to labour against the will of that person sh all punished with imprisonment, of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.” 488 - DI 057, PI - 019, PI - 081, PI - 083, PI - 084, PI - 095, SI - 003 . 489 094. - PI - 081, PI - 084, PI 65

66 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 490 this was done in an organized fashion, such as house by house, on the basis of a quota for 491 493 492 or with the cooperation of village leaders. For example, through a list, each family, one individual from Namhsan Township, Shan State, recounted how 40 soldiers entered his village in March 2013 and called a meeting of the village and then took people away for 494 Individuals were also taken for forced labour from the areas surrounding forced labour. 495 496 their villages while they were fishing or farming or running errands or while travelling. O Township, Kachin State, described being stopped For example, one individual from Puta - by the Tatmadaw while travelling on a highway in Febr uary 2018, then being taken to a 497 In another incident from military base and being required to dig trenches for eight days. 2015, individuals were taken for forced labour from a camp for internally displaced persons 498 in Bhamo Township, Kachin State. 499 ndividuals stated that it was not possible to refuse to participate in forced labour, 259. I 500 In some cases, arrest for and no compensation of payment was received for the labour. 501 o forced labour was accompanied by destruction of houses and looting of property, r by 502 treatment against the individual, - threats, including death threats, or ill or their family 503 members. For example, a teacher from Bhamo Township, Kachin State, described how she treated while being tak en for forced labour in was threatened and ill 2: - 201 I was on my way to work when four soldiers stopped me. The soldiers asked me where I was going and I explained I was going to the school where I teach. The soldiers said “you don’t need to teach any more, come with us.” I told them that I had to go to chool because the students had exams and needed their teacher. The soldiers got s angry. They pointed their guns at me and said “do not speak to us this way, you need to follow us, if you don’t come with us you will die.” They slapped me, blindfolded me 504 made me walk with them carrying heavy bags and . 505 While in some cases only men were taken for forced labour, 260. frequently women were 506 507 Most child victims were also victims. Children were also subjected to forced labour. 508 aged 12 or over, but one victim fro m Kutkai Township, Shan State, reported being taken for portering on multiple occasions from nine years of age until she left Myanmar aged 27, 509 following an attempted rape during forced labour in 2012. Victims of forced labour also 510 511 and elderly individuals. included individuals suf fering from health issues For example, one child from Tanai Township, Kachin State, described how all the people in her village were subjected to forced labour: There is a military base nearby my village. Villagers are often forc ed to work for the soldiers at the base, cooking, cleaning, building and doing other tasks. Even the 490 PI 081, QI - 093. - 491 - 006, PI - 007, QI - 08 6. PI 492 PI - 006, PI - 007, PI - 033. 493 - PI - 011, PI 033, PI - 095, PI - 109, PI 111. - 494 PI - 095. 495 095. - - PI - 060, PI - 079, PI 096, QI 496 - 029, PI - 067, PI - 078, PI - 089, PI - 096, PI - 111. PI 497 - 078. PI 498 PI - 026. 499 DI - 064, PI - 017, PI - 078, QI - 077, QI 086. - 500 PI - 005, PI - 013, PI - 021. 501 - PI - 023, PI - 067, PI 080. 502 PI - 022, PI - 023, PI - - 067, PI - 099. 063, PI 503 022, PI PI - - 068. 504 PI - 067. 505 DI - 063, PI - 077, PI - 080. 506 - PI 006, PI - 063, PI - 067, PI 068, PI - 089, PI - 099. - 507 - DI - 063, DI - 071, DI - 072, DI - 073, PI 022, PI - 063, QI - 084 . 508 DI - 063, DI 072, DI - 073 . - 509 QI - 084 . 510 033, DI PI - - 071 . 511 071. - PI - 063, DI 66

67 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 – children have to participate they carry small bricks for building and the elderly have 512 to plant trees and do other work . The location and duration of forced labour varied. Many individuals were subjected 261. 513 514 to forced labour at military bases, which in some cases were close to their villages. 515 Others were required to travel long distances through the forest with the Tatmadaw. 516 uired to cook for the Tatmadaw in their own homes or, in two Individuals were also req 517 cases, act as translators for the Tatmadaw. 262. In some cases individuals would carry out forced labour during the day and then return 518 to their homes during the nights. However, in many cases individuals subjected to forced 519 This labour were not able to return to their homes until they were released or escaped. 520 522 521 to a month or more, or in one case two years. varied from a period of a day, Measures 523 were taken to try to prevent individuals escaping, including tying up their feet with chains, 525 524 Victims also reported tying up their hands, and threatening retribution if they escaped. 526 ivity. For example, one woman that soldiers would shoot at those attempting to escape capt from Waingmaw Township, Kachin State, who was forced to act as a porter for one day in December 2016, told the Mission, “I decided to escape after my friend was raped. When we started to run, soldiers were shooting at us. I f ell down a cliff and lost consciousness. When 527 I woke up I was covered in blood.” Forced labour has been a common feature of village life for many in Kachin and Shan 263. 528 One individual reported that in her village in Kutkai Township, Shan State, forced States. 529 labour happened almost weekly. t another individual Forced labour was so prevalent tha from Puta O Township, Kachin State, told the Mission she did not know it was a human - rights violation until she left the country. In the words of a victim from Myitkyina Township, Kachin State, who was taken for forced labour twice a month or more from the age of 12 or 530 13, “We have done this for our whole lives”. 264. Individuals subjecte d to forced labour were required to perform a variety of tasks. 531 Many of those detained were required to act as porters for the Tatmadaw, carrying heavy 532 534 533 and in some cases weapons , clothes . Porters would often have packages including food stances over difficult terrain and for multiple consecutive days. For example, to walk long di one individual from Shan State who was forced to work as a porter in December 2014 ribed being required to walk desc ing heavy packs and weapons over a long distance carry 512 - 063. PI 513 - PI - 006, PI - 019, PI - 020, PI - 061, PI - 063, PI - 068, PI - 077, PI 079, PI - 084. 514 PI - 061, PI - - 077. 063, PI 515 PI - 033, PI - 083, PI - 085, PI - 099. 516 094. PI - 060, PI - 075, PI - 093, PI - 517 PI - 111, QI - 077. 518 007. - PI - 005, PI 519 See this chapter, section A.5: A rbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance. 520 - 007, PI - 029, PI PI 081. - 521 PI - 011, PI - - 068, PI - 079, PI - 085. 019, PI 522 PI - 013. 523 098. PI - 019, QI - 524 PI - 012, PI - 060, PI - QI - 093. 084, 525 078. PI - 025, PI - 026, PI - 526 085. PI - 026, PI - 029, PI - 084, QI - 527 PI - 029. 528 022, PI DI - 064, DI - 072 (2010), PI - 007, PI - - 077, PI - 089, PI - 109, QI - 090. 529 QI - 084. 530 DI - 063. 531 - DI - 057, PI - 022, PI - 023, PI - 033, PI - 060, PI - 067, PI - 067, PI - 076, PI - 077, PI - 080, PI - 083, PI 089, PI 092, PI - 094, PI - 095. - 532 021, PI PI - 006, PI - 011, PI - 020, PI - - 022, PI - 029, PI - 077. 533 - PI - 022, PI 076, PI - 079. 534 - 099. DI - 063, DI - 064, PI - 022, PI - 076, PI - 080, PI - 096, PI 67

68 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 e south of Namhsan Township into neighbouring Manton Township, over four days from th 535 Other common types of work, carried out by men and women, included: without any food. 536 Acting as guides to show soldiers the route between villages • 537 • Digging trenches 538 • ning Clea 539 Cooking • 540 • Collecting firewood 541 Cutting down trees • 542 • Constructing roads or buildings in military compounds Individuals frequently had to perform a combination of different tasks. For example, 265. person from Puta told the Mission about the tasks she was - one O Township, Kachin State required to complete when taken for forced labour on many different occasions: In my village every family had to participate in forced labour. The soldiers came to the village and they assigned responsibilities to e ach family. There was no way out. They would register the names of the villagers who had to work. The military was building a road, so we had to carry stones and heavy materials for them. We also had 543 to wash clothes, clean and cook their food. My parents w ere used as porters. The Mission received repeated accounts that individuals subjected to forced labour 266. tmadaw was travelling through the were made to walk at the front of the line when the Ta 544 Some told the Mission that they were put at the front to forest in areas of active conflict. act as “human mine sweepers”, being the first to encounter any landmines in the area, rather than the soldiers. Several victims of forced labour witnessed other civilians being injured or 545 killed by landmines during force d labour. Others subjected to forced labour were killed or 546 . injured during clashes between the Tatmada The Mission received w and EAOs information on two cases where individuals were forced to wear Tatmadaw uniforms while 547 walking at the front of the line, Victims further exposing them to attacks, death and injury. 548 were also intentionally killed during forced labour. Individuals subjected to forced labour were frequently also subjected to ill - treatment. 267. Most of these victims who spoke to the Mission reported that they had been beaten during 549 551 550 often for walking too slowly or resting , . Individuals were also subjected forced labour 552 Women detained for forced labour were vulnerable to sexual violence, and to torture. several victims told the Mission that they were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual 535 PI - 096. 536 - 060, PI - 095, QI PI 095. - 537 PI - 061, PI 084. - 538 PI - 067, PI 078, PI - 084. - 539 - 067 PI PI - 079 PI - 080 PI - 104. - 068, PI - 006, PI - 020, PI - 084, PI - 080, PI - 067, PI - 063, PI 540 - 065, PI - 006, PI - 020. DI 541 - 019, PI - 077. PI 542 020, PI - - 007, PI - PI - 061, PI - 089. 006, PI 543 - 007. PI 544 - PI - 020, PI - 022, PI - 076, PI - 085, PI 104, QI - 95. 0 545 PI - - 104. 085, PI 546 080. PI - 022, PI - 547 - 020, PI - 085. PI 548 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings. 549 078, PI DI - 066, PI - 013, PI - 021, PI - 029, PI - 033, PI - 044, PI - 053, PI - 061, PI - 078, Pi - - 083, PI - 084, PI - 086, PI 089, PI - 094, PI - 099. - 550 084, PI PI - 083, PI - - 089, PI - 099. 551 PI - 078, PI - 089. 552 - treatment. See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill 68

69 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 violence by the military in this context. One woman who was detained for forced labour in 553 Bhamo Township in Kachin State in 2012 was kept as a sexual slave for up to seven days. There was also a complete disregard for the humanity of the victims. Soldiers used 268. derogatory language, on ethnic or religious grounds, or dehumanising language against 554 555 For example, a female victim from Puta - victims. Others were subjected to death threats. chin State, who was subjected to forced labour for several days in June 2015, O Township, Ka reported being subjected to death threats: The soldiers came to our house and asked for one person for forced labour. As I was e bags which were very heavy. I the eldest sibling I had to go. We had to carry som don’t know what was in them, the soldiers said “you shouldn’t ask anything. If you ask we will kill you.” We weren’t allowed to rest all day. When it was dark we stopped in the forest. We had to look for firewood and prepare dinner. Even though we cooked the food, the soldiers did not offer us any. In the evening we had to keep working. They kicked us saying “walk faster, walk faster.” One of the soldiers tried to rape me but I ery angry. He beat me but said this pushed him hard and he fell down. He got very, v time he would spare my life because I had lots of work still left to do. I still have scars The solders said that our lives were in their hands. That they could from the beating. . They let us go but sai d they would be back as they had another task do anything to us for us. I felt that next time they might kill us so I could not stay in the village any longer and I left. I will never forget this incident. Whenever it is getting dark I 556 scared when I think about it . remember it, I feel so overwhelmed and 557 Those detained for forced labour were kept in inhuman conditions. A number of 269. 558 individuals told the Mission that, when detained for forced labour, they had to bring food, 560 559 ality or were not able to eat at all. were given insufficient food or food of poor qu kept in Individuals reported they did not have access to water when needed and were inadequate accommodation, including in the open air without bedding and without adequate 561 sanitary facilities. Children detaine d for forced labour were also subjected to ill - treatment and inhuman 270. 562 F or example, a child from Mongkai ng Township, Shan State, who conditions of detention. was subjected to forced labour in 2011 when she was around 13 years old, described being after asking for water: beaten In 2011, my father was taken for forced labour even though he was old and sick. They did not give him proper food and drink. Two days after he returned home, he died. r three days. When Later I was taken for forced labour. I had to carry heavy bags fo 563 we asked for food, the soldiers got upset. I asked for water and they beat me for it. 271. Individuals subjected to forced labour were also sometimes required to fight or participate in hostilities. Some individuals told the Mission tha t, during forced labour, they 564 For example, one individual from were made to wear Tatmadaw uniforms or given guns. Kunhing Township, Shan State, reported how he was given a gun after fighting broke out while he was doing forced labour in April 2012: The Ta tmadaw were staying overnight in our village and then next morning they said they needed porters and four of us had to go with them. While walking we encountered 553 PI based violence. - - 067. See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender 554 DI - 063, DI - 064, PI - 007. 555 DI - 065, PI - 062. 556 DI - 065. 557 See this c hapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance. 558 PI - 003, PI - - 007, PI - 022. 005, PI 559 019, PI PI - - 020, PI - 080, PI - 083, PI - 085. 560 PI - 096, QI - 098. 561 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance. 562 DI - 063, DI - 071, PI - 022. 563 DI - 071. 564 085. - PI - 011, PI - 020, PI 69

70 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 the SSA - S and fighting started. The Tatmadaw gave me a gun and told me to shoot at . I refused and the soldiers beat ldiers, but I did not know how to shoot the Shan so 565 me . 566 Individuals acting as porters were frequently forced to carry weapons, and one 272. 567 individual reported being required to load ammunition into weapons. 273. In some cases repo rted to the Mission, individuals were taken from their villages for 568 569 One of these individuals was a child. Credible forcible recruitment into the Tatmadaw. information received by the Mission, however, indicates that the Tatmadaw have forcibly 570 recruited a With regard to the dults and children throughout the reporting period. recruitment of adults, it needs to be examined whether these and other cases amount to forced labour, or were imposed in manner that would render the recruitment unlawful or arbitrary (for example, not prescribed by law; implemented in a way that is arbitrary or discriminatory; functions and discipline of recruits not based on military needs and plans; or not The Mission notes that efforts have been mad e to address challengeable in a court of law). 571 In 2012, the Government and the United Nations signed a the issue of child recruitment. joint action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In 2018, it was reported that 572 the total number of released children since the signing In 2018, of the plan was over 924. the Tatmadaw remained listed as a perpetrator of recruitment and use of children in the - Secretary General’s report on children and armed conflict but it is recognised as having put 573 in place measures to improve protection of children during the reporting period. 7. Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and denial of humanitarian assistance The complete disregard for the interests and well 274. being of the civilian population in - Kachin and Shan States, particularly, but not only, in areas of active conflict, is further demonstrated by patterns of movement restriction and forced displacement; the confiscation and destruction of land and property; and the denial of humanitarian relief. (a) Legal framework 275. - international It is a violation of international humanitarian law for a party to a non armed conflict to order the displacement of the civilian population, in whole or in part, unless an evacuation is required to protect the security of the civilians involved or because of 574 imperative military reasons. This displacement includes forced transfer caused by physical force, the “threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppressio n or abuse of power against such person or persons, or by 575 Parties to a conflict also have a duty to ensure taking advantage of a coercive environment”. respect for their obligations under international law so as to prevent displacement caused by 565 - 011. PI 566 096, PI DI - 063, DI - 064, PI - 022, PI - 076, PI - 080, PI - - 099. 567 PI - 080. 568 - PI 012, PI - 016, PI - 080, PI - 081. 569 - 016. PI 570 K - 070, K - 072. 571 Children must never be recruited into armed forces. This applies at a minimum to those under 15 years of age. Voluntary recruitment of children 15 years and above into State armed forces is not prohibited by international law though preference should be given to recruiting th ose closest to 18 years of age. See CRC, art. 38(2)(3). 572 UNICEF, “Seventy - five children and young people released by the Myanmar Armed Forces” (3 September 2018). Also, S/2017/1099. 573 A/72/865, S/2018/465. 574 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 129B. 575 ment, 22 March 2006, para. 281. This language ICTY, Pros ecutor v. Staki c - , IT - 97 - 24 T, Appeals Judg ́ was adopted and appears in the footnote of the ICC Elements of Crime, art. 7(1)(d). 70

71 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 576 Unlawful transfer, deportation or displacement of civilians in non - their own acts. 577 international armed conflicts can constitute a war crime or crime against humanity. Even if ordering an evacuation is justified because relocation is necessary to clear a 276. at zone, the party responsible for the transfer or evacuation must ensure, to the greatest comb practicable extent, proper accommodation for the protected persons and “satisfactory 578 conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition”. right to Displaced persons have a voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist. 277. It is a violation of international humanitarian law if a party to the armed conflict, in the context of an d associated with the conflict: (i) destroys or seizes property of an adversary, 579 ; (ii) attacks unless the destruction or seizure is required by imperative military necessity 580 ; (iii civilian objects, unless and for such time as they are military objectives ) appropriates 581 ; or (iv) fails to respect the property a town or village’s property for personal use (pillage) of displaced persons, including failing to protect against destruction or the arbitrary and 582 or possessions left behind. illegal appropriation, occupation or use of property Such 583 violations may constitute war crimes. 278. Under international humanitarian law, p arties to armed conflicts are required to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian relief for civilians in need, and are in br each when they: (i) impede access of humanitarian relief to civilians; or (ii) arbitrarily deny consent to enable humanitarian relief operations; or (iii) restrict freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel, other than temporarily when it is requ ired by imperative 584 military necessity. (b) Findings Violations related to movement of civilian populations The Mission received accounts of individuals being ordered to leave their village by 279. 585 the Tatmadaw; being physically prevented from returnin For g; or ordered not to return. example, a man from Loilen District, Shan State, reported that in November 2011 the Tatmadaw came to his village and told the villagers “you are no longer allowed to farm and 586 otherwise we will burn your homes”. you all need to leave the village immediately, The Tatmadaw soldiers later burned down his house, along with others in the village. In another the Mission was told how, in February 2013, a village in Bhamo Township, Kachin case, State, was attacked by the Tatmadaw and five houses were burned down. The victim escaped and later tried to return, but found that he was not able to go back because soldiers had closed 587 the entrance to the village and would not let civilians past. 280. Other individuals recounted that condi tions in their villages had become so difficult that it was impossible to remain or to return after they had fled attacks. The Mission identified 588 a widespread practice of attacking, destroying and looting civilian property, including 589 intentional destructi on, or burning, of civilian houses. Victims returning after fleeing 576 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), principle 5. See also, ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 129. 577 chapter VIII: Crimes under international law. See 578 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 131. 579 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 50. 580 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 10. 581 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 52. 582 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 133; Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), principle 21(3). 583 See chapter VIII.C: War crimes. 584 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 55 and 56. 585 , PI PI - 026, PI - 042 - 082, PI - 087, PI - 104, V - 123, V - 124. 586 PI - 082. 587 PI - 026. 588 See this chapter, section A.1: Conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property. 589 094. - DI - 058, DI - 066, PI - 026, PI - 029, PI - 049, PI - 080, PI - 082, PI - 086, PI - 087, QI - 092, QI 71

72 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 attacks on their villages found their houses and livelihoods destroyed, compelling them to 590 For example, one woman from a village in Namkhan Township, Shan State, narrated leave. family tried to stay in her village, but eventually the village was destroyed and they how her had to leave: 6 there were lots of planes flying overhead, and 5 and January 201 In December 201 we could hear January 201 6 , the Tatmadaw attacked our shooting and bombing. In we decided to stay. But in village. Many of the villagers fled but February, Tatmadaw soldiers entered the village. They arrested some people and then shot at us – the indiscriminately as we were trying to flee. There was no KIA post in the village ne arest post is several hours away – they were shooting at civilians. We fled into the forest. The next morning we went back, but our village was entirely destroyed some – of the houses had been burned, others kicked down. The situation had become 591 insufferab le and we had to leave . Township, Shan State, in 2012, 281. Another person , who left his village in Namtu described how the intentional destruction of food supplies made survival difficult, forcing him to move to a camp for internally displaced persons: he Tatmadaw had a huge post in our area and there was lots of fighting. The military T would come and look for our rice stocks and destroy them. When aid agencies would distribute provisions, the military would come and destroy those as well. They even d our pigs. We left because we had nothing to eat – kille the military was making it 592 impossible to survive in our village. 282. The context in which the displacements occurred strongly indicates that there were no imperative military or security reasons for suc h displacements. As explained above, the Tatmadaw intentionally, frequently and systematically directed attacks against the civilian population or individual civilians and terrorized the civilian population, including through killings, torture and sexual v iolence. These tactics and practices have fuelled large - scale displacements in Kachin and Shan States during the reporting period and constitute a complete failure by the Tatmadaw to observe its obligations under international law, including to prevent dis placement caused by its own acts. One person from Muse Township, Shan State, said, “ No one lives in my village now - because the Tatmadaw were coming often - no one wanted to live there anymore so they all moved out. It was not safe for men or 593 .” women and we still do not dare to go back 283. The Mission further notes that the relocation and destruction of entire villages in 594 northern Myanmar was extensively reported in the period prior to 2011. 284. The Mission also received credible information on incidents where civilians who wished to leave unsafe areas were prevented from doing so or denied safe passage, including, 595 in at least one case, despite the Tatmadaw itself having explicitly ordered the displacement. in Tanai Township, K achin State on 5 June 2017, the Tatmadaw dropped a In that incident, 15 June 2017 of a large area, where an estimated 100,000 leaflet ordering the evacuation by civilians resided, because the Tatmadaw would be conducting “area clearance operations” 596 g affecting the environment. due to unauthorised minin The text of the leaflet included the following : Within Ta’ang township ... [list of 10 mines]... are not the nationally legitimized jade mines. Mining, digging and gold extraction not only negatively affect the environment, 590 - 029, PI - 080, PI - 087, QI - 092. PI 591 - 087. PI 592 035. PI - 593 QI - 095. 594 E.g. in 2010, the then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Tomas Quintana, stated that humanitarian and human rights groups had documented the destruction and forced relocation of over 3,500 villages and hiding sites in eastern Myanmar since 1996. See A/HRC/65/368, para. 49; for similar figures, see A/61/369, para. 44 and A/HRC/4/14, para. 54. 595 - K - 063.7, K 063.8, PI - 049, PI - 103, S ee also this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 596 Copies on file with the Mission. 72

73 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 lso impact upon the ecosystem of the Ta’ang region. For this reason, the but a Tatmadaw will be carrying out area clearance operations in the near future. Therefore, local citizens and temporary workers living in the jade mines are to leave 017. Anyone who does not vacate the area by the established the area by 15 June 2 date will be considered an accomplice of the Kachin insurgent group, the KIA. During the area clearance operation, the government does not wish citizens to die or be injured. Therefore, we would l ike to make this public announcement. 285. It is difficult to see the military necessity of such a broad order. The leaflet contains implied threats and appears to merge civilians and fighters. In any event, the Tatmadaw also , evacuation and accommodation for civilians. did not ensure proper transfer , four of Instead the five exit routes were blocked and credible information indicates that some displaced individuals were only allowed to leave on the condition that they did not travel to Tanai town 597 but rathe r to Kawng Ra, which was unsafe and subject to active conflict. 286. The Mission further received recent, credible information on one incident where the Tatmadaw forced villagers who had fled to go back to their villages despite not wanting to 598 return due to safety concerns. One person described how she and 160 others from Man We and Hlaing Naung Hku villages in Hpakant Township, Kachin State, were detained by the military for several days in April 2018, after fleeing their villages and were then forced to return against their wishes: We fled our villages on 11 April 2018 and on the 12 April 2018 we came across the Tatmadaw in the forest. They stopped us and asked us questions, they made us cook for them and build a tent. We were getting ready to sleep wh en they made us move again. They walked us to trucks and then drove us to a field. They made us stay with them for five days and kept asking questions about the KIA. We did not have enough food, only one meal a day. On 16 April 2018, the commander said we should go back to our village. We didn’t want to go back because it is not safe but the commander forced us. The soldiers followed us back to the village to make sure we went back. 599 When we arrived at our village soldiers took our livestock and belongings. 287. Following this, they left the village once again due to the continuing conflict, but were not allowed to set up IDP camps by the Tatmadaw, so they stayed in a local church. Fighting in the area later ceased, and the villagers wanted to return to thei r village. However, the Tatmadaw would not permit them to return . The Mission further understands that there have been other incidents where displaced persons have been put under pressure to return to their 600 villages before they felt comfortable doing so. 288. General restrictions on freedom of movement have also had a significant impact on 601 Formal restrictions on the ability of civilians to access livelihoods and basic services. 602 s. movement include checkpoints, accompanied by documentation checks, and curfew In addition, in one case in December 2016, residents of the town of Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State, were issued with cards to prove their residence and were only allowed to enter 603 so reported limiting their and leave if they were in possession of these cards. Individuals al own movements, including to farmland or tea plantations, because they were afraid of nearby 604 fighting or because of landmines. For example, one person from Namhsan Township, Shan 017 she could not go to her tea plantation. State, reported that during fighting in December 2 explained that a curfew was in place from 6am to 6pm in their village and, if people were She 605 seen outside after curfew, shots would be fired at them. Credible information received by 597 049. K - 063.7, PI - 598 K - 063.9, PI - 104, V - 135. 599 PI - 104. 600 - 331. QM 002, V - 601 PI - 046, PI - 073, PI - - 142. See also this chapter, section A.8: E mblemati c incidents (Tanai). 097, V 602 - K - 064, V 142. 603 See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Monekoe). 604 PI - 046, PI - 094, PI - 097. 605 097. - PI 73

74 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 the Mission also indicates that individuals holding identity documents issued by EAOs have been afraid to flee conflict areas, or return to check on property, for fear of documentation 606 checks or being stopped because of their ethnicity. Land confiscation and violation of property rights of displaced persons Credible information received indicates widespread violation of the obligation to 289. respect the property rights of displaced persons. There is a practice of attacking, destroying 607 In some cases people left their and looting civilian property after individua ls have fled. 608 In others, the Tatmadaw or other actors confiscated homes because of land confiscation. 609 For example, one lands after the individuals had fled and were internally displaced. individual from Laukkaing Township Administered Zone, reported that, after , Kokang Self - his village was attacked by the Tatmadaw in August 2013 and while the villagers were displaced, the Tatmadaw took over their land: One day in 2013, the Tatmadaw attacked our village. The village chief w ent to talk to the soldiers to try to stop the fighting but they killed him. There was gunfire so we ran into the forest to hide for one night. The next day we went back to the village but our d too, so we had to house was burned and all other houses in the village were burne 610 leave. After we had left, the Tatmadaw took over the farmland . 290. person displaced from Waigmaw Township, Kachin State in 2011 explained Another 611 The Mission that her village is now abandoned and there is a new Tatmadaw post there. has also received credible information that other actors, including corporations, have taken 612 over land of displaced individuals. Some internally displaced persons told the Mission that they did not know what had 291. and property as they had not been able to return since they were happened to their land 613 Displaced individuals originally displaced, which in many cases was several years earlier. are concerned that they may be unable to prove ownership over their land should conditions 614 rns be established. There are many impediments to this, including: lack of formal for retu land ownership documents; documents being lost or destroyed during displacements; possession of non - recognised ownership documents issued by ethnic armed organizations; of recognition of customary forms of land ownership; and lack of tax receipts as lack individuals were displaced and therefore unable to work the land. The situation may be and further complicated by the legal framework governing land ownership and resolution of l 615 disputes. 292. Land has also been confiscated by or for the benefit of the Tatmadaw from non - displaced individuals without any proper process or compensation, including in areas where 616 there was no active fighting in Kachin and Shan States. For examp le, an individual from O Township, Kachin State, reported how his land was taken in 2014: - Puta great grandfather. We used to have only one My land was inherited from my great - military camp in the area but more were built around 2002 and this was when land confiscation started. Between 2003 and 2005 two whole villages were forced to move by the Tatmadaw and the land was confiscated. In early 2014, a government official 606 DI - 061, K - 064, V - 136, V - 142. 607 disregard of civilian life and property. section A.1: Conduct of hostilities in flagrant See this chapter, 608 PI - 016, PI - - 082 . 082, QI 609 - K - 142.1, K - 143, PI - 010, PI - 055, PI - 073, QI - 092, QM 018, SI - 002, V - 144. See also this chapter, section atterns of violations and abuses committed by non - State armed actors. B: P 610 092. QI - 611 PI - 052. 612 - - K 142.1, QM 014, V - 143. 613 PI - 052, PI - 056. 614 PI - 031, V - 143. 615 PI - 031, PI - 048, QM - 014, V - 145, see also, Durable Peace Programme, Displaced and Dispossessed, conflict affected communities and their land of origin in Kachin State (May 2018). - 616 “Nothing for our Land”, - 032, PI - 048, PI - 077, QI - 078, V - 143 see also, Human Rights Watch, PI (July 2018). Impact of Land Confiscation on Farmers in Myanmar 74

75 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 called me and showed me a letter. He said my farmland would be confiscated for “security r easons.” The letter said I would not be given alternative land, and the official said all lands belong to the government. I could do nothing and there was no 617 compensation - they just took my land. 293. Individuals consistently reported that in their vill ages they were required to provide 618 food or cook for the Tatmadaw, or that the Tatmadaw would come and take their food or livestock as they wished, placing a constant strain on the their resources and ability to 619 survive. For example, one individual from M ongkaung Township, Shan State, described how villages had to give food to the Tatmadaw and witnessing them taking food from other farmers: A military camp was not very far from our village. Each villager had to take food to the Tatmadaw – we took it in turns. Sometimes my mother had to cook for the soldiers too. One day I took some chickens to the military base but they said I arrived late. They kept me and made me work for them. I worked for five days in the military base and then for five days I walked with them from village to village. Each day I saw the military take food from farmers. One farmer begged to be given his food back but they 620 just hit him. 621 For 294. In some cases, the Tatmadaw would also temporarily stay in villagers’ houses. example, one individual from Laukkaing Township, Kokang Self - Administered Zone, described how soldiers would come regularly, as much as once a week, and stay in one of the village houses. The villagers would have to cook for the soldiers and would sleep in 622 houses or in the forest until the soldiers left. neighbours’ In 2015, this became more frequent and eventually the soldiers confiscated her families’ land and house and started to 623 grow vegetables. Arbitrary denial of humanitarian relief sed a large volume of credible information indicating that the 295. The Mission has amas Government and Tatmadaw have consistently arbitrarily denied consent for humanitarian relief operations and restricted the movement of humanitarian relief personnel for long e, in June and July 2015, fighting between the KIA and Tatmadaw periods. For exampl displaced around 1,400 individuals in Sumprabum Township, Kachin State. Despite displaced individuals lacking sufficient access to adequate food, shelter, drinking water and and repeated requests for access to provide life - saving humanitarian relief medical supplies, from local and international organizations, no access was granted until January 2016, more 624 than six months later. 296. Access for humanitarian relief operations to persons in need has significantly 625 deteriorated during the reporting period, and is now at its lowest point in four years. To deliver relief, conduct assessments, or carry out other activities, international humanitarian via a complex system involving ations organizations are required to seek travel authoris 626 several layers of authority, both civilian and military, including the President’s Office . The United Nations have not been granted travel authorisations to deliver humanitarian relief to 617 - 082. QI 618 - PI - 016, PI - 020, PI - 058, PI - 081, PI 093. 619 I DI - 072, PI - 010, PI - 015, PI - 020, P - 074, PI - 111, QI - 078, QI - 080. 620 PI - 020. 621 PI - 016, PI - 020. 622 - 016. PI 623 Ibid. 624 K - 063.30. 625 K - 064, K - 069.1. 626 QM - 002. Interlocutors informed the Mission that, while the process varies to some extent, travel authorisations are generally sent to an organization’s line ministry (which varies depending on the The organization). The line ministry forwards requests to the Presiden t’s Office for a decision. President’s Office asks the opinion of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs and in some cases the relevant state governments. 75

76 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 the more than 40,000 internal ly displaced persons in areas beyond government control since June 2016. They have now had no access for more than two years, despite previously having had access to these areas, with indications that the needs of the most vulnerable displaced 627 not being met. persons are The Government has proposed that individuals cross conflict lines to access assistance, which would require displaced persons, the majority of whom are women and children, to undertake repeated long and dangerous journeys across conflict 628 fected areas. Organizations requesting permission to undertake relief operations to these af areas have reportedly been told that, if they want access, they should tell the ethnic armed 629 organizations to sign the National Ceasefire Agreement. 297. In Governm ent - controlled areas, the international staff of international humanitarian organizations are granted travel authorisations primarily for urban centres, with the result that other they are unable to access the majority of displaced individuals who are located in 630 areas. National staff have also been subject to increasing restrictions. Requests for authorisation to travel to deliver humanitarian relief are often refused, 298. 631 Distributions of life - aving relief without reasons, or no formal response at all is received. s 632 While local organizations have some access to both items are routinely blocked. 633 - government controlled areas, they face increasing restrictions and Government and non 634 are also unable to access certain areas. uthorisations are In some cases, even when travel a granted, the Tatmadaw prevents deliveries being carried out, including in areas where there 635 was no active fighting. The Mission has also received credible information that humanitarian relief personnel 299. ally threatened with prosecution under the Unlawful in Kachin State have been form Associations Act, after travelling to a non - government controlled area in 2018 to provide 636 relief, and have been told not to travel to the area in future. In addition, the Mission has of individuals being beaten and prosecuted after they tried to deliver received one report 637 humanitarian relief. 300. On the ground, the denial of humanitarian relief means displaced persons are left without adequate shelter for long periods, including in difficult weather co nditions, such as 638 during heavy rains, and face food shortages. The Mission corroborated an incident in April 2018 in Tanai Township where 2,000 individuals, from Sut Yang, Sut Ya and Awng Lat villages, were trapped in the forest for nearly a month, in dire conditions, without access to assistance. Those trapped included pregnant mothers, children, elderly people and sick and 639 One villager recounted the difficult conditions which led injured individuals. to the deaths of two children: On 11 April 2018, there were airstrikes and shelling on our village. We fled into the forest. We thought the shelling would stop but it was continuous. We ended up staying because of shelling and we were in the forest for four weeks. We moved several times afraid of the soldiers who were behind us. Sometimes there were drones and planes overhead, but they did not provide any assistance, they were just watching us. It was or the first three days, there was difficult in the forest. In the place where we stayed f no water because the streams had dried out. Later, we only had access to dirty water, 627 . K - 069.1, V - 155 628 K - 069.1, K - 069.2, QM - 002; A/HRC/34/67, para 52. 629 QM - 00 2. 630 - K - 069.1, V 156. 631 Ibid. 632 Ibid. 633 142.2, QM Ibid. K - - 014, V - 157. 634 section A.8: E mblematic incidents (Tanai). See also this chapter, 635 V V - 147, - 308. 636 K - 146.1. 637 K - 146.5. 638 - K - 063.30, PI - 029, PI - 030, PI 103, V - 156. See this chapter , section C: Impact of conflict, violations and abuses on civilians . 639 See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai). 76

77 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 and many people became sick with diarrhoea. Three women gave birth in the forest, - - year old girl died born babies died at 20 days old. A but one of the new nother five 640 while her mother was carrying her. We faced many hardships. 301. The lack of humanitarian access has led to dire conditions in some camps for internally 641 . displaced persons, contributing to trafficking and raising other prote One concerns ction - young woman, who spent three years in a camp for internally displaced persons in a non government controlled area of Kachin State before leaving the country in 2014, cited the lack of food as the main reason for her decision to leave: I spent three years in the camp but then the Tatmadaw blocked all humanitarian aid. After that, each of us would only get 4kg of rice per month and there was almost no other food, only rice. Because there was no food, I had to leave and went to Thailand, 642 a . nd then Malaysia 302. The Mission received credible information that a convoy of vehicles from the Myanmar Red Cross was attacked on 17 February 2015 and for a second time on 21 February 643 - in Kokang Self The attacks cau sed several Red Cross Administered Zone, Shan State. 2015 dying from the personnel and civilians to be injured, with one Red Cross volunteer later 644 The Government reportedly stated that the injuries he sustained during the attacks. 645 MNDAA was responsible for the attacks, which was denied by t he group. It was not possible for the Mission to verify which party to the conflict was responsible. Following the first attack, Kokang Self Administered Zone was placed under martial law until 17 - 646 Humanitarian access to the 80,000 individu als displaced by fighting November 2015. 647 between the MNDAA and the Tatmadaw was not granted until July 2015. The Mission received allegations that serious violations had taken place in the area during this period but 648 was unable to verify them. 303. The Mission also re ceived one report of Tatmadaw soldiers intercepting and stealing shipments of medicines intended for internally displaced persons, but it was unable to verify - 649 this. The Mission received credible accounts of the Tatmadaw denying or delaying access 304. 650 medical care for injured civilians. to In one well - known case, verified by the Mission, on 13 September 2012, a Tatmadaw Battalion Commander said that Ja Seng Ing, a 13 - year old girl who had been shot by the Tatmadaw in Sut Ngai Yang village, Hpakant Townshi p, Kachin State, could not be taken to hospital until all soldiers had left the village. They left in groups of five to 10 soldiers at a time, taking over an hour, before she could be taken to the 651 In another case, an individual described how her village in Namkhan Township, hospital. Shan State, was attacked by the Tatmadaw in May 2017 and afterwards she had to negotiate to collect the injured residents and take them to the hospital llage : after an attack on her vi Afterwards, we had to negotiate with the Commander to go and rescue the injured. The Commander said he would let women be rescued but that anyone else would be relative . She was in very bad killed. We were able to enter the village and collect my sh ape. We took her to hospital and she had to stay there several months. Now she can 652 hardly move and cannot work . 640 PI - 103. 641 See this chapter, section C: Impact of conflict, violations and abuses on civilians. 642 PI - 030. 643 - K 069.3, V - 158. 644 IFRC, “Myanmar Red Cross Society mourns the death of a volunteer” (3 April 2015). 645 Moe Zaw, “Myanmar, Kokang Rebels Spar Over Red Cross Attack” (VOA, 18 February 2015) . 646 K - 063.23. 647 K - 064.1. 648 SM - 001, V - 159. 649 V - 144. 650 PI - 064, PI - 073, PI - 105. 651 K - 131, PI - 105. 652 - 073. PI 77

78 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 An announcement from February 2018, a copy of which was seen by the Mission, 305. appears to indicate that there is an official policy in at le ast some areas of denying medical assistance to injured fighters. The letter sent by the Township Administrator in Muse Township, Shan State, to various township authorities, including the health department, the Union Government and China. It informs refers to a bilateral agreement reached between administrators and agencies to report to the nearest Tatmadaw base any injured fighters found without delay “and to make sure insurgents do not receive any treatment,” and that Chinese 653 ept wounded fighters. hospitals would also not acc Emblematic incidents 8. 306. This section presents in greater detail two situations that have occurred in Kachin and Shan States during the reporting period. They illustrate how the hostilities, and the conduct of the Tatmadaw in pa rticular, gives rise to the types of gross human rights violations analysed above. They show how civilians are often victims of multiple violations concurrently. November 2017 to April 2018 Tanai Township, Kachin State – (a) 307. The incidents that have t aken place in Tanai Township, Kachin State, from November 2018 2017 to April are illustrative of the manner in which the Tatmadaw’s operation directly and deliberately affect civilians. The area of Tanai that is the focus of the Tatmadaw offensive olled by the KIA. The Tatmadaw’s stated aim is to clear out the “illegal” mines in the is contr area that provide a lucrative source of income for the KIA, and as such the military operations 654 are in relation to control over these natural resources. Mining in the a rea employs an 655 estimated 100,000 people. Before the “clearance operations” began, the Tatmadaw dropped leaflets on 5 June 308. 2017 to warn villagers living near the mining zones to clear the area within 10 days, causing civilians to flee. It then launch ed military offensives against key positions of the KIA. When the deadline passed, the Tatmadaw closed off routes to Tanai town, leaving remaining the same period, the Tatmadaw restricted the delivery of rice and and over civilians at risk, 656 fuel to inhabit ants of Tanai, creating food shortages. 657 Photo of leaflet dropped by the Tatmadaw on 5 June 2017 in Tanai Township 309. For the next five months, the Tatmadaw and the KIA were engaged in a series of clashes, during which the Tatmadaw engaged in indiscriminate attacks on villages and 653 K - 146.2. 654 Primarily gold and amber but also jade, copper and ruby mines. 655 103, V PI - 049, PI - - 62. 656 Ibid. See this chapter, section A.7: Forced displacement, confiscatio n and destruction of property, and denial of humanitarian assistance. 657 See for full translation of the text, this chapter, section A.7: Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and denial of humanitarian assistance. 78

79 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 committed extrajudicial killings, torture and rape among other violations. A number of 658 villages were burned and thousands were displaced as a consequence. Clashes began in June 2017 but fighting intensified in November 2017, reaching a 310. peak in January 2018. On 22 November 2017, the KIA set up a base in a church in De Kaw airstrikes were conducted by the Tatmadaw, which did village in Tanai, and on the same day . An aerial bomb ex ploded next to a civilian’s house, killing not appear to target the KIA base a young child and a man. The next day, Tatmadaw soldiers conducted an operation in the retribution for battlefield casualties, village, as apparent which saw the arrest and detention villagers to flee ning and destruction of the village. It caused of some villagers, and the bur 659 The detained villagers and be displaced. were divided into small groups, beaten and 660 tortured while questioned about KIA membership. One of the victims gave the following account: The Tatmad aw tied us up with ropes and pointed their guns at our heads. They accused us of being with the KIA and requested proof that we were not. It was hard for us to give them the answers they wanted. One of the soldiers told me that they had information that I was involved with the KIA and provided them with assistance, which I denied. The soldier shouted at me, calling me “dog beggar”, which means “person of very low value” in Myanmar. I was on my knees. The soldier standing in front of me was asking questions while the one behind beat me. I was beaten in the back, and hit on the head with the butt of a gun. All villagers detained were on their knees. We 661 . were terrified this period, a number of villages in Tanai were subject to artillery and 311. Throughout 662 For example, air strikes. Nam Kawn village, 20 kilometres from Tanai town, was targeted by aerial bombing and heavy artillery mortar shelling from 22 to 27 January 2018, and with 663 fighting from 25 to 27 January The village is located in the Zeephury Kone area, heaving . 665 664 Reliable and which is controlled by the KIA. where both amber and gold are mined, reports indicate that several aerial bombs were dropped on the village on 26 January 2018, 666 and causing destroying houses two civilian deaths and four injuries, including three 667 The nearest KIA posts were located several miles away, and as such there was no women. 668 apparent military target. One of the injured victims, explained how her house was g an airstrike, and both she and her sister were injured. She completely destroyed followin 669 Another witness stated that Tatmadaw soldiers, in the course of spent a month in hospital. deliberately their military operations that day, shot at or otherwise targeted the civilian population : People fled from the bombings, and as they were fleeing, the military was shooting at them. People fled the area, some to the IDP camps. I think the military operation was 670 designed to make villagers flee the town. 312. controlled territory, strategic KIA posts were As the Tatmadaw progressed into KIA targeted. On 27 January 2018, a group of Tatmadaw soldiers supported by Lisu militia killed Shortly after, approximately 200 Aung Ja village. five, possibly six, men at a KIA tax post at 658 - 069.1. K 659 086, PI I 066, PI - D - 088. - 660 DI - 066, PI - 086, PI - 088. 661 DI - 066. 662 - DI - 061, PI 046, PI - 063. 663 K - 142; T. Miles, “U.N. concerned about heavy fighting in Myanmar's Kachin state” (Reuters, 6 February 2018). 664 DI - 061 . 665 PI - 045, PI - 049, V - 018 . 666 PI - 045 . 667 - DI - 061, DI 062, PI - 043, PI - 049, PI - 053 . 668 DI - 061 . 669 DI - 062 . 670 . 043 PI - 79

80 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 671 ered the area and eight civilians, including at least two women, were Tatmadaw soldiers ent detained by the Tatmadaw and Lisu militia. They were beaten on their backs with an iron rod over the course of some hours while their hands were tied and some were blindfolded. During t his time they were questioned, including in relation to the routes to mining areas . Five men gunfire while the other from the group were then extrajudicially killed by detainees three 672 . remained lying on the floor The on - going hostilities caused 313. displacement of civilians throughout this period. In January 2018, over 3,500 civilians attempting to leave the area of ongoing hostilities near amber mining villages in the “Pat Maw” area, became trapped by the Tatmadaw without food, supplies or latrines for a period of up to 18 days at the “Samat” gate. Religious groups bearing food for the trapped civilians were denied access by the military. Personal belongings, including mobile phones, motorbikes, amber and money were taken by 673 soldiers. This happened in an area with active landmines, which caused at least two civilian 674 deaths. The first group of civilians, approximately 700 women and 50 civilians over the age of 50 were released, following a letter from two Members of Parliament to the President 675 ting safe passage for the trapped civilians. reques Civilians continued to be released in 676 groups over the following days until 9 February 2018. treatment and torture, 314. Throughout the period, the Tatmadaw subjected civilians to ill - targeted on the basis of t heir ethnicity and often questioned about the KIA. In December 2017, several men in uniform entered the house of a man in Naumbyu village. They asked him if he was Kachin and was then beaten repeatedly and threatened with being killed. He saw at least 10 o ther men subjected to similar treatment. Their hands were tied and they were 677 Another victim reported being taken from led away, but he managed to escape in a forest. ch the village of Daru Thu by a group of about 10 Tatmadaw soldiers and forced to clean, cat fish and cook for them. He was beaten while being questioned about whether he was a 678 rebel. The Mission also received a credible report of a group of Tatmadaw soldiers gang 679 raping and then killing two girls in the forest. 315. the Tatmadaw launched a further offensive to consolidate After a temporary lull, control over the mining area, with four airstrikes, and gunfire on the village of Awng Lat on 11 April 2018, killing one civilian and injuring at least two others. Reports indicate that hundreds of T atmadaw soldiers seized the area, causing approximately 2,000 civilians to flee 680 A group of to fields, where some stayed for three days while the shelling continued. villagers were then forced to stay in very difficult conditions in forest areas, to avoid aerial attacks and the presence of soldiers. At least one elderly man, one child and one new born 681 baby died from lack of food and medicines. (b) Monekoe, Shan State – November 2016 to early 2017 316. The incidents that occurred around Monekoe, Muse Town ship, Shan State, from November 2016 to early 2017, also illustrate how the civilian population is subjected to multiple violations concurrently or consecutively during active conflict. This includes mass arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings, and i ndiscriminate airstrikes and aerial bombardments or attacks in violation of the principle of precaution. 671 PI - 053, PI - 054, PI - - 004, V - 018 . 059, SI 672 . PI - 053, PI - 053, SI - 004, V - 018 673 DI - 061, PI - - 018 . 045, V 674 045, PI DI - 061, PI - - 046 . 675 061, V - DI - 018 . 676 DI - 061, PI - 045 . 677 PI - 059. 678 PI - 079. 679 - PI 069; see this chapter, section A.4: S exual and gender - based violence . 680 K - 069.1, PI - 103, V - 063. 681 PI - 103, V - 063, see this chapter, section A.7: Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and denial of humanitarian assist ance. 80

81 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 On the night of 19 November 2016, elements of the Northern Alliance attacked 317. 682 The Northern Alliance captured most of Monekoe with the exception of a Monekoe town. hilltop military base held by the Tatmadaw. 318. Following this, the Tatmadaw conducted the mass arrest and detention of civilians. th Light Infantry Division went from On 20 November 2016, Tatmadaw soldiers from the 99 house to house in Man Jat village, Monekoe and arrested more than 100 people, who were 683 then forced to walk to a military camp on the hilltop. One interviewee was asked by the hat you didn’t know about the attacks, why didn’t soldier who arrested him, “It is impossible t 684 you inform us?” Several individuals were accused of being spies, and a few were 685 specifically accused of being affiliated with the MNDAA, tied up and beaten. About hours later the Tatmadaw released the women and children, as well as some Chinese 12 citizens, leaving approximately 70 to 80 men detained. Several hundred soldiers as well as 686 militia members were stationed at the military camp. The detainees were forced to lie on the ground, day and night 319. , between two wire 687 They fences, placing them between the Tatmadaw base and Northern Alliance troops. 688 Intense fighting between the were told not to make any noise or they would be killed. place during the 13 days Tatmadaw and the Northern Alliance outside the military camp took Tatmadaw troops threw grenades over the heads of the detainees, several the group were held. of which fell on them after getting caught in the trees, killing at least two individuals and 689 690 The injured injuring others. were not relea sed to seek medical attention. One detainee 691 it did not explode. saw a mortar shell land among the detainees, although A 90 year - old 692 detainee was witnessed being killed when he tried to escape during an exchange of fire. ments with no shelter, sleeping on the ground. They had Detainees were exposed to the ele no access to washing facilities and no sanitary facilities, initially urinating in the area they were detained and later in a pit dug behind the second fence. Detainees were also initially not 693 d food for several days. provide When members of the Northern Alliance gained access to 694 part of the military base on 4 December 2016, the civilians were able to escape. The placing of this group of civilian detainees in the line of fire is a clear example of the Tatmadaw not taking all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population under their control against 695 the effects of attacks, one of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. 696 d use of human shields. In this instance, it may also amount to the prohibite 320. The Mission received credible accounts of civilians being intentionally killed by the 697 For example, one man who was Tatmadaw in the Monekoe area during this period. detained in the military base, stated that after they escaped he witnessed another man being 698 Two cases of enforced shot at and then killed by a knife by one of the Tatmadaw soldiers. 699 oth cases following arrest by the Tatmadaw. disappearance were also corroborated, in b 682 058, DI DI - - 060, K - 133.1, K - 133.2, K - 133.3, K - 133.24, V - 056 . 683 . 058 DI - 684 - 060 . DI 685 - 058 . DI 686 - DI - 060, K - 133.6, K - 133.23 . 058, DI 687 - 058, DI - 060, K - 133.23, V - 170 . DI 688 DI - 060 . 689 DI - 058, DI - - 133.23 . 060, K 690 DI - 060 . 691 DI - 060, K - 133.23 . 692 DI - 060 . 693 DI - 058, DI - 060. 694 DI - 058, DI - - 133.23 . 060, K 695 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 22. 696 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 97. The use of human shields is defined as using the presence (or movements) of civilians or other protected persons to render certain points or areas (or military forces) immune from military operations. 697 - DI - 058, K 133.1, K - 133.16. See also this chapter, section A.2: U nlawful killings. 698 DI - 058. 699 . nce See this chapter, section A.5: A rbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappeara 81

82 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The Mission was also able to corroborate that, after the civilians escaped their detention on 700 4 December 2016, Tatmadaw soldiers intentionally burned several nearby villages. During the period of conflict, 321. the Tatmadaw launched airstrikes on and fired into Monekoe and nearby villages, destroying civilian property as well as a church, and in at least 701 November 2016, One victim reported that in early one instance causing civilian deaths. while fighting the MN DAA, the Tatmadaw fired artillery shells at her village, one of which 702 After and children injured hit her house. Two other villagers were killed in the shelling . er the artillery attack, the Tatmadaw entered the village, took the food rations and livestock. H family fled to China and later returned but soldiers prohibited them from returning to their village. She told the Mission, “ losing my home means we are in a dire economic condition. 703 rever .” traumatised The attack has me and my children and changed our lives fo The fighting displaced an estimated 20,000 people, forcing many of them close to the 322. 704 The area was under a state of lockdown that prevented humanitarian border or into China. 705 ports indicate a local aid assistance from reaching some displaced in need; and credible re 706 worker was injured attempting to reach the displaced population. The Tatmadaw regained control of Monekoe town in early December 2016. Displaced 323. th a white individuals who returned to the town and area were photographed and issued wi - 707 coloured card. These cards had to be shown at all times, including when going to cut 708 firewood or to farmland. Credible reports received by the Mission describe that soldiers would frequently check houses to confirm the number of people present and keep family 709 photographs in front of houses to allow for surprise checks. Individuals returning to Monekoe were in n eed of food and shelter assistance as houses had been burned, but access was limited to those holding these white cards, preventing humanitarian agencies from 710 providing assistance. B. Patterns of violations and abuses committed by non - State armed actors 324. The denial of access to the country and the refusal of the Myanmar authorities to respond to the Mission’s requests for information have greatly limited the ability of the - y EAOs. Mission to gather first hand information on violations and abuses perpetrated b Consequently, the Mission had to draw more from secondary sources, with the methodological challenges this entails. The sample of cases reported and verified by the Mission may not be fully representative of the overall, highly complex situation. N evertheless, the Mission has a reliable, but limited body of information suggesting that most 711 EAOs fighting in Kachin and Shan States, to differing extents, have committed international humanitarian law violations and human rights abuses. The informa tion received by the Mission suggests that violations and abuses 325. committed by EAOs occur on a lesser scale than those committed by the Tatmadaw. 700 058, K 133.23. DI - - - 133.4, K - 133.6, K - 133.15, K - 133.22, K 701 - 133.9, K - 133.10, K - 133.11, K - 133.13, K - 133.14, K - K - 042, SM - 001, V - 056. 133.17, PI 702 The Mission does not have sufficient information to ascertain whether these attacks were directed at a egitimate target and/or adequate precautions were taken. l 703 PI - 042. 704 K - 142.40. 705 K - 069.4, K - 069.5. 706 - 069.5. K 707 082. K - 142.41, QI - 708 DI - 058, V - 056. 709 142.48, PI - .133.6, K - K - 041. 710 K - 142.48, QI - 082. 711 These include TNLA, KIA, SSA - S, MNDAA, and AA. I n some instances the Mission was not able to - identify which Shan State Army (SSA) committed the violations, either the SSA - S or the SSA N. The Mission received extremely limited information pertaining to the United Wa State Army (UWSA). 82

83 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1. Legal framework International humanitarian law applies to all parties to an armed conflict, whether 326. international, including non - international or non - State armed groups. Additionally, the - State actors who hold effective control over territory and exercise Mission considers that non - like functions are obliged to respect human rights norms when their conduct government 712 affects the human rights of persons under their control. 327. Specifically with regard to the issue of recruitment, international law does not entitle non - State armed actors, regardless of whether they are a de facto authority over a particu lar part of the territory, to recruit on a compulsory or forced basis (either adults or children). - State actor in control of territory to conscript the population into Even if the rights of a non the armed forces were the same as that of a State, restricti ons would still apply. It would still not be allowed to impose it in a manner that would render the recruitment unlawful or 713 arbitrary. State armed As for States, the (voluntary) recruitment of children into a non - 714 group is prohibited. This includes the re cruitment of children in any capacity, including as 715 fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, or spies. While the age limit is not set in customary 716 It is also a international law, it is agreed that it at least applies to any child under 15 years. human right s violation when the State fails to take all feasible measures to protect children under the age of 18 against recruitment by armed groups, whether forced or voluntary. 2. Findings Failure to take feasible precautions in attack (a) 328. According to the principle of precautions in attack, parties to the conflicts in northern Myanmar must take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. Information received by the Mission suggests that EAOs have in several instances fail ed to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Some EAOs have also often failed to take into account humanitarian considerations when launching attacks, causing large numbers of civilians to fl ee. For example, it was reported that in May 2018, the TNLA attacked government 329. security posts in Muse Township, Shan State. According to this information, 18 people were s of this incident, killed in addition to a police captain. The Mission was unable to verify detail including whether the persons killed were civilians and how they had been killed. However, the TNLA reportedly stated that the “casualties were armed militia members and their 717 families”. Fighting between two EAOs, the TNLA and the SSA - S, has led to massive 330. displacement in northern Shan State. For example, it was reported that 300 civilians fled Mong Hway village, Mongton Township, Shan State in mid - March 2018, following clashes between the two armed groups. It was further reported that civilians were trapped in the cross - 718 fire and had to be evacuated by aid workers. Later in March 2018, it was also stated that, during fighting between the TNLA and SSA South in Taw Phe village, Kyaukme Township, - Shan State, a shell allegedly exploded in the village killing two civilians and injuring others. 719 Earlier in July 2016, As a result of the fighting, approximately 1,000 civilians fled the area. 712 See chapter II, section C: Legal framework. 713 See this chapter, section A.6: Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children. 714 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 136. See also CRC, art. 38. 715 See UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007, p. 7. 716 Under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which Myanmar signed but has not yet ratified, armed groups should not, under any circumstances, recruit persons under the age of 18 years. 717 V - 203, V - 204. 718 V - 205, V - 300. 719 - 301. V 83

84 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 fighting between the two armed groups caused 350 civilians to flee another village called 720 Man Lwe in Kyaukme Township, Shan State. In November 2016, the Northern Alliance, composed of the KIA, the TNLA, the 331. MNDAA, and the AA, launched an offensive attack against police and military outposts and hern Shan State. Reports estimate a business centre in Muse and Kutkai Townships in nort that at least eight people were killed and 29 wounded. Bullets also crossed the Ruili River into Chinese territory, and wounded a Chinese national. About 3,000 residents fled to China ,700 others were reported to have been internally to escape the fighting and more than 2 721 displaced. 332. In early March 2017, the Mission received credible but unverified reports that at least 30 persons were killed when the MNDAA launched an attack against police and military Administered Zone. Thousands fled across the border into China. - posts in the Kok ang Self A separate group of fighters later attacked locations in Laukkai. Official Government statements, accompanied by graphic pictures of the dead and wounded, informed that at least five civilians and five local police officers were killed in the fighting. It also said that a further 722 20 “burned bodies” had been found alongside weapons reportedly of MNDAA fighters. (b) Recruitment into armed groups and forced labour The Mission amass 333. ed a reliable body of information drawing a pattern of some of the 723 EAOs forcing adults and children to join their armed ranks. While some EAOs may not or policies that have been reformed or changed have an official policy of forced recruitment – e reporting period – the situation on the ground demonstrates that persons are often during th recruited against their will. Victims and witnesses have also told the Mission that even if per se , there is no space to object to joining the ranks there is no policy of forced recruitment of certain armed groups. This could be due to a general perception that ethnic minorities in the North need to fight the Tatmadaw and defend their people. Furthermore, there are few to villagers, with the drugs trade and gambling businesses the principle alternatives available other employers. Victims of forced recruitment that have shared their accounts with the Mission were 334. 724 but also in government - forcibly recruited in areas controlled by the EAOs, controlled 725 726 areas. In the latter cases, EAOs would recruit at night or through letters. Because of the limited information obtained, the Mission was unable to draw the specific geographical it occurred in both Kachin locations of this recruitment. However, information suggests that and Shan States and throughout the reporting period. 335. Sources mentioned to the Mission that the SSA - S had a compulsory recruitment 727 policy, - S had a especially during the early years of the reporting period. While the SSA icy of one person from each household joining their ranks, one source stated that this was pol 728 729 while another source stated that it was voluntary. A enforced in a compulsory manner, along the SSA - further interviewee stated that, “you don’t really have a choice to go fight 730 S”. Similarly, the Mission noted a comparable practice among the TNLA, but also with 336. conflicting information as to the extent to which the practice was “compulsory”. According to some sources, while it was obligatory for families who h ad two siblings, especially two 720 - 143. K 721 K - 143. 722 V - 302, V - 303. 723 - DI - 070, PI - 033, PI - 015, PI - 050, PI 095, PI - 096, PI - 072, PI - 097, PI - 10 1, PI - 112, QI - 081, QI - 088, QI - 092, QI - 093, QI - 094, QI - 096. 724 - - PI - 015, PI 095, PI 096, PI - 101, QI - 088. 725 PI - 027, PI - 033, QI - - 094, QI - 096 . 081, QI 726 . QI - 081, QI - 094, QI - 096 727 PI - 050, QI 093 . - 728 QI - 093. 729 BM - 017. 730 - 050. PI 84

85 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 732 731 exceptions to this requirement were sometimes permitted in special circumstances, sons, for example when a person had to take care of his elderly parents. One source provided the ocess: following information on the recruitment pr If there are two brothers then one must join the TNLA. The “person in charge” from the TNLA would inform the village administrator about who should join. At the beginning of 2011, the TNLA started to collect the names of people who should join the T NLA. The understanding was that the next time they came back he would need to 733 join. The TNLA would collect names once every two years . Other sources stated that the policy was stricter, and each household had to provide 337. 734 he TNLA, with no opportunity to object. one person to serve and join t For example, one woman mentioned that the TNLA recruited her 26 year old son by force in 2016, in Namhsan - Township, Shan State. The village administrator, under the orders of the TNLA, selected her son for recruitme nt. He has not returned to his home, more than two years later: My son did not want to join the TNLA to fight. He hid for years in a monastery to avoid forced recruitment but when he returned to the village to visit us, he was caught . Since my son was recr uited, I have not heard from him. I always check Facebook to 735 see if I will recognise him in a post, either dead or alive . 338. Another victim of forced recruitment shared with the Mission that he was forced to ut managed to escape during a religious festival. participate in the TNLA military training, b He fled because he wanted to take care of his mother. But he said that he was not able to return home to his village, because the TNLA would catch him, and he therefore went to 736 e country. Yangon and eventually fled th 339. According to one witness, the MNDAA also required one member of each household, normally young men, to join their ranks. The witness mentioned that he was one of two recruited. He brothers and he had to hide from the MNDAA because he did not want to be eventually fled the country because he feared both the MNDAA recruitment and the 737 Another witness mentioned that he fled the Kokang Self - Administered Zone Tatmadaw. recruited by because he feared being recruited by the MNDAA. He said, “I was afraid to be the Kokang Army [MNDAA] so I decided to flee to Lashio. I wanted to go back home to 738 Kokang but I was told that the MNDAA would be looking for me.” 340. Accounts received indicate that the KIA may also have maintained a “voluntary” recruitment policy which in practice amounted to forced recruitment. The KIA sent letters to many households, including to those in IDP camps, requesting a member of each family to 739 voluntarily join the KIA. However, according to one source, many civilians understood 740 recruitment to be obligatory. One interviewee stated that, “After receiving the letter from 741 the KIA, my father decided that my eldest sister would join”. Another source mentioned that, “The KIA sent us a letter asking us to join voluntarily. They came v ery often and asked us to join but I had no interest in becoming a soldier. I have too many family responsibilities 742 and I do not like shooting guns.” Another source gave information that indicated the manner in which the “voluntary” policy was enforced: The KIA recruited soldiers from my town. If we did not go voluntarily, we would be arrested and forced to go. When the war started again in 2011, the KIA told former 731 PI - 015, PI - - 096, PI - 10 1. 095, PI 732 101, QI PI - - 088. 733 QI - 088. 734 PI - 072, PI - 096, PI - 112. 735 PI - 097. 736 QI - 088. 737 092. QI - 738 PI - 015. 739 PI - 033, QI - 094, QI - 096. 740 QI - 081. 741 QI - 096. 742 - 094. QI 85

86 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 soldiers that they must come back to fight. My younger brother was forced to join the 743 KIA he was 20 - years old. in 2012 – The Mission received multiple accounts of women and men escaping military 341. 744 For example, one victim recounted that he escaped TNLA training in September training. 745 ter his mother. 2011 in Namhsan, Shan State, because he wanted to look af 342. The Mission also recorded accounts of discrimination among EAOs. Many have affirmed that the KIA forcibly recruited from other ethnic minorities in Kachin State, such 746 Jinghpaw . as the Lisu, Shan or Ruwang, rather than the Others have said that Ta’ang 747 A Ta’ang community members fighting for the RCSS or KIA were not treated equally. leader mentioned that six Ta’ang young adults were forcibly recruited to join a KIA military 748 training in Muse Township, Shan State, in January In one account received, the 2016. RCSS forced Ta’ang villagers that had enrolled with the TNLA to join their ranks instead. 749 The RCSS beat villagers asking, “why did your son join the other group?” 750 Women were also recruited by EAOs and often had to 343. perform more tasks than men. A source mentioned that, “not many women were recruited in my village. Usually women have to go through the same training as the men, in addition, however, they have to also clean 751 member’s clothes and uniforms and cook for the m.” 344. The Mission further has reasons to believe that some EAOs have forced civilians to work for them and that such work was not voluntary. The Mission received accounts of the 752 KIA and the SSA - One source S using civilians to dig trenches or to work as porters. - mentioned that, from 2011 to 2013, the SSA S would often require civilians to work for them, and that this would increase as fighting with the Tatmadaw intensified. He said: “The SSA - S used villagers for portering and when the villager did not w ant to go they would beat 753 them”. Similarly, the Mission was told by one interviewee that to his knowledge and in the period before he fled in 2013, the MNDAA would sometimes require villagers to carry their 754 arms and other heavy materials in Laukkaing Town Administered Zone. ship, Kokang Self - A victim shared how he was used for forced labour by the KIA in Mansi Township, 345. Kachin State, in 2012: I was used by the KIA to dig a trench. The KIA came and took our names and other details, and we were told to go and work. I worked for 2 - 3 weeks for the KIA, building a large bunker and a military trench for the soldiers. The KIA did not treat us badly – they had shower facilities, we were given meals. I wanted to sell vegetables in the the KIA and we needed support from the KIA logging area controlled by as a result, – 755 when we were asked to work, we had to. We did not get paid for this. (c) Forced recruitment of children 346. The Mission amassed a reliable body of information demonstrating a pattern of EAOs 756 recruiting children into their armed forces, in violation of international law. The Mission was able to collect information on child recruitment conducted by the TNLA, KIA, RCSS 743 - 081. QI 744 - 070, K - 143, PI - 027, PI - 100, QI - DI 088. 745 QI - 088. 746 K - - 001, PI - 027, PI - 033. 143, PI 747 K - 143, PI - 101. 748 K - 143. 749 QI - 088. 750 - PI 045, PI - 094, PI - 101. 751 PI - 094. 752 QI - 081, QI - 093. 753 QI - 093. 754 QI - 092. 755 QI - 081. 756 - 101. DI - 070, K - 061, K - 064, K - 143, PI - 001, PI - 014, PI - 093, PI - 095, PI 86

87 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 and UWSA. Many of the Mission’s victims and witnesses clearly stated that the ir recruitment and involvement with the armed groups was against their will. 347. The United Nations has verified cases of the UWSA using children in their armed 757 ranks in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Sources informed the Mission that the TNLA recruits boys t hat are no longer in 348. 758 The TNLA has a policy of recruiting boys and school, from the age of 14 to 15 years old. 759 One interviewee explained that the village administrator girls from the age of 16 years old. kept a list of all the boys who are no longer in sc hool and that the TNLA would go through the list to recruit them. He stated that, prior to 2013, the TNLA would only take one boy per household, but that this practice has changed, and as they now take all brothers from a 760 household, and even some girls: “t hey do not have the option of saying no to the TNLA”. Further accounts suggest that young men and boys often run away from the TNLA after being 761 Another source mentioned that his brother was forcibly recruited, or to avoid recruitment. LA after he fled his village to escape recruitment. His brother was 16 recruited by the TN 762 years old when he started his military training. 349. Women and girls usually are recruited by the TNLA for administrative work and do 763 Girls are usual ly asked to cook for the TNLA and are not not engage directly in fighting. 764 This still constitutes prohibited recruitment. necessarily required to fight. 765 350. Although one source - years old. The KIA has also recruited boys and girls under 18 766 mentioned that this practice was in place mostl the Mission received y before 2010, information to suggest its continuation. It was also reported that the KIA abducted children to force them to join their ranks. For example, on 12 March 2014, two girls aged 15 and 16 years old, were abducted by two KIA elements in Mansi Township, Kachin State. After four 767 days in captivity, they were required to join the KIA in military support roles. In another verified incident, the KIA abducted four girls in Lashio Township, Shan State, on 26 were subsequently moved to different posts and reportedly November 2015. The girls 768 received military training. The Mission received accounts of children being recruited in the ranks of the SSA - 351. 769 S, with accounts of children fleeing to avoid compulsory military training by t he SSA - S. The children interviewed mentioned that they were afraid of being caught by the armed group 770 after their escape. 352. A woman shared an account of forced recruitment conducted by the SSA - S in her village of Mong Khung Township, Shan State, when s he was 16 years old in August 2011. The SSA - S arrived in her village and recruited villagers who had not fled the fighting between the SSA - S and the Tatmadaw. The SSA - S recruited 58 villagers in total including nd had been forced to undertake military children and 15 women. She was one of them, a training for nine months until she escaped. She said: I was part of the SSA - S armed men S training, I was forced to go there. Three SSA - S went to each house. If - came and said “you need to be part of our group”. The SSA I had not accepted to go, my father would have been forced to join, but he was already 757 K - 061. 758 PI - 093, PI 101. - 759 PI - 101. 760 093. PI - 761 PI - 093. 762 095. PI - 763 PI - 101. 764 PI - 093. 765 061, K K - - 064. 766 PI - 001. 767 K - 061. 768 K - 064. 769 - DI - 070, K 061, PI - 014. 770 - 014. DI - 070, PI 87

88 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - S military training but they answered old. My father objected to me joining the SSA “if you don’t want her to come, we will come back and get you” . The victim a lso stated that the conditions during training were dire and they often felt 353. hungry: “We had to train hard and to always be on guard for the Tatmadaw. Sometimes we 771 had to work the entire night without eating. It was quite hard for the women in the group. Another 16 - year old girl told the Mission that she was forcibly recruited by the SSA - 354. S in July 2011 in Mongkaung Township, Shan State until she escaped from a SSA - S military needed to work camp. She received training for two years, which she said was because, “they 772 for their country and fight back the Tatmadaw”. (d) Destruction and appropriation of civilian property 355. The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that EAOs have confiscated and destroyed civilian property as a means to coerce civ ilians to participate in military operations, to gain control over a given territory or to punish civilians who have collaborated with the 773 Tatmadaw or an opposing non - This appropriation of property was State armed group. n of natural resources or farming, which appear to be closely connected to the extractio 774 imperative to the armed group’s financial survival. 356. For example, a source reported that the SSA - S destroyed his mother’s tea plantation in 2013 in Namhsan Township, Shan State. The source mentione d that the SSA S wanted to - gain control over the Ta’ang region and exploit the tea plantation for financial reasons. This led his mother and other villagers to leave and move to Yangon as they were no longer able 775 The Mission also recorded other recent unverified to earn a living in their native village. accounts of Ta’ang villagers being forced to leave their land in territory controlled by the 776 S in Shan State. SSA - 357. In several cases reported, the TNLA confiscated the land, house or belongings of famil ies who refuse to give up their sons for recruitment or because they escaped after having 777 been recruited. The property is confiscated until the families allow their son to be recruited. In one credible instance reported, the TNLA confiscated the home of t he mother of the source in 2017, Namhsan Township, Shan State, because her brother was recruited by the TNLA, but had then “deserted” and fled to Thailand. As a consequence, the mother was evicted from 778 her home, under orders from the TNLA. 358. In another account, the TNLA confiscated the home and tea plantation of a family in 779 Namhsan Township, Shan State in early September 2017. The interviewee explained that initially her brother was recruited, despite his mental disability, and when he had escaped mili tary training, she had been forcibly recruited in his place. She was informed of this by the village administrator, acting on behalf of the TNLA. She eventually also managed to flee, but as a consequence her parents were evicted from their home and land, a nd are now 780 displaced. The Mission has also received unverified reports of the SSA S and TNLA looting and - 359. pillaging civilian property during their military incursions into the opposing group’s 781 For example, on 13 February 2016, it was repor ted that, during fighting between territory. S members the TNLA and RCSS in Nam Twe village, Langhko Township, Shan State, SSA - 771 DI 070 . - 772 PI 014 . - 773 PI - 094 , PI - , QI - 088, SI - 003. 101 774 QI - 088 , SI - 003. 775 QI - 088 . 776 PI - 101 . 777 PI - 093, PI - 094, PI - 095, PI - 097 . 778 PI - 093. 779 - PI 094. 780 PI - 094. 781 - 144. K - 137, K 88

89 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 782 entered the village and looted the belongings of villagers. January 2016, in Similarly, on 7 a village and requested villagers to give Tangyan Township, Shan State, TNLA men entered 783 them rice and allegedly said “we do not care if you have rice to eat yourselves”. Taxes and extortion (socio - (e) economic component) Some EAOs implemented arbitrary “taxation” requirements that caused signi ficant 360. economic pressure on civilians. For example, residents of villages under the control of the TNLA in Namhsan Township, Shan State, were obliged to pay “taxes” often referred to by 784 villagers as “extortion money”. lagers were forced to Sources informed the Mission that vil pay up to 10,000 Kyat and one or two bags of rice per month, which represented a major burden for villagers who only earn wages during the short tea leave picking season, from of villagers who did not comply with March to late April. The village administrator kept a list the obligation to pay the taxes. When one household could not pay the TNLA, someone else 785 in the village had to cover for them, and they then needed to pay double the next month. tained a list of villagers who have not paid “their One source mentioned that the TNLA main dues” and that this may result in the TNLA visiting a person’s house “with their guns to shoot 786 In already difficult economic circumstances, this had at you or destroy your belongings.” n villagers. One interviewee mentioned that villagers felt intimidated by a serious impact o this and would share small portions of rice amongst themselves to ensure that they had 787 sufficient to pay the TNLA. 788 Another source mentioned that, when the “Shan Army” controll 361. ed the tea fields around his village in Namhsan Township, Shan State in 2011, they would require villagers to pay them a tax to be able to cultivate the land. Reportedly, they charged 30,000 Kyat per 789 Shan Army destroying tea tea plantation. The Mission also received reports of the plantations in 2013 in Namhsam Township, Shan State, as a mean to coerce villagers to pay 790 them. (f) Abductions, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture and ill - treatment The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude t hat some EAOs have abducted, 362. arbitrarily deprived persons of their liberty, and subsequently ill - treated or tortured, as a mean to coerce them to participate in military operations, to gain control over a given territory, or 791 llaborated with the Tatmadaw or an opposing EAO. to punish civilians who have co 363. The Mission received credible accounts of the TNLA abducting the parents of children 792 who refused to join their ranks. In one case reported to the Mission, the TNLA abducted 793 the mother of a boy who re fused to join the TNLA. 794 The TNLA also arrested and detained civilians. 364. For example, a victim shared an account of arbitrary detention and ill - treatment conducted by the TNLA in Namhsan, Shan State, in March 2013. The victim was taken for forced labour by the Tatmadaw for four days, but managed to escape and returned to his v illage which was under the control of the TNLA. Upon his arrival at the entrance to the village, the TNLA detained and beat him accusing him of being a spy for the Tatmadaw. The victim stated, “I was beaten and tied up for one entire - 782 K - 137. 783 K - 144. 784 - PI - 093, PI - 094, PI - 096, PI 097. 785 PI - 093, PI - 097. 786 PI - 097. 787 PI - 097. 788 - Unclear if Shan State Army - S (RCSS) or Shan State Army N (SSPP). Considering the location of the incident, it is likely to be the SSA - N (SSPP). 789 Ibid. 790 QI - 088. 791 - K - 143, PI - 095, PI 112, PI - 114. 792 112. PI - 093, PI - 097, PI - 793 PI - 093. 794 - 095. K - 143, K - 144, PI 89

90 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 of the village at the area where villagers keep their cows. I was beaten night at the entrance until I could not walk anymore”. Members of the TNLA told the victim, “You betrayed the 795 Ta’ang people by guiding Tatmadaw soldiers”. In another reported case, the TNLA arrested the father of a 29 - 365. year old man who was absent when the TNLA arrived to recruit him in October 2017 in Namkham Township, Shan State. The father was subsequently arrested and detained by the TNLA until the man returned and was recruited. He said, “The TNLA often do this. They arrest parents in order to force 796 the sons to join the TNLA. They release the parents only when the sons are recruited”. 366. The KIA also abducted civilians to coerce them in participating in military 797 For example, in a v erified incident that occurred in February 2017, a 12 - year operations. old girl was abducted by the KIA in Kutkai Township, Shan State, and held hostage by the group because her older brothers had refused to be recruited. During her captivity, the girl 798 received milita ry training. 367. The Mission also received unverified reports of SSA - S and TNLA abducting civilians 799 in the course of their military incursions against each other. The Mission was not able to determine if the civilians were released following the abducti ons. For example, it was S abducted 11 Ta’ang villagers from a village in Kyautme Township, Shan - reported that SSA 800 State, on 17 January 2016. Further, on 17 September 2017, it was reported that the SSA - S Shan State. They were allegedly abducted a monk and his brother in Thibaw Township, 801 released 10 days after their abduction. 368. The Mission verified an incident involving the SSA - S arbitrarily depriving the president and secretary of a local branch of the Ta’ang National Party of his liberty on 20 802 2015 in Mongkaung Township, Shan State. June The victim had erected a billboard for the Ta’ang National Party in his village and had refused to take it down at the request of the SSA - S. As a result, SSA - S armed men detained the victim with another member of th e party under a tree for two days. They were beaten on the head and body with rifle butts. Their hands and legs were tied for approximately 24 hours. The victim was beaten by an SSA - S leader who told him, “if you do not become an SSA - S soldier then you can die here”. The SSA - S leader also pointed a gun at his temple and pulled the trigger in a mock execution. Two days later, the victims were moved to the forest and placed under a plastic covering with no walls, and ictim was handcuffed, making sleeping difficult. remained detained there for 33 days. The v Civil society organizations intervened and eventually secured the victims’ release. The SSA - S initially denied having the detainees in their custody but they eventually confirmed their location and released the victims on the condition that they do not participate in any political - party or recruitment for the SSA S. Members of the armed group also threatened to confiscate 803 and destroy the property of the victims should they be politically active in the future. Another 16 369. year old girl told the Mission that she was forcibly recruited by the SSA - - S in July 2011 in Mongkaung Township, Shan State. The child was ill - treated and wanted to return home to care for her sick mother, she said: I was beaten with a sti ck sometimes. The trainees were often punished by the SSA - S members. If the soldiers did not hit us hard enough, an officer would come and hit us harder. We were punished for serious offences such as wanting to leave the training. The conditions in which w e lived at the training camp were very hard. Once a month 795 095. PI - 796 PI - 112. 797 061, K K - - 064. 798 K - 061. 799 K - 137, K - 144. 800 137. K - 801 K - 137. 802 K - 137, PI - 114, V - 304. 803 114. - PI 90

91 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 a senior officer would come and ask if we had something to say about the training. I 804 was always beaten because I wanted to go home and because I was the youngest. (g) Sexual and gender - based viole nce One incident of sexual violence concerning perpetrators belonging to an EAO was 370. reported by a source and involved the rape of a headmistress by several TNLA officers at her home in Kyaukme Township, Shan State in October 2017. Following the victim ’s report to local authorities, the TNLA negotiated for the perpetrators to pay compensation to the victim, and brought two soldiers to kneel and apologize to her. The TNLA held a “court case” in the 805 chose not to attend. forest to address the crime. The victim was invited, but The Mission also received unverified reports of KIA men raping women in Kachin State during the 806 reporting period who were subsequently tried before courts in KIO controlled territory. These allegations require further verification. (h) Killings 371. The Mission has also obtained credible but unverified information suggesting that 807 some EAOs have unlawfully killed civilians or fighters hors de combat in their custody. 808 372. For example, the Mission recorded an account of the Shan Army killing a Lahu man in 2011 in Maungdaw Township, Shan State. According to the witness, the victim, a former 809 In February 2016, it was Tatmadaw soldier, was mutilated and tortured before being killed. reported that an unspecified ethnic armed group killed seven civilians in Kyaukme Township, 810 Shan State. The bodies were found by the Tatmadaw the day after their abduction. In March 2016, the UWSA reportedly executed two persons after they were convicted of murder by 811 the Wa Special Administrative Zone’s cour t. A further reported case suggests that SSA - S 812 men killed a Ta’ang villager in Namkham Township, Shan State, on 1 July 2016. Similarly, it was reported that TNLA men killed four villagers in the forest near a village of Namkham 813 Township, Shan State, on 8 February 2016. 373. These cases require further verification, including regarding the protected status of the persons killed. C. Impact of conflict, violations and abuses on civilians 1. Fear, trauma, displacement and humanitarian impact 374. Irreversi ble harm has been inflicted on civilians by all parties to the conflicts in northern Myanmar: civilians were killed and injured; families were separated and displaced y multiple times; homes, churches and schools were looted or destroyed, also preventing man 814 and entire villages were burned and destroyed. children from attending school regularly; The civilian population continues to live in constant fear and terror of an army that has thoroughly failed to protect them, and in many instances directly attacked them. 375. Victims have informed the Mission of how their lives have been altered as a consequence of the perpetration of human rights violations. Victims remain highly 815 For example, a source mentioned that children are afraid of opening door traumatised. s and 804 PI - 014. 805 PI - 110 . 806 K - 145. 807 K - 143, QI - 077. 808 S (RCSS) or Shan State Army Unclear if Shan State Army - - N (SSPP). 809 QI - 077. 810 143. K - 811 K - 143, V - 305. 812 K - 137. 813 K - 144. 814 - PI - 087, DI 067, PI - 016. 815 103. - PI - 042, PI 91

92 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 816 Other victims are no longer able to work to sustain a hide when they see or hear planes. 817 For instance, a tea plantation farmer explained that she can no longer work on livelihood. her plantation after she was injured from shrapnel and bullet wounds on her leg and arm during a Tatmadaw attack in northern Shan State on 2 May 2017. She remained hospitalised for several weeks and she can hardly move. Her husband has since become a monk and her ir house was also destroyed only income is from the work undertaken by her children. The 818 A torture victim shared that since an during the attack and they now live in a rented home. incident in northern Shan State in August 2017, and because of injuries inflicted by in his family: “The Tatmadaw soldiers Tatmadaw soldiers, he can no longer work and susta 819 tortured me and destroyed my life”. Other torture and ill - treatment victims have stated that they suffer from severe trauma, cognitive dysfunction, and other mental and physical 820 consequences that require medical care. Many victims reported that it had been extremely challenging to obtain medical 376. services to treat their injuries, and some have felt compelled to travel to China to seek medical 822 821 attention. Victims have also reportedly died because of the lack of timely medical care. a victim from the Monekoe area in Shan State reported that on 15 January 2016 For example, rself a mortar shell exploded in her compound, close to a main road, causing injuries to he and her daughter: The shell pieces are still in our bodies. My daughter is not normal now. She doesn’t respond to me sometimes. When I was in the hospital, doctors didn’t take the shell might harm the baby pieces out of my body because it was too risky. Doctors said it as I was already 8 months pregnant then. I had to have a surgery to deliver my baby 823 because my whole body was swollen. 377. Victims and witnesses’ accounts indicate the Tatmadaw frequently went to the 824 escaped detention or forced labour looking for them, and villages of individuals who had 825 in some cases beat family members of the escaped individual. For example, one victim from Myitkyina, Kachin State, who was arrested and detained overnight in 2012 and whose e Tatmadaw during this detention, reported that after he escaped brother was killed by th detention and fled the country, the Tatmadaw went to his village to look for him. His parents 826 and siblings were afraid to stay in the village so they fled to an IDP camp. Another victim from Myitkyina, Kachin State reported how, as retaliation for her escape after several months of forced labour in 2012, her house was destroyed and her mother beaten, and made to 827 undertake forced labour for the Tatmadaw. 378. An estimated 97,000 people in Kach in and 9,000 people in Shan remain in displacement camps or camp - like situations, many in overcrowded conditions with inadequate shelters, which are in urgent need of repair and provide little privacy. Many of them have been displaced for extended periods of up to seven years. Displaced peoples, - government controlled areas, have told the Mission that the quality of particularly in non education afforded in camps is poor and not recognized by the authorities to attain higher 828 education. Meeting food needs is , in the words of one local organization working in these camps “a constant struggle”, with limited food rations and a rate of chronic malnutrition well 829 above the national average. Access to health care remains limited, and psycho - social 816 - 103. PI 817 - 042, PI - 046, PI PI 072. - 818 - 073. PI 819 PI - 035. 820 PI - 021, PI - 035, PI - 115. 821 055, PI PI - 029, PI - - 065, DI - 057. 822 - DI - 070, PI 105. 823 PI - 115. 824 - PI 066, PI - 067, PI 077, PI - 078. - 825 068. PI - 007, PI - 826 PI - 062. 827 068. PI - 828 087, PI - QM - 014. 829 056. - PI 92

93 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 y non - support is largel existent. Insecurity levels in camps are high and many displaced 830 Thousands of others, approximately 68,000 persons have a sense of despair for the future. since 2017 alone, have suffered from temporary displacements over the reporting period. een displaced multiple times. Some o f these individuals have b 379. Many families have been separated because of the war and many do not have contact 831 with family members left behind. For example, a woman explained that she was separated from her child while flee ing a Tatmadaw attack on her village in November 2017 in Kachin 832 State and had not seen her since. Victims frequently told the Mission that after being released or escaping from 380. 833 in particula detention they were too afraid to return to their villages, r if the Tatmadaw had 834 835 taken their identification documents. and in Many victims decided to leave the country, 836 Leaving Myanmar also impacted victims some cases family members also had to leave. s aunt had to mortgage her land that fled and family members left behind. A man said that hi 837 to pay for his trip to Malaysia, after he had escaped arbitrary detention by the Tatmadaw. Civilians continually suffer as a consequence of the continuing conflicts between the 381. 838 Many express a f eeling of being caught in the middle: for Tatmadaw and the EAOs. example, one witness mentioned that, “villagers want nothing to do with this, all they want 839 is to live in peace and farm their land. Instead we are caught in between so many wars.” difficult to live in the KIA controlled area. It is also very hard Another stated that, “it is very 840 to live under the Tatmadaw controlled areas. Why can’t we live in peace?” (a) Consequences on women The consequences for women, especially for those who lost their spouse or fathers as 382. a result of attacks, killings or whose husbands were forcibly disappeared, are particularly 841 severe. Many face a dire economic situation having lost the main breadwinner of the gender - family, and are vulnerable to other violations, including sexual and based violence. by the Tatmadaw in June 2017 in Namhsan Township, Shan The mother of a victim killed State, stated the following: Before my son died, we relied on him to pay for medicine and food as we are aged. to survive, and our life is very hard now. I live with Now without him it is very difficult 842 my husband, but he is also old. There is no one else to care for us anymore. 383. Another woman recalled the impact of the disappearance of her husband in Kachin State in 2014: I became the head of the household. My children lost their father, and I had to find income to maintain my children and my aging parents. I had to start selling vegetables and to travel from one village to another. That is where Tatmadaw soldiers raped me in February 2018. Eve r since my husband was taken away by the Tatmadaw, we have been struggling for survival. I decided to leave my children in Kachin State with my 843 elderly parents so I can work abroad and ensure they stay alive. 830 QM - - 017. 014, QM 831 086. - 074, PI PI - 020, PI - 027, PI - - 084, PI 832 - 086. PI 833 084, PI - 089, PI 085, PI - PI - 079, PI - 078. - 834 - 011, PI - 029. PI 835 - 062, PI - 033, PI PI 029, PI - 006. - 836 PI - 001, PI - 008, PI - 012, PI - 027, PI - 062, PI - 096, QI - 089. 837 - PI 079. 838 PI - 044, PI - 074, PI - 095, PI - 094, PI - - 077, QI - 079, QI - 080, QI - 087. 097, QI 839 094. PI - 840 PI - 044. 841 - PI - 070, PI 073, PI - 074. 842 PI - 074. 843 - based violence. PI - 069; see this chapter, section A.4: S exual an d gender 93

94 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The impact of sexual and gender based vio lence on women and men reported to the 384. - lasting. The Mission found one case of rape that resulted Mission is severe, varied and long - 844 Other injuries reported by women included in death caused by contracting HIV. 845 omen region during sexual intercourse. experiencing pain in the vagina and lower abd Similarly, men who experienced sexual torture in detention continue to suffer enduring physical and psychological injuries, including bleeding from the anus, loss of cognitive 846 function, loss of emotional control, los s of erectile function and inability to work. 385. The lack of specific medical expertise related to rape exacerbates the effects of sexual violence in the region. As victims are predominantly women, this creates gender - based inequality in access to medi cal services. In several cases, women did not have the access to medical attention and women have fallen pregnant, sometimes even after seeing a doctor 847 immediately after the rape, because they were not given medication to prevent pregnancy. by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in A 2017 report Myanmar had also found that the limited capacity of providers, as well as restrictions on savin women’s freedom of movement due to increased militarization, limited access to life - g 848 - services for survivors of sexual and gender based violence. 2. Landmines 386. There is no systematic nationwide collection of casualty data related to landmines, but 1,000 people have been killed or injured by anti - personnel la ndmines across Myanmar at least 849 since August 2011 across 14 states and regions. Of the recorded incidents in recent years, Kachin and Shan States have among the highest number of landmine casualties, and numbers 850 are increasing. For example, from 2016 to April 2018, the United N ations recorded 199 casualties in Kachin State including 42 deaths, and 182 casualties in Shan State, including 48 851 deaths. Despite the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015, which nd cooperate on mine - committed all parties to end the use of landmines a clearance 852 operations, new landmines continue to be laid. Several victims and witnesses reported instances where civilians were injured or killed 387. 853 due to landmines. Individuals informed encountering landmines in forest areas, eith er 854 while detained by the Tatmadaw or while fleeing fighting, while travelling to their tea 855 856 plantations or farm, The Mission was unable to verify the party and in or around villages. ndicate that both the responsible for laying the mines in these cases, but credible reports i 857 Tatmadaw and EAOs have laid landmines. Credible reports indicate that Tatmadaw soldiers lay landmines in villages they have attacked or after civilians have fled, or on roads 858 frequently used by civilians. ndmines in order to protect their Civilians have also laid la 859 property. 844 PI - 007. 845 PI - - 063, PI 068. 846 PI - 052, PI 055, PI - 056. - 847 098. - - PI - 066, PI - 067, PI - 068, PI 069, QI 848 A/HRC/34/67, para. 56. 849 Myanmar Information Management Unit, Townships with Known Landmine Contamination (2017) and Casualties in Myanmar (December 2016). 850 Ibid. K - 064, V - 306, V - 307. 851 K - 064. 852 V - 308. 853 - PI - 103, PI - 104, PI 094, PI - 085, PI - 046, PI - 045, DI - 061, PI - 076. 854 ee also this chapter, PI - 016, PI - 104, PI - 085, PI - 046, PI - 045. S section A.6: Forced labour. 855 PI - 016, PI - 094 . 856 DI - 061, QI - 094, PI 046, PI - 098 . - 857 094, PI K - 137, K - 144, PI - 045, PI - 049, PI - - 098, SI - 003, V - 309 . 858 , SI PI - 045, PI - 049, PI - 094, PI - 098 - 002, SI - 003. 859 PI - 085; G. Cathcart, “Landmines as a form of community protection in Eastern Myanmar”, in Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion , 2nd ed., N. Cheesman, N. Farrelly, eds. (ISEAS, 2016), 131. - p p. 127 94

95 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The presence of landmines has a severe impact on the lives of civilians. Displaced 388. persons have indicated that landmines were one of the concerns preventing them from 860 F or example, one individual from Namhsan Township, returning to their places of origin. Shan State, explained the impact of landmines: There are many landmines planted on the route to my tea farm. There is no way to see die from them, you only know they are there after stepping on them. Villagers often stepping on them. My friend stepped on one and lost her leg. My father nearly stepped on one but he was lucky, it exploded just before he put his foot on it. The landmines 861 make it dangerous for us to farm. 3. Lack of recourse 389. Not only do victims and survivors live in a continuing state of insecurity and a constant fear, they also have also no recourse to justice. The very authorities that should protect them also fail at this level. The climate of impunity and its underlying causes it disc ussed in detail in Chapter VII (impunity and accountability). This section provides a brief overview of the experiences of victims and witnesses from Kachin and Shan States in this regard. Many victims are too afraid to complain. If complaints are mad e, the default reaction 390. appears to be of reprisal and attempts to silence rather than undertaking a genuine investigation. In cases that have been investigated, the process has often been flawed. (a) No possibility to file complaints escaped after having been detained and in many cases subjected to 391. Individuals who torture, ill - treatment, sexual violence or attempted murder by the Tatmadaw, frequently told the Mission that they were too afraid to return to their villages, let alone to file official 862 com This concern was particularly apparent in cases where the Tatmadaw had plaints. 863 retained the individual’s identity document. This fear was not unfounded as many were later told by family members that the Tatmadaw had come and looked for them after they 864 h In some cases, the Tatmadaw had also threatened or beaten family members ad escaped. 865 of those who had fled. For example, one victim from Puta - O Township, Kachin State, reported that after being sexually assaulted by a soldier in 2012 she did not return h ome but the soldier went looking for her there: I was walking back from another village when a soldier pulled me into the jungle. He put his hand over my mouth to stop me from screaming, he beat me and touched my body. An elderly man passing by heard the c ommotion and told the soldier to leave me alone. I ran away but was too afraid to go back home so I stayed with an elder in my village. The next day the elder went to see my parents, they said the soldier had been to my house looking for me. He had beaten my parents and taken my ID card 866 from them. Because of this, I had to leave my village. 392. Many victims therefore decided to leave the country following their escape from 867 detention. 393. Individuals who did return to their villages, as well as family m embers of individuals who had been killed or who had witnessed killings, told the Mission that they did not 868 This fear is not unfounded given that reprisals have complain as they were afraid to do so. 860 - - 103, SI - PI 003 . 002, SI 861 PI - 094 . 862 - PI 078, PI - 079, PI - - 085, PI - 089 . 084, PI 863 - PI - 006, PI - 007, PI - 011, PI 029, PI - 040. 864 - - 066, PI - 067, PI PI 077, PI - 078. 865 PI - 007, PI - 068, PI - 096. 866 PI - 007. 867 PI - 006, PI - 029, PI - 033, PI - 062. 868 . 070 DI - 057, DI - 068, PI - 041, PI - 95

96 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 869 lained, and given that many been carried out against some individuals who have comp victims or their family members are located in rural and insecure areas often in continued close proximity to perpetrators. Some victims or witnesses indicated that they did not know 870 how to file complaints or there was no one t Others said they felt there was o complain to. 871 no point in complaining. For example, one individual from Loilen Township, Shan State, whose father was killed told the Mission that he did not file a complaint as “the government the Tatmadaw is abusive. There is no point in filing a complaint does not care about us and 872 – there is no justice.” In some cases a combination of reasons are given. One individual from Kutkai Township in Shan State whose son was killed by the Tatmadaw in March 2017 said “I did not complain. I do not have any money and I didn’t know how. I was also 873 Another told the Mission that she was not aware that forced labour was a violation afraid.” 874 until she left the country. 394. Several individuals told the Mission that they had not share d their story with anyone 875 else. For example, a village administrator from Muse Township, Shan State, whose village was attacked by the Tatmadaw in one incident and villagers killed in another, stated: story with anyone. Nobody else After the attack happened in 2016, I didn’t share the in the village shared the story either. We didn’t receive threats from the Tatmadaw but we just understood the situation When the members of my village were killed in . 2017, I felt sad, but nobody lodged any complaints then e ither. We are afraid. As village administrator, I had gone to ask compensation in the past but was told “go 876 and ask compensation from the rebel groups, not from us. (b) Reprisals for speaking out ons committed in Kachin and 395. Where individuals did dare to speak out about violati Shan States, the Mission was provided with numerous examples of the police or Tatmadaw 877 bringing, or threatening to bring, court cases against them under a range of problematic 878 879 In a number of other cases broug ht to the attention of the Mission, legal provisions. the Tatmadaw’s response to alleged violations, has been to assert, often without any investigations, that the individuals were either killed by EAOs, or were fighters of these organizations and therefore legitimately ki lled. Based on such assertions, the Tatmadaw brings cases for defamation of the image of the Tatmadaw, or under the Unlawful Associations Act, against individuals alleging Tatmadaw responsibility for the deaths. This the Mission has found a pattern of individuals being is particularly problematic given that killed while in Tatmadaw custody and given information indicating that the Tatmadaw portrays or disguises civilians that were killed as members of EAOs, such as by making them 880 wear the uniforms of EAOs. 396. A well - known example is the case of Brang Shawng, who was convicted of making “false charges,” under section 211 of the Penal Code on 13 February 2015 and sentenced to a 50,000 Kyat fine or six months in prison. He alleged his daughter had been shot and killed by the Tatmadaw on 13 September 2012 in Sut Ngai Yang village, Hpakant Township, Kachin State and wrote a letter to the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission calling 881 Kachin State, told the Missio for an investigation. n that after her Another individual from 869 090 DI - 062, PI - 070, QI - . 870 Ibid. 871 082. PI - 041, PI - 872 PI - 082. 873 070. PI - 874 PI - 058 . 875 - 062, DI DI - 057, DI 058, DI - - 063, PI - 117 . 876 DI - 057. 877 A/HRC/37/70; K - 139, PI - 037, PI - 038, PI - 102, PI - 106, V - 206. 878 See chapter VI, section A.2: Intimidation and reprisal for engagement with the United Nations. 879 - K - 139, PI 037, PI - 106. 880 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings. 881 208. - A/HRC/28/72, PI - 105, V 96

97 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 tody of the Tatmadaw, in father was killed after having been seen in the cus 2018, charges were brought against a relative that complained: My relative went to the police, she tried to complain and to make a police report she – explained th at the Tatmadaw were responsible and she wanted to get justice. The Tatmadaw said that my father was a member of the KIA, and that my relative was lying. They brought charges against her. She was afraid so she had to leave her 882 . home 883 397. Charges have also been brought against journalists or those interacting with them. For example, p brought charges against Dumdaw Nawng Lat, President of the Kachin olice Baptist Church in Monekoe, Shan State and his nephew and assistant pastor Langjaw Gam guided journalists around their damaged church which they alleged had been Seng, after they bombed by the Tatmadaw in November 2016. Both were sentenced to two years and three months in prison on 27 October 2017 under section 17(1) of the Unlawful Associations Act, with Du mdaw Nawng Lat receiving an additional two year sentence for defamation under section 505(b) of the Penal Code, after also giving an interview to an international news 884 outlet. 398. Lawyers who have taken up sensitive cases against the Tatmadaw in Kachin and Shan 885 States have also faced threats, leading some to be afraid of working on these cases. For example, one lawyer told the Mission that he was harassed and his colleagues threatened when working on a case against the Tatmadaw: It was a sensitive case, so I was watched by the intelligence. Every time I went to the place of the incident, I was harassed by police. My co - workers were threatened by the 886 military. They said, “If you take the case, you will have problems .” Civil society organizations working in Kachin and Shan States face constant 399. surveillance and visits from the security forces, and face additional security concerns when 887 releasing reports that implicate the Tatmadaw. (c) Flawed process when complaints are taken up 400. cases, individuals reported to the Mission that they were given compensation In a few 888 by the Tatmadaw but without any form of process. For example, a father whose son was shot by the Tatmadaw when he was walking along a road in Kutkai Township, Shan State in Augus t 2017, was told by the Tatmadaw that they had made a mistake and was given 500,000 889 Kyat for the funeral. The amount of compensation given appears to be arbitrary - a mother an Township, Shan State, in 2017 rep orted: whose son was killed by the Tatmadaw in Namhs rom the Tatmadaw base gave my village administrator money to pay for A soldier f the funeral but the funeral was more expensive so I had to take out a loan. I spoke to the Tatmadaw, but was very intimidated. I explained to them that my son was the ead winner in my family and without him we could not survive. I asked for more br 890 compensation but they never gave us anything else. 401. The Mission was also told of a recent case of rape in 2018 in Shan State where, rities, a Tatmadaw commander and relatives of the following a meeting between local autho 882 PI - 106. 883 A/HRC/37/70; A/72/382; V - 209; see also OHCHR, The Invisible Boundary – Criminal prosecutions of journalism in Myanmar (11 September 2018). 884 section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and Ibid. PI - - 038, V - 057 . See this chapter, 037, PI enforcd disappear ance. 885 PI - 037, BM - 008; International Commission of Jurists, Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights , (Geneva, 2018). Violations in Myanmar Baseline Study 886 - 008. BM 887 007; BM - A/HRC/34/67. 888 PI - 071, PI - 074, PI - 110. 889 PI - 071 . 890 . 074 PI - 97

98 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 victim, the soldier responsible was slapped 10 times and compensation of 200,000 Kyat 891 provided to a male family member of the victim. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Government of Myanmar, the Mission did not 402. have access to official information on prosecutions against members of the Tatmadaw for violations. However, the Mission is aware that in a small number of cases, members of the Tatmadaw have been prosecuted for violations including killin gs and sexual violence. For example, in relation to the killing of three IDPs in Mansi Township, Kachin State in May 2017, a military tribunal sentenced six Tatmadaw soldiers to 10 years’ imprisonment in 892 January 2018. The Mission is also aware of a case o f a child who was raped in Kachin 893 State where a soldier was sentenced to 10 years in prison with hard labour. However, investigations and prosecutions appear to be limited to a small number of often high - profile cases. The default approach is to deny Tatm adaw responsibility, dismiss the complainant, and in some cases threatening prosecution against anyone alleging Tatmadaw involvement in the incident, and only when these approaches fail to deflect attention, to undertake some form of investigation which ge nerally does not comply with international investigative 894 standards. For example, the Tatmadaw has threatened legal action in relation to the killings of 403. the volunteer teachers named Shan State on Maran Lu Ra and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin in 895 19 January 2 015, and there were serious concerns about the investigation methods. A similar pattern can be seen in incidents of arrest, for example in the case of Dumdaw Nawng Lat and Langjaw Gam Seng in Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State, where the Presidential spok esperson denied on 10 January 2017 they were held by the Tatmadaw, but it later 896 transpired that they had in fact been detained in a military base from 24 December 2016. Credible information received on the killing of seven individuals in Mong Yaw, Shan St ate in June 2016 indicates that following an incident where witnesses saw two individuals being shot by the Tatmadaw after they ignored an order to stop at a checkpoint, and five other individuals being detained near their farm land and not returning, the military ordered 897 When villagers were able to go back to villagers not to leave their village for three days. their farms, the bodies of the seven individuals were found in two sites. On 2 July 2016, the owned newspaper, stated that “rumo - urs on social Myawaddy military media that Tatmadaw had killed seven civilians, which were not true,” continuing that two of the individuals were TNLA members and the other five bodies had been found by troops during “area 898 clearance.” al reportedly admitted publically that However, later a Tatmadaw senior gener 899 and in September 2016, five villagers were killed by the Tatmadaw during an interrogation, seven soldiers were reportedly sentenced to five years in prison with hard labour for the 900 killings. er investigations have been conducted into the two It does not appear furth individuals allegedly killed at the checkpoint. 404. The Mission also received credible information indicating that even when cases are a lawyer who has taken brought before authorities, the process is often flawed. For example, up several cases against the Tatmadaw identified a number of issues related to the functioning of courts in their experience: When cases are tried by a military court, the charges are often not what is expected because the military code is different. For example, in a case of sexual violence, there is no such charge, so a perpetrator was sentenced instead for intoxication during 891 PI - 110 . 892 A/HRC/37/70, para. 36. 893 037. PI - 894 See chapter X: Impunity and accountability. 895 See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender - based violence. 896 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance. 897 K - 076.21 . 898 Article on file with the Mission. 899 W. Lone, “In rare move, Myanmar military admits soldiers killed five villagers” (Reuters, 20 July 2016). 900 . Frontier Myanmar, “Tatmadaw soldiers jailed for killing Mong Yaw villagers” (16 September 2016) 98

99 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 official duty and got a lighter sentence. Sometimes lawyers are allowed to go to military hearings but mos tly we are not, we just get informed of the outcome, we never get a written copy, we are just told orally. We also never know whether or not the rulings are implemented. Even cases before civilian courts have problems. Like with not given a copy of the judgments. Sometimes if we request the military courts, we are them we get them but it takes a long time. For sensitive cases we are generally not 901 allowed to see them – we are told they are lost or in Naypyidaw. V . Emblematic s ituation 2: Rakhine State 40 Rakhine State is located in western Myanmar. It extends some 560 km along the Bay 5. of Bengal and shares a border with Bangladesh. It is geographically remote – much of its internal borders with other states of Myanmar are mountainous and infrastructure l inks to the rest of the country are limited. state remains Despite its strategic location and fertility, the one of Myanmar’s poorest, with an estimated 44 per cent of the population living below the 902 poverty line. All communities in the state are affected by scarcity of livelihood 904 903 opportunities and it score s poorly on many social development indicators . 406. The state comprises various ethnic and religious groups. The majority of the 905 largest religious Muslims constitute the seco nd population is ethnic Rakhine and Buddhist. 906 group, the majority of whom are Rohingya, with a smaller proportion of Kaman. There are also a number of other minorities such as Chin, Daingnet, Khami, Maramagyi, Mro, Thet and Hindus. The distribution of ethnic and religious minorities in the state varies by region, with Rohingya constituting a large majority in the northern district of Maungdaw, and ethnic Rakhine in most remaining districts. Estimates of Rohingya rema ining in Rakhine State after the mass exodus to Bangladesh of 2016 and 2017 vary between 200,000 and 240,000 in the 907 northern townships and 332,000 and 360,000 for central Rakhine State. 407. The ethnic Rakhine, like many other ethnic minorities in the cou ntry, have grievances against the central Government, which they perceive to have favoured Bamar - Buddhists politically and economically. They are proud of ethnic Rakhine culture, language and history, a strong s entiment that the development of which they feel is threatened. There is also Rakhine State has been neglected. In the words of one ethnic Rakhine who spoke to the Mission, “in Rakhine State, there are a lot of resources but we can’t get these resources from 908 This sentiment is fuelled by the high poverty levels. According to data our own State”. from the 2014 census, Rakhine State has the highest unemployment rate in the country, and 901 - 007. BM 902 UNDP, Poverty Profile, Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar - 2009 - 2010 (2011). Rakhine State continues to rank low compared to other states and regions in Myanmar on many indicators of living standards. See UNDP, Myanmar Living Conditions Survey 2017 (June 2018). 903 Center for Diversity and National Harmony, Rakhine Needs Assessment II (January 2017). 904 Rakhine State UNIC EF, – A Snapshot of Child Wellbeing, available at: https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/Rakhine_State_Profile_30 07 - - 15.pdf 905 It is not possible to provide exact percentages as Rohingya were not included in the 2014 census and, 4 census data on ethnicity has not been released. 63 per cent of the population in in any case, the 201 - enumerated population, principally the Rakhine State was of Buddhist faith when adjusted for the non groups in add ition to the ethnic Rakhine. Rohingya. This figure includes some other smaller Buddhist See also: Center for Diversity and National Harmony, (October 2015). Rakhine Needs Assessment The report estimated the population of ethnic Rakhine at 60 per cent in Rakhine State. 906 as due to begin, the Government reneged on an earlier On 29 March 2014, a day before the census w explicit commitment to allow the Rohingya to self identify their ethnicity on cen sus forms. The - p residential spokesperson stated that those wishing to state their ethnicity as Rohingya would not be regi stered. As a consequence, most of the Rohingya were not enumerated in the census. The census estimates the non - enumerated population at 1,090,000 which would constitute 34 per cent of the total population in Rakhine State. 907 K - 113.7. 908 003. - DM 99

100 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 909 - the lowest access to clean water and sanitation. There are also concerns that some large uch as the Shwe Gas pipeline, and initial preparatory phases for scale development projects, s 910 the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone are not benefitting local communities . In late 2015, an ethnic Rakhine armed group, the Arakan Army, started operating in 408. 911 Its stated aims include self - determination for Rakhine State. ethnic Rakhine (Arakanese) people , safeguarding cultural heritage and promoting the “national dignity and Arakanese 912 It has operated in a number of townships within Rakhine State and has national interest”. since sporadi cally clashed with the Tatmadaw, with clashes reportedly becoming more 913 frequent and more deadly in recent years. The casualties incurred by the Tatmadaw in these clashes exceed those resulting from the ARSA attacks of 2016 and 2017. The clashes have also caused displacement of civilians. 409. In September 2016, in an effort to address the concerns of all communities in the State, the Myanmar Government formed the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. The members, was chaired by Commission, composed of six national and three inter national former United Nations Secretary - General, Kofi Annan. It was mandated to “finding lasting solutions to the complex and delicate issues in Rakhine State, in accordance with established international standards”. The Commission produced a final report in August 2017, including 914 88 wide ranging recommendations. The Office of the State Counsellor welcomed - term solutions”. It stated that it would “recommendations for meaningful and long give the report “full consideration with a vi ew to carrying out the recommendations to the fullest 915 extent, and within the shortest timeframe possible, in line with the situation on the ground.” T he report noted that the situation in Rakhine State amounted to a “development crisis”, a “human rights c risis”, and a “security crisis” . I t underscored that the mandate of the Advisory 916 Commission was not to examine specific allegations of human rights violations. 410. The Mission has examined such specific allegations. It has focused on (1) human rights violations against the ethnic Rakhine, (2) the systemic oppression of the Rohingya, (3) the violence in 2012, and (4) the extreme violence in 2016 and 2017 in the context of the ARSA attacks and security forces’ “clearance operations”. A . Human rights vio lations against the ethnic Rakhine I want to share my story with the whole world because the world does not know what 917 is happening in our land. 909 Data from 2014 census data available on an interactive platform: http://www.dopredatam.gov.mm/redbin/RpWebEngine.exe/Portal?BASE=MMARENG&lang=eng 910 - 154, CI 162; International Commission of Jurists, Special Economic Zones in Myanmar and the CI - (February 2017); Earth Rights International, There is no benefit, State Duty to Protect Human Rights (June 2013). they destroyed our farmland 911 The Arakan Army was create d in 2009 in Kachin State, predominantly by ethnic Rakhine migrant workers from the mines of Hpakant who received training by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The Arakan Army is part of the Northern Alliance and the Federal Political Negotiation and sultative Committee (see chapter IV : Emblematic situation 1: Con ) and has Kachin and Shan States participated in hostilities in the north of Shan State, Kokang Self - administered zone and Kachin State. 912 . Myanmar Peace Monitor, The Arakan Army 913 rding to credible reports, the t ownships where the Arakan Army operates include Buthidaung, Acco - - 076.23; D . Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, Mrauk U, Minbya, Ponnagyun, and Rathedaung. See: K . Davis, Mathieson, “Shadowy rebels extend Myanmar’s wars (Asia Times, 11 June 2017); A nmar’s other Rakhine problem (Asia Times, 29 November 2017). “Mya 914 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017). 915 Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Office of the State Counsellor, Statement by the Office of the State Counsellor on the Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (24 August 2017). 916 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towar ds a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017), pp. 9 - 10 and p. 13. 917 - 028. DI 100

101 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The international community has focused much attention on the human rights 411. n rights violations against ethnic Rakhine have largely gone situation of the Rohingya. Huma unnoticed. The Mission purposefully reached out to ethnic Rakhine communities, finding consistent patterns of serious human rights violations against them. In most cases, Tatmadaw s he perpetrator . soldiers were t 918 Forced or compulsory labour 1. The Mission found a consistent pattern of the Tatmadaw using ethnic Rakhine men, 412. 919 women and children for forced or compulsory labour. Forced labour took place throughout 920 the reporting period and across The victims were mostly from remote rural Rakhine State. 921 areas. Considering that victims also referred to family members, including their parents, being subjected to similar practices in the past, it is clear that such practices have been a feature of R akhine rural life for many years. The ethnic Rakhine have experienced multiple forms of forced or compulsory labour. 413. The most common form was the carrying of heavy packs, weapons and supplies for victims usually being males. Both men Tatmadaw patrols, referred to as “portering”, with the and women have also been forced to work in Tatmadaw compounds, with men usually constructing infrastructure and women washing, cleaning and cooking. Other forced labour ng rocks, cutting firewood, clearing forests, related to road construction, breaking and carryi and working in paddy fields. 414. Victims told the Mission of the typical experience. Tatmadaw soldiers would arrive 922 or when in a village or where villagers were gathered, including fields while farming 923 and order villagers to join them without warning or consultation. return ing from work, 924 or take Soldiers would often physically grab people as they passed through the village, 925 them from their homes. In such instances, the selected villagers were often unable t o inform their families. They were given no information on the work they were supposed to do and had to embark immediately on portering or other forms of work for days or weeks. One victim described his experience: rewood to sell. One day, I was on my way back I used to go to the forest and collect fi with other villagers. Suddenly, some Tatmadaw soldiers appeared and grabbed us. They beat us and said that we had to go with them for portering. We had to go with 926 he high hills for eight days . them straight away. We were then portering in t Alternatively, the Tatmadaw would gather labourers by telling the head of the village 415. 927 to provide a number of persons. One victim, who lived in a village next to a Tatmadaw base, reported that announcements were made ind icating the number required on a particular 928 day. Most victims had to participate in forced or compulsory labour on multiple occasions. 416. For some, it was once a week, for others it could be once a month, or two to three times a 929 It appears that proximity to a Tatmadaw base may have affected the frequency. While year. there was little scope to avoid forced or compulsory labour, there are instances where 918 For legal framework, : Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and see chapter IV, section A.7 children. 919 058, CI CI - 053, CI - 055, CI - 056, CI - 057, CI - 060, CI - 153, CI - 154, CI - 158, CI - 159, DI - 014, DI - 015, - 041, DI 028, DI 043, DI - 016, DI - 017, DI - 018, DI - 019, DI - - - 029, DI - 032, DI - 033, DI - 036, DI - 039, DI - DI - - 045, QI - 072, QI - 074, QI - 075. 044, DI 920 The Mission documented cases in the following townships in Rakhine State: Buthidaung, Kyaukpyu, Kyauktaw, Mrauk U, Maungdaw, Minbya, Pauktaw, Ponnagoyun, Ramree , Rathedaung and Sittwe. - 921 DI - 017, DI - 029, QI - 075. 922 CI - 055, DI - 019. 923 QI - 074 . 924 153, CI 028, DI CI - 053, CI - 058, CI - 060, CI - - 154, CI - 158, DI - 018, DI - - 043. 925 CI - 056, DI - 015, DI - 017, DI - 032, DI 036, DI - 041, DI - 044, DI - 045 . - 926 QI - 074 . 927 CI - 056, CI - 057, QI - 074. 928 QI - 072 . 929 075. - CI - 056, DI - 015, DI - 016, DI - 032, DI - 033, DI - 036, QI - 072, QI - 074, QI 101

102 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 930 In some situations, one person from each villagers paid the Tatmadaw as an alternative. household in the village had to go for forced labour, whenever the order came. Victims of forced labour were often required to report on a regular basis. They frequently had to sleep in the Tatmadaw permitted to return camp until the tasks were completed and they were home. Victims were fearful of further forced labour. When the Tatmadaw arrived in the village, the youth would often flee to hide. No payment or compensation was received for 931 the labour. 417. The duration of forced or compulsory labour has varied, lasting from a few hours to 932 Porters could be forced to travel significant distances on foot, days, weeks or months. 933 carrying heavy loads between towns or to other states, for up to ten days. One villager 934 launcher for eight days. In most cases, the porters grenade described how he had to carry a were not given any information about the journey, simply ordered to follow the troops. Forced labour was also imposed in th 418. e context of the conflict between the Tatmadaw 935 exposing porters to significant dangers. In some instances, porters and the Arakan Army, 936 One victim were taken to conflict areas and exposed to combat or the risk of combat. described how another porter was - personnel mine and had his leg badly injured by an anti 937 Porters were also used as minesweepers, with amputated and bandaged without medicine. 938 soldiers sending porters ahead of them. One victim stated: rge group of soldiers came and I was taken as a porter when working in a field. A la told me to follow them. When I refused, they kicked me and punched me in the face. A soldier pointed his gun in my back and said I would be killed if I did not follow. So, I followed and carried their rations. They made me an d others walk at the front, carrying heavy bags. We travelled for three days and then there was shooting between the Arakan Army and the soldiers. The fighting lasted about one hour. I managed to 939 e killed. hide in the forest, but three soldiers and other porters wer Forced labourers received overt verbal threats, including 419. death threats to themselves family members, insults and derogatory references to their ethnicity. Ethnic Rakhine who or tried to avoid forced labour, because of sickness or other com pelling reasons, were subjected 940 941 to beatings with sticks, Additionally, fines were imposed and or kicking and punching. 942 - treatment. they faced the threat of arrest. Forced labourers were frequently subjected to ill over many hours, carrying heavy loads and with Porters often had to walk long distances little or no rest. They were only allowed to stop when instructed. When porters slowed down 943 or were unable to carry the heavy loads, they were beaten with sticks or guns, slapped or 944 One victim state kicked. d: I was subjected to forced labour since I was 20 years old. I had to break stones. It happened irregularly, but it could last for about one week and sometimes three weeks. About 50 male villagers were taken each time. If we worked slowly, we were beaten. After nearly 10 years, I tried to refuse but the soldiers threatened to arrest me. When 930 QI 075 . - 931 - 057, CI - 154, CI - 158, DI - 015, DI - 041, QI - 072, QI - 075. CI 932 075. - DI - 039, DI - 045, QI 933 - 055, DI - 017, DI - 019, DI - 039, DI - 043, QI - 074. CI 934 - 074. QI 935 The Mission is aware of allegations of abuses committed by the Arakan Army, as well as allegations of violations perpetrated by the Tatmadaw i n this context, both of which warrant further investigation. - 159, DI - 019, DI - 043, QI - 074, QI - 075. CI 936 DI - 019 . 937 QI - 074 . 938 043. DI - 019, DI - 939 DI - 019 . 940 - 018, DI - 032, DI - 043, QI DI 072, QI - 075. - 941 CI - 053, DI - 017, DI - 019, DI - 045. 942 DI - 032 . 943 153, CI CI - 056, CI - 062, CI - - 154, DI - 017, DI - 032, DI - 043. 944 - 062. CI - 053, CI - 056, CI 102

103 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 I refused again I was beaten with wooden sticks. My eyebrow was broken; I was 945 bleeding . During patrols, porters were given minimal food and water, while the 420. soldiers had two 946 One victim said that he only received food three times over an eight - or three meals a day. 947 day period. Porters were forced to sleep on the ground in the open air or forest, while 948 The experience o f forced labour and the associated soldiers had sleeping mats and blankets. 949 treatment had negative health consequences, some serious. - ill Women were particularly vulnerable while serving in Tatmadaw camps, as they were 421. 950 also subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence. Some women w ere kept in the camp after completion of their service, and then raped by the Tatmadaw, including at captain 951 rank. 952 Like adults, children were subjected to portering, 422. Children were not spared. 954 953 treatment that often accompanies it (be aten - or hit with a rock ). One including the ill victim explained he still had the scars of injuries inflicted during the beatings while he was a 955 956 Another explained how she had been taken from the age of 13. Tatmadaw soldiers child. cing one person from each household into forced labour. would visit her village frequently, for They would often take her father, but have also taken her mother or one of the four children. When they came, soldiers would just point at whomever they wanted. The witness recalled to a Tatmadaw camp a three that she was taken hour walk away, where she was forced to - break and carry stones. Sometimes she was taken for one week, sometimes for one month. At night, she slept in the forest. If she and other victims got tired, or tried to rest, the soldiers would abuse them verbally, threaten or beat them. She was beaten on five occasions. 423. that porters were guarded by Some of the victims tried to escape. Despite the fact 957 958 Attempts to escape were dangerous, with porters bei ng some managed to flee. troops, 959 shot at: I did not try to escape. We would be shot. One person from a different village tried to 960 . escape and he was shot. I saw this with my own eyes 961 424. Victims felt compelled Those who managed to escape lived in fear of being caught. to hide, leav e their homes, and ultimately flee the country. Forced labour had a significant 962 The majority of the victims already lived in impact on victims’ economic conditions. ing economically deprived rural areas, with most living on a subsistence basis. While undertak forced labour, persons were unable to earn a living for themselves or their families. The 963 economic consequences were also a reason given for leaving Myanmar. 945 DI - 032 . 946 - 019, DI - 032, QI - 074. DI 947 DI - 019, QI - 074. 948 DI - 032, QI - 075. 949 075 . DI - 017, QI - 950 DI - 014, DI - 016, DI - 017, DI - 036, DI - 041, DI - 044, QI - 072, QI 073, QI - 074, QI - 075. - 951 QI - 072 . 952 - DI - 015, DI 016, DI - 017, DI - 029, DI - 042, QI - 072, QI - 075. 953 DI - 015, DI - 017. 954 - DI 042 . 955 DI - 015 . 956 - DI 017 . 957 CI - 153, DI - 016, DI - 028. 958 - CI - 053, CI 153, QI - 074. 959 CI - 153, DI - 028. 960 028 DI - . 961 - CI - 053, CI - 056, CI - 153, DI - 032, QI - 072, QI - 074, QI 75. 962 030, DI DI - 015, DI - - 039, DI - 055. 963 032 . DI - 103

104 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2. Forced evictions (a) Legal framework 425. Forced eviction is a serious violation of huma n rights. It is the “permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate 964 Forc ed evictions often directly or indirectly affect forms of legal or other protection”. various human rights, including the right to life; freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; the right to security of the person; the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right t o adequate housing, food, water and sanitation; the right to non - interference with privacy, home and family; the right to work; the right to property and the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property) ; and the right to an effective remedy. Such violations are often the consequence of the way evictions are decided (for example, without consultation, information, or recourse), on), carried planned (for example, without notification, relocation, or adequate compensati out (for example, at night or in bad weather, under threats, violence or force), or of their result (for example, loss of livelihood, property papers or documentation). Minorities are particularly vulnerable to forced evictions, because of dis crimination or because they 965 constitute a socially excluded, destitute or marginalised part of society. Not all evictions are prohibited. Evictions based on arguments of public or national 426. interest may be justifiable. However, to be justifiable under international law, they must be carried out only in the most exceptional circumstances and after all feasible alternatives have been explored in consultation with the affected community, and after due process protections 966 Evictions may not be are afforded. carried out in a discriminatory manner. Due process protections include genuine consultation, adequate and reasonable notice, as well as legal 967 remedies. Importantly, adequate compensation needs to be provided in advance and all necessary measures should be taken to minimise the impact. 427. Protection against forced eviction is not linked to property rights. Everyone has the right to be protected against forced evictions, regardless of the type of tenure (for example, ownership, rental, informal settleme nt). Security of tenure is the cornerstone of the right to 968 adequate housing, which also applies to occupiers without documentation. Under the Constitution of Myanmar, the Union is the “ultimate owner of all lands and 428. below the ground, above and beneath the water and in the all natural resources above and atmosphere” (section 37). The 1894 Land Acquisition Act provides the framework for land acquisition for public purposes. The Government can compulsorily acquire land for “public 969 purposes” or for a co mpany when notice is given and compensation is at market value. Legal reform in 2012 introduced a system similar to a private property regime. The Farmland 971 970 Law regulates paddy land, and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law e of lands including unused plots and abandoned lands. Regardless of these regulates a rang developments, key issues in Myanmar are still linked to large - scale tenure insecurity and poorly kept land ownership records. 964 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions , 20 May 1997, E/1998/22. 965 For general overview of forced evictions and human rights, see OHCHR and UN - Habitat, Forced – Evictions Fact Sheet No. 25/Rev. 1 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2014). 966 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The , 20 May 1997, E/1998/22. right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions 967 See United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/77. 968 Ibid. 969 1984 Land Acquisition Act, arts. 4, 6, 23 and 38. 970 Farmland Law (Pyidaungs u Hluttaw Law No. 11 of 2012). 971 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Act (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No.10 of 2012). 104

105 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (b) Findings The Mission found a pattern of the T 429. atmadaw arbitrarily appropriating land from 972 ethnic Rakhine villagers across Rakhine State, and forcibly evicting them. Land was taken for various purposes, including construction of infrastructure and food production for 973 soldiers. Land is frequently taken arbitrarily and immediately, not allowing the affected person 430. or family to prepare or to plan an alternative. A small group of up to 10 soldiers would arrive 974 on a plot, and put up a military flag or place a sign indicating that the land was taken. Reports were received that soldiers place fences or bamboo poles around the land and destroy 975 existing properties on the land, for example sheds. There is little or no consultation with 976 Furthermore, land confiscation by the Tatmadaw could the affected individual or family. affect multiple individuals and families at the same time, such as groups of villagers with 977 holdings. One victim stated: adjacent small land - On 8 February 2012, when I was having lunch at home, I learned that the military was taking my paddy field. I went back immediately. I saw six soldiers who had put up bamboo poles around my paddy field. I begged them not to take the land, pleading that it was the only thing I had and that we were dependent on it. They did not listen. They arrested m e and took me to the office of the village head. I saw many villagers there, their hands tied up with rope. I managed to flee when I went to the toilet. The 978 same day the military took away the lands of three other families. persons generally received no compensation, and were not Furthermore, the affected 431. 979 informed of how to make any claims. There are instances where minimal compensation was offered, with the amount viewed as derisory compared to the actual value and the 980 981 economic loss. In other cases One victim , promised compensation was never received. stated: Four soldiers came while I was on my land, asking to show my land documentation. After showing all documents, one of them said: “The military wants to build infrastructures here. We take your land. If you don’t agree, talk to our officer.” I went to the office with my mother. We were offered 9,000 Kyat. The market value was 900,000 Kyat. When we refused, the officer said it was government land and that they would take it anyway. The next mornin g, the military came again and destroyed my 982 tent near the land. They planted a military flag and left. After being evicted, the affected persons no longer had access to their land and efforts 432. 983 to reclaim usage were routinely met with warnings, beating Ethnic s and death threats. Rakhine who objected to the confiscation, or who attempted to file complaints or find legal 984 recourse, were subjected to beatings or detention. One interviewee explained how he was beaten when he sought recourse: When I discove red that my land had been confiscated, I went to see the chief of the local military camp. When I complained the first time, I was told that they need the land for military buildings and for crop cultivation. When I went back, I was ill - 972 073. - 072, QI CI - 055, CI - 056, CI - 059, CI - 060, CI - 158, CI - 162, DI - 015, DI - 016, DI - 031, DI - 033, QI - The Mission documented 14 cases in K yaukpyu, Kyauktaw, Mrauk - U, Maungdaw, Minbya, Rathedaung and Sittwe in Rakhine State. 973 - - 055, CI 056, CI 158, QI - 073. CI - 974 CI - 055, QI - - 073. 072, QI 975 CI - 055, CI - 059, QI - 073. 976 CI - 055, CI - 158. 977 016, QI CI - 056, CI - 059, DI - - 073. 978 CI - 059. 979 CI - 055, CI - 1 58, CI - 162, DI - 016. 980 CI - - 158. 055, CI 981 CI - 158 . 982 CI - 055 . 983 DI - 033, QI - 072, QI - 073. 984 073. - CI - 059, CI - 162, DI - 016, DI - 033, QI 105

106 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 treated. Two soldie rs held me, one from each side, and a third kicked me. I was kicked on the head, my nose was bleeding and I became unconscious. My ribcage was also 985 damaged. I was then detained at the camp for one day and two nights. 433. The economic consequences of the confiscations and forced evictions were often dire for the victims and their families. Often confiscation took away land that was the only source 986 of livelihood, pushing them further into poverty. Alternative means of employment and sources of income were often not available, or were considered to carry significant risks. The evictions also negatively impacted the family life of some victims, as they were forced to 987 separate to earn a living, or to leave the country altogether. 3. Confiscation of food and livestock Confiscation by the Tatmadaw of livestock, food supplies or other possessions, either 434. at security checkpoints or during patrols in villages, was a common experience for ethnic 989 988 food , or a , Rakhine. The Tatmadaw would routinely confiscate domestic animals 990 proportion of a yearly production of crops. Resistance by victims to confiscations could lead to mistreatment by the Tatmadaw, 435. 991 992 including beatings, leaving some with injuries. The failure to provide the Tatmadaw with 993 supplies could subject victims to further violations, including forced labour. As with other violations, the fear of arrest or other repercussions from the Tatmadaw compelled some 994 One interviewee stated: victims to flee the country. My family and I had a vegetable farm and soldiers often came to ask for vegetables. If we did not comply, the soldiers just took them. Sometimes they asked us to give them were stolen by the money. I did not have enough vegetables to sell because a lot military. This went on for a long time. The soldiers also came regularly to our shops and never paid. They just picked whatever they wanted. We could not protest. If we 995 protested, they would damage everything. 436. It appears that the c onfiscation of property in this manner was widespread and a common feature of ethnic Rakhine village life. The manner in which victims describe the practice suggests that it became normalised for villagers: The soldiers would take whatever we had from us. This included our livestock and vegetables from the farm. They took things from us every day. This was actually 996 normal for us, so I didn’t think this was important to mention. While apparently considered normal, the economic impact could be devastat ing. 437. These confiscations removed a significant part of the earnings of poor villagers existing at a subsistence level, affecting the entire family. The practice, and associated mistreatment, also 997 towards the Tatmadaw. served to build mistrust and enmity among the ethnic Rakhine However, powerlessness to respond appeared endemic. Information received indicates that 998 victims did not file any complaints in relation to these practices. One interviewee said: 985 . 073 QI - 986 CI - 060, CI - 158, DI - 015, DI - 016, DI - 033. 987 DI - - 073. 015, QI 988 - CI 054, CI - 057. 989 - DI - 028, DI - 031, DI - 041, QI 073. 990 DI - 036 . 991 - DI 031 . 992 DI - 028 . 993 036 DI - . 994 DI - 028 . 995 DI - 041 . 996 DI - 028 . 997 CI - 053, CI - 056, CI - 154. 998 041 . DI - 106

107 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 de the law. Complaining to the We never filed any complaint. The soldiers are outsi 999 authorities is like complaining to the soldiers themselves . - 4. based violence Sexual and gender Ethnic Rakhine women have been subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence 438. 1000 by Tatmadaw forces. ily taken place in the context of forced labour and This has primar has occurred across Rakhine State. Rakhine women who have been raped by Tatmadaw soldiers face rejection by their families or communities and fear being subjected to further sexual violence. Incidents hav e occurred prior to and throughout the period examined by the Mission. 439. In many incidents, women and girls, who are forced by Tatmadaw soldiers to carry out cooking, cleaning or manual labour, were also subjected to rape or sexual assault. For an interviewee from Kyauktaw Township, who had been subjected to forced labour example, over a period of two decades, was beaten by soldiers and raped on several occasions by a Tatmadaw captain. When she refused to return, the interviewee’s husband was threatened by the Tatmadaw. She fled Myanmar, fearing that soldiers would return and rape her again. She described the last occasion she was raped: At the end of the day [working at the military camp] the “chief” told me to wait, together with about ten other women. He chose about four or five women, and we were taken away one by one. I initially refused to go, but two or three soldiers beat me. In the room I was raped by one soldier, while two others stood outside the closed 1001 door. He had three stars on his uniform. Another woman from Rathedaung Township described being sexually assaulted while 440. undertaking forced labour: As I was washing the clothes of the soldiers, one of them came from behind and grabbed my breasts. He took off my bra and kissed me on the chee k. He touched my breasts with his hands. He touched me and rested his head on my shoulder. I didn’t 1002 resist because I was afraid he would kill me. 441. Ethnic Rakhine men subjected to forced labour also reported witnessing rape by Tatmadaw soldiers against Rakhine women. One former porter reported witnessing the rape of a group of women by the roadside in Mrauk - U Township: We were resting by the roadside and the military had brought a group of four or five women from villages on the way. While we were there , they raped the women. They first made the porters move away so that we couldn’t see. But I could still hear the women crying and saying things like, “what are you doing, stop” and also heard them being beaten. Afterwards, they sent the women back to thei r villages. I heard this each 1003 time I was taken portering. 442. Rape and other forms of sexual violence against ethnic Rakhine have also coincided with instances of forced evictions and other forms of pecuniary exploitation (unlawful tax collection) by the Tatmadaw. One male interviewee from Kyaukpyu Township noted that the rape of young women had occurred in 2014 during land confiscation coordinated by military 1004 camp No. 543. - years old, she had been A Rakhine woman reported that when she was 17 raped at gu npoint by a captain from the Tatmadaw South Western Command in Minbya Township. This happened after her family was unable to provide the Tatmadaw with part of their harvest of rice, framed as a “tax”. The captain said she should marry him in exchange”. 1005 Whe n she refused, she was raped. 999 DI - 041 . 1000 041, DI - DI - 014, DI - 036, DI - - 044, QI 072, QI - 073, QI - 075. 1001 QI - 072 . 1002 DI - 044 . 1003 QI - 075 . 1004 QI - 073 . 1005 036. - DI 107

108 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 443. There are also reported instances of rape by Tatmadaw troops in other contexts. One interviewee described the rape of an adult female relative by a Tatmadaw soldier, while she 1006 agyun Township. In a more recent case, one was cutting firewood near the forest in Ponn interviewee from Buthidaung Township described the general attitude of Tatmadaw soldiers towards Rakhine villagers in the aftermath of the post - 25 August 2017 violence in Rakhine State and the attempted rape she was subjected to: After 25 August 2017, there was an explosion and a lot of commotion. Villagers initially relied on the Tatmadaw soldiers because they thought they would protect us. However, soldiers did not do anything to protect Rakhine villagers. Inste ad, they made the villagers cook for them and took some women. I said I didn’t want to cook for them but they dragged me to a military base close to my house. When I arrived, I saw four other Rakhine women. There was a group of about a dozen soldiers. They grabbed our hands and touched us. They tried to take off my clothes and rape me. We were all screaming. They shut our mouths with their hands but some still managed to shout. We were about to get raped, but my uncle and others arrived and we were released . The soldiers didn’t provide any security. Instead, they stole from us and grabbed 1007 us . 5. Emblematic incident: shooting in Mrauk - U on 16 January 2018 444. The Mission received reports of repressive action against the assertion of ethnic Rakhine identi ty. An emblematic case is the use of excessive force in relation to a demonstration in the Rakhine city of Mrauk - U against the cancellation of an annual ethnic 1008 Rakhine event. The Mission interviewed eyewitnesses of the incident. Mrauk - U was the last capital of the ancient Arakanese Kingdom, with a majority of 445. the population of Rakhine ethnicity. An annual ceremony is held to mark the end of the rule of the Arakan dynasty following the conquest of the area by Bamar forces. After an initial rd due to delays in obtaining permission from the authorities, the 233 postponement anniversary celebrations were scheduled for 16 January 2018. Ethnic Rakhine from across - U. However, the authorities suddenly cancelled the evening events. the state arrived in Mrauk The news spread among the crowd, which had gathered to attend the event. The crowd started to demonstrate against the decision. One witness recalled: People had started to gather in Mrauk - U since the morning. We were in the city and ready for the celebration that night. However, we were unexpectedly informed that the celebration was cancelled. So, the gathering became a demonstration instead of a 1009 celebration. 446. Event participants went to the main police station and then to the District Administration offic e, to know the reason for the cancellation. At the District Administration office, the security forces had closed the gate to prevent the crowd from entering. The demonstration continued outside, with a large crowd gathered. At 6.30 pm, it appears that a 1010 d ecision was made to cut the power supply to the streetlights in the area. The police stationed inside the compound then fired a series of live rounds. It is 447. “launched reported that they first fired into the air. Local media also stated that protestors stones with slingshots and threw bricks” at the security forces, and at one point tried to seize 1011 the weapons of two police officers. T he Government subsequently claimed that the police 0 warning shots with bolt - action fired about 20 warning shots with assault rifles and about 4 1012 rifles. 1006 DI 014 . - 1007 DI - 041 . 1008 CI - 161, DI - - 043 . 042, DI 1009 - DI 042. 1010 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Seven killed, 12 injured in Mrauk - U riot” (18 January 2018). 1011 Ibid. 1012 - Republic of the Union of Myanmar - Ministry of Information, “Seven killed, 12 injured in Mrauk U riot” (17 January 2018). 108

109 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 According to the witnesses interviewed by the Mission, live fire was also directed at 448. the crowd, hitting a number of demonstrators. The police also beat people with guns and ound. The witnesses stated that it was difficult to know sticks, and kicked people on the gr the direction of the shooting because of the darkness, and the chaos caused by people running in different directions in an attempt to escape. One witness stated: I heard gunshots and then there was rapid shooting at the crowd coming from inside (the compound). I saw two people shot and they died instantly. Others were shot in the arms and thighs. The police were shooting at the crowd in the dark. They were 1013 also hitting people with guns and sticks, an d stamping on people with boots. 449. ethnic Rakhine demonstrators were shot and killed, and at least 12 were At least seven seriously injured. According to a statement issued by the Government, “With the rioting escalating, authorities said security for ces fired 10 shots into the crowd with assault rifles and 1014 bolt - action rifles, killing seven people”. 450. In the aftermath, the police started arresting people, particularly you ng people . A number of participants fled Myanmar fearing arrest. One witness s tated: Following the incident, the authorities started arresting people who participated in we re witness to the incident. I was targeted because I went the demonstration and who to the hospital several times to see my injured friend. I could not meet my friend because there were police within the hospital compound blocking access. The police 1015 may have seen me in the hospital area. 451. Under international human rights law, the State is under an obligation to facilitate protests. The use of force by law en forcement officials should be exceptional. Any use of force must comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. The degree of force used should be limited to the minimum necessary in the circumstances, and should be targeted at individuals us ing violence or to avert an imminent threat. Specific rules apply to the use of firearms during assemblies. They may only be used against an imminent threat, either to protect life or to prevent life - threatening injuries. There must also be no other feasib le option, such as capture or the use of non - lethal force. Firearms should never be used 1016 simply to disperse an assembly. Indiscriminate firing into a crowd is always unlawful. It appears uncontested that the police used live fire to shoot into the cr owd, in 452. complete darkness, and that at least seven protesters were killed as a result. While the Mission notes that some protestors may have used violence (throwing of stones), there are no - atening injuries that warranted indications that there was an imminent threat to life or life thre the use of lethal force, let alone the firing of assault rifles into the crowd during the night, after the streetlights were switched off. The Mission therefore has reasonable grounds to ve force in the management of this protest. conclude that the police used excessi The broader context of this incident warrants further investigation. This includes an 453. examination of whether the restrictions imposed on the celebrations were in compliance with international human rights la w; whether the arrest and detention on charges under the Unlawful Association Act (section 17.1) of participants and two prominent ethnic Rakhine men ( former head of the Arakan Wai Hin Aung, a Rakhine writer, and Dr. Aye Maung, the National Party and membe r of Parliament ) is unlawful or arbitrary; and whether the overall handling of the events amounts to an undue and discriminatory restriction on the assertion of ethnic Rakhine identity 6. Conclusion The serious human rights violations experienced by 454. the ethnic Rakhine are similar to those experienced by other ethnic groups in Myanmar, mostly perpetrated by the Tatmadaw. 1013 DI 042. - 1014 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Seven killed, 12 injured in Mrauk - U riot” (18 January 2018). 1015 CI - 161 . 1016 and United Nations Office on Drugs A/HRC/31/66, paras. 57 - 60; A/HRC/26/36, para. 75; OHCHR and Crime, “Resource book on the use of force and firearms in law enforcement” (New York, United Nations, 2017). 109

110 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The forced and compulsory labour imposed by the Tatmadaw against the ethnic 455. igations under international labour law Rakhine is widespread, in violation of Myanmar’s obl and international human rights law. The documented cases show that the work is exacted under the menace or use of physical force and (death) threats. Victims have no free choice and cannot but comply. The types of wo rk consistently described to the Mission, and the circumstances of their imposition, cannot be construed as minor communal services that are permissible under international law. The Tatmadaw bully, force and coerce villagers into submission. This is furthe r manifested in the numerous forced evictions and the total disrespect for villagers’ property rights. Tatmadaw soldiers take anything they want, when they want. In doing so, they further push ethnic Rakhine villagers and their families into hip and poverty. The level of arbitrariness and abuse of power on the part of economic hards the Tatmadaw is astounding. Such conduct is a catalyst for numerous other human rights violations, including the 456. n, sexual and gender based violence, arbitrary deprivation of life, arbitrary arrest and detentio - 1017 treatment. - Such violations are often linked to attempts at and other forms of severe ill escape, protest, or the inability to pay bribes. 457. The Mission is further concerned about additional information received, poi nting at other violations, including of the rights to education, health, culture, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful association and assembly, and freedom of religion. However, the information on these allegations is insufficient to make findings a t this stage . . B Systemic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya In Rakhine State, Muslims are like in a cage, they cannot travel outside. There are no 1018 human rights for the Muslims of Rakhine. I don’t know why God sent us there. 458. The Rohingya are in a situation of severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression from birth to death. Their extreme vulnerability is a consequence of State policies and practices implemented over decades, steadily marginalising the Rohingya and eroding their enjoyment of human rights. The process of “othering” the Rohingya and their discriminatory treatment started long before the period covered by the Mission. 459. The cornerstone of this system of oppression is the lack of legal status of the by restrictions affecting their nded Rohingya. This is compou movement, subsistence and development, and numerous other human rights violations. The life of Rohingya in Rakhine State has gradually become more and more untenable. 1. Denial of legal status and identity 460. nmar authorities consistently and vocally assert that “there are no Rohingya The Mya in Myanmar”. They object to the use of the name “Rohingya”, call the group “Bengali”, and argue that the Rohingya do not belong in Myanmar. They are not considered a “national rac e” and often referred to as “illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh. This was not always the case. Successive laws and policies regulating citizenship and legal status have become increasingly y in their application. exclusionary in their formulation, and arbitrary and discriminator Today, the overwhelming majority of Rohingya are de facto stateless, without proof of legal status or identity. (a) Denial of birth certificates Legal identity starts with a birth certificate: it provides legal recognition to 461. a child. According to article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, all children have the right to be registered immediately after birth. Access to registration must not be undermined by discrimination of any kind, including on the basis of the child’s or the child’s parents’ race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 1017 - CI - 057, CI - 059, CI 061, CI - 157, CI - 162, DI - 014, DI - 029, QI - 072, QI - 073. 1018 007. - DI 110

111 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 origin, property, disability, birth or other status. All children should have access to birth ey are born, including non nationals and stateless registration in the country where th - 1019 children. In Myanmar, the re is a 462. and procedures related to birth registration . multiplicity of laws making procedures complex and difficult The system is administered by several Ministries, 1020 to naviga According to article 9 (b) of the Myanmar 1993 te, especially for the Rohingya. Child Law, “parents and guardians shall register the birth of the child in accordance with the law”. The 1982 Citizenship Law contains a similar requirement but is only applic able to “citizens born inside and outside the State”, and carries punitive measures for parents or guardians who fail to register their children. Failure to register a birth on time is also subject under the W ard or Village Tract Admi nistration Law. to criminal penalties According to credible reports the authorities stopped issuing birth certificates to 463. Rohingya children in northern Rakhine in the 1990s, with no official reason given for this 1021 change of policy. Since then, the only “registration” of birth for Rohingya children in 1022 northern Rakhine is their inclusion in the so Such inclusion is a called “household list”. - pre - requisite for obtaining identity documents, travel authorizations, marriage permissions, Upon the request of parents, the village and enrolment in most government schools. administrator or the “representative person from the village tract” can issue a “certificate of 1023 proof of birth”. The cost of this procedure varies from one location and one family to another. Parents must then approach the immigration authorities and request that their 1024 household list be updated, paying another arbitrary fee. One interviewee from Buthidaung stated: The Rohingya need to pay a large amount of money for receiving a certificate of proof of birth and include new born babies in the family list. The amount appears to vary from case to case. There is no written rule. The authorities made up all these rules 1025 only for the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State. 464. An interviewee from Maungdaw explained how cumbersome this procedure is given the restrictions on movement and the risks associated with not updating the household list on time: After the birth of my first daughter, I went to the village administrator an d gave him 15,000 Kyat to send someone from his office to convey the message to the NaSaKa about my daughter’s birth and to ask for her to be included on the household list. I could not go to the checkpoint myself because of the unavailability of transport ation and the need for travel permission. I thought the village administrator had taken action to include my daughter on the list. A few days later, the authorities came to my ist. I village to check the family lists. They saw my daughter but she was not on the l had to give them 50,000 Kyat. I managed to gather the money with the help of others. 1026 would have been imprisoned for six mont hs . Otherwise, I In December 2015, a new procedure targeting Rohingya children was outlined in a 465. document setting out r equirements for “birth list insertion of children from Bengali ethnics in household population list”. According to credible reports, these additional administrative requirements have further slowed down the process. As a result, only a small number of new - 1019 See A/HRC/27/22, para. 11. 1020 - K 063.11. Myanmar’s birth registration system differs by geographical area and the following Ministries have reportedly acquired parallel competences: Ministry of Immigration and Population; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of H ealth; and Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development. Since 2012, village administrators were also attributed responsibilities . 1021 063.10, K K - - 063.11. 1022 See this chapter, section B.5.b : Restrictions related to household lists. 1023 K - 063.11. 1024 - CI 061, CI - 082, CI - 094, DI - 001, K - 063.10. 1025 CI - 061. 1026 - 094. CI 111

112 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 borns were added to household lists in 2016, with inconsistent implementation from one area 1027 . to another and reported cases of applications being rejected Some Rohingya children were added to a separate “black listed children form” or 466. - “illegitimate c hildren form”. This included children whose parents had not received official marriage permission, children whose parents were not present at the household list updating local order limi ting the exercise, adopted children, and children born in contravention of the number of children in Rohingya families to two . In April 2013, it was assessed that there 1028 - listed” children. It is believed that the number of children who were were 5,111 “black placed on these “black lists” is much higher. The registration of new - borns in the household list has not been undertaken 467. consistently, and as a consequence the number of unregistered Rohingya children in Rakhine State remains unknown. Estimates suggest that almost half of the children in Rakhine State 1029 remain unregist ered . 468. The interim report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State included a recommendation to the Government to “roll out a birth registration campaign comprehensive 1030 with door - to - door visits carried out by mobile teams - in order to reach all children”. - In July 2017, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar stated that she had been informed by the authorities of efforts to improve birth registration in line with the interim recommendations from the Advisory Commission. She welcomed the issuance of 1031 birth certificates in Rakhine State. over 20,000 The Mission is not aware of further details regarding the issuance of these or any other birth certificates in relation to the interim recommendations. In its report on implementation (January to April 2018) the Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State did not make any reference to the 1032 of birth certificates for Rohingya children. issuance (b) Denial of citizenship 469. Legal status and identity is further determined by citizenship. The right to a nationality 1033 alization has been described as the “right to have rights”. It is of vital importance to the re of all other human rights and is recognised and protected in a series of international legal 1034 most of which apply to Myanmar. The prerogative of States to decide who instruments, human rights obligations their nationals are is not absolute. States must comply with their 1035 concerning the granting and loss of nationality. The right to a nationality implies the right of each individual to acquire, change and 470. retain a nationality. International human rights law explicitly prohibits the arbitrary eprivation of nationality. In order not to be arbitrary, denial of access to a nationality must d be in conformity with domestic law and standards of international law, in particular the principle of proportionality. States have the obligation to ensure that all persons enjoy the 1027 K - 063.12, K - 076. 1028 - K 063.10 . 1029 See Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Interim Report and Recommendations (March 2017), p. 4, para. 43 and 44(d). 12; see also: CRC/C/MMR/CO/3 - 1030 Ibi d. 1031 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, “End Yanghee Lee, of mission statement” (21 July 2017). 1032 Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State , Report to the People on the Progress of Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State - January to April 2018 . 1033 See for example, S. DeGooyer, A. Hunt, et al., The Right to Have Rights (Verso, London, 2018). The fundamental nature of the right to a nationality has been consistently rea ffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly (for example, A/RES/50/152) and the United Nations Human Rights Council (for example, A/HRC/RES/7/10; A/HRC/RES/10/13; A/HRC/RES/13/2; A/HRC/RES/20/5; A/HRC/RES/26/14). 1034 UDHR (art. 15), ICCPR (art. 24), CRC (art. 7), ICERD (art. 5), CEDAW (art. 9), CRPD (art. 18), ICPRM (art. 29), ASEAN Declaration (art. 18). 1035 See A/HRC/13/34, para. 57. 112

113 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 right to nationality without discrimination of any kind, and that no one is denied or deprived 1036 of their nationality based on discriminatory grounds. Deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness will generally be arbitr ary, unless 471. 1037 it serves a legitimate purpose and is proportional. States should ensure that nationality is 1038 not denied to persons with relevant links to that State who would otherwise be stateless. obliged to grant nationality to every This is particularly so for children. While States are not child born in their territory, they are required to adopt every appropriate measure, both internally and in cooperation with other States, to ensure that every child has a nationality 1039 when he or she is born. measure is the conferral of nationality to a child born in One such 1040 Decisions regarding the acquisition, the State if they would otherwise be stateless. retention or loss of nationality must also meet minimum procedural standards, for example, 1041 issued in writing an The statelessness d open to effective administrative or judicial review. of a person resulting from the arbitrary deprivation of his or her nationality cannot be invoked 1042 by States as a justification for the denial of other human rights. Historical back ground 472. The current citizenship status of the Rohingya can only be understood in a historical 1043 context. The 1947 Constitution and the 1948 Union Citizenship Act of the newly 1044 In addition independent Myanmar provided a relatively inclusive citizenship framework. to citizenship based on ethnicity, section 4(2) of the Union Citizenship Act provided that “any person descended from ancestors who for two generations at least have all made any of the territories included within the Union their permanent home a nd whose parents and 1045 himself were born in any of such territories shall be deemed to be a citizen of the Union”. Additionally, section 7 provided that a person could apply for citizenship if they were 18 years, resided in the country for at least five con tinuous years, and intended to reside in the country. As such, most long - term residents fulfilled the criteria, regardless of whether they 1046 belonged to one of Myanmar’s “indigenous races”. 473. Most Muslims who then lived in what currently constitutes Rakh ine State were therefore included, whether their ancestry could be traced to pre - colonial times, or whether they were colonial - era migrants from the region. Additionally, there are strong indications that at the time the Myanmar authorities accepted the Ro hingya as an “indigenous group”. Both Prime Minister U Nu, and Sao Shwe Thaike, the country’s first President, are reported to have referred to the Rohingya as an indigenous group of Myanmar, with U Nu referring to 1047 the Rohingya by name in a 1954 radio addr ess, as “... our nationals, our brethren”. Citizens were required to register, after which a National Registration Card (NRC) 474. was issued. At the end of 1960, the Government reportedly claimed to have issued 18 million 1036 - 58. A/HRC/13/34, paras. 21, 29, 57 1037 A/HRC/13/34, para. 59. 1038 A/HRC/13/34, para. 36; see also 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (although not ratified by Myanmar). 1039 CRC, art. 7; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 11: Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention , 12 February 2009, CRC/C/GC/11; United Na General Comment No. 17: Rights of the child (Art. 24), 7 April tions Human Rights Committee, 1989. 1040 A/HRC/13/34, para. 60; A/HRC/31/29, para. 10. 1041 A/HRC/13/34, para. 43. 1042 See for example, A/HRC/RES/32/5. 1043 The Mission has relied on credible secondary sources to summarise the relevant historical context. 1044 1947 Constitution, s. 11. 1045 The 1948 Union Citizenship Act lists a range of other pathways to citizenship not reproduced here, including several non automatic modes of acquiring citizenshi p (for example, naturalisation). - 1046 Defined as “the Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan race and such racial group as has settled in any of the territories included within the Union as their permanent home from a period anterior to 1823 A. D. (1185 B.E.)”, see 1948 Union Citizenship Act, s. 3(1). 1047 E.g. M. Haque, “Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in Burma”, - 469. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 37:4 (2017), pp. 454 113

114 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1048 at the time. nearly the entire population Temporary Registration Cards (TRCs), NRCs, known as “white cards”, were issued in case of loss, damage or pending application for the NRC. Although NRCs or TRCs were not intended to be citizenship certificates, in reality they served as such. 475. At the start of General Ne Win’s regime, the citizenship legal framework remained unchanged. The 1974 Constitution also did not alter the definition of “citizen” significantly. - 1962 period were still to be co nsidered All Rohingya who were citizens during the 1948 citizens. However, in practice, the narrative that most Muslims in Rakhine State were illegal Bengali immigrants took root, in the context of an increasing emphasis on the importance of 1049 In 1 978, the Tatmadaw and “national races” and the need to deport alleged aliens. immigration officials implemented a nationwide project called “Operation Dragon King” to register all citizens and aliens ahead of a national population census. Its implementation in eing to Bangladesh, amid allegations of Rakhine State led to more than 200,000 Rohingya fle serious human rights violations. The Government claimed that the number of Rohingya escaping from scrutiny was an admission of their illegal status. However, analysis suggests 1050 that the number of alleged illegal immig rants identified was very low. The Government agreed with Bangladesh to repatriate the “lawful residents of Burma who are now sheltered 1051 in the camps in Bangladesh”. Nearly all refugees returned to Myanmar. review of the country’s citizenship laws. 476. In this context General Ne Win initiated a He argued that citizenship under the civilian government had been poorly administered, often 1052 wrongly attributed, and leaving many people in legal limbo. He acknowledged that many ng and that the government was “not in a position to drive people had lived in Myanmar for lo away all those people who had come at different times for different reasons from different lands”. However, he added that “leniency on humanitarian grounds cannot be such as to endanger ourselves”, and there should be a system based on “three classes of citizens”, with full citizenship reserved for “pure - blooded nationals”. The two other classes were for people who “cannot be trusted fully” and who would therefore not receive “full citizenship and f ull rights”. From the statement, it is clear that the people targeted included Muslims and Chinese. Current citizenship regime 477. The 1982 Citizenship Law marked a further step towards an exclusively “ethnic” 1053 concept of citizenship. Together with the implementing regulations (the 1983 Procedures), the law created a citizenship framework with three distinct categories (or “classes”) of citizens: • Full citizenship is primarily reserved for “national ethnic groups ... such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen (Kayi n), Chin, Burman (Bamar), Mon, Arakan (Rakhine) or 1054 The law further Shan and ethnic groups who settled in Myanmar before 1823”. states that “the Council of State may decide whether any ethnic group is national or 1048 med Statelessness of Rohingyas”, 15(3) Journal of Immigrant Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Unpacking the Presu (2017), p. 276. & Refugee Studies 1049 Other groups were also considered “foreign”, including Indians and Chinese. N. Cheesman, “How in Journal of Myanmar ‘National Races” Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya”, , Volume 47, 2017 - Contemporary Asia , pp. 461 - 483. Issue 3 1050 is in Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Unpacking the Presumed Statelessness of Rohingyas”, See analys 15(3) Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies (2017), pp. 274 - 275, where the author quotes several State officials and State - found in operation Dragon run media indicating that the numbers of illegal immigrants King were very low (for example, that action was taken against a total of 2,296 people across the country). 1051 1978 Repatriation Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of the So cialist Republic of the Union of Bur ma (9 July 1978). Available at : https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01th83kz 538/1/1978%20Repatriation%20A greement.pdf 1052 Meeting held in the Central Meeting Hall, President House, Ahlone Road, 8 October 1982; translation of the speech by General Ne Win provided in The Working People’s Daily, 9 October 1982. 1053 1948 Citizenship Act and 1948 Citizenship (Election) Act were repealed in 1982. 1054 3. 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 114

115 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1055 r broken down in a list of 135 sub - groups. not”. These initial eight groups were late 1056 They do not include the Rohingya or people of Chinese, Indian or Nepali descent. Full citizens are those with both parents holding a category of citizenship, including at least one full citizen; third generation offspring of citizens in the two other categories of citizenship; and persons who were citizens when the law entered into 1057 force. Full citizens receive a Citizenship Scrutiny Card. “Associate” citizenship is for those whose application for citizenship un der the 1948 • Citizenship Law was pending when the 1982 law came into force. A central body is 1058 They receive an Associate Citizenship Scrutiny tasked to decide on applications. Card. “Naturalized” citizenship may be granted to persons who provide “conclus ive • evidence” of entry and residence in Myanmar before 1948, and of the birth of their 1059 children in Myanmar. It may also be granted under certain circumstances by marriage or descent. In addition, applicants for “naturalized” citizenship must be at least 1 8 years, have command of one of the national languages, and be of “good character” and “sound mind”. Naturalised citizens receive a Naturalised Citizenship Scrutiny Card. a Despite this legal framework being discriminatory in intent and purpose, Rohingy 478. are not necessarily fully excluded from citizenship. First, the Constitution and the law provide 1060 Second, while it that whoever was a citizen at its entry into force would remain a citizen. is disputed whether the Rohingya are a “national race” and autom atically entitled to full citizenship on that ground, many Rohingya would have at least qualified for “associate” or “naturalised” citizenship. Their third generation offspring would have been full citizens by the State to confer any of the three categories now. Third, the law also explicitly authorizes 1061 of citizenship on any person “in the interests of the State”. 479. In reality, however, the law has been implemented in a discriminatory and arbitrary 1062 manner. The authorities commenced enforcement of the law only after the SLORC took power in 1988. In a nationwide citizenship scrutiny exercise, the National Registration Card (NRC) had to be turned in and replaced by a Citizenship Scrutiny Card (CSC). However, ohingya who presented their NRCs were reportedly refused a CSC, even when meeting the R conditions for citizenship. Such arbitrary action was facilitated by provisions of the 1982 1063 Citizenship Law allowing for broad discretion in decision making. NRCs were n ot returned to Rohingya; instead they received Temporary Registration Cards (or “white 1064 cards”). identification documentation for These interim “white cards” became the de facto 1065 the approximately 700,000 Rohingya to whom they were issued for the next 20 ye ars. 1055 4. Ibid., art. 1056 The list of 135 regularly features in State publications, including for example The Working People’s Daily issue of 26 September 1990 (“Our U nion of Myanmar where 135 national races reside”). 1057 5 - 7. 1982 Citizenship Act, arts. 1058 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 23. 1059 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 42. 1060 Section 345 of the 2008 Constitution explicitly provides that any person who is already a citizen according to law on the day of entry into force of the Constitution remains a citizen. Section 346 provides that citizenship, naturalisation and revocation of citizenship shall be prescribed by law. No so this regime still applies. laws have been adopted since the 1982 Citizenship Law, 1061 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 8. 1062 N. Cheesman, “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya”, Journal of Contemporary Asia Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 3 , 2017, p. 12. , 1063 1982 Citizenship Law , art. 71 : “... no reasons need to be given by organizations invested with authority under this law in matters carried out under this law.” 1064 N. Cheesman, “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya”, emporary Asia , Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 3 , 2017, p. 12; Nyi Nyi Kyaw, Journal of Cont “Unpacking the Presumed Statelessness of Rohingyas”, 15(3) Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies (2017), p. 278. 1065 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Unpacking the Presumed Statelessness of Rohingyas”, 15 (3) Journal of Immigrant 280, referring to sources in the Department of Immigra & Refugee Studies (2017), p. 279 - tion and National Registration. 115

116 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 480. Further security operations in Rakhine State in the early 1990s again caused approximately 250,000 persons to leave for Bangladesh, with widespread allegations of serious human rights violations. While the Myanmar government again made claims th at the 1066 issue was one of illegal Bengali immigrants, a repatriation agreement was signed with Bangladesh and Rohingya were accepted back in Myanmar. Citizenship verification process In 2011, the government introduced a “citizenship process” for members of the 135 481. 1067 recognised ethnic groups, with expedited applications. The Rohingya were not eligible for this process but subjected to a separate “citizenship verification” process, which has been 017, it had been completed for only protracted, cumbersome and increasingly coercive. By 2 a very small number of Rohingya. A pilot c itizenship verif ication exercises took place 482. Taung Pyo IDP camp in in Myebon Township in July 2014. Rohingya were required to identif y as “Bengali” when 1068 1069 , the programme F ollow ing protest from both Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine registering . was suspended, and then ended in December 2014, with less than one hundred Citizenship 1070 Those granted citizenship in this process were Scrutiny Cards issued by August 2015. allowed to vote i n the 2015 election but remain confined in camps without freedom of 1071 T he citizenship verification process was extended across R akhine State in movement. 1072 January 2015 but was suspended shortly after. 483. On 11 February 2015, President Thein Sein announce d that the white cards would expire on 31 March 2015 and ordered them to be returned by 31 May 2015. This order pushed Rohingya further into legal uncertainty. Holders were given a “white card receipt” in 1073 exchange for the surrendered white card. By the de adline, only around 67 per cent of cards 1074 had been surrendered of which 80 per cent in Rakhine State. 484. Following the invalidation of the white cards, a new Identity Card for National Verification (ICNVs) was introduced with the stated aim to “scrutiniz e whether the applicant 1075 meets the eligibility to become a citizen of Myanmar”. Rohingya applicants were required to indicate “Bengali” ethnicity on the application form, and the rights associated with the 1076 year validity. A campaign card were unclear, including the implication of th e limited two - to compel acceptance of the card was conducted. It was reportedly accompanied by 1077 with those retaining white card receipts in parts of northern Rakhine State facing threats, 1066 E/CN.4/1993/62, including the response letter from the Government to the United Nations Special freedom of religion or belief. The letter stated that the allegations were “fabricated by Rapporteur on some big countries and certain foreign news agencies”, that “among those who fled were mostly poor eing distributed on the other side” people who were lured by stories that relief food and goods were b and that “some left because they were threatened by terrorist insurgents to burn down their houses”, that the issue was one of “illegal immigration” which had also been the cause of the “outflow of people of Bengali stoc k back in 1978”, and that the “Rohingya do not exist in Myanmar either historically, politically or legally”. These are essentially the same explanations as those given by the Myanmar Government to the massive flight of Rohingya in late 2017. 1067 V - 054 . 1068 Ibid . 1069 Advisory Commission on Rakhine St ate, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017). 1070 K - 063.1. Of approximately 1,300 eligible adult applicants, around 1,200 had applied. By late August 2015, Citizenship Scrutiny Cards had been issued to 97 adults and Naturalised Citizenship Scrutiny Cards to 820 adults, 656 children. 1071 K - 063.1 1072 K - 063.2. 1073 K - 063.1. 1074 Ibid. 1075 Ibid. 1076 Ibid. 1077 Ibid . 116

117 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1078 increased restrictions. h e number of Rohingya applying for ICNVs was very Despite this, t 1079 . low The “citizen verification process” restarted in 2016 under the NLD government, with 485. the Rohingya to accept the rebranded National Verification Cards persuade a new attempt to 1080 (NVCs). pticism following past experience and a limited understanding of However, sce - 9 October 2016 “clearance operations”, reports the new process remained. Following the post 1081 increasingly surfaced of attempts to coerce individuals into accepting the NVCs. By January 2017, just over 6,000 NVCs had been issued in Rakhine State, compared with nearly 1082 On 8 February 2017, the Government 400,000 white cards which were surrendered. appointed a Steering Committee in charge of issuing NVCs to expedite the process. 486. 17, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State observed that the In August 20 sporadic implementation process and lack of communication, consultation and outreach from the Government had undermined public trust. It made a number of recommendations including ensuring thos e who had received citizenship would immediately enjoy the associated benefits, and a simplified verification process. It also urged the Government to 1083 ensure that the process was voluntary. In direct contradiction to this recommendation, 2017, the approach of requesting NVCs to be able to fish was extended to from October 1084 The continued coercion on the Rohingya to accept the NVCs, and the central Rakhine. - up of pressure and tension in this regard in the lead - up to the August 2017 violence in build 1085 hern Rakhine State, is discussed below. nort 487. The rights granted by the NVC remain unclear. Despite the State Counsellor’s Office stating that card holders could travel anywhere in the country, specific additional provisions 1086 . These provisions meant that, in practice, movement for were included for Rakhine State 1087 the Rohingya is still severely limited. The Minister of Social Welfare, Resettlement and 1088 Relief indicated that movement restrictions may be relaxed. However, the Minister for Labour, Immigration a nd Population indicated in April 2018 that travel for NVC holders in Rakhine State would remain limited to travel within their townships, reportedly stating, “the information that NVC holders are entitled to travel to any place in the country is not true a t all. We can’t allow that to happen. I want to stress that the rights, entitlements and restrictions 1089 stipulated at the time of issuing NVCs remain unchanged.” 488. Following decades of arbitrary treatment and legal uncertainty about their legal status an d documentation, it is unsurprising that the Rohingya do not trust the Myanmar authorities and remain sceptical about the “citizenship verification process”. In their view, these efforts 1078 . Ibid 1079 V - 047 . 1080 on the application form and the two year The requirement to state ethnicity validity period were See: Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, removed. Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017). 1081 - K 063.5, V - 047 . See also chapter V, section D.2: A foreseeable and planned catas trophe. 1082 The process was not only applicable in Rakhine, but also in other areas of the country. As of January 2017, over 16,000 NVCs had been issued in Shan State and 3,500 in Kayin. In both states, more than a quarter of the population do not have iden tity documents. See: Notification of the State Counsellor Office, “What is the ICNV” (27 December 2016); 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census. 1083 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous - future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017), pp. 26 28. 1084 K - 063.36 1085 See chapter V, section D.2: A foreseeable and planned catastrophe . 1086 Notification of the State Counsellor Office, “What is the ICNV” (27 December 2016). 1087 See this chapter, section B.2.b : Requirement for a temporary travel permit to travel between townships. 1088 Video available at : https://www.facebook.com/theirrawaddyburmese/videos/2008808825829926/ (ac cessed August 2018). See also Joshua Lipes, “ Myanmar Lifts Travel Restrictions on Rohingyas With ‘Verification Cards’” (Radio Free Asia, 19 April 2018). 1089 Video available at : https://www.facebook.com/standardtimedaily/videos/1451972574914692/ (accessed August 2018). See also the video at : (accessed August 2018) . https://www.facebook.com/NewsWatchJournal/videos/16696 88809735580/ 117

118 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 t only serves to further and the “NVC” are a symbol of a discriminatory citizenship regime tha entrench their status as “immigrants”. Denial of political participation (c) In the past, Rohingya have been allowed to participate in political processes. They 489. were able to vote and stand for election in the 1990 parliamenta ry elections, and four Rohingya were elected as members of Parliament. In 2010, despite the Rohingya not officially being considered citizens, several laws were adopted to allow white card holders to participate in the political process. Three Rohingya wer e elected to Parliament and two to the Rakhine State Government. However, in March 2014, Parliament amended the Political Parties Registration law 490. to require leaders of political parties to be “full” citizens and members of parties to be “full” 1090 turalized” citizens. Although, Parliament approved a bill in February 2015 which or “na included a provision allowing white card holders to vote, on 11 Februar y, following a public outcry, the then President Thein Sein issued an order stating that white cards wo uld expire on 31 March 2015 and had to be returned by 31 May 2015. The Constitutional Court further ruled that the legislative provisions allowing white card holders to vote were unconstitutional, and the Parliament amended the election laws, removing whit e card holders from those 1091 This disenfranchised all white card holders, the vast eligible to participate in elections. majority of whom were Rohingya, from participation in the 2015 general elections. (d) Conclusion 491. The Rohingya have gradually been d enied birth registration, citizenship and membership of the political community. This lack of legal status and identity is the cornerstone of the oppressive system targeting the Rohingya. It is the consequence of the discriminatory and arbitrary use of law s to target an ethnic group and deprive its members of the legal status they once possessed. It is State - sanctioned and in violation of Myanmar’s obligations under international law because it discriminates on the basis of race, ethnicity and has a profound impact on the enjoyment of all other human rights. religion. It 492. Myanmar’s legal framework pertaining to citizenship, and its application to the Rohingya in particular, is contrary to the prohibition of racial discrimination, both in the way es “citizens” and in its attribution of rights to distinct classes of citizens. Membership it defin of a “national race” has been made the key criterion of citizenship. All others, including those who were born and lived in the country for generations, were gradual ly excluded. This extreme and narrow focus on ethnicity, and its arbitrary application in practice, has been profoundly discriminatory in intent, purpose and impact. The treatment of the Rohingya constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of nationality. It is 493. in violation of domestic laws. There was no permissible ground of revocation. The denial of - scale statelessness, nationality is based on prohibited racial grounds. It has resulted in large while it serves no discernible legitimate purpose. The tre atment further violates the right of every child to acquire a nationality, in 494. particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. Where a child is born to stateless parents on the territory of a State Party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child , the State of birth is required to grant nationality. The right to a nationality as articulated in article 7 of 1092 the Convention would otherwise be meaningless. Its practice of not issuing birth certificates to Rohingya children and not granting nationalit y or appropriate documentation to children born on its territory is a violation of the Convention. The practice also has rendered children extremely vulnerable to other severe human rights violations. It deprives Rohingya children of a permanent record of existence and legal identity. It negatively impacts their access to health, education and other services. It deprives them of adequate protection. 1090 The amendments came into effect in September 2014. 1091 The Carter Center, “Preliminary Findings of the Carter Center Expert Mission to Myanmar – April - July 2015”. 1092 A/HRC/13/34, p ara. 36; A/HRC/10/34, para. 64. 118

119 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 495. 2015 in a complete disenfranchisement of The denial of legal status has culminated in ngya from the political process. This symbolised their exclusion from the Myanmar the Rohi 1093 the right to participate in the government of the country. munity and violates political com 496. The complete arbitrariness with which the Rohingya population has been treated is lling. It violates legal certainty, the rule of law and international human rights law appa generally. Arbitrariness is shown in the way in which citizenship was revoked, domestic laws ed “illegal were applied or not, cards were handed out and revoked, and people were call immigrants”, yet accepted back in repeated cycles of mass displacement a nd repatriation. is also illustrated by the repeated temporary solutions that provide no legal Arbitrariness or decades wavered certainty and remain largely unimplemented. The Rohingya have f participation in Myanmar’s national life – from full citizen, to non between different levels of - citizen with voting rights, non - citizen without voting rights, illegal immigrant that must leave, illegal immigrant that may stay and reside, illegal immigrant whose citizenship must be verified, – each status symbolised by a different card or its revocation. 497. The Myanmar State as an institution is responsible for its actions, including for the lication of the 1982 Citizenship Law is not a actions of previous governments. A strict app sign of respect for the rule of law, as professed by the current Government in its insistence on a “citizenship verification process” in line with that law and implemented at all cost, including coercion. It is the continuation by the civilian government of discriminatory policies put in place by a military regime. These policies seek to implement a racist and - exclusionary vision. What is required is no less than a re examination of the link between citizenship and “national races”, and the removal of the latter concept in Myanmar politics and law. This link is particularly problematic considering Myanmar’s flawed legal framework for the protection of human rights, which is largely based on citizenship, in contra vention of international human rights law. 498. The emphasis on “national races” and the ensuing discriminatory practices have come to define the question of Rohingya citizenship and statelessness, with the Rohingya, ethnic Government arguing the question of whether Rohingya are a Rakhine, and the Myanmar “national race”. This is beside the point. The issues of belonging to a “national race”, citizenship rights, and human rights should not be conflated . 2 . Denial of the right to freedom of movement (a) Overview and l egal framework 1094 499. This Article 13 of the UDHR guarantees the right to freedom of movement. includes the right of everyone lawfully within the territory of a State to liberty of 1096 1095 It is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person. movement. Under international human rights law, once a person is lawfully within a State, no restrictions on the right to freedom of movement, as well as any treatment different from that accorded to nationals, may be imposed. The only exc eption is if provided by law and necessary to protect 1097 national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. - citizens should have the right to move from one place In the absence of such exceptions, non 1098 to another. The overarching principle of non - discrimination also applies to the realization of the right to freedom of movement. Importantly, the statelessness of a person resulting from the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, cannot be invoked by States as a justif ication for the 1099 denial of other human rights, including freedom of movement. 500. Rohingya in Rakhine State face severe restrictions on their right to freedom of movement which do not fall within the permissible limitations set out above Their ability to . 1093 E .g. , UDHR, art. 21(1). 1094 Also ASEAN Declaration , art. 15. 1095 See ICCPR, art. 12. 1096 , United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27: Freedom of movement (Art. 12) 2 November 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9. 1097 Ibid. 1098 See also A/HRC/19/43, para. 8 - 10. 1099 A/HRC/RES/32/5. E.g. 119

120 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 move between villages in the same township, between townships and outside Rakhine State is severely curtailed , adversely impacting every aspect of life . verbal The restrictions are imposed through a complex system of written or 501. security rules, physical barriers, abusive practices, and self - imposed instructions as well as restrictions based on fear. Implementation is arbitrary, depending on decisions by local is often associated with the payment of bribes and , where permitted, officials. Movement detailed legal basis for all the restrictions imposed on the Rohingya remains harassment . The unclear. 502. The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State summarised the situation regarding restrictions on freedom of movement as follows: t is one of the most important issues hindering progress towards Freedom of movemen - communal harmony, economic growth and human development in Rakhine inter State. Movement restrictions have a wide range of detrimental effects including d services, strengthened communal reduced access to education, health an segregation, and reduced economic interaction. The Government’s rationale for maintaining the status quo is largely related to fears of destabilization, especially as the Rakhine community is expected to protest greater mo vement of Muslims within the state. Yet, if carefully done, easing restrictions on freedom of movement could have 1100 far - reaching positive social and economic benefits. Requirement for a temporary travel permit to travel between townships (b) According to an instruction issued as early as June 1997 by the Rakhine State 503. Immigration and National Registration Department, all Rohingya (referred to as “Bengali races”) wishing to travel between townships in Rakhine State need to hold a temporary travel permit to “foreigners and persons who are doubted as also applies , called a “Form 4”. This report to the authorities about his or her arrival and departure. foreigners”. The traveller must The Form 4 is only valid for a given time and the traveller must surrender it to the issuing 1101 journey. officer upon completion of the Despite not belonging to any of these approved categori es, the Kaman, who are Myanmar , have also been required to travel with a citizens 1102 Provisions from the 1997 Form 4, indicating a broader application to “Muslims”. instruction continue to be enforced. Violation of the 1997 instruction is punishable by 504. section 188 of the Penal Code, with imprisonment of up to six months, or up to two years under the 1949 Residents of Myanmar 1103 Registration Act. In 2011, the Maungdaw Township General Administration Department issued Order 1/2011 reiterating the need for Ro hingya residing in Maungdaw to obtain a rder refers to the non The o observance by “some Form 4 to travel between townships. - z Bengalis” of the requirement to obtain Form 4 and emphasi serious consequences es that “ aws and section 188” . would be faced in accordance with existing l The process for obtaining a Form 4 is onerous and lengthy, taking from a few days to 505. 1104 The applicant must first obtain a letter of recommendation from the weeks or months. village administrator and then travel to the township immi gration office (LaWaKa) to apply for a permit. According to credible reports, until 2012 a Form 4 used to be valid for 30 days. After 506. the 2012 violence, the issuance of the Form 4 travel permit was temporarily suspended for Rohingya in Maungdaw, Buth idaung and Rathedaung. It was later resumed for travel 1100 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous ( August 2017 future for the people of Rakhine , p. 33. ) 1101 K - 107. 1102 167, CI CI - - 168, CI - 171. See this chapter, section C.2: Kaman Mu slims of Rakhine State. 1103 Sections 6(2) and 6(3) of the 1949 Residents of Myanmar Registration Act penalize the failure to comply with a requirement to produce a required document with imprisonment of up to two years with or without hard labour and/or a fine. Article 188 of the Penal Code penalizes the act of disobeying an order given by a public servant with up to six months imprisonment and/or a fine. 1104 013, CI - 061, CI - 062, CI - - 073, CI - 079, CI - 082, CI - 085, CI - 090, CI - 173, DI - 001, DI - 003, DI - 065, CI - 073. D I - 025, DI - 046, DI - 051, DI 120

121 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 between Maungdaw and Buthidaung but with a reduced validity often between one and two , 1105 Since 2012, Rohingya residing in Rathedaung Township have not been able to weeks. ung town, which has effectively prevented them from visiting travel to the centre of Ratheda the LaWaKa office and being able to apply for a Form 4 to travel to other townships legally. The documents to be submitted when applying for a Form 4 permit include a village 507. departure certi ficate, a copy of the household list and an identity document. Until 2015, the Rohingya were asked to present their temporary registration certificates (“white cards”) and since then their temporary registration certificate receipt. According to credible s ources, in early 2017 the local authorities informed community leaders in northern Rakhine State that National Verification Card only holders of the (NVC) would be able to travel between 1106 townships. (c) Specific restrictions with in northern Rakhine and h arassment at checkpoints 508. In northern Rakhine State, Rohingya have faced restrictions on movement for procedure applicable throughout Rakhine State to move Form 4 decades. In addition to the other, Rohingya in northern Rakhine State from one township to even need permission to an obtain from their village travel from one village to another. In order to do so, they must , called “village departure certificate” . The procedure and the administrator an authorisation vary between locations, although the price generally depends on the cost of the certificate l er is also required to inform the village duration of stay outside the village. The travel 1107 administrator at destination and to pay a similar fee. The legal basis for these requirements r emains unclear . However, their adverse and discriminatory impact is apparent. Other restrictions regarding freedom of movement in northern Rakhine State stem 509. June 2012. from curfew orders that have been in place in Maungdaw and Buthidaung since 1108 Such orders were also in place in other parts of Rakhine State but have since been lifted. In northern Rakhine State, restrictions on freedom of movement are enforced through 510. security checkpoints. These checkpoints were previously operated by the NaSaKa. Since 2013, they are mainly operated by the Border Guard Police and the Myanmar Police Force, but also the Tatmadaw . According to credible reports, as of October 2016 there were as many portedly increased as 126 checkpoints in northern Rakhine State alone. This number was re 1109 At checkpoints, Rohingya often face questioning, searches of to 161 as of August 2017. 1110 vehicles and harassment. The ethnic Rakhine must also go through these checkpoints but usually do not face similar intimidation and harassment. One interviewee explained: T he security forces would check our There were many checkpoints between villages. cars, documents, and bags. They only checked the Rohingya, never the Rakhine. When out, and the a vehicle was stopped at a checkpoint, all the passengers had to get women and men would stand on different sides. O fficials would check bags inside the vehicle, making a mess. Then , they would start checking people. Usually men had to go through a body check ; for women there were female officers to check their body for anything suspicious. They would also check the handbags of women. If they found medicine, even a very basic type, they would ask why you are taking this. They would d one also check all our documents. The procedure would take between 45 minutes an 1111 hour, depending on the number of passengers. 511. Moreover, security forces regularly impose arbitrary and often substantial “transit 1112 interviewee summarised how bribes had to be fees” for passage through checkpoints. One in Maungdaw , but also when passing through paid to obtain the village departure certificate 1105 - 063, V - 047. K 1106 K K - 063, 076, V - 047. - 1107 - CI - 061, CI - 063, CI - 064, CI - 080, CI - 082, CI - 089, CI - 090, CI - 092, CI - 094, DI 001, DI - 002, DI - 006, - DI - 010, DI - 025, DI - 026, DI 038, DI - 051, DI - 053, DI - 073. 1108 See this chapter, section C.4.a : Curfews and prohibition of meetings of more than five people. 1109 K - 076. 1110 - CI - 062, CI 063, CI - 064, CI - 079, DI - 13, DI - 026, DI - 061. 1111 DI - 026 . 1112 - 051. CI - 061, CI - 063, CI - 065, CI - 079, CI - 082, CI - 090, CI - 173, DI - 001, DI - 003, DI - 013, DI - 025, DI 121

122 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 If you didn’t have the certificate you had to pay a lot, but even if you had it, checkpoints: “ 1113 Rohingya who travel without the necessary documents risk you had to pay something.” 1114 prosecution under section 188 of the Penal Code or the 1949 Residents of arrest and Another interview succinctly stated, “ Y ou will not find a single Myanmar Registration Act. 1115 person who did not pay money to the authorities” . (d) Specific restrictions in central Ra khine r estrictions on freedom of movement of the Rohingya and the 512. In central Rakhine, Kaman significantly increased after the 2012 violence. They apply to both displaced and non - illages in central displaced populations. This affects the Rohingya and Kaman residing in v Rakhine (estimates range from 200,000 to 230,000), and an additional 128,000 Rohingya and Kaman living in displacement camps and sites, the majority in rural areas of Sittwe 1116 Township. Rakhine and Rohingya communities have been segregated in central Rakhine since 513. the 2012 violence . T he authorities stat e this i s to ensure the protection of the communities , 1117 but without the actual risks. any specific justification While m ost re strictions relating to are , they are reportedly strictly enforced. According to credible reports, not formally codified when Rohingya or Kaman try to move in central Rakhine beyond locally accepted 1118 boundaries, they are frequently arrested and subjected to ill - t. treatmen 514. Movement of the non - displaced Muslim population is tightly curtailed by the security forces, local authorities and communities. They are not allowed to travel to Sittwe town, or , except very rarely for emergenc y medical treatment or other main towns in central Rakhine other exceptional circumstances. T hese towns previously had substantial Muslim communities. Rohingya and Kaman have also been barred from entering many of the Rakhine villages in central Rakhine State, although there are examples whe re local arrangements have 1119 allowed this. As early as September 2012, the then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 515. situation of human rights in Myanmar warned against the risks of such a policy of segregation: d Buddhist communities following the violence The current separation of Muslim an should not be maintained in the long term. In rebuilding towns and villages, Government authorities should pay equal attention to rebuilding trust and respect between communities, while confronting deep - rooted prejudices and discriminatory - attitudes based on ethnicity and religion. These have been made manifest in the anti Rohingya discourse and in the inaccurate and inflammatory images of the violence in the media, including social media. A policy of integratio n, rather than separation and 1120 segregation, should be developed at the local and national levels as a priority. 1121 Despite numerous calls by two United Nations Special Rapporteurs , the United 516. 1122 Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ears after the 2012 and others, six y violence, this policy of segregation has been maintained and contacts between communities have been extremely limited in central Rakhine. In practice, this policy has contributed to ovided a conducive environment for growing mistrust and misunderstandings. It has also pr 1113 - DI 051 . 1114 CI - 089, K - 076. 1115 CI - 094. 1116 K - 113.7. 1117 Danish Refugee Council, European Commission’s Directorate - General for European Civil Protection Humanitarian Aid Operations, United Nations and High Commissioner for Refugees, CCCM Cluster, Joint IDP Profiling Service, Sittwe Camp Profiling report (June 2017), p. 12. 1118 K - 069. 1119 K - 069, V - 047. 1120 A/67/383, para. 61. 1121 A/67/383, para. 61; A/68/397, para. 52; A/HRC/25/64, para. 82(c); A/HRC/28/72, para. 60. 1122 A/HRC/32/18, para. 54. 122

123 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 dehumanization and hate campaigns and for wrong perceptions to be engrained in the minds of each community. Displacement camps and sites 1123 517. are The displacement camps and sites established after the 2012 violence places of deprivation of liberty. They are effectively from the outside world, cordoned off 1124 In most cases, a ccess is with Rohingya and Kaman unable to move outside freely. strictly controlled by checkpoints set up by the Myanmar Police Force. Moreove r, many camps are surrounded by barbed wire fencing. There are further police checkpoints and military posts near in the camp area , further limiting freedom of movement. A large military base is located the Sittwe camps, where the majority of displaced peo ple are accommodated According to . credible reports, even some local staff members of international organizations have not been 1125 able to leave the camps for the last few years . Given the severe restrictions on freedom of movement imposed on the camp 518. opulation, some humanitarian actors and analysts have referred to the camps as “internment p 1126 camps”: These camps should be viewed as internment camps as the people there are not seeking refuge (at the h camp for internally displaced eart of the definition of a people ). Rather, they are “locked up”. To get into the camp you have to pass through a series of barbed wire fences, then an army checkpoint, and then a police 1127 checkpoint. After 2012, the situation in central Rakhine changed wit h the establishment of the camps, and the unresolved question of whether these should be considered displaced 1128 . people, or people forcibly transferred into detention centres Image from 2018 showing the guarded entrance to the Sittwe displacement the barbed wires all around camps an d In 2015, the Government denied the existence of restrictions on the freedom of 519. movement of the displaced population in central Rakhine. In a response to a report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the Government stated: 1123 See this chapter, section C.1 : Emblematic incidents. 1124 - Danish Refug ee Council, European Commission’ s Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, CCCM Cluster, Joint IDP Profiling Service, Sittwe Camp Profiling report (June 2017), p. 12. 1125 DM - 004, DM - - 047. 005, V 1126 005, V QM - 002, QM - - 337. 1127 QM - 005. 1128 QM - 002. 123

124 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 There is no restriction on the freedom of movement of the IDPs. Security presence in IDP camps is simply to prevent recurrence of communal violence while the level of distrust between the two communities is still h igh. The two communities are staying separately because they feel that they are safer that way. It will take time for both communities to heal themselves to relieve from mental trauma. It needs to wait for a tual understanding and trust. reasonable time until both communities regain mu 1129 by - side. - Neither the government nor others can force them to live side from 2018 showing Image t he sign board at the entry of the Basara camps in Sittwe . It states that the area is “restricted” with “no admittance without t he approval of come in and out” State Government to Despite the statement of the Government, the existence of the restrictions on the freedom of and movement of the displaced population is undeniable. It is attested by the checkpoints sign boards at the entry of the camps, the barbed wires , the experience of those trying the leave the camps, and the simple fact that 128,000 people have not been able to go back to their place of origin, despite their desire to do so. Aung Mingalar 520. Since June 201 2, the only Muslims still living in Sittwe town are the approximately 1130 4,000 Rohingya and Kaman remaining residents of the Aung Mingalar quarter. This area is effectively a closed ghetto, where Muslims are trapped and have lived separately from the rest of the population since 2012. It is guarded by armed police, checkpoints and barbed wire. The Mission also received allegations that the Tatmadaw maintains a small presence in the l permission school grounds in Aung Mingalar. People can only leave the quarter with specia 1131 Apart from emergency medical referrals, and in organized convoys with police escorts. the only travel which Muslims can normally undertake outside Aung Mingalar is to the peo displacement camps and sites in rural Sittwe, where a limited number of ple can sometimes access markets and buy food. This travel is strictly controlled by security forces , . who only allow a shuttle escorted by the police to travel from Aung Mingalar to the camps 1132 The shuttle requires payment to the police. Access to the nearby medical facilities, Sittwe markets and livelihoods are largely cut 521. for the residents of Aung Mingalar, who live in effective isolation . Although the Sittwe off 1129 A/HRC/25/64/Add.1, para. 15 . 1130 as approximately 16,000 before the 2012 It is reported that the population of Aung Mingalar w violence. 1131 K - 069; V - 047. 1132 004; DM - V - 047. 124

125 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 residents have to go through the cumbersome eme General Hospital is nearby, rgency referral 1133 process to access it. There is a sign board at the entrance of Aung Mingalar, similar to the one at the entrance of the Sittwe camps, restricting access (see picture above). According to credible reports, in May 2017 Rakhine nationalists w rongly claimed that the population of Aung Mingalar had grown from 4,000 to 20,000. The Rakhine State Government subsequently initiated a verification process and found that the population had remained static. Nevertheless, new restrictions were reportedly introduced after this verification process, requiring residents of Aung Mingalar wishing to travel to the Sittwe camps to buy food or access medical care, to register and have their picture taken, with the aim of ensuring 1134 that the same individuals would r eturn after their visit to the camps. Image from 2018 of the re stricted entrance to Aung Mingalar (e) Guest registration and household inspections According to the 2012 version Ward or Village Tract Administration Law , of the 522. overnight guests at their home – people hosting even for a single night – had to register with the ward or village tract administrator. The law was strongly criticized by civil society and 1135 as a tool for the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar intimidation and harassment of specific individuals, groups or communities. In northern Rakhine State, the law was strictly implemented and combined with other restrictions on the 1136 right to freedom of movement. nistration Law Ward or Village Tract Admi 523. clearly states , “The ward or Although the village tract administrator shall not collect any currency in respect of guest list information”, many Rohingya in northern Rakhine had to pay the village administrator to register overnight 1137 guests. The amount w as arbitrary and depended on the relationship between the applicant 1138 and the village administrator. When overnight guests without permission were found during the nightly household inspe ctions, Rohingya were arrested and had to pay another 1139 bribe to get rel eased. 524. In 2016, the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law was amended. The requirement for mandatory guest registration was made applicable only to guests staying in 1133 See this chapter, section B.3.b : Restrictions on access to healthcare. 1134 DM - 004. 1135 29. A/71/361, para. 19; A/HRC/31/71, Annex I; A/70/4 12, para. 1136 090, DI CI - 061, CI - 062, CI - 065, CI - 069, CI - 070, CI - 079, CI - 089, CI - - 001, DI - 004, DI - 009, DI - 013, DI - 025, DI - 026, DI - 038. 1137 - 061, CI CI - 062, CI - 089, DI - 001, DI - 004, DI - 026. 1138 CI - 062, DI - 001. 1139 CI - 062, CI 065, CI - 069, CI - 070, DI - 004, DI - 009, DI - 026, DI - 038. - 125

126 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1140 a month or more However, additional investigation is requ ired to somebody’s house for . on the confirm whether this change in the law has been followed by a change of practice ground in Rakhine and elsewhere. Conclusion (f) Rohingya across Rakhine State face severe movement restrictions. They need travel 525. permits to leave the t ownship. In northern Rakhine State, movement between villages is ir also restricted and curfews are imposed. Restrictions are enforced through multiple security 1141 August 2017 checkpoints over 160 . , which had reportedly risen to In central before 25 Rakhine Sta te, severe restrictions imposed since the 2012 violence have result ed in a policy of segregation of communities . Rohingya can generally not move to ethnic Rakhine areas, For the last six years, 128,000 and Kaman including the main towns and markets. Rohingya confined in have been camps or sites and 4,000 Muslims have been confined displacement in the Aung Mingalar ghetto in Sittwe town. These restrictions adversely impact every aspect of life, including their access to food, livelihood, health and education – and in extreme their cases leading to preventable deaths. They are compounded by arbitrary fees , extortion and the risk of arrest. 526. While their citizenship rights and status are debated in Myanmar, it is not denied that most Rohingya are resi dents of Myanmar. As such, they are entitled to freedom of movement. Moreover, their non citizenship, which results from an arbitrary deprivation of their - nationality, cannot be invoked to deny other human rights. No security requirement necessitates the i mposition of these severe and arbitrary movement restrictions for such a long period of time, without any clear legal basis. Therefore, the restrictions violate the right to freedom of movement of the Rohingya. 527. Specifically with regard to the displace ment camps and sites established in central Rakhine State after the 2012 violence, the Mission finds that – beyond a violation of their – the confinement of Rohingya and Kaman constitutes a right to freedom of movement deprivation of liberty. Deprivation o f liberty involves a more severe restriction of movement 1142 within a narrower space than interference with liberty of movement. While Rohingya and Kaman enjoy some limited ability to move within the camps or sites, many of the camps are wire, military camps, security guards and checkpoints, including inside surrounded by barbed the camps. Access to the camps and sites is restricted. The situation in the Aung Mingalar ghetto is similar or even worse on certain aspects. Residents cannot freely leave the disp lac ement camps and sites and Aung Mingalar. They have inadequate access to health care, education and livelihoods. Holding a group in such conditions for over six years amounts to a deprivation of their liberty. 528. The Government justifies their confinement on security grounds. However, the Mission fails to see the present, direct and imperative threat that would justify the security 1143 for over six years and that could not be addressed by detention of 132,000 people 1144 alternative and less invasive means. This is aggravated by the lack of known legal basis or review of the confinement. Were confinement of communities absolutely required to maintain security, the Mission does not see why it should only affect the Muslim as reasonable grounds to conclude that the communities of Rakhine State. The Mission h holding of Rohingya and Kaman in these camps and sites and in the Aung Mingalar ghetto constitutes an arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of their liberty. 529. Beyond the question of lawfulness, the Mission calls into question the effectiveness of policies of segregation to mitigate an alleged or perceived security threat, especially for long periods of time. Rather than contributing to sustainable peace in Rakhine State, they 1140 Ward or Village Tract Administration Law, Chapter IX, section 17. 1141 K - 076. 1142 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Liberty and security of persons (Art. 9) , 16 December 2014, CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 5. 1143 128,000 Rohingya and Kaman in displacement camps and sites and 4,000 in Aung Mingalar. 1144 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Liberty and security of persons (Art. 9) , 16 December 2014, CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 15. 126

127 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 break all relationships between The Mission has concluded that they communities. contributed directly to the events of 2016 and 2017. 530. Considering the lack of reasonable justification for these movement restrictions, in some cases amounting to deprivation of liberty, and their discriminatory implementation, the Mission concludes that they are a second building block of the system of oppression and . persecution targeting the Rohingya 3. Restrictions on access to food, livelihoods, health care and education (a) Restrictions on a ccess to food and livelihood Overview and legal framework The human right adequate food is firmly entrenched in international human rights 531. to law, including article 25 of the UDHR, article 11 of the ICESCR, articles 24 and 27 of the 28 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. To realize the right to food, CRC, and article States must ensure that food is available, economically and physically accessible, and 1145 adequate. The right is realized when “every man, woman and child, alone or in community with ot hers, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its 1146 procurement.” The right to food is closely linked with the right to life: “without food there 1147 is no life, and with the wrong food, life is shorter and more prone to ill The right health”. - to life requires States to take measures to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting 1148 measures to eliminate malnutrition. While the right to fo od is to be progressively realis ed, the United Nations Committee 532. cial and Cultural Rights has established that States have immediate core on Economic, So obligations, regardless of resources and/or level of development, to ensure freedom from - discrimination; and the protection of vulnerable populations. hunger; non This includes the pr ovision of access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, 1149 to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone. 533. In Rakhine State, the Rohingya have long relied on fishing, farming and trading to provide for themselves and their families. However, movement restrictions generally, as well as specific restrictions on access to fishing, agricultural lands and forests, i mpede their access to food and livelihoods. The fear of crossing checkpoints – due to the harassment and has had a similarly negative impact. extortion it entails – Access to food and malnutrition According to a survey by the 2015, Rakhine State had the Myanmar Government in 534. highest rates of global acute malnutrition, at 13.9 per cent, and severe acute malnutrition, at 1150 3.7 per cent, in the country. However, in northern Rakhine, where most Rohingya live, rates were four to five times higher for se vere acute malnutrition, 19 per cent in Maungdaw – – above the World Health Organization Township and 15.1 per cent in Buthidaung Township 1151 The health impacts of malnutrition may include emergency threshold of 15 per cent. heightened risk of preventable deat - existing conditions, especially hs and deterioration of pre 1145 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food (Art. 11) , 12 May 1999, E/C.12/1999/5 . 1146 Ibid, para. 6. 1147 nd A. Eide, “Adequate Standard of Living”, in International Human Rights Law , 2 ed., D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), p. 199. 1148 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: Right to life (Art. 6) , 30 April 1982, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para. 5. 1149 United Nations Committee on E conomic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12) , 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, para 43(b). 1150 Ministry of Health and Sports, Myanmar - 2015 - 2016 Demographic and Health Survey - Key Findings (2017); see also: The UN Network, “Nutrition Situation Analysis”, abridged version (June 2017). 1151 076.44. K - 127

128 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 for children . A Word Food Programme report on northern Rakhine State in mid 2017 - highlighted limited access to livelihoods, due largely to freedom of movement restrictions and the increased securi ty presence, as being a main con tributory cause of malnutrition. It summarised the situation at that time: In line with the previous remote emergency assessments, the survey confirmed a areas after the worsening of the food security situation in already highly vulnerable October 2016 incidents and subsequent security operations. Nearly one third of the insecure and in need of humanitarian assistance. Only population was severely food - cent of women achieved minimum dietary diversity and none of the ch ildren 14 per met the minimum adequate diet. Income opportunities were scarce and households could not access sufficient food to cover their needs. About half of the markets were not functioning or were only partially operational, food prices were highly volatile 1152 and supply of affordable foods in many markets was scarce. 535. The report further stated that poor child feeding practices may have increased wasting - for - height) and stunting (low weight (low height - for - age) in children, both symptoms of acute undernutr ition. Of greatest concern, the report estimated that 80,500 children under the age of five were expected to be in need of treatment for acute malnutrition over the 1153 subsequent 12 months. This preceded the “clearance operations” that began on 25 August 7. 201 536. The various waves of violence in Rakhine State have had a serious adverse impact on the enjoyment of the right to food. Interviewees from northern Rakhine reported increased 1154 hunger following the 2012 violence due to further movement restrictions an d fear. One interviewee explained how they would only eat one meal a day out of fear to le ave the 1155 house . The following account was also provided regarding the impact of the violence on access to food: People couldn’t go to work and couldn’t earn money. At one point, there was no food. People were trying to help each other, but it was particularly difficult for very poor people. Initially, nobody dared going outside. Then hunger was such that people started to take risks and go out to work. They thought: “better to die by a bullet than 1156 ”. to die of hunger 1157 537. The 2016 and 2017 “clearance operations” have had a devastating impact. On 9 January and 23 August 2017, a group of United Nations Special Rapporteurs addressed two 1158 The August 2017 urgent appeals to the Government of Myanmar to raise the issue. communication highlighted information regarding “evident deterioration of the food security situation in northern Rakhine” and raised concern about the “long term, chronic lack of access he context of prolonged security operations in the area”. The Special to adequate food in t that one - third of homes in northern Rakhine were already Rapporteurs highlighted allegations experiencing extreme food deprivation, and that children were especially vulnerable, as cted in their high malnutrition rates. It should be noted that this urgent appeal preceded refle the commencement of the August 2017 “ clearance operations ” by two days, after which access to food and its consequences further deteriorated significantly. 1152 World Food Programme, Food security assessment in the northern part of Rakhine State - Final report (July 2017). 1153 Ibid. 1154 DI - 0 09, DI - 053, DI - 054. 1155 DI - 009. 1156 DI - 054. 1157 World Food Programme, Food security assessment in the northern part of Rakhine State - Final report (July 2017); V - 047. 1158 UA MMR 6/2016 available at: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22927 and UA MMR 8/2017 available at: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23297 128

129 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Restri ctions on access to livelihoods Rohingya have faced severe restrictions on their access to livelihoods for decades. 538. in the 1990s, strict enforcement of movement restrictions against the Rohingya in Already had reportedly led to seve northern Rakhine re impoverishment, to the extent that many people 1159 ovement has been further restricted throughout were in need of humanitarian assistance. M 1160 The Rohingya in central and northern Rakhine Rakhine State with each wave of violence . have been restricted from ac cessing fishing areas (including coastal waters and inland waterways), farmlands, markets, or employment outside their immediate areas, thus severely 1161 limiting their income. Restrictions on access to livelihoods have been a principal 1162 contributory factor fo rcing Rohingya to leave Myanmar. In central Rakhine, severe restrictions on freedom of movement imposed after the 539. For example, 2012 violence have significantly impacted upon access to livelihoods. in villages near Sittwe were reportedly for ced to sell personal assets and reduce Rohingya 1163 Similarly, i n the first half of 2013 over 10,000 the numbers of meals in order to survive. Muslims from isolated villages with very limited access to livelihoods reportedly moved to camps and sites. They were not classified as IDPs displacement and therefore had difficulty 1164 humanitarian assistance. accessing 1165 These 540. Access to fishing has been severely curtailed by curfew orders since 2012. ishermen are have often prevented access at the peak night and early morning periods. F routinely required to pay a fee to the security forces operating checkpoints, and on return are often required to hand over part of their catch. According to credible reports, Rohingya found - treatment, fishing during curfew hours or in the wrong area hav e been subjected to ill 1166 United Nations Special Rapporteurs addressed an arbitrary arrests and even killings. urgent appeal to the Government of Myanmar about the alleged torture of fishermen by BGP 1167 1168 officers in June 2016, causing the death of one. The Government denied the allegations. Restrictions on access to healthcare (b) Legal framework and overview Article 25 UDHR protects the right of everyone to a standard of living adequate for 541. their and their family’s health, including medical care. Article 12 ICESCR protects the “ right of everyone to the enjoyme nt of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”. Human rights standards on the right to health are also included in article 12 CEDAW, article 24 CRC, article 25 CRPD, as well as in article 29 ASEAN. 542. able standard of health includes the right to a system of The right to the highest attain health protection that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest 1169 Key elements of the right to health are non - discrimination and attainable level of health. his includes the right to equality of access to health care and health services. equal treatment. T The Committee emphasized that the ICESCR proscribes any discrimination in access to underlying determinants of health, as well as means and entitlements for th eir health care and 1159 Irish Centre for Human Rights, Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of the Rohingya (2010), p. 99; International Federation of Human R ights Leagues, Burma – Repression, discrimination and ethnic cleansing in Arakan (April 2000), p. 20. 1160 See this chapter, section B.2. Denial of the right to freedom of movement. 1161 K - 113.3. 1162 - 080. CI - 062, CI - 079, CI 1163 K - 076 1164 . K - 076 1165 See this chapter, section C.4.a : Curfews and prohibition of meetings of more than five people. 1166 K - 076. 1167 UA MMR 3/2016, available at: https://spcommreports.ohc hr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=3349 1168 Response of the Government of Myanmar to UA MMR 3/2016, 22 December 2016, available at: https://spcomm reports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=80722 1169 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The , 8 November 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, para. 8. right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12) 129

130 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 procurement. Prohibited grounds of discrimination include race, colour, sex, language, 1170 religion, or social origin. 543. The right to health is to be progressively implemented. Yet, as a party to the ICESCR, CRC, CEDAW and CRPD, Myanmar has an immediat e obligation, regardless of resources, - discriminatory basis, to ensure access to health facilities, goods and services on a non especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups. It must also ensure equitable distribution 1171 of all health facilities, goods and services. 544. The availability of functioning health facilities and services in Rakhine State for all communities is low, with an average of five health workers per 10,000 inhabitants. This is well below the national average of 16 health workers per 10 ,000 people, and the World Health 1172 The Organization recommended minimum of 22.8 health workers per 10,000 people. Mission notes that all communities in Rakhine State have inadequate access to healthcare, and that under - development and poor transportation m ake access to healthcare difficult for all, especially those living in remote areas. The Rohingya, however, face additional barriers due to travel restrictions, financial hurdles, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, and overall 1173 estrictions are often based on official policies and practices. R discriminatory treatment. Movement restrictions on access to health 545. Movement restrictions undermine Rohingya access to health services. The Rohingya and Kaman communities face arbitrary and highly cumbersome pro cedures to travel to hospitals. These are particularly harmful in the case of medical emergencies as they lead to late diagnosis and delays in life - saving treatment. They can result in preventable deaths. For example, one interviewee from northern Rakhine explained that it was easier to access 1174 Another medical treatment by travelling to Bangladesh than to nearby Sittwe hospital. stated: One of my relatives had to go to Yangon to get medical treatment. She tried to get the necessary papers to travel to Yang on but didn’t get them and died at the Sittwe hospital. If Rohingya have a minor sickness it is okay, but if the sickness is serious 1175 they can’t get proper treatment. In 546. restrictions on freedom of movement imposed after the central Rakhine State, the 2012 violence resulted in Rohingya and Kaman being denied access to their nearest hospitals and clinics. 547. One United Nations official shared an experience about attempts to engage with township authorities and Rakhine community leaders in central Rak hine. When the official tried to challenge township authorities about their failure to ensure that Rohingya could access emergency medical care, the response was that this was a policy matter that needed to be discussed at a higher level. Rakhine community leaders on the other hand justified this approach on various grounds, including the claims that Muslim communities “do not belong 1176 to Myanmar” and that their population “needs to be controlled”. 548. re, humanitarian actors have put in place a medical emergency As a mitigating measu referral system for Rohingya and Kaman patients. This system usually requires a humanitarian actor to liaise with the Rakhine State Health Department to take patients to the me, bureaucratic and slow. The patient may Sittwe General Hospital. The process is cumberso 1177 then require hours of travel. To secure an emergency medical referral, a local township medical officer must first certify the need. The patient, supported by a humanitarian actor, 1170 Ibid ., paras . 18 - 19. 1171 . Ibid . , para 43. 1172 2015 - Ministry of Health and Sports, Myanmar - - 2016 Demographic and Health Survey Key Findings (2017). 1173 Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for See also : Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, the people of Rakhine (August 2017), p. 42. 1174 DI - 004. 1175 - DI 013. 1176 DM - 005. 1177 - 047. V 130

131 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 vel, arrange transport, organize a police escort, and pay the must then get permission to tra 1178 Even when all arrangements are in place, ambulances reportedly may associated costs. - nationalist Rakhine groups refuse to go to Rohingya villages, camps or sites, and ultra 1179 sometimes prevent pa tients from reaching Sittwe General Hospital. 549. In central Rakhine, the Aung Mingalar ghetto in Sittwe town is located only a short distance away from Sittwe General Hospital. Mobile health clinics operated by international ain days of the week and can facilitate more rapid referrals. organizations visit on cert However, those requiring medical treatment outside those times, including those requiring emergency treatment, must first travel to a health centre at the Sittwe displacement camp to obtain a me dical referral. If successful, they are then referred back to Sittwe General 1180 Hospital. Adverse consequences The movement restrictions and lengthy bureaucratic procedures have led to numerous 550. 1181 Restriction s have been enforced strictly, even undue delays in reaching medical facilities. in the case of women in obstructed labour, infants needing emergency oxygen, people suffering from heart attacks, and people with severe disabilities. In some cases, the delays 1182 One researcher told the Mission: “Almost l. caused by these restrictions have been fata every Rohingya village in Rakhine State that I have visited has a story about someone who died due to not being able to receive medical care, and not being able to get transferred 1183 out”. th facilities Discrimination in heal 551. Even when they manage to access government health facilities, Rohingya in Rakhine 1184 State face discriminatory treatment, including further delays. Interviewees also reported having to pay bribes or higher fees to receive treatment. One in terviewee from Maungdaw stated: The treatment depends on the amount of money you have. If you pay more you will receive medicine and proper care. They charge more fro m Muslims than from the 1185 . Rakhine Rohingya must also pay additional costs such as a “guard fee” for medicine and for 552. food, phone fees, as Rohingya are not allowed to use their own phones, and translator and 1186 “guardian” fees. 1187 According to credible reports, 553. both ethnic Rakhine and Muslim (Rohingya and ptable behaviour from hospital staff in Sittwe General Kaman) patients experience unacce Hospital, including requests by nurses for bribes to receive “better communication”. Patients also reported verbal abuse, inattention and, in some cases, physical abuse and medical 1188 neglect. However, ac certain discriminatory cording to further credible information, practices at Sittwe General Hospital are only faced by Muslim patients. For example, they are placed in a small segregated ward of only 20 beds, under constant surveillance by security guards , and they can only leave under supervision. To be admitted to the hospital, a patient needs an accompanying “guardian”. In the case of the Rohingya, this can only be a woman 1178 005. - DM 1179 K - 076.12. 1180 113.1. K - 1181 K - 076.12. 1182 - DI 013, K - 076.12, K - 113, DM - 005, QM - 005. It is very diff icult to quantify the number of preventable deaths. Some humanitarian actors estimate that there have been hundreds of preventable deaths in central Rakhine since 2012 (DM - 005). 1183 K - 120 . 1184 - CI 061, CI - 064, CI - 078, CI - 079, CI - 080, CI - 173, CI - 174, DI - 001, DI - 002, DI - 004, DI - 038, DI - 051. 1185 CI - 173. 1186 1 K - 113. , K - 120. 1187 K - 113.1. 1188 - 113.1 K 131

132 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 . As (supposedly for security concerns) and she must speak Myanmar language or Rakhine only very few Muslim women speak these languages, families must hire female translators to do this (which is an additional financial burden) or decide not to hire anyone, meaning that the patient is left on his or her own at the hospital. In 554. lth facilities have led to some instances, delays in treating Rohingya patients in hea 1189 preventable deaths. A Rohingya NGO worker shared her experience at Buthidaung hospital: One day, I went to Buthidaung hospital with an eight - year - old boy who was uncon scious. In the registration room they said: “We have a lot of patients, we can’t do anything for this boy now. Go and sit there. Why are you coming to ask us?” The nurses prioritised a Rakhine patient. I had to wait 30 minutes and the boy died. This 1190 happen ed to me with three patients in total. They were all children. 555. Communication and language issues fuel pervasive and damaging misinformation and rumours regarding the treatment of Rohingya in government hospitals and facilities. Many Rohingya believe that, beyond neglect and discriminatory treatment, they actually face the 1191 danger of being killed by medical staff if they go to a hospital. One interviewee told the Mission that, following the 2012 violence, “The hospital people started killing 1192 Rohingyas” Belief in these rumours has resulted in people limiting or delaying seeking . medical treatment, including in emergency situations. One researcher explained that “in many cases people were to die of preventable disease of not seeking healthcar e, as a result 1193 The rumours are also because of a steadfast belief in the veracity of these rumours”. in reaching medical facilities - fuelled by the simple fact that, given the delays because of restrictions on freedom of mo vement and other restrictions - patients of ten reach the hospital when they are already in critical condition. Restrictions on access to education (c) Legal framework and overview 556. The right to education is protected by article 26 UDHR, article 13 ICESCR and article 28 CRC. According to th ese provisions, primary education should be “compulsory and available free to all”, secondary education should be “made generally available and accessible to all” and higher education should be “made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity”. Th e right to education is an “empowerment right”. It is “the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of 1194 poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities”. 557. element of the right to education is the prohibition against any form of One key discrimination. This prohibition “applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all international prohibited grounds of discrimination”. The principle of - discrimination extends to “all persons of school age residing in the territory of a State non 1195 nationals, and irrespective of their legal status”. party, including non - 558. Through its discriminatory policies and practices, the Government of Myanmar viola tes the right to education of Rohingya children and youth at the primary, secondary and higher education levels. Rohingya interviewees repeatedly described to the Mission how they 1189 CI - 173, DI - 038. 1190 DI - 038 . 1191 CI - 073, CI - 080, CI - 089, CI - 174, DI - 009, DI - 046, DI - 053, DI - 054. 1192 CI - 080. 1193 120. K - 1194 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The right to education (Art. 13) , 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10, para. 1. 1195 Ibid, para. 31 and 34. See also art. 2 CRC and art. 3(e) of the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education. 132

133 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 on their were denied equal access to education and the highly adverse impact this had 1196 lives: Because of the 2012 violence, the dream of my parents for education got shattered. My father and brother were teachers and look at me, I couldn’t even study! Now when s 10”. But I I meet educated people, I think, “Oh my God, I haven’t even passed clas still have hope that one day if I can save a bit of money, I will restart my education because it is so important The military backed Government snatched our life from us. . 1197 They ruined the entire Rohingya community in the country . Discrimination at school in northern Rakhine 559. on government - run A large majority of childre n in northern Rakhine State have relied 1198 Rohingya have faced severe discrimination in basic education schools for their education. these schools. This includes t he humiliating practice of seating Rohingya children at the back of the class, while ethnic Rakhine children sat at the front, or Rohingya and Rakhine students 1199 - appointed teachers neglect being placed in different classrooms. Many government 1200 Some actively Rohingya stude nts and treat them differently from Rakhine students. alar”, or being told that undermine Rohingya students, with examples of them being called “K 1201 they are not Myanmar citizens or that they “do not have any country”. One young Rohingya woman from Maungdaw shared her experience at school: The only regret I have in my life is that no teacher ever considered me as their favourite student. You have no idea, what I was doing to try to get the attention of my and learn like any other stu teachers dent. I obeyed. I behaved nicely. If they wrote anything on the black board, I would help to erase it afterwards. The teachers used to bring their lunch in a box. When I would see them, I would quickly offer to carry their lunch - they hardly checked my homework or classwork to boxes. Even after all this, see if I was learning properly. I always heard that teachers are nice and caring but this was not the case with me. I always completed my homework on time and wanted put a right or wrong sign on the paper without them to look at it but they would simply explaining anything. For the Rakhine students it was different, their was homework 1202 . checked Another barrier consistently highlighted by interviewees is language. Depending on 560. c schools are taught in Rakhine or Myanmar language, which many the grade, classes in publi 1203 Rohingya students do not understand. Rohingya interviewees stated that their classes were irregular, with a high level of absenteeism by teachers, and that often they had little to do at 1204 scho One interviewee explained how the Rohingya students at his school were kept in ol. a separate room and that the teacher would only greet them in the morning before spending nable to the rest of the day with the ethnic Rakhine students. The Rohingya students were u 1205 communicate properly with the teacher . 561. After the 2012 violence, some schools closed. In 2015, it was assessed that the primary - student ratios were 83:1 in Buthidaung and 123:1 in Maungdaw, respectively level teacher more than double and trip le the international benchmark and well above the reported target 1196 BI - 004, BI - 018, CI - 019, CI - 062, CI - 063, - 065, CI - 069, CI - 072, CI - 073, CI - 078, CI - 079, CI - 080, CI - 034, - CI - 125, CI - 173, DI 026, DI 003, DI - 004, DI - 005, DI - 007, DI - 010, DI - 013, DI - 022, DI - 025, DI - - DI - 046, DI - 047, DI - 050, DI - 052, DI - 053, DI 038, DI 073, DI - 076, LI - 055, LI - 087, LI - 092, LI - 098, - LI - 101, LI - 103, LI - 116, LI - 131, LI - 135, QI - 069. 1197 DI - 047. 1198 PLAN and REACH, Joint education sector needs assessment, north Rakhine State, Myanmar (2015), p. 4. 1199 - 038, DI BI - 018, CI - 173, DI - 005, DI 026, DI - - 050, DI - 053. 1200 CI - 062 . 1201 065, CI CI - - 069, CI - - 0 78, CI - 073. 072, CI 1202 026 DI - . 1203 - DI - 004, DI - 010, DI 026, DI - 038. 1204 DI - 005, DI - 025, DI - 052, LI - 116. 1205 - 005. DI 133

134 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1206 . Government teachers reportedly of 30:1 set out by the Ministry of Education of Myanmar attended schools even less frequently, especially in Maungdaw and Buthidaung, supposedly ity concerns. As a consequence, a parallel education system staffed by volunteers due to secur 1207 was started to teach Rohingya children in northern Rakhine. Situation in central Rakhine According to credible reports, in central Rakhine many Rohingya and Kaman c hildren 562. are prevented from attending the formal education system because of the combination of movement restrictions, the lack of schools, and the confinement of an estimated 60,000 mainly accessible displaced children. In displacement camps and sites, primary education is through “temporary learning centres” set up after the 2012 violence and supported by the United Nations and international organizations. These centres follow the government’s curriculum. They are open to both displaced children and childr en from Muslim villages who do not have access to government schools. However, these centres are only primary school 1208 - level, lack support from the Government, are under resourced and lack qualified teachers. Middle school and high school opportunities 563. are even more limited for Muslim - existent for those living outside Sittwe students in central Rakhine, and almost non Township. There is only one high school for Rohingya and Kaman children in central Rakhine, located in Thet Kae Pyin in Sittwe Township. or It provides schooling f approximately 3,500 students . At the high school level, there are reportedly only six teachers in total, with a ratio of 102 students per teacher. Out of the total of 57 teachers, it is reported that only five are government nted (all of whom are Kaman), with all the others being - appoi 1209 “volunteer teachers”. In 2018, the UNICEF spokesperson summarised the situation of Rohingya children 564. with regards to access to education in central Rakhine as follows: ld are on the situation in northern Rakhine and in Cox’s While the eyes of the wor Bazaar, over 60,000 Rohingya children remain almost forgotten, trapped in 23 camps in central Rakhine they were driven into by violence in 2012. (...) The movement or children in the camps – restrictions are shrinking horizons f nowhere more so than in terms of education. (...) Rohingya children desperately need education if they are to have any kind of prospects for a better future. Temporary solutions need to be improved immediately and more durable arra ngements providing children with access to formal education, provided by properly trained teachers and recognized by the education system, must be set in place quickly. Otherwise this generation’s future 1210 prospects will be permanently damaged. Discrimina tion at university 565. Until 2012, a limited number of Rohingya could access higher education, mostly at – students from wealthy or prominent families Sittwe University. A very small minority – could travel to Yangon to study. Travel to Sittwe or Yangon r emained a challenge because 1211 - citizens”, Rohingya were not permitted to study As “non of the movement restrictions. 1206 PLAN and REACH, Joint education sector needs assessment, north Rakhine State, Myanmar (2015), . - According to UNESCO: “In the absence of a global target on pupil p. 5 teacher ratios (PTR) in primary education, the most widely used international benchmark is 40:1.” Education for All Global Monitoring Report and UNESCO Education Sector, “Policy Paper 19: The challenge of teacher shortage and quality: Have we succeeded in getting enough quality teachers into classrooms?” (April 2015). 1207 PLAN and REACH, Joint education sector needs assessment, north Rakhine State, Myanmar (2015), p. 5, LI - 116 1208 QM - 002, QM - 0 05; K - 113.2; UNICEF, Briefing on the situation of children in Rakhine State (January 2018). 1209 . QM - 005 ; K - 113.2 1210 UNICEF, Briefing on the situation of children in Rakhine State (January 2018). 1211 135. - CI - 065, CI - 069, CI - 080, DI - 004, LI 134

135 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 certain “professional” subjects (including law, computer science, engineering and medicine). 1212 helor’s degree level. They were also not allowed to study beyond a bac In some cases, Rohingya students were not given a certificate upon completion of 566. 1213 their studies. One interviewee explained that, because Sittwe University refused to issue her a certificate upon completion of three years of zool ogy studies, she had to work as an 1214 Another interviewee said she had to bribe the university to obtain a office cleaner. certificate which did not correspond to the actual subject of her studies. Despite this, she explained the importance of receiving this document: I finally received my certificate from university. That is the only thing I was hiding in my blouse when I left Myanmar by boat. In the boat, everyone was asking me why I cared so much about this piece of paper o my studies. . My whole life had been devoted t 1215 This is the only piece of paper I cared about. Since 2012, Rohingya students have been unable to enrol at Sittwe University, due to 567. unspecified “security concerns”. In practice, this effectively denied them access to higher 1216 In 2017, the authorities put in place distance learning for Rohingya and Kaman education. 1217 However, only a small number of mainly Kaman students were reportedly students. enrolled in the programme, which is only limited to history and Myanmar language 1218 The M courses. ission views this initiative as totally inadequate in meeting Myanmar’s obligations under international law, to provide access to higher education for Rohingya and Kaman students. The students need full access to all universities in Myanmar. (d) Conclusio n 568. In addition to, and often because of, the lack of legal status, severe movement restrictions, the Rohingya also face restrictions on acc ess to food, livelihood, health care and education. 569. Rakhine State is one of the poorest states in Myanmar. All communities suffer from poverty, poor social services and scarcity of livelihood opportunities, despite it being fertile, 1219 relatively well endowed with natural resources and strategically located. The extreme - levels of malnutrition in Rakhine State, an d in particular in northern Rakhine, must be seen in light of the policies and practices of the authorities. They are a consequence of the authorities’ actions and omissions. The severe movement restrictions and other discriminatory policies, affecting Roh ingya’s access to land, forests, fishing grounds and markets, have a direct impact on their food security and health, threatening their right to life and ability to live in dignity and free from hunger. An already difficult situation has been further compo unded by the waves of violence and security operations in Rakhine State, and the Government’s strict restrictions on humanitarian assistance. The Government of Myanmar manifestly fails in its obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right of Rohingya individuals to an adequate standard of living, including their right to food. The same analysis applies in relation to access to healthcare. The Mission notes that 570. . all communities in Rakhine State suffer from low availability and quality of healthcare However, the severe movement restrictions, the arbitrary and cumbersome procedures to access hospitals and health facilities, the additional fees and bribes they must pay, the uate healthcare discrimination faced in health facilities, and the language barriers, put adeq entirely out of reach for the Rohingya. They experience delays, forgo healthcare, or rely on alternative healthcare strategies, putting them at greater risk. The Government of Myanmar 1212 078, DI CI - 065, CI - 069, CI - - 003, DI - 007, DI - 013, DI - 034, DI - 073, DI - 076, LI - 135. 1213 55 CI - 078, DI - 050, DI - 076; see also : A/HRC/28/72, para. . 1214 DI - 078 . 1215 DI - 050 . 1216 026, DI CI - 080, DI - - 073, LI - 135. 1217 Ministry of Information, “Distance University students studying peacefully in Rakhine State” (12 November 2017). 1218 Ibid. 1219 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous (August 2017), p. 20. future for the people of Rakhine 135

136 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 that is available, accessible, acceptable, fails in its obligation to ensure access to health care and of good quality. Such failure has undermined the dignity of the Rohingya, exposed them 1220 to unnecessary suffering, immediate and long - term health risks, and preventable deaths. to a violation of the right to life and to physical and mental In such instances it also amounts integrity. 571. Rohingya are also subjected to discrimination in education. Quality education is unattainable to them. The discrimination faced in primary and secondary schools, and the denial of access to higher education, amount to violations of the right to education. However, they are also powerful tools to ensure cross - generational marginalisation. The restrictions to access to education described above contribute to the slow erosion and w eakening of the Rohingya community as a whole. As one interviewee told the Mission: The Government didn’t allow Muslims equal access to education. We were excluded, and with no education, you are side - lined. You are separated from the other citizens 1221 ystematic way. in a s 572. What permeates all these restrictions is the blatant discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds, targeting the Rohingya in particular. It is the consequence of policies and form practices established, condoned and/or left unaddressed by the State. The restrictions part of a system of severe and institutionalised oppression, amounting to persecution, of the Rohingya, marginalising and excluding them. 4. Restrictions on humanitarian access 573. In various circumstances, the Government suspends or severely restricts humanitarian access to areas in Rakhine State that are in dire need of assistance, especially in Maungdaw, . This happened after the 2012 violence as well as after the Buthidaung and Rathedaung “clearance operations” in October 2016 and August 2017 . Such restrictions have a serious adverse impact on the population, who are left without critical and lifesaving assistance, 1222 including acces s to food and health services. 574. According to credible reports, restrictions on humanitarian access to northern Rakhine were tightened in June and July of 2017, even before the attacks on 25 August 2017 and the appointment of a new Security Minister, subsequent “clearance operations”. Following some organizations were denied travel authorizations. Furthermore, following the publication of a July 2017 World Food Programme (WFP) assessment on food insecurity in northern Rakhine State, the Government circ ulated a letter addressed to international non - 1223 governmental organizations banning such assessments. The alleged discovery by the authorities of WFP food assistance in a supposed ARSA training camp on 30 July was used as a further reason to justify restric tions. An official statement stated that the “terrorists” were 1224 using WFP support for IDPs. been It was later reported that these biscuits had actually not 1225 by WFP. distr ibuted directly 575. was suspended. After 25 August 2017, all humanitarian access to northern Rakhine - The Government also accused some staff members of international non governmental organizations of participating in the ARSA attacks, while repeating allegations related to the nitarian aid workers to WFP food rations, which reportedly caused a large number of huma 1226 Access then slowly resumed. The Government initially only granted access leave the area. 1220 063, CI CI - - 064, CI - 073, CI - 080, CI - 089, CI - 090, CI - 092, CI - 173, DI - 002, DI - 004, DI - 054, - DI 073; K - 076.12. 1221 DI - 025. 1222 K - 069.1, K 069.7. - 1223 K - 069.13. 1224 Information Committee, “Commodities found close to the suspicious huts built to shelter the extremist terrorists” (Facebook post, 31 July 2017), available at: https://www.fa cebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/773457006160741 . 1225 K - 069.13. 1226 Information Committee, “State Counsell or Office Information Committee’ s Statement regarding available at: Extremist Terrorists” (Facebook post, 27 August 2017), 136

137 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1227 to northern Rakhine to the Red Cross Movement in September 2017, and two months later reportedly selected a few other eyond these two organizations, the Government to WFP. B international organizations to whom it granted limited access, but none of them had 1228 experience working in northern Rakhine before August 2017. One humanitarian actor told the Mission: Some other organizations have permissi on to operate in northern Rakhine, but are not provided with travel authorisations. This appears to be a deliberate attempt by 1229 the authorities to appear to be giving access, but in reality denying it . 576. the majority of humanitarian organizations that were active in As of August 2018, northern Rakhine State before August 2017 have not been allowed to resume their field 1230 . Even when granted access, humanitarian organizations are activities in the area constrained in their work by restrictive procedures, i ncluding the short validity of their travel auth T here has been no comprehensive assessment of humanitarian needs in orisations. northern Rakhine State. Yet, it is beyond question that the current partial access is wholly inadequate to meet all the needs. 577. In central Rakhine, humanitarian agencies need prior authoris ation to visit the camps and other displacement sites. They face questions about the purpose of their visit a nd are camps are required to submit detailed movement plans. Vehicles entering Sittwe rural stopped at the entry of the camps and asked to provide the necessary authorisations. Access for humanitarian agencies may be restricted without notice. 1231 578. Emergency Coordination Committee reportedly gave the In February 2018, the 1232 stringent instructions to international actors: following • Programmatic needs assessments : A requirement to obtain permission from the Ethics Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which can take up to six months – to carry out assessments, particularly th ose used in new areas or for publication. In the case of surveys or reviews, the applicable questionnaires must be shared with the relevant line Ministry in advance. • Memorandums of understanding (MoU) : A requirement to include all activities to be el. taken by the organization in the MoU, including details at the village lev under Organizations may be required to prove that they deliver equal assistance to ethnic Rakhine and Muslims, regardless of the actual needs of each community. If this is not met, the organization risks expulsion. Travel authorisations : A requirement to submit requests two weeks in advance for any • given two week period. - 579. These instructions are of serious concern. Those related to needs assessment and travel authorisations sever ely curtail the ability of international organizations to undertake their work effectively and may lead to self - censorship on assessments to be shared publicly. Any requirement that humanitarian assistance be delivered on the basis of ethnicity or other ctors apart from humanitarian need could contravene the humanitarian principle of fa impartiality. https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/state - counsellor - office - information - - commit tees - statement - regarding extremist - ter/786270838212691/ . 1227 The ICRC, IFRC and Myanmar Red Cross work together on their response in northern Rakhine and collectively refer to themselves as the “Red Cross Movement”. 1228 QM - 005 . 1229 Ibid. 1230 K - 069.7. 1231 ergency Coordination Committee is a body comprised of government representatives, ethnic The Em Rakhine elders, civil society and humanitarian organizations. It vets and monitors the activities of international organizations. K - 069.11; V - 169, V - 345. 1232 - 113.4. K 137

138 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Restrictions affecting private life 5. , and the the severe movement restrictions, Beyond the arbitrary denial of legal status 580. hood, health and education, denial of access to liveli Rohingya face other discriminatory policies and practices, tightly controlling almost every aspect of their private lives. They include restrictions related to marriage, the number and “spacing” of children, and the repair of houses . building and Most of these policies are based on administrative instructions issued by bodies such 581. (NaSaKa) or the Immigration and as the Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters district officials, primarily National Registration Department (INRD), and by township and in northern Rakhine State. These are commonly known as “local orders”. In 2008, the NaSaKa issued an instruction called “Regional order and processes for controlling Bengali populat circulated regional orders first iss ued in 1993 and 2008 and added specific ion”. It instructions to control the Rohingya, including in the following areas: population control • • “spot checking” related to household registration moving in and out of a household list • taking family pictures for the household list • marriage permissions • • birth and death. Many restrictions appear to stem from these documents or similar instructions issued 582. the NaSaKa in July 2013, later. According to credible reports, after the disbandment of Rohingya in north ern Rakhine State described a temporary easing in their implementation. However, by early 2014, the Border Guard Police (BGP), the Committee for Prevention of Illegal Immigration of Foreigners (MaKhaPa) and township authorities had resumed many 1233 of the prac On 13 August 2018, the Union Government issued an announcement tices. , including six issued by the abolishing eight local orders mainly targeting the Rohingya 1234 s NaSaKa . this positive step by the Union Government, although The Mission welcome the extent to which this announcement will be implemented on the ground remains to be seen. The information below reflects the situation prior to August 2018. Restrictions related to household lists (a) 583. - to - dat e “household list” of its Every household in Myanmar is required to have an up 1235 expiration of TRCs on 31 March 2015, household lists permanent residents. Since the The document is necessary for have been the only form of identification for many Rohingya. - applications and marriage or travel permissions. administrative procedures, including NVC 584. Household lists are issued and updated by the Ministry of Immigration and Population 1236 and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Births, deaths and marriages must be reported. Unlike in the rest of the country, the aut horities in northern Rakhine State conduct yearly inspections 1233 K - 063.13. 1234 Announcement 88/2018 by the Union Government of Myanmar (13 August 2018). The announcement abolished six orders issued by the NaSaKa: (a) the order to systematize the marriage permission, (b) the permission for marriage, (c) the issue on the divorce permission of Bengali people, (d) the issue of recording those who are of another race and are not ethnic people, by their father’s name in the household list, (e) the issue of trying to create a separate household for Bengali people, (f) the issu e of prohibiting those with Kalar names to also have a Myanmar name. The announcement also abolished two orders issued by the Directorate of People’s militia and Border Area Units, Ministry of Defence: (a) the issue of enlisting the illegally - born Bengali babies in the household list, (b) the permission on marriage of Bengali people. 1235 See this chapter, section B.1.c : Denial of citizenship. 1236 Household lists are issued by the Immigration and National Identification Headquarters, which is jointly maintain ed by the General Administration Department, a branch under the military - controlled Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Labou r, Immigration and Population. 138

139 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 of Rohingya households to “update” their household list. The stated is to delete the purpose names of those who left or are deceased, and to add new - borns. Although updating the list is a civilian administrative procedure, in northern Rakhine it is jointly conducted with and ndertaken by the BGP and overseen by security forces. Since 2015 this has been u 1237 MaKhaPa. The annual inspections are carried out in a discriminatory manner, targeting the Rohingya in northern Rakhine and providing the authorities unfettered power to add or Inspections are often remove individuals from the list, with no recourse to appeal. accompanied by intimidation, coercion, arbitrary arrests and random deletions from the 1238 list. The process taking photographs of the per manent residents of a household. 585. includes amily membe rs often have to carry a card re presenting their “ seri al number” on the F NaSaKa in the household list. According to the rules annexed to the regional order issued by 2008, if there is any suspicion of a child being “substituted” to mislead the inspectors, the mother will “be made to breas tfeed the child”, or the children “will be questioned 1239 separately”. This violates the right to privacy of the mother and may constitute cruel or is certainly not in the best interest of the child. degrading treatment. It 1240 The authorities often conduct checks during the night, waking up the household. 586. One interviewee explained how armed NaSaKa officers would visit her house in the early hours, forcing everyone to wake up, including young children: “If there was anyone in the 1241 house that was not on the l During the inspections, ist, they would be taken away”. 1242 The Rohingya have to pay arbitrary amounts to get names removed or added to the list. experience of one interviewee from Maungdaw demonstrates the arbitrariness and extortion: cers came to update our household list, my wife had to pay When immigration offi 10,000 Kyat because I had left. Previously, I paid 10,000 Kyat for the inclusion of each of my first four children. For my youngest, I had to pay 30,000 Kyat. Following ilitary or the my departure, whenever the m NaSaKa came to my house, they asked for 1243 money. So my family joined me in Malaysia. 587. According to credible reports, Rohingya who are not at home during the updating exercise may be removed from the list. Additionally, punitive removal of persons allegedly associated with the 2012 is violence have reportedly taken place. Once deleted, a person extremely vulnerable. Effectively denied proof of residence, they face heightened risks of 1244 arrest and conviction for immigration offences. 588. A household list updating exercise took place between December 2016 and January 2017, during the “area clea rance operations” that followed the 9 October 2016 ARSA attacks. This was earlier in the year than usual. In southern Maungdaw, the displaced were reportedly deleted from the list. Some of those who were absent were reportedly recorded on a separate 1245 s “on travel” or “missing”. Additionally, 1,900 buildings were identified as illegal list a and marked for demolition. (b) Restrictions related to marriage and children 589. Rohingya in northern Rakhine have faced targeted and discriminatory restrictions relat ed to marriage and birth for many years. These have been implemented by the General 1237 - 063.12. K 1238 094, CI - 061, CI - 062, CI - 065, CI - 073, CI - 080, CI - 082, CI - 090, CI - 092, CI - DI - 001, DI - 009, DI - 013, DI 025, DI - 026, DI - 053. - 1239 Regional Order on Processes for Controlling Bengali Population NaSaKa, (11 February 2008), Addendum on “Drawing maps, making a record of buildings, and rev iewing household registrations”; K - 076 . 1240 - CI 090, DI - 013, DI - 026. 1241 DI - 026 . 1242 082, CI CI - 061, CI - 062, CI - 065, CI - 072, CI - 073, CI - 079, CI - 080, CI - - 090, CI - 092, CI - 094, DI - 001, DI 025. - 1243 073. CI - 1244 V - 047. 1245 063.12 - K 139

140 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Administration Department as well as by law enforcement officials. To officially register a trary and marriage, Rohingya have to undergo a complex and lengthy procedure which is arbi They must also comply with discriminatory requirements related to the subject to extortion. number and spacing of children . Contravention is subject to criminal penalties. These procedures have not applied elsewhere in Rakhine State. However, in 2015, the local Buddhists” provisions were supplemented by national legislation directed towards “non - generally in Myanmar. Restrictions on marriages 590. A regional order from the Township Peace and Development Council in 2005 aimed ages in Maungdaw Township. It referred to a “dense” population, an at controlling marri 1246 While most “extremely high” birth rate, and the risk that there is “likely to be starvation”. of the order is drafted in general terms, section 1(c) is applicable only to people who marry “as per the Islamic religion”. It requires permission to marry from the Council, following a check by the village level council and the NaSaKa Sector Command. Those who receive only apply permission to marry must limit the number of children. Widows and widowers can for permission to remarry after three years. The order states that “effective actions” will be taken against those who marry or divorce in violation of the order. In 2008, the NaSaKa outlined the application requirements in more detail, includin g a requirement for men to submit a photograph without a beard (except for religious persons, known as “Mawlawis”) 1247 and specific punishments under the Penal Code for contravening the order. 591. A further NaSaKa local order from August 2009 contains simila r provisions, prescribing that violation of the rules can lead to lengthy prison sentences. The order sets out similarly circuitous procedures for obtaining permission to marry, including an interview and at least three witnesses. The application forms had the word “Islam” pre - printed on it, clearly demonstrating discriminatory intent. According to credible reports, harassment and humiliation were frequent during this 592. procedure. Couples could be asked intrusive personal questions about their relationsh ip. Some couples were reportedly forced to hold hands or make other physical displays of affection. Male applicants were sometimes requested to shave their beards and female applicants to remove their hijab or headscarf. Women were reportedly sometimes req uired to prove they were not already pregnant by a pregnancy test at a government clinic, taking 1248 showing their stomach to male officers, or having them touch their stomach. These practices constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Moreover, being particularly aimed at females, they also discriminate based on sex. They violate Myanmar’s obligations under article 16(1)(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women “to take all appropriate measures to eliminate d iscrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage”. The marriage authorisation procedure applicable to the Rohingya is reported to have 593. caused delays of up to two years in obtaining permission and payment of exorbitant fees. did not obtain official marriage permission also risked criminal punishment, Couples who 1249 including fines. In addition, their children risked exclusion from the household list. Because of the delays and the costs, couples often only married religiously, without 594. f irst applying for a certificate, risking the consequences. One interviewee from Buthidaung explained how his sister married and had a child before receiving official permission. She 1246 Peace and Development Council of Maungdaw Township, Regional Order 1/2005 200 5), on (1 May - file with the Mission; K 076. 1247 Regional Order on Processes for Controlling Bengali Population (11 February 2008), NaSaKa, Addendum on “Population control activities” and “Requirements for Bengalis who apply for permission to marry”, o n file with the Mission; K - 076. 1248 . K - 076.15 1249 070, CI CI - 061, CI - 062, CI - 064, CI - 065, CI - - 072, CI - 073, CI - 079, CI - 082, CI - 090, CI - 092, . 15. CI - 094, CI - 173, DI - 001, DI - 004, DI - 009; K - 063.15, K - 076 140

141 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1250 had to hide when the police were searching for her. Another interviewee spoke of the bribes associated with the process, and potential consequences of not obtaining permission: Although my elder brother paid 100,000 Kyat to the NaSaKa for a marriage get married religiously. One permission letter, it wasn’t issued, and he proceeded to day, the NaSaKa went to his house and found his wife pregnant. They asked for the official marriage document, but they didn’t have one. The NaSaKa arrested my 1251 brother and he was detained in Buthidaung jail for five years. . Although not uniformly enforced , credible reports 595 the practice of indicate that restricting the marriages of Rohingya in northern Rakhine continued after th e disbandment NaSaKa in 2013. It was enforced by the BGP, MaKaPha and the General of the 1252 . Administr On 28 April 2016, the BGP in Maungdaw issued a new ation Department instruction on marriage permission. Although it is not known whether this new instruction was applied throughout northern Rakhine State, it is alleged that similar instructions were issu ed in various BGP sectors across Maungdaw and Buthidaung. The instruction on “ marriage related matters of Bengali races” imposes additional requirements for marriage permission. The introduction states: nal standard. For that reason, The population density (...) is greater than internatio in our sector jurisdiction, the movement of the Bengali races and population 1253 increasing rate has been controlled through the household list updating exercise . Restrictions on number and spacing of children 596. Regional Order 1/2005 o f the Maungdaw Township Peace and Development Council states that those who have permission to marry must “limit” the number of children they have, without giving further details. However, as part of the marriage permission procedure, a couples were made to promise not to have more than two children and to use Rohingy 1254 contraception. 597. In May 2013, the authorities in Rakhine State announced the reinforcement of the rule 1255 limiting to two the permissible number of children in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. T he State Government reportedly recognized that the two child - spokesperson of the Rakhine policy was only applicable to the Rohingya: Regarding family planning, they [the Rohingya] can only get two children. (...) The roups (...). For Buddhist people, we don’t need that rule, rule is only for certain g because Buddhist people only have one wife. It is being implemented to control the 1256 population growth, because it is becoming too crowded there. According to credible reports, the Union Immigra 598. tion Minister also confirmed the existence of this policy in 2013 but stated that it did not come from either the Union or State government. He highlighted that it would “benefit Bengali women”. At the time, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had reportedly called the p olicy “discriminatory,” stating that it was “not in line 1257 with human rights”. Adverse consequences 599. According to credible reports, the highly cumbersome and arbitrary marriage permission process, and risks associated with it, has led many Rohingya to leave Myanmar. omen reportedly resorted to unsafe abortions for fear of contravening local orders and W Women were often afraid to seek healthcare because they associated criminal penalties. feared repercussions for having had an illegal abortion, or for l iving with someone without 1250 009. DI - 1251 - 064. CI 1252 063.15 K - . 1253 K - 076. 1254 K - 063.15, K - 076.15. 1255 K - 063.16. 1256 The Irrawaddy, “Govt sets two - child limit for Rohingyas in northern Arakan” (20 May 2013). 1257 - child policy for Rohingya minority” (11 June 2013). Reuters, “Myanmar minister backs two 141

142 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - term This has led to preventable deaths of mothers and infants and long marriage permission. 1258 health impacts for women who survive. “Race and religion” laws 600. In June 2013, the monk Ashin Wirathu called for a law on inter - religious marriage. This was subsequently expanded to a package of four bills to “safeguard nationality and submitted a petition to President Thein Sein supporting this religion”. The MaBaTha proposal, with more than 1.3 million signatures. Despite concern s raised about compliance 1259 , these four bills became with human rights standards, including by United Nations experts law between May and August 2015. The laws make reference to “non - Buddhists”, not explicitly naming Rohingya or Muslims. However, given rhet oric in the lead - up to their adoption, the laws clearly had a discriminatory intent against the Rohingya. They were built on a number of prevailing stereotypes, including that Rohingya are polygamous and have a protection from conversion to Islam and high birth rate, and that Buddhist women need marriage to Muslims. Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law : imposes disproportionate penalties and • - Buddhist men; restricts the rights of non - gender discriminatory barriers on non es, including denying them custody of children in Buddhist husbands of Buddhist wiv the case of dissolution of marriage or divorce; discriminates against women by placing a number of restrictions only on Buddhist women who wish to marry outside their faith; and provides protection against some forms of domestic violence only for Buddhist women marrying outside of their religion. • The Population Control Healthcare Law : adopts a coercive and selective approach to realising the stated goals of poverty alleviation and improvement of living andards; lacks essential safeguards to ensure freedom from discrimination; and st 1260 allows township groups to “organize” couples to practice 36 - month birth spacing, raising concerns of coercion. egulated system for • Religious Conversion Law : establishes a cumbersome and state - r changing religion, requiring state approval following registration and interview; prevents children from changing their religion. • : bans polygamy in accordance with international human rights Monogamy Law ns adopt a restrictive and discriminatory approach to requirements but some provisio - Buddhist persons”; does not prohibit marriage regulation; makes references to “non other discriminatory forms of marriage, including early and forced marriages, practised by other population groups. . The laws remain in force, but little information is available on their implementation. 601 Some reports indicate that, while the first case brought under the Monogamy law was against 1261 many of the following cases were predominantly against Buddhists a Muslim, reported 1262 for extramarital affairs. (c ) Restrictions related to repairs of houses 602. The applicable legal framework in relation to construction and repairs of buildings is unclear. The Rohingya face many difficulties accessing administrative procedures in this regard, including applications for permits. The informal authorisation of construction and repair of buildings is facilitated by unofficial payments and bribes. These sums are paid to Guard Police (and formerly the the General Administration Department and the Border 1258 K - 076.15. 1259 MMR 4/2014 , available at : https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22569 and 11 May 201 MMR 5/2015 available at 5; https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResul tsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=20241. 1260 Vague term used in the law . 1261 A/70/412, para. 76. 1262 - 244. V 142

143 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1263 NaSaKa) to permit Rohingya to construct or repair their houses, especially in rural areas. The authorisation offers no security and is subject to demands for bribes. Those who do not comply, or who construct without authoris ation, risk arrest. One interviewee stated: I had all the necessary permission to build a new house. On the very first day of the construction, about five police officers came to the site with the village administrator. They asked to show the documents re lated to the construction and we did. The police said there was no signature on the documents, although I knew the documents were 100 per cent correct. I could not protest, otherwise they would have arrested me. I offered them chickens worth 10,000 Kyat an d 2kg of rice. They demanded 100,000 1264 Kyat instead. It took me two months to gather this amount. In addition, Rohingya face restrictions on construction and repairs related to the 603. permission to marry implementation of local orders. For example, a couple without official 1265 cannot initiate a new household list, which is necessary to obtain permission to construct. 604. In September 2016, the State Security Minister of Rakhine announced that buildings constructed without the required permissions would be d emolished. Implementation began in November 2016, during the “clearance operation” undertaken by the Tatmadaw. As of January 2017, credible reports indicate that a total of 1,082 buildings had been demolished out of 1,984 which had been identified for demo lition. This also included mosques and 1266 . madrassahs As a consequence, a total of 4,480 people were reportedly forcibly evicted. It is unclear how the procedure for the designation of buildings constructed without permission was conducted and if the process also assessed homes and structures belonging to and occupied by other ethnic groups. (d ) Conclusion The control of the Rohingya does not stop at denial of legal status and severe 605. restrictions on movement and access to food, health and education. It also affects their private life, including through marriage restrictions, birth spacing policies, and undue control on the building and repair of homes and religious edifices. Cumbersome and opaque procedures are put in place for every aspect of life, gene rally applied arbitrarily and requiring the payment of fees and bribes. 606. These policies and practices have emerged in a context of rhetoric labelling Rohingya as “illegal immigrants”, having “incontrollable birth - rates”. The presence of Rohingya is see n as a threat, not only to the local Buddhist communities, but also to the nation and its Buddhist 1267 character as a whole. The discriminatory and persecutory intent of such policies is apparent. They also violate a range of human rights, including the right to privacy and family . life and freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 6 Oppression through arbitrary arrest and detention . 607. The Mission further found a pattern of widespread and systematic arbitrary detention State, but particularly in the northern townships. These arrests of Rohingya across Rakhine are discriminatory, with the Rohingya systematically targeted. The arrests are perpetrated by the NaSaKa, as well different law enforcement agencies, including the BGP and previously as other security forces, including the Tatmadaw. Arrests generally occur during night raids on villages, in houses or shops, at checkpoints or during house searches or household list 1268 s. verification 608. The levels of arbitrary arrest and detention throughout the period under review have been extremely high, with significant spikes during periods of heightened tension, such as 1263 073, CI 090, DI CI - - - 010, DI - 038, DI - 054. 1264 CI - 090. 1265 According to Addendum 2 of the 2008 NaSaKa regional order applicable only to the Rohingya, “action must be taken against people who fix, expand or build a house without a permit”. 1266 K - 063.17. 1267 See Chapter III, section B.2 : Place of Buddhism in society. 1268 076.46. - K 143

144 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - the 2012 violence and the post October 2016 security operations. Arrests were random, not based on evidence or a warrant, often with male v illagers arrested during a “sweep” of the village. For example, following the June 2012 violence, credible reports suggest that more 1269 than 1,000 persons were arrested and detained in northern Rakhine State . Such mass hment of the Rohingya population. arrests may constitute collective punis 609. These patterns are fully in line with reports of the Special Rapporteurs on the situation 1270 of human rights in Myanmar, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and others, who have invariably expressed concern about the issue. Other reports also suggest that arbitrary arrest and detention has been a routine aspect of the life of the Rohingya throughout the period under review and prior. One detailed study published in 2010 stated, “The arbitrary detentio n of the Rohingyas is so prevalent as to be considered to have reached 1271 industrial levels”. Another study of a third of village tracts in Maungdaw over a three 1272 A second study in month period in 2014 found an average of nearly 90 arrests per month. 1273 in northern Rakhine State found an average of approximately 330 arrests per month . 2015 610. A primary motivating factor of perpetrators is extortion. Nearly all such incidents corroborated by the Mission involved either the payment of bribes to secure releas e, or 1274 - payment of bribes The practice was commonplace, . continued detention due to the non implemented by the NaSaKa, the BGP, t he Myanmar Police Force, the LaW aKa, SaYaPa (Military Intelligence) and the Tatmadaw. The amount of the bribes varied and someti mes forced villagers to borrow large sums from neighbours. The economic impact has been significant. One interviewee from Maungdaw Township stated: When my father was arrested, my mother used to pay the military to get him released. He would stay in detent ion for various lengths of time, depending on how fast my mother would pay. The amount would vary greatly, and my mother would borrow money from others to pay the bribe. Then, my father had to work to pay back this money. They would arrest him without givi ng any reason. When we asked why he was 1275 arrested, the response was alar”. that we were Muslims, we were “K In some instances the arrests were in relation to vague “offences”, including travel to 611. M card, or the collection of Bangladesh, possessing a mobile phone or Bangladeshi SI 1276 . One interviewee informed the Mission that his brother was detained for being firewood in possession of a mobile phone. His family could not pay the bribe asked by the police and 1277 It has also been suggested that persons who he remained in detention for seven months. were more affluent were targeted, as they could pay higher bribes. 612. - Arbitrary arrest and detention were frequently associated with torture and ill 1278 treatment. One interviewee described how he was arbitrarily det ained in 2011, seemingly in relation to his involvement in an appeal against the confiscation of the village graveyard 1279 by the NaSaKa. He was repeatedly beaten with a large wooden stick. Deaths in custody 1280 following arbitrary detention were also reported. 7 . Other forms of oppression 613. Rohingya face several other forms of oppression at the hands of the Myanmar authorities, in particular the security forces. These include forced labour, confiscation of 1269 - 076.46. K 1270 . For example, A/HR/32/18 1271 Irish Centre for Human Rights, Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of the Rohingyas (2010). 1272 V - 246. 1273 K - 076. 1274 - CI - 064, CI - 065, CI - 082, CI - 089, DI - 009, DI - 013, DI - 020, DI - 025, DI 054, DI - 056. 1275 DI - 009. 1276 CI - 064, DI - - 054 . 025, DI 1277 DI - 054. 1278 CI - 064, CI - 065, CI - 082, CI - 089, DI - 025, DI - 056 . 1279 CI - 065. 1280 - 245. K - 076 .46; V 144

145 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - based vio property, extortion and sexual and gender lence. These are not necessarily unique to the Rohingya. As described above, they are also faced to a large extent by the ethnic Rakhine and probably other groups as well. However, in the case of the Rohingya, these are added on to all other forms of oppre ssion and persecution described above. Forced or compulsory labour (a) 614. As with the ethnic Rakhine population, forced or compulsory labour has been a common experience for many Rohingya in Rakhine State. The Mission corroborated cases 1281 from Maungdaw a nd Buthidaung Townships in no rthern Rakhine State, although it is likely that Rohingya in central and southern regions have had similar experiences. Forced thirds of Rohingya - labour has been prevalent for many years, with reports that more than two 1282 de forced labour prior to 2011. famili es in the two townships had to provi The Mission found incidents of forced labour in 2012 and 2013, although credible information indicates that the practice continued in northern Rakhine until 2016, and possibly beyond, alb eit at a 1283 Perpetrators of forced labour have primarily been the Tatmadaw and the reduced rate. NaSaKa (until its disbandment in 2013). 615. The established patterns are very similar to those outlined in relation to the ethnic the types of forced labour (for example, portering, Rakhine, including in terms of construction work, farming, maintenance of security camps), the frequency of the work, the general ill - treatment suffered in the context of such labour (including beatings and verbal abuse), and the econ omic impact on the individual and their families. In some cases there appears to have been an option to avoid forced labour, through the payment of bribes, or 1284 through paying other villagers to perform the task on their behalf. Confiscation and extor (b) tion Like the ethnic Rakhine, the Rohingya suffer from arbitrary confiscation of livestock 616. 1285 and goods by security forces One interviewee explained: , usually with total impunity. nd the the Looting of vegetables and domestic animals, by the military, NaSaKa a police was common. They used to take anything they wanted from the land, without paying. They took also commodities from the villagers whenever they thought they 1286 . might need them us and other forms of 617. Already extremely vulnerable because of their lack of legal stat the Rohingya additionally suffer from extortion at the hands of security systemic oppression, 1287 forces and other authorities. It affects many aspects of their lives. having to This includes ce to another, stay ove rnight in another pay to obtain permission to mov e from one pla 1288 They household, and pass checkpoints . have to make payments or pay bribes to obtain also marriage permissions, luded on the household list, have a family member have a child inc 1289 in the ne cessary authoris ations to build or repair their homes, deleted from the list, obta 1290 avoid or b e released from arbitrary as well as bring back wood or bamboo from the forest, 1281 CI - 062, CI - - 079, CI - 072, CI - 092, CI - 093, CI - 094, CI - 173, DI - 001, DI - 002, DI - 005. 089, CI 1282 K - . 063 1283 K - 063 . 1284 - 080, CI - 089, DI CI 047 . - 1285 CI - - 064, CI - 062, CI - 073, DI - 013, DI - 025, DI - 038. 065, CI 1286 CI - 073 . 1287 - 079, CI 080, CI - 061, CI - 062, CI - 063, CI - 064, CI - 065, CI - 069, CI - 070, CI - 072, CI - 073, CI - 076, CI - 098, CI CI 085, CI - 089, CI - 090, CI - 092, CI - 094, CI - - - 100, CI - 133, CI - 134, CI - 136, CI - 144, 082, CI - - 146, CI - 149, CI - 162, CI - 173, CI - 174, CI - 175, CI - 176, CI - 179, CI - 181, CI - 183, CI - 186, CI CI 189, - CI 190, CI - 192, CI - 194, DI - 001, DI - 003, DI - 004, DI - 008, DI - 010, DI - 013, DI - 020, DI - 025, DI - 026, - DI - 037, DI - 038, DI - 046, DI - 047, DI - 050, DI - 054, DI - 076, LI - 105, ZI - 002. 1288 CI - 061, CI - 063, CI - 064, CI - 065, CI - 069, CI - 070, CI - 072, CI - 073, CI - 079, CI - 080, CI - 082, CI - 090, 020, DI CI - 001, DI - 003, DI - 174, DI - 025, LI - 105. - 1289 - CI - 061, CI - 062, CI - 064, CI - 065, CI 070, CI - 072, CI - 073, CI - 076, CI - 079, CI - 082, CI - 089, CI - 092, - CI 173, DI - 001, DI - 004, DI - 025. 1290 - 10. C I - 061, CI - 073, CI - 079, CI - 082, CI - 090, DI - 038, DI 145

146 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1291 . An interviewee from Maungdaw, explained how Tatmadaw soldiers would detention come to the market or village and simply arrest whomever they found, take them to the police 1292 station, and then ask money from the family for their release. An interviewee from Buthidaung also shared the following account: If we wanted to change anything in the house, we had to pay. Our family had to change two bamboo poles in the railing of our house. When the NaSaKa officers heard the 1293 sound of repair, they came and asked for money. Sometimes payments were made, but the issue remained unresolved. One interviewee 618 . explained that his brother paid 100,000 Kyat to to obtain his marriage NaSaKa the years for not having a authoris ation but it was not issued. He was later detained for five 1294 permit. Another interviewee explained how he was detained at a police station and the police officer said he would be released if he paid a large bribe. However, although he paid, 1295 he was not released. The amounts extracted from the Rohingya are exo 619. rbitant compared to their revenue. It adversely affects their right to an adequate standard of living, including to food and livelihood, and to health and dignity. It often leads to unbreakable cycles of debt, household mechanisms: impoverishment and desperate coping The police said that if we couldn’t give them 350,000 Kyat, I would be put in prison. 1296 . My mother had to arrange the money. She sold our land to ensure my release (c) Sexual and gender - based violence 620. There are credible and consistent rep orts of sexual and gender - based violence against 1297 Rohingya women and girls by members of the Tatma The daw, the police and the NaSaKa. experience shared by one interviewee illustrates the prevalence of such acts, even outside the periods of extreme violence in 2012, 2016 and 2017: I was taken to a large government building next to the high school in Maungdaw. There were many police officers. I was taken to a room where there were already about 10 other Rohingya women. Men in uniform took away women in grou ps of four and then I heard screaming. I think they were being raped. I heard girls saying, “Oh Allah, save me” and “please don’t rape me”. Other women were giving massages to men from various security forces, not just the police. It was humiliating. If a girl was not massaging, she was hit by the police. It was very weird because the place was like an office but all of this was happening there. I saw girls with bite marks on their cheeks, and one fully naked girl running away. I managed to escape through a very 1298 small hole . 621. This is consistent with other credible reports published throughout the years. For - General on conflict example, a report of the United Nations Secretary related sexual violence - 1299 noted in 2012 that rape was condoned by military comma Examples of reported nders. sexual violence include the rape of 13 Rohingya girls and women by NaSaKa forces in northern Maungdaw Township on 20 February 2013; the gang rape of a 16 year old Rohingya - girl by police in early 2014; 14 cases of gang rape and sexual assault between January and 1300 1301 June 2014; - year old girl by the military in early 2015. and the rape of a 10 1291 - 133, CI - CI - 062, CI - 065, CI - 069, CI 134, 072, CI - 073, CI - 082, CI - 090, CI - 092, CI - 094, CI - 100, CI - - CI - 144, CI - 146, CI - 149, CI - 179, CI - 181, CI - 183, CI - 186, CI - 189, CI - 190, DI - 010, DI - 020, 136, CI - DI DI 026, DI - 037, DI - 038, DI - 046, DI - 050, ZI - 002. 025, - 1292 DI - 025 . 1293 DI - 010. 1294 CI - 064. 1295 DI - 037. 1296 DI - 025. 1297 048, DI CI - 074, CI - 077, CI - 174, DI - 038, DI - - 050. 1298 DI - 048 . 1299 A/66/657* – S/2012/33* . 1300 S/2015/203, p. 12 1301 125 - K 146

147 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 8. Conclusion The level of oppression faced by the Rohingya is hard to fathom. Cumulatively all the 622. practices laid out in this section have made life for the Rohingya rules, regulations, orders and in Rakhine State slowly but steadily unbearable. Rights were eroded and removed, in a process of marginalisation, exclusion and “othering”. Layers of discrimination and ill - treatment have b een added. This occurred in the context of hateful and divisive rhetoric targeting the Rohingya on the basis of their ethnicity, religion and status. The multiple - sanctioned policies and practices and occur in the elements of oppression are based on State context of State - sanctioned discriminatory rhetoric. The Mission concludes that this severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression, from birth to death, amounts to persecution. 623. This persecution has put the Rohingya population in a situation of extreme vulnerability, undermining all aspects of their lives and eroding their living conditions and their coping mechanisms. The daily attacks on human dignity have created intolerable pushing them further conditions, and have weakened individuals, families and communities, into destitution and insecurity. It is this oppressive climate, and the fear and desperation resulting from it, that forced thousands of Rohingya to leave Rakhine State by boat in the that the episodes of violence in 2012, 2016 years since 2012. It is also against this backdrop and 2017 must be examined . C. Violence in 2012 1. Emblematic incidents 624. Two events that took place on 28 May 2012, in Ramree Township, and on 3 June nce that erupted in Rakhine State 2012, in Toungup Township, played a key role in the viole on 8 June 2012. While the Mission did not investigate these two events, the following is a summary based on publicly available information, including accounts in the State - run port of the Myanmar Government’s newspaper The New Light of Myanmar, and the re “ arian Violence in Rakhine State” (the Rakhine Inquiry Inquiry Commission on Sect Commission) . 625. On 28 May 2012, Ma Thida Htwe, a 27 - year - old Buddhist woman, was killed in the Kyauk Ni Maw village tract of Ramree Townshi p in the south of Rakhine State. On 5 June 2012, The New Light of Myanmar reported the case as murder and rape. It published the 1302 names of the three suspects, along with a mention of their origin as being “Bengali/Islam”. The three accused were subsequentl y prosecuted and sentenced to death. One of them 1303 hung himself while in custody on 9 June 2012. reportedly There appears to be no doubt about the murder of the woman but the Mission understands there are doubts about the rape 1304 allegation and the ethnic orig in of the accused. In the following days and weeks, it was which was used to incite violence and mainly the rape allegation, more than the murder, hatred against the Rohingya. The Mission notes that other episodes of anti - Muslim violence 1305 ed rape allegations, some of which were later found to be untrue. in Myanmar follow 626. Prior to the coverage of this incident in The New Light of Myanmar, graphic images of the woman’s dead body were disseminated, accompanied by incendiary com ments 1306 blaming the incident on “K alars”. The Rakhine Inquiry Commission noted the rapid 1302 New Light of Myanmar, “Three murderers who raped, stabbed a woman to death to be brought to trial soonest” (5 June 2012) . 1303 MNA (Myanmar News Agency), “ Two who rob, rape and murder a woman from Kyaukn imaw Village sentenced to death” (The New Light of Myan mar, 19 June 2012) , available at: - http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012 - 06 - 19.pdf , p.2 ; DI 012. 1304 DI - 012, DI - 077, DM - 066. 1305 See this chapter, section C.6.b : - planning, instigation and role of security forces. Pre 1306 See, for example, the following two blog posts: http://hlaoo1980.blogspot.com/2012/06/arrakan - bo iling - with - anti - islamic - fever.html (accessed August 2018) and http://terrorist2012.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog - post.html (accessed August 2018). ed. Many such articles have since been delet 147

148 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 circulation of these images “together with incendiary remarks” through “anonymous channels on the internet” . It highlighted that the “pictures and news spread even to Rakhine 1307 ithout internet access”. villages and towns w 627. The New Light of Myanmar, on 3 June 2012 the Wunthanu Rakkhita According to Association distributed leaflets to the local population at crowded places in Toungup, southern Rakhine State, with the woman’s picture. They asked the population of Toungup to “take notice” that Muslims were “intentionally assaulting” Rakhine women. On the same day, a crowd of 300 people in Toungup killed a group of 10 Muslim pilgrims travelling by 1308 bus to Yangon the article, the attack appears to have Given the circumstances described in . been pre - planned. 628. From 8 June 2012 onwards, violence spread across Rakhine State and lasted at least . A second wave of violence hit Rakhine State in October 2012. It affected until August 2012 Further violence ethnic Rakhine and Kaman communities across 12 townships. the Rohingya, Between 2012 and 2013, security forces - sometimes acting took place in Thandwe in 2013. alongside the Rakhine - committed serious human rights violations against Rohingya and 1309 . This included the burning of houses, looting of shops, Kaman across Rakhine State 1310 and indiscriminate killings, women, children and elderly people. including extrajudicial of 1311 Bodies were often taken by the authorities, with the subsequent whereabouts unknown. The authorities also conducted mass arbitrary arrests of Rohingya and subjected them to 1312 torture in police stations and in Buthidaung prison. The security forces also willingly y the Rohingya. failed to intervene to stop the violence committed by the eth nic Rakhine or b 1313 There was also a further tightening of general restrictions against the Muslim population. Inquiry Commission, 192 people were killed, more than 265 were According to the Rakhine injured and 8,614 houses were destroyed. These figures are b elieved to be well below the actual scale of the violence. 629. While many other townships were also affected by the violence, the Mission examined in detail events in three main locations as emblematic of the broader picture: Maungdaw in June 2012, Sittw e in June 2012 and Kyaukpyu in October 2012. (a) Maungdaw violence – June 2012 - Maungdaw town 8 June 2012 On Friday 8 June 2012, during the weekly Jumma prayer, the Muslim community in 630. 1314 days earlier. The Maungdaw town honoured the 10 Muslim men killed in Toungup five 1315 in the town centre. A prayer gathering was planned to take place at the Munshi mosque large number of men arrived at the mosque. Muslim leaders tried to stop further people from 1316 The prayer ended abruptly, including because gathering as the mosque was very crowded. towards the mosque from the nearby Myoma monastery. People left the stones were thrown 1307 Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, (July 2013), p. 8 . Final report 1308 New Light of Myanmar, “10 Muslims killed in bus attack” (5 June 2012). 1309 CI - 052, CI - 066, CI - - 069, CI 068, CI 076, CI - 077, CI - 078, CI - 082, CI - 083, CI - 084, CI - 085, CI - 087 , - CI 088, CI - 091, CI - 094, CI - 097, CI - 098, C I - 163, CI - 165, CI - 167, CI - 168, CI - 170, CI - 171, CI - 172 , - - 054, - CI - 173, CI - 174, DI - 004, DI - 007, DI - 012, DI 051, DI 020, DI - 021, DI - 023, DI - 024, DI - 038, DI - DI - 075, QI - 076. 055, DI - 1310 085, CI - 069, CI - 074, CI - 07 7, CI - - 083, CI - CI - 086, CI - 165, CI - 166, CI - 167, CI - 168, CI - 170, 080, CI - 173, CI - - - 193, DI - 002, DI - 004, DI - 007, DI CI 008, DI - 020, DI - 021, DI - 022, DI - 023, DI - 024, 192, CI DI 038, DI - 047, DI - 049, DI - 054, DI - - QI - 076, ZI - 002. 073, 1311 022, DI CI - 061, CI - 068, CI - 088, CI - 174, DI - 002, DI - - 038. 1312 079, CI - 065, CI - 068, CI - 072, CI - 073, CI - 076, CI - CI - 080, CI - 083, CI - 087, CI - 089, CI - 091, CI - 094, CI - 096, CI - 173, CI - 175, CI - 193, DI - 004, DI - 006, DI - 012, DI - 020, DI - 037, DI - 038, DI - 054, DI - 073. 1313 See this chapter, section B : Systermic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya. 1314 192, CI CI - 173, CI - 174, CI - 175, CI - - 193, DI - 004, DI - 012, DI - 025, DI - 073, XI - 008. 1315 Also known as Jame mosque. 1316 . DI - 056, DI - 073 148

149 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1317 surrounding the area soon mosque and ran in different directions, with security forces 1318 after. present took part in a protest in the streets of Maungdaw Many of the Rohingya 631. 1319 town and the situation deteriorated, with confrontations between Rohingya demonstrators and ethnic Rakhine at the nearby United Guest House and clock tower area , a few hundred metres to the south . According to one interviewee, a group of ethnic Rakhine and monks had 1320 Another interviewee gathered at the Myoma monastery, some armed with swords. explained how she had been warned earlier on that day by a monk about the presence of 1321 At the “Rakhine with long kni ves” in the vicinity and told that she should go back home. United Guest House, the Rohingya crowd and ethnic Rakhine on top of the building threw showing the Rohingya crowd throwing stones but stones at each other. A video was made 1322 This video was widely used by the not the violenc e on the side of the ethnic Rakhine. Government to demonstrate that the Rohingya had “rioted” on 8 June 2012. It projected a distorted image of the events. 1323 The security forces fired their weapons at Rohingya. 632. A num ber of people, including 1324 year old boy was shot and killed The minors, were killed and others were injured. A 10 - . 1325 violence escalated and witnesses heard the sound of gunshots throughout the night. In various locations in Maungdaw Township, Rohingya a nd ethnic Rakhine houses 633. 1326 Muslim shops were looted and were set on fire by members of the other community. 1327 ne in the presence of security destroyed. The looting was carried out either by ethnic Rakhi or directly by the later ya witnesses described the inaction . Both Rakhine and Rohing forces 1328 of security forces, including when they were called to help stop the violence. According to one ethnic Rakhine interviewee: On 8 June at around 9 pm, I saw Muslims surrounding Rakhine villages so I ran to om there, I saw Muslims setting my village on fire. The village the hills. Fr administrator called the security forces but they said they didn’t have the capacity to 1329 come and help . Soon after the first incidents in Maungdaw, national media started publishing stor 634. ies blaming the Rohingya for the violence. They used incendiary headlines with reference to “terrorism” and to Rohingya “mobs” attacking the ethnic Rakhine community after the Friday ticipation of security prayer, with no mention of violence by ethnic Rakhine, nor the active par 1330 forces in the violence. 635. In the following weeks, police officers and Tatmadaw soldiers killed Rohingya in 1331 The killings were unlawful and arbitrary. One Maungdaw, including women and children. 1317 - - 192, CI - 193, ZI CI 002 . 1318 CI - - 002. 192, ZI 1319 CI - 173, CI - 175. 1320 DI - 073 . 1321 - 075. DI 1322 CI - 080, CI - 175, - 012, DI - 073. DI 1323 008, - 100, XI CI - 173, CI - 175 , CI - 193, CI - 192, DI - 004, DI - 025 , DI - 038 , DI - 051 , DI - 054, DI - 073, Q I - ZI - 002 . 1324 . 054, ZI - 002 - DI 1325 - DI - 025 , DI - 054, DI - 073. 004, DI 1326 - 076, CI - 082, CI - 091, CI - 092 , CI - 153 , CI - 173, CI - 174 , DI - 004, DI - 012, DI - 038, DI - 039, DI - 040, CI DI - 045, DI - 051, DI - 054, DI - 075, QI - 106, XI - 008 . 1327 CI - 080, CI - 091, DI - 073, XI - 008. 1328 DI - 040, DI - 045. 1329 DI - 040 . 1330 E.g., Myanmar Express, “Circulating news says the Yangon City Hall will be set on fire” (8 June 2012), available at: http://eaglefighter050.blogspot.com/2012/06/blog post_1187.html (accessed - September 2018); Eleven Media Group, “Riots escalate due to insufficie nt security in Rakhine city” (10 June 2012). One interviewee stated that he was very surprised to discover that Eleven Media already posted pictures about the violence on 8 June when both the phone lines and the internet were cut ( DI - 176) . 1331 . 002 CI - 082, CI - 17 3, CI - 192, CI - 193 , DI - 003, DI - 004 , DI - 025 , DI - 038 , DI - 073, XI - 008, ZI - 149

150 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 g girl, 8 or 9 - witness recalled witnessing a youn years old, who was selling vegetables, shot 1332 and killed by the police at a market. The police later said that this had been a mistake. Another interviewee described the killing of a Rohingya woman by the police: ose to my house in Hari hamlet. On 9 June 2012, I went There was a small market cl there to buy food for my friend. At around 9:30 am, 10 police officers came to the market. One police officer shot at a 30 - year old woman who was running. I saw this 1333 he woman in their car . with my own eyes. The police took t Villagers were prevented from collecting dead bodies, or even injured persons, and 636. 1334 Often, police or soldiers would remove the dead soldiers shot at persons who did this. bodies in their vehicles. The Mission received credible reports alleging the presence of two 1335 Moreover, mass graves just outside Maungdaw town on the road leading to Buthidaung. one interviewee stated that he saw soldiers come several times at night to put dead bodies in es were swept into the adjacent river, where he saw a pit in a field. He said that dead bodi 1336 them floating. In addition to killings by security forces, the Mission received reports of killings of 637. ethnic Rakhine by Rohingya and killings of Rohingya by ethnic Rakhine. Arbitrary arrests Arbitrary arrests of large numbers of Rohingya by the police, NaSaKa and Tatmadaw 638. 1337 was a further feature of events after 8 June Many 2012 . This continued for some months. parent act of those arrested were arbitrarily accused of participation in the violence, in an ap of collective punishment. One interviewee explained how, on 9 June 2012, many Rohingya were taken to the police station near Munshi mosque in big open trucks that could take about 1339 1338 ared. In some instances, the detainees subsequently disappe On many 50 people. occasions, the authorities offered to release a detainee against payment of a heavy bribe. 1340 People who could not pay the bribe were One often transferred to Buthidaung prison. interviewee stated: d someone, they used to keep them for When the police or Tatmadaw soldiers arreste two or three days in the local police station and wait for relatives to pay them bribes. Those who managed to pay the money were released. The others were sent to prison. s and accused of participation in the I was arrested, along with seven other villager violence. Some villagers were poor and couldn’t pay the bribe. They were taken to Buthidaung prison and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Others, including myself, 1341 bribed the authorities and were released. of arrested and detained, accused 639. ethnic Rakhine were also arbitrarily Some 1342 participation in the violence . In addition to the mass arrests of Rohingya, the authorities also arrested specific 640. 1343 whose names were on prepared lists. Young men, educated people, NGO Rohingya 1344 workers and religious leaders were targeted. NGO workers from Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships described receiving a letter asking them to go to the police station because of their alleged involvement in the violence. Som e were released upon payment of a 1332 - 073 . DI 1333 DI - 003 1334 CI - , CI - 082 DI - 054. 173, 1335 K - 106 .4. 1336 . 173 CI - 1337 193, CI - 072 , CI - 076 , CI - 082 , CI - 091, CI - 136, CI - 173, CI - 174, CI - 175 , CI - 192, CI - DI - 006, DI - 025 , DI 038, DI - 054, DI - 073 , DI - 075, QI - 108, QI - 106, XI - 008, ZI - 002 . - 1338 DI - 073. 1339 CI - 173, DI - 025. 1340 See this chapter, section C.3 : Torture and ill - treatment at Buthidaung prison. 1341 CI - 065 . 1342 DI - 039 . 1343 - CI 061 , CI - 136 , CI - 173 , CI - 175 , DI - 025. 1344 . 106 CI - 061 , CI - 065, DI - 003, DI - 004, DI - 025, DI - 037, DI - 038, DI - 051, DI - 056, QI - 150

151 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 bribe, others transferred to Buthidaung prison. One interviewee was told by a police officer that his name was on a list of persons “who pass information to the international community”. received orders “from higher authorities” to monitor and The police officer said that he had 1345 Fear of arrest meant that many Rohingya report on him and asked him to pay a bribe. 1346 at home or in hiding when security forces approached their village. mostly stayed 1347 Rohingya started suffering fro m hunger, especially children. Sittwe violence – (b) June 2012 It is estimated that before the June 2012 violence Sittwe town was home to about 641. 1348 73,000 Muslims (Rohingya and Kaman), about half of the total population. 642. Soon after violence commenced in Maungdaw on 8 June 2012, there was violence in 1349 Most of the violence took place in the first Sittwe, more than 100 kilometres to the south. According to the report of the Rakhine Inquiry Commission, the violence in Sittwe few days. death of 11 Rakhine and 24 Rohingya as well as the destruction of 666 Rakhine led to the 1350 The actual scale of casualties and destruction in Sittwe houses and 2,967 Rohingya houses. is believed to be much higher. , murders, summary executions The violence saw the burning and looting of houses 643. scale displacement affecting both ethnic Rakhine and Muslims. The majority of the and large - Muslim population of Sittwe town was displaced by the violence. Six years on, most still live in displacement camps and sites built in the Sittwe countryside, totally segregated from the ethnic Rakhine population. Aung Mingalar, often referred to as a “Muslim ghetto”, is the 1351 only remaining Muslim area in Sittwe town. 644. Given its lack of access to Myanmar, the Mission has not been abl e to gather sufficient information on the violence perpetrated against ethnic Rakhine in Sittwe in June 2012. According to credible reports, groups of Muslims carried out arson attacks against houses of 1352 ethnic Rakhine and monasteries. investigation. This warrant further Involvement of security forces 645. The security forces played an active role in the violence against Muslims in Sittwe, 1353 In other cases, security often attacking them and their houses alongside ethnic Rakhine. 1354 or refused to assist forces provided support to Rakhine who were leading the attacks 1355 One Kaman interviewee who sought protection was Muslims who sought their protection. told by the security forces that they could not assist in the absence of an instruction from 1356 higher authori ties. Similarly, a Rohingya interviewee explained that, on 10 June, a large group of ethnic Rakhine attacked his village and Rohingya families took shelter in a house. e but, when the officer understood They called the police for assistanc that they were 1357 ohingya, he hung up. R Murders and summary executions Ethnic Rakhine, police officers and Tatmadaw soldiers killed Muslims in Sittwe in 646. 1358 June 2012. In the majority of cases, ethnic Rakhine killed their victims with large knives, 1345 CI - 061 1346 DI - 025. 1347 - 075. DI - 009, DI - 054, DI 1348 V - 237 1349 CI - 096 ; K 076.9.15 . - 1350 Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, Final report (July 2013) . 1351 See this chapter, section B.2.d : Specific restrictions in central Rakhine State. 1352 KI - 076.9.01, KI - 076.18. 1353 - 049, DI CI - 066 , CI - 086, CI 166, DI - 020 , DI - 023, DI - 035 , DI - - 050, DI - 055. 1354 CI - 069, CI - 086. 1355 CI - 066, CI - 166. 1356 CI - 166, V - 166 . 1357 CI - 066 . 1358 . 050 CI - 066 , CI - 075, CI - 078, CI - 086, CI - 097 , DI - 020, DI - 049, DI - 151

152 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1359 rces used guns. Sometimes, ethnic Rakhine perpetrators were known while the security fo 1360 to Muslims villagers. One interviewee from Yasina hamlet explained how he recognised some of the ethnic Rakhine who were armed with large knives: good relationship before. When I saw this, I recognized many of them. We had a very I had tears in my eyes. These were people with whom we used to share our meals for 1361 Eid and now they were standing there to kill us. In contrast, the Mission received an account from one Rohingya describing how an 647. ethnic Rakhine person saved the life of her mother who was about to be killed by another 1362 Rakhine. 1363 In some cases, ethnic Rakhine slit the throats of their victims. In other cases, they 648. 1364 mutilated their bodies, including the breasts of women. In addition to killings by ethnic 1365 shot indiscriminately at Rakhine, Tatmadaw soldiers, police officers or Lon Htein 1366 Muslims, including while their houses were being burned. One interviewee described d fire on a group of Muslims sitting in seeing his brother shot and killed when soldiers opene 1367 Another interviewee described the killing of her neighbour by a Tatmadaw a paddy field. 1368 soldier in Sittwe town, because he was outside five minutes after the curfew started. Arson attacks 1369 There was extensive burning and destruction of houses and mosques in Sittwe. 649. Narzi hamlet was one of the most affected. Houses of ethnic Rakhine were also burned, but Muslims were disproportionality affected. Security forces actively participated in the burning uses. In some cases, ethnic Rakhine and security forces jointly burned Muslim of Muslim ho houses. Witnesses described to the Mission how the Tatmadaw and/or the police either helped 1370 set the houses on fire or provided physical protection to ethnic Rakhine who were doi ng 1371 For example, ethnic Rakhine threw bottles filled with petrol on Muslim houses, while so. 1372 security forces shot at the bottles causing the fire to spread. In other instances, security 1373 forces set houses on fire on their own, targeting Muslim houses. The security forces also 1374 shot at villagers attempting to extinguish the fires. One interviewee described his r on 12 June: experience in Na zi hamlet First, the Rakhine were throwing bottles filled with petrol on huts. Muslims were by pouring water on the fire, but the police and Tatmadaw trying to stop the burning soldiers shot at them to prevent them from doing this. Afterwards, security forces came and started using fire launchers to burn the buildings that had not yet burned 1375 properly. 1359 DI CI - 077 , CI - 086, DI - 007, DI - 020, DI - 023 , DI - 035, DI - 049, - 050. 1360 - 066 , DI - CI 023. 1361 DI - 023 . 1362 DI - 050 . 1363 , DI CI - 097 - 023. 1364 - 076.9.16. CI - 077, CI - 078, CI - 086, DI - 020, DI - 049; KI 1365 Lon Htein is short for Lon - chon - hmu Htein - thein Tat - yin , or “security preservation battalion”. It is also known as the “ special police ” or riot police ” . “ 1366 CI - 069 , CI - 077, CI - 086, DI - 007, DI - 020. 1367 DI - 020 . 1368 DI - 050 . 1369 , - CI - 066 , CI - 067, CI - 068, CI - 069, CI - 078 , CI - 086, CI - 096, CI - 097, CI - 156, CI - 159, CI - 166 DI 007, DI - 020, DI - , DI - 035, DI - 049, DI - 050, DI - 05 5, K - 076.1 023 1370 CI - 066 , DI - 007, DI 020, DI - 035, DI - 055. - 1371 - CI - 068 , CI - 069, CI 077 , CI - 086. 1372 CI - 066 , DI 035, DI - 055. - 1373 - DI 023. 1374 DI - 007, KI - 076.9.15; KI - 076.9.16, V - 166. 1375 007 . DI - 152

153 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Displacement and m ove to IDP camps Most Rohingya and Kaman from Sittwe town and the surrounding areas were 650. 1377 1376 Some fled to Muslim villages outside Sit Some left on the advice displaced. twe town . 1378 One interviewee described how Muslims sheltering in a mosque in the authorities. of 1379 Konchi hamlet were removed by police and left at gunpoint. In some instances, Tatmadaw soldiers provided support to Muslim victims, although one victim reported that this was on 1380 Soldiers escorted victims outside Sittwe the condition that they leave the town. town towards Muslim villages in the countryside, with some such as pregnant women and children 1381 Muslims initially took refuge in places such as schools, later transported in military cars. 3, 95,500 people were displaced in moving to displacement camps. As of 30 September 201 Sittwe Township, mainly Muslims (Rohingya and Kaman) with a smaller number of ethnic 1382 Na r zi hamlet shared the pain associated with Rakhine. One elderly interviewee from leaving his village: s of hard work was lost. If I do something wrong to We cried when we left. 25 year you, then you can do something back to me. But if I am innocent, why are you torturing me? What did we do wrong? My time is almost finished, but what will happen to my 1383 children and my grandchildren? ) (c – October 2012 Kyaukpyu violence 651. Kyaukpyu Township is a coastal township in Rakhine State, along the Bay of Bengal, about 120 southeast of Sittwe with a population of approximately 165,000 kilometres 1384 people. Prior to October 2012, the township had a majority ethnic Rakhine population, . There was no major violence reported in Kyaukpyu in Kaman and Rohingya minorities with 1385 1386 However, a larger number of security force s June 2012 were deployed . after June. there 52. From 22 to 25 October 2012, ethnic Rakhine attacked Rohingya and Kaman in 6 1387 Kyaukpyu, destroying mosques, burning houses, and looting properties. Several wards 1388 and village tracts were affected, with Paik Seik ward being one of the most affected areas. Rakhine Inquiry Commission stated that violence led to 11 deaths, 42 The report of the injuries (affecting both ethnic Rakhine and Rohingya) and the destruction of 860 Rohingya houses. However, the number of casualties is believed to be much higher. The Mi ssion interviewed ethnic Rakhine, Kaman and Rohingya in relation to the violence in Kyaukpyu. 653. Ahead of the October 2012 violence, there was increased tension in Kyaukpyu and by ethnic Rakhine. Muslim villagers rumours about possible attacks on Muslim villagers 1389 Rakhine friends of the likelihood of an attack were informed by their ethnic One . interviewee recalled a phone call from an ethnic Ra , informing him that there khine friend 1390 e security forces . was a “high chance” that there would soon be an attack by Rakhine and th 1376 - CI - 066 , CI - 069, CI - 077, CI . 078, CI - 096, DI - 007, DI - 023, DI - 035 1377 CI - 096 , DI - 007. 1378 DI - 023 . 1379 DI - . 035 1380 CI - 069 . 1381 - 066, CI - 077, CI - 078. CI 1382 K - 69. 1383 DI - 007. 1384 Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, Department of Population, “The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census – Rakhine State, Kyaukpyu district” (October 2017). 1385 CI - - 165, CI 167, CI - 168, CI - 170 . 1386 CI - 084, CI - 088, CI - - 168, CI - 170 . 165, CI 1387 - CI - 167 , CI - 168, CI - 170, DI - 021; KI 109, V - 050 . 1388 Including the wards of Ah Yar Shi, Paik Seik (East and West) and Than Pan Chaung; and the village tracts of Taung Yin, Pyin Hpyu Maw and Myin Pyin. 1389 - CI 085, CI - 165, CI - 167, DI - 021, V - 050 . 1390 . 165 CI - 153

154 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 A meeting was held shortly before the violence when Muslims were warned about the 1391 possibility of such an attack. The Paik Seik ward was mixed, with and the east ethnic 654. Kaman the majority in the 2 violence, villagers were already pay ing the security Rakhine in west. After the June 201 1392 Security forces initial ly provided such protection but forces for protection. left Paik Seik on 22 October 2012. At 8pm , a group of ethnic Rakhine arrived and set on 22 October 2012 1393 a Muslim Other s ecurity forces were in the house, leaving shortly afterwards. fire to 1394 when this happened vicinity . 100 655. ethnic Rakhine, armed with swords, knives, slingshots On 23 October, more than , attacked east Paik Seik. They also b rought tyres and bottles and other rudimentary weapons 1395 filled with flammable liquid. violent attacks on both Kaman and Rohingya There were 1396 he . their T s ethnic Rakhine were villagers, and the looting and burning of propertie 1397 accompanied by the police and soldiers W i tnesses stated that they did armed with rifles. 1398 not recognize the majority of the ethnic Rakhine who participated in the violence. 656. There was a clash between ethnic Rakhine and a large group of Rohingya and Kaman 1399 1400 The mosque wa mosque in east Paik Seik. around Jame s partially burned and some the 1402 1401 Inquiry eople were injured, with Muslim houses burned. p The report of the Rakhine 1403 Commission states that two ethnic Rakhine were killed in the clashes . opened fire at Kaman then 657. Soldiers told villagers to return to their houses, but they 1404 and Rohingya villagers gathered near the mosque. child , were Ten persons, including a 1405 killed and a number of others injured. On the same night , ethnic Rakhine and security forces burned Kaman and Rohingya 658. 1406 Soldiers and police opened fire on the Rohingya and Kaman houses in west Paik Seik. 1407 who tried to extinguish fires, killing two and injuring others. One interviewee explaine d w he and others had tried security burning house s, but that members of the ho to extinguish 1408 pointed their weapons and told them not to do so . forces had 659. Kaman and Rohingya villagers were forced to spend the night on the beach, Many 1409 from where they watched their village The burnings continued the following day, burn. 1410 the police and soldiers using “launchers”, alongside the ethnic Rakhine using bottles with 1411 filled with flammable liquid. Soldiers were also seen removing dead bodies from the 1391 I - 076, KI - Q - 050 . 109, V 1392 - - 165, DI - 021, DI CI 024, KI - 109. 1393 051 CI - 168, DI - 021, QI - 076, KI - 109, V - 050, V - . 1394 021, V DI - - 050 . 1395 . CI - 165, V - 050 1396 083 , CI - 165, CI - 168, CI - 170, DI - 024 , QI - 076. CI - 1397 - 025, CI - 083, CI - 165, CI - 168, DI BM 021, QI - 076; V - 050 . - 1398 CI - 085, DI - 021; V - 050 . 1399 - CI 083, CI - 085, CI - 088 , CI - 165, CI - 168, CI - 170; V - 051 . 1400 - CI - 085, CI 165, CI - 168, CI - 170 . 1401 - CI 168, V - 051 . 1402 CI - 083, DI 022 . - 1403 083, CI CI - - 084, CI - 088 . 1404 CI - 085, CI - 165, CI - 167, CI - 168, CI - 1 70, QI - 076; K - 109; V - 049, V - 050. 1405 CI - 083, CI - 085, CI - 165, CI - 167, CI - 168, CI - 170, DI - 022, DI - 024 . 1406 CI - 088, CI - - 076 . 170, QI 1407 V QI - 076, DI - 021; - 050 . 1408 QI - 076 . 1409 170, DI CI - 083, CI - 084, CI - 165, CI - - 021, DI - 022, QI - 076; V - 051 . 1410 Tatmadaw soldiers used weapons referred to by victims as “launchers”. They were described as making loud explosive sounds, after which a whole building or set of buildings rapidly caught fire. “Launcher” likely refers to a weapon that fires a munition that explodes upon impact. 1411 076. CI - 088 , CI - 165, CI - 170, QI - 154

155 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1412 security forces came to the seashore and prevented Ethnic Rakhine and village. the go to the still in the village were forced to villagers from returning to the village , while those 1413 - year old boy, who reportedly had a mental disability, was stabbed to death seashore. A 15 1414 of ethnic Rakhine in the presence of security forces. by a group Ethnic Rakhine and 1415 houses and shops. One man described being ordered security forces then looted the empty to leave his house by the police and carrying his elderly mother: time was up. One police officer hit me on my hands with a The police kept saying that . She hurt her back and died 10 days later. I still stick, and I dropped my mother 1416 remember the incident and cannot bear it. My mother died because of me. When the tide was sufficiently high, towards nightfall, villagers left on 660. many Muslim 1417 towards Sittwe . 50 fishing boats. Most boats headed The majority of approximately north in Sittwe. the displaced from Paik Seik ultimately moved to the displacement camps and sites 2012 . Credible The violence continued in many areas of Kyaukpyu until 25 October 661. indicate s that the areas affected by burning and destruction in satellite imagery analysis 1418 Kyaukpyu were all predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods. (d) Sexu al and gender - based violence during the 2012 violence , Rohingya women and girls were raped, mutilated, abducted 662. During the 2012 violence and killed. For example, a female eyewitness from Maungdaw town described how in June 16 - year old neighbour being raped outside her house and then 2012 she saw her killed by 1419 A 27 - year old female from Sittwe described the killing soldiers and police. of her 1420 cousin : On Monday 12 June, my 14 - year old cousin went out of the house to look for her mother and never return ed home. At around 2am, her dead body was found. She was covered with a piece of cloth. I was shocked when I saw her body. Her left breast was cut and the other one was severely injured , with b ite marks . It was difficult to as her neck w as twisted and it was not in the right position. I think recognize her face 1421 . she was raped 663. There are also credible reports that up to 20 women and girls were abducted in June 1422 2012 from the Narzi quarter of Sittwe and subjected to sexual slavery by soldiers. Another woman, approximately 22 - years old, was reportedly detained at a military hospital and forced 1423 to marry a soldier from the Tatmadaw medical corps. In most cases of sexual violence the madaw, NaSaKa or during this period , the alleged perpetrators were members of the Tat 1424 other security forces. Sexual violence was perpetrated during home searches or on security 1425 sexual violence was not reported to the authorities as Rohingya forces’ compounds. Most 1426 treatment or arrest. that this would result in ill considered - 1412 - 088, DI - 022; CI - 050 . V 1413 CI 085, CI - 088 . - 1414 CI - 085, CI - 168, CI - 170, V - 051 . 1415 CI - 083, CI - 168, DI - 021 V - 050 . , 1416 . CI - 165, V - 050 1417 CI - 170. 1418 Human Rights Watch, Damage Assessment Summary for Kyaukpyu – Based on satellite imagery of 25 October 2012 Burma: New Violence in Arakan recorded on morning ; Human Rights Watch, State – Satellite Imagery Shows Widespread Destruction of Rohingya Homes, Property (26 October 2012). 1419 DI - 038 . 1420 CI - 077 . 1421 CI - 077 . 1422 K - 076.19 . 1423 K - 076.19 . 1424 K - 076.6 . 1425 K - 076.7 . 1426 - 076.8. K 155

156 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2. Kaman Muslims of Rakhine State 664. Unlike the Rohingya, Kaman Muslims are one of the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups of Myanmar, the only Muslim group to have been granted this status. The Rohingya not having been counted in the 2014 census, most of the 28,700 Muslims recorded in Rakhine State were likely Kaman. Despite being citizens of Myanmar, and not appearing to have 1427 the problematic relationships with ethnic Rakhine neighbours prior to the 2012 violence, Kaman have suffered serio us human rights violations. This has significantly worsened since the 2012 violence, possibly attributable both to the prevailing anti - Muslim sentiment and to the frequent absence of distinction between the Kaman and the Rohingya. One Kaman refugee, who pr eviously lived in Kyaukpyu, stated: In Myanmar, it is a crime to be a Muslim. The authorities are saying that the Rohingya are illegal Bengalis. Then what about us? We are nationals of Myanmar. I believe the 1428 main issue for the authorities is religion. 665 . In March 2018, a former Minister and member of Parliament from the Union Solidarity and Development Party oppo sed a decision by the Government to resettle a small group of Kaman fro m displacement camps to Yangon. He reportedly said: I think it will be mo re appropriate if we treat the cancer that is occurring in Rakhine State within Rakhine State itself. Allowing the Kaman families to resettle in Yangon 1429 would be like allowing the cancer to spread across the country. The Kaman were directly affected b y the 2012 violence, particularly the second wave 666. in October. Kaman were killed and injured, including by security forces. Many were displaced and moved to several displacement camps and sites in Rakhine State. The actual number of Kaman affected is unclea r. The report of the Rakhine Inquiry Commission 1430 . provided no information on Kaman, referring only to “Bengali Muslims” or “Musl ims” The Kaman have shared similar experiences to the Rohingya, including being insulted 667. 1431 and called “Kalar”. One intervie wee stated that at school Kaman students were only referred to as “Kalar” and never by their names, and he was told by a teacher that he was 1432 Like the Rohingya, Kaman had to slow in class because he was an “uneducated Kalar”. obtain authorisation to travel between townships (k nown as a “F orm 4”), even though they 1433 do not fall into the category of either “foreigners” or “Bengali”. The process to obtain a 1434 travel authorisation is expensive, lengthy and involves considerable bribes. remain in displacement camps and sites in Rakhine State, six 668. Thousands of Kaman years after the 2012 violence. Others have moved to Yangon or abroad. The Myanmar authorities appear to have taken no concrete steps towards facilitating the return of Kaman to igin. Recently it was reported that, although more than 1,000 Kaman their places of or continue to live in a displacement camp close to their place of origin in Kyaukpyu, the 1435 authorities continue to deny their right to return, citing unspecified security concerns. 3. Tortu re and ill - treatment at Buthidaung prison In Buthidaung prison, the situation was terrible. They beat everybody with wooden sticks. There were restrictions on everything: going to the toilets, speaking, moving. When we went out of the cell we were beaten, and when we came back we were beaten. 1427 V - 355. 1428 165. CI - 1429 V - 355. 1430 . , Citizenship in Myanmar: Ways of being in and from Burma A . South and M Lall (editors) ( ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute/Chiang Mai University Press , 2017). 1431 167. CI - 052, CI - 1432 CI - 167. 1433 See this chapter, section B.2.b : Requirement for a temporary travel permit to travel between townships. 1434 - CI - 052, CI 167, CI - 171. 1435 356 . V - 156

157 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 At night, we couldn’t move or we would get kicked. People had to behave like robots. 1436 Buthidaung prison was like hell. 669. The Mission received multiple accounts of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degradi ng treatment or punishment against Rohingya men and boys held in Buthidaung 1437 Similar violations were verified up until 2017, prison following the 2012 violence. - treatment at Buthidaung prison is endemic. Mistreatment was particularly indicating that ill fe in the period after the June 2012 violence in Rakhine State. However, similar patterns ri were seen in the aftermath of the 9 October 2016 attacks by ARSA and the subsequent “clearance operations”, when significant numbers of Rohingya men were arrested. Th ere are indications that similar abuse also occurred in the context of the “clearance operations” after 1438 Much of the abuse was perpetrated directly by the prison authorities, but 25 August 2017. 1439 - detainees, also by ethnic Rakhine fellow with facilitation o r sanction from the prison authorities. Information received suggests that the mistreatment was particularly acute trial detainees and that conditions improved once a person had received a - against pre 1440 custodial sentence. Detainees frequently suffered mistreatment prior to their arrival at the prison, while 670. 1441 being transported, or when taken from the prison to court hearings. Tatmadaw soldiers usually provided transportation, with detainees transported in large, open military trucks. Detainees would be literally thrown into the back of the trucks, normally after their hands had been tied behind their backs. They were routinely covered with a large tarpaulin and then subjected to repeated beatings, with rifle butts or clubs, or kicked by soldiers. Soldier s would also sit on or walk over the detainees under the tarpaulin. Beatings and other forms of mistreatment would continue throughout the journey. One interviewee described the treatment he suffered: As well as hitting us with rifle butts, Tatmadaw soldie rs put cigarettes out on our faces. While he forced a lit cigarette into my nose, one soldier said, “please, have a cigarette”. The hair inside my nose burned and it was very painful. The soldiers 1442 ney to the prison. tortured us all like this throughout the 16 kilometres jour The mistreatment during transportation led to serious injuries among detainees, 671. including broken bones and head injuries, sometimes with lasting consequences. One 1443 e impact on his chest, interviewee described the difficulties he had in breathing due to th while another explained how he lost consciousness during the journey because of the 1444 Another interviewee explained that, more than five years later, he still had beatings. 1445 oken wrist. difficulties walking, due to the pain from his back and a br Another interview ee remembered how a fellow detainee was beaten unconscious on a journey back from a court 1446 hearing. 672. - Once detainees had arrived at Buthidaung prison, they continued to suffer ill th numbers vastly exceeding capacity. There treatment. Cells were extremely cramped, wi were no beds or bedding, and often not even the space to lie down. Former detainees estimate that the number of detainees in the cells was up to seven times the actual capacity, with 1447 in the same room. Food and drink was insufficient, often hundreds of men held together 1436 DI - 037 . 1437 While t he Mission has not received information to suggest that detainees from other ethnic groups . were treated in a similarly manner , this should not be discounted and warrants further investigation 1438 - 176, RI - 013 . CI 1439 CI - 136, QI - 105, QI - - 107, RI - 011 . 106, QI 1440 K - 076.3 . 1441 011, CI - 136, DI - 037, QI - 105, QI - 106, RI - K - 076 . 1442 CI - 136 . 1443 - DI 037 . 1444 QI - 106 . 1445 - QI 105 . 1446 DI - 037 . 1447 . 011 CI - 130, CI - 136 , DI - 037 , QI - 105 , QI - 106 , QI - 107 , QI - 108 , RI - 157

158 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 only involving small portions of rice, with allegations of instances when the rice was thrown 1448 Fluids given to detainees appear to have on the ground for them to eat by licking the floor. 1449 deliberat ely included urine at times. Much of the mistreatment was perpetrated by ethnic Rakhine detainees, facilitated by 673. 1450 may have been brought the prison authorities. There are allegations that some Rakhine 1451 One former detainee referred to 10 ethnic Rakhine into the prison for this specific purpose. 1452 although the overall number involved may detainees who were “in charge of discipline”, 1453 have been larger. The ethnic Rakhine detainees perpetrated the abuse throughout all hours hen they were sharing the same cells as Rohingya detainees. Mostly of the day, particularly w it involved severe, repeated and systematic beatings with wooden sticks, including while being forced to adopt a “praying position”, kneeling on the ground. Similar beatings were also carri ed out by prison guards. Guards used catapults to fire pellets at detainees from outside the cells and some reportedly made detainees crawl on the floor and beat them in this 1454 position. The beatings were accompanied by insults and references to retrib ution for the alleged 674. 1455 For example, one interviewee stated that the ethnic Rakhine detainee beating violence. 1456 him said, “you burned our homes, you killed our people. Is this your country?” It appears that men with beards, often religious persons, were par ticularly targeted and suffered 1457 One Rohingya interviewee mistreatment focused on the forced removal of their beards. stated that he was forced to “pull out the beards” of 10 to 20 detainees, with his hand: “It was leeding, and I was helpless. I did not have any other very painful for all of them. They were b 1458 option. I felt bad.” For the period following the June 2012 violence, there are also credible and consistent 675. torture reports of men and boys being subjected to sexual violence, including rape, sexualised 1459 and humiliation, either by authorities or in their presence. Rohingya boys were detained in the same cells as adult men. Detainees stated that guards anally raped Rohingya boys. At night, groups of boys and young men were subjected to penile rape, both orally and anally, by ethnic Rakhine detainees, often in the same cell as other detainees. One former detainee described how boys were taken into the latrine after dark: them to Almost every night they took these boys to the latrine in the cell. They forced perform oral sex and raped them. If they refused, they put their face into the latrine. We used to hear the screaming of the victims, but we were helpless and could do 1460 nothing. 1448 CI - 130 , CI - 136 , CI - 176, DI - 037 QI - 105 , QI - 107 , KI - 076.4 . , 1449 CI - 136 , - 176 , QI - 108. CI 1450 . 076.5 DI - 037; KI - 076.2, KI - 076.3, KI - 1451 In 2013, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar said: “In Rakhine State, following violence in June 2012, Muslim men and boys were allegedly arbitrarily detained in Bu - treatment by thidaung prison. They were subjected to three months of systematic torture and ill prison guards and up to 20 prison inmates, who appear to have been brought into the prison for the s”, A/68/397, para. 10; KI - 076.4. specific purpose of administering beatings to Muslim prisoner 1452 DI - 037 . 1453 A/68/397, para. 10 . 1454 076.4, KI QI - 105, QI - 107, QI - 108; KI - - 076.5. Similar beatings continued more recently. One interviewee informed the Mission that, when he visited his relatives in the prison in early 20 17, they were “hardly recognisable”, with marks on their bodies and their faces swollen and black. 1455 106 CI - 130 , CI - 136 , QI - 105 , QI - , QI - 108 . 1456 QI - 105 . 1457 CI CI - 082, - 176 . This happened to Rohingya men detained during the post - 25 August 2017 “clearance operation”, including an account of more than 30 religious leaders whose beards were burned off with gas lighters . 1458 CI - 136 . 1459 CI - 136 , DI - 037 , QI - 107, QI - 108 . 1460 136 . CI - 158

159 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Rohingya men and boys were also subjected to sexual humiliation, 676. often in the Detainees experienced the degrading treatment of being forced to presence of other inmates. walk naked from their cell to the shower and showering in groups of up to 20 to 30 persons in front of one another, including family members, which was particularly uncomfortable and 1461 Detainees reportedly had to wait outside their cells naked until they considered shameful. 1462 Another detainee described how guards burned the genitals of Rohingya dried. 1463 detainees. A significant number of Rohingya det 677. ainees died because of mistreatment in 1464 Buthidaung prison. Some were beaten to death and corpses were dragged out of the cells. One former detainee described seeing four people killed in his cell: “They were beaten to hree others, who were beaten a lot, died a few months death by the guards in front of me. T 1465 later.” Detainees also suffered serious injuries, including broken bones, infected wounds and 678. 1466 - other life One former detainee described the impact of his regular changing injuries. ore than a month, by both ethnic Rakhine and guards: beatings, for m My back was injured, and I can no longer carry things on my back. They beat me on my toes and ankle and my little finger was broken. I have scars on my hands and feet 1467 and suffer pain on my back and waist . 679. Corruption was also prevalent within Buthidaung prison. Prison guards demanded 1468 bribes to reduce or end the beatings or to provide preferential treatment. Relatives or 1469 Large payments could also get pris oners friends had to pay a fee to visit detainees. 1470 released. 4 . Government response to the 2012 violence (a) Curfews and prohibition of meetings of more than five people 680. to the violence in Maungdaw was the One of the first responses of the Government of A dministrator on 8 June ownship a curfew an d prohibition T imposition by the Maungdaw 1471 . S of public gatherings of more than five people imilar 2012 orders were imposed in 1472 According to the law, Buthidaung, Kyaukpyu, Ramree, Sittwe and Thandwe townships. uch s e for two months, unless the President directs orders should only remain in forc 1461 CI - 130 , CI - 136 , DI - 037 , QI - 105 , QI - 106 , QI - 108; KI - 076.3, KI - 076.4, KI - 076.5 . 1462 . 076.4 KI - 076.3, KI - 1463 DI - 037. 1464 ; KI CI - 136, DI - 037 , QI - 105 , QI - 106 , QI - 107 , QI - 108 , RI - 011 - 076.2, KI - 076.4, KI - 076.5. 1465 QI - 106 . 1466 DI CI - 136 , - 037 , QI - 107. 1467 CI - 136 . 1468 CI - 082 , CI - 175, DI - 037 , QI - 104 , QI - 107 . 1469 CI - 082, CI - 136, QI - 104, QI - 107. 1470 DI - 010, DI - 037; K - 076.4. 1471 Township General Administration Department, Curfew Order No. 1/2012 (8 June 2012), available at: http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf . See page 7. The power to impose such curfew orders appears to have been increasingly used by the General Administration Department, through township administrators. It is viewed as an indirect way for the Tatmadaw to exercise control. See: M. Crouch, “The Everyday Emergency: Between the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Pr ocedure”, in Constitutional Change and Legal Reform in Myanmar , A. Harding, Khin Khin Oo, eds. ( Hart Publishing/Bloomsbury, 2017 ), p. 165. 1472 See presentation posted by the Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations and other internati onal organizations in Geneva on “Preventive measures and actions taken by the Government”, p. 2, available at: http://w ww.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf 159

160 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 otherwise in “cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an 1473 affray”. By September 2014, all curfew orders in Rakhine State were lifted, except in 681. ownships, where they have remained in force continuously Maungdaw and Buthidau T ng 1474 since 2012. According to credible reports, the orders are more strictly enforced in 1475 Maungdaw and Buthidaung towns than in surrounding rural areas. According to the curfew orders, people w ere not allowed to be outside their homes 682. and but, o n 25 August 2017, the curfew between 6pm 6am. These times were later shortened 1476 ownships were again extended T Although the hours in Maungdaw and Buthidaung . practice they have been enforced mainly curfew orders were drafted in general terms, in against Muslims generally, and in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships against the Rohingya. Enforcement has been undertaken by village administrators, the NaSaKa, the BGP 1477 and the Tatmadaw . Many Rohingya int referred to the curfew as one of the serious restrictions erviewees 683. 1478 Given its prolonged and discriminatory application, it they faced after the 2012 violence. , adverse effects on the li v e s has had severe of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, including on 1479 Interviewees also said that they were not allowed to keep lights or access to livelihoods. 1480 In some isolated cases, security forces were more lenient candles on during curfew hours. 1481 , and made exceptions wing Rohingya to be outside during curfew hours. However, in allo the majority of cases, the curfew was strictly enforced , especially in 2012 , and in the periods after the ARSA attacks in 2016 and 2017 . In some cases, security forces went as far as killing 1482 who were outside during curfew hours. including elderly people – ingya Roh – The curfew orders also prohibited gatherings of more than five people on 684. “roads, 1483 This has had a far - streets, the main road, lanes, garden (or) mosques and public schools”. rea over the subsequent six years. The list of public places where ching adverse impact gatherings of more than five people is not allowed reveals discriminatory intent , as it includes mosques but not monasteries or temples . Given the importance to Muslims of congregational prayers in mosques, this prohibition represents a serious obstacle to the right to freedom of religion, protected under international human rights law, including religious worship, by article 18 of the C . C redible reports indicate that including UDHR and article 14 of the CR ed some Rohingya have gather secretly to pray in private houses, makeshift mosques or 1484 madrasas in remote areas. This long - lasting prohibition of gatherings of more than five people is also a violation of the right to peace ful assembly, protected for example by article 20(1) of the . UDHR and article 15 of the CRC 1473 Code of Criminal Procedure , s . 144(6) . 1474 047 . V - 1475 V - 047 . 1476 See also chapter V, section D.3: An enduring catastrophe. 1477 CI - 125, DI 073, V - 047. See also A/HRC/32/18 - 1478 - CI - 062, CI - 063, CI - 064, CI - 076, CI - 079, CI 080, CI - 082, CI - 084, CI - 089, CI - 092, CI - 094, CI - 174, 186, CI CI 175 , CI - 181, CI - 183, CI - 184, CI - 185, CI - - - 187, CI - 188, CI - 189, CI - 192, CI - 194, CI - 195, - CI - 196, CI - 198, CI - 199 , DI - 003, DI 047, DI 004, DI - - 050, DI - 052, DI - 053, DI - 054, DI - 073, DI - 075, 015, RI DI RI - 002, RI - 003, RI - 009, RI - 010, RI - 012, RI - 076, - 017. - 1479 DI - 053 . 1480 053 CI - 082, CI - 094 , DI - . 1481 DI - 075, DI 076 . - 1482 - CI - 076, CI - 174, DI 050, DI - 054, DI - 073 . 1483 Township General Administration Department, Curfew Order No. 1/2012 (8 June 2012), available at: http://www.myanmargene va.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf . See page 7. 1484 - 047. V 160

161 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (b) State of emergency 685. On 10 June 2012, President Thein Sein reinforced the curfew orders by declaring a 1485 state of emergency in Rakhine State under section 412 He stated (a) of the Constitution. that this was to “bring about security and peace and stability for the people immediately”. In his declaration, the President invoked section 413(a) of the Constitution, the power to “obtain the assistance of the Defence Services”. According to section 414(b), when declaring a state of emergency, the President may, if necessary, restrict or suspend one or more fundamental rights of the citizens residing in the areas where the state of emergency is in operation. However, t he ordinance adopted by the President did not invoke this power. 686. The state of emergency in Rakhine State remained in force for nearly four years. According to international human rights law, a state of emergency can only be invoked in the 1486 a “ public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” presence of . The Myanmar Government itself did not see the situation in Rakhine State in those terms. On the contrary, in November 2015, at Myanmar’s second Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Permanent Representative of Myan mar stated that there communal violence in Rakhine State since 2012, and that “peace and - had been no inter stability in Rakhine State has been restored”. He highlighted that communities in Buthidaung and business engaging in inter - communal trade “ ” with their and Maungdaw were now 1487 ldren attending school together . chi 687. The Mission considers that the prevailing situation in Rakhine State was not “threatening the life of the nation” and that the continuance of the state of emergency and njustified. Instead, these measures were a means to restrict the lives of curfew orders was u the Rohingya and the Kaman through their discriminatory application and to provide more powers to the Tatmadaw. President Thein Sein lifted the state of emergency on 28 March 1488 - led government. 2016, s hortly before handing over power to the newly appointed NLD (c) Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State Inquiry Commission on Sectarian 688. On 17 August 2012, the President established the 1489 While it was a positive step that the President set up the Violence in Rakhine State” . Commission, the composition of the Commission as well as the way it executed its mandate were fundamentally flawed. The Commission was initially composed of 27 members, including six Muslims, but d id not include a single Rohingya. Two out of the six Muslim 1490 , reportedly because of their overly members were expelled from the Commission 1491 The Commission also included members who held independent stand on some issues. strong public anti such as Dr. Aye Maung, the Chair of the Rakhine - Rohingya stands, Nationalities Democratic Party (RNDP), and U Ko Ko Gyi, one of the leaders of the 88 1485 Rep ublic of the Union of Myanmar, President Office, Ordinance No. 1/2012 (10 June 2012), available at: http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf . See page 10 1486 United Nations Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 29: Derogations during a State of Emergency (31 August 2001), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11. The Human Rights Committee specified that, “not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”. The declaration of the state of emergency may also be viewed as unconstitutional since it did not specify its duration, as required by section 414(a) of the Constitution. 1487 Statement by Mr. Mau ng Wai, Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva, “Situation of Rakhi ne State and Cooperation Special Advisor” (6 November 2015), available at: with UNSG’s https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/upr/Sessions/23session/Myanmar/Statements/103.1_Closing%20Rema 0 - rka%2 - %20Situation%20of%20Rakhine%20State_UPR_Myanmar.pdf %201%20 1488 Announcement on the lifting of the state of emergency available at: http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/29/03/2016/i - 6792 d 1489 The New Light of Myanmar, “Investigation Commission formed” (18 August 2012). 1490 Haji U Nyunt Maung Shein and U Tin Maung Than. 1491 - 240. DI - 077; K 161

162 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1492 The Chair of the Commission was Dr. Myo Myint, former Generation Students Group. Director - General at the Ministry of Relig ious Affairs; concerns were expressed to the 1493 Mission about his lack of independence. The Commission published its report on 8 July 1494 The Mission welcomes the fact that some parts of the report seek to reflect the 2013. perspectives of both communities on t he violence. However, the report contains fundamental 1495 flaws that undermine its credibility. (d) Displacement camps and sites 689. about 140,000 people (Rohingya, Rakhine, Kaman and Maramagyi) As of July 2013, as a result of the 2012 violence. They initially lived were displaced in Rakhine State in 76 1496 displacement camps and sites. Another 36,000 people were considered as “people in humanitarian need” having been adversely affected by the violence but without having been displaced. The displa camps and sites were located across Rakhine State (see details cement 1497 13 were in the map below About 95 per cent of those who were displaced in 2012 - ). , and the remaining five per cent were ethnic Muslims , the great majority of them Rohingya 1498 Rakhine and Ma . ramagyi 1492 See this chapter, section C.5 : Spreading hate. 1493 DI - 077. 1494 ( Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, Final report July 2013) 1495 See chapter X, section B.2.b : Case study 2: violence and oppression in Rakhine State. 1496 Approximately 100,000 people were displaced in the June 2012 violence, and the r est as a result of the October 2012 violence. 1497 United Nations, Rakhine Response Plan (Myanmar) – July 2012 – December 2013 , p. 4 1498 069. - K 162

163 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 OCHA map of June 2013 showing the populatino affected by the 2012 violence in Rakhine State 690. By mid - 2013, about 20 displacement sites in Sittwe and Maungdaw had closed. These were small sites, such as monasteries, where mostly ethnic Rakhine people had stayed for a short period. By the end of 2015, approximately 25,000 displaced people , including most of the Rakhine resettle, with individual housing or , had been assisted to return to their homes to assistance provided by the Rakhine State Government with support from the international 1499 community. mainly Rohingya along with a small number of 691. As of 31 July 2018, 128,000 people – 1500 – still remained in 23 displacement camps and sites across cent ral Rakhine State. Kaman 1499 K - 069. 1500 as of 31 July 2018” (20 August 2018). OCHA, “M yanmar: IDP Sites in Rakhine State - 163

164 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 They have not been allowed to return to their place s of origin , and have been confined with severe restrictions on their freedom of movement. The majority of the displaced live in a ). s in the map below large area on the outskirts of Sittwe town (see detail OCHA map of July 2018 showing the displaced population in Rakhine State 692. The camps in Rakhine State do not meet international standards for long - term camp Mission considers that the holding of , the populations. Moreover, as highlighted ab ove 164

165 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Rohingya and Kaman in these camps and sites since 2012 constitutes an arbitrary and 1501 discriminatory deprivation of their liberty. According to credible reports, when the camps were established, the author 693. ities 1502 decided on their location and stated that they would not be permanent. However, six years later, little has changed, with no indication that the situation will be resolved in the foreseeable future. The displaced population is heavily dependent on h umanitarian assistance. The humanitarian community faces multiple challenges in seeking to improve - crowded long - houses with conditions in the camps. Most of the displaced live in over inadequate privacy and restrictions on access to livelihoods, health and education. 4,000 people displaced in the Nget Chaung 2 camp in Pauktaw Township live in muddy, wet, - lying land, which is continuously unsanitary conditions because the camp is located on low 1503 flooded. During her visit in April 2018, the United Nations Ass istant Secretary - General for Humanitarian Affairs described the conditions in the camps as “beyond the dignity of any 1504 people”. 694. In its interim report of March 2017, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (the that Advisory Commission) recommended prepare s a comprehensive the Government strategy towards the closure of all the IDP camps “through a consultation process with 1505 affected communities”. As a “first step and sign of goodwill”, t he Commission called for the return and relocation of displaced people from three locations in Ramree, Pauktaw and . The Government claim ed in May 2017 to have achieved this. However, while it Kyaukpyu moved e thnic Rakhine from Kyaukpyu to successfully relocation site within Rakhine State, a 55 Kaman households were re located from Ramree to Yangon . They were told that they would not be allowed to return to their places of origin and were given small financial incentives. Furthermore, rather than returning the Rohingya from Kyein Ni Pyin camp s origin, or offering them a durable solution elsewhere, the of (Pauktaw) to their place 1506 . Similarly, the Government built individual houses on their displacement site Government’s pilot project to start closing the remaining displacement camps in Rakhine 1507 State , announced on 2 January 2018 , is highly unsatisfactory. According to credible camps and returning the displaced to in the pilot project, reports, instead of closing the 10 their place s of origin or relocating them, the intention is to convert some of the displacement camps into villages. This goes against the wish, expressed by the majority of the displaced, 1508 to return to their places of origin, often located in urban centres. It is also contrary to the . Implementation of these pl final recommendations of the Advisory Commission ans, as with Kyein Ni Pyin, will further en trench marginalization , segregation and confine ment . 695. The Mission is extremely concerned about the protracted confinement of Rohingya and Kaman communities in these camps and sites, which has a devastating imp act on the human rights of these individuals. It urges the Myanmar authorities to resolve the situation urgently in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Its principle 28 underscores the primary duty and responsibility o f the competent authorities to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily to another part o f the country. It further stipulates that authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returnees, and that special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of the affected persons in the planning and management of their ret urn. 1501 chapter, section B.2.f See this : Conclusion. 1502 069. K - 1. 1503 K - 069. 1. 1504 See video: https://twitter.com/uschimuller/status/981625075953782784?lang=fr 1505 Interim Report and Recommendations (March 2017) , p. 12 - Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 13 1506 K Final report (July 2013), p. 35; Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, - 063 1507 The Global New Light of Myanmar, “ Meeting on IDP camps, freedom of movement matters held in Rakhine State ” (3 January 2018) ; Statement by the Office of the State Counsellor on the Final Report of the Adviso ry Commission on Rakhine State ( 24 August 2017 ). 1508 069. 1. K - 063, K - 165

166 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 5 . Spreading hate Rohingya sentiment - (a) Inciting anti The Mission has examined documents, publications, statements, Facebook posts and 696. audio - visual materials that have contributed to shaping public opinion on the Rohingya and Muslims more gen erally. The analysis demonstrates that a carefully crafted hate campaign has developed a negative perception of Muslims among the broad population in Myanmar. This campaign has been the work of a few key players: nationalistic political parties and politic ians, leading monks, academics, prominent individuals and members of the Government. This hate campaign, which continues to the present day, portrays the Rohingya 1509 and other Muslims as an existential threat to Myanmar and to Buddhism. In the case of the Rohingya, it has gone a step further. It is accompanied by dehumanising language and the branding of the entire community as “illegal Bengali immigrants”. This discourse created a conducive environment for the 2012 and 2013 anti - Muslim violence in Rakhine State and beyond, without strong opposition from the general population. It also enabled the hardening of repressive measures against the Rohingya and Kaman in Rakhine State and subsequent waves of State - led violence in 2016 and 2017. 697. - Muslim campaigns are not a recent phenomenon in Myanmar. A book published Anti - in the 1980s by an anonymous author, spells out a series of anti Muslim concepts and admonitions that would resurface and gain traction 20 and 30 years later. Entitled “Fear of extinction of the race”, the book presents Islam as a serious threat to Buddhism and calls on people to “protect their race and religion”. It states that Buddhist women are particularly ndly with people of other religions. vulnerable and that children should be taught not to be frie The book also calls the readers not to do business with Muslims (referred to by the derogatory 1510 term “Kalars” ) and states that, “ it is certain that in 100 years, the glorious Buddhism along with Myanmar ethnic people wi ll disappear completely ”. It also calls for a boycott of Muslim shops (“... and states: buying from them is like watering poisonous plants ...”) If we are not careful, it is certain that the whole country will be swallowed by the Muslim Kalars (...). When we stu dy world - history, we can see that different races of the world did not get swallowed to extinction by the earth, but only by other 1511 humans. 698. This book was published close to the adoption of the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law. According to credible reports, it was initially banned by the military Government but 1512 Muslim pamphlets. In 2001, violence was later distributed either in full or in shorter anti - broke out in Taungoo (Pegu division), reportedly after the distribution of these pamphlets by the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which later became the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), established in 2010 by former senior military officers. The 1513 mos ques destroyed and houses b urned. violence reportedly l eft around 200 Muslims dead, The main narrative of the book and the calls for boycotts of Muslim businesses were 1514 More generally, the idea amplified by the 969 movement in 2012 and later by MaBaTha. that there is risk for one race to extinguish another can be found in the mott o of the Ministry of Immigration and Population, now the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population: The earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another race will. The Ministry has had this motto since its establishment in 1995 but some r eports trace 699. it back to the first military dictator, General Ne Win, around 1962. Credible reports indicate 1509 See chapter VI, section B.2 : Finding s on the issue of hate speech. 1510 The word “Kalar” is used as a racist slur to insult and highlight someone’s dark skin or foreign ancestry. 1511 K - 112. Unofficial translation of A Myo Pyaut Mhar Soe Kyaut Sayar 1512 K - 111. 1513 K - 111. 1514 For a brief description of 969 and MaBaTha, see chapter III, section B.2 : Place of Buddhism in society. 166

167 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1515 that until recently this motto was displayed prominently on billboards and in offices. Ministry’s Although this motto now appears to be less prominent, it is still featured on the . On 26 August 2011, during a discussion in the lower house of Parliament about the website issuance of white cards to the Rohingya, the then Minister of Immigration stated: “Our gan ‘Race is not swallowed by the earth but by Ministry is trying its best to uphold the slo 1516 another race’”. 700. Another influential publication in relation to the hate narrative against the Rohingya – The illegal Muslims in Arakan by U Shwe Zan and Dr. Aye Chan, Influx viruses is the book 1517 The title and content of the publication published in the United States in August 2005. refer to the Rohingya in an offensive and degrading manner, with a stark difference between the English and Myanmar language sections. The latter refer to the Rohingya as “hair y with long beards” and to “Bengali Kalars ... swallowing other races”. Similar patterns are seen Paccima zone magazine, where the English content – some of which was also with the authored by Dr. Aye Chan was drafted in a very different tone and style to the Myanmar – language content, possibly in an attempt to project a more acceptable image to the international communit y. Several interlocutors informed the Mission that the publication of the Paccima zone 701. magazine in February 2012 marked a turning point in the targeted campaign of hate and 1518 The first volume of the mag azine includes hostility against the Rohingya in Rakhine State. the Maungdaw District Administrator. It also lists some of the most a foreword drafted by senior State officials and police chiefs from Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships as s of monks who “patrons” and “committee members” and includes the names and picture 1519 were “consultants”. - Rohingya articles 702. The magazine includes one section containing a series of anti written with provocative titles such as “Black tsunami in a pitiful disguise” or “Slow invasion”. Articles present the entire Rohingya population as terrorists; assert that the term “Rohingya” was invented to take over the land; make reference to a “Rohingya invasion”; challenge the claim that the Rohingya suffer human rights violations; portray the Rohingya as perpetrators of serious ab uses; and accuse the international community of believing “Rohingya lies” and in prioritising Maungdaw and Buthidaung over other parts of Rakhine State. In one article, the Rohingya are referred to as the “common enemy” of all the ethnic 1520 Another article, “What the Rohingya is”, states: groups in Myanmar . What the Rohingya is, is the latest weapon of the religious extremist terrorists... they are trying their very best to steal the land. Current actions of the Muslim extremists 1521 are extremely frightful. 1515 240. V - 1516 Pyithu Hluttaw, “ Question from U Thein Nyunt of Thingankyun Constituency, on whether the Union gration Offices incurred arbitrary delays Government was aware of the fact that the Township Immi for people of Islamic faith to go through the nationality verification process, to obtain household list and birth certificates, as answered by the Minister of Immigr ation and Population, U Khin Yi” ( 26 ) August 2011 https://pyithu.hluttaw.mm/question - 2747 , available at: 1517 K - 112 . The first author used to be an immigration officer in Rakhine State, while the second author is a Rakhine historian and professor at Kanda University of International Studies in Japan. He is currently the Chair of the “Ancillary Committee for Reconstruction of Rakhine National Territory in the Western Frontier”, a body set up after the 25 August 2017 attacks. 1518 112). Paccima zone magazine, v olume 1. On file with the Mission (K - “Paccima zone” refers to the Maungdaw - Buthidaung region. 1519 Maungdaw District Administrator; Chief of Maungdaw District Police Force; Maungdaw District Buthidaung Township Police Force; Chief of Planner; Buthidaung Township Administrator; Chief of Buthidaung Township Planning Administration, and the Administrator of GAD for Buthidaung Township. 1520 n the so Paccima zone magazine, volume 1 , “Local people’s view o - called Rohingya” (February 2012) pp. 60 - 61. , 1521 San Shwe Maun g, “What the Rohingya is” ( Paccima zone magazine , volume 1, February 2012) pp. - 32. 30 167

168 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 7 03. The presence of key northern Rakhine State officials in the editorial board indicates that these articles had their backing or at least their tacit approval. It gives an indication of the attitude of State officials towards the Rohingya shortly ahead o f the 2012 violence. The themes covered in the magazine were amplified and used more systematically to cultivate the hate environment against the Rohingya prior to and after the commencement of the violence. 704. On 29 May 2012, seven days before the report in the New Light of Myanmar, the Narinjara newspaper published an article about the murder of Ma Thida Htwe the previous day, and referred to it as the “worst homicide case in Myanmar”. Quoting a police officer, the article stated that the woman was raped by “Kalars”. This article was republished in the Arakan Independent Bulletin with a graphic picture of her dead body. The author called on 1522 all the ethnic Rakhine to be united when dealing with the Rohingya issue . 705. On 1 June 2012 – three days after the murder of Ma Thida Htwe and two days before the killing of the 10 Muslims in Toungup – Zaw Htay, the spokesperson of the President of ut the arrival Myanmar, posted a statement on his personal Facebook account. He warned abo from abroad of “Rohingya terrorists” from the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and stated that the Myanmar troops would “completely destroy them”: Rohingya terrorists as members of the RSO are crossing the border into Myanmar with wea pons. ... Our troops have received the news in advance so they will completely destroy them [the Rohingya]. It can be assumed that the troops are already destroying them [the Rohingya]. We don’t want to hear any humanitarian or human want to hear your moral superiority, or so rights excuses. We don’t called peace and - loving kindness. (Go and look at Buthidaung, Maungdaw areas in Rakhine State. Our ethnic people are in constant fear in their own land. I feel very bitter about this. This is our country. This is our land.) (I’m talking to you, national parties, MPs, civil 1523 societie s, who are always opposing the President and the G overnment.) 706. Although this post was later deleted, the impact of a high official equating the Rohingya population with terrorism ma y have been significant ahead of the 2012 violence, which erupted a week later. 707. On 8 June 2012, the newspaper Eleven Media – one of the most widely read reported on the violence that took place that day in Maungdaw. publications in Myanmar – the title “Curfew imposed in Rakhine Township amidst Rohingya terrorist attacks”, it Under attributed the violence exclusively to “Rohingya terrorist attacks” and made no mention of 1524 the violence carried out by ethnic Rakhine and security forces against the Rohin gya. Both the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) and the 88 Generation 708. - Rohingya statements in two articles published by Eleven Media. Students group made anti These quotes went far beyond the specific events that took place in Maungdaw o n 8 June 2012. The RNDP statement was reported as being made as early as 4.15 pm on 8 June, only three hours after the beginning of the violence. It labelled the violence as “terrorist about attacks” and stressed the fact that the Rohingya were not among t he 135 recognised ethnic groups in Myanmar: Rohingyas are not the national ethnics. As successive government officials favoured and issued them national registration cards by taking briberies, they are acting as the - indulgent persons. Due to the contr ol of Rakhine ethnics, they could not widely over spread until now. The prevailing attacks mean insulting the hosts by the guests. This 1525 is a terrorist attack. 1522 dent Bulletin, Issue 4, No. 11 ( Arakan Indepen May 2012 ) , pages 3 - 6 . 1523 V - 247. 1524 Eleven Media, “ Curfew imposed in Rakhine township amidst Rohingya terr orist attacks” (8 June 2012), available at: http://aboutarakaneng.blogspot.com/2012/06/curfew - imposed - in - rakhine - township.html 1525 Eleven Media, “ Curfew imposed in Rakhine township amidst Rohingya terrorist attacks” (8 June rakhine 2012), available at: http://aboutarakaneng.blogspot.com/2012/06/curfew - imposed - in - - township.html 168

169 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 On the same day, Eleven Media also published a statement of Dr. Aye Maung, the 709. Chair of the RNDP , in which he drew parallels between the violence in Maungdaw on 8 June 2012 and the 1942 violence when more than 60,000 Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine are 1526 - communal violence during the Second World War. believed to have been killed in inter He referred to “a ttacks that seriously threaten the Arakanese people” and called for the on to state that “the Rakhine and Shan States. He went establishment of paramilitary forces in persons behind the curtain”, presumably alleging that Rohingya groups have instigated the 1527 violence, will be “responsible for the consequences”. 710. The 88 Generation Students group made similar statements, with Ko Mya Aye, a prominent leader of the group and former political prisoner, quoted as describing the incident as a “terrorist attack” , referring to “infiltrations” by “illegal migrants”, and calling for a “firm . The article also quoted Ko Ko Gyi, another and solid immigration law” in response prominent member of the 88 Generation Students group and former political prisoner, as stating that the Rohingya were not a Myanmar ethnic race and that this incident might 1528 “threaten the sovereignty of the State”. 711. On 25 June 2012, Eleven Media published an op - ed by its editor - in - chief warning about the “risk and danger of ethnic cleansing or genocide”, as a result of the threat posed by the lives of the Rakhine nationals the Rohingya. It claimed that swift action had save(d) “ 1529 from being attack of genocide”. On 11 July 2012, President Thein Sein held a meeting in Naypyidaw with Mr. Ant 712. onio Guterres, then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. During this meeting, the President referred to “illegal migrants” who “sneaked into” Myanmar and “later took the name Rohingya”. He stated that he could not take responsibility for them and that they should 1530 either be sent to IDP camps and be supported by UNHCR, or be sent to a third country. A depiction of this nature by Myanmar’s highest official further stigmatised the Rohingya in an already tense climate. 713. From mid - June 2012, various groups, including the RNDP, the All Rakhine Refugee Committee, the Wunthanu Rakhita Association and Buddhist monks’ associations, such as the Arakanese Youth Monk’s Association, stepped up activities that served to incite the population in Rakhine State a gainst the Rohingya. They included increasingly extreme calls to the Rakhine population to act, and other provocative statements, with a common theme of the perceived threat represented by the Rohingya and the need to sever ties between 1531 xample, on 26 June 2012, the RNDP warned against the threat of the For e communities. “present population of Bengali” and called for a “final solution”. One of the recommendations of the RNDP was to “relocate the non Myanmar national Bengali to a third - 1532 The RNDP al so praised Hitler and argued that inhuman acts were sometimes country”. necessary to maintain a race. In a November 2012 publication, it identified a collective need a decisive stand on the issue of Bengali Muslims”. It went on, “if we do not to take “ olve these problems, which we have inherited from several previous courageously s generations, and instead hand them over to the next generation, we will go down in history as irresponsible”: 1526 See for a study on the 1942 events: J. Leider, “Conflict and Mass violence in Arakan (Rakhine State) – The 1942 Events and Political Identity Formation”, in Citizenship in Myanmar, A. South, M. Lall (eds.), (Chiang Mai Universit y Press, 2018), pp. 193 - 221, noting that “the waves of communal clashes of 1942 have been poorly documented, sparsely investigated and rarely studied” (p. 194) and that “the absence of a factual master narrative, which both Buddhists and Muslims could have agreed upon, barred the emergence of consensual interpretations of the events” (p. 211). 1527 Curfew imposed in Rakhine township amidst Rohingya terrorist attacks” (8 June Eleven Media, “ 2012), available at: http://aboutarakaneng.blogspot.com/2012/06/curfew imposed - in - rakhine - - township.html 1528 Ibid. 1529 Than Htut Aung, “I will tell the real truth” (Eleven, 25 June 2012). 1530 V - 243. 1531 K - 112 . 1532 242. - V 169

170 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Although Hitler and Eichmann were the greatest enemies of the Jews, they were probably heroes to the Germans. America had to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why? If inhumane acts are sometimes permitted to maintain a race, a country and the sovereignty... our endeavours to maintain the Rakhine race and the sovereignty and longevity of the Union of Myanmar cannot be labelled as 1533 inhumane. In July 2012, a group of monks published a statement calling on the ethnic Rakhine 714. to implement a “great plan of staying away from bad Bengali (Kalar)” to prevent a “Rakhine cleaning programme”. The statement called on ethnic Rakhine not to employ ethnic Rohingya and not to trade with them. In October, a conference of monks concluded that there need to “ e xpose sympathisers of Bengali Kalars as national traitors along with photos was a 1534 and to spread the information to every township”. In August 2012, a blog called “ Terrorist 2012” published a poem called “To Thida 715. 1535 Htwe, record written in blood, oath declared in blood”. In 2016, the MaBaTha released a - urder of Ma Thida Htwe and including a background song with video re enacting the m 1536 on CDs and other formats . similar lyrics. The video was widely circulated 716. Specific efforts were also made to sow fear and hatred against the Rohingya among October 2012, soldiers new recruits to the Tatmadaw. In received specific training reportedly at the Naypyidaw Divisional Military Headquarters on the “expansion of Islam” and the “extinction of Buddhism”. A presentation titled “Fear of extinction of the race” echoed some of the main anti - Muslim themes of the book published 30 years before. It concluded with the 1537 need to “protect our race and religion as much as possible”. (b) Inciting negative sentiments against the international community Following the 2012 violence, the operating conditions for international organi z ations 717. z ations assisting Rohingya in Rakhine State deteriorated severely. Humanitarian organi communities faced extreme hostility or even violence. This took place regardless of whether they also assisted ethnic Rakhine. Rumours were spread that the Rohingya were being unfairly prioritised for humanitarian assistance over the ethnic Rakhine . This translated into 1538 hostility against international organi T his ations. hostility was already prevalent in z northern Rakhine State prior to the 2012 violence but afterwards, with the support given to displacement camps and sites in central Rakhine, it became more apparent in central Rakhine also. Again, i t was fuelled by nationalist groups, political parties and monks. For example, t he Group of Wunthanu Ethnic People circulated a letter accusing the United Nations and 1539 international organizations of “watering poisonous plants” The , using a recurrent analogy. letter labelled nine leading international organizations as “traitors” for as sisting the Rohingya. The group also warned landlords against renting properties to organizations 1540 assisting the Rohingya. 718. This narrative was also spread by some government officials. In late February 2014, ain health care providers in north ern Rakhine State, an international organization, one of the m statement on was ordered to cease operations throughout Myanmar, shortly after releasing a 1541 killings in Du Chee Yar Tan, Maungdaw Township. reported The Presidential 1533 RNDP, Toe Thet Yay Journal, vol. 2(12) (November 2012) . 1534 K - 112 . 1535 http://terrorist2012.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog - post.html. 1536 - 234). Facebook posts with the video have since been deleted. A copy is on file with the Mission (V 1537 106 K - .3. 1538 A/69/398 . 1539 . Analogy originally used in the book Fear of extinction of the race in the 1980s See this chapter, section C.5 Spreading hate. : 1540 ). On file with the Mission ( K - 112 1541 In January 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a press release calling on the Government to investigate credible reports that more than 40 Rohingya had been killed in Du Chee Yar Tan between 9 and 13 January 2014. The Governm ent strongly denied these allegations. 170

171 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1542 pokesperson reportedly said it was “ giving Bengalis preferential treatment” The s . 1543 This left organization was not permitted to return to Rakhine State until December 2014. many beneficiaries, particularly in the north of Rakhine State , without access to vital, and in - saving, health services. some cas es life 1544 On 26 and 27 March 2014, in the lead up to the national census, the premises of 719. more than 30 United Nations and other international organizations in Sittwe were attacked and destruction of by large groups of ethnic Rakhine. There was extensive looting 1545 property. A stray bullet from the security forces engaged in crowd control reportedly 1546 Around 300 humanitarian staff members were struck and killed an ethnic Rakhine child. for four weeks. The dominant temporarily evacuated and most humanitarian activities ceased narrative is that the violence was sparked by reports that a Buddhist flag, hung in opposition 1547 to the census, had been removed by a humanitarian worker from outside her house. 1548 However, credible reports indicate that the violen ce was coordinated and pre planned. - Shortly afterwards, on 29 March 2014, the Government reneged on an explicit commitment - to allow the Rohingya to self identify in the census. 720. These incidents had a significant impact on the provision of services to both communities, but particularly to the Rohingya. By June 2014, the capacity of the 1549 leaving humanitarian community was only 60 per cent of what it was before March 2014, populations in need without access to vital services for a prolonged period. 721. During this period, the Government also reportedly started to require that the Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities each receive 50 per cent of any assistance, 1550 The Emergency Coordination Center (ECC), a body regardless of humanitarian need. o facilitate humanitarian activities in Rakhine State, was expanded to include local intended t Rakhine community leaders alongside the original membership of the authorities and 1551 police. The delay in resumption of humanitarian operations appears to have been at least 1552 to some extent due to the ECC. The ECC also appears to have taken on a monitoring 1553 function, to ensure “balanced” distribution of aid. Ethnic Rakhine national staff of international organizations faced threats and 722. intimidation from their community and reported feeling like traitors for continuing their 1554 1555 International staff faced harassment in the streets and in some cases threats. work. 723. Successive United Nations S pecial Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in Myanmar were met with protests and in some cases faced threats. In August 2013, then Special Rapporteur Thomas Quintana was surrounded with demonstrators, some of whom punched and kicked the doors of v ehicles in his convoy when he attempted to visit Mei k tila 1556 (Mandalay Region) after the violent attacks against the Muslim community. In January 1557 “ bills, 2015, during a public rally promoting the ” Ashin Wirathu called Race and Religion 1542 V - 053, V - 333 . 1543 335. - V 1544 See this chapter, introduction. 1545 - 069.9 ; V K 337. - 1546 V 338. - 1547 Ibid, V 339 . - 1548 069.10 K - ; V - 168 , V - 337. 1549 V - 340 . 1550 169. V - 1551 K - 069.11 . 1552 069.12 K - . 1553 V - 169 . 1554 K - 069.11 . 1555 V - 341. 1556 V - 168; Tomás Ojea Quintana, “Statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar” (21 August 2013), available at : - http://yangon.sites.unicnetwork.org/2013/08/21/statement of - the - special - rapporteur - on - the - situation - in of human - rig hts - - - myanmar - 2/ 1557 Restrictions related to marriage and child. See this chapter, section B.5.b : 171

172 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1558 apporteur, Yanghee Lee a “bitch” and a “whore” . , He later threatened the current Special R in response to her report to the United Nations her with violence Human Rights 1559 According to credible reports, - nationalist Council there have been instances where . ultra prevented international organizations from have dividuals or organizations ethnic Rakhine in delivering aid to Rohingya communities or transferring those in need of medical care to 1560 hospitals. Overall analysis 6. nce (a) Relationships between communities before the 2012 viole The problems in Rakhine State are often ascribed to poor relations between the 724. rooted grievances and prejudices. Yet, Rohingya and the ethnic Rakhine, reflective of deeply - the majority of Rohingya and Rakhine interviewed by the Mission on this topic indicated that 1561 or very their relationship with the other community before the 2012 violence was good 1563 1562 good Some Others stated that there were “no problems” or “no tension” before 2012 . . various business dealings, mentioned having friends from the other community, engaging in studying together, visiting each other’s festivals. other’s houses or even celebrating each Some Rakhine interviewees stated they had no interaction with the Rohingya, as there were 1564 no Rohingya in or near their villages. O 725. ne ethnic Rakhine from Maungdaw stated that he had many Muslim friends but 1565 mistrust grew between the two communities after the 2012 violence . Another Rakhine , said: from Kyaukpyu, who left Myanmar after the 2012 violence The relation between Rakhine and R ohingya was peaceful until I left Myanmar. Rakhine do not have any problem with the Muslims. The problem is with the 1566 repression by the military. One Rohingya from Maungdaw town said: 726. Before the 2012 violence, the relationship between the Buddhists a nd the Muslims was good. We had no problems. We went to their houses and they came to ours. Even in the monastery we had good relationships. We used to exchange food for Muslim and football Buddhist festivals. I used to go to the monastery compound nearby and play 1567 with the young monks . Some Rohingya expressed negative feelings against the way ethnic Rakhine treated 727. about difficulties with their them at school or at university. A few interviewees did speak 1568 fter the 2012 violence, the Rakhine neighbours before the 2012 violence. However, a relationship between the ethnic Rakhine and the Rohingya communities seriously 1569 Many interactions between the communities stopped or were significantly deteriorated. he policy reduced, either out of fear or of segregation imposed in central because of t 1570 Rakhine. 1558 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=comAfSalvEY Video available on youtube at 1559 Yanghee Lee, “St atement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar at ” ( the 28th session of the Human Rights Council ) , available at 16 March 2015 ht tps://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15713&LangID=E 1560 - V 343, V 344 . - 1561 062, CI 162, - CI - 057, CI - 155, CI - 063, CI - 064, CI - 082, CI - 083, CI - 086, CI - 091, CI - 097, CI - 154, CI - - DI - 017, DI - 047, DI - 051, DI - 053, DI - 073, QI 003, DI 072, QI - 073, QI - 075, QI - 076 . - 1562 159, CI CI - 065, CI - 085, CI - 088, CI - 158, CI - - 173, CI - 175, DI - 022, DI - 023, DI - 075, QI - 105 . 1563 019, DI CI - 153, CI - 157, DI - 014, DI - - 031, DI - 055, DM - 002 . 1564 - 029, DI DI - 018, DI 028, DI - - 030, DI - 032, DI - 033, QI - 074 . 1565 CI - 158 . 1566 154 CI - . 1567 DI - 073 . 1568 020 DI - 001, DI - 004, DI - . 1569 163, DI CI - 086, CI - 158, CI - 159, CI - 160, CI - 162, CI - - 022, DI - 023, DI - 047, DI - 051, DI - 075, QI - 105 . 1570 Specific restrictions in central Rakhine State. See this chapter, section B.2.d : 172

173 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (b) Pre - planning, instigation and role of security forces The Government’s portrayal of the 2012 violence as “intercommunal” between the 728. Rohingya and Rakhine has prevailed but is inaccurate. While there certainly was violence between Rohingya and Rakhine groups, resulting in killing and destruction of property, these attacks were not spontaneous outbursts of hostility. They resulted from a plan to instigate violence and build tensions. This was facilitate d and amplified by the hate campaign that 1571 Myanmar started in February 2012 and intensified significantly after 28 May 2012. security forces failed to stop the violence and often actively participated. Distribution of pamphlets inciting ethnic Rakhine According to credible information, incendiary letters or pamphlets were distributed to 729. ethnic Rakhine before some of the incidents. In Sittwe, a few days before the violence in June 1572 2012, pamphlets were reportedly members of the ethnic Rak hine community received by ing each household request to send at least one person to participate in planned attacks on Rohingya neighbourhoods, while others were asked to remain behind to defend their village in case of retaliatory attacks. One credible report quotes Rohingya interviewees stating that before the violence they saw pamphlets being distributed to Rakhine houses by people on motorbikes. They realised that something was happening but even close Rakhine friends 1573 An would not tell them what the pamphlets said. interviewee from the town of Ramree, which also saw significant violence in June 2012, stating that Muslims referred to pamphlets should not be allowed in Myanmar. He was warned by one of his Rakhine friends that some 1574 of the Rakhine were planning to attack Muslims and destroy his village. Transportation of ethnic Rakhine and distribution of weapons 730. Ethnic Rakhine were transported in groups ahead of the violence and weapons were also distributed. According to credible reports, in June 2012, gro ups of Rakhine were brought 1575 to Sittwe downtown on boats and buses. As they were waiting next to the bus, they were 1576 Another report states that before one of the attacks, reportedly given sticks and machetes. men on motorbikes had allegedly driven around s houting that the attack would take place at 1577 Similarly, one Kaman interviewee from Kyaukpyu told the 2 pm, as later transpired. , ahead of the violence in Paik Seik on 25 October 2012, he saw members of the Mission that nd knives to the ethnic Rakhine, in the presence of RNDP distributing alcohol, machetes a 1578 security forces. 731. One interviewee , who lived in Shikdar hamlet , near the entrance of Maungdaw town, witnessed the arrival at various monasteries of a large number of ethnic Rakhine who she did 1579 . not r ecognise, reportedly in military vehicles Similarly, another interviewee described how , on 8 June 2012, she saw Tatmadaw soldiers collect ethnic Rakhine and their valuables k place soon in their vehicles, reportedly to protect them from the burning of houses that too 1580 after. The simultaneous nature of many of the incidents further indicates pre - 732. planning. The initial violence in Maungdaw on 8 June 2012 was followed within 12 hours by a significant outbreak of violence in Sittwe, some 60 kilometres to the south. Similarly, in October 2012 , 1571 See this chapter, section C.5 : Spreading hate. 1572 K - 114, K - 076.9.20, K - 076.9.24. 1573 K - 076.9.24 . 1574 - CI 171 . 1575 K - 076.9.18, K - 114, V - 168 . 1576 V - 168 . 1577 K - 076.17 . 1578 CI - 165 . 1579 DI - 026. 1580 054. - DI 173

174 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ttacks by ethnic Rakhine against Muslims took place almost simultaneously in nine a 1581 between 21 and 25 October 2012. townships across Rakhine State Involvement of local officials and security forces State actor s, including village administrators and members of the security forces , were 733. in the violence. The security forces actively participated in involved significantly violence or 1582 . For example, on 10 June 2012, security forces stood aside and watched failed to stop it 1583 The police and as an ethnic Rakhine mob burned Kaman houses in Ramree. Tatmadaw the had the capacity to intervene and halt but chose not to do so. I n October 2012, violence a ile , i nterviewees stated th Rakhine State was under a state of emergency t, when they wh 1584 to seek protection, they were refused approached assistance . district and township officials One interviewee from Kyaukpyu received a similar response from a senior township official k who told him that the fire engine could not be used to put in October 2012 in west Paik Sei 1585 . A out the burning houses because no permission had been given by “high officials” ood credible source reported that police and ethnic Rakhine casually st together during the burning in areas of Kyaukpyu. While the Muslims attempted to extinguish fires, ethnic 1586 . ed idly at the other end of the road Rakhine, the security forces and a fire truck all wait The Mission also received accounts from both Sittwe and Kyaukpyu of fire brigades 734. which fall under the authori ty of the Tatmadaw - actually spread ing fires instead of - 1587 One interviewee from Sittwe shared the following account from June extinguishing them. 2012: A vehicle came to extinguish the fires. However, when the firefighters spread liquid I realized that they were spreading petrol and not water. It increased from the vehicle, 1588 . the flames instead of stopping the fire 735. local government officials were present when ethnic Rakhine were In Kyaukpyu, 1589 interv Instead of setting houses on fire in October 2012. ening , one official accused Kaman 1590 and Rohingya villagers of burning the houses and told them to leave. Also in Kyaukpyu, security forces , who had been paid by Muslim villagers for weeks to ensure their protection in Paik Seik left in the morning of 22 Oc tober 2012, just a few hours before ethnic Rakhine , 1591 attacked the area. Involvement of monks and political parties z 736. Rakhine nationalist political parties and organi ations as well as influential monks hrough either instigation or direct participation. also played an important role in the violence, t Monks and members of the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) were 1592 reportedly involved in the attacks that took place in Sittwe. More generally, influential vement appear to have been engaged from the earliest Buddhist organizations and the 969 mo fuelling anti - , , instigating ethnic Rakhine to carry out the stages in 2012 Muslim sentiments 1593 . violence, or directly participating in violence 1581 V - 050. 1582 See this chapter, section C.1: Emblematic incidents. 1583 CI - 163, CI - 171 . 1584 CI - 085, CI - 165, CI 168, CI - 170. - 1585 CI - 168 . 1586 V - 050. 1587 021, DI 022; K CI 083, CI - 084, CI - 166, CI - 168, DI - - - 109, KI - 076.17 . 1588 - 166; KI CI 076.17 . - 1589 CI - 165, CI - 168, CI 170 . - 1590 - CI - 085, CI - 165, CI 168, CI - 170 . 1591 DI - 021, DI - 024; V - 050 . 1592 - CI - 171; K - 114, K - 076.9.16, K 076.9.17, K - 076.9.20, K - 076.9.22, K - 076.9.23, K - 076.9.32. 1593 - 164. CI 174

175 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 In Kyaukpyu, a group of ethnic Rakhine from other areas was reportedly led by a 737. local 1594 of the 969 group to burn Kaman houses in October 2012. Similarly, violence that leader Kaman community in 2013 was instigated and led by members of th targeted Thandwe’s e 1595 One Kaman 969 movement, with the active or passive support of security forces. interviewee recognised the leader of the 969 group in Thandwe , who was also reportedly 1596 Muslims in Toungoup on 3 June 2012. connected with the killing of the 10 Credible repo rts also suggest the involvement of the RNDP in inciting ethnic Rakhine before the 1597 violence in Kyaukpyu. Moreover, t he Mission received credible reports suggesting linkages between the 738. leadership of 969 and MaBaT a and the Tatmadaw or some members of the Government h 1598 affiliated with the Tatmadaw. One report suggests that senior officials approached former leaders of the 2007 “Saffron revolution”, upon their release from prison, and encouraged incentives to do so. It is them to join 969 or MaBaTha and offering financial and other 1599 reported that some monks refused this, while others, notably Ashin Wirathu, accepted. Given the important role played by 969 and MaBaTha in fuelling anti - Muslim violence in Myanmar, these allegations are significant and warrant further investigation. Specific events in Maungdaw Various witnesses suggest that men might have 739. accounts by Rakhine and Rohingya 1600 brought to Maungdaw to participate in the violence been or that the security forces sible for some of the burning of Rakhine houses in themselves might have been respon 1601 Maungdaw. President Thein Sein stating the violence was instigated 740. In a statement issued on 25 October 2012, President Thein Sein himself stated that the estrated by “persons and organiz ations who are conducting violence was being orch manipulations in the incidents in Rakhine State behind the scene”. He promised that 1602 perpetrators would be “exposed” and legal action taken against them . However, no legal action wa s taken and the President never clarified who were the alleged perpetrators of the instigation. Echoing the above statement, a credible report quoted an anonymous military source in the central government stating that the October 2012 attacks were carefully organized. The military source reportedly accused “Rakhine nationalists with ties to the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party” of leading the mobs, who were “fuelled by 1603 Buddhist monks spreading anti - Muslim rhetoric”. A year later, on 3 October 2013, the aimed the violence was being instigated, this time referring to President on c e again cl “outsiders” responsible for the violence in Thandwe: Ethnic Rakhine and ethnic Kaman have been living here in peaceful coexistence for many years. External motives instigated violence and con flicts. According to the evidence in hand, rioters who set fire to the villages are outsiders. Participation of all is needed to expose and arrest those who got involved in the incident and those t cause of the problem be instigating the conflict behind the scene. Only then can roo 1604 addressed. 1594 CI - 167 . 1595 - CI - 164, CI 169 . 1596 CI - 164, CI - 169. 1597 CI - 165; V - 050, V - 051. 1598 106; See also DI - 011; K - 101, K - acilitators Hate Speech Narratives and F C 4ADS, Sticks and Stones - in Myanmar . (2016) 1599 DI 011, K - 106, DM - 002. - 1600 - DI - 038, DI - 045, QI 106. 1601 CI - 153 . 1602 The New Light of Myanmar (26 October 2012) . 1603 V - 051 . 1604 Governme nt to The New Light of Myanmar, “No winner in Myanmar’s 60 - year old armed conflict – use all ways and means vested by the Constitution for restoring peace and stability, ensuring rule of 175

176 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Similarities with other anti Muslim violence elsewhere - Myanmar ther waves of anti - Muslim violence beyond Rakhine State in 741. experienced o 2013 and 2014 and included the destruction or burning of mosques. Incidents were reported dalay and Bago Divisions in the following locations: Yangon town (February 2013), Man March 2013) , Oakkan in Yangon Division (April - May 20 13), Hpakant in Kachin State ( May ( Shan State ( May 2 013), Mone in Bago Division ( M ay 201 2013), Lashio in 3) and Mandalay 1605 town ( July 2014). The Mission did not investigate these incidents. However, given their relevance in 742. Muslim violence, it examined understanding the overall dynamics at play in Myanmar in anti - credible accounts that indicate many of th - planned and instigated, ese incidents were pre 1606 following a similar pattern. was often an allegation of rape or another crime by a There Muslim perpetrator against a Buddhist victim, which was quickly spread by 969, whether true or not. Then a public rally was held, aimed at spreading hatred and inciting violence against Muslims. Credible information indicates that almost every major outbreak of communal violence since October 2012 was preceded by a 969 - sponsored preaching tou r in 1607 the area, usually by Ashin Wirathu himself”. In Meiktila, groups of people reportedly went door to door one week before the 743. violence to distribute 969 stickers to Buddhists asking them to put them on their houses to ensure that they would not get burned in the anti Muslim violence that followed. Monks were - 1608 allegedly involved in the violence. 744. In Mandalay, one Muslim and one Buddhist were killed in riots after a social media post went viral , falsely alleging that two Muslim men had raped a Buddhist woman. Credible rep orts established that the violence was instigated and perpetrated by outside agitators. The instigation included two fabricated rape allegations made by a Buddhist woman and a Muslim 1609 woman, reportedly both hired by the same man. In March 2015, these two w omen and three other persons were reportedly convicted and sentenced to 21 years imprisonment under 1610 the Emergency Provisions Act and the Penal Code for making false rape allegations. Senior abbots from Mandalay stated in a pubic report that the rioters – some of them allegedly trying unsuccessfully to recruit them , drunk and dressed like monks – visited them at night to take part in the violence. Similarly, Muslim community leaders from Mandalay stated in the same report that unknown people tried similar t actics on them but they also refused to 1611 The attitude of both Buddhist and Muslim leaders prevented the violence from join. spreading further. Moreover, the President’s Office reportedly decided to temporarily block access to Facebook in Mandalay to preven t the circulation of the fabricated rape allegations 1612 and related information. 7. Conclusion 745. The official narrative according to which the 2012 violence was “intercommunal” has prevailed both in Myanmar and internationally. While some human rights organizations, commentators and journalists have questioned it, they Regard less remained isolated voices. of whether it was the intent and purpose from the outset , the Myanmar authorities have used the narrative as a justification to further oppress the Rohingya and the Kaman communities, law in Rakhine State: President” (4 October 2013), available at: - - 2013 - http://ww w.burmalibrary.org/docs16/NLM 04 - red.pdf 10 1605 V - 049 . 1606 V - 167 . 1607 V - 167 . 1608 V - 049 . 1609 V - 167 . 1610 published in the Burmese version of the State The information was first - run newspaper, Myanma Alin 19 March 2015 ), available at : http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/19.Mar_.15_mal.pdf , n Daily ( p.14 ; K - 238. 1611 V - 167 . 1612 Myanmar” (Wired, 6 July T . McLaughlin , “How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and C onfusion in 2018). 176

177 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 cement camps and sites impose segregation in central Rakhine and confine Muslims to displa for more than six years. Both Rakhine and Rohingya leaders told the Mission that they believed the violence 746. was instigated to divert the attention of the ethnic Rakhine from the Kyaukpyu development project that started in 2009 and was met with strong resistance and protests. They also indicated that it might have been a way for some elements in the Tatmadaw to derail the 1613 and claim back additional power. democratic transition 747. hat the 2012 and 2013 violence in The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude t Rakhine State was pre planned and instigated and that the Myanmar security forces were - actively involved and complicit. They participated in acts of violence. They refused to fulfil their duty to provide protection ally to Rohingya and Kaman in need and their , especi . Local authorities, ultranationalist Rakhine organizations and properties politicians, as well as radical monks instigated and/or assisted in acts of violence, to varying degrees. Given the role of the Tatmadaw in the area at the time, allegations that it had a “hidden hand” in instigating the violence merit further investigation. 748. The extreme levels of violence perpetrated against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine ion – as discussed in the next sections – State in 2016 and 2017, and their mass expuls can only be understood against this backdrop: • Years of concerted hate campaigns against the Rohingya portraying them as “illegal immigrants” constituting a threat to the nation and the Buddhist character of the c ountry, using dehumanising language – with the involvement of and condoning by State authorities and influential figures of authority; • Decades of gradual marginalisation and eroding of rights, resulting in a State - sanctioned and institutionalised system of oppression affecting the lives of Rohingya from birth to death ; restrictions on movement, access to food, liveli Denial of legal identity, hood, health • and education significantly weaken the Rohingya population for years; ing Actively instigated viole • nce between the ethnic Rakhine and the Rohingya, with the involvement of State institutions and other figures of authority, resulting in mass arrests of Rohingya, policies of segregation and the mass displacement and d barb wired “displacement” sites and camps confinement of Rohingya into squalid an - in central Rakhine, where they have been arbitrarily detained for more than six years; and A Government response that has consistently failed to attribute responsibilities, giving • the perpetrators a stamp of ap proval. D 25 August 2017 and “clearance operations” . the That day felt like the last day of this world, as if the whole world was collapsing. I 1614 thought judgment day had arrived. 749. What happened in northern Rakhine State on 25 August 2017 and the following days and weeks was the realisation of a disaster long in the making. It resulted from the systemic oppression of the Rohingya, the 2012 violence, and the Government’s subsequent actions and omissions. It caused the disintegration of a community a nd resulted in a human rights catastrophe, the effects of which will span generations. In the early hours of 25 August, ARSA launched coordinated attacks on a military 750. base and up to 30 security force outposts across northern Rakhine State, in an appa rent response to increased pressure on Rohingya communities and with goal of gaining global the attention . A small number of minimally - trained leaders had some arms, and a significant 1613 006, DM DM - 002, DM - - 007, DM - 008, DI - 012. 1614 - 120. LI 177

178 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Some had improv number of untrained villagers wielded sticks and knives. ised explosive devices. Twelve security personnel were killed. 751. The security forces’ response was immediate, within hours, brutal and grossly he days in t disproportionate. Ostensibly to eliminate the “terrorist threat” posed by ARSA, lowed it encompassed hundreds of villages across Maungdaw, Buthidaung and weeks that fol and Rathedaung Townships. The operations targeted and terrorised the entire Rohingya population; the authorities called them “clearance operations”. They continued for more than hs, and for a considerable period after the Government claimed their completion on two mont 1615 5 September 2017. During the course of the operation more than 40 per cent of all villages in northern Rakhine State were partially or totally destroyed. The most intense p hase was the first three weeks when more than 80 per cent of the destruction was perpetrated. As a result, 1616 September 2018. 5 over 72 ,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh by Despite the operations covering a broad geographic area, they were strikingly similar . 752. would attack a village in the early hours, frequently joined by other soldiers Tatmadaw ethnic Rakhine men security forces, often by sometimes men from other ethnic and th rd and 99 minorities. Elements of the Tatmadaw’s 33 Light Infantry Divisions had been deployed to Rakhine State earlier in August. The operations were designed to instil immediate terror, with people woken by intense rapid weapons fire, explosions, or the shouts and screams of villagers. Structures were se t ablaze and Tatmadaw soldiers fired their guns indiscriminately into houses and fields, and at villagers. 753. suggests a level of preplanning The nature, scale and organization of the operations and design on the part of the Tatmadaw leadership consisten t with the vision of the - in - Chief, Senior - General Min Aung Hlaing, who stated at the height of the Commander - standing one which has become an unfinished operations, “The Bengali problem was a long e it. The government in office is job despite the efforts of the previous governments to solv 1617 taking great care in solving the problem.” 1. A human rights catastrophe The Mission obtained a wealth of information on these events, including over 600 754. interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, satellite imagery, documents, photographs and videos. It examined many incidents in detail. It found consistent patterns of the most serious human rights violations and abuses. Most serious incidents ) (a 755. , as verified by the The events in six villages or areas are set out in detail below the information collected by the Mission, these are among the gravest Mission. Based on incidents in the course of the “clearance operations”. Min Gyi (Tula Toli) 756. Min Gyi (known in Rohingya as Tula Toli) is a village tract locat ed in Maungdaw Township in northern Rakhine State. With a population of approximately 4,300 Rohingya 1618 , it is surrounded and 400 ethnic Rakhine by a river on three sides. Across this river on the eastern side are two other village tracts, Wet Kyein (known i ung) a n Rohingya as Wed Kay i yal Toli). and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit (known in Rohingya as D 1615 “Speech delivered by Her Excellency Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on Government’s efforts with regard to National Reconciliation and Peace” (Facebook post, 19 S eptember 2017), https://www.facebook.com/state.counsellor/posts/speech - by delivered - ency - her - excell - daw - aung - san - suu - kyi - state - counsellor - of - the - /1121130291354519 . 1616 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/ documents/files/iscg_situation_report_05_september_2018.pdf 1617 Senior - General Min Aung Hlaing, “Entire government institutions and people must defend the country with strong patriotism” (Facebook post, 2 September 2017), now defunct, post on file with the Mission . 1618 067. - V - 064, V - 065, V - 066, V 178

179 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Image from 13 February 2018 showing the village tracts in the vicinity of Min Gyi village tract 1619 Gyi. Witnesses 757. On 25 and 26 August 2017, two ARSA attacks took place near Min 1620 The Government further reported hearing gunshots close to Min Gyi on the same dates. reported that ARSA burned down 30 houses and set off a handmade mine in Wet Kyein on 1621 On the same day, the Government also reported that ARSA b 29 August. urned ethnic Mro (Myo) village homes in Khu Daing in Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit village tract and was responsible 1622 for violent acts against Mro villagers during this attack. 758. Between 26 and 29 August 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers carried out two “clearance ons” in the Rohingya villages in Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit village tracts, operati 1623 1624 As they entered Wet Kyein, they used “launchers” to set houses on east of Min Gyi. 1625 1626 fire Then they moved to Pa Da Kar while shooting villagers escaping towards the hills. 1627 Ywar Thit and continued shooting towards villagers and setting houses on fire. Many were 1619 According to the Government, on 25 August “at around 3.35am ”, ARSA attacked a police checkpoint in Net Chaung village, a few kilometres north of Min Gyi. A second Government statement issued a day later reported that, on 26 August 2017, another ARSA attack took place in Wet Kyein at around 7.16pm at a deserted pol ice checkpoint. Information Committee, “Breaking News 8: Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks” (Facebook post, 26 August 2017), - https://www.facebook.co m/InfomationCommittee/posts/786222098217565 ; K 154.2. 1620 - CI - 041, CI - 042, CI 046, CI - 144, CI - 189, EI - 066, QI - 030. 1621 Information Committee, “Breaking News 12: Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks” (Facebook post, 29 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/787636841409424 1622 Information Committee, “Breaking News 17: Extremist terrorists continue setting houses on fire” (Facebook po st 30 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788328661340242 ; EI - 098, RI - 008, V - 067, V 068, Satellite imagery confirms that ethnic Mro homes in Khu Daing were burned down, and while - the Mission believes this information to be credible, it has not been able to verify these allegations. See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. 1623 - - CI - 040, CI - 041, CI - 042, LI - 073, Q1 058, QI - 071, QI - 114, V - 064, V 065. 1624 Tatmadaw soldiers used weapons referred to by many victims as “launchers”. They were described as making loud explosive sounds, after which a whole building or set of buildings rapidly caught fire. “Launcher” likely refers to a wea pon that fires a munition that explodes upon impact. 1625 - CI 042, LI - 073. 1626 CI - 040, LI - 073. 1627 006. - CI - 040, CI - 041, CI - 144, LI - 105, LI - 128, QI - 058, QI - 114, XI 179

180 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 injured. One villager who escaped from Wet Kyein recalled that the military were firing at the village from a bridge, using “launchers” and guns. As he tried to flee year - , carrying his 3 - old son, he was shot in the thigh. The bullet went through his leg and entered his son’s chest, 1628 who died on the spot. Another interviewee, a medical shop owner, said he treated at least at at least 100 people were shot and injured 20 people wounded by gunshots, and estimated th 1629 while fleeing. Similar accounts suggest that many others were also shot and killed in both 1630 Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit. - hand accounts of homes burning are corroborated by satellite images 759. The first analysed by UNOSAT showing the destruction of approximately 900 structures in Wet Kyein 1631 and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit village tracts. Some villagers who escaped from Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit, fled towards 760. 1632 of Min Gyi had reassured villagers, including Min Gyi. The ethnic Rakhine chairperson those who had fled from Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit and Wed Kyein, that it was safe to remain in 1633 He told them that the soldiers would come but reassured the villagers not to flee, Min Gyi. 1634 as they would not be harmed. 761. On the morning of 30 August 2017, between 8 and 9am, Tatmadaw soldiers entered 1635 accompanied by armed ethnic Min Gyi, across the river and west of Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit, 1636 They entered Rakhine, members of other ethnic groups and police security forces. the 1637 village from the north, opened fire and began burning houses using “launchers” from the 1638 village outskirts. As the soldiers advanced, villagers fled. Some were able to flee to the 1640 1639 others fled towards a large sandbank area beside the river, kn hills, own as the shore. The soldiers then opened fire directly at the large number of people fleeing towards the 1641 Many people were shot. One man reported: shore. When I came out of my house that morning on hearing gunshots and seeing the village d see the military about half a kilometre away. They were firing their burning, I coul weapons. I immediately ran from my house in the other direction, towards the river and the shore. I think that everybody from my village was running towards the shore. While I was runni ng, there was a lot of shooting and I saw many people hit and falling down. There were a huge amount of people at the shore. Five minutes after I arrived, the military moved to the shore and encircled the group. By this point many houses in 1642 e burning. the village wer 1643 A helicopter was observed flying over the village during the morning. Some 762. 1644 described seeing a helicopter landing in the nearby ethnic Rakhine village and unloading 1645 containers of petrol. 1628 - 073. LI 1629 - 114. QI 1630 - 189, LI - 105, LI - 106, LI - 128, RI - 008, XI - 006. CI 1631 Satellite imagery anal ysis prepared for the Mission by UNOSAT. 1632 - 040, CI - 042, CI - 144, CI - 197, LI - CI - 059, QI - 071, QI - 114. 097, QI 1633 - 040, CI - 041, CI - 042, EI - 066, LI - 078, LI - 095, QI - 058, QI - 059, QI - 071, WI - 037, WI - 038, YI - 025, CI V 064, V - 065, V - 066, V - 069, V - 072. - 1634 CI - 197, LI - 078, LI - - 71, WI - 038. 095, QI 1635 - 066. CI - 046, CI - 144, QI - 066, QI - 067, QI - 068, WI - 004, WI - 037, WI - 039, YI - 025, V - 064, V - 065, V 1636 CI - 197, CI - 198, EI - 066, LI - 075, LI - 078, LI - 098, QI - - 058, QI - 059, QI - 067, QI - 071, YI - 008, YI - 030, QI 025. 1637 - CI - 041, CI - 197, QI - 030, QI - 058, QI 114, WI - 037, YI - 025. 1638 067, QI CI - 042, CI - 046, CI - 198, EI - 102, QI - 058, QI - 059, QI - 060, QI - - 068, WI - 039. 1639 - WI - 038, WI 039, YI - 025. 1640 - - CI - 046, CI - 197, EI 066, EI - 102, LI - 075, QI 030, QI - 058, QI - 066, QI - 067, QI - 068, QI - 071, WI - 037. 1641 CI - 041, EI - 102, LI - 078, QI - 066, QI - - 037. 067, WI 1642 QI - 067. 1643 - CI - 041, CI - 046, CI - 197, EI - 066, LI - 078, LI 095, LI - 098, LI - 128, QI - 058, QI - 068, WI - 037, YI - 008, YI 025. - 1644 - CI - 197, LI - 078, LI 098, QI - 058, YI - 008 , V - 067. 1645 - 025. CI - 144, EI - 066, LI - 095, YI 180

181 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The villagers who made it to the shore were 763. then effectively trapped, on one side by the river, and on the other side by soldiers. “We were running to the sandy field as we didn’t 1646 know where to go. There was nowhere to flee”, reported an elderly woman. 764. eastward to Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Some attempted to swim across the river 1647 Numerous persons, especially elderly and Thit on the far side. Some made it across. 1649 1648 children, drowned. Others were shot by the military while trying to cross the river. shot by soldiers but managed to get away by 765. One interviewee recounted that he was jumping into the river, where he saw another man shot just in front of him. He then swam across the river and saw bodies floating. He could also hear shooting and screaming from the 1650 ribed bodies of men, women and children floating in the Several accounts desc shore. 1651 1652 river. Dozens of bodies were recovered by a group of men at the other side of the river. Those who remained on the shore, who numbered in the hundreds, were then rounded 766. 1653 up. The soldiers separ Soldiers then systematically ated women and children from the men. 1654 killed the men. As one witness described: The first round of shooting was like a rain of bullets. The second round was slow as 1655 t each man and shot. the soldiers killed the men individually. They aimed a gun a Soldiers then killed those who had survived gunshot wounds with long knives, 767. 1656 including children. One woman described how she saw her husband shot, after which his 1657 orted that: throat was slit, and another woman, who lost seven children, rep Soldiers separated the groups into men and women. The men were all in one group, and were killed. Men who were not shot dead, who were struggling or severely 1658 injured, were killed with a knife. The dead bodies were then thrown into pits 768. dug by the military and ethnic Rakhine, 1659 covered with tarpaulin, and set on fire with gasoline. They put all dead bodies into those three pits and then set them on fire. I think that the military used petrol to burn the dead bodies because flames from the fire rose up very 1660 high and fast. 769. also removed jewellery and other valuable items from the dead bodies before Soldiers 1661 setting them on fire. Soldiers then turned to the women 770. and children who, after being separated from the 1662 men, were forced to sit in a lowered area on the shore. Some of the children were shot, 1664 1663 One witness said that, after some thrown into the river, and others thrown onto a fire. 1646 LI 078. - 1647 - - - 095, WI CI 037. 198, LI 1648 CI 197, LI - - 097. 1649 QI - 066, QI - 067, QI - 068, YI - 025. 1650 QI - 067. 1651 - - 040, CI - 042, EI 066, LM - 018, QI CI 058, QI - 066, QI - 067, YI - 025. - 1652 018. - CI - 040, CI - 042, CI - 197, LI - 097, LM 1653 CI - 197, CI - 198, EI - 066, LI - 078, LI - 095, QI 05 8, QI - 059, QI - 060, QI - 067, QI - 071. - 1654 030, QI CI - 042, CI - 046, CI - 197, CI - 198, EI - 066, EI - 081, LI - 075, LI - 078, QI - - 058, QI - 059, QI - 060, QI - 071. 1655 CI - 046. 1656 - CI - 197, LI - 078, QI - 68, QI 071, WI - 037. 1657 EI - 102. 1658 LI - 078. 1659 041, CI CI - - 042, CI - 046, CI - 144, CI - 197, CI - 198, EI - 066, EI - 102, LI - 075, LI - 095, LI - 097, QI - 030, 025, V QI - 059, QI - 067, QI - 068, QI - 071, WI - 038, YI - 008, YI - 058, QI - 064, V - 065. - 1660 CI - 046. 1661 046, CI CI - - 197, LI - 098, QI - 068. 1662 LI - 078. 1663 - CI - 046, CI 144, CI - 197, EI - 102, LI - 078, V - 064, V - 065. 1664 - 097. EI - 102, LI 181

182 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 pter, the soldiers took infants from their mothers’ laps and threw the departure of the helico 1665 Another them into the river. She described seeing children’s bodies “floating away”. year - witness described seeing soldiers stabbing a 10 - old boy who was trying to run away 1666 he described her body turning numb with fear. with a knife . S 771. The soldiers then took women and girls in groups of between five and seven to some 1667 Many women had their young children and infants with them. larger houses in the village. - One mother said that she was wi th her daughter when the soldiers took her, her two sisters - in - law aged between seven and in law, an elderly woman and three of her younger brothers - ten years old. On the way to the houses, they were taken past the large pits in which bodies were being put . A soldier grabbed the woman’s daughter from her, and threw her into one of the pits. She did not want to leave her daughter and just stood there. A soldier then beat her 1668 repeatedly and she was forced to move on towards the houses. Women and girls w into rooms where their jewellery and money was taken 772. ere taken 1671 1669 1670 and frequently stabbed. Children or They were beaten, from them. brutally raped infants who were with them in the room were also killed or severely injured, often by 1672 1673 stabbing. The houses we re then locked and set on fire. The few women who survived, and who spoke with the Mission, displayed both serious burn marks and stab wounds, which 1674 1675 and were deeply traumatised. They also described were consistent with their accounts, 1676 in the houses . of men, women and children A survivor described how seeing dead bodies she was taken together with her sister, her mother, two neighbours and her young daughter and son to one of the houses. When she entered the house she saw women being raped. Then they wer e taken to an empty room where they were robbed, undressed and raped. Her sister, mother and son were killed: “My daughter woke me up saying she was getting burned. They had locked the house and set it on fire. I managed to break down the door, and my daug hter 1677 Another and I managed to escape. I had no clothes on and my skin was very badly burned.” survivor recounted a similar experience: I entered the house with four of my neighbours, and three of us had babies. I knew the house. There were dead bodies on the floor, young boys and older men from our village. After we entered the house, the soldiers locked the door. One soldier raped me. They stabbed me in the back of my neck and in my abdomen. I was trying to save my baby who was only 28 days old but they t hrew him on the ground and he died. The other women who were there were also raped. It was late in the afternoon when I became conscious. I awoke because small flames were dropping from the roof onto my body. I was the only one who survived in that room. I could barely move but I realised I was going to burn to death. Although my baby was dead, I held him close to my heart, but I could not bring his body with me. I escaped through a small door 1678 in the kitchen, which was unlocked. During the course of t he “clearance operation”, the houses and other structures in the 773. various Rohingya hamlets of Min Gyi were completely burned and destroyed. Satellite imagery analysis confirms that Min Gyi was destroyed by 16 September 2017 and that 1665 CI - 046. 1666 LI - 078. 1667 - 060, QI - CI - 042, CI - 046, CI - 197, EI - 066, EI - 080, EI - 081, LI - 075, LI - 078, QI - 030, QI - 058, QI - 059, QI 068, QI - - 037, WI - 038 YI - 025, YI - 0081. 071, WI 1668 QI - 071. 1669 EI - 080, QI - 071. 1670 080, EI EI - - 081, QI - 071, LI - 075, LI - 078. 1671 075, QI CI - 046, EI - 080, EI - 081, LI - - 071, QI - 114, K - 150, K - 151. 1672 - EI - 080, EI - 081, LI - 078, QI - 071, WI 004. 1673 CI - 042, CI - 046, CI - 197, CI - 198, EI - 066, LI - - 078, QI - 030, QI - 058, QI - 059, QI - 060, QI - 068, QI - 075, LI 071, WI - 037, WI - 038, YI - 008, YI - 025. 1674 E I - - 102. 081, EI 1675 EI - 081, EI - 102. 1676 EI - 081, EI - 102 1677 EI - 102. 1678 081. - EI 182

183 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ures were burned. The ethnic Rakhine village to the south remains approximately 440 struct 1679 intact (referred to in the image as “Min Gyi (Tu Lar Tu Li)”). Image from 25 May 2017 shows intact settlements in Min Gyi Image from 16 September 2017 shows destroyed Rohingya settlem ents and intact Rakhine settlement (in bottom left corner) in Min Gyi Credible information collected by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee 774. camps in southern Bangladesh indicates that at least 750 people died in Min Gyi on 30 August 1680 The total number includes 2017, i ncluding at least 400 who had been residents of Min Gyi. villagers from Wet Kyein, Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit and elsewhere who had sought safety in Min 1681 People died from being shot, stabbed, slit across the throat by a knife, beat en to death, Gyi. drowned and burned. Many more were injured, and others remain unaccounted. 1679 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR - UNOSAT . 1680 K - 153.1. 1681 070 . K - 153.1, V - 183

184 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 While the Mission has not been able to verify the accuracy of the full list, the Mission 775. - . One 25 year interviewed dozens of victims who had lost many family members in Min Gyi old man interviewed had lost his entire family: his father and his three younger brothers of 13, nine and seven years old were shot and killed and he believes his mother, wife and sisters 1682 year old woman saw 11 family members were killed by soldiers inside the houses. A 27 - - day old baby who she said was slaughtered with , including her 20 n the killed that day o shore 1683 year old man reported returning to the village to a knife and thrown on the ground. A 22 - 1684 A 25 year old - collect the dead bodies of his family th ough he found only burned bodies. female survivor of rape reported that she lost eight members of her family, including her 28 - 1685 day old baby. 1686 main perpetrators. A number 776. All interviewees identified Tatmadaw soldiers as the 1687 recognised Many accounts the insignia of the Western Command on the shoulder patch. also described helmeted soldiers in camouflage uniform that were distinguishable from other 1688 regular uniformed soldiers. The Mission believes these soldiers to be from the 99th th 1689 Credible sources have identified the 99 LID as being present in Min Gyi during the LID. 1690 attack. Ethnic Rakhine and members of other ethnic minorities participated. Several 777. interviewees identified ethnic Rakhine, as well as Mro (Murong), Chakma and Kui from 1691 nearby villages. They were equipped with long knives, machetes and other type of local 1693 1692 Some saw them also use knives to kill, including children. weapons. Survivors of rape in Min Gyi also identified members of the Tatmadaw and soldiers 778. mouflage as the perpetrators of rape and killing of women and children in the houses. It in ca 1694 is likely that this indicates the involvement of the 99th LID as perpetrators of these rapes . Chut Pyin 779. Chut Pyin (known in Rohingya as Shua p Par u ng) is in nor thern Rathedaung, at the intersection of the three townships of northern Rakhine State. Chut Pyin includes a Rohingya village, with an original population estimated approximately 1,200 inhabitants, and a n as Rakhine haml ethnic ak Para), inhabited by approximately et, Thet (known in Rohingya a s Ch an other ethnic 400 Rakhine, located a short distance away. Within the village tract there was ( Rohingya village, Chin ). There was one security forces ’ camp to the north of Pyaing Taung ose to Thet, where Tatmadaw, Police and BGP had been the Rohingya hamlet located cl 1695 stationed. A number of events , occurring throughout July and August 2017 in and around Chut 780. 1696 An Pyin village tract, had heightened tensions in the north of Rathedaung Township. severely restricted increased military presence led to of movement for villagers in freedom 1682 YI - 025. 1683 - 066. EI 1684 041. CI - 1685 EI - 082. 1686 - 095, LI - CI - 041, CI - 046, CI - 197, CI - 1 98, EI - 065, EI - 066, EI - 081, EI - 102, LI - 021, LI - 075, LI - 078, LI - 098, QI - 058, QI - 059, QI - 60, QI - 066, QI - 067, QI - 068, QI - 071, WI - 034, WI - 037, WI 030, QI 038, WI - - 039, YI 008, YI - 025 . - 1687 QI - 060, QI - 114. 1688 197, CI CI - - 198, EI - 066, EI - 102, QI - 059, QI - 071, WI - 004. 1689 098, XM CI - 197, CI - 198, LI - - 008, YM - 008. 1690 LM - 014, XM - 008, V - 067, V - 071. 1691 075, LI - CI - 197, CI - 198, EI - 066, LI - - 078, LI 098, QI - 030, QI - 058, QI - 059, QI - 067, QI - 071, YI - 008, YI - 025. 1692 - CI - 197, EI - 066, LI - 075, LI - 078, QI - 030, QI - 059, QI - 067, QI - 071, YI - 008, YI - 025. 058, QI 1693 078. CI - 197, LI - 098, EI - 066, LI - 075, LI - 1694 CI - 046, EI - 080, EI - 081, LI 075, QI - 071, QI - 114, WI - 004. - 1695 003, WI BI - 007, BI - 009, CI - 185, WI - - 006, V - 072, V - 073 . 1696 2017. up to 25 August See this chapter, section D.2.b. The build - 184

185 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 “ the weeks prior to the , and a meeting was convened for village leaders clearance operation ” rd 1697 Tatmadaw soldiers of the 33 at which LID made death threats. yanmar authorities reported that the “Chopyin outpost in Region 781. - M 11” was attacked the attack was “repulsed by by ARSA that on 27 August 2017 “with homemade bombs” but 1698 The Mission was unable to verify this . security personnel” No casualties were reported. 1699 However, plans for a “ clearance operation ” in Chut Pyin a have been made ttack. appear to nearby prior to this. Different groups of people fleeing from the “clearance operation” in Zay Di Pyin the previous day were instructed by soldiers present not to ente r Chut Pyin. One Rohingya village elder stated that he received a phone call from the village administrator of 1700 Chin to this effect. , Consequently Pyaing Taung villagers fleeing Zay Di Pyin sought ( ) 1701 ) instead. Pyaing Taung ( refuge in Chin On 782. t 2017 , Chut Pyin was su bject to a particularly brutal “clearance 27 Augus 1703 1702 a large group of hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers, . At around 2pm, including operation” rd 1705 1704 , members of the 33 came out of the Rakhine LID as well as other security forces 1707 1706 and surrounded Chut Pyin. They were accompanied by a smaller number of hamlet 1708 ethnic Rakhine from neighbouring villages. The security forces then opened fire, shooting at villagers, including those who were 783. 1709 from hous es and shot some of them at point blank fleeing. Soldiers also dragged people 1711 1710 “If people were range. Others were killed by having their throats slit with large knives. not killed by the gunshots, they were slaughtered to make sure they were really dead”, 1712 reported one survivor. Killing with knives was frequently perpetrated by ethnic 1713 Rakhine. 784. structures in Chut Pyin were burned and destroyed. During the course of the operation , 1714 A The security forces used “launchers” to set houses on fire, including those still occupied. 1715 which were then intentionally set alight. number of people In were forced inside houses , and men were forced inside ; some escaped, others seven one house, a group of between six 1716 burned alive. were One elderly woman described how she was pulled out of her house, tog ether with her 785. years old brother - 70 : 1697 - 001, RI - 004; See this chapter, section D.2.b. The build up to 25 August 2017. RI - 1698 Information Committee, “Breaking News 10: Terrorists trying to destroy Maungtaw“ (Facebook post, https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786691611503947 27 August 2017), 1699 - 154.1. K 1700 - 145, LI - 118, LI - 129, QI - 115, K - 155.1. CI 1701 - 145, CI - 184, LI - 118, LI - CI - 115, K - 155.1. 129, QI 1702 BI - 007, BI 008, BI - 009, BI - 010, CI - - CI - 177, CI - 185, CI - 191, LI - 008, QI - 050, QI - 052, RI - 001, WI - 003, WI - 005, 019, WI - 006, WI - 027, V - 067. 1703 - 019, CI - BI - 007, BI - 008, BI - 009, CI - 052, WI - 177, CI - 191, EI - 003, EI - 004, EI - 005, LI - 008, LI - 009, LI - 010, QI - 050, QI 003, WI - 006, WI - 024, WI - 027, LM - 006 , LM - 012, LM - 018, K - 151, K - 155.1, V - 075. 005, WI - 1704 - 191, LM - 014, XM - 008, V - 067, V - 071. CI 1705 - - 007, BI - 008, BI 009, BI - 010, CI - 019, WI - 003, WI BI 006, WI - 024, LM - 012, V - 073, V - 067. - 1706 CI - 177, WI - 003. 1707 BI - 007, BI - 008, BI - 009, BI - 010, CI - 185, CI - 191, LI - 010, QI - 052, WI - 005, LM - 006. 1708 BI - 008, BI - 009, CI - 019, CI - 177, CI - 185, CI - - 003, EI - 004, EI - 005, LI - 042, QI - 031, QI - 052, 191, EI RI - 001, RI - 004, WI - 005, WI - 006, WI - 027. 1709 BI - 008, BI - 009, BI - 010, CI - 019, EI - 003, EI - 004, EI - 005, LI - 009, LI - 010, QI - 050, WI - 003, WI - 005, W I 006, WI - 024, WI - 027. - 1710 - 008, LI - 008, WI - BI - 006. 024, LM 1711 CI - 191, LI - - 009, WI - 002, WI - 005, WI - 027. 008, LI 1712 WI - 005. 1713 050, WI BI - 009, CI - 191, LI - 042, QI - - 024, WI - 027, K - 155.2, V - 073, V - 075. 1714 050, RI BI - 008, BI - 009, BI - 010, EI - 003, EI - 004, LI - 008, LI - 009, LI - 010, QI - - 001, WI - 003, WI - 005, WI 024, WI - 027. - 1715 WI - 003, WI - 005. 1716 075. - WI - 003, WI 005, V 185

186 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Soldiers used rifle butts to beat my brother on the head and I saw his brains come out. long were also spraying bullets being killed with I saw people knives. The soldiers and many people were injured and killed. Our village was full of dead bodies. I saw dozens of people killed. First, they shot the people and then if they were still alive and 1717 the body was moving they used a machete to slaughter across the throat. She managed to escape with her 10 - year old granddaughter who was shot in the leg. 786. the child recalled in shock: “ They were shooting at us so we were just crawling through As 1718 1719 The child said that she saw the bodies”. and brother killed. her father, mother, sister The girl and her grandmother told the Mission that they lost seven members of their family 1720 that day. The chaos 787. of the situation was described vividly by one woman who was shot in her arm while trying to escape: They began to set fire to the houses so I ran. That is when I was shot. It wasn’t easy to get away, as I had to hide behind whatever I could find to avoid bullets. As I was running, I saw others running to save their lives too. People were being shot, slaughtered and beate n , forcing us to move from one place to another . Everyone was 1721 desperate as we didn’t know where to flee. 1722 in Chut Pyin lasted until about 7pm. 788. The operations Rohingya from nearby villages confirmed seeing smoke rising from Chut Pyin from 2pm until th e evening, when it started 1723 Satellite imagery analysis from to rain, and hearing the sound of bullets until around 7pm. 16 September 2017 shows the extent of the destruction in Chut Pyin. The entire Rohingya non - Rohingya village of Thet remains village of Chut Pyin was destroyed, while the nearby intact. Image of Chut Pyin from 16 September 2017 showing burned structures 1717 LI - 008. 1718 LI - 009. 1719 LI - 009. 1720 LI - 008, LI - 009. 1721 075. WI - 003, V - 1722 001, WI CI - 177, RI - - 005, V - 075. 1723 - 115. LI - 118, LI - 129, QI - 031, QI 186

187 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1724 number of women and children were victims of the attacks. A Children, 789. large argeted; some were wrenched from their including infants and babies were specifically t , 1725 mothers’ arms and thrown to the ground, others were thrown into fires and burned alive. As one woman explained, women were sometimes slower to flee and therefore easier targets, 1726 ir infants and children. One woman was inside her particularly if they were carrying the house with a group of children when the house was set on fire. She ran to escape, carrying month old baby, and dragging along her eight - her 20 - year old child. She was then shot. The her baby, who died immediately. Her eight year old was also shot, and bullet hit both her and 1727 died later that night in the paddy field where they were hiding. Another mother recalled and who was shot in the side the death of her young son who was two and a half years old of his upper torso . His last words were , “ I need water, mother, I am very thirsty . ” She held his 1728 dead body in her arms all night. Women and girls were also subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual mutilation and sexual 790. 1729 humiliation during the “clearance operati ons” in Chut Pyin Credible and consistent . . They selected reports describe how members of the Tatmadaw separated women and girls them to a school, which was being used as a military base, where mass some of them, taking 1730 . gang rape took place Women and girls were subjected to serious physical injuries either 1731 before being raped or after being killed, including the mutilation of their breasts An . interviewee described how he saw two groups of five Tatmadaw soldiers arrive in Chut Pyin from the nearby military compound. From his hiding place , he saw them “grabbing” women and heard the women screaming. He saw the military cutting off the breast of a 1732 woman who later died The Tatmadaw also assaulted and humiliated women and girls . 1733 om them while stealing fr . A large group of 57 men, mostly teachers and other educated people, were taken away 791. by soldiers during the “clearance operation”. There has been no further information regarding 1734 . their whereabouts 792. Some persons who managed to survive d id so by hiding in the long grass of the paddy 1736 1735 ponds. F rom their hiding places , s ome of these saw many dead bodies. fields or in returned Others who strewn across the to the village later that evening reported seeing bodies 1737 es and outside compounds. village, including inside hous ed through Another man who pass Chut Pyin a few days later noted, “There were dead bodies everywhere, and many children’s bodies were floating in the river. We were terrified, and had to cover our mouths because of 1738 the bad smell. ” Rohingya villagers who survived fled to neighbouring villages, with a lar ge number 793. et Nan Yar village (known in Rohingya as Razar Bil ), where local finding refuge in Ah Ht 1739 with basic medical care , food and shelter. Rohingya provided them One woman described the situation : 1724 155.1. - EI - 003, EI - 004, EI - 005, LI - 009, QI - 050, WI - 003, WI - 005, WI - 006, K 1725 QI - 052, WI - 003, WI - 005, LM - 018. 1726 006. WI - 1727 003. WI - 1728 QI - 050. 1729 - CI - 177, LI - 009, QI - 052, WI - 005, WI - 006, WI 027, K - 151, K - 155.1. 1730 CI - 191, EI - 093, QI - , K - 151, K - 155.1. 052 1731 WI - 005, WI - 006, WI - 027, LM - 018. 1732 WI - 005. 1733 003, WI BI - 010, WI - - 005 . 1734 CI - 185, CI - 191, RI - 001, K - 153.3. 1735 - BI 009, BI - 010, CI - 185, RI - - 003, WI - 027, LM - 006. 001, WI 1736 BI - 007, BI - 008, BI - 010, QI - 050, QI - 052, WI - 003. 1737 CI - 019, CI - 177, LI - 042, QI - 031. 1738 LI - 118. 1739 006, BI 007, BI - 009, BI - 010, CI - 019, CI - 177, CI - 185, CI - 191, LI - 008, LI - 042, RI - 001, WI - 003, WI - - 018 . WI - 027, LM - 006, LM - 187

188 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 , Everyone was crying as everyone had lost someone, members of their families. I have 1740 never seen so many people mourning the deaths of loved ones at the same time. A number of survivors died soon afte rwards in Ah 794. et Nan Yar due to a lack of Ht . Bodies recovered from Chu t Pyin were also brought to Ah access to adequate medical care 1741 et Nan Yar Ht As one villager from Ah Ht et Nan Yaar and buried in collective graves. explained: Chut Pyin came to our village. Some of That night, many people who had fled from my relatives brought with them 16 dead bodies from Chut Pyin. I arranged the funeral and buried them in the graveyard in the village. There were many dead bodies and 1742 injured people brought by other villagers as well . - 795. video footage, time The Mission received stamped 29 August 2017, of injured Rohingya describing the attack on Chut Pyin, as well as footage of sites described as mass 1743 graves o f those that were buried in Ah Ht Forensic analysis of the foo tage , et Nan Yar. which shows Rohingya, including men, women and children, with gunshot wounds and other 1744 further serious injuries, is consistent with the testimonies received Forensic analysis . indicates areas of freshly disturbed earth indicative of gravesites. 796. A list prepared by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh indicates that 358 persons were killed that day. The list further details that 127 children aged five or under were killed ; 19 women raped; 94 people lost lim bs due to injuries 1745 57 people remain unaccounted . sustained; and While the Mission cannot confirm the accuracy of the list, it is consistent with information received, and many deaths documented from Chut Pyin by the Mission appear on the list. Almost all of the more tha n 20 people interviewed by reported deaths of many family members and neighbours. the Mission 1746 A number of 797. The Chut Pyin “clearance operations” were led by the Tatmadaw. 1747 Consiste nt and credible victims recognised the insignia of the Western Command. rd 1748 Myanmar media, indicate that the 33 sources, as well as the LID led or actively 1749 1750 The Tatmadaw were accompanied by other security forces and ethnic participated. 1751 were rec Individuals from the neighbouring ethnic Rakhine village Rakhine. ognised as 1752 participants and s ome ethnic Rakhine men assisted the military in identifying specific 1753 Rohingya villagers. In particular, the Rakhine chairperson of Chut Pyin participated in the 1754 guiding the military thro ugh the village. violence, armed with a knife or sword, 1755 798. - military clothing, equipped with swords, Some of the ethnic Rakhine were in non 1756 Others were wearing military style knives and machetes, or other types of local weapons. 1740 WI - 006. 1741 - CI 019, CI - 177, CI - 191, CI - 199, WI - 027, LM - 006, LM - 012, QI - 050. 1742 CI - 199. 1743 200. CI - 1744 - 191. CI 1745 CI - 185. 1746 BI - 007, BI - 008, BI 009, CI - - - 003, EI - 004, EI - 005, LI - 008, LI - 009, LI - 010, QI - 050, QI - 052, WI - 019, EI 003, WI - 005, WI - 006, WI - 024, WI - 027, LM - 006, LM - 018, K - 155.1. 1747 BI - 009, QI - - 067. 050, V 1748 ar Tatmadaw LID 33 K - 1 63, V - 256; “It was reported that extremist Bengali terrorists and Myanm were fighting in Chut Pyin Eleven Media Group, 27 August 2017 ) . village, Rathedaung Township" ( 1749 - CI 191, K - 155.2, V - 067, V - 071. 1750 007, BI - BI - - 008, BI - 009, BI - 010, CI - 019, WI - 003, WI - 006, WI 024. 1751 BI - 008, BI - 009, CI - 019, CI - 177, CI - 18 5, CI - 191, EI - 003, EI - 004, EI - - 042, QI - 031, QI - 052, 005, LI RI 001, RI - 004, WI - 005, WI - 006, WI - 027. - 1752 019, QI CI - - 052, WI - 005, LM - 006, K - 155.2. 1753 BI - 010, WI - 005. 1754 115, LM BI - 007, BI - 010, QI - - 006, LM - 012. 1755 - BI - 008, CI 019, LI - 042. 1756 006. BI - 008, BI - 009, CI - 019, CI - 191, EI - 003, LI - 042, QI - 031, RI - 001, RI - 004, WI - 188

189 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1757 uniforms and equipped with guns. This may indicate the involvement of the ethnic . Rakhine militia, who are sometimes referred to as Pyi Thu Sit Maung Nu Maung Nu (known in Rohingya as Monu Para) is a village in the Chin Tha Mar village 799. 1758 approximate Less than with tract of Buthidaung Township ly 400 Rohingya households. one kilometre north, Hpaung Taw Pyin village (known in Rohingya as Pondu Prang) has 1759 and a BGP outpost. approximately 350 Rohingya households mmand. 800. There are two military bases near Maung Nu, both under the Western Co Light Infantry Battalion 564 is just south of Maung Nu and Light Infantry Battalion 552 is 12 kilometres north, in Nga Yant Chaung village tract (also known as approximately 10 to Taung Bazar). 1760 801. Early on 25 August 2017, ARSA attacked the BGP ou tpost in Hpaung Taw Pyin. Villagers in Maung Nu and Hpaung Taw Pyin heard gunshots coming from this direction in 1761 The Government stated that two police officers and two assailants were the early morning. 1762 killed. ARSA 802. attac ks near Maung Nu early that morning; the first There were two additional at the military base occupied by the Light Infantry Battalion 552, and the second shortly afterwards at the BGP outpost village tract . The Government said , both in Nga Yant Chaung 1763 assailants involved. One interviewee reported that at it recovered seven bodies of approximately 8am that day, after the shooting had ended, he came out of his house and saw 1764 security forces dragging seven bodies onto a boat. Later that morning, Tatmadaw soldiers entered Hpaung 803. Taw Pyin in their vehicles 1765 and stopped near the BGP outpost. They opened fire and people started to flee. Interviewees reported that soldiers and other security forces that morning arrested four young boys, including the 15 old son of a Rohingya vill age leader and a 22 - year old religious - year 1766 scholar. Both were believed to have been killed. 804. Many people from Hpaung Taw Pyin and surrounding areas fled south to Maung 1767 Nu. Some families sought shelter in relatives’ homes, and some in a large compound owned by two Rohingya relatives, who were known to have good relations with the security 1768 Within the compound forces in the area. a large two - story house and other smaller were 1769 Most of the men hid upstairs in the main house, while most of the women and houses. children sought shelter downstairs. Eventually approximately 200 people had sought shelter 1770 inside the compound. 1757 027, LM EI - 003, EI - 004, EI - 005, QI - 052, RI - 004, WI - 005, WI - 006, K - 155.2. - 1758 CI - 196, LI 055, V - 076. - 1759 055. - CI - 026, CI - 109, LI 1760 K - 154.1, K - 154.2. 1761 CI - 026, CI - 044, CI - 109, CI - 110, CI - 195 , CI - 196, EI - 019, LI - 055, LI - 084, WI - 017, YI 032, YI - 033. - 1762 Information Committee, “Breaking News 2” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017), mittee/posts/785202504986191 https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCom 1763 Information Committee, “Breaking News 1: Many police outposts and police stations in Maungtaw attacked by extremist terrorists” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/a.639477959558647.1073741828.63945620 6227489/785096194996822/?type=3 1764 LI - 055, V - - 078. 077, V 1765 EI - 019, WI - 017. 1766 LI CI - 195, - 084, V - 067, V - 076. 1767 CI - 109, CI - 110, CI - 026, CI - 196, EI 019, LI - 055, WI - 017, YI - 032. - 1768 - CI - 026, CI - 110, CI - 195, CI 196, LI - 081, LI - 084, LI - 094, QI - 042, WI - 017, YI - 032. 1769 194, CI CI - 026, CI - - 195, LI - 094. 1770 032. - CI - 026, CI - 196, LI - 079, QI - 042, YI 189

190 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 A large group of Tatmadaw soldiers entered Maung Nu 805. on 27 August 2017, between 1771 They arrived in military trucks and spread out in small groups on foot 10 and 11am. 1772 making their way towards the compound, while firing in the air. 1773 Once in the compound, the soldiers ordered people to come out with of 806. the houses, 1774 the threat that otherwise the houses would be set on fire. Soldiers then broke down a door of the main house, and a number of them entered and continued to fire sporadically once 1776 1775 inside. shortly afterwards. A child was hit in the head by a bullet and died - The soldiers broke down a door and started firing inside. I saw my brother’s 10 year old son shot in the head. His head was split open and his brain splattered on the 1777 wall. As people started to come out from the houses, the sold 807. iers separated women and children from men. Soldiers ordered the women at gunpoint to remove their headscarves, with some soldiers pulling them off. They also searched the women repeatedly for valuable 1778 One interviewee ha items, ripping open their clothes. d an earring ripped from her ear by 1779 Soldiers then separated the women and children into a soldier, leaving her wounded. 1780 different groups and locked them inside smaller houses within the compound. first to be killed. While two 808. One of the men who owned the compound was among the soldiers held him, a third stabbed him with a knife. Two of his sons were shot dead while 1781 trying to intervene. The killings then became more organized. In the courtyard, men and ound with rope, and made to kneel face boys were rounded up, most having their hands b down, pointing eastwards. Soldiers also used some of the women’s headscarves to blindfold 1782 They then opened fire on the the men and boys, and to tie their hands behind their back. 1783 men and boys. Soldiers also slit thei r throats with knives. A small group of men and boys were taken from the courtyard to an area of scrubland a few minutes walking distance away, 1784 where they were killed. O ne interviewee who managed to hide within the compound recounted: e men out of the house and tied up their hands behind their back The soldiers took th with a rope. When the rope had finished they used women’s headscarves to tie them up. Soldiers forced them to lie with their chest and face down on the ground. Some of d then their throats were slit with a knife. Others just had their them were shot first an 1785 throats slit. 1786 809. One interviewee saw a young Soldiers killed a number of children in the courtyard. 1787 Another woman saw soldiers kill her two ne child stabbed by soldiers while crying. phews through a crack in a door of one of the compound houses: The soldiers killed the male members of my family. They shot at them first and then slit their throats. The courtyard was full of blood. They killed my husband, my father - 1771 CI - 026, CI - 110, CI - 196, LI - 079, LI - 084, QI - - 017. 042, WI 1772 - 026, CI - 110, CI - 195, CI - CI - 055, YI - 033. 196, LI 1773 - 026, CI - 109, CI - 110, EI - 019, LI - 081, QI - 042, WI - 017, YI - 032. CI 1774 076. - CI - 195, LI - 079, QI - 042, WI - 017, YI - 032, V 1775 CI - 195, EI - 019, YI - 032, YI - 033. 1776 - QI - 042, YI 032, YI - 033, V - 076. K 156. - 1777 QI - 042. 1778 LI - 079, LI - 084, QI - 042, WI - 017, YI - 032, YI - 033. 1779 LI - 084. 1780 - LI 079, QI - 042, YI - 032, YI - 033. 1781 - 110, CI CI - 026, CI 109, CI - - 196, WI - 017. 1782 CI - 026, CI - 109, EI - 019, QI - - 017, YI - 032, YI - 033. 042, WI 1783 079, LI CI - 026, CI - 109, CI - 110, CI - 194, CI - 196, EI - 018, LI - - 094, QI - 042, WI - 017. 1784 CI - 194, CI - - 067. 196, V 1785 C1 - 196. 1786 LM - 018, V - 077. 1787 - 109. CI 190

191 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - law and my two neph in ews of 15 and eight years old. They even killed the child in 1788 . the same way 1789 Women and girls were also gang raped, killed and mutilated. One interviewee saw 810. two women being raped by two or three members of the Tatmadaw. The screams he heard 1790 Another witness led the i nterviewee to conclude that the two women were then killed. 1791 knifed in her vagina. killed by being who was hiding nearby described one woman being 811. soldiers caught her and other A female survivor from Maung Nu described how e trying to flee the village: women whil I ran to the My husband and I were caught by the military. hills to escape the shooting. My husband was badly beaten and could not move. Three members of the military took me. One man held me down and pushed me to the ground. They tore of my clothes. They took many other women – Two men raped me. My husband could still see me. 20 women. I saw them being raped. They took women at different maybe around 10 - 1792 I knew some of the women – times. they were from my village. 812. The incident lasted until sunset. After the killings, soldiers loaded a number o f bodies, 1793 wrapped in tarpaulin, onto military trucks. One interviewee who had been hiding nearby 1794 saw soldiers leaving the village in the early evening in three military trucks. Another witness in hiding saw military trucks leave and later return to the v illage several times. He 1795 believed that soldiers were transporting bodies to the military base. , 813. villagers returned and rescued women Later that evening, after the soldiers had left 1796 Others and children. Witnesses described seeing blood and the ground feelin g “sticky”. 1797 described seeing bodies, including of children, and body parts scattered on the ground. One interviewee described stepping on peoples’ clothes and headscarves that were covered returned the following day with a slit thro He . at with blood, and then finding a dead body, found a pit where the soil was disturbed and where he presumed bodies had been and 1798 buried. Credible reports suggest that soldiers buried some bodies in shallow pits in a nearby 814. 1799 field. The Mission analysed video foo tage and photos that show patches of blood in a 1800 reviewed footage of tarpaulin It has also scrubland area said to be near the compound . bags buried just below the surface in an area similar to the one previously described. A human leg, already in an advanc ed stage of decomposition , is visibly protruding from one of the bags. The Mission was not able to independently verify the geo - location or date of the video footage , the details ; however shown , such as patches of blood, women’s headscarves and other eleme nts, are consistent with eyewitness accounts of the events in Maung Nu. up to that 100 people, mostly men and boys, were executed in 815. Information indicate s 1801 Maung Nu. The Mission has received a non - exhaustive list of the dead compiled by commu in the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh. It details the Rohingya nity volunteers names, ages and professions of 82 people killed (48 people from Maung Nu and 34 from Hpaung Taw Pyin). Aside from one woman, they are all men and boys, with 28 under 18 the youngest six years old. While the Mission cannot confirm the accuracy of years old, the 1788 LI - 079. 1789 EI - 019, EI - 027, LI - 081, LI - 094. 1790 LI - 094. 1791 - LI 081. 1792 EI - 027. 1793 CI - CI - 026, CI - 194, CI - 195, - 196, LI - 094, QI 042, WI - 017, YI - 033. 1794 LI - 055. 1795 CI - 196. 1796 - 084, LI - 094, YI - 033. LI 1797 - CI - 026, CI - 044, CI 194, LI - 055, LI - 079, LI - 094. 1798 LI - 055, V - 067. 1799 VI - 067. 1800 K - 157.1. 1801 079. - 076, V EI - 019, LI - 055, V - 91 1

192 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 documented by full list, it is consistent with information received, and names of persons the 1802 as killed Mission appear on the list. Maung Nu and Hpaung Taw Pyin were bu 816. rned over a period of several days. Satellite imagery shows the burning and destruction of structures in Maung Nu and Hpaung Taw Pyin by 16 September 2017. The images show that more than 320 structures were destroyed by 1803 fire in both locations. Image of Maung Nu from 16 September 2017 showing areas of burned structures 1804 Tatmadaw soldiers led the operation in Maung Nu, with witnesses recognising 817. 1805 soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion 564. Many accounts identified by name one of the ppeared to have directly led and participated in the killings of men and boys soldiers, who a 1806 in the courtyard of the compound. Gu Dar Pyin Gu Dar Pyin is a village tract in southern Buthidaung Township, approximately 15 818. are three ethnic Rakhine settlements, and two kilometres south of Buthidaung town. There larger Rohingya villages. Gu Dar Pyin is the main settlement of the Rohingya population, who know it as Gudam Para. There is one police camp in the village tract, which is located 1807 k Sar Taing, about a mi le from Gu Dar Pyin. in Kya u 819. Although the Government did not initially report an ARSA attack in Gu Dar Pyin on 1808 or after 25 August 2017, there are unverified reports of an incident, including a possible 1802 019. - 07 CI - 026, CI - 109, EI - 019, LI - 055, LI - 9, LI - 084, QI - 042, WI 1803 Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR - UNOSAT. 1804 - CI - 026, LI - 079, LI - 084, QI 042, WI - 017. 1805 - EI - 019, LI 094, WI - 007. 1806 026, CI - CI - 109, CI - 195, LI - 094, LM - 018, V - 076, V - 077. 1807 CI - 103. 1808 Although no mention was made of an attack on Gu Dar Pyin at the time, on 3 February 2018, in a response to a media article providing details of the “clearance operation” in Gu Dar Pyin, the Government claimed that an ARSA attack did take place. See Global New Light of Myanmar , “Authorities refute AP’s report on mass graves in Buthidaung” (3 February 2018), stat ing that in Gu Dar Pyin, “security forces were attacked by a combined group of ARSA terrorists, and some 500 villagers had attacked the security forces on 28 Aug ust 2017.” 192

193 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1809 explosion on or near a bridge in the vicinity. The following days saw a significant build - up of security force personnel at the police camp. A large number of Tatmadaw soldiers were 1810 One interviewee saw white sacks being seen arriving at the camp, some on motorcycles. 1811 There may also have been a meeting at around transported to the camp on the mo torcycles. 1812 this time between the soldiers and Rohingya village leaders. Information suggests that some local ethnic Rakhine villagers warned Rohingya neighbours that something would 1813 happen, urging them to leav e. The Tatmadaw and police conducted an initial operation on around 28 August 2017. 820. Security forces entered the main village of Gu Dar Pyin in the early morning and opened fire 1814 from the side of the main road. It is unclear whether people were kille d; one interviewee 1815 The gunfire caused panic mentioned that two people might have sustained bullet injuries. among village residents, who fled. For many, this meant crossing the river running down the how she fled with her children into eastern edge of the village. One interviewee described the forest and then had to cross the river: “Some children died trying to cross the river, as it 1816 was raining and the water level was so high.” The operation ended in the early hours of the morning, with the security for ces returning to the police camp. A number of villagers returned to their homes. The main “clearance operation” took place the following day, in the early 821. 1817 The Tatmadaw led the operation, accompanied by armed police and non - afternoon. uniformed indivi duals, identified as ethnic Rakhine. According to one interviewee, the security forces first gathered on a hill above the village. They then surrounded the village and entered from multiple directions. The soldiers and armed police opened fire as they ente red, including at people who ran to escape. A large number of Rohingya villagers were shot and killed or injured as they tried to flee, including children. One interviewee described how his 1818 year old boy, was shot dead while trying to untether his family’s cows. cousin, a 15 Ethnic - Rakhine men, armed with local sw captured or injured persons ords known as “da”, then killed 1819 by slitting their throats. The soldiers and armed police also used knives to kill people captured or injured. 822. During the operation, buildings were set on fire by the security forces and ethnic 1820 Rakhine used petrol. ethnic Rakhine men. The Tatmadaw used “launchers” and the Burning the entire village took two to three days. other side of the river 823. One woman watching from a neighbouring village on the described what she saw: The soldiers were shooting at the people, who were running from burning houses to People were running everywhere, in the paddy fields, jumping into save their lives. 1821 le burning, and people being cut. I saw peop the river, and hiding in trees. 824. As the security forces had entered the village from three sides, villagers able to flee were forced to head east and attempt to cross the river. Rohingya villagers were shot as they crossed. One interviewee, watching from a hamlet on the other side of the river, described 1822 seeing many bodies floating in the water. Some drowned in the river, including women 1809 LM - - 067. 004, V 1810 - 063. CI - 103, LI - 062, LI 1811 LI - 063. 1812 - CI - 103, YI 013. 1813 LI - 065. 1814 062, LI CI - 103, LI - - 063, LI - 088, YI - 013, YI - 014, YI - 015, YI - 016, YI - 018. 1815 LI - 062. 1816 YI - 015. 1817 - LI 062, LI - 063, LI - 064, LI - 065, LI - 088, YI - 014, YI - 017. 1818 YI - 015. 1819 065, LI LI - - 062, YI 014, V - 080. - 1820 LI - 062, LI - 063, YI - 014, YI - 015, YI - 016, YI - 018. 1821 WI - 014. 1822 088. - LI 193

194 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 and children. Another interviewee helped four men on the other side of the river, each with 1823 gunshot wounds. One mother described how she had to choose which of her children to save. The 825. security forces had entered her house and grabbed her young daughter. Her son tried to save his sister and was attacked by the security forces. The mother watched from the other end of the house and made the split second decision that that these two children would not live, but that she could perhaps still save her two younger children. Her husband returned the next ound the corpse of their son. morning to the village and dug through pits of bodies until he f They never found the body of their daughter. The mother told the Mission with haunted eyes: 1824 “How can I continue with my life having made this choice?” 826. Women and girls were subjected to sexual and gender - based violence, i ncluding rape, 1825 They were gang raped by members of the Tatmadaw in bushy gang rape and abductions. 1826 and forested areas as they fled. They were also abducted from their homes, sometimes 1827 prior to the main “clearance operation” commencing. Based on credible reports received, and in light of similar patterns established in other locations, it is likely that abducted women and girls were raped or gang raped. A 50 - year old mother said: The soldiers came to my house and took my daughter away. I do not know what h appened to her. I saw soldiers taking quite a lot of beautiful girls when we were 1828 fleeing. Some of those who participated in the operation were recognised as locals from the 827. 1829 village, Kya u k Sar Taing. A short time before the oper ation was nearby NaTaLa 1830 conducted, a new group of men had arrived in Kyak Sar Taing and it appears they may also have been brought to the village by the Tatmadaw. 828. Satellite imagery analysis confirms that all structures in Gu Dar Pyin were burned by 1831 16 September. 1823 YI - 017. 1824 079. - EI 1825 EI - 078, EI - 079, EI 080, K - 151. - 1826 - EI - 078, EI 079, EI - 080. 1827 079, EI EI - 078, EI - - 080, K - 151. 1828 EI - 079. 1829 The Myanmar authorities have engaged in the policy of building “model villages” since the 1990s taking the name of “NaTaLa” from the Ministry for Development of Border Areas and National Races that designates and establishes them. Farmland was appropriated, an d individuals and families were resettled from urban areas to border regions. In northern Rakhine State, “model villages” were largely intended to allow for the resettlement of ethnic Rakhine from other parts of Myanmar, or to encourage persons of ethnic R akhine origin (and possibly other ethnicities) to move from Bangladesh. The apparent purpose appears to have been, at least in part, to transform the demographic profile of northern Rakhine State through increasing the ethnic Rakhine or Buddhist population ; K - 063.20, K - 160.1, K 160.2 . - 1830 LI - 062, LI - 063, LI - 065. 1831 . UNOSAT Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR - 194

195 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Satellite imagery analysis from 10 October 2017 showed burning detected on 16 September 829. In the aftermath of the operation, numerous corpses were strewn throughout the village. Witnesses saw bodies and in some instances separated heads, showing si gns of both gunshot and knife or sword wounds, including in the compounds of houses and a large 1832 number in paddy fields. 830. Efforts were made by the Tatmadaw, police and the ethnic Rakhine men to dispose of 1833 bodies. A series of pits were dug in different locations and the bodies put in them. A number of villagers who returned to Gu Dar Pyin some days after the operation described seeing bodie s, uncovered in shallow graves, that were blackened and swollen. Video footage blackened and swollen human heads demonstrating reviewed by the Mission shows 1834 putrefactive change (decomposition). 831. One interviewee, who returned to the village about three days after the operation, described moving some soil away from one of the pits, and seeing many black corpse s, with 1835 faces looking as though they had been burned. The sight and smell made him nauseous. Another interviewee described that, when he returned to the village 12 days after the “clearance operation”, he saw a big pit of bodies: They were not properly co vered so I could see that the bodies were swollen and the faces were black. I could not perform any funerals because the bodies were so rotten. I saw many heads separated from bodies . There were bodies in a number of different places, scattered around. Som e were piled together and some were buried in the pits. There were the bodies of women and children. I only stayed in the village for an hour, 1836 but it was so horrific that I was crying on the entire journey to Bangladesh . lter in neighbouring Rohingya settlements across the Rohingya who escaped took she 832. 1837 river, or hid in forest areas. Some days later, men from the village returned to collect food 1832 CI 103, LI - 065, YI - 016. - 1833 - CI - 103, LI - 062, LI - 063, LI 088, YI - 016. 1834 LI - 062, LI - 063. 1835 LI - 063. 1836 LI - 062. 1837 - 018. LI - 062, YI - 013, YI - 014, YI 195

196 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 and other items. However, they again encountered the Tatmadaw and a number were shot 1838 and killed as they trie d to flee. Despite the difficulties in calculating the exact number of Rohingya villagers killed 833. during the “clearance operation” in Gu Dar Pyin, Rohingya community volunteers have the violence. They compiled lists from discussions with villagers who managed to escape 1839 While the Mission estimate that 243 persons were killed in the course of the operation. cannot confirm the accuracy of the list, it is consistent with information received that large numbers of people died. Koe Tan Kauk 834. Koe Tan K auk (known in Rohingya as Ko Tan Kaung) is a village tract in Rathedaung Township, with a shoreline along the Bay of Bengal, bordering the southernmost tip of ethnic Maungdaw. The village tract contained four villages, two Rohingya and two Rakhine. Dun Say Para) had gest Rohingya village of Koe Tan Kauk The lar (known in Rohingya as 1840 The village tract contained two IDP settlements, both of approximately 1,000 households. which housed Rohingya who were internally displaced from elsewhere in Rathedaung in 1841 1842 Within the village tract there was a military compound and a BGP post. 2012 . 1843 As the location of one of the 9 October 2016 ARSA attacks, Koe Tan Kau k had 835. been under constant surveillance. This included an increased military presence, resulting in 1844 continued and increased oppression of villagers. In November 2016, torture and mass arrests were carried out as a reprisal for the community engaging with the United Nations 1845 Resident Coordinator. Tensions increased further in August 2017, with threatenin g 1846 meetings demanding that villagers accept the National Verification Card . Credible reports rd 1847 LID arrived in the village tract around this time, indicate that the 33 and may have been 1848 - Au gust 2017, two responsible for beating one man, who died a few days later. By mid 1849 navy boats were also stationed off the shore of Koe Tan Kauk. On 25 August 2017, around 4am, the Tatmadaw alleged that two ARSA attacks took 836. 1850 place in Koe Tan Kauk village tract. Gunshots were heard by residents of both Koe Tan 1852 1851 nd nearby Chein K h ar Li. a The Government did not report any casualties; Kauk 1853 however, it noted that seven ARSA members were killed. 1838 CI - 103, YI - 015. 1839 K - 154.2. 1840 QI - 113, K 158.3, K - 158.4. - 1841 003. - RI - 002, RI 1842 - 116, CI - 137, LI - 100, YI - CI 007. 1843 See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salavation Army. 1844 CI - 118, CI - 119, CI - 181, CI 182, LI - 045, LI - 053, LI - 118. - 1845 See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salavation Army. 1846 CI 181, CI - 182, CI - 183. - 1847 - CI - 181, CI - 182, LM - 014, V 067. 1848 CI - 181, CI - 182. 1849 052, LI LI - 045, LI - - 053, LI - - 113. 100, QI 1850 Inf ormation Committee reported that ARSA attacked the Koe Tan Kauk police station at 4:50 a.m.; “[t]he military columns arrived... at 5:15 a.m. and returned fires [sic],” killing six attackers. Information Committee, “Breaking News 2,” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191 1851 CI 116, LI - 100. - 1852 CI - 014, CI - 030, CI - 031, CI - 137, CI - 181, QI - 003. 1853 Information Committee, “Breaking News 2” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191 196

197 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1854 accompanied by other security 837. Early on 25 August 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers, 1855 1857 1856 entered Chein Khar Li from the south, shooting at and ethnic Rakhine, forces 1859 1858 and many people were shot Some Rohingya ran towards the forested hills villagers. 1860 when fleeing. Others died in more targeted killings by having their throats slit or other 1861 stabbings er the attack found bodies with throats cut . Those who returned to the village aft 1862 and decapitated heads, including those of children. One survivor who returned to the village recalled: - month old son’s body lying next to my wife’s body. She had been shot. I found my six My baby son was stabbed in his stomach and his intestine and liver were coming out. 1863 When I took his small body into my lap, I was showered with his blood. Soldiers then started to burn houses in a systematic fashion, from the south and 838. 1865 1864 1866 “Launchers” were used, as well as petrol and matches. One villager moving north. 1867 A number of persons unable commented: “They burned everything. Not one tree was left.” to escape, including disabled persons, children and the elderly, were burned inside their 1869 1868 re thrown into burning houses. A number of corpses we houses. 839. On 28 August 2017, the Tatmadaw undertook a further “clearance operation” in Koe 1870 Early that morning, a group of Tan Kauk village, one and a half kilometres to the north. 1872 1871 forces entered Tatmadaw soldiers, accompanied by other security and ethnic Rakhine, 1873 the village from both sides. The Tatmadaw led the operation, shooting into the village and towards people fleeing. Weapons were also fired towards the village from naval ships that had been stationed 840. 1875 1874 The military also fired “launchers” towards homes. A number of just off the shore. 1876 1877 and disabled persons elderly were burned in their houses, with their bodies found b y relatives who returned to the village in subsequent days to search for survivors or recover 1878 food and belongings. Rape and sexual violence also occurred in both locations. In Koe Tan Kauk village, 841. old him she had been raped by the one man found a young girl naked and bleeding, who t 1879 h ar Li who saw The Mission received a report of a man from Chein K military. She died. 1854 CI - 014, CI - 030, CI - 031, CI 13 7, LI - 045, LI - 052, LI - 053, LI - 100, YI - 006, YI - 007, WI - 029, WI - 030, - - 067. V 1855 CI - 137, LI - 053, QI - 002. 1856 CI - 137, LI - 052, LI - 053, YI - 006, LI - 045, K - 076.22. 1857 014, CI CI - - 030, LI - 052, LI - 053, QI - 002. 1858 CI - - 137. 014, CI 1859 - 137, CI - 014, CI - 030, CI - 031, CI - 067. LI - 0 53, WI - 029, WI - 030, YI - 007, V 1860 CI - 030, CI - 137, LI - 053. 1861 - 030, CI - CI - 045. 137, LI 1862 006. - 030, CI - - 052, WI - 030, YI - CI 137, LI 1863 CI - 030. 1864 - CI - 014, LI - 052, LI 053, WI - 029. 1865 CI - 014, C - 030, CI - 137, YI - 006, YI 007. - 1866 CI - 030. 1867 LI - 045. 1868 CI CI - 030, - 137, LI - 045, LI - 052, LI - 053. 1869 - CI - 137, LI - 053, WI 029. 1870 CI - 116, V - 067. 1871 - 116, CI - 118, LI CI 100. - 1872 CI - 116, LI 100, QI - 003, QI - - 33. 1873 CI - 116, CI - 118, LI - - 113, XI - 001, K - 076.21. 100, QI 1874 - CI 183, LI - 100, QI - 113, V - 081. 1875 CI - 118, LI - 100, QI - 33, QI - 0 34. 1876 QI - 113. 1877 CI - 116, CI - 119, LI - 100, QI - 113. 1878 - LI - 100, QI 034, QI - 113. 1879 001. - XI 197

198 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Tatmadaw soldiers rape and kill his wife by slitting her throat, as well as kill his three 1880 children, all aged under five. te imagery analysis from 16 September 2017 confirms that all the Rohingya 842. Satelli hamlets and two IDP camps inside the village tract were burned and destroyed. The two 1881 ethnic Rakhine hamlets remained intact. While total numbers of persons killed remain unkn own, the number of casualties, as 843. compiled by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh, ar Li and 94 Rohingya died in Koe Tan K suggest that 94 Rohingya died in Chein K k, h au 1882 s within the village tract. resulting in a total number of more than 180 death While the Mission was not able to verify the number of casualties, it notes that almost every person interviewed reported losing at least one family member in the “clearance operation”, with many having lost multiple family mem bers and other credible sources further note significant 1883 casualties sustained in this village tract. 844. The Tatmadaw led the operation, with credible independent sources identifying the rd 1884 LID. presence of the 33 Ethnic Rakhine were also involved with n eighbours identified, 1885 Most ethnic including current and former village chairmen. Rakhine wore civilian clothes 1886 1887 in Chein K h ar Li, some wore uniforms and carried guns. and were armed with swords; ethnic Rakhine militia, active since 2 012, were also identified as Members of the local 1888 h ar Li. participating in Chein K In Koe Tan Kauk, ethnic Rakhine were involved in burning 1889 houses and looting. Southern Maungdaw Southern Maungdaw Township was one of the main targets of the Tatmadaw’s 845. “clearance operations” in the initial phase from 25 August 2017. A number of these operations commenced in the early morning on 25 August. In a matter of days, operations were impleme nted across a vast swathe of territory encompassing dozens of Rohingya between the Bay of villages stretching along the fertile plains and the forested hills Bengal separating Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships. This was also a region where a number of ARSA attacks took place. The Mission has collected detailed information on the operations in four village tracts, although these are reflective of patterns seen across this area. Kyauk Pan Du 846. kka, has two Rohingya Kyauk Pan Du village tract, known in Rohingya as Shitar Fawri hamlets and one ethnic Rakhine NaTaLa village. A BGP camp is located in the NaTaLa 1890 1891 ARSA attacked the BGP camp in Kyauk Pan Du on 25 August, and there is village. 1892 official reference to ARSA destroying a small bridge nearby. Rohingya villagers heard 1893 gunfire from approximately 3am on 25 August . 1880 - 052. CI - 181, CI - 182, LI 1881 - 158.4. Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR - UNOSAT . K 1882 - 153.2. K 1883 See for example, Amnesty International, We Will Destroy Everything: Military Responsibility for (2018), pp. 76 - 69. Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State 1884 K - 153.3, V - 067. 1885 CI - 030, CI - - 052. 137, LI 1886 LI - 052, LI - 053, YI - 006, K - 076.22. 1887 YI - 006 1888 CI - 181, CI - 183, LI - 052. 1889 - CI 016, CI - 183, LI 100, QI - 002, XI - 001. - 1890 LI - 130. 1891 K - 154.2, Information Committee, “Breaking News 2” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017), 85202504986191 . https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/7 1892 “ Kyaut pandu: At 8:5 am, extremist terrorists blew out a small old - concrete bridge near Kyaukpandu Village.” Information Committee, “Breaking News 2”, (Facebook post, 25 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191 1893 - 016. CI - 138, WI 198

199 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The Tatmadaw immediately commenced a “clearance operation” in the two 847. neighbouring Rohingya hamlets, arriving from the direction of the BGP camp. They were s and some non - accompanied by armed BGP officer uniformed individuals believed to be th 1894 Members of the 99 ethnic Rakhine villagers, carrying knives. LID participated in the 1895 The “clearance operation” lasted for at least two days, resulting in a large operation. number of people killed or injured, and the burning of both hamlets and ultimately nearly all 1896 1897 in the village tract. On the second day, it is reported that additional Rohingya property Tatmadaw soldiers arrived on foot from the direction of the neighbouring Thin Baw Kwe 1898 village tr act to the south. 848. During the operation, as people left their houses, the security forces opened fire with 1899 One elderly woman stayed automatic weapons. Fleeing people were shot, injured or killed. ame back to get her; he was shot in the in her house after her family members fled. Her son c 1900 head and killed. 849. Knives were used to kill some Rohingya villagers who had been captured or 1901 One witness’ brother - injured. - in law was killed after being shot in the thigh and unable to run. He was surrounded by approximately 12 soldiers, two of whom held him, one pulling 1902 Another witness described how he and his his head back, while a third slit his throat. family hid next to a river and watched as four elderly men, who were unable to run fast, were 1903 captured and A number of people took shelter in beaten. He later heard they were killed. 1904 were killed. One paddy fields and ditches between the hamlets and the forested hills; some villager who later returned to the village saw 12 bodies in a ditch, including his father and his niece. He had seen people taking cover there, and believed soldiers found and killed 1905 urning houses by the them. Captured or injured people were also seen being pushed into b 1906 It appears that other persons unable to flee were also burned in their security forces. houses. The destruction of the village took at least two days, and involved the use of 850. 1907 1908 The whole village was destroyed by fire, including the mosque and school . “launchers”. 1909 Villagers who were able to flee took shelter in the forested hills to the west, and 851. hid for days in difficult conditions. Some villagers were able to return to their hamlets at 1910 eturned to the camp in the north. night, after the security forces had r They found a large number of corpses and performed funerals for some. One villager who returned recalled burying around 25 of the dead, whose ages varied from 1 month to 80 years old, both male 1911 10 and female. He also saw elderly people who had been burned in their houses. 852. Ethnic Rakhine villagers looted belongings from Rohingya houses before they were 1912 burned, piling items outside which were then removed on vehicles. 1894 120, QI CI - 138, LI - 039, LI - - 013, WI - 016, YI - 010. 1895 - 153.3. RI - 012, ZI - 001, K 1896 te imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR - UNOSAT . Satelli 1897 - 138, LI - 020, WI - 016. CI 1898 LI - 120. 1899 CI - 014, CI - 138, LI - - 028, LI - 039, RI - 012, WI - 016, ZI - 001. 005, LI 1900 LI - 039. 1901 039, WI LI - - 016. 1902 WI - 016. 1903 120. LI - 1904 CI - 138, QI - 013. 1905 QI - 013. 1906 LI - 005, LI - 039. 1907 120, QI 138, LI - 039, LI - CI - 013, YI - 010. - 1908 LI - 039, WI - 016. 1909 LI - 120, WI - 016. 1910 028, LI LI - - 039, WI - 016. 1911 WI - 016. 1912 - 013. CI - 138, LI - 120, QI 199

200 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 After days in hiding, and unable to return h 853. ome, many villagers left for Bangladesh. and known in Rohingya as May ulla , R , One person described walking north to Myin Hlut spending a night there before it too was attacked, forcing them to flee from a “clearance 1913 operation” for a second time. Duri ng the “clearance operation” in Kyauk Pan Du, women and girls were gang raped 854. and subjected to serious physical injuries by members of the Tatmadaw and ethnic Rakhine 1914 A young woman, 20 - men. This included mass gang rapes. years old, described her e: experienc My husband was shot and then he had his throat cut. I was raped. It is so difficult to say what happened. They tore off my clothes, then six soldiers raped me, and after that two ethnic Rakhine men, whom I recognised, raped me. They pressed my breasts a nd face continuously. My face almost turned blue. I knew the ethnic Rakhine who 1915 lived nearby. A list of 855. by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee casualties developed by camps of sourthern Bangladesh put an estimate of deaths at 38. While the Mission has not been able to verify this number, it is consistent with testimony received. Myin Hlut People were running in different directions, and I wasn’t even able to carry my 1916 unning for their lives. children. Everyone was just r R Myin Hlut, known in Rohingya as May 856. ulla, is a village tract to the north of Kyauk Pan Du. There are 10 hamlets spread along fertile land near the coast, the majority of which ern part of the village tract. were Rohingya, and with a police post in the west On 25 August 2017, an ARSA attack took place in Myin Hlut, and the Tatmadaw 857. 1917 alleged that two police officers were killed. Continuous gunfire was heard in the early 1918 One villager described how his family gathered hours. out of fear. Bullets entered their 1919 of his cousins was hit and killed inside his uncle’s house. compound. One 858. An initial “clearance operation” in the village started in the early morning of August, with Tatmadaw soldiers and members of the BGP ente 25 ring from the west and 1920 firing weapons at people fleeing and burning properties. A number of people were shot 1921 and died, some while trying to escape. The security forces also killed people by cutting 1922 their throats with knives. 859. One witness, who hid in a dumping site, recognized BGP members involved in the 1923 operation. He knew them from playing football together. A large number of properties in 1924 A witness saw the security forces Myin Hlut West and South were burned by “launchers”. first burning the market buildings and madrassa to the west, then moving through the first hamlet, burning houses as they proceeded. As he ran with family members, he was shot in the leg: 1913 - 120. LI 1914 EI 007, EI - 072, LI - 020, LI - 039, WI - 016. - 1915 - 072. EI 1916 QI - 111. 1917 154.2, V K - - 082; Information Committee, “Breaking News 2: Extremist terrorists launch series of attacks on police stations and police outposts in Maungtaw Township ” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017). 1918 - BI 002, QI - 111, QI - 112, YI - 010. 1919 QI - 111. 1920 BI - 002, YI - 010. 1921 - EI - 03 5, QI 112, WI - 022, YI - 010. 1922 WI - 020, WI - 022. 1923 YI - 010. 1924 010. - BI - 014, WI - 022, YI 200

201 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ves. I was helping my younger sisters to flee. I was Everyone was running for their li shot in the leg and the bullet fractured my leg. I fell down, but my father and uncle 1925 carried me to the hamlet next to the forest. There they tried to stop the bleeding. 1926 The “clearance operation” took several days. It appears that the security forces first 860. launched operations in the more westerly hamlets, closest to the police camp, later south - moving east and north. They burned buildings as they proceeded. A witness described leaving his house wh en he saw the security forces approaching: I left my house and ran, but as I was running through a paddy field, I was hit by a bullet in my mouth. I fell down and lay there unconscious. When I regained sister had come to rescue me consciousness, I realised that my mother, brother and and had carried me to the forest. I could see that our house was completely burned, 1927 as well as many other houses. 861. Some people ran towards Shee Dar, the most northern hamlet, and then towards the forested hills. People, in cluding the injured, women and children, hid in the forest for some Persons days. ger with some with serious injuries, received treatment in the forest from a villa 1928 medical knowledge . 862. Women and girls were subjected to sexual violence, including rape b y members of 1929 the Tatmadaw and the police both in their homes and in the forest when trying to escape. One survivor recalled: The military came to our village. I hid in the toilet outhouse, some distance from our by 10 soldiers and some police. I was house. I saw that our house was surrounded able to see what happened. First they tied up my parents. Then they shot my father and raped my mother; later they killed her too. After this, they burned our house. The 1930 escape. toilet was far from the house, so I was able to Satellite imagery analysis demonstrates that the Rohingya hamlets of Myin Hlut 863. village tract were burned and destroyed by 16 September 2017. Further satellite imagery analysis shows that the area was bulldozed and cleared of all buildings and vegetation by 1931 February 2018. 13 864. A list of casualties developed by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh indicate that up to 70 persons were killed in Min Hlut. While the Mission has not been able to verify this n umber, it is consistent with testimony received. Ah Lel Than Kyaw 865. Ah Lel Than Kyaw (known in Rohingya as Hassu Rata) is a village tract with approximately six kilometres of coastline. It has seven main hamlets and a large majority population. There is a small ethnic Rakhine population in the northeast of the tract. Rohingya There is also a BGP checkpoint and camp, where Tatmadaw soldiers were based too. It appears that the presence of security forces increased significantly at these location s from 1932 October 2016 onwards. At around 4am on 25 August 2017, ARSA launched attacks on the two BGP locations. 866. According to the Government, the Deputy Township Immigration Officer was killed. One police official reportedly stated that 17 participants in the ARSA attack were killed during a 1933 three - hour encounter. The same police official reportedly also stated that he had been 1925 BI - 002. 1926 - EI 017, LI - 120. 1927 BI - 014. 1928 BI - 014. 1929 127. BI - 002, WI - 020, V - 085, V - 1930 WI - 020. 1931 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR - UNOSAT. 1932 - CI - 129, CI - 192, LI 111, LI - 112, ZI - 006. 1933 083; Information Committee, “Breaking News 2: Extremist terrorists launch series of - XI - 008, V attacks on police stations and police outposts in Maungtaw Township” (Facebook post, 25 August 201

202 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 - Muslim population into the camp for given advance warning and had taken the non 1934 The sound of gunfire was heard by r esidents of the village tract, and from protection. 1935 neighbouring Chein Khar Li village tract to the north. 1936 A “clearance operation” was launched shortly afterwards 867. from the BGP camp, with continuous shooting from BGP officers and Tatmadaw soldiers. The security forces moved to various locations, including a football field, and continued shooting towards people’s 1937 houses and at people fleeing. One witness stated that he later saw seven or eight people 1938 who had been shot dead inside their homes. The operation cause d people to run towards the forested hills, a few kilometres northeast. Later that day, the security forces went to the 1939 market area of the village in Zay Kone Tan. Shooting continued there. According to one witness, these shootings happened after ethnic R akhine villagers started to loot market stalls, 1940 - . Up to 15 corpses were later causing a confrontation with local Rohingya stall owners 1941 . found at the bottom of a well in the market area 868. The “clearance operation” lasted for at least three days, and le d to the burning and destruction of most Rohingya property. One villager described how he returned to his home after the security forces had left and found the burned bodies of his two nephews, two and 1942 three years old. Buildings in the village were still smouldering as late as 6 September 1943 2017, indicating that burnings may have taken place for up to 12 days. Members of the 1944 security forces used “launchers” to burn properties. Ethnic Rakhine were involved in 1945 killings and looting. atmadaw Special Forces reinforcements One witness stated that T and that he saw three trucks of soldiers arrived in the village in the evening of 26 August th arrive. He believed them to be from the 99 LID. The more intense phase of the operation 1946 hose remaining to flee. started the following day, causing t 869. While assessing the numbers killed or injured in the village tract is challenging, there are indications that the numbers are high. A list of casualties developed by Rohingya villagers indicate that up to 77 persons were kill ed in Ah Lel Than Kyaw. While the Mission has not been able to verify this number, it is consistent with testimony received. Villagers from further south observed dead bodies in the village when 870. to en route 1947 Bangladesh. One villager from Inn Din stated the following: When we passed though Hassu Rata, I saw 15 dead bodies in different houses, all with bullet wounds. We had planned to sleep there, but decided not to sleep alongside dead 1948 bodies. Din Inn 871. Inn Din is a village tract of up to six separate Rohingya settlements, and two small ethnic Rakhine hamlets, one of which is a NaTaLa village. Before the ‘clearance operations’ 2018), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191 , where they state: “Alel Than Kyaw: At 4:50 am, an unidentified number of extremist terrorists attacked Ale Thankyaw 8, leaving Deputy Township Immigration Officer Zar Moung dead. The pol ice station in Region - policemen repulsed the terrorists who retreated from the scene.” 1934 - 083 . V 1935 065, CI - 012, CI - 013, CI - - 039, CI - BI - 129, LI - 111, LI - 112. 038, CI 1936 CI - 013, CI - 039, CI - 129, CI - 187, LI - 112, ZI - 006. 1937 LI - 068. 1938 LI - 112. 1939 CI - 129, LI - 112. 1940 LI - 112. 1941 CI - 129, LI - 112. 1942 - CI 035. 1943 V - 083 . 1944 129, LI CI - 035, CI - - 111, LI - 112. 1945 CI - 013. 1946 LI - 112. 1947 - LI - 112, QI 116, YI - 010. 1948 - 116. QI 202

203 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1949 the population of Inn Din was approximately 7,000, 90 per cent of whom were Rohingya. Alth ough there were no ARSA attacks in Inn Din on 25 August 2017, there were attacks on BGP posts in village tracts directly to the north and to the south, in Thin Baw Kwe and Tha Win Chaung. Tensions were heightened in the immediate aftermath of 25 Augu st, with villagers 872. reporting the presence of Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine and a number of shootings 1950 which caused injuries to Rohingya villagers. An ethnic Rakhine man, who had taken his s to have further increased cattle to a forested area, also went missing, and this appear 1951 tensions. Other credible reports suggest that many of the ethnic Rakhine residents of Inn Din took shelter in the local monastery, where there were also Tatmadaw soldiers and BGP 1952 officers present. 873. was launched across Inn Din in a similar manner to A “clearance operation” neighbouring village tracts. It was led by the Tatmadaw, with the active engagement of ethnic Rakhine. Over the course of up to a week, the Rohingya settlements of Inn Din were targeted, rival of soldiers and ethnic Rakhine, often in the early morning. Their arrival with the rapid ar was accompanied by gunfire and the burning of houses and other Rohingya property, including through the extensive use of “launchers”. Men, women and children were killed and wo unded. They were shot. They were stabbed or slashed with large knives and swords, 1953 including by persons in civilian clothes, believed to be ethnic Rakhine. 874. Many interviewees saw Rohingya villagers shot or stabbed. One elderly woman, interviewed in a B angladeshi hospital in mid - September 2017, had seen soldiers setting 1954 houses on fire and shooting people, including her elderly neighbour. A young mother gave a sense of the surprise nature of the operations. She was at home in the early hours of the ng when she heard gunfire. She saw her neighbour’s house ignite in flames. Bullets morni - then entered her house and her three year old son was killed. She ran to the forest with her bodies of other children and could see houses across the village burning. She also saw the 1955 in - her uncle and her brother In another incident, three members of - law, with slit throats. the same family were executed by Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine. A witness, who s other son, his father hid with one of his sons in a latrine, later found the bodies of hi in - law - 1956 . and uncle, who had been stabbed and had their throats slit 875. At one point there appears to have been an attempt by a large group of Rohingya men to offer some resistance in one of the hamlets, known to the Rohingya resi dents as Bor Para. Men gathered with the aim of preventing the soldiers and ethnic Rakhine from entering the dispersed, with at least one man then hamlet. The soldiers opened fire on the group, which 1957 killed. Many villagers who were able to escape too k shelter in the forested hills to the eastern 876. side of the village tract. Some reported spending up to a week in the hills in difficult 1958 conditions under makeshift shelters. Tatmadaw soldiers also shot into forests where 1959 people were sheltering, causing fur ther injuries and possibly deaths. 877. Other villagers congregated on the beach. Reports suggest that some felt forced to leave the forested hills due to the difficult conditions and lack of food and water, moving to 1960 Reuters journalists investigated the beach with the aim of continuing on to Bangladesh. 1949 - 084. V 1950 - CI 146, LI - - 130, QI - 116. 006, LI 1951 LI - 130, V - 067; Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February 2018). 1952 V - 067. 1953 130, QI - CI - 029, CI - 146, EI - 006, EI - 008, EI - 057, LI - 006, LI - 027, LI - - 006, QI 051, QI - 116. 1954 EI - 006. 1955 027. LI - 1956 QI - 051. 1957 146, LI CI - - 130. 1958 CI - 146, QI - 051. 1959 CI - 029, LI - 027, QI - 116. 1960 - 084. V - 067, V 203

204 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 the separation of 10 men from a group of several hundreds gathered on the beach on 1 1961 This account is consistent with September 2017, who were executed the following day. 1962 information verified by the Missi on, including the account of the wife of one of the men, given shortly after she had arrived in Bangladesh in September 2017. She explained how she and family members had gathered on the beach. Then the men were separated and made to r hands tied behind their backs, including her husband and brother. She sit in rows with thei 1963 . had not seen them since and had been told that they were killed 878. The “clearance operations” in Inn Din were led and largely undertaken by Tatmadaw soldiers, supported by local BG P officers and ethnic Rakhine. Locally - based soldiers from rd LID during the course of the the Western Command were joined by members of the 33 1964 operation. Some of the ethnic Rakhine who participated were from local villages; they 1965 were recognised by Rohingya witnesses. However, some soldiers and police may also have worn civilian clothes alongside ethnic Rakhine villagers, in an attempt to avoid being 1966 nised as members of the security forces. recog 879. Satellite imagery analysis indicates that, by 16 September 2017, the majority and 1967 possibly all Rohingya houses and buildings inside Inn Din were burned and destroyed. The neighbouring NaTaLa village of Pae Yo une was untouched. Further satellite imagery analysis shows that, by 16 February 2018, most of the burned Rohingya properties, along 1968 with trees and other vegetation, were bulldozed and cleared. Other verified incidents modus operandi 880. “Clearance operations” following the same took place in numerous other Rohingya villages across northern Rakhine State. The Mission verified, through multiple interviews and other information, “clearance operations” similar to those detailed 5 4 separate locations, and it received first - hand accounts of additional above in a total of 2 “clearance operations” in a further 2 locations. For example, in northern Maungdaw Township, the Mission verified additional 881. saw serious human rights violations against Rohingya, in the “clearance operations”, which 1970 1971 1969 Kha Maung Seik, Tha Man Thar, Pa Da Ga Day village tracts of Kun Thee Pyin, 1972 1973 and Kyein Chaung. Similarly, in Buthidaung Township, the Wa Na Li / Net Chaung 1974 ons” in Tin May Mission verified “clearance operati , as well as in a large cluster of villages, known collectively in Rohingya as Taung Bazar. Multiple Rohingya villages in this region were subjected to a wave of “clearance operations” as soldiers moved from one village eriod of days. These included operations in the village tracts of Mee to the next over a p 1976 1977 1975 Nga Yant C and Thin Gar Net. Chaung Zay, haung, 1961 Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February 2018) . 1962 051, RI CI 146, LI - 006, LI - 130, QI - - 012 . - 1963 - 006. LI 1964 LI - 112, ZI - 001, V - 067, V - 084. 1965 027. LI - 006, LI - 1966 Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February . 2018) 1967 Satellite i magery of Inn Din is reproduced below. 1968 UNOSAT. - Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR 1969 LI - 015, LI - 017, LI - 032. 1970 - BI - 006, CI - 049, CI 050, CI - 124, LI 014, LI - 103, LI - 104, QI - 070, WI - 048. - 1971 048, CI CI - 002, CI - 004, CI - - 104, CI - 121, CI - 122, EI - 014, EI - 049, EI - 064, EI - 089, EI - 090, LI - 101, LI - 102, QI 069, WI - 047. - 1972 - CI - 131, LI 076, LI - 113, LI - 119, QI - 114, XI - 003. 1973 - 125, EI CI 114, CI - 123, CI - - 023, EI - 028, EI - 045, EI - 096, EI - 097, EI - 098, EI - 104, LI - 031, LI - 107, LI - 004, YI 109, LI - 114, WI - 110, QI - 023. - 1974 029. CI - 021, CI - 115, EI - 001, EI - 067, EI - 068, EI - 069, EI - 071, LI - 056, LI - 116, YI - 1975 - CI - 112, CI - 135, EI - 021, EI - 107, LI - 044, QI - 024, XI 005. 1976 , WI EI - 093 - 007, YI - 030. 1977 031. - BI - 013, LI - 081, YI 204

205 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Each of these incidents saw a similar pattern of conduct on the part of the Myanmar 882. attack on the village by Tatmadaw soldiers, and military and security forces. There was an property, and the killing and injuring of often other perpetrators, the burning of Rohingya civilians through indiscriminate shooting or targeted killing, leading to multiple deaths. In many cases, women and girls were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence. b rights violations by the Myanmar security forces ( ) Patterns of serious human The “clearance operations” constituted a human rights catastrophe. The Myanmar 883. military and other security forces committed human rights violations on a colossal scale, in of international law. The operations had a devastating impact on violation of all basic tenets the Rohingya civilian population, which was targeted, brutalised and terrorised. Thousands of Rohingya villagers were killed and injured. Women and girls were subjected to rape and other form s of sexual violence, and frequently then killed. Children were attacked deliberately and callously and subjected to grave violations. Men and boys were disappeared, probably killed. The arduous journey to Bangladesh caused further death and injury. Rohing populated areas across the three townships of northern Rakhine State were - ya deliberately destroyed, in a targeted manner. Unlawful killings and other forms of excessive and indiscriminate use of force Many Rohingya were killed or injured by indiscr 884. iminate shooting. Rohingya villages were approached without warning, usually from more than one direction, and often in the early morning, by armed Tatmadaw soldiers. They were often accompanied by other armed r Police Force and riot police (known as lon security forces, including the BGP, the Myanma htein ), and frequently by ethnic Rakhine civilians. Members of the security forces, primarily rd th LIDs, shot assault rifles Tatmadaw soldiers of the Western Command and the 33 and 99 s from a distance, not targeting any particular military objective towards the Rohingya village or making any distinction between ARSA fighters and civilians. Men, women and children 1978 were all shot at. Many victims referred to the volume of gunfire, with some describing it 1979 bullets”. Many were shot and killed or injured while attempting to flee. as “raining Witnesses saw relatives, friends, neighbours or fellow villagers shot and fall down 885. while they themselves were running away, and saw people lying on the ground, shot dead or wo unded. One young girl described the operation in Maungdaw Township: 1978 CI - 001, CI - 002, CI - 005, CI - 006, CI - 007, CI - 008, CI - 013, CI - 014, CI - - 017, CI 015, CI 019, CI - 020, CI - - - - 029, CI - 030, CI - 033, CI - 034, CI - 035, CI 024, CI 040, CI - 050, CI - 103, CI - 105, CI - 106, CI - 021, CI - - 118, CI - 109, CI - 110, CI 108, CI 111, 112, CI - 113, CI - 114, CI - 115, CI - 116, CI - 118, CI - 120, CI - 121, - CI 122, CI - 123, CI - 124, CI - 126, CI - 127, CI - 128, CI - 129, CI - 131, CI - 132, CI - 133, CI - 134, CI - 135, CI - - 146, CI - 139, CI - 140, CI - 142, CI - 143, CI - 144, CI - - - 147, CI - 148, CI - 149, CI - 150, CI - 137, CI 138, CI - 178, CI - 179, CI - 180, CI - 181, CI - 184, CI - 185, CI - 186, CI - 187, CI - 188, CI - 189, CI - 191, CI - 177, CI - - 192, CI 195, CI - 196, CI - 197, CI - 198, CI - 199, EI - 001, EI - 003, EI - 004, EI - 005, EI - 006, EI - 008, 193,CI - - - 010, EI - 011, EI - 013, EI - 0 15, EI - 018, EI EI 019, EI - 020, EI - 024, EI - 027, EI - 029, EI - 030, EI - 009, EI 053, EI - 061, 035, EI - 039, EI - 040, EI - 041, EI - 044, EI - 045, EI - 047, EI - 048, EI - 049, EI - 050, EI - 051, EI - EI - - 064, EI - 065, EI - 066, EI - 071, EI - 076, EI - 078, EI - 080, EI - 081, EI - 082, EI - 083, EI - 0 97, EI - 062, EI - - - 005, LI - 008, LI - 010, LI - 011, LI - 012, LI 102, LI 013, LI - 015, LI - 016, LI - 017, LI - 018, LI - 020, 098,EI LI - 021, LI - 022, LI - 027, LI - 028, LI - 030, LI - 031, LI - 032, LI - 036, LI - 039, LI - 041, LI - 042, LI - 044, LI - - 045, LI - 047, LI - 054, LI - 062, LI - 064, LI - 06 5, LI 046, LI 067, LI - 069, LI - 070, LI - 072, LI - 073, LI - 074, - LI - 076, LI - 080, LI - 081, LI - 102, LI - 103, LI - 104, LI - 105, LI - 109, LI - 111, LI - 112, LI - 114, LI - 117, LI - 130, LI 119, LI - 120, LI - 124, LI - 128, LI - 003, QI - 131, LI - 132, QI - 001, QI - - 004, QI - 008, QI - 009, QI - 011, QI - 2, QI - 014, QI - 016, QI - 023, QI - 025, QI - 028, QI - 029, QI - 048, QI - 070, QI - 106, QI - 107, QI - 01 - - - 114, QI - 116, RI - 002, RI - 003, RI - 004, RI 113, QI 005, RI - 007, RI - 008, RI - 010, RI - 012, RI - 112, QI 013, RI - 016, RI - 018, WI - 001, WI - 002, WI - 009, WI - 015, WI - 017, WI - 024, WI - 03 9, XI - 001, XI - 002, - XI - 004, XI - 006, YI - 006, YI - 007, YI - 009, YI 003, XI 010, YI - 011, YI - 013, YI - 014, YI - 018, YI - 025, - YI - 030, YI - 031 , YI - 032, YI - 033. V - 128, K - 061, V - 128; See also XChange.org , The Rohin gya Survey (15 December 2017), where 40 per cent of respondents reported indiscriminate shooting. 1979 - 012. CI - 033, CI - 112, CI - 150, LI - 120, QI - 036, QI - 116, RI 205

206 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 When the soldiers came to my village, we all ran, and they shot at us. We were around 50 people, and maybe half of us were shot. The people shot fell down while they were 1980 d and some escaped. Somehow, I escaped. running. Some die Another man described how his wife was shot as they were fleeing their village in 886. Village Tract, Maungdaw Township: Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son I was in my house with my family, and my wife had just finished cooking the rice. We heard shooting and so we ran out of our house. My wife followed me, but she was hit by a bullet in h er chest just outside the house. I tried to hold her. Then I realized she was dead. I couldn’t carry her body because the shooting did not stop. There was shooting everywhere and I had to run to save my life . I could have been hit by the 1981 was lucky . same bullet but I 887. Others who had found shelter, such as in nearby forested hills, witnessed fellow villagers being shot. Some who were able to return to their villages in the following days, 1982 often at night, saw many dead bodies with bullet injuries. Many villagers who sustained non 888. fatal bullet wounds had to be left behind by fleeing - relatives, and are presumed dead. The intensity of the “clearance operations” made their rescue impossible. One man from Kyein Chaung village tract, known in Rohingya as Boli in northern Maungdaw Township explained the circumstances in which his daughter Bazar , was killed: I don’t know how many people died that day. The military, they were just shooting at whomever. They were shooting at people whenever they saw them, on the streets or in the houses. When they were shooting, there was no time to look back and care for those who were shot. As people were running, they were shooting at them. That is how 1983 my daughter died. She was hit fleeing. I couldn’t go back and carry her. 889. Some people risked their lives to carry injured or otherwise stranded relatives to safety, or to try to recover possessions. One elderly woman stranded in Kyauk Pan Du , Maungdaw Township, was rescued by her son who was subsequently killed. She described what happened: It was complete chaos. All we could hear were the sounds of bullets. All the other family me mbers ran away, but I was an old woman, so I stayed behind. Then my son came back to get me. He helped me and I joined my family. But then he went back to the house to get our belongings and some rice. My son was shot inside our house. The bullet went into the house and hit my son in the head. Later that night, after the 1984 military left, I went back to see my son’s dead body. He was 30 years old. 890. The indiscriminate shooting disproportionately affected those unable to move quickly, often children, preg nant women or those with young children, the elderly and disabled 1985 persons. Their dead bodies were often discovered later, with bullet wounds. One man explained what happened to an elderly woman in his village in Kha Maung Seik, northern Maungdaw Township: There was a very old woman in my hamlet, and she was left behind by her family when the military came, as they couldn’t help her escape. When I went back to my village a 1986 few days later, I saw that she had been shot dead. I saw the bullet wound. Some Rohingya villagers who could not flee, or who sought shelter inside their 891. houses, were also shot and killed or injured, when bullets penetrated thatched roofs and 1980 LI - 011. 1981 YI - 009. 1982 042, LI - CI - 030, LI - 028, LI - 029, LI - - 074, LI 093, LI - 114, QI - 002, QI - 027. 1983 LI - 107. 1984 LI - 029. 1985 LI - 039, LI - 093, QI - 014, QI - 071, WI - 032, YI - 018, YI - 019. 1986 102. - LI 206

207 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1987 bamboo walls. Villagers were shot in other locations where they had found shelter, 1988 includin g through rapid arms fire into forested hills where they had fled. T Mission has provided detailed 892. he Many Rohingya were killed in targeted attacks too. accounts above of corroborated mass killings perpetrated in the villages of Min Gyi, Maung Gu Dar Pyin, the villages of Nu, Chu au k . Dozens, and in some cases t Pyin , Koe Tan K hundreds, of men, women and children were killed. Additional organized mass killings are reported seeing bodies of large numbers of Rohingya , likely to have taken place. Witnesses including those with gunshot and machete wounds, as well as decapitated heads in burned , 1989 to Bangladesh. en route The Mission is concerned that other such mass killings villages f northern remain undocumented. Moreover, other “clearance operations” in the villages o Rakhine State verified by the Mission resulted in a significant numbers of casualties, with numbers of killed often in the dozens. These incidents also constitute mass killings, although seemingly implemented in a less organized manner. In addition to these instances of mass targeted killings, members of the security forces 893. 1990 and executed people, including shot individual persons, including at point blank range, those injured, by slitting their throats using long knives. In some cases, these targeted killings occurred as Tatmadaw soldiers and other security forces systematically moved from house to house, pulling people out of their homes and executing them, or shooting them inside their 1991 family members. houses, or as they left their houses, often in front of Ethnic Rakhine, working alongside the Tatmadaw and other security forces, also targeted and killed victims with long knives. A woman from Kyein Chaung village tract, northern Maungdaw Township, saw many 894. in - family members executed. Her - mother law was shot and killed and her husband was shot while fleeing. Two of her children were also killed, while a third child sustained multiple stab wounds to the head, but survived: Soldiers took to me into a house and beat me and my youngest child . He was one and a half years old, and he died as a result of the beating. My four year old son’s hand was being held by my daughter, who was also stabbed in the head. He started crying and then the military stabbed him and he died. It was with a long knif e, the length of 1992 a forearm. After they killed him, the soldiers washed the knife. Another man described the killings of a group of women and children inside a house 895. in Kyet Yoe Pyin village tract, Maungdaw Township: ing assisted by a midwife as well as a number of A pregnant woman in labour was be other female relatives. I saw approximately five soldiers enter the house and heard a few gunshots. Later I went back and saw the dead bodies of an elderly woman, the - year old girl, and another girl who was 16 to 18 years old and the new - mother, a two 1993 . born baby 896. Tatmadaw soldiers and the ethnic Rakhine used swords, knives or machetes, known locally as “da”, to injure and kill, most notably through the intentional slitting of throats of villagers. Numerous interviewees shared accounts of such killings that they had Rohingya 1994 witnessed. One man, who was hiding in a paddy field, watched as a group of soldiers took - e, leaving his 70 year old mother from their house. One soldier slit her throat with a large knif 1995 her dead on the ground. Another young woman from a village in northern Maungdaw also 1987 011. - LI - 025, LI - 027, LI - 029, LI - 039, LI - 041, LI - 099, LI - 107, QI - 111, YI 1988 WI - 007. 1989 BI - 013, CI - 014, CI - 016, CI - 023, CI - 183, QI - 063, QI - 065, QI - 116 . 1990 - EI - 024, LI - 011, LI - 027, LI - 030, QI - 035, QI 038, WI - 039, WI - 007, WI - 010, XI - 006; See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents. 1991 024, LI - EI - - 011, LI 027, QI - 038, WI - 039, XI - 006. 1992 WI - 004. 1993 CI - 111. 1994 - CI - 029, CI - 045, EI - 029, EI - 034, LI 003, LI - 008, LI - 010, LI - 011, LI - 012, LI - 013, LI - 063, LI - 072, QI - 028, WI - 001, WI - 002, WI - 009. 1995 - 028. QI 207

208 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 witnessed her mother’s murder: “I was inside our house to get my baby, but just at that moment a soldier took out a big knife and cut my mother’s throat. I saw her body fall to the 1996 ground.” 897. In some instances, ethnic Rakhine appeared to have a specific role of killing Rohingya 1997 They mostly used the same kind of swords or villagers who had been shot and injured. 1998 hi Taung . (known in Rohingya as Shab Bazar) in large knives One woman from Maung G Buthidaung Township recalled seeing six people, who had been shot and injured, having their 1999 throats slit by ethnic Rakhine using knives. instances wore In some villages, people identified as ethnic Rakhine, who in some 898. 2000 At times, they used uniforms, were carrying firearms, shooting and killing Rohingya. 2001 made guns with a single home while - load function, known locally as “thela” or “jaitani”, 2002 grade weapons. uns were also seen being Military - grade g in other cases they used military - distributed to ethnic Rakhine by the Tatmadaw, in some cases immediately in advance of the 2003 “clearance operation” itself. Other Rohingya were summarily executed while trying to help family members and 899. neighbours, including th ose being subjected to sexual violence. One woman from Kun Thee Pin, northern Maungdaw, described the following incident: - - law, my three children, my husband I was inside my house, together with my mother in ning when soldiers approached our and some other relatives. It was early in the mor village and were shooting their weapons. Bullets hit the trees in our yard. I could see that some houses were burning. Then they came straight into our house. They were my scarf and tried to undo my touching my body and pulling my hair. They pulled off dress and to lie on top of me on the ground. My husband tried to stop them and protect me. They shot him straight in the face and then used a big knife and slit his throat. He 2004 was 35 years old. Rohingya fleeing the “cl operations” also faced violent attacks at border 900. earance crossing points, resulting in loss of life and serious injuries. Soldiers opened fire on groups of Rohingya at or close to border crossing points, including large numbers gathered on the 2005 A man e Bay of Bengal or Naf River, while waiting to cross into Bangladesh. shores of th from Nga Yant Chaung village tract, Buthidaung Township, described arriving at the Naf River in mid - September 2017 and being fired upon by soldiers. Some of the people ran; , like him, lay on the ground. He said that 25 people were killed, including three of his others 2006 . relatives Soldiers also shot at boats carrying Rohingya to Bangladesh, resulting in further 901. 2007 One witness explained how the boat she was in was sho casualties. t at by soldiers as it 1996 - 029. EI 1997 EI - 030, LI - - 027, LI - 065, WI - 016, WI - 024, YI - 014; See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most 073, LI incidents. serious 1998 CI - 001, CI 029, CI - 114, CI - 124, EI - 030, EI - 049, EI - 057, EI - 066, EI - 073 EI - 102, LI - 003, LI - 027, LI - - 039, LI 062, LI - 063, LI - 065, LI - 071, LI - 073, LI - - - 104, LI - 118, LI - 129, QI - 004, QI - 011, QI - 029, 081, LI 042, WI - 036, WI QI - 066, WI - 004, WI - 005, WI - 016, WI - 024, WI - 027, WI - - - 037, WI - 038, WI - 041, WI 014, YI 044, WI 003, YI - 004, YI - - - 027. 048, XI - 1998 CI - 001, CI - 029, CI - 114, CI - 124, EI - 030, EI - 049, LI - 003, LI - 027, LI - 039, LI - 062, LI - 063, LI - 065, LI - 066, W - LI - 081, LI - 104, LI - 071, LI - 129, QI - 004, QI - 011 , QI - 029, QI - 073, I - 016, WI - 048, YI - 118, LI 014, YI 027. - 1999 EI - 030. 2000 - CI - 120, EI 003, EI 004, EI - 005, LI - 052, QI - 052, WI 005, WI - 027, YI - 006, YI - 031. 2001 CI - 124, LI - 062, LI - 065, LI - 069, WI - 048. 2002 CI - 120, LI - 052, LI - 054, LI - 120, YI - 031. 2003 LI - 052, LI - 103, YI - 031. 2004 LI - 032 2005 CI - 050, EI - 065, LI - 030, LI - 070, LI - 076, LI - 077, LI - 127, LI - 131, QI - 069, QI - 109, WI - 007, XI - 006. 2006 QI - 109. 2007 001. - BI - 017, EI - 034, EI - 065, LI - 107, LI - 127, QI - 026, QI - 099, QI - 109, WI - 007, XI 208

209 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2008 , killing three men and two women. Another witness described her crossed the Naf River experience while waiting for a boat: Soldiers started shooting, so we crawled away and lay down behind the plants in the mud. I saw many people be ing shot at. Dead bodies of men, women and children were 2009 floating in the river. 902. Soldiers also used large knives to kill or attempt to kill Rohingya individuals crossing 2010 waiting to cross A 13 - year old boy explained that he was part of a large group the border. the Naf River when they were attacked by soldiers. The boy was struck with a large knife and his arm was cut, but he managed to escape in the water. He saw the bodies of seven 2011 The Mission viewed the wound on th e boy’s arm and found people who had been killed. it consistent with wounds from a large knife or other sharp implement. 903. Tatmadaw soldiers also opened fire at groups of Rohingya gathered at the border, 2012 causing fear and panic but apparently no casualties. ended to instil This gunfire seemed int fear and ensure Rohingya left Myanmar. Other groups of Rohingya who encountered the 2013 military en route were not subject to violence, but were threatened. One victim explained that he was part of a large group of approximately 200 Rohingya w alking towards the border. to They encountered a group of soldiers who surrounded them and said that, if they went Bangladesh and promised never to come back, then they would allow them to go free. If they 2014 victim was also approached by a did not, the soldiers said they would be killed. Another group of armed Tatmadaw soldiers and told explicitly to leave or be killed: We were heading towards one of the main crossing point across the Naf River. We , to Bangladesh saw armed Tatmadaw soldiers there, who told us: “Go quickly 2015 otherwise we will kill you.” 2016 Other Rohingya were killed and injured through beatings, which sometimes 904. 2017 targeted the most vulnerable, including children, women and the elderly. A witness from Chut Pyin, Rathedaung Township, saw soldier s using their rifle butts to repeatedly beat her 70 - year old brother in the head until he died. The beating was so severe that part of his brain 2018 A survey estimated that 18.4 per cent of deaths during the “clearance came out of his head. s a result of beatings, the second highest reported cause of death after operations” were a 2019 bullet wounds. 905. Another feature of the “clearance operations” was the widespread destruction of Rohingya homes and villages, causing further death and injury through burning. Hou ses were burned both manually using flammable liquid and matches, and by the use of “launchers”, 2020 weapons firing a munition that explodes upon impact. This latter method in particular meant that victims were often caught by surprise and had little time to escape. Death by burning in this manner disproportionately affected vulnerable persons less able to run and escape from the “clearance operations”, including the elderly, disabled, young children and members and others were left pregnant women. Numerous witnesses reported that family behind when they fled the fires. Information indicates that the number of people killed in this manner is high and likely underreported. 2008 EI - 034. 2009 EI - 034. 2010 LI - 019, LI - 068. 2011 LI - 019. 2012 - LI - 099, LI 028. 2013 099, LI LI - - 028. 2014 LI - 048. 2015 LI - 099. 2016 146, EI CI - 006, CI - - 024, LI 008, LI - 022, QI - 018, YI - 001. - 2017 - - 052, LI - 008, LI EI 022, LI - 061. 2018 LI - 008. 2019 Médecins Sans Frontiers, “Retrospective mortality, nutrition and measles vaccination coverage survey in Balukhali 2 & Tasnimarkhola camps” (Bangladesh, 2017). 2020 in this section. Details regarding the methods used to burn houses are set out later 209

210 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Those who were able to return to their villages reported seeing burned corpses in 906. ses. A man who returned to Kyauk Pan Du in southern Maungdaw saw the burned corpses hou 2021 of 10 elderly people and one younger person inside their houses. A man from a village in 2 bodies Buthidaung Township was able to return to his hamlet after dark and found around 1 2022 of elderly people who had been burned in their homes. Another victim from Ta Man Thar in northern Maungdaw Township returned to find the charred bodies of a disabled man and 2023 A female victim from a village in M two elderly people in their houses. aungdaw that was subjected to a “clearance operation” in early September 2017 described her experience: My house was in the west of the hamlet and the military entered from the east. They er had a house started burning houses and I could see the flames. My disabled broth in the east. His wife and children fled, but she told me that he was not able to. He burned inside his house, as he was unable to get out. After two days of hiding and 2024 watching the village burn, we left for Bangladesh. One interviewee 907. described fleeing when soldiers entered his village, Zone Kar Yar in Tha Pyay Taw village tract, southern Maungdaw, and set fire to houses from one end of the - village. His 80 year old mother was unable to run. Shortly afterwards, he could see his house bur ning from where he was hiding. The following day, when he returned to his village, he 2025 found the charred body of his mother. Another witness reported seeing the bodies of his grandmother and his two infant nephews, who had been burned to death in his grand mother’s 2026 house in Ah Lel Than Kyaw, southern Maungdaw Township. The Mission further verified a pattern of Tatmadaw soldiers intentionally forcing 908. people into houses that were either burning or about to be set alight, and even locking them 2027 inside. O ne victim from Ngan Chuang in northern Maungdaw recounted: The military came into my village and burned the houses with launchers. I was inside my house with my children when they locked the door from the outside. The house was reak down a bamboo wall and then rescued my children burning, but I was able to b 2028 one by one. However, my 11 - year old daughter was severely burned. During the operations in Min Gyi, soldiers took women and children to houses where 909. they were raped and gang raped, after which the doors were locked and the houses set on fire. Most victims, including young children who had accompanied their mothers, were unable to escape and burned to death. Similarly, in Chut Pyin, a number of people were forced inside 2029 houses, which were then inten tionally set alight by soldiers. 910. Multiple accounts were received of people, including babies and children, being 2030 pushed or thrown into burning houses by soldiers. One interviewee reported seeing two young children, six or seven years old, running ou t of a burning house, only to be pushed 2031 An back in by soldiers during the operation in Myin Hlut, Maungdaw Township. interviewee from Kyauk Pan Du, Maungdaw, also described a group of approximately 10 burning house, but being pushed back women, children and elderly persons trying to escape a inside by soldiers. He saw one soldier stabbing a child, and then pushing the child inside the 2032 burning house. The entire group were burned alive in the house. 2021 WI - 01 6. 2022 - 007. QI 2023 - 070. QI 2024 QI - 025. 2025 QI - 012. 2026 CI - 025. 2027 BI - 006, CI - 023, EI - 007, EI - 058, EI - 066, LI - 005, LI - 012, LI - 059, LI - 071, LI - 075, LI - 078, QI - 049, QI - 111, WI 059, QI - - 003, WI - 004, WI - 005, WI - 016, WI - 029, XI - 001, YI - 008. 2028 LI - 071. 2029 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents. 2030 - EI - 007, EI 058, LI - 005, LI - 059, QI - 111, WI - 005. 2031 QI - 011. 2032 - 005. EI - 007, LI 210

211 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 In a similar incident, a woman from Ku Lar Bil in Th w village tract, Maungdaw 911. u U La year old daughter from their - Township, described fleeing with her husband and their nine burning house. Her husband was holding their daughter’s hand but was shot in his leg by a bullet. Their daughter stopped to help him an d soldiers dragged them both into their burning house. They were both burned alive. “I wish it had been me holding my daughter's hand, 2033 rather than my husband.” Landmines, planted by the Tatmadaw in and around Rohingya villages as part of the 912. . 2034 “clearan ce operations” also caused death and injury On or around 26 August 2017, a group of Tatmadaw soldiers approached Sin Oe Pyin (Ywar Gyi) hamlet, in Maung Gyi Taung village tract, Buthidaung Township. They systematically planted mines along the main 2035 2036 with one villager describing them as being placed “15 feet apart”. road to the village, 2037 As Once the operations began, the landmines killed and injured many who tried to flee. one villager described, “The mines were put at the entrance of the village, that is the only 2038 Another recalled: way out so when people were running they stepped on them and died”. Some people were running and were killed by the mines, as they didn’t know that they were planted there. Others were hit by the mines as they were coming back from the - year old relative died from an explosion coming back from the paddy field. My 18 2039 field just in front of my house. 913. Mines laid on pedestrian routes or roads inside northern Rakhine State detonated as 2040 villagers fled. - year old man, who was severely injured in a mine blast, including One 18 broken legs and serious burns on both legs and hands, described his experience: When I heard the sound of shooting, I started running towards my village to find my family. As there were checkpoints on the mai n road, I chose to run along a smaller path so I could reach my family quickly. When I was about 15 minutes away from my village, I was blown up from the ground. It sounded like a huge bomb exploding. Then I fainted. I took this path to school often, but h ad never seen or heard of an explosion 2041 on that route before. 2042 The Government reportedly claimed that only ARSA planted mines in the region. 914. Although ARSA did use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their 25 August attacks, 2043 there is no information to support a claim that ARSA had access to, or used, landmines. T he Tatmadaw claimed to have recovered IEDs used by ARSA, but they have made no such 2044 claim in relation to landmines. Medicins Sans Frontiers reported that between 25 August and 3 Decem ber 2017, its 915. - related injuries, and the clinic in Kutupalong refugee camp treated 224 people with violence number of people presenting with gunshot wounds started to decrease only after 2045 September 2017. 25 This confirms the Mission’s conclusion that violen t “clearance operations” continued well beyond the Government’s declared end date of 5 September 2017. 916. The Mission met with a large number of victims who sustained injuries during the “clearance operations”. It should be noted that, for the most part , it is the “walking wounded”, 2033 058. - EI 2034 - 006, CI - 007, CI - 016, YI CI 029, V - 087. - 2035 CI - 132, CI - - 046, LI - 114, LI - 117, QI - 107, XI - 004. 133, LI 2036 LI - 114. 2037 C I - 132, CI - 133, LI - 046, LI - 114, LI - 117, QI - 107, XI - 004, YI - 001. 2038 LI - 046. 2039 - 114. LI 2040 BI - - 001, WI - 009, V - 087. 004, CI 2041 BI - 004. 2042 V - 088. 2043 See this chapter, section D.1.c : Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. 2044 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017) . 2045 Médecins Sans Fr ontiers, Retrospective mortality, nutrition and measles vaccination coverage survey in Balukhali 2 & Tasnimarkhola camps (Bangladesh, 2017). 211

212 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 those who have sustained less serious injuries and survived the journey to Bangladesh, who were able to meet Mission members, and from whom forensic information could be gathered. - documented injuries, and in some cases The Mission conducted forensic analysis of ph oto the medical records, of more than 50 victims whom the Mission also interviewed. This has allowed for an objective assessment as to whether the injuries corroborate specific allegations, and as such contributes to the overall assessment of the credibility and reliability of witnesses. In general, the forensic assessment of the documented injuries has provided additional corroboration of allegations, sometimes strong corroboration. In a small number of cases, the inf - specificity of injuries, ormation was neutral, because of lack of detail or non and in only one case has the information undermined the credibility of the allegation made. as a gunshot In general, where the injured victim is a child, the very presence of an injury such wound is itself of great concern. 917. Illustrative examples of additional corroboration that forensic analysis has provided include: (1) a schoolboy from Tha Yet Oke, Maungdaw Township, who was the victim of a land - mine explosion and sustained extensive burns to all four limbs and a fracture of the right 2046 ; (2) a 10 - year old girl from Chut Pyin, Rathedaung Township, who was shot lower leg 2047 twice while crawling on the ground and had two untreated gunshot wounds in her legs ; (3) an 11 - yea r old girl from Ngan Chaung, Maungdaw Township, who suffered an extensive 2048 burn injury when her home was hit by a “launcher” and set on fire - year old ; and (4) a 10 girl from Kyein Chaung, Maungdaw Township, who suffered multiple sharp force head 2049 wounds ; and (5) from repeated blows from a large knife inflicted by a Tatmadaw soldier. - year old woman from a 45 u Gyi, Maungdaw Township, who was shot in both feet Myo Th 2050 while attempting to flee. 918. Clinics, including the Sadar Hospital in Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong Medical College Hospital, both in Bangladesh, also treated patients with violence related injuries. Many - private hospitals and clinics in southern Bangladesh also treated Rohingya patients. Other medical reports from clinics and medical professionals who treated gunshot victims in Bangladesh have confirmed that many patients, including women, children and th e elderly, 2051 had bullet entry points from behind, consistent with being shot while fleeing. 919. No consolidated data is available on the numbers who received treatment or the nature of their injuries. Moreover, many Rohingya in Bangladesh did not seek tre atment for their injuries, due to difficulties accessing services in the camps in Bangladesh, particularly in the initial weeks and months when demand greatly exceeded available services. The Mission - , with serious bullet or stabbing observed that a number of its interviewees in Bangladesh related wounds, had not sought medical treatment. It appears that, for many Rohingya, the practice of not seeking professional medical care, even for serious injuries, has been nal medical services in northern Rakhine normalised by the lack of access to professio 2052 State. Rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence 920. Rape and other sexual and gender - based violence were perpetrated on a massive scale during the “clearances operations” from 25 August 2017. This in cludes mass gang rapes, 2053 sexually humiliating acts, sexual slavery and sexual mutilations. Rohingya women and girls were the main victims, although there were some instances involving men and boys. Young women and girls were particularly targeted for sexua l violence and were disproportionally affected. The main perpetrators were the Tatmadaw, although other security forces, and sometimes ethnic Rakhine men, were also involved. 2046 BI - 004. 2047 LI - 009. 2048 LI - 071. 2049 WI - 004. 2050 - WI 011. 2051 K - 155, V - 085. 2052 See chapter V.B.3: Restrictions on access to food, livelihoods, health care and education. 2053 Women and girls were also subjected to sexual assault during body searches for jewellery and money. 212

213 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Mass gang rape, involving multiple perpetrators and multiple victims in the same 921. 2054 incident, was a notable pattern, and occurred in at least ten village tracts between 2055 - The Mission received further credible reports of mass September. 25 August and mid ated in gang rapes in a number of other locations. Mass gang rapes were commonly perpetr in front of family and neighbours, within forested areas near the open public spaces , 2056 2057 and during detention in military and police in large houses within the village; village; 2058 In some incidents, up to 40 women and girls were raped or g compounds. ang raped 2059 Women and girls were commonly raped by more than one perpetrator, frequently together. 2060 by many perpetrators, sometimes as many as ten. In Kyein Chaung , north Maungdaw year old woman spoke of being brutally gang raped by nine men near her Township, a 35 - house: I was eight months pregnant. They stamped and kicked my stomach with their boots, and then stripped me naked. I recognised some of the Tatmadaw from the local camp. , both I was blindfolded and hung by my wrists from a tree. I was raped nine times anally and vaginally. I counted all of them. Whilst they were raping me, they bit me on my breasts and neck. They left me tied to the tree. My mother found me in the 2061 evening. My unborn baby died. 2062 ucky, I was only raped by three men”. Another female survivor told the Mission, “I was l Often, mass gang rape took place after the separation of women and girls from men 922. 2063 and boys. In some instances, women and girls were brought to houses where Tatmadaw 2064 flage and with helmets. After entering the soldiers were waiting, including men in camou houses, women and girls were beaten, stripped and brutally raped or gang raped in common 2065 spaces or in separate rooms, toilets or other areas. For example, a young woman, from a village in Kyet Yoe Pyin 923. ungdaw Township, , Ma explained how she was taken by members of the Tatmadaw, together with 20 to 30 other women and girls, to a large house in the village. The women were then taken to different 2066 An 18 rooms to be raped. - thidaung year old woman from Maung Gyn Hanut, Bu Township, described how she and a group of 12 women and girls were gang raped in a forest raped by two soldiers and she saw the other women and girls being taken away area. She was 2067 by soldiers and heard screaming. Later, these women told her that they were also raped. In nearby Nga Yant Chaung, Buthidaung Township, a 23 - year old woman described how villagers were first gathered in the centre of the village, and then soldiers took her and other women to forested areas in groups of four and five. Sh e was raped by two soldiers, whom she recognised from the local military compound, and saw many other women being 2068 raped. 2054 EI - 001, EI - 030, EI - 038, EI - 039, EI - 065, EI - 067, EI - 073, EI - 075, EI - 080, EI - 081, EI - EI - 094, EI - 089, 097, EI 098, LI - 105, K - 128. - 2055 , Kyein Chaung In Maungdaw: Kha Maung Seik ( Fwaira Bazar ) , (Min Gyi ) ( Tula T oli) ( Boli Bazar), Kyauk Pan Du ( ( Fati Yaar), Nga Yant Chaung (a) Taung Shitar Fawrikka); in Buthidaung: Ba Da Kar Nga Yant Chaung Bazar ( Chin Tha Mar ( Hang Sar Para), Gu Dar Pyin (Gudam Para ), Maung Gyi ), Shuap Praung). ( Taung ( Shab Bazar) and in Rathedaung: Chut Pyin 2056 EI - 021, EI - 027, EI - 030, EI - 064, YI - 030. 2057 - CI - 042, CI 046, EI - 021, EI - 080, EI - 081, QI 052, QI - 060, QI - 071, WI - 038. K - 128 - 2058 023, EI EI - - 028, EI - 064, EI - 066, EI - 086, EI - 094, EI - 097, K - 151, K - 127. 2059 EI - 007, EI - - 037. 055, LI 2060 EI - 007, EI - 014, EI - 057, EI - 096, EI - 102. 2061 096. EI - 2062 EI - 075. 2063 - CI - 034, CI - 042, CI - 046, EI - 021, EI 080, EI - 081, EI 097, QI - 052, QI - 60, QI - 072, WI - 038, K - 151. - 2064 - EI - 057, EI - 065, EI 080, EI - 081. 2065 - CI - 042, CI - 046, EI - 080, EI - 081, EI - 097, QI - 052, QI - 060, QI - 072, WI 038, K - 151. 2066 EI - 097. 2067 EI - 030. 2068 021. - EI 213

214 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2069 924. One of the most brutal scenes took place in Min Gyi, Maungdaw Township. Tatmadaw soldiers took dozens of women and girls to larg e houses. Upon arrival, each group was taken to a different room. Once in the room, women and girls were stripped and beaten with sticks, punched or stabbed. They were then raped in groups of up to seven victims at a 2070 infants and children with them, who were killed time. Many of the women and girls had 2071 or severely injured, while their mothers were raped. The houses were then often locked 2072 A few women and set on fire and most victims who were still alive were burned to death. , survivors described how they re gained consciousness when the houses were being burned 2073 Survivors who escaped from the burning and saw dead women and children in the rooms. 2074 The Mission houses exhibited serious burn marks and knife wounds to the head and neck. conducted forensic analysi injuries to one woman with extensive burning to her right s of the - side, including her outer right leg, hand and wrist and right forehead and cheek. The burn scarring pattern is additional corroboration of her account of being awoken in a burning house le lying on the floor and as burning material fell upon her with her right side uppermost. whi 2075 This awoke her, and she was able to escape. The rapes of Rohingya women and girls were particularly brutal, often accompanied 925. physical and mental torture. Many victims were injured by acts of sexual humiliation and before the rapes began beaten with guns, sticks, wire and fists, and kicked in the stomach - 2077 2076 Injuries included broken bones. or the head. Once the women and girls were subdued, 2078 their clothes were torn off. One survivor stated that the soldiers had brought scissors with 2079 Many women and girls were seen them, “in case they could not tear off my clothes”. running naked in forested areas in vis ible distress and eyewitnesses believed that they had 2080 2081 Blindfolds were commonly used. been raped. Often, one member of the Tatmadaw would hold the victim down, often gripping her wrists, while another would rape her. They 2082 e instances, women and girls had their legs tied to In som would then change places. 2083 doors. Others were strung up naked to trees in the forested areas, either by their hands or 2084 by their hair. During rapes, women and girls were frequently bitten on the cheeks, neck, breast and 926. 2085 h. The bite marks were still visible months afterwards to members of the Mission, thig - marks and other mutilations have left United Nations doctors and counsellors. The bite permanent scars on the survivors and serve as a constant reminder to them, their husba nds, family and community of the violations and humiliations they have been subjected to. Due to the substantial portion of women and girls affected, it is difficult to believe that this was not an intentional act and akin to a form of branding. n conducted forensic analysis The Missio the information of a 15 - of such injuries. For example, it was able to additionally corroborate year old girl from Maungdaw who was mass gang raped with three other girls by Tatmadaw 2069 this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents . See 2070 CI - 042, CI - 046, EI - 080, EI - 081, QI - 60, QI - 071, WI - 038, K - 150, K - 151. 2071 - CI - 042, CI - 046, EI - 080, EI - 81, QI 060, QI - 071, WI - 038, K - 150, K - 151; See this chapter, section . D.1.a: Most serious incidents 2072 - 042, CI - 046, EI - 080, EI - 81, QI - 060, QI - 071, WI - 038, K - 150, K CI 151; See this chapter, section - . D.1.a: Most serious incidents 2073 EI - - 081. 80, EI 2074 - 80, EI - 081. EI 2075 EI - 102. 2076 057, EI EI - 007, EI - 029, EI - - 083. 2077 EI - 029, EI - - 083. 057, EI 2078 - EI 083, EI - 089, XI - 001. 2079 - 089. EI 2080 - EI - 011, EI - 014, EI 022, EI - - 094, LI - 105, XI - 001. 076, EI 2081 - EI - 069, EI - 086, EI - 089, EI - 096, EI 098. 2082 EI - 027, EI - 089. 2083 - EI - 034, EI - 057, EI 078, EI - 102. 2084 - EI - 096, EI 098, LI - 105. 2085 001. - EI - 011, EI - 014, EI - 022, EI - 076, EI - 094, XI 214

215 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 lent bite marks, one on each cheek, sustained soldiers. Forensic analysis confirms two vio 2086 during the rape. Many victims were killed after being raped. Most had their 927. throats slit, or were burned 2087 A large number of interviewees saw dead bodies of women and girls to en route to death. because the bodies were naked and large who they thought had been raped, Bangladesh 2088 amounts of blood were visible between their legs. A number of interviewees said that girls 2089 had been “raped to death”, because of unusual amounts of blood in the genital area. In 2090 me instances, the genital area, or their breasts, appeared mutilated. so Death may have been 2091 especially when a woman had been gang raped, or women and caused by genital trauma, girls may have been raped with instruments, such as knives or sticks, which caus ed internal 2092 organ damage, leading to death. Frequently, rapes took place in front of family members, including husbands, parents 928. 2093 and young children. A mother from Inn Din described how her adult daughter’s legs were tied to different doors and she w as raped by 10 male perpetrators. Her daughter’s throat was 2094 then slit and the house set on fire. Mothers were often gang raped in front of their young 2096 2095 who were often ill treated, and sometimes killed. A mother from Nga Yant children, - ng saw her seve Cha - year old son killed with a large knife while she was being gang raped u n 2097 Many women and girls stated that the rape itself was only by five men in police uniform. one aspect of their suffering. The loss of family members, particularly children or unborn 2098 chi ldren, was described by mothers to the Mission as “unbearable”. 929. The “clearance operations” also involved the systematic abduction and detention of women in military and police compounds and bases, where they were then raped or, more 2099 , gang Parents, relatives and neighbours reported that they saw women commonly raped. and girls being forcibly taken by the Tatmadaw who were not seen again. A large number of Rohingya women and girls remain missing, presumed dead. The Mission received examples of the Ta tmadaw demanding a number of women or girls to be brought to their 2100 A young woman from Dar Gyi Zar, Maungdaw Township, described how compounds. she and 20 other women and girls went to the local military compound when such a demand t 2017. They were locked in a room for three days, and the two was issued in late Augus youngest girls, aged around 13 or 14 years old, were taken to the next room. Ten Tatmadaw soldiers entered the room and she heard screaming. A few hours later, the girls’ dead bodies were carri ed out. They were naked from the waist up, had blood in their genital area, and bite 2101 marks on their faces or scratches on them. In and around Buthidaung town, women and girls were systematically abducted, 930. detained, gang raped and killed in military and police compounds during the “clearance operations.” An 18 - year old woman from a village near Buthidaung town was detained and gang raped for five days in a military compound. She could hear women in other rooms beli screaming during her detention. She eved that there were up to 20 other women detained 2086 CI - 045. 2087 E1 - 014, EI - 064, EI - 065, EI - - 075, EI - 076, EI - 080, EI - 081, EI - 088, EI - 094, EI - 098. 067, EI 2088 - 067, EI EI - 001. - 077, EI - 078, EI - 095, XI 2089 EI - 064, EI - 067, EI - 092, LI - - 105, WI - 006, WI - 027. 081, LI 2090 027, XI EI - 064, EI - 067, EI - 092, LI - 081, LI - 105, WI - 006, WI - - 001. 2091 K - 124. 2092 K - 124. 2093 EI - 027, EI - 029, EI - 057, EI - 071, EI - 083. See below in this section, Attacks on and grave violations against children. 2094 057. EI - 2095 EI - 025, EI - 029, EI - 083; See below in this section, Attacks on and grave violations against children. 2096 - EI 044, EI - 071, EI - 083; See below in this section, Attacks on and grave violations against children. 2097 EI - 083. 2098 EI - 083, EI - 096. 2099 083, EI EI - 022, EI - 064, EI - 078, EI - 079, EI - 080, EI - - 086, XI - 001. 2100 EI - 022, EI - 083. 2101 022. - EI 215

216 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2102 and raped. - year old female eyewitness saw In the third week of September 2017, a 40 military vehicles arrive at the military compound in Buthidaung town and unload a group of etween 12 and 18. She saw them being stripped naked by the approximately 10 girls aged b 2103 soldiers before she ran away. The abduction and gang rape of women and girls also took place at the military 931. compound next to Gu Dar Pyin village, Buthidaung Township, on the day of the “clea rance 2104 - operations” in that village. year old daughter being A woman described watching her 15 forcibly taken by soldiers to the compound, along with other girls: “My daughter cried out to me to save her. I watched her taken away until I couldn’t see her an ymore. There is not a day 2105 that I do not cry.” On the same day, another woman saw her 15 - year old daughter being taken away by soldiers from their house, while her elder son tried to intervene. She and her husband escaped with their younger children. Her h usband returned the next day and found 2106 the body of their son. They do not know what happened to their daughter. Tatmadaw was the main perpetrator of sexual violence. A total of 80 per cent of 932. rape, and 82 per cent of these incidents of rape corroborated by the Mission were of gang gang rapes were perpetrated by the Tatmadaw. Incidents of rape and sexual violence were also carried out by members of the BGP, the Myanmar Police Force and ethnic Rakhine, 2107 Although the majori although considerably less so. ty of Rohingya women and girls do not understand Myanmar language, those who did described the use of derogatory language during rapes. One woman, gang raped with her sister, reported a member of the Tatmadaw saying, “We are going to kill you this way, by raping. We are going to kill Rohingya. We 2108 will rape you. This is not your country.” Another woman from Kha Maung Seik, Maungdaw Township, reported a soldier saying, “We will rape you and kill you” and using 2109 insulting terms such as “Kalar”. 933. A review of interviews conducted Women an d girls of reproductive age were targeted. ed, shows that the most common age by the Mission, together with other information receiv range for rape and gang rape was approximately 13 to 25 years old. Soldiers would commonly 2110 It is unclear whether pregnant women were specifically select unmarried women or girls. targeted but many were raped, and many suffered miscarriages or their babies died following 2111 rape, including one woman who was eight months pregnant. also Older women were 2112 - based violence, as were very young girls. gender victims of sexual and 934. Victims frequently complained of severe pain in their genital area, severe blood loss, 2113 Women and girls often had to be pain in their abdomens and severe pain on urination. carried to Bangladesh by husbands, brothers, sons or neighbours because they could not 2114 Months after being raped, victims still suffered from severe injuries that prevented walk. cerns that them from having sexual intercourse with their husbands, and women voiced con 2115 their husbands would leave them and that they would no longer be able to have children. A woman from Laung Don, Maungdaw Township, underwent a hysterectomy in Bangladesh 2102 EI - 086. 2103 EI - 064. 2104 - 078, EI EI - 151. - 079, EI - 080, K 2105 EI - 078. 2106 EI - 079. 2107 EI - 075, EI - 083, EI - 084, EI - 088, EI - 098, EI - 093. 2108 EI - 084. 2109 EI - 090. 2110 EI - 014, QI 052, WI - 004. - 2111 - EI - 014, EI 073, EI - 083, EI - 096. 2112 EI - 067, EI - 068, EI 048, V - 13 8. - 2113 - EI - 029, EI - 025, EI 030, EI - 071, EI - 083, EI - 089. 2114 081, EI EI - 074, EI - - 083, EI - 090. 2115 089. - EI - 025, EI - 029, EI - 030, EI - 083, EI 216

217 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2116 by lack of access due to injuries sustained because of gang rape. Injuries were exacerbated en route to healthcare to Bangladesh and on arrival. The Mission received information of 2117 due to the severity of injuries and lack of medical care. women and girls who died en route event pregnancy or to treat sexually There was also limited or no access to medication to pr transmitted diseases or genital trauma. Many did not realise that they could seek medical care in Bangladesh, or feared it, due to their discriminatory experiences and the effective denial of health care to them in Myan mar or their fear of family and community shaming. 935. Many women and girls became pregnant from rape but the number is unknown. In - May June 2018, the United Nations and other organizations noted a spike in the number of 2118 in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. pregnant women and girls In spite of its public 2119 the Government of Myanmar has dismissal of “fake rapes” following the 2016 violence, implicitly accepted that large numbers of rapes occurred and many babies were born as a he repa triation agreement it signed with Bangladesh has a clause, section result of the rapes. T Children born out 6(v), that appears to specifically address the issue of babies born of rape: “ 2120 of unwarranted incidents are to be certified by a court of Bangladesh.” 936. Medical clinic s reported an increased request for late term pregnancy terminations in March and April 2018, and girls aged 13 to 17 requested terminations from clinics stating 2121 that they had been raped by the Tatmadaw. Health clinics have performed terminations uested, consistent with the laws of Bangladesh (“menstrual regulation”). Doctors when req and counsellors reported that, if they were unable to obtain medical terminations, women and girls have resorted to unsafe terminations. Women and girls have used locally deri ved - abortifacient potions or abortifacients obtained in Bangladesh, which are toxic to both the 2122 woman and the foetus. 937. Babies born of rape are a constant reminder to their mothers of the events endured and may be resented. Cases of infanticide and th e killing of pregnant adolescent girls were 2123 Rape survivors also face reported to the Mission by counsellors in Bangladesh. stigmatisation. Many women and girls who have survived sexual violence live in fear of their 2124 ut. husbands, family or community finding o For unmarried women, this is heightened. In general, if it is known that a girl has been subject to sexual violence, it is unlikely that she will marry. 938. The circumstances in the vast overcrowded refugee camps in southern Bangladesh mean that wom en and girls continue to be at risk of sexual violence and, in particular, sexual exploitation and abuse. The Mission is concerned about reports of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation and abuse. Women are also reportedly facing increas ed levels 2125 of family violence in the camps. 939. Women and girls were not the sole victims and survivors of sexual violence during the “clearance operations”. The Mission received credible reports of sexual violence against 2116 151. - K 2117 CI - 034, QI - 061. 2118 V - 139, “ ” – UNICEF, 17 More than 60 Rohingya babies born in Bangladesh refugee camps every day May 2018. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/press - releases/more - 60 - rohingya - babies - born - - bangladesh refugee - camps - every - day%E2%80%93 - unicef . 2119 - “ V - 254, V 255. The fake rape ” charge appeared as a banner on the Facebook page of the State Counsellor’s Office (screenshot on file with the Mission). It is discussed in detail in chapter X, rape and other forms of sexual violence by the military See section B.2.a: Case study 1: the use of . : http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/545 . also 2120 “Arrangement on return of displaced persons from Rakhine” between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Naypyidaw, 23 November 2017). 2121 KI - 129. 2122 K - 124. 2123 - K 124. 2124 K - 124. 2125 124. - K 217

218 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2126 2127 mutilation and sexualised torture, sometimes men and boys, including rape, genital 2128 leading to death. The scale of this sexual violence remains unknown. The patriarchal religious leaders in the nature of the Rohingya community, combined with the centrality of make it extrem ely difficult for men and boys to discuss sexual violence against community, them. Isolation, attachment to cultural references and low levels of education further prevent an accurate assessment of the extent of sexual violence against men and boys. there are 940. During detention, which was prevalent during the “clearance operations”, consistent credible reports of men and boys being subjected to sexual violence, including 2129 The extent of rape, sexualised torture and humiliation by authorities or in their presence. sexual violence against men and boys in northern Rakhine throughout this period warrants further investigation. Individuals, families and the wider Rohingya community have been highly 941. fered or witnessed. Rape was used traumatised by the brutal sexual violence, which they suf as a form of torture, to terrorise the community and as a tactic of war. It continues to have a devastating and lasting impact on the individuals who suffered from it, their families and the physically and mentally. The Mission has concluded that wider Rohingya community, both the widespread sexual violence and the manner in which it was perpetrated was an intended Rohingya community and effort, at least in part, to weaken the social cohesion of the contribute to the destruction of the Rohingya as a group and the breakdown of the Rohingya 2130 way of life. Attacks on and grave violations against children 942. During the “clearance operations”, infants and children were indiscriminately killed 2131 eted for killing. Infants and children were frequently killed by and in some instances targ 2132 gunfire, stabbed or burned to death. A health survey produced by Médecins Sans Frontiers observed that, after 25 August 2017, 57.5 per cent of child deaths under the age of five om violence and, of those deaths, 56.5 per cent of children died from gunshot resulted fr 2133 wounds . In some instances, children were targeted for killing and their parents were left 943. 2134 A 23 - year old woman from Chin Tha Mar, Buthidaung Township, described: alive. as able to see the killings through the door crack to the yard. I w When the soldiers year old child. - started shooting, all women were screaming. They even killed an eight During the night, I escaped and I saw so many dead bodies including children. Most 2135 the children were boys, but there were girls too . of A father from Kyauk Chaung village tract, Maungdaw Township, recalled: 944. A son and daughter of mine were taking a bath in a pond. I was about to call them in ars old. My son was shot in the head. My to have some food. They were six and four ye daughter then fell to the floor and was screaming. Then there was a second shot. They shot my daughter in the chest. The ricochet of the bullet hit me in the foot. I saw that 2136 nding about 20 feet away from us. the shots had come from the soldiers sta 2126 K - 130, V 134. - 2127 EI - 092, EI 096, LI - 022. - 2128 - EI 096. - 092, EI 2129 K - 151, V - 134 ; See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build - up to 25 August 2017. 2130 K - - 124. 122, K 2131 - CI - 045, CI 131, CI - 136, CI - 137, LI - 024, LI - 025, LI - 026, LI - 094, LI - 099, LI - 105, LI - 112, LI - 115, LI - 119, LI - 148 2132 131, CI - CI - 013, CI - 019, CI - 035, CI - 045, CI - - 136, CI 137, EI - 080, LI - 024, LI - 025, LI - 026, LI - 054, LI - 036, WI 073, LI - 099, LI - 105, LI - 112, LI - 115, LI - 119, QI - 094, LI - 004, YI - 009; YI - 028, YI - 030, V - - 138. 2133 V - 086. 2134 004, K EI - 038, EI - 075, LI - 085, WI - - 076.25, K.076.26. 2135 LI - 079. 2136 - 026. QI 218

219 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 In Kyet Yoe Pyin, Maungdaw Township, one witness described finding the b odies of 945. 2137 year old girl, a baby and a teenage girl in a yard, while another described how he - a two saw two young children, who were searching for their mother, being killed by soldiers. One year old boy had his throat cut, while a four mped to death, before the year old was sta - six - 2138 body was thrown into a nearby burning house. 946. Children and infants were disproportionally impacted by destruction of villages by 2139 fire. Large numbers burned to death in houses, unable to escape. Infants and young children we re often sleeping when houses were set on fire, were the slowest to leave, or were too frightened to leave. They were also forced back into the burning houses by Tatmadaw 2140 A 14 - year old boy from Kyauk Pan Du, Maungdaw Township, soldiers or others. d how he saw around 10 people, mainly children, but also some women and elderly, describe being pushed back into a house by members of the Tatmadaw during the “clearance operations”. One of the children was stabbed when the group tried to leave the house. The 2141 soldi ers then set the house on fire and the witness believed that all inside died. Children and infants were also killed while their mothers were being raped or gang 947. 2142 raped. While a woman was gang raped, her 10 - year old son was killed with a knife in Tin 2143 Buthidaung Township. May, Another mother from Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, recounted: I don’t know how many policemen raped me, it was not my priority. The only thing I can remember is that they were trying to take my children. They dragged my son fr om under the bed. I was screaming to protect my children. I have not seen my son 2144 again. Children were also disproportionately affected by the conditions in which they fled, 948. having to sleep in the open in the forested hill areas and needing to cross rivers and the sea to reach Bangladesh. Many children and infants drowned, as they could not swim, particularly with the high water levels of monsoon season. Others drowned when boats 2145 An 18 - year old woman from Kyein Chaung, Maungdaw Township, de capsized. scribed 2146 seeing four children drown when their boat capsized. Parents also often became separated 2147 from their children en route. A mother fleeing the “clearance operations” in Gu Dar Pyin, Buthidaung Township, lost her six - people fleeing. She year old daughter in the crowd of 2148 never saw her again. A large number of children fled from Myanmar alone or with only their siblings. 949. A 12 - year old boy from Gaw Du Thar Ra (Ywar Thit Kay) , Maungdaw Township, told the Mission how he left Myanmar after his parent s were killed. He is now living in a 2149 refugee camp in Bangladesh, looking after five younger siblings: I saw smoke rising from my village. Later, when the soldiers had left, I went back to my village with my uncle. At my house we found the burned bodies of my parents. My year old sister was also dead, burned, in my mother’s lap. I saw many dead bodies - one in my village. Bodies were both inside the houses and outside. They had been shot, 2137 CI - 111. 2138 CI 137. - 2139 EI - - 007. 001, EI 2140 049, CI CI - - 137, LI - 042, LI - 135. 2141 EI - 007. 2142 - EI 071, EI - 075, EI - 081, EI - 083, EI - 102. 2143 EI - 071. 2144 EI - 075. 2145 137, EI CI - 123, CI - - 084, LI - - 114, LI - 115, LI - 118. 097, LI 2146 CI - 023. 2147 CI - 148, EI - 078, LI - 097, LI - 119, LI - 122. 2148 EI - 078. 2149 033. - WI 219

220 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 clothes with me, stabbed and burned. I couldn’t bear it. I couldn’t even take any of my 2150 everything was burned. 950. The Mission met a large number of children in the Bangladesh refugee camps in September and October 2017 who exhibited visible injuries corresponding with accounts of th a sharp implement, or burned. For example, being shot with live ammunition, stabbed wi the medical records of a 15 - year old girl from Chut Pyin confirmed that she had been shot by live ammunition, consistent with the account she had given of being shot by a soldier. A 12 - year old girl from Nga Ya nt Chaung, Buthidaung Township, showed injuries to her leg which she said occurred when she was shot by soldiers, and her Bangladesh hospital medical records showed that she had spent 30 days in hospital for two gunshot wounds. She was unable to 2151 the Mission met her. walk when 951. Children were also victims of sexual violence. Girls and young women were targeted for rape, mass gang rape, sexual slavery and forced nudity. They were selected by members of the Tatmadaw for sexual violence, including girls of 11 or younger, some as young as 2152 seven. The Tatmadaw used schools as military camps during the “clearance operations”, where civilians were subject to sexual violence, beatings and tortured, and in some instances women and girls were raped and mass gang r aped. Girls were also abducted from their homes by the Tatmadaw and police in the lead up to the 2017 “clearance operation” and were frequently raped, mass gang raped and killed following their abduction and detention. Disappearances of men and boys 952. The clearance operations also resulted in the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as the disappearance, of many Rohingya men and boys, perpetrated by the Tatmadaw, often tims amounting to enforced disappearances. Their removal was usually violent, with vic beaten and rounded up into groups, with their hands tied together and sometimes blindfolded, 2153 before being taken away. 953. One mother described Tatmadaw soldiers tying up her son and other male villagers, 2154 Another using rope that they had cut from cows. They were then made to lie on the ground. female witness described how male members of her f i amily were rounded up in Maung Gy Taung village tract, in Buthidaung Township: The military tied their hands behind their back with a rope. There were 25 men t ied in line to the same rope, including my 18 - year old son and my husband. T hey were 2155 badly beaten and forced to lie down on the ground. 954. Another villager described the experience in Nga Yant Chaung , also in Buthidaung Township: They were going into different houses and taking some of the men. They gathered the men and told them to line up. They tied them up tog ether by the hands. While they were tying them up, they hit the men with guns, and kicked them injuring some of them, 2156 while continuing to round men up. Information suggests that mostly young men were targeted and detained, together with 955. 2157 persons consi dered as respected or influential, including religious leaders, teachers and village administrators. In most instances, the men were taken away from the village, either on foot or in military trucks or vehicles. This pattern of the targeting and dis appearing of men also appears to have continued 956. during the flight to Bangladesh. One woman described how the group she was travelling with 2150 WI - 033. 2151 EI - 040 2152 EI - 077. 2153 EI - 030, LI - 048, QI - 115, WI - 007, WI - 017, YI - 001. 2154 EI - 030. 2155 - YI 001. 2156 WI - 007. 2157 001. - LI - 001, LI - 004, QI - 051, XI - 009, YI 220

221 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 encountered Tatmadaw soldiers. She said that some of the men were shot, while others were 2158 tied up, taken away and not seen again. A woman provided information of her two sons village in A being captured in a el Than Kyaw , Maungdaw Township, where they had h L sought refuge during their journey to Bangladesh: We were trying to cook some rice under a tree when soldiers came and we all gathered. The soldiers picked out the males, including my two sons. They were forced onto the ground, with their hands tied behind their heads. The soldiers put their boots on the sides of uding my my sons’ faces. Thirteen men were then taken away, incl 2159 sons. 957. The men and boys detained have not been seen since and their whereabouts are 2160 unknown. The circumstances in which men were detained during the “clearance operations” have not afforded family members the opportunity to seek information from the authorities, with many relatives now in Bangladesh. In any event, the Tatmadaw is unlikely to assi st them with information. The Tatmadaw publicly referred to the detention of 114 “Bengalis” in October 2017, although no further details were provided regarding their 2161 ed. identity or whereabouts, or whether any charges had been laid or judicial process initiat Even a conservative estimate of those disappeared far exceeds this figure. Although relatives hope that those taken away are detained, many presume that they have been killed. Some of were taken away. For these fears are based on indications given at the time men and boys example, a woman who saw her son and other men taken away by soldiers was told, “ We 2162 saw men being Another interviewee will do nothing to you, but we will slaughter them”. of gunfire. He could not see tied up and taken into a house, after which he heard the sound 2163 what happened but believes that they were killed. - documented Similarly, in a well incident, 10 men who had their hands tied and were taken away in Inn Din, southern 2164 forces and local villagers. Maungdaw Township, were subsequently killed by the security 958. The anguish of not knowing what happened to those disappeared remains overwhelming within the Rohingya community. One man made a specific request to the Mission: Please help us find out about the people who were taken awa y, those who died are 2165 gone, but please try to find information about these people . Destruction and looting of civilian homes, property and other protected objects Burning of property 959. Through analysing satellite imagery and witness accounts, the Mission has established widespread, systematic , deliberate, organized and targeted destruction, mainly by fire, of populated area across the three townships of northern Rakhine State. Maungdaw, Rohingya - Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships are comprised of approximately 993 villages. 2166 Satellite imagery from August 2017 to March 2018 August 2017, shows that, following 25 2167 across the three townships were partially (214 approximately 392 of these villages 2158 - 001. XI 2159 EI - 030. 2160 BI - 016, XI - 006. 2161 This was stated in the Tatmadaw initial investigation in November, with the same figure reiterated in , its more recent publication Myanmar Politics and the Tatmadaw: Part 1” (2018). “ 2162 EI - 030. 2163 QI - 115. 2164 CI - 146, LI - 006, LI - 130, QI 051; See this chapter, section D.1.a. Most serious incidents; Wa Lone, - Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February 2018). Commander - in - Chief, “Tatmadaw investigation team statement on findings of discovery of unidentified bodies in Inn Din Village Cemetery in Maungdaw Township” (Facebook post, 10 January 2018), post on file with Mission. 2165 - 001. RI 2166 This is the period covered by the UNITAR - UNOSAT data analysis provided to the Mission, a summ ary of which is accessible at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM - Myanmar/UNOSATReportMyanmar_20180912.pdf 2167 Maungdaw, 96 villages in Buthidaung, and 19 villages in Rathedaung. 277 villages in 221

222 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 s period. This represents the destruction villages) or totally (178 villages) destroyed during thi of approximately 40 per cent of villages in northern Rakhine State. More than 70 per cent of the destroyed villages, or 277, were located in Maungdaw Township, where the majority of Rohingya population in northern Rakhine State resided. Fire was the main means of destruction. 222

223 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Map showing areas with visible destruction, through burning, of houses, other structures and vegetation in northern Rakhine State. The map was developed through n satellite imagery collect resolutio ed on multiple dates between the analysis of high - 25 August 2017 and 18 March 2018. Destruction is represented by coloured dots, with colours corresponding to the date range when visible destruction was detected. Due to cloud cover and satellite over pass range, damage is de tected within a date range. . The date range refers to damage detection, as opposed to when it occurred 223

224 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Within these affected villages, approximately 37,700 individual structures were 960. 2168 The vast majority were Rohingy destroyed. a homes, but the Mission has established that 2169 2170 were religious schools (madrassas) and mosques, other buildings, including markets, also destroyed. The majority of the detected damage, approximately 80 per cent, was already of 16 September 2017. By that date, approximately 30,800 visible in satellite imagery as 2171 As such, the majority of the structures had already been destroyed in 279 villages. destruction occurred in the first three weeks of the “clearance operations”, consistent with the timing of the mo st serious incidents in this report. However, the burning of houses and 2172 structures continued over an extended period, until at least March 2018. Villages were burned by Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine. Much of this burning 961. was done manually, thr ough the use of flammable liquids thrown onto the buildings and set alight using matches and through lighting buildings with flaming torches. Tatmadaw soldiers also used weapons referred to by many victims as “launchers” and described as making loud explos ive sounds, after which a whole building, or set of buildings, rapidly caught fire. “Launcher” likely refers to a weapon that fires a munition that explodes upon impact. Victims generally described a hand - mounted weapon, but some also desc ribed - held or shoulder weapons fixed to the ground using some sort of support. Victims were most likely describing armour weapon such as an RPG - 7 (rocket propelled grenade launcher) or the a portable anti - 3 Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, both of which are used by the Tatm adaw and match the M - description in terms of both use and results. It is likely that both rocket launchers and mortars were used by Tatmadaw soldiers to destroy buildings and homes. 962. The accounts collected further demonstrate the systematic and planned nature of the burning of villages. Burning followed a regular pattern. Interviewees describe “launchers” - inhabited areas, often at night or very early being fired by soldiers directly into Rohingya morning, and setting one or more structures on fire. The e thnic Rakhine played a role, burning Rohingya homes manually, house to house, often equipped with cans of petrol among other 2173 2174 equipment. In some villages, other minorities fulfilled this role. For example, in Mee Chaung Zay, Buthidaung Township, interviewees stated that members of the Hindu minority and Tatmadaw soldiers burnt their village together. The Hindus were recognised from barber 2175 Rakhine and other ethnic shops in the nearby Bazar. The participation of ethnic communities in the burning was often coordinated with the Tatmadaw operations. In many 2176 One locations, ethnic Rakhine methodically set fire to houses, alongside the soldiers. Rohingya from Kyauk Pan Du, Maungdaw Township, explained : 2168 UNOSAT estimated the number of destroyed structures in the affected townships between 25 August 2017 and 18 March 2018 by carrying out a damage assessment using statistical predictive analytics based on a simple linear regression. This involved identifying a sample of representative areas and performing a structure count in these areas. This created a “sample dataset” which was then used to estimate the number of structures destroyed wi thin the identified damaged areas across the three townships. UNOSAT estimate a margin of error in counting as low as 10 per cent. 2169 BI - 002, CI - 189, CI - 192, CI - - 106, RI - 008. 194, QI 2170 BI - 002, CI - 009, CI - 028, CI - 042, CI - 102, CI - 103, CI 108, CI - 114, CI - 129, CI - 135, CI - 189, EI - 017, EI - - - 014, - 066, LI - 076, QI - 001, QI 013, WI 070, RI - 015, RI - 016, WI - 005, WI - 006, WI - 009, WI - 012, WI - WI - - 001, YI - 013, YI - 019 YI - 030. 017, YI 2171 According to UNOSAT, due to the presence of extensive cloud cover in the imagery collected du ring this period, the damage analysed is very likely underestimated. UNOSAT subsequently collected additional images of those areas, which were covered by clouds on 16 September and identified onal 1,700 individual structures. Given additional damage in 10 villages affecting approximately additi the pattern of the damage and the presence of fire detections on those areas, it is likely that this destruction might have occurred before 16 September 2017. 2172 Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR - UNOSAT. 2173 069, LI CI - 036, CI - 120, CI - 124, CI - 125, LI - 066, LI - - 102, LI - 118, LI - 120, LI - 129, LI - 132, QI - 002, QI - - 005, QI - 115, WI - 007, WI - 014, WI - 032, WI - 016, XI 002, XI - 003, XI - 005, YI - 006, YI - 013, YI - 014, 021, YI YI - 018, YI - 015, YI - 030. - 2174 044, LI CI - 125, CI - 135, CI - 148, EI - 057, LI - - 119, QI - 012, QI - 022, QI - 035, QI - 109, WI - 044. 2175 CI - 135, LI - 044. 2176 014. - CI - 124, LI - 066, LI - 119, WI - 016, YI - 006, YI 224

225 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 They threw bottles full of liquid onto the houses, and then they would throw a match. They also used large canisters containing between 10 to 20 litres of liquid. The military were using launchers, and they were directing the Rakhine to target the smalle r houses and those that had been left unburned after the launcher had been 2177 used. 963. Although significant burning took place at and around the sites where ARSA carried cated out their attacks, the overall area affected was far greater, encompassing villages lo 2178 significant distances away from these attacks. 964. A number of villages close to the location of ARSA attacks experienced “clearance operations” and burning in the immediate aftermath, within hours of the attacks on 25 August 2017. Three examples are given below. Verified accounts confirm that in each area the burning of villages commenced on 25 August and then continued for some days afterwards. Satellite imagery analysis taken from 16 September 2017, when the absence of cloud cover etailed imagery, shows the extent of the destruction in each location. allowed for d 965. Mee Chaung Zay village tract in Buthidaung Township was near the location of three 2179 ARSA attacks. Interviewees from Ywar Thit, Mar Zi and Hpaw Tay Ahr Li villages reported hearing the sound of nearby gunfire in the early morning of 25 August and seeing soldiers entering their villages soon afterwards. The soldiers shot at people and burned homes with the use of “launchers”. Burnings took place over a series of days while people soug ht 2180 2181 shelter in the nearby forested hills. The mosque was also burned. Image of Mee Chaung Zay from 11 October 2017. Burnings first detected on 16 September 2017 Villagers from Myo Thu Gyi village tract, Maungdaw Township, described soldiers, 966. ac companied by ethnic Rakhine, burning houses on the morning of 25 August 2017 and the 2177 WI - 016. 2178 UNOSAT. Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR - 2179 In the early hours of 25 August 2017, ARSA conducted an attack at the BGP outpost in Hpaung Taw Pyin, at the military base occupied by the Light Infantry Battalion 552, and another shortly afterwards at the BGP outpost in Nga Yant Chaung. 2180 112, CI CI - - 135, QI - 024, XI - 005. 2181 - 164 CI - 195, YI - 030; K 225

226 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2182 following days. They burned several hamlets in the surrounding area. Despite not being mentioned in official Government accounts as the location for an ARSA attack on 25 August, there is official reference to ARSA carrying out an ambush on vehicles of the security forces 2183 in Myo Thu Gyi on 26 August 2017, which resulted in an exchange of fire. Image of Myo Thu Gyi from 11 October 2017. Burnings first detected on 16 Sept ember 2017 967. Ywa r Thit Kay, Ward Five in Maungdaw town, was also the location of an ARSA 2184 attack. One interviewee described how on 25 August, at around 3am, she heard gunshots he returned to her and a loud explosion, and joined others fleeing to a nearby village. When s 2185 house two days later, she saw military and ethnic Rakhine setting houses on fire. 2182 QI - - 108, WI - 011. 035, QI 2183 Information Committee, “Breaking News 6”, (Facebook post, 28 August 2017),https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786693624837079 2184 Information Committee, “Breaking News 2”, (Facebook post, 25 A ugust 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191 ; K - 154.2 2185 - 021. YI 226

227 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Image of Ywa r Thit Kay from 25 September 2017. Burnings first detected on 16 September 2017 The “clearance operations” were also initiated in 968. the days after the ARSA attacks in numerous other locations across northern Rakhine State that were not in the vicinity of an ARSA attack. One example is the village of Sin Oe Pyin, in Maung Gyi Haunt village tract, Buthidaung Township. On or around 26 Aug ust 2017, the village was set on fire by Tatmadaw soldiers. Neither the Government nor any other source reported any ARSA attack in the vicinity. Several interviewees said that soldiers entered the village, started shooting at 2186 “The soldiers were everywhere; the whole villagers and used “launchers ” to burn houses : village seemed full of soldiers. They were shooting towards the people randomly and 2187 shooting launchers to burn the houses.” These accounts are consist with satellite imagery on showing that Sin Oe Pyin was burned by 16 analysed by the Missi September 2017. 2186 CI - 132, LI - 047, LI - 114, XI - 004. 2187 114. - LI 227

228 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Image of Sin Oe Pyin from 11 October 2017. Burnings first detected on 16 September 2017 The security forces and ethnic Rakhine often returned to “clear” and systematically 969. 2188 Satellite imagery confirms that, despite the State Counsellor’s statement of burn villages. 2189 19 September 2017 that the military’s “clearance operations” ended on 5 September, the illage in destruction of villages continued for weeks afterwards. One example is Goke Pi v Buthidaung Township, which was intact as of 25 September and subsequently burned by 2190 1 October. 1 2188 062, QI 107. CI - 043, QI - 008, QI - 010, QI - 011, QI - 017, QI - 025, QI - 061, QI - - 2189 “Speech delivered by Her Excellency Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on Government’s efforts with regard to National Reconciliation and Peace” (Facebook post, 19 September 2017), https://www.facebook.com/state.counsellor/posts/speech - - delivered - by - her - ex cellency - daw - aung - san suu - kyi - state - counsellor - of - the - /1121130291354519 . 2190 For example, although not the site of any ARSA attacks, Aw Lan Pyin village in Nga Kyin Tauk village tract (Buthidaung) ; Mee Chaung Khaung Swea (Buthidaung); Tin May (Buth idaung); Goke Pi were all burned after 5 September 2017. (Buthidaung) 228

229 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Image of Goke Pi from 25 September 2017. All structures remain intact Image of Goke Pi from 11 October 2017. A large number of structures are b urned While in southern Bangladesh, the Mission witnessed large plumes of smoke from 970. near the border in neighbouring Myanmar, which indicated the presence of large fires: on 15 - western Buthidaung; and on 17 S eptember in September, in northern Maungdaw or north central Maungdaw, most probably in Kyauk Hlay Kar or Zin Paing Nyar village tracts in 2191 central Maungdaw . 2191 Photographs taken by Mission staff member on 15 September 2017 at 1.15pm from 21°12'36.9"N western Buthidaung. Photographs 92°09'40.0"E is of burning in northern Maungdaw, or the north - 229

230 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 971. Imagery further demonstrates that the destruction deliberately targeted Rohingya villages and property. It shows that in some location s only clusters of structures appear to be burned, while the surrounding vegetation remains untouched, suggesting that fires were lit 2192 separately and that burning deliberately targeted specific structures. The images below, from 5 September 2017, show Hla Poe Kaung and Maung Hna Ma villages in Maungdaw 2193 These fires appear to be distinct and separate, Township, with numerous visible fires. rather than fire spreading from one area to another. taken b y Mission staff member on 17 September 2017 at 3.34pm from 20°53'29.0"N 92°17'44.0"E is likely to be of burning in Kyauk Hlay Kar or Zin Paing Nyar village tracts in central Maungdaw. (On file with FFM) 2192 V - 067. 2193 US National Imaging Systems. 230

231 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 972. The targeted nature of the burning is further demonstrate d by the fact that, in at least 22 locations analysed, only specific Rohingya settlements were affected, while other non - 2194 Rohingya settlements within the same village tracts remained untouched. The untouched settlements are often more organized in layout, with evenly distributed structures in rows, and appear to be constructed from higher quality materials, including corrugated iron roofs. Buddhist pagodas are also often visible within, or close to, these settlements. The burned settlements are generally le ss organized in layout, giving the appearance of having grown organically over time, and usually with less robust structures, with thatched roofs. These factors indicate that the intact areas are non - Rohingya, usually ethnic Rakhine, and the burned areas a re Rohingya. 973. Similarly, where the Mission could establish that the “clearance operations” were carried out in mixed ethnicity villages, satellite imagery shows that only the areas populated by the Rohingya were targeted. Accounts provided to the Missi on further corroborate this 2195 - analysis. ethnicity For example, the image below shows one area of Zay Di Pyin, a mixed village in Rathedaung Township, with an ethnic Rakhine majority population, damaged by the area burned was populated by fire. According to accounts provided to the Mission, Rohingya. 2194 Kha Maung Seik (Maungdaw); Kyee Kan Pyin (Maungdaw), Laung Don (Sin Thay Pyin village, Maungdaw); Koe Tan Kauk (Rathedaung); Myo Thu Gyi (Maungdaw); Inn Din (Maungdaw); Nyaung Chaung (Maungdaw); (Du) Chee Yar Tan (Maungdaw); Ywar Thit Kay (Gaw Du Thar Ra villa ge, Maungdaw); War Cha (Maungdaw); Chut Pyin (Rathedaung); Tha Man Thar (Maungdaw); Min Gyi (Maungdaw); Kyauk Pyin Seik (Maungdaw); Tha Yae Kone Tan (Maungdaw); Zaw Ma Tet (Maungdaw); Kyauk Pan Du (Maungdaw); Myauk Ye (A) Pan Be Chaung (Buthidaung); Zee Ht on (Buthidaung); Zay Di Pyin (Rathedaung) 2195 142 . CI - 007, LI - 006, LI - 042, LI - 100, LI - 101, LI - 118, LI - 231

232 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Image of Zay di Pyin taken on 16 September 2017 974. Many settlements that remained intact in mixed villages are “model villages”, also known as “NaTaLa”. For example, in Inn Din, southern Maungdaw Township, there are six . Rohingya hamlets and two small ethnic Rakhine hamlets, one of which is a NaTaLa village Satellite imagery analysis demonstrates that most Inn Din villages have been completely burned during the “clearance operations”, while the NaTaLa village, Pae Youne, is unaffected. The Mission collected numerous accounts of the targeted burning of Rohin gya settlements in Inn Din by Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine. Image of Inn Din taken on 9 October 2017 showing b urned structures and Pae Youne the west, intact (with pagoda shown in inset) NaTaLa village , to 232

233 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 lysis shows most of Kyauk Pan Du village tract, Similarly, satellite imagery ana 975. southern Maungdaw Township, burned, while the NaTaLa village, characterised by a more structured distribution of houses and a pagoda, remains untouched. Image of Kyauk Pan Du taken on 1 December 2017 . Targeted destruction is also visible in satellite imagery analysis of Tha Pyay Taw 976 village tract, southern Maungdaw Township. A small residential area, with a pagoda in the centre, remains intact, while the surrounding three villages, Tha Pyay Taw, Zone Kar Yar and Thar Yar Taw, are totally destroyed, as is Myin Hlut village tract to the southeast. Similarly, the majority of settlements in Tha Yae Kone Tan village tract in southern Maungdaw Township were destroyed, while Tha Ray Kon Baung, the nearby NaTa La village, remains untouched, as does Saw Gi Nar. Pagodas unaffected by fire can be seen in each area. A more recent image of Tha Yae Kone Tan village tract shows new road improvements connecting the pagoda to Tha Ray Kon Baung. 233

234 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 aken on 18 March 2018 Image of Tha Pyay Taw t Image of Tha Yae Kone Tan taken on 11 October 2017 234

235 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Image of Tha Yae Kone Tan taken on 16 December 2017 The Mission also received information of soldiers or local authorities demanding large 977. 2196 One example was villagers to spare their villages from burning. bribes from the Rohingya Zaw Ma Tet village in central Maungdaw Township where one interviewee claimed that, after the Tatmadaw burned the local market place on 27 August, they requested 60 million Kyat or the villag e would be attacked. The interviewee stated that they were unable to pay such a large sum and so they fled to Bangladesh. Satellite imagery analysis shows that the 2197 village was subsequently burned. Image of Zaw Ma Tet taken on 11 October 2017 2196 - QI 040, QI - 041, QI - 106. 2197 - 106. QI 235

236 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Looting The “clearance operations” also encompassed the looting of goods, in which civilians 978. played a central role. For the most part, looting was carried out by security forces together 2198 Other minority with ethnic Rakhine, often recognisable to their Rohingya neighbours. 2199 groups also looted and were recognizable by their distinctive dress or appearance. Looting often took place at the outset of a “clearance operation”, with participants arriving together with the security forces, and systematically looting Rohingya goods and other possessions from houses prior to the burning of the village. 979. Looting was comprehensive. Often, all moveable property was stolen, including gold 2200 The stolen and other valuables, food stocks, motorcycles, cattle, goats and other livestock. 2201 property was then set aside so that it would not be destroyed once the burning started. One 2202 from his village, Rohingya witness described seeing ethnic Rakhine “taking everything” while another explained how the ethnic Rakhine put looted prop erty in sacks which were put 2203 A man described the scene in his village in outside before they set structures on fire. southern Maungdaw: I had fled my house and was with my family crouching and hiding in the bushes near river . From there I could see th e ethnic Rakhine looting the houses. They were the piling up all the valuable things outside the houses before burning the houses. They were piling things on the main road. Some things were in sacks and some were on the 2204 road. Sometimes goods were put di rectly into military vehicles, including large military 980. 2205 One Rohingya villager described seeing military trucks, before houses were set on fire. vehicles being loaded up and driven away and then the ethnic Rakhine leaving with all that 2206 nother villager described how looted goods were taken to temporary A they could carry . 2207 military camps. Looting continued in the days following a “clearance operation”, with ethnic Rakhine 981. Rohingya often returning to the cleared villages to continue looting and round up abandoned 2208 cattle. The mass looting resulted not only in widespread theft of Rohingya goods, but also 982. contributed to the forced deportation of the Rohingya population, through forced destitution and, in the case of livestock and other property, loss o f their source of livelihood. Many women and girls, including survivors and victims of sexual violence were also 983. of their sense systematically robbed during body searches and assaults, and frequently told 2209 jewellery is an important status symbol, and of loss for their home and possessions. Gold 2210 Many victims of rape also lamented the loss of its loss has a deep psychological impact. 2211 their new clothes, bought for the Eid festival just before the “clearance operations” began. 2198 - CI - 029, CI - 036, CI - 120, CI - 124, CI - 138, LI - 069, LI - 081, LI - 100, LI - 102, LI - 109, LI - 119, LI - 066, LI - 015, YI - 120, LI - 131, LI - 132, QI - 005, QI - 013, QI - 027, WI - 004, WI - 032, YI - 006, YI - 009, YI - 014, YI 018, YI - - 031. 021, YI 2199 - CI - 124, LI 076, LI - - 112, LI - 119. 109, LI 2200 037. CI - 138, LI - 2201 LI - 112, LI - - 132. 120, LI 2202 LI - 100. 2203 LI - 132. 2204 - LI 120. 2205 CI - 034, CI - 138, LI - 037, QI - 013. 2206 CI - 034. 2207 WI - 032. 2208 QI - 113, XI - 005. 2209 - EI - 034, EI 069, EI - 096, EI - 099. 2210 K - 122. 2211 - 086. EI 236

237 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The arduous journey: mor s and hardship e death The “clearance operations” forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee and 984. walk for days, or even weeks, through forests and over mountains, to reach Bangladesh. On this journey, many more died or were killed or injured. Th ere was minimum shelter, with people having to sleep in the open, and little food or water. 2212 en route . Tatmadaw soldiers shot at groups of Rohingya who were At times, these 985. were seeking attacks occurred in villages that were already burned, where fleeing Rohingya 2213 refuge on their journey. At other times, attacks took place in forested areas or when 2214 Rohingya were forced into the open, for example when crossing rivers. One woman from Township, described how, after walking for two Chin Tha Mar village tract, Buthidaung days, she and her group were near a river crossing when soldiers opened fire at people as 2215 they were crossing. She saw two people shot. Another man recounted how he and his family were awaiting a boat to carr y them across a river. A group of soldiers and police 2216 opened fire at a boat carrying people across, killing four of the passengers. 986. Many dead bodies sighted on the journey exhibited bullet or stab wounds. There appear to have been violent attacks at passes in the mountain ranges, most notably in the “Fati Yaar Dala” range, separating the north of Buthidaung from northern Maungdaw Township. Although the Mission was not able to verify the circumstances of these killings, it received accounts of many Ro hingya corpses indicating death from violent injuries. This included 2217 persons with slit throats and others with bullet wounds. Witnesses spoke of there being 2218 As one man recounted: piles of bodies and a row of severed heads. There were a lot of bodies in t he hill near to Fati Yaar. I think there were more than 50 bodies. We saw them in a place where there were many bags of abandoned rice and other possessions. People appeared to have been gathering there when they were 2219 . killed Other villagers saw nume rous bodies in another nearby mountain pass, the “Lobboi 987. Dala”, which was near Pa Da Kar Day War Nar Li/Net Chaung village tract in Maungdaw 2220 One man described his journey through these mountains: Township. I crossed Fati Yaar Dala. There I saw dead bodies , including women, and some severed heads. I also saw one man strangled with a vine. Then I left the Fati Yaar Dala and crossed the Lobboi Dala, which is a smaller mountain range nearby. There laughtered with I saw many more dead bodies. I could see that people had been s 2221 knives; very few had bullet injuries. You can see so many dead bodies there. 988. Data from Médecins Sans Frontiers indicates the scale of violent deaths en route to Bangladesh, noting that 13.4 per cent of violent deaths occurred during t he period between 2222 displacement from their vil lage and arrival in Bangladesh. 989. The appalling conditions of the journey also contributed to the high number of casualties. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled with little or no notice and few, if any, p ossessions. Many had sustained injuries and needed urgent medical care. Most would have been experiencing deep psychological trauma, leaving their homes following a violent assault , as well as during which many had witnessed the deaths of family members and neighbours the destruction of their homes and villages. Continuing “clearance operations” and the 2212 001, YI - 001, LI - 057, LI - 119, WI - 007, XI CI - 031. - 2213 QI - 003. 2214 CI - 001, CI - 050, EI - 027, EI - 034, LI - 003, WI - 007, XI - 001. 2215 EI - 027. 2216 CI - 050. 2217 CI - 135, LI - 049, LI - 114, LI - 051, QI - 024, YI - 030, YI - 031. 2218 LI - 049, LI - 051, LI - 059. 2219 QI - 024. 2220 CI - 010, YI - 030, YI - 031. 2221 YI - 030. 2222 Médecins Sans Frontiers, “Retrospective mortality, nutrition and measles vaccination coverage survey in Balukhali 2 & Ta snimarkhola camps” (Bangladesh, 2017). 237

238 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 presence of large numbers of Tatmadaw soldiers and other security forces made it dangerous to travel on main roads or to seek shelter or provisions in other villages. Instead, Rohingya villagers walked for days or weeks in forest and mountain areas, sleeping in makeshift shelters or in the open, during heavy monsoon rains, and without sufficient food or water. This disproportionately affected the most vulnera ble, including children and the elderly. Many persons died and were buried in makeshift graves. A woman described her journey, with experiences that were typical of many: It took nine days to reach Bangladesh. On the way, I saw four or five decapi tated heads by the side of the path. One of our group died on the journey, a small boy. One woman gave birth. I had a packet of biscuits with me, but nothing else. It was raining 2223 heavily. Everything was burning around us. 990. One woman, who had seen her husban d and son killed in Kha Maung Seik, Maungdaw Township, spent three nights in a forest before arriving in Bangladesh. She recalled how hungry her children were during this period, and how she had to feed them with plant 2224 leaves. Another man, from Buthidaung town, described walking for 16 days through the forests to Bangladesh using a small pot to cook leaves to eat, while drinking water from 2225 streams. Three people with him died on the journey, including his aunt. 2226 Villagers carried injured relatives or n eighbours on the journey. 991. Others were left 2227 behind, unable to be carried, with forced to make difficult decisions. A survivor people from Min Gyi, Maungdaw Township, recalled how she and her sister - in - law had to leave behind another woman: dy and difficult due to the heavy rain. The other woman was injured, It was very mud with stab wounds on her neck, and it was very difficult for her to walk. We were all slipping in the mud, and we realised that we could not drag her along with us anymore. We could hear t he military and ethnic Rakhine talking nearby at a well, and we knew that, if we kept on waiting for the other woman, we would all be killed. We tried again to move her but we couldn't, and so we decided that we had no choice but ter - in - law dragged me away and said, “don't look back, to leave her there. My sis 2228 there's no point”. People succumbed to their injuries, including because of lack of access to medical 992. 2229 some of whom may have died or suffered treatment. Mothers gave birth to babies en route, 2230 extreme malnutrition. Deaths occurred on the beaches of the Bay of Bengal, as people waited for days for a boat to take them to Bangladesh. One man described seeing babies born on the beach and helping to bury more than 10 people who died there, including children and 2231 the elderly: “It was very hot and there was not enough food or water. A large number of Rohingya also drowned while trying to flee to safety across rivers 993. rn Rakhine were swollen to high levels from the or at sea. Most bodies of water in northe August and September monsoonal rains, and the risks were amplified by dangerous tides. 2232 Children, women and the elderly, less able to swim, were particularly vulnerable. As one man fleeing his village in Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, recalled, many people attempted to cross a narrow river beside his house. The height of tides forced people to swim 2233 rather than wade across. Two sisters, 10 and 12 years old, could not swim and drowned. 2223 062. QI - 2224 049. EI - 2225 - 061. QI 2226 - 005, BI BI 010, BI - 014, QI - 024, WI - 003. - 2227 CI - 029, CI - 116, CI - 126, CI - 179, CI - 197, CI - 198, QI - 071, WI - 005 . 2228 071. QI - 2229 save - 111, QI - 011, QI - 063, See also http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/8/5b75848e4/cant - CI - life - give - comfort.html . 2230 - QI - 036, See also http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/8/5b75848e4/cant - save life - give - comfort.html . 2231 - 011. QI 2232 CI - 023, EI - 065, LI - 107, LI - 129. 2233 129. - LI 238

239 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ng Nar in southern Buthidaung Township, recalled, “There were Another man, from Myau 2234 babies’ bodies floating in the water”. Drownings were prevalent in those villages where crossing large bodies of water were 994. hip, when trying to the only way to escape. Many drowned in Min Gyi, Maungdaw Towns 2235 One man recalled that the escape from the shore, located on the long bend of a wide river. river was so high that elderly people and children were not able to cross, with many of them drowning. His young son probably drowned: “He was t rying to swim with us, but he was young, only 7 years old. The rest of the family could cross by swimming, but we don’t know 2236 what happened to him.” Similarly, in Gu Dar Pyin, Buthidaung Township, many people lence, but this also led to drownings. One villager tried to cross a nearby river to escape the vio 2237 described seeing 10 to 12 people drown in the river, mostly women. 995. People also drowned after being shot at and forced to jump into the water. An elderly man recalled the military shooting at a group trying to cross the river, some of whom jumped in the water and drowned: My grandson, who was three - years old, died when my daughter - in - law jumped into the river, while crossing the canal. The military started shooting at people who were about to cross th e river. She was afraid and jumped into the river with her son. The 2238 child drowned and we found his body later on. 996. In certain locations, babies were thrown into the river by security forces and 2239 intentionally drowned. One woman described seeing soldie rs throwing a number of infants and babies, taken from their mothers, into the river at Maung Gyi Taung in Buthidaung Township. Some of their parents protested and were killed, while others managed to rescue er mothers lost their children as they were trying their children from the river. She said that oth to cross the river: “The children could not hold on properly and they were lost in the 2240 water”. 997. A large number of people died when boats capsized on the journey to Bangladesh, across the Naf River or in the treacherous open waters of the Bay of Bengal. The Bangladesh Border Guard Police recovered more than 100 bodies from the Bangladesh side of the border. 2241 Many people saw boats capsize, people drown, and dead bodies floating in the water. One witness saw a boat capsize as she was crossing a river, and all passengers drowned, including 2242 children. Another man recalled the large number of dead bodies he saw in the water when he reached the Bangladesh side of the border: “There were many people crying the re, 2243 mourning their drowned family members”. 998. Members of the Mission witnessed the aftermath of a boat that had capsized in the Bay of Bengal on the coast of southern Bangladesh, in Imani, approximately 12 kilometres north of Shamlapur, on 31 October 2 017. The boat capsized in waves not far from the shore and 10 people drowned, including elderly women and children. Disposal of bodies 999. The “clearance operations” resulted in a large number of corpses, strewn across villages, inside houses, along roads, in paddy fields or floating in ponds or rivers. Many also saw dead bodies on their journey to Bangladesh, often in or near burned villages. Witnesses able to return to their villages after “clearance operations”, normally after nightfall, saw large numbers of dead bodies of their neighbours and relatives. However, others who returned to 2234 LI - 107. 2235 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents. 2236 LI - 097. 2237 - LI 063. 2238 CI - 023. 2239 CI - 046, EI - 030, EI 050, WI - 021. - 2240 030. EI - 2241 EI - 045, WI - 016. 2242 CI - 123. 2243 - 111. QI 239

240 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 their villages were unable to find the bodies of relatives who they had witnessed being 2244 killed. In a number of locations, the security forces burned the bodie s of Rohingya who had 1000. 2245 One person from Koe Tan Kauk village, Rathedaung Township, saw been killed. 2246 Tatmadaw soldiers carrying bodies and putting them in a boat, which was then burned. Maungdaw Another witness saw a large number of burned bodies in Kha Maung Seik, 2247 Another villager from Yae Township, which he said had been collected in one location. Khat Chaung Gwa Son village tract, Maungdaw Township, observed soldiers collecting dead 2248 bodies and putting them inside houses before setting the houses on fire. Similarly, in Chut 2249 One witness watched for two hours as soldiers Pyin, bodies were burned in a house. 2250 Following the mass killing in collected dead bodies and threw them into a burning house. Min Gyi, bodies were burned in three large pits dug for this purpose, while the bodies of 2251 multiple women were burned in the houses where they were subjected to mass gang rapes. In other locations, the Tatmadaw buried bodies in mass graves. Gravesites have been 1001. s killings took place, including Maung documented in a number of the locations where mas 2252 The Mission has received further reports of soldiers and Nu, Gu Dar Pyin, and Inn Din. 2253 in other locations. One man security forces digging graves and burying multiple bodies rls who had been shot, but was forced to flee the saw in a house the bodies of women and gi shooting. When he returned some hours later, he found that the bodies had been moved into 2254 Another man returned to his village in Ah Lel Than Kyaw to find a number of bodies a pit. 2255 thrown into a well. of men who had been shot The Mission also heard repeated reports of 2256 bodies thrown into rivers, ponds and paddy fields. The information points to a concerted effort by the Tatmadaw to dispose of Rohingya 1002. llages. The manner in which the bodies corpses following the “clearance operations” in vi were disposed of, including through the preparation of large pits, both to burn bodies and to bury them, and the use of vehicles to transport corpses and the use of other equipment, - planni ng and an intention to destroy criminal evidence. This has suggests both a level of pre been consolidated by subsequent terrain clearance through bulldozing, removing evidence of burned bodies and graves. It is likely that hundreds, and possibly thousands, of bodies have been burned, buried or subsequently destroyed. The Tatmadaw were also witnessed collecting dead bodies in military vehicles, and 1003. 2257 In particular, in central Buthidaung Township, bodies were wrapped in removing them. plastic sheets by soldiers and then removed in military vehicles from the village tract of Chin 2258 litary Bodies were then removed in mi Tha Mar, the location of the Maung Nu mass killing. vehicles and trucks. O ne villager from Chin Tha Mar, reported seeing a number of large 2259 trucks being driven away, each Another witness saw military trucks containing bodies. leave and later return to the village several times. He believed that soldiers were transporting 2260 bodies to the military base. 2244 CI - 079, LI - 055, LI 083 LI - 099, WI - 002, WI - 003. - 2245 CI - 030, LI - 020, LI - 048, LI - 059, LI - 072, LI - - 002, QI - 003, QI - 004, QI - 035, RI - 004, V - 075. 088, QI 2246 - XI 001. 2247 - 029. QI 2248 - 020. LI 2249 CI 177, CI - 186, CI - 191. - 2250 CI - 186 2251 See this chapter, section D.1.a : Most serious incidents. 2252 See this chapter, section D.1.a : Most serious incidents. 2253 - EI - 047, CI - 111, CI 187, CI - 195, WI 011. - 2254 CI - 111. 2255 112. CI - 129, LI - 2256 - - 004, CI - 014, CI - 015, CI - 021, CI - 146, CI - 183, LI - 046, LI - 055, LI - 063, LI CI 080, LI - 094. 2257 - CI - 016, CI - 035, EI 017, LI - 055. 2258 CI - 027, CI - 109, CI - 195, LI - 020, LI - 046, LI - 055, LI - 080, QI - 042, WI - 017, V - 067, V - 75, V - 077. 2259 LI - 020. 2260 - 196. CI 240

241 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The Mission notes the considerable efforts of some victi ms to return to their 1004. Rohingya villages, normally after nightfall, and perform funerals, a significant cultural and religious practice. These funerals were often done hurriedly, with a number of bodies placed in one 2261 makeshift grave. “clearance operations” Death toll of the 2017 1005. Quantifying the number of people killed or injured during the “clearance operations” is challenging. This is due in part to the nature of the “clearance operations”. Large numbers eir bodies were subsequently systematically of people were killed without witnesses, and th disposed of, including through burnings, terrain clearance and bulldozing vast areas of northern Rakhine . These difficulties are compounded by the lack of accurate available demographic data on the Rohingya popul ation of Rakhine State. While the Myanmar authorities have maintained detailed lists of Rohingya villagers in northern Rakhine State, obtained through the annual compilation of “household lists”, this information is not available. Further, Rohingya people were not included in the Myanmar national census in 2014 and so there is no public record of their numbers at that time. No comprehensive casualty recording process has been undertaken by any actor to date. On 14 November 2017 the Tatmadaw’s Investigation Team presented results of its investigation into the “terrorist attacks” and subsequent “military operation” in which it only makes reference to 520 people killed, almost none of whom were Rohingya civilians. This is patently at odds with the facts 2262 as esta blished and assessed by the Mission. Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps in southern Bangladesh have 1006. been developing detailed casualty lists, compiling information directly from family members. These listed the names, ages and villag es of people killed, or presumed killed. The assessment lists 9,208 Rohingya as killed and an additional 1,358 whose whereabouts are unknown, 2263 presumed disappeared or killed, 2,157 people in detention and up to 1,834 victims of rape. These figures do not i - violent deaths, such as those who drowned en route , or nclude non otherwise perished. This list was incomplete and at the time of reporting remains a work in progress. The Mission is unable to verify this list. It notes that the numbers are in the range of other statistical studies. For example, a series of six health surveys have provided quantitative data on 1007. providing e stimates that between 9,425 and 13,759 Rohingya lost their lives in casualties , whom between 6,759 and 9,867 Myanmar between 25 August and 24 September 2017, of 2264 died from violence. At least 730 of these were Rohingya children under the age of five. these figures only record the deaths of family members witnessed by While informative, 2265 should be considered conservative estimates. In addition, respondents to the survey, and it should be noted that these estimates only relate to the first month of the “clearance operations”. Other statistically based estimates have indicated significantly higher 2266 numbers. 2261 014, - 194, EI CI - 006, CI - 023, CI - 030, CI - 039, CI - 114, CI - 115, CI - 122, CI - 127, CI - 128, CI - 131, CI - - 026, WI - 041, LI - 077, LI - 114, LI - 119, LI - 131, QI - 004, QI - 005, QI - 011, QI 029, LI - - 016, WI - 032, LI ZI 001 . - 2262 The reported findings of the Investigation Team refer to 376 “ARSA Bengali Terrorists” killed, 131 “ethnic/Hindu/Bengali people” and 13 “members of security force”. Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information releas ed by the Tatmadaw True News Information Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungtaw region, Ra khine State” (14 November 2017). 2263 K - 153.1. 2264 Médecins S ans Frontiers, Rohingya crisis - a summary of findings from six pooled surveys (9 December 2017). 2265 Ibid. 2266 For example, the report of International - State Crime Initiative (ISCI) have provided an estimate of a final death toll of 22,000 to 25,000, see ISCI, Genocide Achieved, Genocide Continues: Myanmar’s Annihilation of the Rohingya (Queen Mary University, 19 May 2018), p.14. See also: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, “The Rohingya Crisis: Past, Present and Future” (Summary of which noted that out of approximately 688,000 new arrivals since 25 findings, 21 - 24 January 2018), 241

242 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Information collected by t - finding into the 1008. he Mission through the course of its fact 2017 “clearance operations” broadly corresponds with the numbers indicated in these efforts to date, and suggests that the estimate of up to 10,000 deaths is conservative. Arakan Rohingya Salv ation Army (c) Organization, structure and resources 1009. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) emerged following the violence in 2012. The 2012 events, including the participation of the authorities in the violence and violations against the Rohingya, combined with increasing widespread human rights oppression affecting all aspects of Rohingya life, served as a trigger for many of the founding 2267 It first came to public attention in October 2016, when it launched and early members. on security posts in Rakhine State. It became more visible following three coordinated attacks its subsequent attacks of August 2017. 2268 id not have a name or clearly defined goals. 1010. It In its early stages, the organization d was loosely organized around the principle of seeking justice for the Rohingya Muslim community. Initially, the movement may have been open to engagement with the authorities and to finding a political solut ion, particularly in view of the democratic opening in Myanmar 2269 during this period. The group appears to have waited for the 2016 transfer of power to the civilian government, hoping it would bring positive change in the promotion and protection a rights. However, in the absence of any visible improvements for the Rohingya of Rohingy 2270 in the months after the NLD took office, the group prepared its military strategy. On 9 October 2016, the group launched its first offensive action against government 1011. rgets, carrying out three attacks on BGP posts in Maungdaw Township. It adopted an ta 2271 al - - Yaqin (Faith Movement), only after these attacks. official name, Harakah In March 2017, the organization opened a Twitter account, and issued its first public 1012. 2272 ARSA sta tements, using the English name Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. issued a series of public statements in English about its objectives and intentions, reiterating its goal “ defend the Rohingya and their rights. ARSA noted in its first press stateme nt, released ” to on Twitter on 10 March 2017: ...our sole objective is to defend, salvage and protect the innocent Rohingya indigenous native ethnic community of Arakan State with our best capacities as we have the legitimate right under international law to def end ourselves in line with the principle of self - defense. In doing so, our defensive attacks have been aimed only at the Burmese terrorist government and its terrorist military regime in accordance with 2273 international norms and principles until our demands are filled. point list of demands, asking for a - 1013. In the same press release, ARSA elaborated a 20 range of political, economic, social and cultural rights for Rohingya, as well as requesting 2274 independent investigation of all allegations, including by and the United Nations, 2275 accountability for past abuses. August at the time of APHR’s visit, over 36,000 children were reported to have lost at least one pare nt and over 7,700 were reported to have lost both parents, 2267 099, XI LI - 121, LI - 122, QI - - 007, XI - 008, BM - 024, BM - 025, V - 094; See chapter V.B : Systemic opp ression and persecution of the Rohingya. 2268 QI - 099. 2269 LI 122, BM - - 024, BM - 025. 2270 BM - 024, BM - 025, V - 129, ARSA/PR/01/2017. 2271 @ARSA_Official in its biography on Twitter describes itself as “formerly called Faith Movement or Harakah Al Yaqeen” . 2272 See: https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official 2273 Press Release, ARSA/PR/01/2017, 10 March 2017 BM - 025. See ARSA . 2274 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/08/2017 on 6 September 2017 . 2275 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/01/2017, 10 March 2017 . 242

243 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ARSA as the Tatmadaw, rather than civilians or members of other ethnic its target claimed w groups: ARSA, in principle, strictly does not allow any of our members to attack civilians, their places of worship and properties regardless of their religious and ethnic 2276 background. ARSA does not have stated religious motivations, but a seemingly secular ideology 1014. 2277 - level Myanmar officials imply that ARSA with a strong Muslim identity. While high 2278 an independent state, homeland or caliphate, the Mission has not seen such seeks 2279 statements from ARSA. 2280 ARSA has both a military wing and a political wing. 1015. The military wing is organized preme Council, with hierarchically, led by a small group of commanders, known as the Su 2281 making powers. - decision The Commander 1016. in - Chief is known as Ata Ullah, although he may also operate under - other pseudonyms. Credible sources indicate that he is a Rohingya Muslim born outside who spent much of his life in Saudi Arabia and Myanmar to a Rohingya refugee family, Pakistan. He is reported to have returned to Myanmar at some point between 2012 and 2016. Ata Ullah first gained international recognition as ARSA’s leader after releasing a video 2282 f 9 October 2016. Since the opening of the ARSA Twitter following the ARSA attacks o - handle in 2017, his signature appears on all public statements, denoting him as Commander - Chief. Ata Ulla appears to maintain secrecy around his identity, and it is reported that very in 2283 few ARSA mem bers have met or seen him. 1017. ARSA members at the military leadership level were responsible for clusters of 2285 2284 below which were village Individual level groups, referred to as “cells”. - villagers, 2286 receiving i nstructions and communications members had responsibilities at each level, based messaging applications. Village leaders then - along the chain through Internet 2287 communicated those orders to supporters inside the villages. 1018. gnments ARSA members were loosely divided into different roles according to assi and expertise. These included recruitment, training, and a group of fighters sometimes 2288 referred to as the “Tiger Group”. Others were involved in the production of locally made 2289 - type activities and sentry duty of villages. explosives, intelligence ARSA did not have 2290 military style uniforms, although there are credible references to some of them wearing 2291 black, which is also visible in some of the videos posted online. 2276 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/27/2018, on 31 January 2018 See also: ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/01/2017 on 10 March 2017. ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/02/2017, 30 May 2017. 2277 BM - 025; See also, ARSA public statements 1 and 5. 2278 Chief: “Because they (the For example, on 11 September 2017, the Office of the Commander - in - Rohingya) don’t have c itizenship, and they are not “Nationality” and not a recognized ethnic group, there is no way they could ask for a self - administered zone. That’s why they will remove the governing structure (in Rakhine State) with whatever means possible. They will remove all the ethnic people, everyone except their own kind, in the region. They will make sure the government and other ethnic people cannot re - enter the region.” ; Part 6 of the “Talk on Rakhine issue and security outlook” post on file Facebook Post (removed, with the Mission). 2279 BM - See also, all ARSA Statements. 025; 2280 - BM - 003, BM 025, BM - 024. 2281 QI - 099, BM - - 013. 025, QM 2282 Video available at: https://www.y outube.com/watch?v=qcCPxEod87o 2283 159, V K - - 097. 2284 - QI - 099, K 159. 2285 BM - 025. 2286 CI - 140, QI - 099, QI 100, QI - 103, XI - 137. - 2287 - LI - 122, QI - 99, QI - 102, BM 003. 2288 QI - 099, XI - 008. 2289 140, QI CI - 137, CI - - 099, QI - 100. 2290 LI - 054, BM - 003. 2291 075. - V 243

244 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The political wing of ARSA is made up of five people who live outside Myanm 1019. ar and 2292 who are authorised to represent the organization. They appear to have responsibility for the political and media strategy of the organization, including the public statements issued ssued at least 31 written on ARSA’s Twitter feed. Since the October 2016 attacks, ARSA has i 2293 press releases, as well as videos and messages on Twitter. 1020. The number of ARSA members and supporters has varied over time. The three 2016 2294 attacks were carried out by a small group of fighters. ess was However, their relative succ a turning point in terms of support. The publicity garnered by the Government’s response increased ARSA’s visibility, both domestically and internationally, which encouraged 2295 the 9 October Rohingya men to support ARSA, and for some to formally join it. Moreover, 2016 violence led to the first series of Tatmadaw “clearance operations” and triggered an increase in the oppressive, discriminatory and abusive treatment of the Rohingya by the 2296 As a result, between October 2016 and Aug Myanmar authorities. ust 2017, ARSA grew 2297 stronger in both its membership and its support base. The number of ARSA members and supporters varied from village to village, with 1021. ARSA supporters in each village information indicating that there may have been at least ten 2298 However, the extent of their reach was not consistent across act where they were active. tr 2299 all villages in the three townships of northern Rakhine. Total numbers of members and supporters are difficult to ascertain. The actual 1022. membership seems to hav e been small but the support base was certainly in the hundreds. This includes the “last minute” mobilization of many Rohingya, with many of those who participated in the 25 August 2017 attacks mobilized only shortly before that day or on the 2300 day itself. However, overall membership and support for ARSA represented a minority of the total population. 1023. Supporters claim to be motivated by the need to fight long - standing discrimination 2301 Some had personally suffered against the Rohingya and the denial of human rights. 2302 oppression and abuse by the Tatmadaw or other security forces. One young man said he joined ARSA after having been tortured over a period of days while detained by the 2303 n saw his mother and brother Tatmadaw following the October 2016 violence. Another ma other oppressive killed in the 2012 violence and, as a result of this experience, as well as , he joined ARSA: measures The military’s goal was to kill us all. Because of all these abuses, we decided to try to 2304 . protect ourselves . We needed to establish a group to defend our rights 1024. ARSA retained a strong Muslim identity as a Rohingya group, and recruitment at the village level was sometimes conducted through local religious leaders. This may have been due to their influenc e among the Rohingya population, rather than their religious function 2305 . Religious scholars, known as per se Moluvis , approached potential supporters, often 2306 outside mosques, particularly in the months prior to the 2016 and 2017 ARSA attacks. 2292 ARSA, Appointment of Official Representatives, ARSA/PR/21/2017, on 16 November 2017. 2293 See: https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official 2294 V - 094 2295 007. - CI - 137, LI - 121, LI - 124, QI - 102, XI 2296 - up to 25 August 2017. See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build 2297 - 121, BM - 025. LI 2298 CI 140, LI - 054, QI - 099, QI - 103, YI - 029. - 2299 BM - 025. 2300 079. CI - 140, LI - 054, LI - 121, QI - 103, XI - 007, BM - 003, BM - 029, BM - 049, QM - 013, V - 2301 CI - 140, LI - 121, LI - 124, QI - 099, QI - 100, XI - 007, XI - 008, BM - 024. 2302 CI - 137, CI - 140, LI 122, QI - 103. - 2303 QI - 103. 2304 LI - 122 . 2305 LI - 124, BM - 025. 2306 - 124. LI - 054, LI - 089, LI 244

245 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ers were initially asked to undertake sentry duty for their village, and Potential memb 2307 subsequently sometimes to join the attacks. 2308 While joining ARSA may largely have been voluntary, credible public reports 1025. indicate that ARSA used intimidation and coercion and pressure, as well as its influence in 2309 Boys under the age of 18 were a1so the community, to push people into joining its ranks. 2310 One man mobilised directly prior to the 2017 recruited, and participated in activities. attacks explained: attack, I wasn’t informed in advance. The leader came to my house On the night of the at around 3.30am and told me to come and fight. I felt unsure but I felt pressured to 2311 go as they were in my house. 2312 It appears that some members were able to leave ARSA. ho One member w 1026. participated in the October 2016 attacks was shot in the hand by the Tatmadaw. He believed that ARSA was going to provide better support in the attack itself in terms of participants and weapons. He was surprised by the lack of backup, as well as the vi olent response by the military, and so renounced his membership. He noted that “there was not a problem not re - 2313 joining”. A level of secrecy surrounded ARSA membership. Members and supporters did not 1027. necessarily know who else was affiliated, even wi thin the same village. An oath of secrecy 2314 appears to have been required, with members stating that they had been required to 2315 This seems to have been a strategy to protect promise not to talk about ARSA or betray it. 2316 in ARSA activities. members, given the Tatmadaw’s interest 2317 Although ARSA denies having any links with foreign terrorist organizations, 1028. it was reported after the 25 August 2017 attacks that international Islamist terrorist organizations 2318 such as al - This appears to have been e Rohingya. Qaeda called for public support for th - unsolicited. The following day, ARSA issued a press release explicitly rejecting links to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State (Daesh or ISIS), Lashkar e - Taiba and all other transnational terrorist - not welcome the involvement of these groups in the Arakan groups, noting that they “do 2319 - equipped nature of ARSA, as outlined below, lends credibility to those conflict”. The ill 2320 and the Mission has seen no information that would suggest such links. ARSA claims, 2321 has, however, receive d financial support from the Rohingya diaspora. Training and weaponry Training received by ARSA members and supporters varied greatly. A core group of 1029. 2322 Some who had ARSA members received some military training, including in weaponry. received weapons training then replicated it for others, although often without weapons, by 2307 - 054, LI - 074, LI - 124, YI - 010. LI 2308 008. - 103, QI CI - 137, CI - 140, LI - 054, LI - 074, LI - 124, QI - - 100, XI 2309 - 054, XI - 009, QM - 013, V - 098. LI 2310 - 137, XI - 008. CI 2311 LI - 054. 2312 089. - 054, LI - LI 2313 LI - 089. 2314 LI 054, QI - 102, LM - 007, V - 159. - 2315 003, LM LI - 054, QI - 102, WI - 044, BM - - 007. 2316 - 003, EM - 001, QM - 013. BM 2317 008, BM ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/12/2017, 14 September 2017, XI - 007, XI - - 025, V - - 100 099, V V - 101, See also Official Video of ARSA, 18 August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJoWeV1DlFM&feature=youtu.be ; 2318 V - 254, V - 255. 2319 ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/12/2017, 14 September 2017 . 2320 BM - 049. 2321 BM - 003, BM - 025, QM - 013, V - 094. 2322 049. - CI - 140, QI - 099, BM 245

246 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2323 using hand gestures and wooden models. Other members were provided with basic 2324 - hand combat. defence techniques, the use of swords and hand to - instructions on self - ARSA supporters mobilised shortly prior to the 2017 attacks had no training and little 1030. 2325 information about the group. As one young man explained: I joined ARSA about one or two months before the August 2017 attacks. I didn’t training or weapons. On the night of the attack, I wasn’t informed in receive any advance. I heard gunshots around 1am in the distance. The leader came to my house at around 3:30am and told me to come and fight. But I only had my small tool for 2326 digging. 2327 the goals of the 9 October 2016 attacks was to obtain weapons. 1031. One of During m the BGP those attacks, ARSA did obtain a small number of firearms, including fro 2328 an Pyin (Ta Na Shock), Maungdaw Township. Headquarters at Kee K 2329 Regardless, in the 2017 attacks but 1032. , most ARSA members were without firearms, shots and some - equipped with homemade weapons such as sticks, knives, swords and slings 2330 homemade explosives. Some participants noted that even these types of homemade weapons were difficult to obtain, given the Tatmadaw’s confiscation of knives and other 2331 bladed objects from Rohingya households after October 2016. At the village level, those who were mobilised to participate were reassured that 1033. moment, although this did not weapons and proper training would be provided at the right 2332 One participant stated that ARSA members had said that he and others would eventuate. be provided with training and weapons: “But all they did was give us a stick and said that we 2333 should pretend that it is a weapon. We never got any training or weapons.” 2334 ARSA did have some capacity to produce some crude IEDs 1034. but that capacity is 2335 questionable, both in terms of production and execution. As one ARSA member articularly strong. We elaborated, “The IEDs were made locally by members and are not p 2336 use them just to scare the military.” In the attack in which he participated, the explosive 2337 was not directed at the checkpoint as intended, and no military casualties were reported. While the Myanmar Government’s list of ARSA attac ks mentions the use of IEDs by ARSA, none of the casualties sustained by the Myanmar security forces were reported as having been 2338 caused by an IED. 2323 LI - 121, QI - 102, BM 049. - 2324 CI - 137, CI - 140, QI - 102, XI - 008. 2325 - CI 141, LI - 054, LI - 089, LI - - 049, V - 075, V - 102. 121, BM 2326 - 054. LI 2327 LI - 121, LI - 122, XI - 008; Facebook posts of Commander in Chief, removed, on file with Mission. 2328 121, LI LI - - 122, BM - 003, Furthermore, according to Government official statements, ARSA looted 65 to 68 firearms and many rounds of ammunitions during the 9 October 2016 attacks, of which 37 were recovered by 16 November 2017; Multiple Facebook Posts of the Commander - In Chief See, removed, on file with Mission. 2329 - CI - 140, LI - 089, QI 099, QI - 103, XI - 007, BM - 025. 2330 - CI - 137, CI - 140, QI - 102, QI - 103, XI - 007, XI 008. 2331 See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build LI - 054, - up to 25 August 2017. 2332 LI - 054, LI - 089 , C I - 137. 2333 LI - 089. 2334 - CI - 022, CI 137, CI - 140, QI 099, XI - 007, BM - 003. - 2335 CI - 140, V - 102. 2336 CI - 140. 2337 CI - 140. 2338 See the following posts from the Information Committee: “ Breaking News 7: After being declared as terrorist group, extremist terrorists continue making violent attacks” (Facebook Post, 26 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/Inf omationCommittee/posts/786695324836909 ; “Breaking News 8: Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks (Facebook Post, 26 August 2017), https://www.facebook.co m/InfomationCommittee/posts/786222098217565 ; “ Breaking News 10: Terrorists trying to destroy Maungtaw” (Facebook post, 27 August 2017), ommittee/posts/786691611503947 https://www.facebook.com/InfomationC ; “Breaking News 12: 246

247 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1035. The Government reported that, during the 2017 “clearance operations”, it confiscated 2339 made IEDs” These figures - . “15 assorted arms and 97 ammunitions” and “67 home demonstrate ARSA’s weaponry capacity at the time, in particular when juxtaposed against the military capacity of the Tatmadaw. Photographs of the confiscated weapons, published ent investigation report, show one relatively modern assault rifle and a in the Governm 2340 - made bladed weapons number of sticks and hand . ARSA attacks on 9 October 2016 On 9 October 2016, ARSA launched three attacks on the BGP headquarters in Kyee 1036. act ( Maungdaw Township , on the BGP camp in Nga Khu Ya (Maungdaw e tr Kan Pyin villag ) 2341 All three Township) and on a BGP camp in Koe Tan Kauk (Rathedaung Township). attacks were carried out by fighters mainly armed with sticks, knives and a few firearms. 2342 on both sides. According to the Government reports, nine police Casualties occurred 2343 2344 ARSA claimed responsibility for these attacks. officers and eight assailants were killed. In response, the military and the BGP launched “area clearance operations” with the stated 2345 of recapturing guns and munitions looted by ARSA. purpose 1037. The Government has alleged that a number of further ARSA attacks involving IED - denotations and ambushes of security force convoys took place on 12 and 13 November 2016, 2346 The Mi ssion was not able to corroborate these incidents. According killing two soldiers. to a statement issued by the Tatmadaw on 14 November 2016, the October and November 2016 attacks led to 69 ARSA fighters, seven Tatmadaw soldiers and 10 police officers killed, 2347 five Tatmadaw sold iers and six police officers injured, and 234 Rohingya arrested. ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017 1038. Early on 25 August 2017, ARSA attacked around 30 security force outposts in on to the northern Rakhine State. ARSA subsequently claimed responsibility in relati 2348 attacks. A majority of attacks took place in the early hours of 25 August 2017, with a number of reported subsequent attacks in the following days of 27 and 28 August 2017. The Office of the Commander in - Chief claimed that there were 38 “engagem ents” on 25 - 2349 The findings of the Tatmadaw’s investigation team, reported in November 2017, August. Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks” (Facebook post, 29 August 2017), mationCommittee/posts/787636841409424 ; “B reaking News 14: https://www.facebook.com/Info Terrorist hideouts discovered, items provided by int'l organizations seized” (Facebook post, 30 ; “Breaking ://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/787634948076280 https August 2017), News 17: ARSA extremist terrorists continue setting houses on fire (Facebook post, 30 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788328661340242 2339 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the securi ty troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017). 2340 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017). 2341 - CI - 118, CI 119, Information Committee, Interim Report of the Investigation Commission on Maungtaw (Facebook Post, 2017), ; K - 154.2 https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/665265300313246 2342 137, LI CI - - 121, LI - 122. 2343 Information Committee, “Interim Report of the Investigation Commission on Maun gdaw Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (Facebook post, 3 January 2017) https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/665265300313246 2344 K - 154.2. 2345 chapter, section D.2.a: The 2016 violence. V - 068; See this 2346 Information released by the Office of the Commander - in - Chief (Facebook post, now defunct), on file with Mission. 2347 - in - Chief (Facebook post, now defunct), on Information released by the Office of the Commander file with Mission. 2348 K - 154.2. 2349 Information released by the Office of the Commander - in - Chief (Facebook post, now defunct), on file with Mission . 247

248 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2350 The refer to a total of 94 “engagements” between 25 August and 5 September 2017. Mission has been unable to corroborate these figures. The majority o f targets chosen were BGP posts and checkpoints, with the exception 1039. of army base 552 in Chin Tha Mar village tract, Buthidaung Township. The attacks were 2351 carried out by ARSA members together with some local villagers mobilised in support. The Mission corr oborated 17 separate attacks, including the attack against army base 552. There is credible information that an additional 17 attacks took place. The Government originally estimated the number of assailants as ranging from 10 to 20 in some locations, 100 t o 300 in others, and an alleged 1,000 in relation to the attack on Myin Hlut (Mayrulla), Maungdaw Township, police station. However, the Tatmadaw’s investigation team later 2352 referred to between 6,200 and “more than 10,000” ARSA participants on 25 August. T he Mission was not able to verify these numbers. Although the Government officially declared 2353 Tatmadaw “clearance operations” 5 September 2017 to be the end of the offensive, 2354 continued for some time after this date. There is nothing to indicate that the T atmadaw suffered any casualties during any post - 25 August “engagements”. The Mission did not find credible information to substantiate the Government’s claims of continuing offensives or clashes with ARSA in September. 1040. On 10 September 2017, ARSA dec lared a one - month ceasefire, “in order to enable 2355 humanitarian actors to assess and respond to the humanitarian crisis in Arakan State”. After the deadline for the cessation of the ceasefire, hostilities did not resume. However, four months later, in January 2018, ARSA claimed responsibility for an ambush of a military gdaw Township. convoy in Turaing village, San Kar Pin Yin village tract, northern Maun Video footage of this ambush, stamped with ARSA’s logo, shows a number of fighters 2356 2357 No casualties were reported. shooting from the bushes towards a military vehicle. According to the Government, 376 “assailants” and 13 members of sec urity forces 1041. died in the 2017 attacks, and 15 assorted arms, 97 ammunitions, 30 packs of gunpowder and 2358 67 homemade mines were confiscated from alleged ARSA members. 1042. Following the 25 August 2017 attacks, the Government declared ARSA a “terrorist 2359 ” , org and thus a threat to national security. anization ARSA supporters could be held 2350 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information Team on the fi ndings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017). 2351 QI - 099. 2352 True News Information Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017). 2353 “Speech delivered by Her Excellency Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on Government’s efforts with regard to National Reconciliation and Peace” (Facebook post, 19 September 2017), https://www.facebook.com/state.counsellor/posts/speech - delivered - by - her - excellency - daw - aung - san - suu - kyi - state - counsellor - of - the - /1121130291354519 . 2354 For example, Of fice of the Commander - in - Chief stating that “engagements were on the decrease after 008, QI 5 September”: (Facebook post on file with Mission ) . CI - 043, QI - - 010, QI - 011, QI - 025, QI - 061, QI - . 062 2355 ARSA Press Release, ARSA/PR/10/2017 on 10 September 2017. 2356 - BM 049. 2357 See ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/23/2018 on 7 January 2018. Information Committee; See also, Information Committee, “Soldiers and civilians injured due to the attack by a group of armed insurgents who were already under investigation” (Facebook Post , 5 January 2018), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/a.639477959558647.1073741828.63945620 6227489/8550530546 ; Facebook posts of the Office of the Commander - in - Chief, on file with 67802/ Mission. 2358 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017). 2359 The Republic of Union of Myanmar Anti - Terrorism Committee Order no 1/2017,” (27 Aug 2017) http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/968 . 248

249 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 responsible for acts of terrorism and the attacks conducted by ARSA treated as crimes that 2360 Terrorism Law. qualify as offences under Myanmar’s Penal Code or the 2014 Counter - ARSA stated that the 2017 attacks were in response to what it viewed as increased 1043. oppression of the Rohingya over the previous weeks and months, including arbitrary arrests nt, and and interrogations, extortion, increasing restrictions on freedom of moveme disappearances. A “blockade” of Rohingya in Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, appears 2361 On 15 August 2017, Ata Ullah appeared in a video, with to have had a particular impact. es. He spoke four armed fighters, warning the Myanmar military to stop committing abus about the longstanding suffering and oppression of the Rohingya, and urged the Myanmar 2362 blockade ” . Government to stop the Zay Di Pyin “ ARSA further stated that the “ramping up” of the military in northern Rakhine State 1044. and the increasing oppression by the Tatmadaw and other security forces in early August 2017 were an attempt to “derail” the work and recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, led by former United Nations Secretary - General Kofi 2363 2364 Annan. The final report of the Commission set out solutions for peace and development in Rakhine State and included a series of recommendations, for example on citizenship for 2365 the Rohingya. The ARSA attacks commenced hours after the release of the Commission’s final report in Yan gon on 24 August 2017. 1045. ARSA denied that its attacks were linked to the Advisory Commission report. They may have been prompted by an accidental IED explosion on 25 August, raising concerns 2366 among ARSA leadership that the Tatmadaw would be alerted to t It appears heir activities. that, shortly after this explosion, an order was sent through a messaging application telling 2367 ARSA “cell” leaders to mobilise male villagers. However, this accidental explosion only appears to have brought forward plans by one to two days. ARSA was able to carry out multiple, coordinated attacks in a highly controlled and 1046. militarised environment, but with little military capability. The attacks employed “hit and run” tactics with predominantly untrained civilians, mostly wielding sticks and knives. The ARSA attacks caused minimal Tatmadaw casualties compared to their own losses. 1047. It appears, therefore, that the objectives of the ARSA attacks may not have been military , but aimed at eliciting a response by the Tatmad aw (as in October 2016), with the 2368 broader goal of drawing renewed global attention to the Rohingya situation. As one ARSA member stated: The main aim of the attacks was to get international attention, as we knew the response [of the Tatmadaw] would be br utal. We hoped that, if the world could see 2369 their response, they would finally understand our suffering . 1048. Some ARSA members noted an instruction not to use weapons against the Tatmadaw in the 2017 attacks, as the purpose of the attack was in fact to draw attention to the Rohingya 2370 While it is not known whether this instruction was followed by all, given that some cause. weapons were used, it adds weight to the conclusion that the operation was aimed at drawing attention, rather than any military succe ss. 1049. Another ARSA participant in the August 2017 attacks characterized it as follows: 2360 - 120. V 2361 See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build - up to 25 August 2017. 2362 XI - 007, V - 101. 2363 7 ( ARSA statement, 25 August 20 1 https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official/status/900904120076435457 ). 2364 V - 119. 2365 - BM 025, V - 117. 2366 CI - 140, LI - 121, QI - 099, XI - 008. 2367 V - 068. 2368 - CI - 137, CI - 140, XI - 008, XI - 009, EM 001. 2369 XI - 008. 2370 - 140. CI - 137, CI 249

250 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 We were a group of men, approaching the check - post with sticks and stones. But then ones. the military started shooting. We could not respond as we only had sticks and st It was not really like a military attack by us, it was a protest or uprising, claiming our 2371 rights. Allegations of human rights abuses committed by ARSA 1050. ARSA has been accused of committing abuses against both the Rohingya population and other ethnic minority groups in Rakhine State. These allegations are serious and warrant full investigation. The Mission itself has been constrained by its lack of access t o Myanmar. For its investigation on the 2016 and 2017 situation in Rakhine State, because of the mass - exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh, the Mission had access to large numbers of Rohingya hed methodology. It had victims and was able to conduct interviews in line with its establis no comparable access to victims of alleged abuses committed by ARSA, given that most remained in Rakhine State. In line with protection of sources and genuine fear of reprisals for those cooperating, the Mission did not reach out in other ways to those affected communities inside Myanmar. 1051. Furthermore, even in Bangladesh, the Mission noted a widespread reluctance of Rohingya to talk about ARSA and any alleged abuses committed by it. It may be that Rohingya are fearful of ARSA o r that they wish to avoid detracting from the gravity of the violations perpetrated against themselves. The secretive nature of ARSA and lack of knowledge about it may have also contributed. Killing of Rohingya informants 1052. Allegations of abuses pe rpetrated by ARSA against Rohingya have mostly concerned the mistreatment or killing of Rohingya individuals suspected of providing information to Myanmar authorities. ARSA has stated that its objective was only to attack Tatmadaw or 2372 However, it used threats and ts and has denied killing civilians. security related targe intimidation, including violence, against the population to protect its plans and activities and to ensure secrecy. Informants, known locally as “ tabbe” , were present within the Rohingya mmunity and provided information to the Myanmar authorities. ARSA took steps to co 2373 killings. control them, including through beatings and One interviewee stated that, just he before the August 2017 violence, he was approached by a religious scholar to monitor t activities of three persons suspected of passing information on ARS A activities to the BGP 2374 Hlut (Mayrulla). in Myin 1053. On 29 June 2017, the Global New Light of Myanmar, a government newspaper, published a list of 35 alleged incidents involving the killing of 38 civilians in Maungdaw Township between October 2016 and June 2017. Eleven of these incidents were reportedly 2375 perpetrated by “men wearing black masks”. Other sources refer to other alleged killings of Rohingya in this period, reportedly also perpetrated by ARSA. Collectively, allegations 2376 suggest that more than 50 “informants” may have been killed by ARSA in this period. 1054. While the Mission was unable to verify each of these specific incidents, credible reports indicate that there were kil lings of Rohingya and that responsibility for many of the 2377 The Mission received information from two people killings may be attributable to ARSA. acknowledging the killing of two informants in U Shey Kya village tract, Maungdaw 2378 Other sources, re ferring to the same killings, stated that they occurred after the Township. 2371 LI 121, BM - 003. - 2372 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/09/2017 of 30 May 2017. 2373 LI - 122, QI - 016, QI - 102, QI - 103, XI - 008, YI - 010, YI - 022, V - 0940 . 2374 - YI 100 . 2375 Global New Light of Myanmar, “List of civilian murdered in Maungtaw Dis trict (2016 October t o 2017 June 27)” (29 June 2017). 2376 075. LM - 017, V - 094, V - 115, V - 2377 017, QM BM - 003, LM - 007, LM - - 013, V - 067, V - 075. 2378 009. - CI - 137, XI 250

251 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 to BGP night raids and names of eight local ARSA members were given to the BGP, leading 2379 . arrests A number of additional smaller militant Rohingya groups appear to have been active 1055. northern Rakhine State and may also have been involved in controlling or killing in 2380 The Mission reviewed a number of videos showing men wearing black masks informants. giving death threats to villagers, whom they referred to by name and who they suspected h ad passed information to the authorities. ARSA stated that the men in black masks were not ARSA members. The Mission was not able to verify the origin of these videos or their 2381 content. Killings of members of other ethnic groups 1056. Open sources repor ted the first case of alleged killings of ethnic Rakhine villagers by ARSA on 24 June 2017. ARSA members reportedly confronted four individuals who came across an ARSA IED cache, while foraging in Kyun Pauk Pyu Su village tract, northern Maungdaw Township. Two were shot dead and two, one of whom was injured, fled and alerted the authorities. When the authorities returned to the location of the incident, the 2382 2383 materials were not found. The Mission was not able to corroborate this incident, 2384 although credible sources indicate that this may indeed have been attributable to ARSA. 1057. On 3 August 2017, six to seven men and women of the Mro ethnic group were NaTaLa village allegedly killed in the hills of Maungdaw Township near to Kine Gyi, the where they lived. The Myanmar Government has stated that ARSA is responsible for these 2385 killings, allegations that were shared widely and publicly within Myanmar. The Mission has not been able to verify this incident or its perpetrator. Credible i nformation indicates, 2386 however, that the killings may have been related to the illegal narcotics trade. ARSA has 2387 denied involvement in this incident. 1058. The Government further alleged that ARSA was responsible for an attack on twenty Daignet villagers, village, in Kar Lar Day Hpet village tract, reportedly from Ran Khar Zay Di travelling towards Aung Zan village in Aung Zan/ Bauk Shu Hpweit village tract, northern Maungdaw Township. While it was first reported that 19 of the group were missing following 2388 n attack by ARSA, it was later reported that five of the group had been killed. a The Mission has been unable to verify this incident. 1059. ARSA has also been accused of the alleged killings and disappearances of up to 100 Hindu men and women from Kha Mau ng Seik village tract, in northern Maungdaw ndus in the hamlet of Au Township. It is alleged that, on 25 August 2017, ARSA killed 45 Hi 2389 and a similar number from a second hamlet in the same village tract, Nauk Ka Maung Seik 2390 ara). Ye Bauk Kyar village (Reak Kya P Referring to this incident, Amnesty International has concluded that ARSA is responsible “... for at least one, and potentially a second, 2379 - 094. V 2380 BM - 025. 2381 LM - 017. 2382 V - 068. 2383 August 2017. See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build - up to 25 2384 V - 067, K - 156.2. 2385 Information Committee, “Press Release on the Situation in Maungdaw” (Facebook post, 11 August 2017),para 4, https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/pcb.778752418964533/778752095631232/? type=3&theater 2386 BM - 025, LM - 007, V 094. - 2387 ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/04/2017, of 6 August 2017; ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/05/2017, at 13 August 2017. 2388 V - 113; Ministry of Information, “Interview with the family members of the villagers slain by ARSA extremist terrorists” (4 September 2017), 2017/id - http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/4/09/ 11434 ; Multiple Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander - in - C hief, on file with the Mission. 2389 067; Global New Light of Myanmar, “Interview with bereaved families of Hindus killed by ARSA V - terrorists” (27 September 2017) ; http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/1041 2390 067. - V 251

252 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 massacre of up to 99 Hindu women, men, and children as well as additional unlawful killings 2391 and abductions of Hin ARSA is also alleged to be responsible du villagers in August 2017”. for the killings of six other Hindus, on the outskirts of Maungdaw town, near Myo Thu Gyi 2392 The Myanmar Government has stated that ARSA was village on 26 August 2017. 2393 e incidents. the Myanmar authorities responsible for thes On 27 September 2017, organiz ed a public event in Kha Maung Seik with national and international media representatives, during which it displayed a large number of corpses. It stated the bodies were of the Hindu victim s of Ah Nauk Kha Maung Seik that had been excavated from a mass 2394 2395 ARSA denies any involvement in these killings. grave. 1060. The Mission interviewed seven Hindus from Au Nauk Kha Maung Seik (Shab Bazar) and nearby villages who witnessed these events or we re victims of abuses in September 2396 2017. The Mission has verified that a large number of Hindu victims were killed on 25 August 2017 in Au Nauk Kha Maung Seik. However, the information received was the perpetrators, which, according contradictory, including regarding the language spoken by to the accounts taken, was a key identifying feature since the perpetrators reportedly had their faces covered. The Mission’s information is insufficient to make any determinations on reasonable grounds regarding the iden tity of the perpetrators. The Mission has also been unable to verify the facts regarding the killing of Hindus in Myo Thu Gyi. non Burning of Rohingya villages - 1061. On 28 August 2017, three days after the commencement of the “clearance operations”, audio order to burn down non - an Rohingya villages was allegedly given by Ata Ullah through 2397 a messaging application. The Mission received a copy of the audio file, which contained an instruction for Rohingya to burn down non - Rohingya villages. It was unable t o ascertain the authenticity of the recording or its source. 1062. Regardless of the authenticity of the audio message, ASRA burned down the Rakhine 2398 village of Ah Htet Pyu Ma village. A Rohingya interviewee saw the village burning. He described hearing a n exchange of fire between ARSA and the police at an outpost near Purma August 2017. “I heard the Fume in Ah Htet Pyu Ma village tract in the early morning of 25 gunfire and I saw the trailers of gunfire passing in each direction. I got out of bed and went outside to see. It was about two miles away and it went on for one and a half hours.” The interviewee said that the Rakhine villagers fled the following day and, after that, ARSA set 2399 Approximately 100 Rakhine families had been living the village on fire. there. While 2391 V - 108. 2392 Information Committee, “Breaking News 22: Local and foreign media continue coverage of news in Maungtaw and Sittway” (Facebook post, 1 September 2017), https://www.facebook. ; com/InfomationCommittee/posts/789155627924212 Information Committee, “Interview with Hindus who fled from their villages” (Facebook post, 1 September 2018); ebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788602791312829 https://www.fac ; Presidents Office, “Hindu women and children escape from terrorists,” (3 September 2017), State Counsellors Office, “Interview with bereaved families of Hindus killed by ARSA terrorists” (27 September 20 17) office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine - state http://www.president affairs/id - 7656 ; V - 067. - - 2393 Information Committee, “Interview with Hindus who f led from their villages” See, for example, (Facebook post, 1 September 2017), ; Information Committee, https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788602791312829 “ The words of bereaved families of Hindus killed by ARSA terrorists” (Facebook post, 27 September https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/807089859464122 ; M 2017), ultiple Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander - in - Chief, on file with the Mission. 2394 - V 106, Global New Light of Myanmar, “Slaughtered Hindus testament to brutality of ARSA terrorists” (28 September 2017). 2395 ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/13/2017, on 27 September 2017 t, ARSA/PR/28/2018, ; ARSA Statemen 25 May 2018. 2396 - LI - 023, LI - 024, LI - 025, LI - 026, QI - 019, QI 020, QI - 021 . 2397 K - 163.01, K - 163.02. 2398 QI - 018, V - 067. 2399 - 018. QI 252

253 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ARSA did not claim responsibility for burning villages, it did claim an attack on a police 2400 station in Ah Htet Pyu Ma village tract. 1063. Satellite imagery analysis confirms the burning of Ah Htet Pyu Ma. The imagery reveals that there are two parts of the village, the northern part, containing structures distributed in a more organized manner and made of higher quality materials, indicative of an area inhabited by ethnic Rakhine, and a more southern part, likely Rohingya. Both parts 2401 of the village were burned. This contrasts with the burning that took place in a large 2402 majority of village tracts, where the Rakhine hamlets were left intact. and 16 September 2017, Comparative images of Ah Htet Pyu Ma on 23 May showing burning of both Rohing ya and ethnic Rakhine settlements 1064. ARSA also reportedly burned the Mro village of Khu Daing (Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit 2403 Satellite imagery analysis confirms the burning and village tract) on 28 August 2017. destruction of Khu Daing by 16 September 2017. Th e Mission has credible information that 2404 Rohingya or ARSA were responsible for the burning of this village. Other sources also report that ARSA was responsible for violent acts against Mro villagers as part of this attack, 2405 with a number of persons injured and others assumed killed, although the Mission has not been able to verify these allegations. 2400 K - 154.2. 2401 Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR UNOSAT. - 2402 See this chapter, section D.1.b. Patterns of serious human rights violations by the Myanmar security forces. 2403 Information Committee, “ Breaking News 17: ARSA extremist terrorists continue setting houses on fire” (Facebook post, 30 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788328661340242 - 067, Global New ; V Light of Myanmar, “Seven more civilians killed in Rakhine” (31 August 2017). 2404 - RI 008, LM - 007, LM - 017, V - 067. 2405 - 067, Global New Light of Myanmar, “Seven more civilians killed in Rakhine” (31 August 2017). V 253

254 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Image of Khu Daing from 25 May 2017 showing an intact settlement Image of Khu Daing from 11 October 2017 showing a burned and destroyed rning was first detected on 16 September 2017 settlement. The bu 1065. In numerous Facebook posts, the Tatmadaw has indicated that ARSA was responsible 2406 for burning other Rakhine and ethnic minority houses and villages. The information in these posts is unclear and no othe r evidence has been provided to support these claims. There appears to be no other official Government sources that provide clarity around these allegations. The Mission has not been able to verify these assertions. 2406 Chief, on file with the Mission. - Multiple Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander - in 254

255 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Government allegations regarding the burning of Rohingya villages by ARSA The Government has alleged that ARSA set fire to multiple Rohingya villages, and 1066. that the widespread fires that led to the destruction of Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine 2407 Indeed, in its own internal investigation of the State were a result of ARSA’s own actions. 2017 crisis, the Tatmadaw stated that ARSA was responsible for the burning of Rohingya so on houses and that the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya who fled Myanmar did 2408 2409 ARSA denies these allegations. instruction, and because they feared ARSA. 1067. The Government has provided no credible evidence to support its version of events. s To the contrary, the Mission has established that the burning of Rohingya villages wa systematically undertaken by Tatmadaw soldiers, together with other security forces and ethnic Rakhines, as well as other ethnic and religious minorities, through the use of 2410 “launchers” and other means. 2. foreseeable and planned catastrophe A 1068. The 2017 ARSA attacks and ensuing “clearance operations” did not occur in a vacuum. They were foreseeable and planned. (a) The 2016 violence Overview 1069. On 9 October 2016, ARSA launched a small first offensive against three Border Guard Police posts in northern Rakhine State. Nine police officers were killed. Security forces, led Tatmadaw , responded by conducting “clearance operations” across an “area clearance by the zone” between Taungpyoletwa and Maungdaw, in central Maungdaw Township. 1070. In t he weeks that followed, Rohingya victims who fled to Bangladesh revealed that these operations had been characterised by serious human rights violations, including torture, rape and sexual assault, killings, and the destruction of homes and mosques. The sa me tactics and violations were seen in this operation as later in 2017, albeit on a smaller scale. The means and methods of attack, which would later form the of the August modus operandi 2017 operations, were already present. By December 2016, satellite i magery analysis undertaken by Human Rights Watch estimated that 1,500 structures had been burned in 2411 Active military operations continued eleven separate locations in Maungdaw Township. for at least two months, and the Myanmar Government declared an end to the operation on 2412 16 February 2017. Ultimately, some 87,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. President, and the security - A Government Investigation Commission, led by the Vice 1071. forces’ own inquiries cleared the security forces of wrongdoing, endorsing t he lawfulness “ 2413 ” and appropriateness of the response . Verified incidents of the 2016 “area clearance operations” 1072. The 2016 “area clearance operations” took place across a large area of northern Maungdaw, with at least 11 different locations affected . The Mission focused its fact - finding 2407 Information Committee, “ Brea king News 7: After being declared as terrorist group, extremist terrorists continue making violent attacks” (Facebook post, 28 August 2018), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786695324836909 ; Multiple Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander - in - Chief, on file with the Mission. 2408 Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander - in - Chief, on file with the Mission. 2409 ARSA, S tatement, ARSA/PR/06/2017, on 28 August 2017 . 2410 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Patterns of serious human rights violations by the Myanmar security forces. 2411 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Military Burned Villages in Rakhine State” (13 December 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/13/burma - military - burned - villages - rakhine - state . 2412 a clearance The Republic of the Union of Myanmar - President’s Office, “Tatmataw ends are operations in northern Rakhine”, http://www.president - office.gov.mm/en/?q=print/7288 . 2413 See chapter X: Impunity and accountability. 255

256 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 work on two key incidents, which are considered to be among the most grave. This focus should in no way detract from the scale or significance of the 2016 violence, which warrants on. further investigation and documentati Pwint Hpyu Chaung 1073. P wint Hpyu Chaung village tract yai khut is in northern Maungdaw Township, approximately 12 kilometres north of Maungdaw town. It is made up of three Rohingya Hpyu Chaung on 11 and 12 hamlets. The Tatmadaw led “area clearance operations” in Pwint 2414 November 2016. 1074. Following the 9 October 2016 ARSA attacks, soldiers had increased visits, held regular meetings with the village elders and came to the village twice a week to look for “bad 2415 people”. The situation det eriorated early on 11 November 2016, when soldiers detained a large 1075. number of men attending prayers at the local mosques. Between 60 and 80 men were detained and held for two or more hours before being released. Some were subjected to beatings and 2416 other il One man described being taken from a mosque to the school building treatment. - l and tied together with ropes. As well as being kicked and beaten with rifle butts, the soldiers 2417 “Kalar”. burned his beard and chin with matches. The detainees were called “Bengali” and After their release, the men who had originally been detained were told by the 1076. Tatmadaw commander to return at 12pm to the village meeting place. Word spread that other the meeting place men from the village should attend also. Approximately 60 men came to as instructed at around 12pm on 11 November. They were taken away to Buthidaung prison in two military trucks and detained for at least one year. At least one individual, an elderly 2418 One man who later visit ed relatives in the group believed man, died on the way to prison. 2419 treated. from their appearance that they were ill - 1077. From 3am the following morning, 12 November 2016, a large number of Tatmadaw “area soldiers and police arrived in the village tract in military vehicles and commenced an clearance operation”, moving through the three hamlets. Weapons were fired, followed by the burning of houses, starting from the southern end of the village. Villagers fled, many running for nearby forested areas or neighbouring villages. Petrol was used to burn houses, as were weapons described as “launchers”. The burning continued all day, with dozens of 2420 houses set alight. Although the number of people killed or wounded is unknown, up to nine died from 1078. 2421 One interviewee saw fou r of his male relatives, between the ages of 13 and bullet wounds. 77, having their hands tied and being put inside a house that he later saw on fire. He has not 2422 seen any of them since, and believes that they were killed. A group of village elders who n a few days later discovered the bodies of four or five people burned in a were able to retur 2423 house. There are strong indications that a number of women and girls were subjected to 1079. 2424 sexual and gender - based violence during the operation. One witness reported how he hi d 2425 and watched his niece being gang raped and then shot and killed by soldiers. 2414 - 133. LI 2415 104. - CI - 142, LI - 133, QI 2416 CI - 142, CI - 143, LI - 127, LI - 133, QI 104. - 2417 LI - 127. 2418 - CI - 142, CI - 143, LI - 096, LI - 127, QI 104. 2419 QI - 104. 2420 - 104. CI - 142, CI - 143, CI - 150, LI - 127, LI 133, QI - 2421 CI - 142, CI - 143, CI - 150, LI - 127, LI 133, QI - 104, QI - 100, XI - 009. - 2422 LI - 133. 2423 CI - 143, LI - 127, L I - 133, QI - 104. 2424 - CI - 150, LI 127, QI - 100. 2425 - 127. LI 256

257 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The group of village elders recorded the impact of the “area clearance operation” on 1080. listed approximately 170 houses as burned and destroyed, to gether their village tract. They with two mosques, two or three madrassas and 16 shops. The shops were also looted and 2426 Credible satellite more than 1,000 animals and dozens of motorcycles were stolen. in the village imagery analysis confirms that at least 65 structures were burned and destroyed 2427 tract between 10 and 17 November 2017. 2428 The perpetrators of the violations were Tatmadaw soldiers, accompanied by police. 1081. 1082. While the majority of villagers from Pwint Hpyu Chaung eventually fled to Bangladesh, a number returned in late 2016 or early 2017 and lived in tents and makeshift shelters, receiving international humanitarian assistance. Since the 2017 “clearance of the villagers, if not all, have relocated to operations”, it appears that the majority 2429 Bangladesh. Dar Gyi Zar 1083. Dar Gyi Zar village tract, known to the Rohingya as Choto Go Zi Bil, is made up of a series of hamlets, located three to four kilometres south of Pwint Hpyu Chaung in northern Maungdaw Township. The Tatmadaw launched “area clearance operations” in Dar Gyi Zar on 12 November 2016 and in Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son village tract, directly to the north. The operation in Dar Gyi Zar continued for two days. 1084. The “area clearance operation” commenced in Dar Gyi Zar with the arrival of two or three heli copters, from which soldiers opened fire using automatic weapons. This caused panic, with villagers running to seek shelter. People were shot and killed or injured, both outside and inside houses. Shooting from the helicopters continued for up to two hours . At least one woman was shot and killed inside her house and witnesses saw up to 15 other bodies 2430 of people killed by gunfire from the helicopters. A number of villagers, particularly women and children, headed to the Kula Bil area in the south of the vil lage tract. The following morning, a group of up to 200 soldiers entered Dar Gyi Zar along the 1085. main road. They opened fire in an indiscriminate manner and started to burn houses, 2431 including by using “launchers”. People again fled; some were shot as One they ran. 2432 People ran and hid in the paddy fields. From witness estimated that he saw 16 people shot. 2433 there they watched as the village was systematically burned. Through the course of the 2434 day, nearly all of the ho uses in the village were burned . 86. 10 Tatmadaw soldiers captured a group of up to 200 men, women and children, and took them to a paddy field, where they were told to kneel. People were beaten, following which the men and boys of approximately 12 years or older were separated from the grou p. The men were told to take off their shirts and the women were searched and robbed of jewellery, being touched inappropriately in the process. The women and younger children were then - walled house, while the men and boys were kept outside. The women taken and held in a mud 2435 then heard repeated gunfire and the screams of the men and boys outside. 1087. At sunset, the soldiers left and the women, girls and young children were able to leave the house. The bodies of the men and boys had been put in a pile, or series of piles, and burned using hay, harvested rice and the removed shirts. A number of other witnesses saw 2426 CI - 142, CI - 143, LI - 133. 2427 Human Rights Watch, Updated Damage Assessment of Affected Villages in Maungdaw District , 18 November 2016. 2428 CI - 142, LI - 127, LI - 133, QI - 100. 2429 127, QI LI - - 104. 2430 - 123, LI CI 139, LI - - 125, LI - 135, QI - 101, XI - 009. 2431 CI - 139, LI - 123, LI - 135. 2432 LI - 123. 2433 CI - 139, LI - 135. 2434 CI - 139, LI - 123, LI - 135. 2435 126. - LI - 125, LI 257

258 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2436 the pile of burned bodies. Two weeks later piles of bones were also seen. The total number were up to 40 men and boys burned, of bodies is unclear, although it appears that there 2437 possibly more. One victim who had been held inside the mud - walled house informed the Mission that her husband and two young sons, aged 10 and 13 years old, had been killed and 2438 Other families were burned in their houses, with the corpses found later by fellow burned. 2439 villagers. 1088. The total number of people killed in Dar Gyi Zar on 12 and 13 November is estimated to be 75, according to a list developed by Rohingya community organizations in the refugee 2440 camps of southe rn Bangladesh. While the Mission is not able to verify the accuracy of this number, it is consistent with other information received by the Mission of a high number of casualties. The situation in the surrounding area after the burning of Dar Gyi Z ar was very 1089. difficult, with large numbers of villagers sleeping in the open and further visits from Tatmadaw soldiers. The local ethnic Rakhine village administrator appears to have negotiated a. Eventually some were with the Tatmadaw regarding the return of the displaced Rohingy able to return. They lived in constructed tents and temporary shelters on the sites of their former homes, with intermittent international aid distributions. Others made the journey to 2441 the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Credib 1090. le satellite imagery analysis shows that 265 structures were burned and 2442 destroyed in the village between 10 and 17 November 2017. Rohingya community organizations have stated that a total of 400 structures were burned in Dar Gyi Zar, as well 2443 es and 38 shops, which were also looted. as five mosqu - based violence Sexual and gender 1091. Rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence were widely perpetrated in the 2444 course of the 2016 “area clearance operations”. Mass gang rapes, led by the Tatmadaw, e a significant pattern of the violence from October to December 2016. According to wer Yae information verified by the Mission, they were perpetrated in s t Chaung G wa Son, Kh Kyein Chaung and Kyet Yoe Pyin, amongst other locations. A 14 - year old girl from Mau ngdaw described her experience: t - year old, and We were hiding in the forest and he soldiers took my sister, who was 12 eight other girls Four of them were raped and killed. Then the soldiers took me. . There were around 40 women and girls in the forest. I remember the first man who raped me, feeling all the pain. I became numb to the next three men and then I went 2445 unconscious. They were raping most of the women and girls. 1092. The Kyet Yoe Pyin “area clearance operation” in Maungdaw Township saw a particu larly brutal level of sexual violence. Women and girls were subjected to mass gang 2446 rape, forced nudity, sexual humiliation and sexual assault. One 30 - year old survivor, who was pregnant, described how a large group of soldiers arrived in a military truck. They then - to house, taking jewellery, money and other belongings, before raping the went house - 2436 LI - 135. 2437 LI - 123, LI - - 135. 126, LI 2438 LI - 125 . 2439 CI - 139, LI - 123, LI - 135. 2440 K - 153.3. 2441 - CI 139, LI - 123, LI - 125, LI - 126, LI - 135. 2442 V - 150. 2443 K - 153.3. 2444 CI - 106, EI - 055, EI - - 093, EI - 094, EI - 095, LI - 105, K - 127, K - 128. 091, EI 2445 EI - 055. 2446 076.28, K CI - 106, K - 076.25, K - 076.27, K - - 076.29, K - 076.30, K - 076.31, K - 076.33, K - 076.34, K - 076.36. - 076.35, K 258

259 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 women. She said that six members of her family were raped, including her two nieces aged 2447 10 and 15. 2448 Some of the women and girls who were raped in Kyet Yo e Pyin, were then killed. 1093. One survivor described eight to ten Tatmadaw soldiers entering the house she was in and taking two young girls to the toilet. She held a child in her lap so that the Tatmadaw would realise that she was a mother and would not rape her. The soldiers threw the child aside; five to six men raped her. She said that she had pain everywhere afterwards and bled until she 2449 reached Bangladesh. She heard that the two girls who were taken to the toilet died. from Kyet Yoe Pyin explained that she was gang raped Another female survivor, aged 25, 2450 by four Tatmadaw soldiers in her house during this time. 1094. Despite the “area clearance operations” being focused on an area of central Maungdaw 2451 Township, rapes and gang rapes were also perpetrated i A 25 - n Buthidaung Township. year old female interviewee from Maung Gyi Taung described how she was gang raped in her house after her village chairman failed to take girls to the local military compound as instructed. She was severely bitten on her forehea d, cheeks and left breast. Having lost consciousness, she does not know how many men raped her. She was pregnant at the time of 2452 the rape and miscarried shortly afterwards. e body 1095. Women and girls were also sexually assaulted and humiliated during intrusiv 2453 A 30 - searches by Tatmadaw soldiers. years old woman from U Shey Key, Maungdaw – they would Township stated that the military did the “most embarrassing body checks ever 2454 put hands inside our tops, press our breasts and pinch our nipples in front of everyone.” Another woman, aged 20 year from Doe Tan, Maungdaw Township described how the military arrived and surrounded her village and invasively searched the women for jewellery and money. Women were made to sit in a field with their heads down and man y women had 2455 their headscarves taken off. (b) The build - up to 25 August 2017 Since October 2016, life had become so difficult. We were not even allowed to put the light on in our house at night, or buy anything at the bazar. We could not pray. The militar y did not allow our men to sit in a tea stall or in a coffee shop. We could not go to the hospital, even those who were really ill. Because the lights were off in our house, we could not eat anything at night, so we had to go to bed so early. The military also 2456 robbed us and our shops in the market. While systematic discrimination and restrictions had long been part of Rohingya life 1096. in Rakhine State, the period following the 9 October 2016 attacks saw an intensification of restrictive measures targeti ng the Rohingya, particularly in northern Rakhine State. These measures, coupled with the increased presence of security forces on the ground, resulted in a wide spectrum of human rights violations against the Rohingya in the period between d August 2017. October 2016 an 2447 CI - 106. 2448 - CI 105, CI - 106, EI - 054. 2449 K - 076.28. 2450 CI - 105. 2451 EI - 094, EI - 095, EI - 107. 2452 EI - 094. 2453 - CI - 105, EI - 091, EI - 106, K 076.41. 2454 K - 127. 2455 EI - 091. 2456 084. - LI 259

260 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Campaign of increased intimidation by the Myanmar security forces Increased presence of security forces The presence of security forces near Rohingya villages increased following October 1097. 2457 for example, 2016. New military camps were established inside villages, and checkpoints 2458 a new BGP checkpoint near Tin May, Buthidaung Township; a temporary military camp 2459 in Nan Yar Kone, near Buthidaung town; and a new police checkpoint in Pa Da Kar Ywar 2460 Thit, northern Maungdaw Township. 2461 Additional troops were stationed inside existing military or BGP compounds or 98. 10 2462 Following the occupied community structures such as schools and religious buildings. October 2016 attack on Koe Tan Kauk BGP base, additional Tatmadaw soldiers were 9 stati oned in the Chein Khar Li village military compound, located in Koe Tan Kauk village 2463 tract, providing additional support. y in Hlut, Maungdaw Township, early August saw increased foot patrols of 50 to 1099. In M er 100 personnel from security forces, and great movement of military vehicles. Previously, 2464 were Tatmadaw soldiers rarely seen in the area. 1100. This build up became particularly pronounced after 10 August 2017, when elements rd th 2465 LIDs arrived in northern Rakhine State. of the 33 and 99 Arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and ill - treatment 1101. The increased presence of security forces resulted in more frequent patrols, during 2466 which villagers were often beaten, particularly targeting young men. These patrols led to lations against Rohingya, including an increase in arbitrary arrests and a range of other vio looting. Wealthy, educated and influential men were often targeted for arbitrary arrests, 1102. ivities. purportedly in an effort to locate ARSA members or gather information about their act Those arrested were often beaten or tortured, and accused of being ARSA members, with security forces often saying they were looking for “bad people” or “anti - government 2467 2468 required the payment of bribes. people”. This practice was Release usually widespread across the three townships. One Rohingya man from Pwint Hpyu Chaung, Maungdaw Township, described his experience following the October 2016 attacks: They broke the door to my shop open, tied me up and beat me for five hours. Then I the military camp. They kept me for three days and three nights in a was taken to kneeling position with my hands tied behind my back. I was together with 25 other Rohingya men. We were not even offered water. They tortured us in many ways: they e gun in our mouths, stubbed burning cigarettes into our flesh, forced the barrel of th 2457 CI - 112, CI - - 115, CI - 145, LI - 053, LI - 054, LI - 057, LI - 073, LI - 074, LI - 103, LI - 105, WI - 010. 144, CI 2458 CI - 115. 2459 - LI 057. 2460 LI - 074. 2461 100, WI 010. CI - 119, LI - - 2462 - 183, LI - 046, QI - 101, YI - 021, K - 063.35. CI 2463 CI - 119, LI 100. - 2464 QI - 111, QI 112. - 2465 V - 213, V - 231 2466 - - - 182, LI - 053, XI CI 001, YI - 006, YI - 007. 181, CI 2467 104, CI CI - 007, CI - 016, CI - 021, CI - 028, CI - 032, CI - 034, CI - 048, CI - 071, CI - - 105, CI - 106, CI - 111, - CI - 112, CI 118, CI - 119, CI - 133, CI - 134, CI - 140, CI - 144, LI - 002, LI - 030, LI - 051, LI - 053, LI - 066, - LI - 073, LI - 074, LI - 076, QI - 002, QI - 014, QI 069, LI 015, QI - 022, QI - 038, QI - 040, QI - 062, QI - 102, - QI - 111, WI - 006, WI - 044, YI - 001, YI - 002, YI - 003, YI - 007, YI - 012, YI - 021, BM - 025, V - 073. 2468 003. - CI - 118, CI - 145, LI - 066, LI - 073, LI - 074, LI - 076 , XI - 005, YI 260

261 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 and dripped hot wax onto our penises. Five men died from the torture. Of the 2469 remaining 20 men, 18 were able to pay a huge amount to be released. Villagers from Pa Da Ka r Ywarmin gyi 1103. Thit, Maungdaw Township, described how, after 9 October 2016, the police would visit their village regularly and arrest men at night. 2470 Police accused the men of being part of ARSA and demanded payment for their release. 1104. Given that those “arrested”, apparently for having collaborated with ARSA, were regularly released on payment of bribes, the Mission considers that in many cases the arrests were without legal or factual basis. Rather, it was a tactic employed by Myanmar security buse and extort from Rohingya. As one Rohingya witness commented: forces to oppress, a 2471 It may “To the authorities you are a bad person unless you can pay, then you are good”. explain why the wealthiest were often targeted. However, this extortion had a disproportionate impact on poorer members of the community and others who could not pay. 2472 1105. In some cases, detainees have not been seen again. In May or June 2017, a large group of Tatmadaw soldiers detained six or seven men from Gudar Pyin, Buthidaung Township. The group in cluded an Imam and religious scholars. According to one interviewee, the soldiers brought a list of names of men they were looking for, and sought 2473 the assistance of the ethnic Rakhine village chairperson to identify them. The whereabouts 2474 of the men remain The number of people who have disappeared in this manner s unknown. is difficult to estimate. Some think their family members may have been transferred to Sittwe or Buthidaung prison and may have been charged or sentenced for alleged involvement with 2475 . Others suspect they were killed. ARSA 1106. Some people do appear to have been charged and sentenced for the ARSA attacks of 2016, and Rohingya villagers provided information on relatives having been arrested and 2476 charged for such acts. However, reliable or accurate information remains scarce. One interviewee from Myin Hlut, Maungdaw Township, said that, on or around 14 October 2016, the police and military came to his village and searched houses. He ran into the hills with other village rs, but a businessperson and a teacher were detained. According to the interviewee, they were later sentenced to 10 and seven years imprisonment respectively, 2477 although he had no information about the charges or trials. The government initially repor ted that 575 persons were detained and charged in 1107. 2478 No information was provided on the connection with the attacks. charges applied against those detained and if all had been formally charged with an offence. A judgment issued by Buthidaung Township’s cour t, dated 8 February 2018, listed 416 people tried in relation to the October and November 2016 events under sections 17/1 and 17/2 of the Unlawful Associations Act. 392 were convicted and 24 Of the 416 people, the judgment indicates that 2479 acquitted. 2469 QI - 103. 2470 CI - 144, LI - 074. 2471 QI - 114. 2472 CI - 111, LI 002; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights , “FLASH - REPORT: Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016”, 3 February 2017. 2473 YI - 014. 2474 LI - - 063, YI 013, YI - 015, YI - 016. 2475 LI - 002, LI - 116. 2476 CI - 189, LI - 104, QI - 111, RI - 008. 2477 QI - 111. 2478 State Counsellor’s Office, “470 suspects still under investigation in northern Maungtaw attacks. | http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/481 . According to the report, of the 575 detained on suspicion of their participation in the 9 October 2016 attacks and subsequent violence, 88 were sente nced, 11 were released, and six died in detention. It further noted that470 suspects remained under investigation. 2479 166. - K 261

262 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The Mission also received credible information that from January 2017, “special 1108. Township and District levels were opened at Myo Thit Taung Ward in courts” at th e Buthidaung Town to try the cases of persons detained in connection with the 9 October 2016 att acks. It is reported that warehouse buildings were transformed into temporary detention facilities during the hearings period, and into courtrooms for the trials. It remains unclear whether the “special courts” were established by law and officially gazett ed and if this 2480 process was completed before trials were initiated. In January 2017, detainees in Buthidaung prison were reportedly transported to these “special courts” where expedited wyers nor had access trials were conducted. Detainees were reportedly not represented by la 2481 to lawyers during the expedited trials. 1109. It is alleged that by January 2017, 500 detainees had been tried and sentenced in these 2482 special courts, and many of those tried were sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The notes the lack of clarity regarding whether proc , Mission edural guarantees were provided including the presumption of innocence, and the right to review by a higher court. Other credible reports indicated that that children as young as 10 - year old were arrested an d 2483 charged. There are also multiple credible reports of Rohingya deaths in custody in 2484 connection with these arrests and detentions. - based violence Sexual and gender For more than a year, we could not sleep in our houses because the military was 2485 requently and arresting people, extorting money and taking women. coming f In the months before the “clearance operations” of 25 August 2017, women and girls 1110. were raped, gang raped and subjected to sexual slavery across the three townships of - based violence by soldiers Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. Sexual and gender increased after 9 October 2016, with soldiers visiting villages more frequently and either raping women in their homes or taking them to military bases, where they were raped and 2486 gang raped. 1111. For example, in Kyet Yoe Pyin village, Maungdaw Township, one survivor estimated that more than 100 females were raped. She stated that she used to hide her daughters 2487 whenever soldiers came. Similarly, a witness from Hpon Nyo Leik village, B uthidaung Township, described soldiers visiting around twice a week to take women, who were then 2488 raped. In another village, up to 15 women were estimated to have died after excessive 2489 A 20 bleeding from rapes. year old female survivor from Thet Oo Chaung, Maungdaw - Township, described how Tatmadaw soldiers came to her village in March 2017 and she was 2490 gang raped by three to four Tatmadaw soldiers in her house. In Koe Tan Kauk village, Rathedaung Township, sexual assaults on women were common and some of th e women and 2491 girls taken to military camps did not return. 2480 076.36, K.076.38, - K 2481 Ibid. 2482 - 076.37. K 2483 QI - 107, K.076.36, K.076.38, V - 257. See also: Ministry of Information, “Child det ainee hospitalised - 10083 for 2nd time” (3 February 2017), http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/2/03/2017/id 2484 K - 076.41, V - 215, See also, Special Procedures Communications to the Government of Myanmar, UA MMR 3/2017, (11 July 2017) and UA MMR 4/2016, (21 October 2016), https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23089 ; https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22815 2485 LI - 117 . 2486 105, CI - CI - - 119, CI - 133, CI 145, EI - 094, LI - 004, LI - 045, LI - 059, LI - 077, LI - 117, QI - 063, QI - 105, QI - 114. 2487 - 105. CI 2488 077. LI - 2489 LI - 004. 2490 EI - 041. 2491 - 001. CI - 119, LI - 045, XI 262

263 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Witnesses gave corroborating accounts of village administrators or other villagers 1112. being asked to supply the women to the military, sometimes in groups of up to 10 women in 2492 being told that this was to “serve the nation”. a night, with one In Maung Hna Ma village, Maungdaw Township, a witness saw women and girls being taken to the bases of battalions 2493 Another witness Nos. 564 and 345. He stated that those who came back had been raped. an announcement by megaphone in Chin Tha Mar, Buthidaung Township. It told recalled young women to go to the military camp where they would be taught to sew and do handicrafts. Seven girls went and were never seen again. The witness did not know what 2494 happened to t hem. Increased restrictions and oppression Rohingya had long suffered restrictions on their freedom of movement. 1113. This became 2495 but in the post - October 2016 period Rohingya reported more pronounced after 2012, facing ever greater difficulties and restrictions in their movements. Even if a travel permit was issued, travelling between villages required passing through an increasing number of checkpoints, where Rohingya were increasingly exposed to threats, extortion and physical violence. For many i t became very difficult, or impossible, to visit family, conduct business, 2496 or make a living. Although many of the restrictions were already in place prior to October 2016, the Mission understands that, after this time, they were more strictly and violentl y enforced. 1114. One witness recounted his experience at a checkpoint in early August 2017 while travelling to another village tract to visit a family member. He was on his motorbike, together with his grandson, when they were stopped by Tatmadaw soldier s and taken to a nearby military camp. The soldiers forced the witness to shave off his beard and confiscated his motorbike keys, demanding 60,000 Kyat to get them back. He could not pay, so the soldiers beat both him and his grandson and took their phones . They were released only after the 2497 chairperson of their village identified them. The motorbike was not returned. After 9 October 2016 the Tatmadaw declared the whole of the three townships an 1115. , 2498 The timings of the curfew was extended to 7pm to 6am following the “operational area”. 9 October attacks in Buthidaung and Maungdaw. It was shortened to 9pm until 5am in 2499 February 2017. These curfews were strictly enforced, with villagers subject to arrest, 2500 , or more often extortion by local authorities and police. physical violence 1116. One interviewee reported that, on 11 November 2016, the military arrested a large number of men who were praying in three different mosques in Pwint Hpyu Chaung village 2501 ship, outside curfew hours. As part of the imposition of the curfew, tract, Maungdaw Town 2502 people were not allowed to light up their houses after dark. 1117. Movement restrictions and the curfew meant many could not access markets in 2503 2504 y and sell goods neighbouring ethnic Rakhine villages to bu or access paddy fields. Interviewees described needing permission from the village administrator, which often 2505 Many could not buy food or medicine. involved payment. 2492 145, LI CI - - 059, LI - 117. 2493 - 117. LI 2494 QI - 063. 2495 See this chapter, section B.2: Denial of the right to freedom of movement. 2496 - CI - 112, LI - 069, QI - 051, QI - 110, QI - 111, YI 005. 2497 YI - 023. 2498 - V 211. 2499 V - 047. 2500 066, LI - CI - 118, CI - 134, CI - 140, LI - - 074, LI - 104, QI - 113, YI 021, YI - 028. 2501 QI - 104. 2502 LI - 084, RI - 005. 2503 066, LI CI - 122, LI - 053, LI - - 072, LI - 084, LI - 105, QI - 067, WI - 007, YI - 019. 2504 LI - 045, LI - 053. 2505 067. - LI - 053, LI - 105, QI - 058, QI - 059, QI - 060, QI 263

264 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 In the one or two months preceding the August 2017 violence, in s 1118. ome locations 2506 As one man Rohingya were no longer able to leave their village, under any circumstances. from Chut Pyin, Rathedaung Township, explained: Everything changed about two months before the violence. In the past, other village tracts were accessib le if you had the relevant token from the chairperson, but suddenly people were no longer able to move between villages using these tokens. Even villages within the same village tract became inaccessible. We were not allowed to go outside 2507 the village. 11 Theft, intimidation and extortion by security forces, already a large part of daily 19. 2508 also increased during this period, largely as a result of the increased Rohingya life, 016. presence of the Tatmadaw and other security forces in the region after October 2 1120. Rohingya were required to pay exorbitant informal taxes or bribes in all aspects of 2509 Extortion, intimidation and theft took place their personal, business and community life. ity forces , stole from the in the context of regular patrolling by the security forces. The secur 2510 Rohingya Rohingya and regularly looted belongings and valuables, and extorted money. 2511 stolen cattle and animals were regularly . 2512 Theft from Rohingya shops was very common. One interviewee said that the 1121. regularly to his medicine shop in Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit , Maungdaw military would come to extort money. Once, he was detained, beaten, and forced to pay a “fine” to be Township , 2513 Another interviewee was forced to close his shop any time the police visited his released. 2514 village; otherwise, they would steal from him. If the villagers slaughtered an animal, they 2515 were forced to share it with the BGP. Public gatherings of more than five Rohingya were prohibited after 2012, in 1122. 2516 However, while curfew orders were accordance with curfew orders imposed at the time. lifted in most of Rakhine State in September 2014, they have remained in force in Buthidaung and Maungdaw until the present day. It appears this prohibition became more strictly tober 2016 violence. This measure prevented enforced against Rohingya following the Oc 2517 Rohingya from coming together to practise their faith. After October 2016, several 2518 closed down or destroyed. interviewees reported that mosq ues and madrassas were locked, One interviewee, a religious leader from Buthidaung Township, recalled that their madrassas and mosques had been closed after October 2016 and Qur’ans had been destroyed. Due to 2519 S religious people being targeted, he stopped wearing his religious clothes . ecurity forces also engaged in the humiliating and degrading practice of cutting the beards of Rohingya 2520 men. O ne notable incident during this period was the arson attack against the mosque of 1123. e month of Ramadan, and the Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, in June 2017, during th failure of the security forces to protect it. The mosque, which was over 100 years old, was 2506 RI - - 004. 001, RI 2507 RI - 004. 2508 See this chapter, section B.7: Other forms of oppression. 2509 - 104, XI - 008. LI 2510 118. - CI - 118, CI - 119, CI - 140, LI - 049, LI - 053, LI - 067, LI - 084, LI 2511 - 012, CI - 105, CI - 133, LI - CI - 057, WI - 010. 050, LI 2512 CI - 047, CI - 049, CI - 105, CI - 112, CI - 118, CI - 119, CI - 133, LI 050, LI - 057, LI - 084, QI - 002, QI - 051, - QI 063, QI - 114, QI - 036, WI - 005, WI - 006, W I - 010. - 2513 QI - 114. 2514 QI - 036. 2515 QI - 002. 2516 See this chapter, section C.5: Spreading hate. 2517 053, LI CI - 140, LI - - 104, QI 106, XI - 008, YI - 012. - 2518 050, LI LI - 049, LI - - 053, LI - 066, LI - 067, LI - 076, LI - 104, LI - 124, QI - 106, QI - 111, YI - 010, YI - 025. 2519 LI - 124. 2520 - 023. LI - 046, LI - 051, LI - 068, LI - 127, YI 264

265 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2521 set alight by local ethnic Rakhine, who also prevented Rohingya villagers attempting to 2522 put out the fire. Rather than assisting, the B GP took a number of religious leaders to their base, where they were forced to sign a document stating that they had set the mosque alight 2523 It appears that a number of religious items were destroyed, including Qur’ans . themselves and the religious garments of the Imam. 1124. During this period, Rohingya houses across the three townships of northern Rakhine State were frequently searched. The authorities confiscated sharp objects, including small 2524 One woman noted, “They knives and other implements used for cooking and harvesting. 2525 did not leave a single small tool, not even to clean fish”. These house searches were they deprived purportedly in relation to countering insurgent activities, but in practice o conduct daily activities, and in Rohingya families of the tools and implements needed t some cases deprived them of their livelihood. One man noted: In July, soldiers came and took all of our sharp implements, such as knives, cleavers, – thi s was all that we etc. They only left us with the small scissors used for beetle nuts 2526 had to cut food to cook . On 9 June 2016, the General Administration Department, under the authority of the 1125. Ministry of Home Affairs, wrote to village administrators in Maungdaw Township regarding Rohingya around their properties. The letter cited a the zinc sheets commonly used by decision by the township management committee prohibiting this type of fence, but 2527 authorising the use of fencing with concrete poles and barbed wire. 1126. Following the October 2016 violence, implement ation of this administrative order accelerated. Rohingya villagers in northern Rakhine State were ordered to remove their fences from around their properties. This was widely implemented in the three townships, generally communicated by the ethnic Rakhine village administrator. In some instances, the village administrator was accompanied by security forces, with soldiers or police removing 2528 fences by force. Non - compliance with this order would often result in beatings and fines. An interviewee from Kha Maung Seik village tract, Maungdaw Township, reported: A few months before the August 2017 incident, the village chairman, an ethnic Rakhine, accompanied by the military, demanded us to remove the fences from the yards and around the houses. They visited the village together with the police three times in one month since the order of removing the fences was issued. The villagers 2529 who did not implement the order were beaten and had to pay fines to the chairman . While this meas 1127. ure was purportedly justified by “security considerations”, it greatly limited the ability of Rohingya to keep their homes private, which is of particular cultural importance. Villagers felt more vulnerable and exposed to intimidation and harassment by sec urity forces and ethnic Rakhine, making it difficult for them to shelter safely in their own 2530 It also had a disproportionate impact on women, who felt particularly vulnerable homes. and insecure, as bathing and toilet facilities were often located within t hose fences in the 2531 One young Rohingya woman explained that it was difficult for compounds of the houses. her to go to the bathroom after the fences had been removed. She described it as having to 2521 CI - 145, CI - - 129. 178, LI 2522 CI - - 129. 145, LI 2523 178. - CI - 145, CI 2524 BI - 001, CI - 044, CI - 048, CI - 100, CI - 118, CI - - 122, CI - 182, LI - 023, LI - 053, LI - 054, LI - 066, 119, CI LI - 105, QI - 002, QI - 014, QI - 052, QI - 061, QI - 069, RI - 006, RI - 007, WI - 002, WI - 027, WI - 031, WI - 032, YI - 003, YI - 010. 2525 CI - 118. 2526 QI - 069. 2527 K - 076.41. 2528 118, CI CI - 044, CI - 046, CI - 048, CI - 112, CI - 115, CI - - 120, LI - 105, QI - 110, QI - 111, YI - 019, YI - 025. 2529 CI - 048. 2530 K - 104. 2531 A/HRC/34/67. 265

266 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2532 s precisely to open up Rohingya use “open toilets”. The effect of the removal of fences wa households to greater surveillance and to facilitate the movement of security forces into and across Rohingya property. On 5 March 2017, 1128. the Maungdaw District Fisheries Department issued a letter regarding a decision o f the District Administration Office in Maungdaw that only NVC 2533 holders could go fishing, and fishermen would be examined at security checkpoints. 2534 Several interviewees reported that they were no longer allowed to fish after this. One villager from Ah Lel Than Kyaw village tract, Maungdaw Township, explained: The Tatmadaw closed the dock for boats on the shore in our village. They also removed the engines and fans from all our fishing boats. The soldiers said that they r. Then they went to each village and said that were doing this as per government orde people could only use their boats and recover the engines and fans if they accepted 2535 . the NVC Similar restrictions were reportedly applied to people collecting firewood, forest 1129. 2536 Families and communities were products and others who n eeded to travel to make a living. denied their livelihoods and food security was affected. 1130. Pressure to accept the NVC increased in the months leading up to August 2017. On 8 2537 ering Committee to expedite the process. February 2017, the Government appointed a Ste Despite this, there was little information about the process and many interviewees stated that viewed as likely to entrench their status as they refused to accept the cards, which they 2538 roviding no guarantee for citizenship. “Bengali immigrants”, while Some Rohingya p believed that accepting the NVC would prevent them from retaining title to property and 2539 make them lose their land. Frequent meetings with Rohingya villagers were convened by the authorities, often org anized by the ethnic Rakhine village administrators, together with 2540 the immigration authorities (LaWaKa), and often attended by BGP, police and soldiers. While the purpose of these meetings appears to have been to persuade the Rohingya to accept they also instilled fear. Rohingya attending these meetings were subjected to threats the cards, and intimidation, including warnings that failure to accept would result in greater restrictions 2541 Others were told to accep t the NVC or on their freedom of movement and livelihoods. 2542 they would be forced to leave the country. A series of more targeted and aggressive meetings were held with Rohingya elders in 1131. - August 2017, convened by the BGP and Tatmadaw soldiers, often including members mid th rd Light Infantry Divisions, sometimes together with 33 of the recently deployed and 99 2543 ethnic Rakhine village administrators. They took place in a number of locations, including Chut Pyin and Koe Tan Kauk in Rathedaung Township, and Min Gyi and Kyauk Pan Du in Maungdaw Townshi p. Some of the most brutal “clearance operations” subsequently took 2532 QI - 069. 2533 Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Irrigation District Fisheries Department Maungdaw - - 13/ 2017(1829/1831); K - 076.40. District, Maungdaw Letter No. Fisheries District/Maungdaw 2534 LI 045, LI - - - 077, LI - 103, QI - 106, YI - 005, YI - 012. 053, LI 2535 006. - RI 2536 K - 076.42 . 2537 Formation of the Steering Committee for issuance of National Verification Card (NVC) in Rakhine State for those who will undergo verification for citizenship, Notification No.21/2017 (8 February 2017) . 2538 CI - 178, CI 194, CI - 196, CI - 198, LI - 066, RI - 008. - 2539 WI - 040, V - 073, V - 151. 2540 - BI - 017, CI - 178, CI - 179, CI - 181, CI - 182, CI 194, CI - 195, LI - 057, LI - 066, QI - 058, QI - 060, QI - 066, - QI - 070, QI 106, RI - 010, RI - 017, WI - 016, WI - 042, YI - 004, ZI - 006, V - 073, V - 222. 2541 005, YI CI - 182, LI - 045, LI - 053, LI - 066, LI - 077, LI - 103, QI - 106, WI - 041, YI - 004, YI - - 012, V - 073. 2542 181, CI - 182, CI - 179, CI - CI - 183, CI - 192. 2543 - 001. CI - 197, CI - 198, ZI 266

267 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 place in these locations. Threats were made regarding the continued refusal of the NVCs at 2544 these meetings. One significant meeting was held on 22 August 2017, convened by members o 1132. f the rd LID at the school located in the Rakhine hamlet of Chut Pyin. During the meeting, 33 rd LID threatened the Rohingya elders in attendance, including elders from leaders of the 33 rd 2545 LID, whose A commander of the 33 Chut Pyin as well as from other nearby villages. 2546 , explained that together with his Division he had recently name is on file with the Mission been deployed from Kachin State. He stated that Rohingya must accept the NVC, or else they 2547 would be killed, as had happened to villagers in northern Myanmar. The meeting was also 2548 attended by the Rakhine chairman of Chut Pyin. Following the meeting, village leaders 2549 discussed the proposal, but eventually reported back that they would not accept the NVC. o their homes and oppression increased After this, villagers were reportedly confined t 2550 further. 1133. Immediately preceding the 25 August 2017 attacks, the ethnic Rakhine chairman of Min Gyi had organized a meeting during which he made a speech instructing Rohingya to 2551 2552 “ would not be allowed to stay in Myanmar”. take the cards One interviewee or they from Min Gyi (Tula Toli) described: There were meetings where we were told, “You must accept the NVCs”. We always refused. This pressure was for a year but the worst incident was two or three months rior to August 2017 violence] when the chairman came with the military, who ago [p 2553 . were armed, and told us to take the cards with guns pointed at us. We refused Rising tension in northern Rakhine State ion Committee, State media, and 1134. After October 2016, the State Counsellor’s Informat other national media increased the focus on ARSA activities, with increased monitoring and reporting. The inflammatory nature of much of this reporting, often characterizing Rohingya as “Bengali terrorists”, coupled with ris ing vitriolic discourse and hate speech against the 2554 Rohingya, fuelled an already volatile situation. These reports, which had regional and national prominence, contributed to a fear 1135. among non - st activities. They Rohingya communities in Rakhine State of alleged terrori deepened inter - communal suspicion and fear. They were likely a factor in a notable breakdown in the relationship between the communities, particularly in the weeks leading up to 25 August 2017. Between May and July 2017, media so 1136. urces reported a number of alleged ARSA 2555 and activities, including reports on the killing of Rohingya informants by ARSA, an 2556 accidental explosion during a training course, killing seven individuals, including two discovery of alleged ARSA training camps in “foreigners”. The media also reported the different locations, where materials for making explosives and other weapons were 2544 QI 058, V - 076. - 2545 - 076. CI - 185, CI - 186, CI - 191, LM - 006, LM - 012, K - 155, V - 067, V 2546 CI - 186, CI - 191, LM - 006, V 067, V - 076, K - 155. - 2547 - CI - 177, CI - 185, CI - 186, CI 191, RI - 001, LM - 006, LM - 012, LM - 018, K - 155, V - 067, V - 076. 2548 186, RI CI - - 004. 2549 191. CI - 185, CI - 2550 LM - 006, V - 076. 2551 058, QI QI - - 060, QI - 066, QI 067, WI - 037, V - 073. - 2552 - QI 060. 2553 QI - 058; See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents. 2554 See chapter VI, section B.2: The issue of “hate speech”: Findings. 2555 Global New Light of Myanmar, “ Rakhine slayings by insurgents” (22 July 2017). 2556 yanmar, “Five bodies unearthed near 5 May explosion site in V - 094, V - 216; Global New Light of M 16 May 2017). ( Buthidaung” 267

268 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2557 recovered, and ARSA members were killed. This reportedly prompted security forces to he area, particularly around Tin May village tract, undertake violent evictions and arrests in t 2558 killing several people and prompting some families to flee to Bangladesh in May and June. On 22 June 2017, the State Counsellor’s Information Committee released photos of an alleged ARSA terrorist traini ng camp in the Mayu Mountain range and published pages of 2559 information about ARSA and its activities, including the alleged killing of informants. There were also public reports on killings by ARSA of members of non - Rohingya 1137. communities. On 24 June 2017, the Global New Light of Myanmar, a Government newspaper, reported that ARSA members had shot and killed two ethnic Rakhine villagers and injured two others, when they inadvertently discovered materials for explosives in Kyun 2560 Pauk Pyu Su village tract , Maungdaw Township. The Mission has not been able to verify responsibility for these killings, although credible reports indicate that they may have been 2561 perpetrated by ARSA. On 3 August 2017, the State Counsellor’s Information Committee claimed ARSA wa s responsible for the killing of seven ethnic Mro, whose bodies were found near their village of Kine Gyi, Maungdaw Township. Some had been shot and others killed 2562 Credible but unconfirmed information suggests these killings were not by machete. 2563 to ARSA, but to unrelated criminal activity. connected Rohingya interviewees gave accounts of deteriorating relations between the 1138. communities throughout this period, with ethnic Rakhine neighbours ceasing to engage in 2564 priation of Rohingya land. business relations and instances of appro One interviewee said that ethnic Rakhine confiscated his land and fenced it with red flags, after which he no longer 2565 Another interviewee was told by his neighbour that his farmland was “not his had access. 2566 was forced to live off his food stocks, which eventually depleted. land”, after which he Some Rohingya noted the breakdown immediately preceding the 25 August 2017 2567 - violence. August 2017, he was no For example, one interviewee reported that, by mid 2568 longer able to sell goods t ethnic Rakhine. o the 1139. The Mission also received reports where ethnic Rakhine neighbours actively issued 2569 warnings to their Rohingya neighbours about impending violence. For example, one was warned by a n ethnic interviewee from Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, said that he Rakhine friend of his that: You [Rohingya] cannot stay here and we cannot control the bad behaviour of our own 2570 people. The government is planning to drive away your people. 1140. It is also of interest to note that, one to two day s before 25 August 2017, a small group of up to 10 Hindu families left the Myin Hlut village tract in southern Maungdaw Township. They had lived in rented shops, including barbershops, but left their accommodation at short 2557 “ Five Bodies Found in Buthidaung”, (15 May 2017); Global New Light of Myanmar, The Irrawaddy, ( “Terrorist training camps, guns uncovered in Mayu Mountains” 2017); Global New Light of 22 June Myanmar, “Tents of violent attackers discovered in Mayu Mountain” (1 August 2018). 2558 V - 094. 2559 Global New Light of M yanmar, “Terrorist training camps, guns uncovered in Mayu Mountains” ( 22 June 2017). 2560 V - 067, V 152; Global New Light of Myanmar, “Four local ethnic people were attacked by swords - and killed two” (26 June 2017). 2561 See this chapter, section D.1.c. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. 2562 Information Committee, “Press Release on the situation in Maungdaw” (Facebook Post, 11 August . 2017), para 4, https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/pcb.778752418964533/778752095631232/? type=3&theater 2563 See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. 2564 LI - 077, LI - 114, QI - 040, YI - 005. 2565 YI - 005. 2566 QI - 040. 2567 081, LI - 065, LI - LI - 114. 2568 LI - 114. 2569 LI - 033, LI - 118. 2570 - 118. LI 268

269 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 ple had gone to the shops as usual, but had then discovered notice. One witness said that peo 2571 that the Hindu families had left. The Mission notes, that the breakdown of intercommunal relationships, as well as the 1141. ethnic Rakhine to their neighbours, and the dep arture of other groups warnings given by some - in advance of the violence, may indicate that some non Rohingya were informed of or aware of the upcoming plans of the Tatmadaw regarding the impending “clearance operations”. In some locations, ethnic 1142. ons, who were particularly Rakhine village chairpers aggressive towards the Rohingya, contributed to the further breakdown of relationships. For example, many accounts indicate that the relationship between the Rohingya and their ethnic Rakhine neighbours in Min Gyi (Tula Toli) had initially been amicable. Relations began to deteriorate when a new chairman was elected in 2015, and continued to worsen through 2017, 2572 including through severely restricted access to the market in a nearby village. During this period, the Myanmar a uthorities made increasing efforts to recruit ethnic 1143. Rakhine as members of the security apparatus. In November 2016, the Chief of the Rakhine State Police reportedly stated that his police force was recruiting a new “Regional Police” from among ethnic Rakh ine and other non - Muslim ethnic minorities living in Maungdaw 2573 Township to serve in their own villages. It was reported that they intended to provide the 2574 recruits with weapons, other equipment, and compensation. On 17 November 2016, Myanmar police authori ties officially reported that 116 new police members had started “special” four - month security training “to protect local people from various forms of crimes”. Recruits would receive training in martial arts, weapon use, and riot control tactics. The annou ncement continued, “Every Rakhine national wishing to protect their state will have a 2575 chance to become part of the local armed police”. This auxiliary police force, which would wear police uniforms, was to fall under the command of the BGP, which ultimate ly falls 2576 under control of the Tatmadaw during military operations. 1144. Moreover, the recruitment of non - Rohingya to Government - supported militias, known as (“People’s Army”), continued thro ughout this period in Rakhine Pyi Thu Sit 2577 State. The Government appears to have supported the establishment of Pyi Thu Sit after 2578 the violence of 2012, and they were subsequently set up in specific village tracts in provided with uniforms and northern Rakhine State, armed by the Government and 2579 Often, Rohingya villagers could identify Pyi Thu Sit participants, either because training. they knew them, or because they were recognisable from some type of adapted military 2580 uniform distinguishing them from the Tatmadaw or p olice. Independent of Pyi Thu Sit, the Myanmar authorities also mobilised and armed other 1145. 2581 Rakhine militia groups after October 2016. One interviewee stated that these groups did 2582 not have uniforms . Another villager, a village administrator, stated that he saw weapons 2583 being transported by the Tatmadaw and handed out to ethnic Rakhine. The Government has confirmed the establishment of these “new” militias during a parliamentary debate in 2571 QI - 111, QI - 112. 2572 - QI 058, QI - 059, QI - - 066, QI - 067. 060, QI 2573 - V - 153, V 154. 2574 V - 153 . 2575 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Information, “Police training aims to raise security in Rakhine State,” (17 November 2016), ht tp://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/18/11/2016/id - 9208 2576 V - 165. 2577 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 340, although this would require the approval of the Nation al Defence and Security Council. 2578 V - 164. 2579 LI - 052, LI 101, LI - 103, LI - 104, LI - 118, YI - 009. - 2580 LI - 052, LI - 104, LI - 118. 2581 - LI - 054, LI - 101, LI - 103, YI 009. 2582 YI - 009. 2583 - 101. LI 269

270 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2584 t, following the October January 2018. The Deputy Minister for Home Affairs stated tha 2016 violence, 34 more Rakhine community militia groups had been established in the - Maungdaw Buthidaung region, three of which were armed by the Tatmadaw and had been 2585 provided tactical weapons training up to an advanced level in Fe bruary and March 2017. On 8 August 2017, the Rakhine State General Administrative Department issued an announcement referring to acts of “extremist terrorism” perpetrated by “Muslim Bengalis” that forced “local residents to flee their native homes”. Signi ficantly, the statement also referenced “a security system and cooperation among the public and particular security 2586 forces.” 1146. On 9 August 2017, a seven - member delegation from the Arakan National Party visited - Senior Commander - in - Chief of the Tatmadaw, in Naypyidaw General Min Aung Hlaing, the to discuss local concerns and to call for further heightened security measures in Rakhine 2587 The next day, the Rakhine State Government announced that the Tatmadaw would State. 2588 be carrying out an “area clearan ce operation” in the Mayu mountain range. According to a media source, the announcement was intended to alert ethnic Rakhine, so that they would 2589 avoid the mountains and not be mistaken as targets. 1147. Intercommunal relationships were likely further wea kened by divisive rhetoric from Rakhine politicians, repeated calls for ethnic Rakhine to be armed to protect themselves, and the actual arming and training of some ethnic Rakhine. - 1148. In some village tracts, new non orthern Rakhine Rohingya people were brought into n 2590 State, including into NaTaLa villages, directly in advance of the clearance operations. It remains unclear who these people were, although some were believed to be Buddhists from 2591 Bangladesh. One interviewee from Kyauk Pan Du, southern Mau ngdaw Township, witnessed new people arriving in the nearby NaTaLa village for two to three months prior to August 2017. He said that there was a large group of youths who would stay for about a week , and that he subsequentl and then leave and return later y identified these people as 2592 participants in the “clearance operation”. A number of other interviewees also informed the Mission that new arrivals to NaTaLa villages had been seen participating in the “clearance 2593 operations”. 1149. In Gu D ar Pyin village, Buthidaung Township, villagers observed the arrivals of these new people in the week directly preceding 25 August. One Rohingya man observed: Recently new people were brought to live in the NaTaLa. Our Rohingya villagers always had a good relationship wit h our Rakhine neighbours. Even after October 2016, the relationship was good. But then the new arrivals came, about one week 2594 before the violence. All the relationships broke down. Increased military build - up in northern Rakhine State after October 2016 1150. In the weeks prior to the 25 August ARSA attacks, there was a noticeable build - up of 2595 troops and other military assets across the three townships. nd 2584 Amyotha Hluttaw, 7th regular session, 9th day on 30 January 2018”, meeting minutes, available “2 https://bit.ly/2NaW1SQ at: 2585 Ibid., See also Myoe Mint, “Deputy Minister Says Tatmadaw Arming, Training up to 30 Militias in Maungdaw” (The Irrawaddy, 30 January 2018). 2586 Republic of Union of Myanmar, State Administrative Government, Rakhine State Announcement 1/ 2007 (8 August 2017) . 2587 - 229 . V 2588 V - 231 2589 http://thevoicemyanmar.com/news/10992 - mrt 2590 065, LI LI - 054, LI - 061, LI - 063, LI - - 066, LI - 071, LI - 110. 2591 LI - 054, LI - 110 , WI - 048. 2592 ZI - 001. 2593 - LI 054, LI - 061, LI - 063, LI - 065, LI - 066, LI - 071, LI - 110. 2594 LI - 062. 2595 003. - LI - 071, QI - 111, QI - 112, QI - 116, WM 270

271 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 rd th and 99 On 10 August 2017, more than 1,600 members of the Tatmadaw’s 33 Light 1151. Infantry Divisio ns (LIDs) based outside Rakhine State, were airlifted to Rakhine State from their deployment in northern Myanmar. This re - deployment was reported in the national media; reference was made to the troops “going to northern Rakhine to carry out area 2596 ”. clearance 1152. Other military units were shifted from other military bases and attached to Military 15, whose area of responsibility covers Buthidaung Operational Command (MOC) - Township. As many as nine battalions from other Western Regional Command units were 15, as well as one Armoured Brigade consisting of up to 60 tanks and attached to MOC - 2597 - 17 helicopters were also relocated to Rakhine armoured personnel carriers. Eight MI 2598 State. The deployment of tanks, heavy artillery and this number of helicopters was 2599 c onsidered unusual. Furthermore, in the weeks just prior to 25 August 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers moved 1153. closer to the border areas, and the movement of helicopters into and out of BGP camps in Rakhine State increased. Areas that were normally guarded by BGP units now also had a 2600 The arrival of new troops at the beginning of significant presence of Tatmadaw soldiers. 2601 Some new troops travelled in convoys of military August was noticeable to villagers. 2603 2602 vehicles . Some were garrisoned inside military and oth er security force compounds. One villager commented, “It was clear to us that there were new soldiers, as they had different uniforms to the soldiers who were permanently stationed inside the compounds, who we 2604 knew and recognised”. In relation to the rep utation of the LIDs, one interviewee stated the following: New soldiers had come from Yangon and they were very tough. My Rakhine neighbour said to me, “Now you Rohingya are doomed because the government is sending e to kill every Muslim. Someday in Rakhine military from Yangon who are coming her 2605 State there will be no Rohingya Muslims at all.” Deliveries of military equipment were made to the Tatmadaw and other security forces 1154. 2606 in advance of 25 August 2017. camp explained: A villager with a shop next to a military Approximately four days before the [clearance operation] in my village there were many vehicles arriving to the base. Five trucks were full of troops, and the other two white sacks. trucks were full of equipment. The trucks with equipment were full of When the new arrivals got out of vehicles, they were handing out the things inside the 2607 sack. I saw that they were distributing “launchers”. In Maung Gyi Taung village tract, Buthidaung Township, what appears to be artillery 1155. installed in the hills overlooking the village approximately one week prior to 25 August was 2608 A witness reported that when 2017. It was used in the “clearance operation” a week later. stroyed” a this weapon was fired, it made a loud sound and the subsequent explosion “de 2609 paddy field. 2596 213. - V - 212, V 2597 K - 002. 2598 002. K - 2599 XM - 005. 2600 001, QM - XM - 005. 2601 - LI - 062, LI - 081, LI - 100, QI 069, QI - 110, QI - 111, QI - 112. 2602 069, LI 081, LI LI - - - 112. 2603 - 081, QI - 110, QI LI 116. - 2604 - 081. LI 2605 LI - 092. 2606 LI - 063, LI - 081. 2607 LI - 081. 2608 LI - 114, LI - 117. 2609 117. - LI 271

272 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Approximately two weeks prior to 25 August 2017, two navy vessels, not normally 1156. seen in the area, were operating in the Bay of Bengal, in the area of southern Maungdaw and 2610 2611 essels fired on a Rohingya village. coastal Rathedaung Township. At least one of these v This level of build 1157. up, both in quantity and nature, would have required significant - logistical planning over a considerable period. It would have required decisions at the most Mission has concluded that this preparation, the joint senior levels of the Tatmadaw. The 2612 nature of the operations, and the deployment of the LIDs indicate that the “clearance operations”, or at least the ability to carry out a large and widespread operation, was planned and ordered well i n advance of 25 August 2017. Incidents in Rathedaung Township, July and August 2017 1158. A number of incidents took place in northern Rathedaung Township in July and August 2017 that contributed to the rapidly escalating tensions across Rakhine State. T hese were not isolated events but took place in close proximity to each other, in a series of neighbouring village tracts. 2613 1159. These incidents were well publicized, reported on by Rakhine media as well as in 2615 2614 and international media. national In a publ ic statement, ARSA stated that these incidents were “pre - planned and organized crimes” which it viewed as being aimed at - style causing intercommunal violence in Rakhine State “to trigger a repeat of 2012 2616 violence”. 2610 LI - 045, LI - 052, LI - 053, LI - - 113. 100, QI 2611 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents, for details on the “clearance operation” in Koe Tan Kauk. 2612 Joint Operations are operations involving two or more of the military branches; Army, Navy and/or Air Force. 2613 Narinjara, “Cows are still be ing stolen, killed and eaten, despite the increased security in Zay Di Pyin, https://bit.ly/2xbYja9 Mayu coastal area” (Narinjara News, 13 August 2017): 2614 For example, Global New Light on Myanmar, “Attack on police force arresting financial supporter of violent attackers in Yathedaung” ( 5 August 2017). 2615 – S. Naing, “ Rohingya villagers blockaded amid fresh tensions in Myanmar's Rakhine residents” (Reuters, 22 August 2017). 2616 PR/04/2017, on 6 August 2017. ARSA Statement, ARSA/ 272

273 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 hich highlights the proximity of villages of Map of northern Rathedaung Township, w Chut Pyin, Ah Htet Nan Yar, Auk Nan Yar and Zay Di Pyin and Chin (Pyaing Taung). The red marking indicates the subsequent burning of the villages in “clearance operations” detected by 16 September 2017. 273

274 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Visit of Ashin Wirathu to northern Rakhine State In May and July 2017, the monk Ashin Wirathu visited northern Rakhine State. In 1160. reportedly visited the locations of the 9 October 2016 attacks, among early May, Wirathu 2617 escort from the BGP. It was also reported that, as part of other villages, with an armed this trip, Wirathu had a private meeting with the Brigadier General of the BGP in Kyi Kan - day trip, Pyin. - ranking At the end of this five Wirathu was reportedly seen off by high ls, including a colonel of the Western Command. The Arakan National Party military officia 2618 (ANP) welcomed the visit publicly and reportedly made donations for his entourage. 2619 Wirathu returned to Rakhine State on 11 July 2017. He travelled from Sittwe to 1161. northern R athedaung, where he visited both Zay Di Pyin and Chut Pyin village tracts. Both , and b are majority ethnic Rakhine areas but with a significant Rohingya population oth were e locations of “clearance operations” encompassing serious human rights violations som 2620 weeks later. Wirathu first convened a meeting and delivered a sermon at the Zay Di Pyin 2621 of people, monastery, reportedly attended by a large number and travelled to nearby Chut 2622 As one Rohingya man commente d: Pyin the following day for a similar meeting. I myself saw Wirathu in Zay Di Pyin. When Wirathu came, all the villagers were welcoming him using their Buddhist flags. Rakhine villagers announced with a After the meeting, I also megaphone the arrival of the “Honourable Monk Wirathu”. 2623 me Rakhine friends that Wirathu was there learned from so . Given the incendiary nature of Wirathu’s public statements towards Muslims and the Rohingya, this visit is likely to have heightened tensions in the area. A few days after the to Zay Di Pyin, the Rakhine village administrator reportedly called the visit of Wirathu told: “This is not your land. This Rohingya elders to a meeting. One person who attended was 2624 Another villager in Chut Pyin noted that, after is not your country. Go away from here.” harassment of Rohingya villagers, by both Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine, the visit , 2625 increased. Arrest, detention and torture of Rohingya from Chut Pyin 2626 On approximately 14 July 2017, 1162. a group of Tatmadaw soldiers and BGP entered the vill Pyaing Taung ), Chut Pyin village tract, Rathedaung Township, in the age of Chin ( middle of the night. They rounded up and arrested eight men. The men were severely beaten, 2627 handcuffed, tied up together to a metal chain and marched to the BGP in Zay Di Pyin. base For four or five days, the men were tortured, including through continuous beatings and 2628 burning of their genitals with candles. Four men were then released, following payment 2629 of a significant bribe by their village elders. The other four were repo rtedly sent to Sittwe prison to be charged with terrorism offences. There is no information about their 2630 whereabouts, charges laid against them or any judicial process. 2617 224, V 226. See also Wirathu’s own website noting his “West Gate Security Tour - V - 223, V - 225, V - https://www.eng.wirathu.com of May and July”, - gate - security - trips - 1/ (accessed /2017/07/25/west August 2018). 2618 - 227, V - 228. V 2619 V - 223, V - 224. 2620 129, QI - 177, LI - - 115, LM - 012. CI 2621 129, QI LI - - 115, LM - 012. 2622 LI - 129, LM - 012. 2623 LI - 129. 2624 LI - 129. 2625 CI - 177. 2626 V - 067, V - 218. 2627 190, RI CI - 186, CI - - 005, RI - 009, V - 067. 2628 009, V CI - 190, RI - - 067. 2629 CI - 186, CI - 190, RI - 009. 2630 - 190. CI - 186, CI 274

275 A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Disappearance of Rakhine man from Chut Pyin and killing of three Rohingya On 29 n ethnic Rakhine man from a village in Chut Pyin village tract went July 2017, a 1163. 2631 The following day hundreds of ethnic Rakhine reportedly mobilised missing in the forest. 2632 and an armed Rakhine mob to search for him, armed with swords and sticks, ethnic et Nan Yar in apparent retaliation. Rohingya lage in Ah Ht approached the Rohingya vil controlled the villagers prepared to defend themselves. The military and BGP intervened and 2633 However, the bodies of three Rohingya, two men and a 15 - year old bo situation. y, were 2634 found the next day in a stream. The Government stated that these were killings of Rohingya informants perpetrated by ARSA, although reports also indicate that these were revenge killings perpetrated by ethnic Rakhine ethnic Rakhine in retaliation for the missing 2635 2636 After these incidents, Muslims were banned from Zay Di Pyin market, the main man. 2637 market for all surrounding villages, including Rohingya villages. These restrictions caused severe problems in terms of access to livelihoods and food secu rity for surrounding Rohingya co