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1 113th Congress S. Report ! " SENATE 2d Session 113–288 REPORT of the SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE STUDY of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM together with FOREWORD BY CHAIRMAN FEINSTEIN and ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS December 9, 2014.—Ordered to be printed VerDate Sep 11 2014 14:39 Dec 10, 2014 Jkt 091733 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6015 Sfmt 6015 E:\HR\OC\SR288.XXX SR288 rmajette on DSK2TPTVN1PROD with REPORTS

2 RON WYDEN. OREGON IDAHO e. B1SCH. JAMES A. MUKULSKI. BARBARA MARYLAND iMDiAMA COATS. 0ANIE1. MARK UOALL COLORADO HUH JO. FLORIDA UAfiCO MARK NCR, WAR OTsGlMA SUSAN COLUNS. MAINE HClNRKH, MARTIN MEXICO NEW TOM CO&UHN, OKLAHOMA KiNC. ANGUS MAINE HARRY RBD, NEVADA. EX OFFICIO KENTUCKY tX OFFICIO WITCH McCGNNEi.!.. MICHIGAN, LSVIN. CARL OPFCIO OKLAHOMA, OFFICIO INHOFE. EX JAMES United States Senate OIRECTOR OAVJD G R ANPJIS. S TAFF IWElllGENCtT ON COMMITTEE SELECT SCOTT POINOEXTER, MINORiTV SWF MARTHA DiRECTOF? WASHINGTON. DC 2G5: 0-6

3 CONTENTS Page i Letter of Transmittal to Senate from Chairman Feinstein ... Foreword of Chairman Feinstein ... iii Findings and Conclusions ... x Executive Summary ... 1 Additional Views of Senator Rockefeller ... 500 Additional Views of Senator Wyden ... 503 Additional Views of Senator Udall of Colorado ... 506 Additional Views of Senator Heinrich ... 510 Additional Views of Senator King ... 512 Additional Views of Senator Collins ... 515 Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss, Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn ... 520 Minority Views of Senator Coburn, Vice Chairman Chambliss, Sen- ators Burr, Risch, Coats, and Rubio ... 678 Minority Views of Senators Risch, Coats, and Rubio ... 682 (ii) VerDate Sep 11 2014 14:39 Dec 10, 2014 Jkt 091733 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5905 Sfmt 0481 E:\HR\OC\SR288.XXX SR288 rmajette on DSK2TPTVN1PROD with REPORTS

4 UNCLASSIFIED OFQRN TOP SECRKE^^^^^^^M by Senate Select Foreword on Intelligence Chairman Bianne Feinstein Committee Approved December 13, 2012 Updated Release April 3, 2014 for Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014 TOP SECRE1 IOFORN UNCLASSIFIED in

5 UNCLASSIFIED Foreword April 3,2014, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to send the On the Conclusions Findings Executive Summary of its final Study on the and and the and Interrogation to the President for declassification Program CIA's Detention release. public subsequent and marked the culmination of a monumental effort that officially This action began the decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had with Committee's CIA an in the CIA's destruction of videotapes of investigation its roots into interrogations that began in December 2007. detainee full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 The remains classified pages, but now an official Senate report. The full report has been provided to the White is the CIA, Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the House, the of State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the Department and that it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the hopes of management covert action programs. other the additional of the Committee since 2009,1 write to offer some As Chairman context, and history. views, Committee my on the I began Intelligence service in January 2001. I Senate remember testimony that summer from George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, that of a possible major terrorist event against the United warned method but the time, location, or on of attack. On specifics States, without 2001, the world learned the answers to those questions that had September 11, 1 CIA and other parts of the consumed Intelligence Community. the U.S. I recall watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of vividly World men women jumping out of the and Trade Center towers to escape innocent the fire. The images, and the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below, will remain me for the rest of my life. with that the - the largest attack against It is against American homeland in backdrop this our the events described in - that report were undertaken. history 1 For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11,2001, see the Final Report of the National General Commission Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and Office of the Inspector on the Report CIA Accountability With Respect to on 9/11 Attacks. Page 1 of 6 UNCLASSIFIED IV

6 UNCLASSIFIED Nearly years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of 13 report are released. They are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and this being in Reading to forget the context it is easy which the program so. rightfully them, that the context should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for began - not future. the the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the It is worth remembering attacks, felt. after the September 11 a week powdered anthrax was sent threat Just news organizations and to two U.S. Senators. The American public was to various by plots of new terrorist shocked and elevations of the color-coded threat news of the Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks level Homeland nation. the against throughout to remember the impact I have the nation and to the CIA attempted on from the attacks of September 11, 2001. I can understand the workforce CIA's impulse consider the use of every possible tool to gather intelligence and remove to 2 and battlefield, from terrorists CIA was encouraged by political leaders the and the to do whatever public to prevent another attack. it could The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence agencies to act quickly in to threats and world events. response such pressure, and expectation of further terrorist plots do not Nevertheless, fear, individuals temper, improper actions taken by excuse or organizations in justify, or name of national security. The major lesson of this report is that regardless of the pressures the the need to act, the Intelligence Community's actions must and reflect our we are as a nation, and adhere to always laws and standards. It is who our at times of national crisis that these government must be guided by precisely the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review. Instead, CIA aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a personnel, of the secret detention and program use of brutal interrogation indefinite treaty techniques of U.S. law, violation obligations, and our values. in This Committee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made Summary between and early 2009. The Executive 2001 of the Study provides late 2 It is worth repeating that the covert action authorities approved by the President in September 2001 did not provide interrogations. any or contemplate coercive authorization Page 2 of 6 UNCLASSIFIED v

7 UNCLASSIFIED a significant of new information, based on CIA and other documents, to amount has already made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations, as what been non-governmental organizations the press. well as and length Study than full times the is more of the Executive Committee's The ten includes comprehensive and excruciating detail. The Study Summary and history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program from its describes the known its including to of each of the 119 termination, inception a review who were held in CIA custody. individuals full Committee Study also provides substantially more detail than what is The included in Executive Summary on the CIA's justification and defense of its the program on basis that it was necessary and critical to the interrogation the of of plots and the capture terrorist specific terrorists. While the disruption specific Summary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies of Executive of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study is far more each extensive. time. to seek declassification of I chose full Committee Study at this not I the believe the Executive Summary that enough information to adequately includes describe the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Committee's Findings and cover the entirety of the program. Seeking Conclusions of the than six thousand page report would have significantly declassification more be release the Executive Summary. Decisions will the made later on the delayed of and release of the full 6,700 page Study. declassification when this effort began, I stated (in a press release co-authored with the In 2009, Chairman that the Committee, Senator Kit Bond) Vice "the purpose is to review of interrogation the to shape detention and and policies in the future." The program review is now done. It is my sincere and deep hope that through the release of these Findings Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy will and again the for secret indefinite detention and never use of coercive allow the interrogations. Study describes, prior to the attacks of September 2001, the As CIA itself determined from its own experience with coercive interrogations, that such techniques not produce intelligence," "will probably result in false "do be answers," historically proven to had ineffective. Yet these conclusions and were ignored. We cannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past mistakes to be repeated. Page 3 of 6 UNCLASSIFIED vi

8 UNCLASSIFIED President signed Executive Order 13491 in January 2009 to prohibit the Obama from holding other than on a "short-term, transitory basis" and to CIA detainees techniques limit included in the Army Field Manual. to interrogation those could are limitations of U.S. law and not be overturned by a these However, part with the stroke of a pen. They future be enshrined in legislation. president should so, U.S. law and treaty obligations should have prevented many of Even existing While and made during this program. mistakes the Office of Legal the abuses found otherwise between 2002 and Counsel it is my personal conclusion 2007, that, any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also under that the of confinement and the use of authorized and conditions believe and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman, and interrogation unauthorized I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible. degrading. the did While not make specific recommendations, several emerge Committee the June review. The CIA, in its from 2013 response to the Committee's already Study December 2012, has also from made and begun to Committee's implement its own recommendations. I intend to work with Senate colleagues to produce recommendations to solicit views from the readers of the Committee and Study. I would to take this opportunity to describe the process of this study. like also of previously, Committee approved the Terms the Reference for the noted As in March 2009 and began requesting information from the Study and other CIA federal The Committee, through its staff, had already reviewed in departments. thousands the CIA cables describing 2008 interrogations of the CIA detainees of Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations were the Abu subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA in 2005. The 2008 was complicated by the existence of a Department of Justice review opened Attorney General Michael Mukasey, into the destruction investigation, by videotapes and expanded by Attorney General of the in August 2009. In Holder particular, employees and contractors CIA would otherwise have been who interviewed by the Committee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and workforce therefore would not compel its CIA to appear before the Committee. the This constraint lasted until the Committee's research and documentary review largely were and the Committee Study had completed been finalized. Page 4 of 6 UNCLASSIFIED vii

9 UNCLASSIFIED Furthermore, the volume and internal nature of relevant CIA documents, the given insisted that Committee enter into an arrangement where our staff would CIA the conduct research a CIA-leased facility ^Hfj^H reviewulocuments and at at the offices on Capitol Hill. than rathe Committee's 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staff reviewed the more From early million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence than six memoranda materials, emails, briefing internal interview transcripts, reports, and Study other Draft sections of the and were prepared and contracts, records. to the full Committee membership beginning in October 2011 and this distributed continued through to the Committee's vote to approve the full Committee process on December 2012. Study 13, of which material on which the Study relied and breadth the documentary The cites is unprecedented. While the Committee did not interview Study Committee officials in the context of the Committee Study, it had access to and CIA drew from interviews of numerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA's Inspector the of and CIA Oral History program General subjects that lie at the heart the the on Committee as well as Study, testimony to the Committee. past Following the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was sent to the President and appropriate of the Executive Branch for comments by February 15, 2013. parts CIA responded late June 2013 with extensive comments on the Findings The in CIA Conclusions, part on the responses of in officials involved in the and based At my direction, the Committee staff met with CIA representatives in program. to order understand the CIA's comments, and then incorporated suggested fully or as appropriate. edits comments Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive Summary and The and and as updated is now final Conclusions, represents the official views Findings of the Committee. This and future Administrations should use this Study to guide future programs, past mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations correct and by coercive interrogation practices are not used to policymakers, our ensure again. government I want to recognize the members of Finally, staff who have endured years of the long hours poring through the difficult details of one of the lowest points in our nation's They have produced the most significant and comprehensive history. oversight report in the Committee's history, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate, and and contributions should be recognized their praised. Page 5 of 6 UNCLASSIFIED Vlll

10 UNCLASSIFIED Daniel has managed and led the Committee's review effort from its Jones Dan has more than six years to this effort, has personally inception. devoted integrally thousands pages, and has been its involved in every Study written of Evan Gottesman, Chad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played decision. roles Committee the integral Study and have spent considerable years in and specific sections of the Committee Study. researching drafting Committee staff members have also assisted in Other review and provided the valuable at the direction of contributions Committee Members. They include, our among others, Jennifer Barrett, Nick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella, Eric Chapman, Dickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete John Michael Tommy Michael Pevzner, Johnson, Ross, Caroline Tess, and Noblet, James The Committee's Staff Director throughout the review, David Wolfe. Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and guiding the Committee patience, through process. Without the expertise, entire and work ethic of our this able staff, our Members would not have been able to complete this most important work. Feinstein Dianne Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Page 4 of 6 UNCLASSIFIED ix

11 UNCLASSIFIED MHHMI^MBM'H II miu'i > and Findings; Conclusions Approved December 13, 2012 Updated for Release April 3, 2014 Declassification December 3, 2014 Revisions TQP:SECRET/4 Page 1 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED X

12 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ 1//NOFORN The the following findings and conclusions: Committee makes CIA's #1: its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of use The of gaining from detainees. or cooperation intelligence acquiring based on a review of The interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's Committee finds, CIA techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate enhanced interrogation information detainee or gaining cooperation. detainees according records, seven of the 39 CIA CIA known to have been example, to For the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques subjected no intelligence while in CIA to produced 1 CIA's detainees were subjected to CIA who enhanced interrogation techniques custody. the usually subjected were the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. to Other provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been detainees to these subjected techniques. subjected multiple the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, being While to fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided CIA detainees information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the fabricated identified highest its CIA priorities. as Interrogation times CIA's Detention and the Program, CIA personnel At numerous throughout that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence assessed detainees, including from from detainees CIA considered to be the most the was to confront the detainees with "high-value," information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into question whether CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the the of the failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence. use techniques techniques CIA's for The use of its enhanced interrogation justification rested on #2: the claims of their effectiveness. inaccurate CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department The of Justice, CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure the effectiveness interrogation the CIA's enhanced of techniques was examples of specific of a result plots and specific terrorists captured as terrorist of the use of the techniques. "thwarted" The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only effective, but necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that also lives." "saved Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported The the successes the CIA has attributed to that use of its enhanced interrogation counter-terrorism techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no and relationship cited counterterrorism success the any information provided by between detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the TOP SECRET/ ^ W NOFORN Page 2 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxvii

13 UNCLASSIFIED TOP cases, the inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information remaining CIA from was "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, a CIA acquired detainee the already was either: (1) corroborative of information fact available to the when in information sources other the U.S. Intelligence Community from of other than the CIA or CIA elements was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) detainee, from the CIA detainee and acquired to use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The examples provided by the prior the numerous inaccuracies. included factual CIA "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and In providing the of CIA omitted the significant amount consistently relevant intelligence obtained the others, from other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced sources interrogation the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique techniques—leaving from the of the techniques. information use enhanced the that the CIA claimed to have "disrupted" as a result of the CIA's plots Some of techniques assessed by intelligence and were enforcement officials as being interrogation law or ideas that were never operationalized. infeasible The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA #3: to and others. represented policymakers with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with Beginning others, numerous the applied its enhanced interrogation techniques CIA significant repetition for days or with weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" (slamming detainees against a wall) used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and were Records do support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an "an open, non- nudity. not 3 2 that interrogations began with the "least coercive technique possible" or approach," threatening to more coercive techniques only as necessary. escalated and waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu The for Zubaydah, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, example, 4 mouth." Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad full as 5 into of near evolving drownings." a "series to deprivation keeping detainees Sleep for up involved 180 hours, usually standing or in awake stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of hallucinations cases, the CIA nonetheless continued those sleep deprivation. the Justice, to representations Contrary the Department of CIA the CIA instructed personnel that to 6 interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care, resulting the in during the a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred of his capture. In at least two deterioration other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA medical medical that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA personnel personnel TOP SECRET/^ K/NOFQRN Page 3 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED Xll

14 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/ WOFQRN treated one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep at least deprivation. five were subjected to "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without CIA At least detainees "baths." necessity. placed detainees in ice water CIA The CIA led medical documented The to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA several alive, suggesting detainees custody 7 he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box. detainee One interrogator told another to one that never he never go to court, because "we can that let the world know what I have detainee would 8 you." their CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees with harm to done families— to threats to include harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a to 9 and "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat." a threat detainee, to the conditions confinement for The detainees were harsher than of CIA had #4: CIA to policymakers and others. represented at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. Conditions detainees the CIA COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly at 10 in cells with loud noise or music and only shackled to use for human waste. a bucket isolated the of at the facility likely contributed to heat death of a detainee. The chief of Lack 11 described COBALT as a "dungeon." senior Another interrogations CIA officer stated that 1 COBALT an enhanced interrogation technique. was " itself the detainees COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their At times, at their Other for extended periods of time. above times, the detainees at COBALT hands heads in to was described as a "rough takedown," what which approximately five CIA were subjected would scream at a detainee, officers him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure drag him Mylar tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long with while being slapped and punched. corridor with after conditions Even confinement improved the the construction of new detention of facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by CIA personnel. the program, CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced multiple Throughout and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, techniques interrogation hallucinations, including insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. paranoia, Multiple identified the lack of human contact psychologists by detainees as a cause experienced of psychiatric problems. #5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, CIA's impeding analysis of the legal Detention and Interrogation Program. a proper From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied detainees, on CIA regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for representations (2) the TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 4 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xlll

15 UNCLASSIFIED VNOFORN TOP SECRET/ of the enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the application CIA's detainees, and the effectiveness of the techniques. Those representations were techniques on (4) respects. material in inaccurate Justice did not conduct The analysis or verification of the Department of independent from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts information it received the to were by change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA provided CIA information was provided to the Department of Justice that incorrect, the CIA determined it had the informed depaitment. rarely the initiation of the CIA's Prior and Interrogation Program and throughout the life to Detention program, the legal justifications for the CIA's of the interrogation techniques relied on enhanced the claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. In late 2001 and early 2002, CIA's attorneys at CIA Office of General Counsel first examined the legal implications of senior the "a interrogation CIA attorneys stated that techniques. novel application of the using coercive defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain necessity 13 that many lives." saved information included reviewed by the CIA, the OLC provided the "necessity defense" in Having information 1, 2002, memorandum to the White its August counsel on Standards of Conduct for House Interrogation. OLC determined that "under The current circumstances, necessity or self- the defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture. On same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific the interrogation techniques Abu Zubaydah—subsequently referred to as the CIA's coercive against techniques." CIA OLC relied on inaccurate interrogation representations about "enhanced The team's Zubaydah's al-Qa'ida and the interrogation in "certain|ty]" that Abu Abu status was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA's Zubaydah to representations OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques the later applied. would be 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various In March of the examples "effectiveness" the CIA's enhanced interrogation of that were inaccurate. OLC techniques memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations, determining that techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable the 14 that of otherwise unavailable intelligence" quantities saved lives. and intelligence" "substantial The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional #6: of the program. oversight The did not brief the leadership of CIA Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been to approved The CIA did not respond used. Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional and information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the Chairman Committee January 2003. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice in John D. 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 5 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED XiV

16 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ 1//NOFORN Rockefeller investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested IV, to the full documents to Committee. of access about the program from members information the Committee restricted to CIA The beyond vice chairman until September 6, 2006, the day the president publicly the chairman and program, by which time 117 of the 119 known detainees had already entered acknowledged the custody. Until the CIA had declined to answer questions from other Committee CIA then, 15 related CIA interrogation activities. that to members September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the Prior of the to leadership Briefings the full Committee beginning on to 6, 2006, also contained Committee. September inaccuracies, including numerous descriptions of how interrogation techniques were inaccurate applied what information was obtained from CIA detainees. The CIA misrepresented the and of members Congress on a number of occasions. After multiple senators had been views of the concerns and written letters expressing of to CIA Director Michael Hayden, critical program to nonetheless a meeting of foreign ambassadors told the United States that Director Hayden Committee member was "fully briefed," and every "[t]his is not CIA's program. This is not that 16 program. This is America's program." the The CIA also provided inaccurate President's describing the views of U.S. senators about information program to the Department of the Justice. A year being briefed on the program, after House and Senate Conference Committee the considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using only interrogation authorized by the Army Field Manual. That legislation was techniques by the and the House of Representatives in February 2008, and was vetoed by approved Senate on 8, 2008. Bush March President CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making. #7: The incomplete provided amounts of inaccurate and extensive information related to the CIA The and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention operation Interrogation Program to the White and House, National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and the understanding officials, the program by Executive Branch complete thereby impeding of and oversight decision-making. to CIA records, no CIA officer, According to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and up Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before April 2006. that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's By 17 interrogation had already been subjected to enhanced techniques. the The CIA did techniques of inform not or vice president of the location the CIA detention facilities other than president 18 Country (, At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the program National - were not briefed on Council specifics until September 2003. An Security internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that "... the WH [White House] is extremely concerned TOP SECRET/ ^ W NOFORN Page 6 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxvii

17 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 7NOFORN SECRET; 19 Powell his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on." would [Secretary] blow of State complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of Deputy Secretary Armitage 20 Council Security process. the National coordination White provided repeatedly inaccurate information to incomplete House personnel CIA The and operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. regarding the the includes of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements This provision Government as later to the public, as well U.S. instances in which specific questions of the and fully. House were not answered truthfully or officials In briefings for the National from White Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use Security CIA's of the interrogation techniques, warning that "[t]ermination of this program will enhanced 21 in life, possibly extensive." loss result of and CIA's management of the program complicated, and in some cases The operation #8: national security missions of other impeded, Branch agencies. the Executive CIA, the conduct of its Detention and in Program, complicated, and in some The Interrogation impeded, the national security missions of other cases Branch agencies, including the Executive Federal of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of Bureau Intelligence to The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant National these (ODNI). missions to responsibilities, denied access agencies' detainees, and provided inaccurate and Interrogation information CIA's Detention and the Program to these agencies. on The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet traditional U.S. resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their standards in CIA and detention activities. This reduced the ability of the U.S. involvement interrogation deploy personnel resources and expert to to interrogate detainees and Government available from detention CIA denied specific requests The FBI Director Robert Mueller operate facilities. for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary III understand CIA to detainee on threats to the U.S. Homeland. Information obtained from CIA detainees reporting restricted CIA the Intelligence Community, leading to concerns among senior was within that undermined on sharing information officers government-wide counterterrorism limitations analysis. access The State Department leadership from CIA to information crucial to foreign blocked policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of state of of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications locations to of hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders related the countries of generally informed host their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. were with ambassadors discuss the CIA program to State Department officials, preventing the not ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention facilities in countries in which they served. the to countries, ambassadors In two informed of plans U.S. establish a CIA detention site in were the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the VNOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 7 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED XVl

18 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN countries the detention sites. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new to host 22 facilities place, were the CIA told local government officials not to CIA detention taking 23 ambassadors. inform the U.S. about provided inaccurate was incomplete information with the program, ODNI The and director of national intelligence from effectively carrying out the director's preventing the to as responsibility the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. statutory serve information the to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in inaccurate ODNI releasing The provided to public information in September 2006. inaccurate the Office CIA The by the CIA's impeded of Inspector General. #9: oversight CIA avoided, The and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and resisted, Interrogation by the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG). The CIA did not brief Program OIG on program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at the the Once detainees two different CIA detention sites. at notified, the OIG reviewed the 22 least Detention and Interrogation Program and issued several reports, including CIA's important an May "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies. 2004 the with reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG During inaccurate information on the OIG Interrogation and of the CIA's Detention and operation Program, as well as on the management effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The inaccurate information was included in final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released the and remains publicly, uncorrected. Director further requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate CIA In 2005, Goss until the Detention and Interrogation Program CIA's reviews already underway were reviews of In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in completed. to OIG's response inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. the information The the release of classified coordinated to the media, including #10: CIA information concerning the effectiveness of the inaccurate enhanced interrogation CIA's techniques. CIA CIA's of Public Affairs and The Office officials coordinated to share classified senior information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to counter public shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict criticism, CIA's occurred and interrogation authorities and budget. These disclosures the when detention had program a classified covert the program, and before the CIA was briefed the full action Committee membership on the program. The deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center wrote to a colleague in 2005, shortly get before by a media outlet, that "we either interviewed out and sell, or we get hammered, being which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN Page 8 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xvll

19 UNCLASSIFIED 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ 24 budget... put out our story or we get eaten. [T]here is no middle ground." we The our either officer explained a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York T]imes same CIA to [CIA's official,' intelligence authorized and directed by opa it's Office of quotes 'senior us... 25 Affairs]." Public the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention Much of Program of its the effectiveness Interrogation enhanced interrogation techniques was and and the was the inaccurate information provided by to CIA to the Congress, and inaccurate similar of Justice, and the White House. the Department CIA The unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation #11: was than six months after being granted detention authorities. Program more September 17, 2001, the On signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification President (MON) the CIA unprecedented counterterrorism authorities, including the authority to granting capture and individuals "posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death covertly detain no and or persons terrorist activities." The MON made interests reference to to U.S. planning or coercive interrogation techniques. interrogations CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. In the fall of 2001, the CIA The the of explored establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. The possibility that review associated with clandestine detention risks led it to conclude that CIA's identified military bases were the best option for the CIA U.S. detain individuals under the MON to authorities. late March 2002, the imminent capture In Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to of again consider various detention options. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the International Committee the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S. of base, the decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a military CIA considered in country that had not previously been |—a as a potential host for a facility Country detention site. A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge CIA 26 gaps certain planning/preparations," our but stated that this plan would be presented to the in At approved Daily Briefing session that day, the president president. CIA's a Presidential to Country Abu Zubaydah in proposal detain its CIA a plan for The eventual disposition of lacked detainees. After taking custody of Abu the Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he "should remain incommunicado for the remainder of 27 his "may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country." life," which CIA statement not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous The did that are physical or psychological techniques to Congress counterproductive because "inhumane 28 in produce they and will probably result not false answers." do The CIA also did intelligence not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise. contract In July the basis of consultations with on psychologists, and with very limited 2002, internal deliberation, the CIA requested approval from the Department of Justice to use a set of of coercive techniques. The techniques were adapted from the training interrogation U.S. TOP SECRET/ '/NOFORN Page 9 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED XViii

20 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ 1//NOFORN military the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) personnel at was school, prepare U.S. military personnel for the conditions and treatment designed which to be do if taken prisoner by countries that might not adhere to the Geneva to which subjected they Conventions. deployed interrogation operations, the CIA and personnel who lacked it began detention As and experience. The CIA began relevant training more than seven months training interrogation taking of Abu Zubaydah, and more than three months after the CIA began using its after custody techniques." George Director interrogation Tenet issued formal guidelines for "enhanced CIA January conditions confinement at detention sites in and 2003, by which time interrogations of the 119 known 40 of had been detained by the CIA. detainees #12: CIA's management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program The deeply flawed the program's duration, particularly so in 2002 and early was throughout 2003. operations detention facility in Country | began COBALT in September 2002 and The CIA's housed more than half of the 119 CIA detainees identified in this Study. The CIA ultimately few the records of kept detainees in its custody at COBALT. Untrained CIA officers at formal facility using frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees the conducted physical never techniques that were not—and harsh became—part of the CIA's interrogation junior formal program. The CIAplaced a interrogation officer with no relevant "enhanced" experience in charge of COBALT. On November 2002, a detainee who had been held partially nude chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility. and time, no unit at CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and At the single the In conducted in 2003 with interviews Office of Inspector General, interrogation operations. leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of CIA's at that and some believed operations enhanced interrogation techniques were not used COBALT, there. guidance Tenet in January 2003 issued Director for detention and interrogation Although CIA serious management problems persisted. For example, activities, December 2003, CIA in personnel that they had made the "unsettling reported that the CIA had been "holding discovery" a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very little" at multiple detention sites in 29 Country (, through lines for interrogation activities persisted authority at least 2003. Tensions Divergent of interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and among of each other's effectiveness interrogation practices. or CIA individuals with no The experience placed training in senior detention and applicable interrogation roles, and provided inadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective intelligence. questioning detainees, resulting in diminished CIA The lack of CIA personnel of available to question detainees, which the CIA inspector general referred to as "an ongoing 30 problem," persisted throughout the program. TOP SECRET/ ^ WN OFORN Page 10 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxvii

21 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN / ^ TOP SECRET/ the chief the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA In 2005, of "high-value" were complained that CIA Headquarters "managers seem to be assessed held, as underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or problem, selecting either to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "the production whomever seems 31 I dare or, intelligence..." useless of mediocre say, officers serious documented personal and professional problems—including CIA had Numerous violence and records of abusive treatment of others—that histories have called into of should their to participate in the CIA's suitability and Interrogation Program, their question Detention with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. employment nearly all In cases, problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to these and interrogation detention positions. interrogation contract the CIA's enhanced devised techniques and Two psychologists #13: role in the operation, assessments, and played of the CIA's a central management and Program. By 2005, the Interrogation had overwhelmingly outsourced Detention CIA related to the program. operations CIA with The two psychologists to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation contracted Air The experience was at the U.S. prior Force Survival, Evasion, operations. psychologists' and Escape (SERE) school. Neither Resistance had any experience as an psychologist interrogator, did either have specialized nor of al-Qa'ida, a background in knowledge counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise. On the behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on CIA's 32 helplessness," developed the list of enhanced interrogation techniques that was "learned and use CIA Abu Zubaydah and subsequent for detainees. The psychologists approved against most conducted some of the CIA's of significant detainees using these personally interrogations They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the techniques. continued use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom of psychologists were or had interrogated. The interrogating carried out inherently they themselves functions, such as acting as liaison governmental the CIA and foreign intelligence between services, the effectiveness of the assessing program, and participating in the interrogation interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody. In 2005, the formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their psychologists with all CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced virtually work aspects of the program. the the In 2006, of the CIA's base contract with value company formed by the psychologists with the all options exercised was in excess of $180 million; the contractors received $81 million prior to the the in 2009. In 2007, termination CIA provided a multi-year indemnification contract's agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the to program. CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant The the agreement. W NOFORN TOP SECRET/^ Page 11 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxvii

22 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET; 7NOFORN In 2008, Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detention and the CIA's at interrogation had a total of positions, which were filled with | CIA the operations CIA, workforce H contractors, and contractors made up 85% of the meaning for staff officers that interrogation operations. and detention detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been #14: CIA the approved of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters. by Department mid-2004, nudity CIA routinely subjected detainees to to and dietary manipulation. Prior the dousing also abdominal slaps and cold water CIA on several detainees during that The used None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice. period. 17 At least were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without detainees from CIA Additionally, multiple detainees were subjected to authorization Headquarters. were specific in ways that diverged from the that authorization, or were techniques applied had enhanced techniques by interrogators who interrogation not been authorized to subjected to them. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some use were cases identified the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective at was taken against the interrogators involved. action rarely The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting #15: the number of of individuals and held individuals who did it detained, meet the legal standard for not detention. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its enhanced interrogation were inaccurate. techniques CIA never a comprehensive audit or developed a complete and accurate list of the The conducted detained techniques. subjected to its enhanced interrogation it had CIA statements individuals or detained and Committee the public that the CIA later fewer than 100 individuals, and to the to less than a third of those 100 detainees were subjected to that CIA's enhanced interrogation the techniques, inaccurate. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA were at subjected 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were detained to the CIA's enhanced least techniques. interrogation the 119 known detainees, at least 26 Of wrongfully held and did not meet the detention were standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an "intellectually challenged" whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family man to intelligence information, two individuals who were member sources for foreign provide individuals services liaison former CIA sources, and two and whom the CIA assessed to be were connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the in CIA's techniques. Detainees often remained interrogation custody for months after enhanced the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. CIA records provide insufficient detainees. information justify the detention of many other to TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 12 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED XXl

23 UNCLASSIFIED 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Headquarters instructed at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention CIA that the facilities not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The host individuals because did independent the to hold no detainees. country had reason as CIA of interrogations may be impossible, detentions records in some accounting A full and non-existent, and, in many other cases, are sparse and insufficient. cases were almost are There detailed of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility no records almost GRAY such records for the CIA's and detention site, also in Country At no in 2002, kept facilities of Country the CIA outside increasingly less-detailed records of detention CIA activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. its interrogation #16: The failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation CIA techniques. The conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced CIA never despite general by the CIA inspector techniques, and similar interrogation a recommendation the the by advisor and the leadership of national Senate Select Committee on requests security Intelligence. assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA Internal who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by personnel continuation contractors a financial interest in its had and expansion. An "informal CIA who assessment" of the program, led by two senior operational officers who were not part of the CIA CIA's Center, determined that it would Counterterrorism be possible to assess the not effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy for the of Human Subjects" regarding human experimentation. The CIA officers, Protection review relied briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program, whose on that Detainee "CIA only Program" was a "success" without addressing the the concluded 33 the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. of effectiveness in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the In 2005, of CIA's of the effectiveness enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two each of not the CIA to conduct a broader review by "the entirety of' the individuals employed 34 and interrogation program." "rendition, According detention one individual, the review was to "heavily on the willingness of [CIA Counterterrorism reliant staff to provide us with the Center] factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." That individual acknowledged lacking the requisite review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation expertise to all and that "the program," meaning only CIA detainee reporting techniques, concluded of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation regardless 35 concluded success." was The second reviewer a "great that "there is no objective techniques, 36 to answer the question of efficacy" of the techniques. way any There CIA records to indicate that no of the reviews independently validated the are "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence use cited the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the by of the CIA's enhanced '/NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 13 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED XXii

24 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN interrogation did the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by techniques. Nor as being "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was the CIA obtained previously unavailable," claimed by the CIA, and not "otherwise obtained from unique and as sources. other CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and #17: The inappropriate and and systemic violations, individual management significant activities, failures. officers contractors who were found to have CIA CIA policies or performed CIA and violated rarely held accountable or removed poorly positions of responsibility. were from events, include the death and injury of to detainees, the detention of individuals Significant CIA did who meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques not against detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not CIA in appropriate, or in many eases, any corrective actions. CIA managers who result effective, did of and shortcomings in the program but aware not intervene, or who failed to were failings proper leadership and management, were also not held to provide account. On occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability two were In by senior CIA leadership. recommendations one instance, involving the death overruled not of a CIA COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided at to take disciplinary action against detainee an officer involved because, at the time, CIA Headquarters had been "motivated to extract any 37 and information" from the detainee. all In another instance related to a wrongful operational no action taken against a CIA officer because, "[t]he Director strongly believes detention, was with mistakes expected in a business filled be uncertainty," and "the Director that should the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against believes 38 that connect them." those In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA under personnel. management The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and #18: the objections operation and management of the CIA's Detention and concerning Interrogation Program. Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior personnel overseeing managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical and involved or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations. officers in of these concerns include CIA officers questioning Examples effectiveness of the CIA's the enhanced techniques, interrogators disagreeing with interrogation use of such techniques the against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists of recommending conditions, and Office isolated Medical Services personnel questioning less both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. These concerns were regularly overridden by policies CIA and the CIA made few corrective changes to its management, governing the TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 14 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxill

25 UNCLASSIFIED 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ At times, officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or program. CIA written communications. observations in about officers in CIA representations inaccuracies the In several identified CIA instances, effectiveness program the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the and its to Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CIA nonetheless failed to Department of to representations, these action and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the take correct position. official CIA's was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The deputy director The CIA Review stated the CIA inspector general's draft Special that should have come to operations for 39 that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," while the the "conclusion general CIA counsel the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture" of accused 40 program. February 2007 report from the International Committee of the Red Cross the A the stated acting general counsel initially which "actually does not sound that far (ICRC), CIA 41 CIA the was also criticized. reality," officers prepared documents indicating removed from "critical portions of the Report are patently false that misleading, especially certain key factual or 42 CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of claims..." and and abuse and faulty legal assumptions physical analysis in the [ICRC] report threatened 43 its credibility." overall undermine Program The Detention #19: Interrogation CIA's was inherently unsustainable and and had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation from other and legal and oversight concerns. nations, CIA required and cooperation from other nations in order to operate clandestine The secrecy and President had eroded significantly before facilities, Bush publicly disclosed detention both of on 6, 2006. From the beginning program the program, the CIA faced the September challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention sites. These significant challenges became difficult over time. With the exception of Country the CIA increasingly in forced detainees out of every country relocate which it established a detention facility was to of pressure from the host government because public revelations about the program. or Beginning early 2005, the CIA sought in to convince the U.S. Department of unsuccessfully Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. By 2006, the CIA admitted its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an in decision and an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" Administration "the on 44 could of its own program weight." collapse detainees of to Lack medical care for access in countries hosting the CIA's detention adequate facilities caused recurring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill contributed detainee hospital due to security concerns a local to the closing of the CIA's into detention facility in that country. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide medical to detainees upon CIA request. care '/NOFORN SECRET/ TOP Page 15 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED XXlV

26 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ 1//NOFORN In mid-2003, the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of a statement by Torture and statement by the White House that prisoners in U.S. custody are Victims of a public continued the to question whether there was CIA policy support for "humanely" treated caused and seek reauthorization from the White House. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily the program use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general suspended the the of seek an updated legal opinion from the Office that Legal Counsel. In recommended CIA in 2004, Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari U.S. the case of Rasul v. Bush early the the CIA to move detainees out of a CIA detention facility prompted Bay, Cuba. at Guantanamo In late and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Court decision 2005 Hamdan v. caused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced in Rumsfeld techniques. interrogation press disclosures, the unwillingness of other 2006, to host existing or new detention By countries and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine sites, facilities. detention CIA detaining 113 individuals through 2004, the least brought only six additional After at into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, detainees one in 2007. By March 2006, the and program operating in only one country. was CIA last used its enhanced interrogation The techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008. #20: The Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States' CIA's in the and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs. standing world, Detention U.S. Interrogation Program created tensions with CIA's partners and allies, The and damaging formal to the United States, and to and complicating bilateral leading demarches relationships. intelligence example, in June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the In one ambassador in Country | to U.S. deliver demarche to Country "in essence demanding [Country | Government] provide full a to the [Country | I^Hfl^^h detainees" to the International Committee of access Red all detainees At time, Cross. the detainees Country | was holding included the being held however, 45 in secret at the CIA's behest. More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States' public standing, as well as the United States' longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the to of in particular. prevention torture records indicate that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program cost well CIA $300 over million non-personnel costs. This included funding in the CIA to construct and maintain for detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly million that were never used, in part due host country political concerns. to sites, encourage to To host CIA detention governments or to increase support for clandestinely existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government TOP SECRET/ ^ W NOFORN Page 16 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxvii

27 UNCLASSIFIED '/NQFQRN TOP SECRET/, construct CIA cncouraged CIA officials. to Headquarters "wish lists" of proposed Stations financial assistance to entities of foreign governmental, and to 46 assistance. in terms of that big" "think Page 17 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED XXVi

28 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 1 by the number of disseminated intelligence reports. Therefore, zero intelligence reports were As measured on disseminated by seven of the 39 detainees known to have been subjected to the information based provided techniques. enhanced CIA's interrogation I Counsel, A. Rizzo, Senior May General John Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for 30,2005, Deputy Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from of Legal Counsel, Department of Steven G. Office Application United States Obligations Under Article 16 of of Convention Against Torture to Certain re: Justice, the May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Techniques al Qaeda Detainees. that Value 3 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006. Transcript of 4 episode described in CIA cables, but was described in not emails sent by personnel in the CIA This was internal Medical Services and the CIA Office of General Counsel. Office review of the videotapes of the interrogations of A Zubaydah the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) did by note the incident. A review of the catalog of Abu not however, found of videotapes, recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions, were that missing. re to cc: More. from ^^BHHH^ Committee Study, names in all capitalized letters are pseudonyms. Throughout the last 6 JUL (182321Z 02) ALEC 7 confining a detainee in a box with At dimensions of a coffin was an approved CIA enhanced the time, the interrogation technique. 8 [REDACTEDU32^161750Z referring to Hambali. SEP 03), 9 of ty [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, Interview 17, June HH^^^H 2003 10 case, interrogators informed a detainee that one could earn a bucket if he cooperated. In he II Report, Interview Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, April 7, 2003-7123-IG, p. 12. 2003, 12 May Review of Interrogations for Report, Purposes, 2003-7123-IG, 8, Interview Counterterrorism p. 9. 2003, 13 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations tor CIA November Officers," at 1. 14 May 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 30, General, Steven Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney G. Office of Legal Counsel, Department of from Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. July 20,2007, Memorandum May John A. Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal for Rizzo, re: Attorney of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Office Application of War Crimes Assistant General, Deputy Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of Act, Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May the the by CIA in the Interrogation of the Value al Qaeda Detainees. be Used High 15 CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the The Detention and Interrogation Program CIA's states these limitations were dictated by the White House. The CIA's June 2013 Response then acknowledges that 11 the "comfortable CIA with this decision. was that 16 (152227Z MAR 07) DIRECTOR 17 Committee's conclusion is based on CIA records, including statements from The Directors George Tenet and CIA Porter to the CIA inspector general, that the directors Goss not briefed the president on the CIA's interrogation had program. According to CIA records, when briefed in April 2006, the president expressed discomfort with the "image of chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." The a detainee, June the Response does not dispute the CIA records, but states that "[w]hile Agency records on CIA's subject 2013 admittedly in former President Bush has stated are his autobiography that he discussed the program, incomplete, 2002, the of enhanced techniques, with then-DCIA Tenet in including prior to application of the techniques on use Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A memoir by former Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo disputes account. this 18 policymakers indicate that the CIA had CIA informed records of the presence of CIA detention facilities in not Countries | and It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country | information and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The CIA requested that country names and at directly or indirectly TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN Page 18 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxvii

29 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP SECRET/FL countries be The Study therefore lists the countries by letter. The Study uses the same identifying redacted. so designations forexample^jefers to the same country throughout the Study. "Country consistently, J," 19 PC John Rizzo to re Rump from on interrogations. 2003, 31, email July 20 from Chief of the Lotus Station in Country | to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from Notes message CIA [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED], | [REDACTED], | to Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage, date 9/23/2004, at 7:40:43 PM , subj: ADCI 21 slides, Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003 Briefing CIA 22 CIA were established in these facilities countries. detention No two 23 (22 U.S.C. § 3927) requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and currently U.S. with law informed to activities and operations of the Go vera men t within that all including the activities and respect country," of the CIA. operations 24 communication, between John P. Mudd Sametime April 13, 2005. and 23 communication, between P. Mudd and April 13, 2005. Sametime John 26 29,2002, |to ^^^^^HTre/VZ Interrogation Plan. email March from 27 (182321Z JUL 02) ALEC ^^^ 28 Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, January Vice Chairman William S. 8,1989, to Senate Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on at Select Cohen, 7-8. 29 [REDACTED] 1528 (191903Z DEC 03) 30 of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Report of Memorandum Notification, No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006. Report 31 DETENTION email from [REDACTED] (Chief of Base of 2005, SITE BLACK), to April IS, re ^mmm 32 helplessness" in this context was the theory that detainees might become passive and "Learned in depressed response adverse or uncontrollable events, and would thus cooperate and provide information. Memo from to provide SWIGERT, February 1, 2003, "Qualifications to Ph.D., special mission interrogation consultation." Grayson 33 They also concluded that the CIA "should not be in the business of running prisons or 'temporary detention facilities."' May Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, 12,2004, Operations Center, Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division via Associate Deputy Information and CIA Operations, subject line, "Operational Review of the Detainee Program." with for Director 34 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert March Grenier, Director DCI 21,2005, L. Center, Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the re Rendition, Detention, and Counterterrorism CTC Programs. Interrogation 35 2, 2005, Memorandum from to Director Porter Goss, CIA, "Assessment of September EITs Effectiveness." 36 September Memorandum from to The Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central 23, 2005, Assessment Agency, request from Director for to of EIT effectiveness." Intelligence "Response 37 10, 2006, Memorandum for CIA OFFICER 1], February Center, National CounterTerrorist Clandestine from Executive Director re: Accountability Decision. Service, 38 Detention CIA Response to OIG Congressional Regarding the Rendition and notification, of Investigation German Citizen Khalid al-Masri, October 9, 2007. 39 Memorandum for Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February Special Counterterrorism 2004; 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's February Detention and 27, attachment: Activities. Interrogation 40 24, 2004, Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation February Special Review (2003-7123-IG). Program cc: 9, email from John A. Rizzo, to Michael V. Hayden, Stephen •" November Kappes, 2006, Michael Morell, R. HHHHH> ^^HHH Subject: Fw: 5 December HHH^H' Meeting with ICRC Rep. 2006 42 CIA CIA the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in on Comments Custody." 43 transcript Committee on Intelligence Senate Select for April 12, 2007. hearing 44 DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention Interrogation Program. and 45 HEADQUARTERS JUN 04) __ ___ ^^B(071742Z 46 [REDACTED] 5759 03); ALEC 03); ALEC 03) /NOFORN TOP SECRET/, Page 19 of 19 UNCLASSIFIED xxvill

30 Executive Summary Approved December 13, 2012 Updated for Release April 3, 2014 Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014 TOP Page 1 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 1

31 UNCLASSIFIED I<>1*IIM I IMIHI11 III' of Contents Table the on 8 Committee I. Background Study Interrogation and the CIA's Detention and of Program 11 History Operation II. Overall Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and A. September a 17, 2001, Detain of viduals 11 Specific Category Indi That Clandestine Various the CIA Determines Detention a U.S. Military Considering 1. After Locations, Option "; the CIA Delegates "Blanket Bas^^ht^" Approvals to CIA Officers in Best " Detention 11 •••• Least Holds 21 More Detainees Than ft Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees at 2. The CIA 14 Detained Wrongly of Abu Zubaydah and the B. The and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Detention Development Techniques Interrogation 17 Coercive Led CIA to Experience that the Interrogation Techniques Were 1. Past Assess " and "Ineffective "; After "Counterproductive of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Issuance Legal for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Defense Relies on with No Relevant Experience 17 Interrogations, Contractors Renders Without Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval CIA Inter- 2. The Abu 21 Deliberation Agency Host Country Leadership and 3. Tensions Attention Foreshadow Future Challenges 23 with Media Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; 4. FBI Abu Zubaydah Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as is and 24 "Important" "Vital" Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation 5. While Techniques Against Zubaydah 25 Abu Zubaydah's CIA Plan Focuses 6. New Abu Interrogation "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily on Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning 27 Proposal by Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the 7. CIA Determines the Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Enhanced that "the of Development CIA's Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures" 31 Interrogation Process The Obtains and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; Legal CIA 8. The CIA Not Brief the President 37 Does CIA Uses the Waterboard and 9. The Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah Other 40 the A Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on Presidential Interrogation of Abu 10. CIA 47 Zubaydah The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation 11. Abu Zubaydah 48 of C. Interrogation Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines 49 in Inexperienced CIA DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places 1. The First-Tour Officer in Charge Establishes 49 2. CIA Records Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country | 50 Lack | Use Headquarters Untrained Interrogators in Country That the CIA's Enhanced 3. CIA Recommends Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar 51 Interrogation ofGul to Leads CIA Headquarters 4. Death Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Rahman Reveals at Techniques COBALT; CIA Inspector General Review DETENTION Lack of Oversight SITE of the Detention Site 54 5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department of Included in the Training Syllabus 57 Justice Fails Recommendation CIA Attorneys, the CIA 6. Despite to Adequately Screen Potential from Interrogators in 2002 and 2003 58 Site 7. Bureau Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention of 59 mi n iii i MMBBBB^^B imiiiii11 Page 2 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 2

32 UNCLASSIFIED 11 ii 11111 ii i ii i CIA Places Detainees in Country | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON 8. The CIA Detention 61 Standard for Interrogation; First Detention Conditions and on Formal 9. DC Guidelines I Tenet Establishes Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Consolidation Disagreements of Program Resolve Personnel Among CIA 62 Interrogation of and al-Rahim al-Nashiri 66 Detention D. The 'Abd Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; 1. CIA Interrogators Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 66 Interrogators Oppose Sends 2. CIA to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator Untrained Interrogator Headquarters a Gun and a Drill 68 with Threatens al-Nashiri Recommends Continued Use 3. CIA the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Contractor of Chief Threatens to Quit Because Interrogator Techniques Might "Push [Al- Al-Nashiri; Additional Over NashiriJ Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the CIA Program /4s a "Train Wreak I sic] The Waiting Happen " 70 to with Country to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees 73 E. Tensions | Relating and Bin of Ramzi Detention Al-Shibh 75 F. The Interrogation Prior Al-Shibh Information Bin in Foreign Government Custody, Provides to Rendition 1. Ramzi While Custody 75 to CIA Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of 2. Interrogation and Shackling with Nudity Hands the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees 76 Above Enhanced Headquarters Use of the CIA's Continued Interrogation Techniques, Despite 3. CIA Urges Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Interrogators' Cooperative 78 Wins 4. Information Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Already the Custody of a Foreign Government in Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Bin Pain 79 Stomach Detention Interrogation of Khalid Shaykli Muhammad 81 G. and The in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to 1. KSM Custody at Held CIA SITE KSM Is Immediately Subjected to COBALT, CIA's Enhanced Interrogation DETENTION the 81 Techniques CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates 2. The of the Waterboard Prior to His Use Arrival 83 Reporting CIA at Least 183 Times; KSM's KSM Includes Significant Fabricated 3. The Waterboards 85 Information the Use of the 4. After Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues CIA's to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information 93 H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 96 1. Fifty-Three CIA Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 96 Detainees DETENTION CIA SITE BLA CK in Country | and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in 2. The Establishes 97 Country| Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to 3. At CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA the Headquarters 99 Authorization of Headquarters Water Dousing 4. CIA Department Authorizes Justice Approval; Application of Without Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding 105 5. Hambali Fabricates While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Information 108 Techniques the Use of the CIA's 6. After Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Enhanced Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and Held An Additional Four Years 109 for 11ii 1111 i ' ii i II Page 3 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 3

33 UNCLASSIFIED 11II I IIII I IIII 11111 Year After SITE COBA LT Opens, the CIA Reports '' Unsettling Discovery That We 7. A DETENTION a Number Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little" 110 Are Holding of in the | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support Sites 8. CIA Detention Country Ill Detainees Interrogations of and Behavioral Issues Ill Medical, I. Other Psychological, Precedence Over Medical Care Ill Take 1. CIA Interrogations Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues 113 2. CIA Detainees Seeks CIA of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 115 J. The Reaffirmation Concerns About Treatment of Detainees Raise Humane at the CIA Statements the 1. Administration Lack of Policy Support for About Interrogation Activities 115 Possible CIA CIA Inaccurate Information to Select Members Provides the National Security Council, 2. The of that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life, Possibly Extensive"; Represents Reauthorize Policymakers 117 Program Oversight and Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. K. Additional Outside 119 Court Supreme Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the CIA that the Pressure /. ICRC Provides "Should Be in Government Position of Causing People to Disappear"; the CIA Not U.S. the Information CIA Detainee to the on of Defense 119 Inaccurate Department Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General 2. CIA Review of the Program "Imbalanced and Special Inaccurate. Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA's " and Program by the Inspector General 121 Detention Interrogation CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the 3. The of Effectiveness CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 124 the Director CIA 4. The Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Wrongfully Rejects Accountability for Officer Detains Involved 128 5. Hassan Ghul Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL Facilitator- Provides to the Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 130 Prior CIA's to Wrongfully 2004; CIA Sources Subjected iti the CIA's Enhanced Detainees Held 6. Other CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Interrogation "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything Techniques; Is What Have Seen " in You Ghraib Photographs 133 Like Abu CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use 7. The the Techniques of on Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information 134 an |Detains on the CIA's Behalf. 139 8. Country Individuals Supreme Court Action in the Case of Rasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of 9. U.S. Detainees from CIA Guantanamo to Country 140 Bay of Pace CIA L. The Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Operations Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem" 143 M. and Operational Challenges in 2005 145 Legal CIA's of Approval for the Use of the Renews Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 1. Department Justice 2005 145 in May Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to 2. Abu of Department Justice on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Memorandum Techniques Al-Libi the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation to When He Complains of Hearing Faraj Problems 146 3. CIA Acquires Detcunees from the U.S. Military 148 Two Due CIA "End Game" 4. The Detainees in Early 2005 Seeks to Limited Support From Liaison for Partners 149 5. Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result in the Countries Closing Detention Facilities in CIA | andj^ 151 of 11 1 11 MB^BBMI^^^M 11 ii 11 " ii " Page 4 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 4

34 UNCLASSIFIED TOP CIA Considers to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee 6. The Changes Hanulan Treatment 157 v. Act, Rumsfeld of Program...159 Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Disposition N. The Final CIA and Acknowledges Existence of the CIA's Detention the Interrogation 1. President Bush Publicly 159 Program ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains 2. The to CIA Detainees After Their In Access to Military Custody in September 2006 160 Transfer U.S. Considers Act of the Program Following the Military Commissions CIA 161 3. The Future of Develops Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage CIA the Military 4. The Modified Act 162 Commissions Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to 5. Muhammad Use of the CIA's Enhanced Extensive Interrogation Provides No Intelligence 163 Techniques, After-Action Review Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of Interrogation 6. CIA of Recommends in Use of Rapport-Building Techniques and Future CIA Techniques Greater 167 Interrogations by Related to Company Formed 7. CIA SWIGERT and DUNBAR 168 Expenses Contracting CIA's Detention and In terrogation Program Ends 170 8. The Intelligence and III. CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Acquired to Multiple 172 Techniques Constituencies on Effectiveness Representations 172 A. Background CIA Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the B. Past Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 178 CIA's C. The of CIA Representations Regarding the Origins of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Effectiveness Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists" 179 D. CIA Representations the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific About Detainees 204 CIA 204 1. Abu Zubaydah Sliaykli Muhammad (KSM) 210 2. Khalid Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence" E. CIA Effectiveness 216 Eight CIA Effectiveness Representations—the Use Primary the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation F. The of "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture Additional Terrorists" 217 Techniques Thwarting Bomb/Tall the Dirty 1. The Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla 225 of Thwarting the Karachi Plots 239 2. The of Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba 3. The 246 Group 4. The of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot Thwarting the Capture of Dliiren Barot, aka Issa and til-Hindi 258 5. The Identification, and Arrest oflyman Paris 276 Capture, Identification, and Arrest of Sajid Badat 284 6. The Capture, Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting 7. The 294 8. The of Hambali 301 Capture Cited CIA G. Representations—Less Frequently Secondary Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Effectiveness Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 311 Mastermind Identification Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as 1. The of of the September 11. 2001. the Attacks 312 2. The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias 315 3. The ofRamzi bin al-Shibh 316 Capture 4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) 326 5. The ofMajid Khan 334 Capture TOP SECRETfl^^^^^MU^^M^NQPQRN Page 5 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 5

35 UNCLASSIFIED IIII M III I "^M^BI^^Wi^B^N'HinHI I 'II Thwarting of Camp Lemonier Plotting 336 6. The the that 7. The Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA CIA Assertion Detainees Sources 342 Identification of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha 8. The 352 Arrests and the to Alerting Jaffar al-Tayyar 358 9. Critical Intelligence CIA and Arrest ofSaleh al-Marri 366 The 10. Identification Collection of Critical Tactical 11. on Shkai, Pakistan 368 The Intelligence Information the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation 378 12. on of the Representations to the Media While Overview Program Was Classified. 401 IV. CIA and Provides on the Still-Classified Detention Information Interrogation Program to Journalists A. The CIA then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories Who 401 B. Senior Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior CIA Full Committee Briefed 402 to the Being Not Caution Information Provided to the Media Should Classified Be Attributed to the Attorneys C. CIA that CIA 404 of Engages Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account with the Interrogation of Abu D. The CIA 405 Zubaydah of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice... V. Review 409 A. August 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah 409 1, CIA Other the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to B. The Detainees, Despite Language of the Interprets from Memorandum; Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge of the CIA's Interrogations Representations to the OLC 411 C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains Approval from OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees 413 the 2005 OLC Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation D. May Memoranda CIA's of Interrogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness the the Techniques 419 Process, Enhanced Opinion of Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Passage on CIA Conditions of Confinement, E. After the Draft Opinion on the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Withdraws the U.S. Supreme Court After Case Haindan v. Rumsfeld 428 of Representations 2007 Relies on Inaccurate CIA Memorandum Regarding CIA Interrogations and F. July OLC Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation the CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views Techniques; to the of Justice 431 Department Review VI. CIA Representations to the Congress 437 of A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the Committee Will Be Notified of Every Individual by the CIA 437 Detained but CIA of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, Committee Makes No Reference to Coercive B. The Notifies Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Interrogation After the Use of the CIA's Chairman Enhanced Techniques; the CIA Discusses Strategy to Interrogation the Chairman's Request for More Avoid Information 437 C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer Questions from Members or Provide Requested Materials 439 Committee Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation 441 D. Vice E. In Response to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from CIA Senator for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the Levin to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes 443 TOP tfNOFORN Page 6 of499 UNCLASSIFIED 6

36 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETfl^^^^^BI^^^^BflNQgQRN Act; Director Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Seeks CIA F. CIA Goss to Answer Questions for the Record 444 Declines Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Interrogation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged G. September on 2006 446 6, CIA Inaccurate; Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It H. The Provides Authorized Intelligence Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Act by the Army Authorization Field Manual 449 I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA Declines to Answer Committee Questions the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program 452 for Committee CIA of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to VII. Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Destruction Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 45S VIII. Appendix Terms of Reference 457 1: Appendix IX. CIA Detainees from 2002 - 2008 458 2: X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee- April 12,2007 462 y/NOFORN TOP SECRET/^ Page 7 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 7

37 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN I. Background Committee Study on the December (U) the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("the Committee") 11, On 2007, the of of videotapes related to the interrogations of CIA detainees initiated a review destruction day and al-Nashiri after receiving a briefing that al-Rahim on the matter by Zubaydah Abu 'Abd Michael Hayden. At that briefing, Director CIA stated that contemporaneous Director Hayden operational were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes," and he agreed to CIA cables Committee to limited access the these cables at CIA Headquarters. provide with presented February 2009, after the Committee was On with a staff-prepared summary of (U) 11, operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah the al-Nashiri, the and Committee considering a broader review of the CIA's detention and interrogation began On March 2009, in a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved Terms of Reference practices. 5, 1 of CIA's Detention a study Interrogation Program. and for the Interrogation Committee The the CIA's Detention and Study Program is a lengthy, highly (U) of report exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 footnotes. detailed is divided It into volumes: three and Operation the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This of I. History chronologically into sections addressing the establishment, is divided volume and evolution development, the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. It of includes addendum on CIA Clandestine an Sites and the Arrangements Made Detention with Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. II. Intelligence and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Acquired Interrogation Techniques. volume addresses the intelligence the CIA Enhanced This CIA CIA's and the use of the to enhanced interrogation techniques, attributed detainees effectiveness on representations regarding the CIA of the CIA's specifically focusing interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's Detention and Interrogation enhanced was Program and managed. It includes sections on CIA representations to the operated the of Justice, and the Congress. media, Department Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This volume HI. the detention addresses and of 119 CIA detainees, interrogation the program's authorization on September from 17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture, detention, interrogation, conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive and on its CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day operation of information the and Program. Detention Interrogation On December 13, 2012, (U) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved the the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program ("Committee Study") by a 20 bipartisan 9-6. The Committee Study included of findings and conclusions. The vote 1 See Appendix 1: "Terms of Reference, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's and Interrogation Pro Detention TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 8 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 8

38 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET/JI requested that executive branch agencies review and provide comment on Committee specific Study the Committee action to seek declassification and public release of the prior Committee to which June the CIA provided a written response, 2013, was followed On Committee Study. 27, between the CIA and the Committee that concluded in September 2013. by a series of meetings and the receipt of Minority views, the Committee revised the findings Following these meetings by updated Committee Study. On April 3, 2014, and a bipartisan vote of 11- conclusions and the agreed to send the 3, the findings and conclusions, and the updated Executive Committee revised of Committee Study, to the president for declassification and public release. Summary the conducted Committee's most comprehensive review ever is the of the CLA's The (U) Study Interrogation Program. The CIA has informed the Committee that it has provided Detention and 2 with CIA records related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. all the Committee produced production lasted more than three years, phase more than six million The document of material, and was pages in July 2012. The Committee Study is based primarily on completed 3 these documents, a review which include CIA operational cables, reports, memoranda, of products, and interviews conducted of CIA personnel by various entities intelligence numerous the CIA, the CIA's Office of Inspector General and particular CIA's Oral History within the in 5 4 internal email and Program, other communications. as well as The Executive is divided into two parts. The first describes the establishment, (U) Summary and and of the CIA's Detention evolution Interrogation Program. The development, operation, part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention second Interrogation and Program, include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use to CIA CIA's techniques; as well as interrogation representations on the of the enhanced and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the effectiveness of and Department the Congress. The Executive Summary does not include a Justice, 2 CIA The not have access to approximately 9,400 Committee documents related to the CIA's Detention and did Interrogation Program that were withheld by the White House pending a determination and claim of executive privilege. The requested access to these documents over several years, including in writing on January Committee May 22, and December 19, 2013. The Committee received no response from the White House. 3, 2013, 2013, 3 January to August 30, 2012, the Department 2008, Justice conducted a separate investigation into From 2, of of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, with various possibility of criminal prosecutions of aspects the personnel contractors. On October 9, 2009, the CIA and the Committee that it would not compel CIA CIA informed to participate in interviews with the Committee personnel to concerns related to the pending Department of due Justice ( See DTS #2009-4064.) While the Committee did not conduct interviews with CIA investigations. previous during of this review, the Committee utilized course interview reports of CIA personnel and personnel the contractors conducted by die CIA's Office of the CIA General and the CIA's Oral History Program. In Inspector addition CIA materials, the Committee reviewed a much to quantity of documents from the Department of smaller Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as documents that had separately been provided to Committee outside of this review. Inconsistent spellings found within the Committee Study reflect the inconsistencies in the underlying documents reviewed. the found 4 CIA informed die Committee that due to CIA record retention policies, the CIA could The produce all CIA not email requested by the Committee. As a result, in a few communications the text of an email cited in the cases, Study was not available in its original format, but was embedded in a larger email chain. For this reason, the the Committee, limited cases, cites to an email chain that contains some original email, rather than the original in email itself. 5 The report does not review CIA renditions for individuals who were not ultimately detained by the CIA, CIA treatment interrogation in U.S. military custody, or die detainees of detainees in the custody of foreign of governments, as these topics were not included in the Committee's Terms of Reference. VNOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 9 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 9

39 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN description detention and interrogations of all 119 known CIA detainees. Details on each of the are of these Volume in. included detainees in CIA summary the this report, non-supervisory and personnel have been Throughout (U) entire pseudonym. The pseudonyms for these officers are used throughout the report. To listed by officers distinguish from those in true name, pseudonyms in this report are CIA in pseudonym CIA last in upper case letters. Additionally, the by requested that the names of denoted names that hosted CIA detention sites, or with which the CIA negotiated countries hosting of sites, the as well information directly or indirectly identifying such countries, be redacted from the as version provided Committee members. The report therefore lists these countries by classified to "Country report the same designations consistently, so The J," for example, refers to letter. uses same country throughout the Committee Study. Further, the the requested that the CIA 6 the original code names for CIA detention sites with new identifiers. Committee replace 6 Committee 7, 2014, the Executive Summary of the On Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation April Program was provided to the executive branch for declassification and public release. On August I, 2014, the CIA returned to Committee the Executive Summary with its proposed redactions. Over the ensuing months, the the House engaged with the CIA and the White deliberations to ensure that the Committee's narrative— Committee in support for the Committee's findings and conclusions—remained intact. Significant alterations have been made and Executive Summary in order to reach agreement on a publicly releasable version of the document. For to the Committee example, requested that in select passages, the CIA replace specific dates with more general time the frames. The Committee also replaced the true names of some senior non-undercover CIA officials with pseudonyms. The branch then redacted all pseudonyms for CIA personnel, and in some cases the titles of executive classified held the CIA personnel. Further, while the by Executive Summary and full Committee Study positions lists specific countries by letter (for example "Country J"), and uses the same letter to designate the specific country 1 this Committee Study, the lette throughout ' ' branch for the public release. TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN Page 10 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 10

40 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET/JI Overall History Operation of the CIA's Detention and II. and Interrogation Program A. September of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to 17, Memorandum 2001, a Specific of Detain Individuals Capture and Category Determines Clandestine Various the CIA Detention That a Considering 1. After Locations, Base Is the "Best Option"; the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention U.S. Military CIA to in \ Approvals Officers terrorist 17, days after the six attacks of September 2001, On 2001, President George W. Bush signed September action Memorandum of 11, a covert (MON) authorize the director of to intelligence (DCI) to "undertake Notification central designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious operations of threat 7 death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities." violence or the CIA previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named Although had the the of formal criminal charges, issuance MON provided unprecedented individuals pending granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual authorities, K for detention, and the basis of the detention. length The MON made no reference to the 9 or techniques. interrogations interrogation September 14, 2001, three days before the issuance of the On HHi^^H the of operations of the CIA's chief based on an urgent requirement from MON, the chief of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in seeking 10 input locations for potential CIA detention facilities. on Over the course of the appropriate as month, considered at least four countries in and one in HHIHH CIA next officers 11 three facilities and H at least detention proposed site locations. for possible hosts September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnel met to discuss the On and detain authorities in the MON. On September 28, 2001, I^^^HCTC Legal, capture an of describing the meeting and a number sent policy decisions. The email 7 the September of Notification, for Members of 17,2001, National Security Council, re. | Memorandum 8 Attachment 5 to May 14, 2002, letter from Stanley Moskowitz, CIA Office of Congressional Affairs, to A1 Cumming, Staff Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, transmitting the^| Memoranda of Notification Director, #2002-2175). (DTS ^^^ 9 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security September re. U^BJ Council, 10 fronl: email (HHHHB; [REDACTED]; D1RECTOr|HH [REDACTED]; subject: Cable re to: Country |; date: January 29,2009. 11 Memorandum DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director for Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central of Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central for Intelligence/Military entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility Support, Terrorists." Page 11 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 11

41 UNCLASSIFIED TOP stated that facilities would be operated "in a manner consistent with, but not email covert the pursuant of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the formal to, provision maximum facilitiesandthe inmates held under the of lawful prison incarceration operation of email recognized the CIA's lack of experience security running mechanisms." ^^H^l's in and that the CIA would consider stated cleared personnel from the facilities, detention acquiring Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to Department the CIA in of assist 12 the On September 27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that operating facilities. 13 "U.S. would have to meet facility POW Standards." CIA any future detention 1 In further November 2001, CIA Headquarters ) determined (^S/^^^^H^H^Ni early U.S. future detention any would have to meet CIA prison standards and that CIA that facility and interrogation operations should be tailored to "meet the requirements of U.S. law detention the and rules of criminal procedure," adding that "[sjpecific methods of interrogation federal be permissible long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices w[ould] so 14 site by The CIA's search for detention courts." locations was then put on lawful U.S. deemed an internal memorandum from senior CIA hold explained that detention at a U.S. and officials 15 of the United States was the outside option." base The memorandum thus urged military "best DCI to "[pjress DOD and the US the at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to military, host facility, and have them identify an agreeable location," specifically requesting a long-term at the to have the US Naval Base "[s]eek Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term that DCI 16 detention facility." Addressing risks (^S/^^I^HHI^^/NF) associated with the CIA maintaining a the captured facility, detention memorandum warned that "[a]s the terrorists may be held days, CIA months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time," and that "[mjedia exposure could inflame opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the public operation of facility." The memorandum also anticipated that, "[i]n a foreign continued the 17 intensive host government will entail the negotiations." cooperation The close with country, warned that "any foreign country poses uncontrollable CIA that could create memorandum risks vulnerability the security of the facility, to problems, and uncertainty over incidents, bilateral 1 facility." establishment " The memorandum recommended the maintaining of a "short-term" the in the facility CIA's role would be limited to "oversight, funding and responsibility." The which 12 date: [REDACTED]; subject: EYES ONLY - Capture and Detention; to: Email from: 28, 2001, at 09:29:24 AM. September 13 •• (272119Z SEP 01) DIRECTOR 14 November 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I. 7, 15 Memorandum DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director for Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central of Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." entitled, 16 CounterteiTorism, from J. Cofer Black, Director of DCI via Deputy Director of Central Memorandum for General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence/Military entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." Support, 17 of Memorandum from J. Cofer Black, Director for Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central DCI Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." entitled, 18 of Memorandum from J. Cofer Black, Director for Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central DCI Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military entitled, "Approvahj^ist^ for Terrorists." Support, 1 1 111 ii " 11ii " BBBBB^^BliM Page 12 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 12

42 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP SECRET/JI would CIA other requirements to other US Government organizations, "contract out all 19 as governments." companies, commercial appropriate, and, foreign the 2001, George Tenet delegated 8, management October On (^flHHB^) DCI the capture and detention authorities provided and the MON to the CIA's deputy oversight of by operations James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief (DDO), the Counter-terrorism Center, for director of 20 The DCI also directed that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be Black. Cofer DDO writing. 17, 2001, however, the December rescinded these On documented in t0 via a CIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in IBII^^I requirements and issued violence poses] requisite 'continuing serious threat of the or death to US [who "determine 21 interests persons who are planning terrorist activities.'" and By March 2002, CIA or Headquarters expanded the authority beyond the language of the MON and instructed CIA had that it would appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets be personnel 22 on could provide information but high-value targets. right, own in their a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that "at this stage in the war [we] believe there is sent opportunity advance sufficient to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our in 23 and operations." as I^^^^H's cable also provided guidance capture to who could detain under stating: MON, be detained the to must an articulable basis "there which be conclude that the actions of a on specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a 'continuing serious threat' violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person of a terrorist activity. is planning a suspicion not detain someone merely upon to that he or .. .We permitted are valuable information about terrorists or she acts of terrorism... has planned the membership in a particular group, or mere mere existence of a Similarly, the familial tie, docs not ncccssarily connote that the threshold particular of 24 threat' has been satisfied." 'continuing, serious 19 Counterterrorism, from J. Cofer Black, Director of DCI via Deputy Director of Central Memorandum for General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Intelligence, for Operations and Associate Director of Central Director Intelligence/Military entitled, "Approval to Establish Support, Facility for Terrorists." a Detention 20 Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Deputy Director for Operations, October 8, 2001, Subject: Delegations of Authorities. (U) 21 DIRECTOR||Hla71410Z DEC 01) 22 (272040Z 02) WASHINGTON®!! MAR 23 APR 03) DIRECTOR |^M(072216Z 24 (072216Z APR 03). In a later meeting DIRECTOR Committee staff, •^^•CTC Legal, with •• that the prospect that the CIA stated hold [detainees] forever" was "terrifying," adding, "[n]o "could one wants to be in a position of being called back from retirement in however many years to go figure out what do Briefing you with so and so who still poses a threat " See November 13, 2001, Transcript of Staff do on Covert Action Issues (DTS #2002-0629). Legal 11 >i 11111 i ii i ii Page 13 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 13

43 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1 SECRET/JI //NOFORN 2. Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA The CIA Detained Detainees Wrongly has CIA public and classified settings that While represented the in 25 CIA hundred" the Committee's review of one records than "fewer it detained individuals, 26 number of CIA detainees was at least indicates that Internal CIA documents the total 119. inadequate keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many indicate record that overseeing In 2003, a CIA Station December CIA detention detained. individuals it had Country | informed CIA Headquarters that it had made the "unsettling discovery" operations in 27 CIA "holding a number of detainees about whom" it knew "very little." that Nearly the was how later, 2008, the CIA attempted to determine late many individuals the CIA had years five in the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael detained. At were informed the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals, Hayden, that 28 the According to an email summarizing more. meeting, CIA Director Hayden and possibly 25 Director Hayden typically described the program CIA holding "fewer than a hundred" detainees. For example, as in testimony the Committee on February 4, 2008, in response to a question from Chairman Rockefeller before an open Hayden stated, "[iln the life of the CIA detention program we have held fewer than a during hearing, ( 5, DTS #2008-1140.) Specific references to "98" detainees were included in a May people." 2006, hundred See Select on on Intelligence (HPSCI) report Permanent Renditions, Detentions and Interrogations. House Committee Central Memorandum John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, also Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. See for Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Bradbury, Application of Re: the Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques War Qaeda May by the CIA in the Interrogation ofHighValueal Used Detainees. Other examples of this CIA that Be a statementb^TCofficer^^H^m to the HPSCI on February 15, 2006, and a representatio^nclude by statement Legal ^•^•^•totheSScTon June 10, 2008. See DTS #2008-2698. ^^HCTC 26 detainees accounting The the number of CIA Committee's is conservative and only includes individuals for of whom there is clear evidence of detention in CIA custody. The Committee thus did not count, among the 119 detainees, six the 31 individuals listed in a memo entitled "Updated List of Detainees In | of attached to 2003 email sent by DETENTION SITE COBALT site manager | •^•H," a March and 1], were not explicitly described as CIA detainees they because they did not otherwise OFFICER [CIA because (See email from: ^HH|^|HH[C1A0FF1CER 11; to:|HHflh> HH appearinCIA records. and HI^^^H DETAINEES; date: March 2003.) An |HI> subjectT^^^H^fefl^HH from is subject of individual cables describing a planned transfer the U.S. military to CIA custody at additional CIA SITE COBALT. He was likewise not included among the 119 DETENTION detainees because of a lack of CIA CIA confirming either his transfer to, or his presence at, DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in this records number in the CIA attempted to identify the total 2008, of CIA detainees. In a graph prepared summary, December CIA leadership, the CIA represented the number of CIA for as "112+ ?" See 12417 detainees (I01719Z 02); ALEC (232056Z OCT 02);•• 190159 (240508Z OCT OCT and ALEC WKM 02); (301226Z OCT 02). 37 15281 28 As of June 27, 2013, when the CIA provided its Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program the "CIA's June 2013 Response"), the CIA had not yet made an independent (hereinafter, June of of individuals it had detained. The CIA's number 2013 Response does not address the determination the of detainees determined by the Committee to be held by the CIA, other than to assert that the number discrepancy between CIA representations, that there were fewer than 100 detainees, and the Committee's determination of past "substantively there least 119 CIA detainees, was not at meaningful." The CIA's June 2013 Response states being that the discrepancy "does not impact the previously known scale of the program," and that "[i]t remains true that also approximately were part of the program; not 10 and not 200." The CIA's June 2013 Response detainees 100 states "[t]he Study leaves unarticulated what impact that, relatively small discrepancy might have had on the policymakers or Congressional overseers." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts that, at the time Director internal Hayden representing there had been fewer than 100 detainees (2007-2009), the CIA's was research 11II I III I •^•fr/NOFORN I Page 14 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 14

44 UNCLASSIFIED TOP a CIA officer a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number instructed to devise had the to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself, previously CIA briefed stated: 29 in could be included detainees RDI additional the that CIA "I briefed me to keep the detainee number at 98 ~ pick numbers. DCIA instructed 30 needed make that happen but the number is 98." date whatever to i [sic] acknowledged to the House Permanent Select CIA While the Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had Committee detained five on wrongly 31 course of its detention program, throughout a review of CIA records indicates individuals the 112," total detainees could have been as high as of and that "uncertainty existed within CIA the number "indicate[dj a group of additional detainees were actually part about the program, partially because some of them had whether of tlirough SITE COBALT] prior to the formal [DETENTION of the program under CTC passed establishment on 3 December 2002" (emphasis added). auspices June 27, 2013, CIA statement is inaccurate: the CIA's This determination the time was that there had been at least 112 CIA detainees and that the inclusion of detainees held at to December 2002, would make that number higher. On December 20, 2008, a CTC officer informed the prior 3, not CTC "112 were detained by CIA of September 11, 2001," noting "[tjhese revised statistics do that chief since any at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] (other detainees Gul Rahman) who departed [DETENTION include than COBALT] prior to RDG assuming authority of [DETENTION SITE COBALT] as of 03 December SITE 2002." (See numbers brief.doc," attached to email from: to: "I^^HBi ^^^^^^^^^subject: Revised and Detention |, [REDACTED], Rendition had December 2008.) By December date: 2008, CTC 20, created a graph that identified the total Statistics; 23, of CIA detainees, excluding number Rahman, "Post 12/3/02" as 111. The graph identified the total number Gul including Rahman, but excluding other detainees "pre-12/3/02" Gul "112+ ?." ( See CIA-produced PowerPoint as Slide, RDG Numbers, dated December 23,2008.) With regard to the Committee's inclusion of detainees held at DETENTION SITE prior to December 3, 2002, the CIA does not dispute that they were held by the CIA COBALT to the MON authorities as detainees held after that date. Moreover, the CIA has regularly counted pursuant same detainees solely of individuals who were held its at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to among a number exclusively 3, well as several who were held as at Country ^^^Hmfacilities on behalf of December 2002, CIA. In discussing the role of DETENTION SITE COBALT in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation the Program, then Director of Operations James Pavitt told the CIA Office of Inspector General in August 2003 that Deputy are is who say that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, but that "there 'bullshit.'" (See those Report, for Review of Interrogations Interview Counterterrorism Purposes, James Pavitt, August 21, 2003-7123-IG, 2003.) 29 "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred The as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, to Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records. 30 Email to: HirnselfJ; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5, from: not According CIA's June 2013 Response, "Hayden did the view the discrepancy, if it existed, as 2009. to significant given that, if true, it would increase the total number by just over 10 particularly percent." 31 subjected include Habib, who was detained duetofabrications made by KSM while KSM was They Sayed being to the enhanced interrogation techniques (Bj^^l CIA's (1308012 JUN 04); | 1281 2817 . Ali Saeed Awadh, the subject of mistaken identity (ALEC | Modin Nik by whom determined had been purposeftilly misidentified CIA a source due to a blood feud Muhammed, the —Ml; 143701 •• | DIRECTOR 152893 Khalid al-Masri, whose "prolonged d^^^riB^^KT was determined by the CIA detention" Inspector General to be "unjustified" (CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and who Detention German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007, at 83); and Zarmein, of was one of 11 ii 11111 ' >i i ii ^BBMiMWi^B Page 15 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 15

45 UNCLASSIFIED TOP Bf/NOFORN SECRET//B at least additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees that 21 32 this not meet the MON standard for detention. identified This is a conservative Study, in did did only whom the CIA itself determined detainees not meet the includes CIA calculation and It does not inclucfc individuals about whom standard was internal for detention. there the over whether the detainee met the CIA or not, or the numerous within disagreement standard following their detention and interrogation, were found not detainees "pose a continuing who, to of or death to U.S. persons and interests" or to be "planning terrorist activities" as threat violence exception, the 2001. MON." With one known 17, there arc no CIA by September required detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very little" "a number of (| 1528 2 include Abu Hudhaifa, who was subjected to ice ' baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation They water being released before the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be because (WASHINGTON 51303 Muhammad Klnin, who, like HH was annul); about whom the CIA acknowledged knowing "very little" Zarmeiu, detainees another of mistaken identity (HEADQUARTERS ^H Rahman, case Gul Khan, who, like his brother. Saved Habib, was the subject |): Shaistah fabrications Habibullah of KSM HaiKjhaltfi^vkMvas detained as "useful leverage" by (MEADQUARTERS^^H^^^^^^H); member Nazar AM, an "intellectually against a family individual whti.se taped crying was used as leverage against his family member J challenged" ^47 13065 J Jimi;i Gill, wlii' wi;s H'lcuscd with a [29864 I of curi rn I f^^M^^B I |other | payment and | " • _ 53265 133693 Hayatullah Haqaani, whom the CIA determined "may have been in the 133693 place wrong wrong time^HHIi^^^l^^l^l 33322 ^^^^H^^HkAIi Jan. who was detained (lie 1542| using phone, traces on for "revealed no derogatory inform a satellite which two individuals Moliammud al-Shomaila and Salah Nasir Salim Ali—on whom derogatory information was "speculative" (email from: | REDACTED]; to: | REDACTED!. | REDACTEDI, and IREDACTED]: Backgrounders: date: April 19. 2006; 17411 ALEC subject: document f undated Points for HPSCI about Former CIA Detainees"); titled, "Talking being who to be foreign government sources prior to discovered rendered to CIA custody, and individuals two were to be former CIA ([REDACTED!); ALEC| later determined HEADQUARTERS B^B([^EDACTED|)rseven | ((REDACTED!); individuals based be to Iraq to join alQa'ida who to detained travelling on claims that were "thin but cannot he thought were - (email from: to: | REDACTED! ignored" , cc: [REDACTED!. I REDACTED). I^H^^^H' IREDACTED]; IREDACTED). [REDACTED|; I IREDACTED].[REDACTED!. Departing Chief/CTC to Apprehend and Detain subject: Approval Imminently for Iraq to Fight Request Individuals US Forces; date: September 16, 2003); and Btsmullah, who was mistakenly arrested Against later \ and with and told not to speak about his experience 46620 released 33 the For Committee did not include among example, 26 individuals wrongfully detained: Dr. Hikmat Naft the Shaukat. even though it was determined that he was not involved in CBRN efforts and his involvement with al- personal neighbors was limited to members relationships with former ja'ida (| |30414 DIRECTOR HHKarim. aka Asat Sar Jan, about whom < j u est ions raised been the CIA about whether he may have were slandered by a rival tribal faction (| within [REDACTED] SUBJECT: ^^HH^^^H ^^^•27931 getting a handle on Memo. 56 A a Khan, who detainees); disturbing hallucinations after real hours of standing sleep deprivation, after suffered which the CIA determined thai he "does not appear to he the subject involved in... current plans or activities against l^MjereomieU^Lilities'' 1393 03): HEADQUARTERS •• (2GI006ZOCT hallucinations Janat who and suffered "frightful" Gul. following sleep deprivation and also about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, "[t|here simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to thai a site would continued holding of [Janat Gul| at our such us [DETENTION SITE BLACK]" <| justify K )\>S\ :( U I I ,, , M OKN Page 16 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 16

46 UNCLASSIFIED //NOFORN 1 TOP SECRET/JI to indicate the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the records that 34 determined detained. CIA were itself wrongfully country four CIA used host the detention least occasions, 2) On at | to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA sites did not meet the MON in Country who capture detention. ALEC Station officers and Headquarters explicitly for standard at CIA these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, acknowledged that and placing individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not recommended the detain standard. country had no independent reason to host these individuals and the The meet 35 at the behest of held CIA. them solely the Detention Abu Zubaydah and the Development and of of the CIA's B. The Authorization Interrogation Techniques Enhanced Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive 1. Past Techniques Were Interrogation "Counterproductive and "Ineffective "; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys " Possible Legal for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Research Defense with Research Interrogations, Relies on Contractors Effective No on No Conducts Experience Relevant the time of the issuance of ^^^^^^H^/NF) September 17, 2001, MON— At the as did not reference interrogation techniques—the noted, had in place long-standing which, CIA standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards formal the with 104); email 04); 1537 1530 04) (COB | SITE BLACK]); to: [REDACTED] from: [DETENTION ^^HIHH date: April subject: re 34 CIA's June 2013 Response "acknowledge^] that there were cases The which errors were made," but points in only the case of Khalid al Masri, whose wrongful to was the subject of an Inspector General review. The detention CIA's June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that it was "far than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that fewer" Agency frequently too slowly to release detainees," and that "[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we "the moved to only in less than 31 days. Most took three cases six months. CIA should have acted sooner." adjudicated three detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of As determined the individuals CIA to have been by ^^•J^tfta^^HDlRECTOR •••HBHB ALEC DIRECTOR did the conclusion that Despite individuals CIA's not meet the ALEC^^BfHI^^^^H. these for detention, these individuals were included in die list of standard wrongfully detained if they were released, 26 but if they were transferred to the custody of another not The list thus does not include Hamid Aich, country. although CIA Headquarters recognized that Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sought to place him Country BI^HIi^^l custody where the CIA could still debrief him. (See DIRECTOR in Hamid was transferred to Country custod^r^pn^B^003^uid I)). Aich to ^^^^ftanother country's] custody more than a month later. (See 36682 transferred m^H). also list 138836 does not include The the Dinshah, a determination prior Mohammad his capture that despite CIA "does not view Dinshah as meeting to the 'continuing serious threat' threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority," the and his capture, that "he does not meet after strict standards required to go to [DETENTION a determination, SITE COBALT]." (See DIRECTORjHH HEADQUARTERS ^BlB^^BI^M)- Dinshah transferred to custody. See HEADQUARTERS | was 1 11111 H^^B^BBB^B^B 11ii "'" Page 17 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 17

47 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN Committee. 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or In January are counterproductive they do not produce intelligence and psychological techniques because 36 in answers." deputy Testimony of the CIA result director of operations in false will probably or interrogation stating, "[pjhysical abuse techniques, other degrading coercive denounced 1988 rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be treatment was 37 By 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army ineffective." October 38 of "Intelligence A CIA Directorate " Operations Handbook from Manual Interrogation Field states that the CIA does not engage October "human rights violations," which it defined 2001 in "Torture, inhuman, degrading treatment or cruel, or prolonged detention without as: punishment, or trial." The handbook further stated that "[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate charges in directly encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical nor extremely demeaning or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an torture, indignities 39 interrogation." to aid CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. (U) The In the produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence CIA Manual, intended as a 1963, Interrogation for Cold War interrogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of manual arrest, sensory deprivation of interrogation: stimuli through solitary confinement or detention, suggestibility methods, fear, debility, pain, heightened and and hypnosis, narcosis similar threats 40 regression." former Tn 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner asked and CIA officer John induced 41 using investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko Limond to Hart 42 methods—to include sensory deprivation KUBARK and forced standing. the In techniques Hart's testimony before the House Sclcct Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978, he noted that his 31 years of government service: in has never to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant "It fallen way of first, the investigation possible this case, and, second, the in every as, it is an of it and testifying. To me upon abomination, and I necessity lecturing 36 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman January S. William at 7 Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on HHft Cohen, Select "8 (DTS #1989-0131). Senate 37 Senate Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Select Agency 1988), 17, Intelligence p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302). (June 38 Establish Attachment entitled, "Approval to to a Detention Facility for Terrorists," CTC: Memorandum 1026(13 8)/01 from J. Cofer Black, Director of DCI Counterterrorist Center, to Director of Central Intelligence via multiple parties, 25, 2001; Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogations." October 39 updated Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(l)(a), Operations October 9,2001. Directorate of 40 Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85. KUBARK 41 According public records, in the mid-1960s, the to imprisoned and interrogated Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB CIA officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964, for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers at the time not believe Nosenko was an actual defector and ordered his imprisonment and interrogation. did but Nosenko in a specially constructed "jail," with nothing confined a cot, and was subjected to a series of was sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing. 42 5, other documents, see CIA "Family Jewels" Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. Among 23-24, available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAr TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN Page 18 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 18

48 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET/JI happy to that... it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues am say 43 in during the time I was connected with it." the and I did agency Hart findings, just five years the investigation (TS/^l^mi^H/lNF) Notwithstanding a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual later, the in 1983, into Exploitation Training Manual, which the same (HRE) used to provide Resource Human officer in Latin America in the early 1980s, and which was used to provide interrogation training m 44 to 198I- training HHI^^^^^^HIiH CIA officerH^^M interrogation the in was training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later the involved HRE 45 of admonished for inappropriate use orally interrogation techniques. be that recommended he of 2002, BHI became In the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions fall the 46 47 in charge CIA interrogations officer the of Group, the CIA's (^pg^^m^^^^^^^NF) statements that coercive physical and Despite previous 48 techniques "result in false answers" and psychological have interrogation to be "proven 49 as well as the aforementioned early November 2001 determination that "[sjpecific ineffective," of interrogation be permissible so long as they generally comport with methods w[ould] 50 the by U.S. courts," practices by lawful end of November 2001, accepted deemed commonly had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques CIA officers considered that by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On were torture of General 2001, in the CIA's Office 26, Counsel circulated a draft legal November attorneys describing the criminal prohibition on torture memorandum a potential "novel" legal defense and for officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that CIA harm torture to prevent imminent, significant, physical necessary to persons, where there the was other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states is no be very unwilling to may 51 U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in the thousands of lives." call An August 1, saving 43 "Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Hearings before the Select Committee on th Assassinations House of Representatives, 95 of Congress, Second Session, September 11-15, 1978. U.S. of John pp. 487-536 (September 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761). Testimony Hart, 44 of on Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988, Hearing 3- 4 (DTS #1988-2302). Committee Transcript pp. 45 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspector General William F. April to Jim Currie and John Nelson, 13, Donnelly Staff, Answers to SSCI Questions attachment M re: Memorandum to Chairman and Vice SSCI to re: Inquiry into Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 Chairman, # 1989-0675). See also (DTS jHlQS^jMeniorandum Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re: for IG-||84. HH^H. 46 program the Group was also known As the Renditions as the "Renditions and Interrogations noted, during as well as the "Rendition, Detention, Group," Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." and 47 Value 4, Training Report, Revised Version, December 2002, Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) High was Seminar 12-18 02 ("dHll Training recently assigned to the CTC/RG to manage the HVT Nov as and mission, assuming die role (HVTIE) HVT interrogator/Team Chief."). Interrogation Exploitation 48 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs to Vice Chairman William S. January Senate Cohen, Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on at 7-8 (DTS #1989-0131). Select 49 Senate Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Select Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Richard Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302). so November 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I. 7, 5 ' November 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, 26, Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." "Hostile The draft memo cited the "Israeli example" as a possible basis for arguing that "torture was necessary to prevent harm." imminent, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the significant, inn mi 1 iii i i mi 1 i Page 19 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 19

49 UNCLASSIFIED TOP OLC memorandum the White House Counsel includes a similar analysis of the 2002, to 52 in potential charges of torture. "necessity response defense" to began 2002, Security Council principals National to January the (TS/^^^H^HH^/NF) In apply the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the debate of whether to Treatment War August 12, 1949 ("Geneva") to the of with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. of Prisoners conflict for DCI Tenet to the president urged that the CIA A letter exempt from any drafted be of protections, arguing that application of Geneva would "significantly hamper application these 53 save obtain critical threat information necessary to to American lives." of On ability CIA the 2002—approximately two months prior to the February of the CIA's first detainee— 1, detention attorney that if CIA detainees were covered wrote Geneva there would be "few a CIA by to alternatives asking questions." The attorney concluded that, if that were the case, simply "then optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the the 54 but lives." ultimately convention, saves 7, President Bush issued a memorandum stating February 2002, On al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of war under Geneva, and that that neither not 3 of requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did Geneva, Article Common 55 to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees. apply the issuance of the MON to early From there are no 2002, indications CIA records that the CIA conducted significant research to identify effective in military practices, conferring with experienced U.S. as or law enforcement interrogation such or with the intelligence, military, or law interrogators, services of other countries enforcement 56 in counterterrorism and the interrogation experience terrorist suspects. with Nor are there of CIA records referencing any review of the CIA's past use of coercive interrogation techniques and associated learned. The only research documented in CIA records during this time lessons issue of was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was on the interrogation 52 for R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Memorandum under Alberto Israeli 2340-2340A. the November §§ 2001, draft memo, the OLC memorandum addressed the Like 18 U.S.C. 26, example. 53 [REDACTED] cc: Email [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Rodriguez, subject: For OOB Wednesday - Draft Letter to the President; date: January 29, 2002. No records [REDACTED]; or been indicate that this letter was to was not sent. have identified 54 from: [REDACTED]; to: |^HHHH|and [REDACTED]; subject: POW's and Questioning; date: Email 1, February at 01:02:12 PM. 2002, 55 Secretary 2002, Memorandum for the February President, the 7, of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Vice Attorney General, chief of staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re. Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Affairs, Detainees. 56 the CIA was unsuccessful in acquiring information from its last detainee, Muhammad Rahim, using the After 2008 enhanced techniques, an after-action review in April interrogation suggested that the CIA conduct a CIA's survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to develop effective techniques. See undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, interrogation [Rahim] [REDACTED], undated CIA Memorandum, titled author After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, and with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification see of Sleep and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT. For additional information, Deprivation Volume I. 11II II III I —VNOFORN Page 20 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 20

50 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRKm^^^^^^^^^^BBflNQFORN assessed initially to include strategies to resist interrogation. This report was by the CIA by CIA's Technical Services (OTS) and drafted of two CIA the by commissioned Office 57 and Dr. Hammond DUNBAR. contractors, Dr. Grayson SWIGERT DUNBAR and been psychologists with the Both SWIGERT had school, Survival, Force and Escape (SERE) Evasion, which exposes select Air U.S. Resistance personnel to, among other things, coercive interrogation techniques that they might U.S. military if taken to countries that did not adhere to Geneva protections. Neither be subjected prisoner by specialized experience interrogator, nor did either have an knowledge of al- had psychologist as in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise. Qa'ida, a background which reviewed on "learned helplessness," in research individuals might become had SWIGERT 58 depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable passive and He theorized that events. 59 a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information. inducing such The CIA Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval 2. Renders Deliberation Inter-Agency Without late March 2002, Pakistani government authorities, working In (TSyV^m^^^H^NF) a raid CIA, al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah in the during which Abu Zubaydah with captured bullet wounds. At that time, Abu Zubaydah was assessed by CIA officers in ALEC suffered the CIA within the Station, with specific responsibility for al-Qa'ida, to possess detailed office in of attack plans. However, as is described terrorist greater detail in the knowledge al-Qa'ida Committee Study, this assessment significantly overstated Abu Zubaydah's role in full al-Qa'ida 60 information he was likely to possess. and the 57 and and Hammond DUNBAR, Recognizing Grayson Developing Countermeasures to A1 Qaeda SWIGERT Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (undated). See also Memorandum for the Record, 15, 2007, SSCI Staff Briefing with Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR (DTS November #2009-0572). 58 example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, subject, "Qualifications to provide special See, for consultation"; a untitled memo stating: "The following information was obtained by interrogation mission Undated, with | conversation [REDACTED], telephone Lesson Plan, Title: A Scientific Approach , Interrogator Successful Interrogation; D1R Training, to APR 02). ^^^^^^ |(031227Z 59 for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, See, "Qualifications to provide special subject: mission consultation." interrogation 60 also of Abu Zubaydah in Volume III. See review CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, See detainee Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, "Countering The document states: "Khaldan 1990-2001." Not With Al-Qa'ida. A common misperception in outside Affiliated is that Khaldan camp was run by al- articles Qa'ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant,' which led to the inference that Khaldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama bin Laden. The group's flagship camp, al- the have reportedly created in Faruq, late 1980s so that bin Laden's new organization could was a training the infrastructure of 'Abdullah Azzam's Maktab independent the nongovernmental organization that al-Khidamat, supported Khaldan. Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and Khaldan was not between overseen Laden's organization. There were relations bin the al-Qa'ida camps and Khaldan. Trainees, by particularly Saudis, who had finished basic training at Khaldan were referred to al-Qa'ida camps for advanced exchange courses, Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'ida training. The two groups, however, did not and trainers." mi iii i MIB^B^BWi^B ii"iHIMi 11 Page 21 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 21

51 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN (TS/^^m^^^^^y/NF) day that Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys On the of discussed prohibition on torture that might permit CIA officers to the interpretations criminal 61 interrogation with An attorney in CTC also sent an email certain the engage in activities. Update" H^HCTC "Torture Legal listing, without subject line to the on in the Geneva Conventions, restrictions Convention the commentary, interrogation 62 the criminal prohibition on torture. Against Torture, and 2002, In late its eventual custody of Abu March anticipating CIA CIA options for his transfer to considering custody and detention the began Zubaydah, MON. The CIA rejected U.S. military custody BIHIH, in under part because of the large lack security and the fact that Abu Zubaydah of have to be declared to the the would 63 of the Red Cross (ICRC). The International Committee concerns about custody at CIA's Guantanamo Cuba, included the general lack of secrecy and the "possible loss of control to Bay, 64 military and/or Rendition to Country | was rejected because of the perception that US FBI." of disappointing, country's recent interrogations had been results as well as the intense the that Station in from CIA leadership. As ALEC Zubaydah wrote, the CIA needed to interest Abu directly in the interrogation, "[n]ot because we believe necessarily we can participate on improve [Country performance, but because the reasons for the lack of progress will be transparent |j 65 reportable the line." and up the course of four days, the CIA settled on a detention site in Over Country | because that country's of only the of U.S. court and The lack disadvantages identified by the CIA with jurisdiction. detention in Country | were that it would not be a "USG-controlled facility" and that 66 "diplomatic/policy be required. decisions" As a March 28, 2002, CLA document would the proposal render Abu Zubaydah to Country | had not yet been broached acknowledged, to country's "[w]e The document also warned: that can't guarantee security. If AZ's with officials. 67 impact not clear what the known, would be." become presence does The decision to detain Abu Zubaydah at a covert detention facility (TS/^^^^^^I^I^NF) | did input involve the in Country of the National Security Council Principals Committee, not 68 Department State, the U.S. ambassador, or the CIA chief of Station in Country (, On the of have 29, an email from March Office of the Deputy DCI stated that "[w]e will 2002, to the 61 29, 2002, email from March cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject, NEW INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan ("I have thought about the 18 USC sect. 2340 we briefly discussed yesterday."). issues 62 March to: ^Hlfl^H; subject: Torture Update; date: [REDACTED]; 28, 2002, at 11:28:17 Email from: AM. 63 (281106Z MAR 02). PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu 19595 March 27, Zubaydah, 2002. 64 presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. PowerPoint presentation, PowerPoint Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002. 65 ALEC (282105Z MAR 02) 66 PowerPoint Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. presentation, 67 Zubaydah, Options for Incarcerating Abu PowerPoint March 28, 2002. presentation, 68 to: from: [REDACTED] HflHR Pavitt; James Email subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE MAR GREEN] Armitage; date: September26^002jDIRECTOR^^B (HH| for 02). Briefing 1111 |M 1 i i MBBI^^^MBMI mi " i II Page 22 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 22

52 UNCLASSIFIED //NOFORN 1 TOP SECRET/JI certain gaps our planning/preparations, but this is the option the DDCI will lead acknowledge in 69 POTUS That morning, the president approved moving forward with consideration." for with 70 transfer Zubaydah to Country |. the During to same Presidential Daily Brief the Abu plan option of Rumsfeld suggested exploring the Defense of putting Abu Secretary (PDB) session, a ship; however, CIA records do not indicate any further input from the Zubaydah on 71 That the CIA Station in Country | obtained the approval of Country |'s jrincipals. day, 72 the detention site. in The U.S. deputy chief of mission for officials CIA the was by the CIA who after Country J's leadership, concurred in notified Country Station 73 of the ambassador, ^fl^^fl^^^^HHI^^HB Shortly thereafter, Abu absence was rendered from Pakistan to Country | where he Zubaydah held at the first CIA was 74 referred to in this summary as "DETENTION SITE GREEN." detention CIA records site, that Country the last location of a CIA detention facility known to the president indicate | was president, the subsequent locations were kept from vice principals as a matter of White or the as 75 of inadvertent disclosures of the location avoid the CIA detention sites. policy House to with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future 3. Tensions Challenges 1) The after the rendition of Abu Zubaydah to DETENTION day GREEN, which was responsible for the security of SITE the detention facility, linked its support for the CIA's detention site to a request the | for support the CIA The CIA eventually provided the from requested | According to CIA cables and internal documents, | 69 : from: HHHHH to: HIHHA subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002. Email is POTUS President of the United States. an abbreviation for 70 date: subject: from: INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan; to: March 29, [REDACTED]; Email NEW 2002. 71 [REDACTED]; to: HHi^H> subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; email from: Email from: [DETENTION to: Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on James SITE GREEN] Briefing for ^HH; [REDACTED] was September 26, 2002. After the Armitage; session, the assistant secretary of state date: PDB briefed. assistant secretary indicated that he would brief the secretary and deputy secretary of state. An internal The Advisor email that at the NSC, CIA National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy National Security stated only Hadley briefed. See DIRECTOR •• (H^H were 02); email from: [REDACTED] fl^^fl; to: MAR James Pavitt; date: September 26, 2002. 72 [REDACTED] MAR 02) 69132 73 [REDACTED] MAR 02) 69132 (H|| 74 and on the rendition For Abu Zubaydah information the establishment of DETENTION SITE additional of see. Volume 1. ^^^ GREEN, 75 HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS ••Hfl^HHB CIA records [REDACTED]; presence that CIA had not indicate policymakers of the the of CIA detention facilities in Countries | informed and It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country | and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 76 02); example, [REDACTED] 70240 (300614Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70112 (250929Z See, for APR [REDACTED] (080545Z MAY 02); Congressional 70459 Intelligence Support to | Notification: 12002 (DTS #2002-2932); and Operation, MEMORANDUM Director of Central Intelligence; FOR: ~ FROM: |; SUBJECT: Your meeting with 12002; cover page dated 2002. y/NOFORN TOP SECRET/, Page 23 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 23

53 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NQFORN | to replace | for supporting responsible | individuals 77 whom officials were replaced by different officials Those the CIA the facility. CIA's detention 78 of the CIA's believed site. were Despite considerable effort by the not supportive detention for DETENTION SITE GREEN from its new Countiyltoretaii^upport CIA^tationin called for the closing of the CIA detention facility partners, ll^^l^HH 79 weeks. Continued lobbying by the chief of Station, however, eventually led within three to reverse allowing DETENTION SITE GREEN decision, remain this | to Country 80 operational. 2002, the CIA Station in Country On to list April | attempted number Country | officers who, "[t]o the of of Station's knowledge," had "knowledge the best presence of Abu Zubaydah" in a specific city of the Country The list included eight in individuals, to "various" personnel ^gggg^gg^ references H » of ff» sta {he and 81 April others." concluded By many H, 2002, ••H, "[d]oubtless and had learned that Abu Zubaydah was in Country a media the CIA to organization prompting 82 media organization the "security implications" the revealing the information. to The explain of Station in Country | also expressed concern that CIA inquiries "would do nothing for our press liaison bilateral relations, possibly diminishing chances that [the ^^^Bl^l of Country and permit that Zubaydah] to remain in country or |] will he would accept other [Abu [Abu 83 2002, the future." Zubaydah]-like In November in after the CIA learned that a major renderees U.S. newspaper knew that Abu Zubaydah was in Country senior CIA officials, as well as Vice 84 President the newspaper not to publish the information. Cheney, While the U.S. urged did not Country | as the location of Abu Zubaydah, the fact that it had the newspaper reveal to combined media interest, resulted in the decision previous close information, with 85 SITE GREEN. DETENTION Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to FBI Abu a Hospital is Taken to Cooperate; Where He Provides Information the Zubaydah Later Describes "Important" and "Vital" CIA as Abu ) After was rendered to DETENTION SITE GREEN Zubaydah on March he was questioned by special , 2002, from the Federal Bureau of agents 77 for [REDACTED] 74636 See, example, 78 76975 [REDACTED] 79 [REDACTED] 77115 80 [REDACTED] 77281 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks detailing the began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement." program revelations described, the tensions with Country | were unrelated to public As about the program. however, 81 [REDACTED] 69626 ••^••B 82 Email from: William Harlow, Director of the CIA Office of Public Affairs; to: John McLaughlin, Buzzy Stanley Krongard, Rizzo, James Pavitt, [REDACTED], John Moskowitz; subject: [REDACTED] Moseman, John Re: Abu Zubaydah; date: April 25, 2002,12:06:33 PM. call 83 [REDACTED] 701681 84 A ril ALEC P HH 6> 2006, Interview, | Chief, Renditions and Detainees Group 85 DIRECTOR | TOP SECRET//I — Page 24 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 24

54 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET/JI (FBI) who Arabic and had experience interrogating members of al-Qa'ida. Investigation spoke confirmed Abu to the FBI officers, informed the FBI officers he wanted to his Zubaydah identity evening, background his activities. That on Abu provided information cooperate, and deteriorated rapidly and he required immediate Zubaydah's medical condition hospitalization. Zubaydah largely unable to communicate because was a breathing tube, he Abu Although of provide information to FBI and CIA officials at the hospital continued an Arabic to using chart. to records, the FBI officers remained at Abu Zubaydah's bedside alphabet According Abu ordeal in his medical care. When assisted Zubaydah's breathing tube this and throughout on April 8, 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided was intelligence and reiterated his removed additional 85 to intention cooperate. April 10, an debriefing session, conducted in the During 2002, intensive hospital's unit, Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI officers that an individual care named was the al-Qa'ida "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified "Mukhtar" of Mukhtar by the FBI from the FBI's Most Wanted list. The picture was of a picture provided Mohammad in who had been indictcd Shaykh 1996 for his role in Ramzi Khalid (KSM), United s to detonate explosives on 12 plotting States-flagged aircraft and destroy Yousef terrorist 87 over the Pacific Ocean. them Abu mid-flight told the interrogators that "Mukhtar" Zubaydah was to Ramzi Yousef, whom Abu Zubaydah said was in an American jail (Yousef had related convicted and the aforementioned terrorist plotting been was involved in the 1993 World for 88 Center attack). terrorist Trade officers Abu told (TS^^BH^^P&JF) FBI Zubaydah that "Mukhtar" trained the the 9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include that KSM spoke English, was approximately 34 years old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida fluent 89 outside of Subsequent representations on the success of the CIA's operations Afghanistan. Interrogation of consistently describe Abu Zubaydah's identification and Detention Program as in September role 2001, attacks, as well the his identification of KSM's alias KSM's 11, 90 being "important" and "vital" information. records A review of CIA ("Mukhtar"), found as 91 this was corroborative that information already in CIA databases. of information of Abu Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use is Coercive 5. While Zubaydah Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah Interrogation (092316Z APR 02). See Abu Zubaydah detainee review 10005 Volume III for additional in information. ^^^^ 87 2001, States Court of Appeals, August See United U.S. v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR •• Term, H-TAN 02). See also ^^••^^•CIA MAR 02). ^ 10022 (121216Z 02). CIA records include the variant spelling, "Muhktar." KSM was placed on APR FBI's 10,2001. "Most Wanted Terrorist" list on October the See also U.S. Department of Justice materials public to related Ahmed Yousef. Ramzi 89 H^H 10022(1212167 02); 18334 (261703Z MAR 02) APR 90 See, for example, President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, information which Abu Zubaydah provided "quite important" that and "disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, stated or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." that 91 See information later in this summary and Volume II for additional details. I I II I I I I I I III II Page 25 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 25

55 UNCLASSIFIED TOP While Abu was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA (TSZ/H^I^^I^^B^^) Zubaydah discussing Headquarters officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his how began CIA recommended SITE initial CIA interrogation proposal The that DETENTION GREEN. return to with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested the interrogators engage involving that government personnel, be taken "only as a last a "hard foreign approach," 92 a meeting about this proposal, ^^^^^^CTC Legal, At resort." a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of recommended Services that Technical Grayson be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to (OTS), SWIGERT, 93 Zubaydah^esistance overcome SWIGERT had come to ^^H^l's to Abu interrogation." worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA through attention who proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept Headquarters an all-white room that was lit 24 formally in a day, Abu Zubaydah not be provided any that that his sleep be disrupted, that hours amenities, loud be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with noise him. records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions CIA 94 lead to develop a sense of "learned helplessness." Abu CIA Headquarters would Zubaydah an was team to Country including SWIGERT, whose initial role sent to then interrogation 95 the on of the interrogation. aspects consult psychological Tenet provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah DCI was plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA interrogation was preparing for team Abu transfer back to DETENTION SITE GREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation Zubaydah's 96 intended "set the stage" and increase control over Abu Zubaydah. update The team stated: to [CIA] require interrogator will "Our Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most lead if he sensitive knows we are seeking; he dissembles or diverts the secret conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time... In accordance with strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters, the two on-site agents will no longer directly participate in the the FBI 97 interview/debriefing sessions." from: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; to ^HH^^HB subject: Interrogation email Attachment to: on H^H^^^I [Abu Zubaydah] Interrogation Strategy, 01 Strategy, 2002; date: March Powerpoint April ^^^^^^^ 31,2002. 93 1,2002, to [REDACTED], cc: from [REDACTED] re: POC for [Grayson Email April consultant who drafted al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation SWIGERT]- (noting that CTC/LGL backgrounder woukUeach to SWIGERT). According to die email, after the meeting, IH^HHCTC Legal, out officers, provided information to ALEC Station contact noting that it was SWIGERT W^m SWIGERT's composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa'ida resistance techniques. who 94 On evening of April 1, 2002, "at the request the CTC/OPSand ALEC" Station, a cable from OTS with a of proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country | (H^H 178955 (012236Z APR 02). The information in this cable consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed "several was strategic modifications an atmosphere that enhances the create interrogation process." The cable environmental to "[t |he deliberate manipulation of the environment noted, intended to cause psychological disorientation, and is reduced wherewithal for the interrogation," as psychological as "the deliberate establishment of psychological well dependence upon the interrogator," and "an increased sense of learned helplessness." ( See [REDACTED] 69500 detainee (070009Z For detailed information, see Volume I and the Abu Zubaydah 02).) review in Volume III. APR 95 DIRECTOR •• APR 02) 56 CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 Hours." 97 Hours." Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 CIA 1 urn iii i UBBMi^^BBM mi mil 11 i Page 26 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 26

56 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECi^^^^——//NQFQRN FBI special questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital The agents the CIA's In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that objected to plans. 98 had "tremendous influence." psychologists The message further stated: the CIA acquired and has the last two days over Agency [CIA] is ready health "AZ's improved Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back to^H^^^on to move [Abu plan change elaborate AZ's environment. Agency [CIA] in an to in day will be immediately changing tactics they all future AZ this that advised having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ interviews will by (there FBI in interview room). This change contradicts all be no presence to date... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away conversations had and holding information' from providing threat information (It should be back note that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and [sic] now got speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital have him not full appropriate interview environment for and follow-up (due to bed [an] AZ health). psychiatric team here wants the to only interact with his Suddenly [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way their get the threat to information... offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions We .This immediately further discussion. .. without again is quite were declined as all information obtained from AZ has odd from FBI lead interviewers come and 1 have spent an questioning... amount of hours at [Abu un-calculable Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and comforting him medical procedures, even assisting him in through various [sic] the have built tremendous report We with AZ and [to] bathroom... going we are on the eve of 'regular' interviews to get threat now we that information, 99 out' of future interviews." been have 'written "Most Interrogation Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's CIA Important Secret"; FBI 6. New Plan Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed Temporarily for 47 Without Questioning in Isolation Days n while 13, 2002, O Abu Zubaydah April still at the hospital, (^S/ylHHHUH^P) was 100 initial implemented interrogation program." CIA This "new meeting was held with the the one interrogator in the room and lasted 11. minutes. A cable stated that the CIA interrogator just 101 coached by the "psychological team." was The CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that he (Abu Zubaydah) a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know." "had to about cable, Abu Zubaydah "amazingly" nodded in agreement According the secret, but the 98 interrogation of Investigation documents pertaining "to the Federal of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Bureau Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). 99 interrogation Bureau Investigation documents pertaining "to Federal of of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu the Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). (131233Z APR 02) 110026 110026 (131233Z APR 02) llll I I III I MMfJI^^^^MB^NOFORN Page 27 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 27

57 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 102 "did information, as [the interrogation team] expected." not A cable further any divulge Abu Zubaydah that he understood that the key question was about explained that indicated 103 plans the United States," officer and that the CIA terrorist told Abu "impending future against key for "when he decides to discuss that 'one signal item he knows he is Zubaydah to him 104 [interrogator].'" officers The FBI keeping provided a similar account to FBI from the adding that: spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA Headquarters, "We Zubaydah] one psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu the to signal he was and of officer] talk. [Abu Zubaydah] apparently went to sleep... ready did not approach [Abu to they 105 of the day." the In their rest with FBI Headquarters, the FBI Zubaydah] communications wrote that they explained officers rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation their team "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members and 106 much success KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that with (al-Owhali, 107 was where we could time to solicit threat information..." attempt valuable passing the April 2002, per a scripted plan, 15, same CIA interrogator vxmm^mmw) On what a CIA cable described as "the pre-move message" to Abu Zubaydah: that "time is delivered out," had his situation running changed, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu that 108 was "to discuss the one thing he signal hiding." did Abu Zubaydah was sedated Zubaydah not moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE and When Abu Zubaydah awoke at GREEN. 11:00 four hours after his arrival, he was PM, as surprised and disturbed by his new described situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the "objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at 109 his state." most vulnerable A cable Abu Zubaydah's ccll as white with no natural (TS/^^B^^^^H^^) described 110 cell. four halogen lights pointed into the with windows, An air conditioner was or but lighting the room. A white curtain separated also interrogation room from the ccll. The in the cell three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also had with one of two chairs interrogation provided were rotated based on his level of that (one described as more comfortable than the cooperation other). officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and Security well to Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as Abu as to prevent Abu Zubaydah goggles keep seeing the security guards as individuals "from he may attempt to establish a relationship or who 111 dialogue The security officers communicated with." hand signals when they were with by 102 10026 (131233Z 02) APR 103 10029 02) (131505Z APR 104 (131505Z 02) 10029 APR 105 of Investigation documents pertaining Federal the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Bureau "to and provided to Zabaidah" Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS the #2010-2939). 106 Papers Science Board "Intelligence Interviewing: See Intelligence and Case Studies" for additional Teaching details on the FBI's interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali. 107 Federal of Investigation documents pertaining "to the Bureau of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu interrogation Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2< 108 02) 10043 (151614Z APR 109 10047 (161406Z APR 02) 110 APR 10116 (250731Z 02) II (162029Z APR 02) 10053 TOP SECRET/, 7NOFORN Page 28 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 28

58 UNCLASSIFIED TOP Zubaydah and hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud Abu used was played noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah's "sense of rock music or 112 113 kept naked and sleep typically Zubaydah Abu was hopelessness." deprived. 2002, cable explained that the An strategy April 16, interrogation since Zubaydah's medical condition prevented Abu isolation as originally shifted had "total to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now "deemed to be the planned." According approach" for information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed best acquiring 114 with April 17, 2002, an FBI officer met On Abu Zubaydah for six Zubaydah. Abu to question 115 records state that Abu Zubaydah had FBI seen the interviewing (FBI) agent" since hours. "not 116 but that Abu Zubaydah greeted the 2002, by name. 11, During the questioning April agent Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific targets Abu a pending attack and for "advised many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about that types of against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that all attacks 117 States] not be concerned about this type of United talk." Abu Zubaydah provided [the should well al-Qa'ida, on past travel to the United States, as KSM, as general information his 118 on extremists in Pakistan. information Abu Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators (TS/Zm^HII^I^NF) April throughout but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the 2002, officers of 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI 20, about two men who approached evening April with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in him United States. Abu the Zubaydah he did not believe the plan was viable stated did not know the names of the two and 119 but provided physical descriptions of the pair. information This individuals, was acquired after Abu was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals Zubaydah 120 The would later represent that this information was acquired "as a result" of the to KSM. CIA information the interrogation techniques, and that the enhanced acquired resulted in of CIA's use APR 02). CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah was 110116 but given a towel to (250731Z nude, himself interrogated. See, for exampl^Jjm 10080 (200735Z when 02). cover APR 10053 113 l90iz APR02 As 02);^^^^10094(21 (162029Z )- APR detailed in BHH III, the FBI Volume Special only questioned Abu Zubaydah when he was covered with a towel. Sleep deprivation during this Agents the also how sleep deprivation was implemented after from Department of Justice approved the period differed enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. Rather than CIA's placed in a stress position during sleep being deprivation, Zubaydah was kept awake by being Abu nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. questioned Records further indicate that during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See, example, ••• 10116 (250731Z APR 02). for (161406Z 02) 110047 APR 110058 (171904Z APR 02) 116 Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Federal July and to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated Zabaidah" 20, 2010 (DTS provided #2010-2939). 117 I^HH 10058 (171904Z APR 02) 118 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information. 119 ••• (210703Z APR 02). As described in more detail in Volume 10090 Abu Zubaydah did provide II, kunyas for the pair. 120 10063 II (180515Z APR 02). As described in detail in Volume MHi and Volume III, as well as more sleep. briefly this summary, Abu Zubaydah provided this information after being allowed to in 11 ii 11 i MWI^B^MBBB i ii i II i i Page 29 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 29

59 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 121 the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla. the However, the chief of thwarting of Zubaydah Task stated that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find the Abu Force CIA "alert" stated that the CIA was already another to the threat posed by them," while officer the that CIA's "suspicion" was only "enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Jose Padilla, and 122 information on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" Zubaydah." the capture of Jose Padilla and Additional in this summary. is provided later the During April 2002, which included a period during month (TS^HI^mHH^^) of to was on life support, and unable Zubaydah speak, the CIA Abu which hospitalized, 123 reports on intelligence his interrogations. 39 At the end of April 2002, the disseminated based GREEN provided team SITE CIA Headquarters with three DETENTION interrogation coercive strategies. chose the most Headquarters interrogation option, which interrogation CIA 124 and This by CIA contractor SWIGERT. proposed was coercive interrogation supported included sensory again opposed by the FBI special agents at option—which deprivation—was 125 engage interrogation proposal was to The in "only a single-minded, the site. detention 126 Once questioning threat information." focused current implemented, this totally of consistent, to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed approach Zubaydah failed Abu threats the United States and information to al-Qa'ida operatives located in the possessed: about States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide other intelligence. In May United 127 the disseminated 2002, intelligence reports based on the interrogations. 56 CIA In early 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that (TS/^^^^H^^^^/NF) June the spend weeks in isolation while Zubaydah interrogation team members departed Abu several facility "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to the the team needed allow time for a break and to attend to personal matters as well as to discuss off "the 128 Abu Zubaydah HIH with officers of CIA Headquarters. endgame" As a result, from from June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being 121 See in this summary and Volume II for additional details on the CIA's representations on the information the of interrogation techniques to policy makers and enhanced Department of Justice. effectiveness CIA's the to: 122 H^^HHHR July ^I^I^^H^H subject: AZ information; date: CIA 10,2002, at email from: is The states: "The only way we put this together email that Paki liaison mentioned to PM. 01:18:50 two ut two anc of (one American) and H^^BHH P individuals two an ' arrest together. Therefore, AZ's the being alone would never have allowed us to find them." See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated info 12, Pakistani (DTS #2002-2603), in which a CIA officer states, "the June liaison felt it was important to bring 2002 to information attention, given the recent raids.. .there was enough [Padilla] indicating that his travel was our the to suspicious, on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during put debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which us occurred on 21 April." '"See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the ^B^latabase. The of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are titles in in Zubaydah detainee review Abu Volume III. listed the 124 ^^^ ••• MAY 02) ALEC 125 Heat exchange from: [REDACTED]; to See with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the email in [REDACTED]; the Interrogations; date: April 30, AZ at 12:02:47 PM. 2002, 126 See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in the AZ date: April 30,2002, at 12:02:47 PM. Interrogations; CIA, analysis to the Committee ™See April 18,2011, by the provided based on CIA searches in 2011 of the on database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are review listed Abu Zubaydah detainee the in Volume III. in I2H 10424 (070814ZJUN 02) TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 30 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 30

60 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET/JI any questions. the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the asked Despite CIA month, intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu disseminated the 37 129 well CIA would later represent publicly—as The as in classified June 2002. Zubaydah in use of "established US Government settings-—that techniques," Abu during the interrogation all in June 2002, requiring the cooperation" of the CIA's "stopped Zubaydah development 130 enhanced CIA records do not support this assertion. interrogation techniques. Abu Prior 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah to Zubaydah's on provided plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to al-Qa'ida information activities, leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, on information its 131 training, As described and more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu tactics. in inability provide information on the next to in the United States and Zubaydah's attack in the United States operatives as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah served was as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use "uncooperative," would later known as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" to become of what be reveal Abu information the CIA believed he was withholding. and Zubaydah "compliant" the information this provided CIA officers later concluded this was information, Abu never and 132 did not possess. Zubaydah After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, the Abu Zubaydah (^S/V^BBBjjj^^B^yNF) | ^^BBH^BBBH^^BI[departed MI IIIIIIIII Country Security and medical iliniili not remained detention site. The FBI special agents did the return to DETENTION personnel at 133 GREEN. SITE Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based 7. Techniques Interrogation Leads the Development of the CIA 's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA to Over that Interrogation Process Takes Precedence "the Preventative Determines Medical Procedures " m See analysis to tlie Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the provided database. The of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are HI titles III the Zubaydah detainee review in Volume Abu of the Committee Study. listed in 130 Presidential Speech on September 6,2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CI A personnel. See also See September "During Unclassified Public Release: ODNI initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some 2006 important, that viewed as nominal. Some was probably however, including that Khalid Shaykh information lie (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the Mohammad 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to moniker comb collected intelligence for both names, opening previously new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that up eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed al-Qa'ida; See interrogation would be safe, effective, and legal." that also CIA Director Michael Hayden, a new program Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention Classified Interrogation and Program, 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-1563) ("...FBI and CIA continued unsuccessfully to try April glean information to from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government interrogation techniques..."). 131 See reporting in Abn Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu charts in dated 2005. The same information is included March an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared Zubaydah," on 9 August 2006." 132 See Zubaydah detainee review in Abu III for additional details. Volume 133 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume IB for additional details. 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 31 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 31

61 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN In early CIA officers held several meetings at CIA July 2002, 134 discuss use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah. Headquarters the to possible from of SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived meetings the U.S. the course During those 135 Resistance and Escape) school. a SWIGERT provided military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, SERE possible for 12 use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) list techniques of standing, facial (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall slap, (7) stress positions, (8) (4) facial hold, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock sleep deprivation, 136 SWIGERT recommended that the CIA enter into a contract with Hammond burial. also co-author DUNBAR, CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance of his the 137 SWIGERT, CIA interrogation process. in Like aid DUNBAR had never to training, the a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the participated in paper 138 and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school. with he authored SWIGERT 134 titled, dated, July 3, 2002, .1630 Hours, document "CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA See CIA SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Leadership, on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and Hi Raid Update 135 more information the SERE program, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the For on Senator Detainees Custody, December 2008. See also statement of U.S. Carl Levin on the inquiry, of in Treatment 2008: "SERE training is intended to be used to teach December soldiers how to resist interrogation by 11, our that to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. refuse SERE school, our troops who are at enemies In of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted risk abusive from used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean tactics of SERE include stress positions, forced nudity, use techniques fear, sleep deprivation and, until War. training the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste recently, they be of what subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to might detainees The were never intended to be used against techniques in U.S. custody. As one [Joint Personnel resist. Recovery Agency (JPRA)] instructor explained, SERE training is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years." Geneva 135 Email subject: Description of Physical Pressures; date: July 8, from: to: 04:15:15 PM. 2002, at 137 (051724Z 02) •• ALEC JUL 138 Hammond DUNBAR, submitted to the CLA in March 2003. In a section on "Interrogation and See Resume, and Experience," resume noted that he had been a "dehriefer for all USG DOD 2003 Debriefing DUNBAR's Civilian other experience in the All related to his |.)." section experience as a contractor for the CIA beginning in 2002. DUNBAR's resume did state that he had interrogation in participated interrogation training course in in 1992, and that he had taken a one-week an does Interrogation some point in 2002, although his resume at not indicate whether this was prior to, Defense Course the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the Committee or after, was Study "incorrect... asserting that the contractors selected had no relevant experience." The CIA's June 2013 in Response notes and DUNBAR's experience at the SWIGERT of Defense SERE school, and SWIGERT's Department "academic research" and "research papers" on "such topics as resistance training, captivity familiarization, and learned helplessness of which were relevant to the development of the program." The CIA's June 2013 - all interrogations does any experience related to actual describe or counterterrorism, or any relevant Response not geographic, or linguistic expertise. The CIA's June 2013 Response provides tine following explanation: cultural, [SWIGERT] [DUNBAR] "Drs. had the closest proximate expertise CIA sought at the beginning of the program, and Experts in area of non-standard means of interrogation. the on traditional interrogation methods did not specifically meet this requirement. Non-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertise of CIA officers or of the US generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we Government be not out when it became clear that CIA would them heading into the uncharted territory of the program" sought (italics and emphasis in original). As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a in decision made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather, SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role was convincing CIA to adopt such a policy. the 11 ii 11111 Page 32 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 32

62 UNCLASSIFIED //NOFORN 1 TOP SECRET/JI 1 ) May 2003, a senior CIA interrogator would tell personnel from (^SyV^^I^^HIHr^ I" Office the that SWIGERT and DUNBAR's SERE school model was of Inspector CIA's General North designed "physical torture" and was resisting to extract "confessions based on Vietnamese actionable from airmen "who possessed little U.S. intelligence." The propaganda for purposes" believed, "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists CIA, he where 139 the ultimate goal." are confessions not July meetings, the CIA's l^flCTC Legal, the 2002 After letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft asking the Department m^l^m^drafted a of for formal declination of prosecution, in advance, "a any employees of the United Justice for as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, States, may employ who methods the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to in 140 The further indicated that "the interrogation team had concluded" that prosecution." letter of Abu aggressive methods is required to persuade use Zubaydah to provide the "the more innumerable information to safeguard the lives of need innocent men, women and critical we within the United States and abroad." The letter added children these "aggressive methods" that would be prohibited by the torture statute, "apart from potential reliance upon the otherwise 141 of or of self-defense." was This letter doctrines circulated internally at the CIA, necessity indicate to however, there are no records to including it was provided to the attorney SWIGERT; 142 general. and the CIA's acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from the National Security Council and Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as well as with Michael the the head the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel Levin, the chief of Chertoff, of of the director, to provide an overview FBI the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques staff to to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness of employing the and 143 CIA techniques against Abu Zubaydah. specific interrogation CIA described the 12 proposed interrogation The attorneys and told the Department of Justice and National Security techniques attorneys that Abu Council Zubaydah to withhold critical intelligence on continued identities of al-Qa'ida personnel in the the United States and planned al-Qa'ida attacks. The CIA attorneys also told the group that CIA officers were by: complemented personnel retained contract who possess extensive experience, "expert on psychological the of Defense, on the within and physical gained Department 139 of by [REDACTED] and Interview Office of the Inspector General, October [REDACTED], 22, The senior interrogator had participated in the 2003. of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques with use SWIGERT and DUNBAR 140 July 2002. 8, date: DRAFT; ONLY- EYES ; subject: from: Email |; to: 141 date: EYES ONLY- ; subject: 2002. 8, July DRAFT; Email from: ; to: 142 DRAFT; date: ONLY- July EYES 2002. ; subject: 8, Email from: ; to: 143 DIRECTOR (031357Z 02) AUG y/NOFORN TOP SECRETA Page 33 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 33

63 UNCLASSIFIED TOP of interrogation the resistance techniques employed as methods and 144 such interrogation." to countermeasures CIA describing the meeting, the the cable According to OLC, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, representatives from the advised criminal on torture would not prohibit prohibition methods proposed by the the that the because of the absence of any specific interrogation to inflict severe physical or team intent 145 suffering. pain On July 13,2002, Yoo sent an unclassified letter to the CIA's acting mental or 146 describing counsel of the statute. interpretation general his that the Despite expressed by Yoo initial the use of the (TS/^H^^HH^^/NF) view CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security proposed Condoleezza Advisor requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for Rice 147 Zubaydah's the attorney general issued an opinion. interrogation The following Abu until and requested National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley Rice that the Department day, Deputy next the of the memo detailing the "delay phase of interrogations" until the of Justice approval provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and CIA explanation of "an why CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu the 148 the asked the CIA to provide Zubaydah." OLC with a description of each of the Rice planned interrogation and to "gather and provide techniques, available empirical data on the reactions any and likelihood of prolonged mental harm from the use of the 'water board' and the staged 149 burial." July (TSy/^B^^^^H^^P) a cable providing details on the proposed 15, On 2002, of that the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief stated Base would be phase interrogation only interrupt or stop allowed interrogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the to an decision-making as to whether the CIA's authority techniques applied to Abu final interrogation 150 be discontinued. Zubaydah The CIA officers at the detention site added: would [Abu "If a serious medical condition which may involve a Zubaydah] develops another of a heart attack or including catastrophic type of host conditions all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be condition, dies, to In the event [Abu Zubaydah] [him]. we need to be prepared provided 151 accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts." to act 144 DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02) ^^M 145 DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02) BBB 146 13, 2002, Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General to John Rizzo, Acting General July Counsel, CIA. 147 Staff, the Record from John H. Moseman, Chief Memorandum for re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 17, 2002. of 148 July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update the Abu Zubaydah Operation and Raid on 149 Update July 1630 Hours, CIA Operational 21, Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE 2002, ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and Raid 10536 JUL 02) (151006Z 151 10536 (151006Z JUL 02) TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN Page 34 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 34

64 UNCLASSIFIED //NOFORN 1 TOP SECRET/JI To address issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were (TS/^im^mi^NF) these 152 the would be cremated. interrogation, The interrogation team closed the cable to die he during by stating: and we follow however, option especially in which [disposition] "regardless the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we light of get that assurances to [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation need reasonable 153 for remainder of his life." incommunicado the and from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to (TS^SHI^^IB^^) Officers the team's several days later. Their cable comments that the interrogation team interrogation noted correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedcncc over was 154 preventative medical ALEC Station further observed: procedures." is a fairly unanimous within HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will "There sentiment placed significant a situation where he has any be contact with others never in While the to be released. opportunity it is difficult to discuss and/or has at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu specifics should incommunicado Zubaydah] for the remainder of his life. This remain to preclude from being turned over Zubaydah] another country, but may [Abu decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet a final be to 155 made." 2 the A s a result of (TS/^H^^^^^^H^H ) by National Security Advisor Rice for request additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel contacted individuals the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), at agency that the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the the administers 156 training to According in CIA officer who had techniques exercises. an the OTS after | years at JPRA, joined individual with SERE school Ht CIA's commented that "information gleaned via harsh experience may not be accurate, as the treatment prisoner say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations may of in permanent phase of conducted may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds the capture »1S7 questioning. Pursuant to National (zsmmmmm) Advisor Rice's request, CIA Security Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team—particularly JUL 02) (151006Z 10536 (151006Z JUL 10536 02) (182321Z JUL 02) 02) 182321Z JUL 156 19, July date: information; Email 2002; |; to: [REDACTED]; subject: from: for JPRA Request from 2002, 24, July to John Yoo and [REDACTED] providing fax from the information OTS/OAD psychologists; email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ject: Discussion with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002. 157 Email to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for from: information; date: July 19, 2002. JPRA Records indicatethat^^B^fs notes were not provided to the Department of Justice. In November 2002, interrogator |, along Chief of Interrogations led the first CIA with training course. Page 35 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 35

65 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ / NOFORN 1/ DUNBAR—about and effects of the use of the waterboard and the SWIGERT psychological chief noting Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN responded by cable The that: mock burial. of parse of and we do not wish to a nation words. A bottom line in are "We laws new measures proposed is that considering Zubaydah] is being held the [Abu confinement, his will, without legal representation, as an in solitary against Therefore, our society and our people. our while the of country, enemy in Headquarters meetings and techniques are administered to described below volunteers the U.S. in a harmless way, in no measurable impact student with psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe on the can assure the same here we for forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this a man future course the remainder of his life. Station, [DETENTION SITE is the of of GREEN] and [DETENTION SITE chief personnel will make GREEN Base] subject effort insure [sic] that to is not permanently physically every possible harmed but we should not say at the outset or mental this process that there of 158 is no risk." former for the United States Air Force, As psychologists and DUNBAR had no direct experience with the SWIGERT as it was not used in waterboard, Air SERE training. Nonetheless, they Force that the waterboard—which they indicated described as an "absolutely convincing technique"—was necessary to overwhelm Abu 159 Zubaydah's ability They also responded that they were aware that the Navy—which to resist. any waterboard training—had not reported in significant long-term the technique used individuals from its use. Unlike the CIA's subsequent use consequences the waterboard, on of the use of the technique was a single Navy's exercise and did not extend to however, training sessions. SWIGERT and DUNBAR wrote: multiple physical "any to extremes can cause severe mental pain or pressure applied the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling suffering. Hooding, and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions taken to darkness safety can the same outcome. The have of any technique lies extreme 160 in how it is applied and monitored. primarily On July 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use 24, walling, interrogation included: the attention grasp, which the facial hold, the of 10 techniques, slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, wall standing, facial positions, sleep deprivation, stress 161 diapers, and use of insects. use of interrogation team, however, indicated that they The intended to wait for the approval to use the waterboard before proceeding with their verbally interrogation Zubaydah. On July 26, 2002, the attorney general Abu approved the of 158 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) 159 I^H 10568 (261101Z JUL 02) 160 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) [REDACTED] 161 DIRECTOR HH (251609Z AUG 0 TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 36 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 36

66 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 162 of the The OLC finalized its classified written legal opinion on August 1, use waterboard. earlier 2002. to conduct a mock burial was not formally considered by the CIA request The CIA interrogation along with other techniques, interrogation techniques approved OLC. The subsequently identified and used by the CIA, are referred to as the CIA's that were "enhanced techniques," more commonly by the CIA as "EITs." interrogation or 1 ) the course of seeking approval to use the techniques, CIA (TSidlHM In national the of Justice and the Department security advisor that "countless Headquarters advised Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what more knows." CIA he Headquarters represented that the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team further "Abu Zubaydah to withhold critical threat information," and "that in order to believed continues to use that information, "the him of more aggressive techniques is persuade provide" 163 The to DETENTION SITE GREEN cable CIA Headquarters documenting required." from information CIA Headquarters had provided to the Department the Justice warned that "[t]he of legal are predicated upon the determinations by the interrogation team that Abu conclusions 164 continues withhold critical threat information." According Zubaydah to cables, however, to determined CIA the the detention site had not interrogators that "the use of more aggressive at techniques was required" to "persuade" Abu Zubaydah to provide threat information. Rather, the interrogation believed the objective of the coercive interrogation techniques was to team Abu Zubaydah not have additional information on threats to the United States, confirm did writing: assumption the objective of "Our operation is to achieve a high degree is this [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information that of confidence threats to the United States beyond that concerning [Abu Zubaydah] has which 165 already provided." more As this summary, and in in detail in the full (fS^mi^iF) is described Study, the interrogation team later Committee the use of the CIA's enhanced deemed interrogation a success, not because it resulted techniques critical threat information, but in because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding the 166 aforementioned the interrogators. information from CIA Obtains and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; Legal 8. The Does Not Brief the President CIA The 162 from: to: Email Rodriguez, [REDACTED], ^ACTED]; Jose subject: ONLY - Where we stand re: Abu Zubaydah; EYES July 26,2002. JeTofrolH^HI 10568 date: (261101Z JUL02). 163 DIRECTOR ^^M (031357Z AUG 02) 164 DIRECTOR AUG 02) ^^^^^^^ (031357Z 165 email (231043Z [REDACTED] 02) and 73208 from: ••••^^fl; to: [REDACTED], JUL [REDACTED], and subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED] 23, 73208 02); date: July JUL 2002, at 07:56:49 PM. (231043Z 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) VNOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 37 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 37

67 UNCLASSIFIED TOP described, AS represented to National Security CIA (TS/^^^^^^^^BP/NF) officers attacks Abu withholding information on pending was and operatives that Advisor Rice Zubaydah On July 31, 2002, Rice informed Deputy DCI John McLaughlin that, in in the United States. of application CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the possible balancing the the CIA's lives, would not object to the American enhanced interrogation techniques if of loss she 167 determined legal. to be general attorney the them the (T&vBIHflB^B''^) July 2002, the CIA anticipated that the month During of enhanced to the use of the CIA's need interrogation techniques before would president approve be used. Therefore, in late July 2002, the they prepared talking points for a briefing could CIA president. draft talking points indicated that the CIA was planning to use These of the law beyond was normally permitted by what enforcement, and included techniques inteirogation description of the waterboard interrogation technique. On August 1, 2002, based on a brief from comments Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the talking points were revised to White House 168 that to CIA records indicate, however, waterboard. the talking points references the eliminate used to brief the president. On August 2, 2002, the were Security Council legal not National informed DCI's chief of staff that "Dr. Rice the been informed that there would be advisor had 169 the President on this matter," the but that no briefing DCI had policy approval to employ of 170 CIA's techniques. the enhanced interrogation of state prior records the use that the CIA's enhanced CIA to techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, the CIA did not brief Secretary of State interrogation members Powell of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two Secretary of the National Security or Colin 171 the techniques. Council, The Committee, including the chairman and vice chairman, was on 172 not briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques prior to their use. also Approximately a year on July 31, 2003, senior CIA personnel later, the president still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation believed had 173 In 2003, DCI Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that "he had techniques. August program to President regarding the detention and interrogation the or EITs, nor was never spoken 167 for the Record from John Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 31, 2002. Memorandum 168 July 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; July 31, 26, DCI that Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Note 2001, the draft Talking lists incorrect year. document the 169 records do not indicate who informed National Security Advisor CIA "that there would be no briefing of the Rice President on this matter." 170 Email from: John Moseman; to: John McLaughlin, Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; subject: Abu-Z date: August 2, 2002. Interrogation; 171 interrogations; Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on John date: July 31, 2003. Email from: 172 Volume II for additional information on See briefings. congressional 173 stated email CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel John An from that "the President will be briefed as part Rizzo of the regular annual [covert action] review. Briefing (by Rice or VP or Counsel to the President or some fact combination describe the interrogation program, the will that some aggressive but AG-approved thereof) techniques have been used, but will not apparently get into the details of the techniques themselves." See email 31, from: Rizzo; to: ^^^HBR subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July John 2003. 11II III I III III Ml Page 38 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 38

68 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 174 of had been briefed by his staff." he aware The May 2004 CIA whether the President Review General for the DCI to: Inspector included Special a recommendation regarding implementation of the Agency's detention President the "Brief the pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any and interrogation activities the other of EITs and the fact that detainees have authorities, including use 175 is significant." died. This Recommendation Review Special the Committee, DCI Tenet the In transmitting to the recommendation, noting only that "[t]he DCI will determine whether and to responded to 176 the a briefing on the Program." extent On April 6, 2006, CIA what requires President Chairman responded a request from Committee Vice to John D. Helgerson Inspector General on the status of corrective actions taken in response to the Special Review Rockefeller IV Helgerson regard for the president, a briefing wrote: "Consistent to With recommendations. recommendation, DCI Tenet, before he left office, and Director Goss, shortly after with this 177 both advised me that they taking made requests to brief the President." office, Prepared had "Questions Answers" for the National Security Council principals in connection with the and of the in September 2006 and subsequent media outreach also suggest that disclosure program interrogation was at the outset about the CIA's briefed techniques. In response president not the question: "What role did the President play.. .Was to the briefed on the interrogation potential he and when?" the proposed answer did not if so that the president was briefed, techniques, assert rather that the "President was not of course involved in CIA's day to but operations - day including should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are who 178 or by CIA Directors." made overseen 174 of General Counsel Comments on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program Special Review, Office Tenet, ("[i]n 2003, the at 23 advised OIG..."); CIA Office of Inspector General, Interview of George August DCI memorandum 8 September 2003, Subject: 2003-7123-IG, Review dated Interrogation for Counterterrrorism of Purposes. 175 Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001- October 2003), 7, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710). May 176 Letter J. Tenet to Chairman Pat Roberts, June 22,2004 (DTS #2004-2710). from George 177 then public disclosure of many of these "Additionally, ensured wide awareness. In Helgerson added, activities these developments, 1 consider the matter closed." The Helgerson letter light not indicate to whom Directors of does and who met regularly with the President, submitted Goss, to brief the President about the program. Tenet requests letter from John L. Helgerson to Vice Chairman John D. See IV, April 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-1564). The Rockefeller CIA's 2013 Response does not dispute these records. It states, however, that "[w]hile Agency records on the June his are former President Bush has stated in incomplete, autobiography that he discussed the subject admittedly including the use of enhanced techniques, with DCIA Tenet program, 2002, prior to application of the techniques in on Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." Abu subsequent memoir by former CIA Acting General A Counsel John Rizzo (published January 7,2014) states, "The one senior U.S. Government national security official during this August 2002 through 2003—who I did not believe was knowledgeable about the E.I.T.s was time—from Principal Bush was not present at any of the He Committee meetings ... and none of the President himself. at any of the E.I.T. sessions during this period principals alluded to the President knowing anything about ever them." 178 following: the packet of CIA information was Included in "Question: 'What role did the President play in the authorizing this program? Did he select detainees held by CIA or direct their interrogation? Was he briefed on the after interrogation if so when?' Answer: 'In the days and 9/11, the President directed that all the techniques, instruments of national power, including the resources of our intelligence, military, and law enforcement bounds communities, employed to fight and wi ' '" '"'"'iates, within the be of the law. 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 39 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 39

69 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN (^S/^I^^HHH^NF) indicate that the first CTA briefing for the president on CIA records 179 enhanced occurred on April 8, 2006. interrogation CIA records state that the CIA's techniques of was expressed discomfort with the "image he a detainee, chained president briefed, when the 180 a diaper, and forced to go to to the bathroom on himself." ceiling, clothed in the Uses Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation the Against 9. The CIA Techniques Zubaydah Abu August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation (^^S^fH^li^l^NP) On DETENTION at GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced team SITE According including against Abu Zubaydah. waterboard, to CIA techniques, interrogation the the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu records, only CIA Other at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical Zubaydah. personnel 181 - were "interrogators with whom he is familiar" and only to observe. other personnel CIA From August 4, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected 2002, Zubaydah to enhanced interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. After Abu its the had complete isolation for 47 days, in most aggressive interrogation Zubaydah been Abu 182 approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, phase began Security personnel entered the at 2002. shackled hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed and towel (Abu Zubaydah was then cell, his Without asking any questions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around his neck as naked). and a collar, him up into the cell wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collar was backed questioning included roles for CIA in detaining and new terrorists. [He was periodically updated by This important, Directors on significant captures of terrorists, and information obtained CIA helped stop attacks and led to that capture other terrorists.] [The President was not of of involved in CIA's day to day operations - including course who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are made or overseen by CIA Directors].'" See Questions and Proposed Answers, attached to Memorandum from National Security Advisor Draft J. Hadley; the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, Director of Stephen for: the and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; cc: Intelligence of staff to the President, Counsel to Chairman National chief Assistant the President for National Security, White to Spokesman, dated September 2, 2006. President, House in the original. Brackets m See 16, 2008, CIA "Backgrounder: Chronology of Interrogation Approvals, 2001-2003" (noting that "CIA April with and Presidential briefers and individuals involved with the interrogation program at documentation discussions time suggest that details on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) the not shared with the President" in the were 2001-2003 CIA Q&A, Topic: Waterboarding ("The information timeframe); have indicates the President was not we briefed by CIA regarding the specific interrogation techniques until April 2006, and at that time DC1A Goss briefed him on seven EITs proposed at that time for the post-Detainee Treatment Act CIA interrogation program."). As the in to April 2006 briefing the President "expressed discomfort" with the "image of a detainee, chained described, the SWIGERT; ceiling, in a diaper^an^forced to go to the bathroom on himself." See email from: Grayson clothed the to: cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June [REDACTED]; with DCI; date: June 7, 2006. meeting 180 7 June Email SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's Grayson from: meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006. 181 Increased Pressure in the Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogations, Attachment to email from: [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], to: [REDACTED]; subject: Increased Pressure Phase - for DCI Sensitive Addendum; date: July 10, 2002. 110586 AUG 02) (041559Z Mil I I III I ^^^^BM^^BBBOTWFTmN Page 40 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 40

70 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 183 to Zubaydah against a concrete wall). slam The interrogators then removed the used Abu an attention and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box hood, performed grab, 184 states laid on the floor. the A cable and Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded into cell was brought confinement box was carried into the and room and paced [sic] on the the large interrogation 185 appear as a coffin." as The interrogators to demanded detailed and verifiable so floor then terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone information on email addresses, caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records numbers, weapon Zubaydah describe apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having as Abu appearing 186 face perform a facial slap or would grab. the At information, additional interrogators PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for approximately first time. Over a two-and-a- 6:20 the period, Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and Abu half-hour 187 noted Detention site personnel waterboarding. that "throughout the during extremities" [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the process to respond to questions about opportunity threats" the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any to 188 information to In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a additional provide. wrote: officer medical rapidly progressing quickly to sessions water board after "The accelerated the walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydah] seems very large box, the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far to resistant shortly. 17 This is sure to increase seconds. NO useful information been has 183 email detainee [REDACTED]; to: HHI^^^B subject: Subject See allegation - per our telcon of from: claims date: 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states Abu Zubaydah 28, "a collar was used to slam him today; March a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at against site at the time the confirmed this did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed that the site at after walling on the concrete the wall." 110644 (201235Z AUG 02) 10586 (041559Z AUG 02) 10586 (041559Z 02); ••• 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) AUG (201235Z AUG 10644 02) AUG 110586 contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that "[t]heir 02). (041559Z CIA is, of were [chief focus on only one issue, that Base] Zubaydah's knowledge of plans to attack from instructions to According to the OIG's record of the interview, "[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT] could ask that question in U.S." the of but it was the only theme they were authorized ways, [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah." a number by February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond (See Office of the Inspector General.) The acting DUNBAR, chief Station in Country in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that "there were days at [DETENTION of GREEN] of the team had no requirements from Headquarters," and that CTC did not give the chief SITE Base when (See the as COB to ask other (COB) besides those related to threats to the United States. "flexibility May questions" 28, interview report of IHHHHHflK Office of 2003, Inspector General.) The chief of Support the Services at the CIA Station stated that "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were frustrated that they kept beating Zubaydah up the same question while getting the same physiologic response from hiin." (See May 21, 2003, on Other report of die Inspector General.) Office interviewees described how interview of assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. ( See May 22, 2003, interview report analytical of | Office the Inspector General; and February 27,2003, interview report of Rodriguez, of |, Office General.) Chief of CTC, Jose the told the OIG that "CTC subject Inspector matter experts" pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting and thus with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was "compliant." disagreed Rodriguez According OIG's record of the Jose the interview, "disagreement between the analysts and to interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong." ( See interview of Jose Office of the Inspector General, March 6, 2003.) Rodriguez, I I II I I I I I —I II I II Page 41 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 41

71 UNCLASSIFIED TOP far.. ..He vomit a couple of times during the water board with some so did rice. beans 10 hours since he ate so this is surprising and It's and been to I'm feed Ensure for a while now. plan head[ing | back disturbing. We only 189 water board for another session." of use CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques— The (I^/i^^lK/Wj the attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress including cramped confinement, "walling, positions, noise sleep deprivation"—continued in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day" for 17 white and 190 through 20, 2002. left When Abu Zubaydah was days, alone during this straight August waterboard was in a stress position, left on the he with a cloth over his face, or period, placed in one of two confinement boxes. According to the cables, Abu Zubaydah was locked also subjected the waterboard "2-4 times a day... with multiple iterations of the watering cycle to 191 each during application." August "aggressive interrogation" continued until of 23, phase The (rnm^mmm) 192 the course of the entire 20 day "aggressive 2002. of phase Abu Zubaydah Over interrogation," a total 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the of (coffin size) confinement box and 29 spent large in a small confinement box, which had a width of hours inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a 21 height 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah that the only way he would leave of 193 facility in the coffin-shaped confinement the box. was According DETENTION the daily cables from (TS^I^^^BH^NF) SITE GREEN, to and Abu "cried," "begged," "pleaded," frequently "whimpered," but continued to Zubaydah deny that he had any additional information on current threats to, or operatives in, the United 194 States. August By sixth day of the interrogation period, the 9, 2002, the to informed that they had come Headquarters the "collective preliminary team interrogation CIA it was unlikely Abu Zubaydah "had actionable new information about current assessment" that 195 the States." the On August 10, 2002, United interrogation team stated that it was to threats 196 that Abu "highly possessed the information they were seeking. unlikely" On the Zubaydah same the interrogation team reiterated a request for personnel from CIA Headquarters to day, 189 Emphasis the original. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: So in informed date: it begins; 2002, at 09:45:09AM. CIA Director Hayden August the Committee in 2007 that "in the 4, section [of the ICRC report] on medical care, the report omits key contextual facts. For example, Abu Zubaydah's statement that was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that he was on a he appropriate he liqui^die^jmte was recovering from abdominal surgery at the time." because ,9I) days, 10644 02). For the first 17 (201235Z the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were AUG used against Abu Zubaydah in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day." The "aggressive phase," as defined by the interrogation CIA, an additional three days. The CIA continued to use its enhanced for techniques against continued Abu until August 30, Zubaydah 2002. 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); | (240229Z 110672 AUG 02) 02) 10615 (120619Z AUG 02) AUG (201235Z 10644 10604 AUG 02) (091624Z 10607 (100335Z AUG 02) SECRET//! TOP //NOFORN Page 42 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 42

72 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET// ^ the travel to view the interrogations. A cable stated that the team believed that a detention to site is best," if CIA look Headquarters personnel could not visit, a "first-hand, on-the-ground but 197 personnel DETENTION SITE GREEN suffice. also informed teleconference video would that it was their assessment that the application of the CIA's enhanced CIA Headquarters 198 was the legal limit." interrogation The chief of CTC, Jose techniques "approaching] Rodriguez, responded: any speculative language as to that legality of given "Strongly urge the more precisely, judgment calls activities to their legality vis-a-vis or, as guidelines this activity agreed upon for vetted at the most operational and levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable senior 199 Such helpful." language traffic). is not GREEN DETENTION Abu Zubaydah as cables SITE describe "raised Headquarters when the interrogator CIA his eyebrow, informing "compliant," that Abu Zubaydah "slowly walked on without own to the water table and sat instructions," his 200 Zubaydah the "snapped his fingers twice," When interrogator would lie flat on down." Abu 201 waterboard. the assessment of personnel at the detention site that Abu Zubaydah Despite the believe compliant, stated that they continued to Headquarters that Abu Zubaydah was was CIA threat information and instructed the CIA interrogators to continue using the CIA's withholding 202 interrogation techniques. enhanced 203 times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical" (fSjV^m^F) and At 204 to the level that he was unable to effectively communicate." "distressed Waterboarding sessions "resulted immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and in 205 pleas." at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "became completely "hysterical In 197 (100335Z 02). On August 2002, a video-conference 10607 DETENTION SITE between AUG video CIA occurred, which included an interrogation and described by the interrogation team GREEN Headquarters graphic" and possibly "disturbing to some viewers." After as "quite video-conference, CIA Headquarters the instructed SITE GREEN to continue the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against DETENTION observe Zubaydah, agreed to send two Abu Headquarters officers to the detention site to but the interrogations CIA first-hand. August 2002, a team from On Headquarters, including Legal | CIA and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station visited DETENTION SITE GREEN and observed die use of the CIA's interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. Th^aggressive phase^interrogation" enhanced CIA days arrival of the officers from the Headquarters. See |H|HHl0616 i^^^H AUG ended after ALECHHJHH AUG 02); 10643 AUG 02)JHBHi0667 (231206Z AUG 02); AUG 02)j_and^^^B(l0672(240229Z 02). (100335Z 02) 10607 AUG 199 from: Jose Rodriguez; to: Email subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002, [REDACTED]; with attachment of earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]. 10614 02) AUG (111633Z 10614 (111633Z AUG 02) for example, ALEC||^|(101728 AUG 02); ALEC | ALEC 02); AUG |(130034Z See, | AUG 02). (280820Z 10700 and 02); AUG (201235Z AUG 02) 10644 10643 AUG 02) (191518Z 10643 (191518Z AUG 02) //NOFORN SECRET//! TOP Page 43 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 43

73 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SF.CRKT//^^^^—^^»/NOFORN 206 with through his open, full mouth." bubbles According to CIA records, unresponsive, rising remained unresponsive medical intervention, when he regained Abu Zubaydah until the "copious liquid." This experience with of waterboard expelled amounts and consciousness 207 but was not documented or otherwise noted in CIA cables. referenced When in emails, was Headquarters officers later compared the Abu Zubaydah interrogation videotapes to the two CIA neither record, on this session. A review of the catalog of videotapes, cable commented two that a 21-hour period, which included of waterboarding sessions, found however, recordings 208 missing. were at GREEN SITE personnel reported being CIA DETENTION interrogation the by the CIA's enhanced use techniques against Abu Zubaydah. disturbed of records include the following CIA and comments by CIA personnel: reactions • August 2002: "want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a 5, he's ever before in his medical career...It is visually and psychologically place been 209 uncomfortable." very 2002: "Today's first session.. .had a profound effect on all staff members • August 8, should seems collective opinion that wc the not go much .it present.. .everyone seems strong for now but if the group has further.. continue.. .wc cannot to 210 much longer." guarantee how some 8, on the team profoundly affected... "Several to the point of • August 2002: 211 choking up." tears and 206 The of the episode stated that "on being righted, description failed to respond until the interrogators gave him he a xyphoid thrust (with our medical folks edeingtowanlthe room)." This passage was included in multiple emails, See to include the|^H|OMS, MH^I^IH. emails email from: Mta^^^HH; to: [DETENTION from and [REDACTED]; Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: SIT^BLUE] subject: [REDACTED] Acceptable [REDACTED]; subject: Re: to: lower ambient temperatures; OMS; and ^••flMf, 7, March 8:22 PM; email from: 2003, OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; date: at Re: Talking Points for review subject: comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; and email from: and •IB [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: to: with 26, Levin- AZ; date: October Discussion 2004, at 6:09 PM. Dan 207 Email OMS; to: [REDACTED] and from: subject: Re: Acceptable lower [REDACTED]; ambient temperatures; date: March 7,2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: IHHHflH, OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^jubiect: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; Re: from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], email ••HH; [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Discussions with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004, and 6:09 PM. at 208 Interrogation Inspector Special Review on Counterterrorism Detention CIA General's Activities issued on and May 7,2004. ^^^^^^ 209 Email from: to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, [REDACTED]; at 05:35AM. ^^^^^^ 2002, 210 and [REDACTED]; Email [REDACTED], from: [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: to: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM. ^^^^^^^ 311 Email [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], from: [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: and August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM. I//NOFORN Page 44 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 44

74 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 9, 2002: perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from • August "two, site the is made to continue with the CIA's enhanced if the detention decision 212 techniques. interrogation the pressures on Abu Zubaydah 2002: video "has produced • August 11, Viewing on futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining strong feelings of the 213 tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously." viewing pressure." the Per of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques use After the personnel at the detention site concluded that ended, Zubaydah had been truthful and CIA Abu 214 not possess any new terrorist threat information. he that did Zubaydah noted, indicate that Abu records never provided As (^S^jl^^^^^m^WF) CIA for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and die information on next information terrorist attack and operatives in the United States. approved: the 2002, compared the period prior to August as the quantity and type of Furthermore, to produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely intelligence during and after the August unchanged 215 of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 2002 Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters use the National Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used informed Security 216 Zubaydah and were "producing meaningful results." effective A cable from were Abu against 212 [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: Email from: 2002, August 10:44:16 PM. ^^^^^^^ 9, at and 213 to: H^^HHI Email [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; [REDACTED]; August 11, 2002, from: date: at 09:45AM. 214 for example, ••• 10672 (240229Z AUG 02). See, 215 See Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for details on Abu Zubaydah's intelligence production. As Abu 2002, Abu taken into CIA custody on March H, was and was hospitalized until April 15, 2002. noted, Zubaydah the months of April and May 2002, which During a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support included and to speak, the interrogations of Abu unable produced 95 intelligence reports. Abu Zubaydah spent Zubaydah much of June 2002 and all of July 2002 in isolation, without being asked any questions. The CIA reinstituted contact with Zubaydah on August 4, 2002, and immediately began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation Abu the waterboard. the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah produced techniques—including During detention. reports, than the first two months of his CIA fewer CIA records indicate that the type intelligence four 91 Zubaydah provided remained relatively constant of intelligence to and after the use of the CIA's enhanced Abu prior techniques. to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah According information on "al-Qa'ida activities, interrogation provided capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership plans, including personalities, structure, decision-making training, and tactics." See also CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005, processes, as "Abu Bio" document, "Preparedon9Augus^006." Zubaydah as well with NSC met 2,6 Legal, ^HHH^^l Bellinger On August Legal Adviser John 30, to 2002, Abu from: interrogation. See email discuss John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Zubaydah's SEP Legal August 30, 2002; ALEC ^^H (052227Z date: 02). In his email documenting the meeting, Adviser; ^BHU "noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at methods site current at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appeal" that the the and was Rizzo; meaningful results." (See email from: John phase to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with producing not Legal date: August 30, 2002.) The email did NSC provide any additional detail on what was described Adviser; to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the "results" of the interrogation. It is unclear from or CIA the CIA ever informed the NSC Legal Adviser whether anyone else at the NSC or the Department of records Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about future attacks against the United States or operatives of tasked commit attacks in the U.S. during or after the use to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Page 45 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 45

75 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ NOFORN I// which SITE indicate was authored by SWIGERT and DETENTION CIA GREEN, records The the Abu Zubaydah as a success. of cable viewed also DUNBAR, interrogation aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be recommended as a that "the used 217 of high value captives," future not because the CIA's enhanced template interrogation for use useful but rather because their information, confirmed that produced interrogation techniques did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu Abu Zubaydah have. to from the detention site stated: Zubaydah The cable any to the was where we have broken reach will or ability of goal "Our stage resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he subject to the We to bring subject to sought point that we additionally access. had that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information, confidently assess 218 could or intelligence a terrorist event." that prevent (TS/^HBI^^^A^^) cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely The to contractors and DUNBAR — "familiar with interrogation, exploitation reference SWIGERT value to shape compliance of high should captives prior to and interrogation resistance 219 experts." by debriefing substantive From Abu on March 28, 2002, to his transfer Zubaydah's capture information Defense on September 5, 2006, custody provided by Abu to Department of 220 in 766 disseminated intelligence reports. According Zubaydah to CIA documents, resulted Abu Zubaydah information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and provided structure, in information on "its leadership to including personalities, relationships," addition 221 training, and tactics." was As noted, this type of information decision-making processes, by before, Zubaydah provided during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation Abu use techniques. time during or after the no of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques At According to CIA records, on September 27, 2002, the CIA briefed the chairman and the vice chairman of the Committee, Senators and Shelby, as well as the Committee staff directors, on Abu Zubaydah's Graham The CIA's of the briefing indicates that the chairman and vice chairman were briefed interrogation. memorandum enhanced and that had been employed," as well as "the nature "the quality of reporting provided by on techniques Zubaydah." See (252018Z OCT 02). Abu (DIRECTOR 2.7 10644 ^HH 02) AUG (201235Z 2.8 10644 AUG 02) (201235Z 2.9 (201235Z AUG 02) 10644 220 The uses sole-source intelligence reporting in this summary. While CIA multi-source intelligence Committee the are the full Committee Study, the focus of in Committee analysis is on sole-source intelligence reports included as these reports were deemed to reporting, accurately reflect useful reporting from individual CIA detainees. more As multi-source intelligence reports are reports that background, data from multiple detainees. For example, contain a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at a specific CIA site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able to identify detention see information individual. As a specific example, the HEADQUARTERS 1HI (202255Z JUN or provide on which states that from January 1,2006 - April 30, 2006, 06), from Hambali was "used in the information dissemination three intelligence reports, two of which of non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay detainees," and were the third of which "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sporting information events." by contrast, are based on specific reports, provided by one CIA detainee. Sole-source 221 CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Same information included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" "Prepared on 9 August 2006." document TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 46 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 46

76 UNCLASSIFIED I //NOFORN ^ TOP / SECRET/ Abu Zubaydah information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United did provide 222 States. 10. Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of A CIA Daily Presidential Abu Zubaydah CIA DETENTION Although GREEN agreed SITE at personnel CIA was and cooperative, personnel at Zubaydah Headquarters prepared a Abu that compliant Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflect[ed] Presidential Daily 223 HQS collective the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date." of The the view "significant PDB Zubaydah was still withholding Abu threat information," 2002 stated October on operatives in the United States, and including Abu "Zubaydah resisted information that useful until becoming more cooperative in information August, probably in the providing early 224 improving his living conditions." hope The of made no reference to the CIA's enhanced PDB interrogation or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team techniques 225 that was cooperative and not withholding information. Abu indicating Zubaydah identified "key intelligence" acquired from documents the CIA as information related to suspected terrorists Abu Padilla and Binyam Zubaydah Jose information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and Mohammad, identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who information the used 226 alias All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu "Mukhtar." 227 capture. Zubaydah's The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated (^^S/zfU^^BI^^^/NF) cooperation. the enhanced that techniques were necessary to gain his CIA's For interrogation example, the CIA informed the OLC that: "As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, 'brothers who captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide are 222 See detainee review in Volume III for additional details. Abu Zubaydah 223 •• 02) (181439Z ALEC OCT 224 (181439Z 02) — ALEC OCT 225 documents, see^^^i 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); Among (240229Z AUG 02); and other 10672 from: (^^^fdiiefof Base at DETENTION SITE [REDACTED] to: CIA Headquarters; subject: email GREEN); to Date" of Abu Zubaydah; date: "Assessment 6, 2002, at 05:36:46 AM. October 226 KSM," "Key Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and and dated February 2008, updated for See Intelligence on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to briefings Leon Panetta, as well as the "Effectiveness Director Memo" to the Department of Justice, testimony provided by CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other provided documents discussed in detail in Volume II. For example, see ODNI September 2006 press release stating: "During initial interrogation, Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was Abu however, was that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) important, the 9/11 mastermind and used the including previously 'Mukhtar.' identification allowed us to comb This collected intelligence for both names, moniker opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his information interrogators Zubaydah possessed a great deal of Abu about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped that all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, legal." and 227 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details. 11 ii 11111 I II I II Page 47 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 47

77 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ / / I NOFORN they believe have 'reached the limit of their ability to information when they 228 hardships.'" psychological and physical of the in face withhold it' in greater detail in the full Committee Study, (TS^m^^iF) As is described CIA 229 the CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah support these statements not CIA do records made that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never records indicate 230 could information from interrogators. he In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah believed withhold that psychologist believed prior to his capture he every captured "brother" would a CIA that told detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp talk "brothers should be in that to that the organization will make adjustments to protect expect and plans when able people 231 with knowledge is captured." someone The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu 11. Zubaydah Tn contrast relatively open communications that the CIA had to the Committee the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA with following detention its the Committee on its with and interrogation limited communications significantly 232 Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002. activities In after to three different Abu responses of Questions for the Record addressed to Committee CIA regarding the MON authorities sets the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that in the CIA had established the DETENTION GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation SITE 233 techniques. 27, 2002, CIA officials September a briefing on Abu On provided interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard Zubaydah's and directors. staff Shelby, After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and their 228 Counsel, John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Memorandum Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. for Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Obligations in the of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). This OLC memorandum Used Interrogation for of Bradbury at the Department memorandum Justice, dated March 2,2005, from citesCIA Steve of wm DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness Group, the CIA Counterterrorist ^HH, Legal Techniques." Interrogation no records of Abu Zubaydah making these statements, the deputy chief of ALEC Station, ^^OTiil^hei^jre to d the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [the CIA] received on l die detainees came from a walk-in [a source howtohandle [CIA] information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told to volunteer we were us underestimating The detainees were happy to be arrested Al-Qa'ida. the U.S. because they got a big show trial. by When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so they talked. Allah apparently allows you talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the to of." and to methods they never dreamed subjected See Memorandum for the Record; U.S. being with deputy chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July subiect^eeting 2003. 230 cable 1°496 FEB 03). For more information, see a March 7, HH (162014Z describing Abu 2005, Zubaydah^xplanations more fully (|^|2166 (070647Z MAR 05)). 231 Mfe^Hl0496 (162014Z FEB 03) For additional details on this matter, see Volume IJ, specifically the section on information by the CIA to the Department of Justice. provided 232 on provided The the CIA to the Committee information the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is by summarized later in this document, and described in greater detail in Volume IL 233 CIA Volume II, specifically the section on See representations to Congress. Page 48 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 48

78 UNCLASSIFIED I //NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ requests specific on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. for additional information hook include how the CIA could "get... off the of on the cheap" emails Internal discussion CIA 234 for additional information. regarding In Chairman end, CIA officials Graham's requests the not to Graham's requests prior to his departure respond the Committee in simply did from 2003. January Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines C. Interrogation in Establishes CIA COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour 1. The DETENTION SITE Charge in Officer facility CIA detention Plans in Country | began (^S/^H^HH^^^I^^P) a specialized for with the intention that it would be "totally under [|^^^^^|]/Station in April 2002, 23 more June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved On than $200,000 for the '' Control." 236 the facility, identified in this summary as construction SITE COBALT." of In "DETENTION a 2003 with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for interview described his of this facility and "stated that [DETENTION Operations views was [Country because there needed to be a detention site in COBALT] |] for those SITE opened to a place [DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not enroute for the use detainees ^Hfl^H 237 of EITs." SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding, £) DETENTION 238 in opened September 2002. | in According to CIA records, the windows at Country kept SITE blacked out and detainees were were in total darkness. The DETENTION COBALT monitored detainees using headlamps and loud guards was played music constantly the facility. While in their cells, in were shackled to the wall and given detainees buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of 239 the Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bar with their hands above cell. 240 heads, to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep. forcing their them 234 from: Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; Email Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached Stanley cc: 9, Graham on interrogations; date: December request 2002, at 05:46:11 PM. Re: document] 235 June custody the CIA had taken By of five detainees who were captured outside of Country land placed 2002 CIA held in Country ^^^H detention facilities. The detainees were these at the Country^ facilities at detainees them. request the the and the CIA had unlimited access to of See MHHH^^^^^H 21147 | CIA 236 DIRECTOR (062212Z JUN 02) 237 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, | September 9, 2003. 238 specific on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume 1 and Volume III. The information date For additional been at the request generalized the CIA. has of 239 28246 ••^^••••l I^Hi^^H 240 other additional on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume 111, and For information among documents: DlRECTOR|^H|^HHHH< email 31118 [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Hfl^B^HT[REDACTED]; to: subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: Prisons; [REDACTED]; with SO & Federal Bureau of Meeting date: December 5, 2002; Special Review, subject: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, January 2004; for Deputy Director of Operations, from Memorandum 28,2003, Subject: Page 49 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 49

79 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFQRN The in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA officer OFFICER 1 ], was officer on his first overseas assignment with ^^BHH^H [CIA a junior training interrogations. handling prisoners or conducting or no previous experience in the was 1] SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a OFFICER [CIA DETENTION died and numerous CTA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive CIA detainee 241 techniques. review of CIA records found that prior to [CIA interrogation A DETENTION deployment as the CIA's assignment SITE COBALT l's] and OFFICER CIA officers recommended [CIA OFFICER 1] manager, have continued other not 242 information due to a "lack of classified judgment, and maturity." to access honesty, to records, "the chief of CTC told [CIA OFFICER According that he would not 1]] 243 in his overseas station." want A supervising officer assessed that [CIA [him] 1]: OFFICER with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the "has issues worrisome. advised officer] further is also that [|HflH [CIA field [The an was put into processing for 1]] overseas position so that OFFICER only would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. someone [The officer noted that fl^^H [CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his further 244 of when in the field." chief station CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details 2. Interrogations in of Country | detained Detainees in Country (TS/^H^^^^H'/NF) held under the authority of | were the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees DeatMnvestigation - Gul and CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee | RAHMAN; told (2003-7402-IG), 2005. One senior interrogator, April the CIA OIG that ••• 27, at could for a detainee or weeks without anyone looking go him," and that his team found one "literally, days who, "'as far as we could determine,' had been chained to the wall in a standing position detainee 17 days." for According the CIA interrogator, some of the CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT "'literally looked to cowered.'" a dog had been kenneled.' When like doors to their cells were opened, 'they that (See Interview the Report, Revie^Hnterrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, 2003-7123-IG, 30, 2003.) April told tlle of interrogations, good The CIA OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is chief for interrogations because the closest thing he has seen to a dungeon, facilitating the displacement of detainee it is of ions." Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review See Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ( CIA 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations April DETENTION SITE COBALT told the at E Interview that SITE COBALT] is OIG "[DETENTION Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of anEIT^(5ee Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, May 8, 2003.) 241 See 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, April of Investigation: Death of a Detainee Report April 7, 2005, Memorandum for John Helgerson, Inspector General, from Robert Grenier, Subject: Comments on (2003-7402-IG). Draft Investigation: Death of a Detainee of Report 242 I | [CIA OFFICER 1]. | [CIA OFFICER 1]| | [CIA 1]| OFFICER TOP SECRET/d //NOFORN Page 50 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 50

80 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ a continuing, serious of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or... "pose[d] threat terrorist | we]re CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in activities." planning The period determine the CIA remains unable to this the number and identity Country | during that interrogations The details of the CIA full there remain largely individuals of the it detained. DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to unknown, not reported multiple uses of as have deprivation, standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, sleep required 245 and of food, nudity, and "rough treatment" of CIA quantity detainees. reduced quality Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country | Use the Headquarters 3. CIA Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar Enhanced CIA's al-Najjar was the first CIA Ridha to be held at detainee DETENTION COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr amU SITE raids of arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after was conducted by other individuals, number 246 May 2002. as Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA ^•HPakistan^H a in late 247 Abu bin Laden, for and was rendered with Usama Bakr to CIA custody at a bodyguard former 248 detention facility on June Country |Hfl^^^l Ridha al-Najjar was transferred |, 2002. 249 COBALT on September2002. to DETENTION SITE of the describing to the Department was Justice why it While CIA to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques needed Abu Zubaydah, a parallel against internal at the CIA was taking discussion regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station place cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002: "ALEC/HQS held session regarding the interrogation of high a strategy detainee Ridha al-Najjar in [Country The priority Ahmed the the to review the progress of was interrogation to date and of session goal plan as to how to devise to proceed once the new [Country | a general best facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is detention/debriefing 250 completed." meeting participants included individuals who were also The involved in related to Abu Zubaydah's interrogation, including deputy chief of discussions Station, ^^fl^R^TC Legal and the ALEC H^I^^^H' 245 full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. The While there no records of the CIA using the waterboard are COBALT, the waterboard device in the photograph is at surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two tliirds of the way to the top) and a watering can on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between the Committee Staff and the resting the in summer of 2013, the CIA was unable CIA explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, to solution, watering can, as well as the and presence at COBALT. waterboard's 246 1^•••H 11443 247 ^^^^^^^^^ 248 249 27054 250 02). Although the plans at the ALEC^^B(162135ZJUL were for DETENTION SITE COBALT to be time owned and operated by the Country | government, the detention site was controlled and overseen by the CIA and September its from the day it became operational in officers 2002. Page 51 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 51

81 UNCLASSIFIED TOP followed the on use CIA Country | suggesting possible interrogation techniques to in the Station to 2002, including: al-Najjar, Ridha against for the well-being of his • utilizing to our benefit," with the cable "Najjar's fear family that could not "threaten his interrogators with imminent death"; stating explicitly family threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that • using "vague 252 would get worse until he cooperated; situation his continue to music; al-Najjar's a hood, restraints, and using and Ridha • manipulating environment 253 through the use of round-the-clock interrogations. • employing sleep deprivation "possibility cable on to note that the went that [al-Najjar] may The (TS/^^^^^^^I^/NF) 254 threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him," have With current the of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al- exception no and the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers to Najjar," references 255 al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators. evidence Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country none (TS^m^^^^^l^F) had in trained of whom the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed been 256 al-Najjar isolation "sound and using putting disorientation techniques," "sense of time in 257 deprivation. cold temperatures, and sleep light, deprivation," The CIA officers added limited that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and 258 locator on UBL and Bin Ladin's family." lead The plan for al-Najjar was information 259 to officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update. senior circulated CIA 2SI ALEC JUL 02). The deputy chief 162135Z ALEC Station, and H^^HCTC of Legal later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the CIA's |, would interrogation against enhanced Abu Zubaydah. techniques 252 Abu virus" first appeared in the interrogations of "mind Zubaydah. See 10086 (201900Z The term 02). APR 253 July 16, 2002, cable is ALEC •• (162135Z JUL 02). Referenced 254 ALEC JUL 02) (162135Z 255 (162135Z JUL 02) ALEC 256 At this time, July 26,2002, Abu Zubaydah was in isolation at DETENTION SITE GREEN. Abu Zubaydah was its placed on June 18, 2002, and remained in isolation for 47 days, until the CIA began subjecting him to isolation in enhanced techniques on August 4, 2002. interrogation 257 107 JUL 02) (260903Z 258 (260903Z JUL 02) 25107 259 Email from: [REDACTED]MoJJuzz^Crongard, John O. Brennan, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John H. Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEdT^^^M. Rodriguez^^Hj^^Kjphn P. [REDACTED], Jose HHI^I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 11111111111 11 III i BBBW^B^BBBi mi Page 52 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 52

82 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ August 5, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation On 2002, CIA's using techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA enhanced the interrogation proposed of plan for al-Najjar, to include the use the loud Headquarters authorized interrogation such than level that would cause physical harm less as permanent hearing loss), (at music the (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), worse deprivation, and food sleep 260 hooding. than on September 21, later, CIA interrogators More a month 2002, as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" described al-Najjar as 261 isolation. of The cable added that al-Najjar was the to do whatever the CIA result willing 262 asked. officer 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short In October of debriefing at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest al-Najjar 263 thorough On November 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited in a more debriefing. COBALT detentior^cility/^ioting described it as a "CIA SITE that "while DETENTION and 264 they user of the facility is contend it is a [Country facility." the CIA only U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the The "has to facility no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners." With respect to al- little CIA's specifically, advisor indicated that the legal interrogation plan included Najjar the in total darkness; lowering the quality of his "isolation keeping him at an uncomfortable food; temperature [playing music] 24 hours a day; (cold); keeping him shackled and hooded." In and addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging—which involved handcuffing one or both wrists an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his arms—for 22 hours to day for consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted al- each two 265 wearing was had no access to toilet facilities. and Najjar a diaper military legal advisor concluded that, because of al- The U.S. s treatment, and the concealment of the facility Najjar' the 1CRC, military participation in from al-Najjar's would involve risks for the U.S. military The legal advisor interrogation briefing U.S. CIA's detention and interrogation activities to recommended the 1630 [REDACTED]; ABU ZUBAYDAH IREDACTED], ADDENDUM TO DCI DAILY subject: - SENSITIVE OPS UPDATE -26 JULY; date: July 26,2002. 260 DIRECTOR •• (052309Z AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and approved the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydah. The Office of Legal techniques, August did produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other Counsel held by or for the CIA until not 2004. detainees 261 27297 SEP 02) [REDACTED] (210713Z 262 27297 [REDACTED] SEP (210713Z November 2002, Memorandum for Subject: Legal Analysis of Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka SITj^OBALTT^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ "[DETENTION 2002, for November Memorandum Legal Analysis of Personnel Participating in Interrogation Subject: the CIA Detention Facility in at [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). November 2002, Memorandum for Facility Subject: Analysis of HI Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Legal in [REDACTED] "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). (aka Page 53 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 53

83 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN | [combatant alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military command] to 266 in of the interrogation of al-Najjar. any According to the CIA | being involved aspect detention "became interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar the the model" for inspector general, and 267 CIA DETENTION SITE COBALT. CIA The at disseminated one other handling detainees 268 its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar. intelligence report from Gul of Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive 4. Death Rahman at SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General Techniques Interrogation DETENTION Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site Review Reveals ALEC Station officers requested that CIA In November 2002, primary Hammond interrogator of the two DUNBAR, interrogators of Abu contract one in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess Zubaydah for the a detainee 269 of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. possible While DUNBAR was present at use CIA SITE assisted||HH0H [ COBALT, OFFICER 1] in the DETENTION he to Gul Islamic extremist. As reported a suspected CTA Headquarters, of Rahman, interrogations included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, this overload, total darkness, interrogation auditory a cold and rough treatment." CIA shower, did not approve these isolation, Headquarters techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, interrogation at CIA officers Headquarters that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information responded suggested and from Gul Rahman" and Islami that "enhanced measures" on al-Qa'ida Hezbi be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. might Headquarters also requested that a CIA 270 of Rahman be completed. psychological assessment to DUNBAR's departure from the Prior detention site on November 2002, [a few days before the death of Gul Rahman] DUNBAR proposed the of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered use 271 to 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques. [CIA suggestions OFFICER 1 ) November 2002, [CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that (T^fHI^^^^H^ On a position be to the Rahman of his cell in shackled that required the detainee to rest on Gul wall bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as the [CIA OFFICER 1] |m had that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative ordered an Gul interrogation. The next day, the guards found during Rahman's dead body. An earlier from CIA internal autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died review hypothermia—in part and 266 November |, 2002, Memorandum for | Subject: Legal Analysis of HHPersonnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka SITE COBALT]"). "[DETENTION 2002, to report, "in late July or early August IG a senior operations officer on TDY to | ^^According the a particularly obstinate detainee interrogated al-Najjar] at detention facility [Ridha that used before [COBALT] was opened. The was drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, officer becamethemodel for [COBALT]." See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death of a Detainee | ••^•H (2003-7402JGWeefl^ntoview 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Report, Purposes, 2003-7123-IG, Report, Counterterrorism Review of Interview Interrogations Counterterrorism PuiposesT^^^^^^^^, April 2, 2003. for 268 See Volume II and Volume III for additional information. 269 I ALEC 270 ALEC | 271 TOP SECRET//I ^^^^^^^^^P^NOFQRN Page 54 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 54

84 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 272 having to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants. been [CIA from forced initial cable CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of OFFICER l's] to Rahman's that discovered until internal investigations into not and misstatements omissions were 273 death. Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA The death of interrogation activities Country | by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally detention and in 274 for Renditions as the responsible entity CTC's the management and the designated Group all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early maintenance of 275 2002. this change, many of the same individuals within the CIA— December Despite officers including COBALT, and officers within ALEC at DETENTION DUNBAR, SITE enhanced recommended use of the CIA's had interrogation techniques against who Station the key figures in the CIA interrogation program Gul received no reprimand Rahman—remained and for death. Instead, in March 2003, just four months after the death Rahman's Gul or sanction of the CIA Station in Country | recommended that 1] Rahman, a "cash receive of $2,500 for his "consistently I ' ^BBB [CIA award" OFFICER remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and 1] to continued in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified be involved his in after the practical portion of 2003 training requirement was interrogator April as a CIA 277 his past experience with interrogations waived DETENTION SITE COBALT. because of at 272 January for Director of Operations, Memorandum Deputy 28, 2003, Subject: Death from were Investigation - Gul RAHMAN. Other contributing factors and identified as dehydration, lack of food, due to "short chaining." ^^^^^^^^^^ immobilit 273 See Volume and III for additional details. 30211 1 274 the Renditions Group As also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations noted, was as well as the "Rendition, Detention, Group," Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." and 275 I j^Min I II DEC02) llll l Hll 276 ^ 277 late DIRECTOR^^H^^lH^^^Hln the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the 2005, actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman's death. The board recommended that the executive director "impose a 10 day suspension pay" on [CIA OFFICER 1 ], and noted that this action would "strike the without balance between: the fact that [HIHH [CIA OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made appropriate 1) the led unintentionally, to Rahman's death, and 2) albeit significant weight die Board that directly, decisions the mitigating factors at play in this incident." attached Memorandum for Executive Director from | to (See Deputy for Science and Technology, re: Report Director Recommendations of the Special Accountability H, and Regarding the Death of Afghan Detainee Gul Rahman.) On February Board 2006, however, the CIA Executive 10, Director Foggo notified |BHH [CIA OFFICER 1 ] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against K.B. stated: In describing that decision, the executive director memo "While not condoning your actions, it is him. his in my view, that they... be judged within the imperative, context that existed at the time of Rahman's operational detention. traffic reviewed by the board shows Cable that Headquarters generally was aware of, and conclusively as osed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques being imposed on Rahman as late in | November. date, Headquarters notified [the CIA Station that COUNTRY 1]... that it was ' motivated to On S achieving any operational information' from Rahman, that it rated all Rahman's cooperation to be of extract and importance' and that it acknowledged that Rahman 'may need to be subjected to enhanced 'great interrogation measures induce him to comply." (See February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [^H^MHI [CIA to OFFICER 1 CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, ]], Executive Director, re: "Accountability Decision.") from With regard to the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Most egregiously, we believe that the CIA in not holding anyone formally accountable for erred actions and failure of management related to leaders the death of Gul Rahman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management's the decision overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on to least 11(11111111 mi in i 11 Page 55 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 55

85 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I of DETENTION SITE COBALT conducted Later investigations inspector by the the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul general CIA and techniques—and the the CIA's enhanced interrogation of other coercive that Rahman found use widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA interrogation techniques—was more interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included cables. Specifically, the above deprivation a detainee's arms were shackled which his head, nudity, sleep standing in exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in dietary manipulation, 278 instances, use of mock executions. at least two the 11 Novembe^8^002^tafffrom Office of Inspector the (TSZ/I^HHI^^ft^^ CIA's to their interest in being Legal, Generalcontacted^^^HBiCTC indicate CTC on the detention facility in Country At their meeting with the DDO and the briefed by CTC chief November 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that country on a on of included the had overheard a conversation that staff references to "war crimes" matter, separate "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on and this information. to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event According 279 Gul which occurred on November 2002. Rahman"—his concerning death, have involved. junior in the chain of command should not most to bear the full weight of officer The experienced larger, systemic problems exist and when they accountability thrust into difficult battlefield situations by when are supervisors given a risky and difficult task and little preparation and guidance. Still, it is hard to accept that their or officer does not bear at least some responsibility for his or a CIA actions, even under trying circumstances." her 278 Review, Counterterrorism and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) Special Detention of May Memorandum for Deputy Director 2004; Operations, from January (2003-7123-IG), 7, 2003, Subiect^eath Investigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, 28, of a Death Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA M^HI training, debriefer "[djuring the two weeks of interrogation that, she heard stories of [COBALT] detainees indicated being 'hung for days on end,' not being fed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being repeatedly choked." senior debriefer also informed the Office of Inspector General that, "[s]he heard that while The [^^HHH aka OFFICER 2"] had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes at [COBALT] "CIA Interrogations (See 2003-7123-IG, Review of report, for Counterterrorism touchimMh^round." interview barely 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a "rough takedown" following the Purposes, of Gul April death at "According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately COBALT. CIA officers from the renditions Rahman five Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door team. cell in rushed of Rahman's screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his and a hood and with Mylar tape. They covered his head with him and ran him lip and down a long clothes secured adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him corridor times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it several was they were not trying to hit him as hard obvious they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As as they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells dirt). Rahman did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required is attention. a may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had medical (This of face.) abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis^nnsjegs, and number At this point, Rahman was returned to surface OFFICER his secured. [DUNBAR] stated that [H^HHH [CIA and 1]| [the CIA officer in charge of cell DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what something [•••1 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after OFFICER like this is done, interrogators should [CIA speak to the prisoner to 'give them something to think about.'" ( See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Investigation Operations, January 28,2003, Subject: Death |HHHH^H< - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.) from 279 See Notes of November J, 2002, meeting D/IG [REDACTED]. Page 56 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 48

86 UNCLASSIFIED I / / NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 2003, CIA General John Helgerson began a Tn January Inspector of formal of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA the review death Program. resulting Special Review of Counterterrorism Interrogation The Detention and Activities ("Special Review") found that there were Detention guidelines and Interrogation no use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques of DETENTION SITE COBALT the for at December 2002, and that interrogators, some prior little or no training, were "left to their to with 280 working with detainees." devices own in the Inspector Review also revealed Special lack of The General's (TS^m^^l^^l^NF) DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated oversight he was of that very with DETENTION SITE COBALT and "what familiar" CIA is doing with medium "not the 281 that Associate Deputy Director of Operations stated value he was targets." 282 unaware CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there. that In August the CIA General Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that 2003, Counsel COBALT he only a holding facility and that SITE had "no idea who is DETENTION was 283 John Senior Deputy General Counsel [COBALT]." Rizzo informed the OIG responsible for he knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION that 284 GREEN DETENTION SITE BLUE. SITE CTC Chief of Operations •• and operations that much less knowledge of had at DETENTION SITE stated he and that the CIA's GREEN and BLUE detention sites were much more important to COBALT, 285 him. Chief of CTC Jose Rodriguez stated that he did not Finally, on DETENTION focus 286 SITE COBALT because he had "other higher priorities." 5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department Justice Included in the Training Syllabus of 280 See Inspector General Special Review of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities Office of interview 2003), p. 52. According to an OIG 7,2004, with an analyst who 2001-October May (September at DETENTION SITE COBALT, "indicative conducted the lack of interrogators was the fact that interrogations of OFFICER enlisted a [REDACTED] case 1]] friend... to conducHnterrogatio^ [CIA officer SITE COBALT] after he completed his [REDACTED] business [DETENTION ." in (See Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for I Ii il I ni|in i May Interview debriefer Inspector of an interview with a senior CIA records indicate that the debriefer, "heard 8, 2003.) General to taking the [interrogator] training that people at prior had debriefed detainees on their own, sometimes [COBALT] going to the site at night." (See out Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Interview Purposes, April 5, 2003.) As described elsewhere, DCI Tenet issued formal interrogation guidelines for the on January 28, 2003. ( See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential program George of 17 September 2001, signed by of Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum Notification 28, 2003.) January 281 Interview George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, memorandum of September 8, 2003. dated, 282 General, Office of Interview Inspector of September 9, 2003. the 283 Interview of Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 2003. 20, 284 Office John Rizzo, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], of of the Inspector General, and August 14,2003. 283 Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 11,2003. 286 General, of Jose Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector Interview August 12, 2003. 111111111111 111ii iBMB^^BB^^MI mi Page 57 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 57

87 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN The Renditions Group began preparing for the first CIA's CTC training CIA August 2002—during the period in which Abu Zubaydah was course interrogator in the CIA's techniques at DETENTION SITE interrogation being enhanced interrogatethjsing 7 2 of interrogations, GREEN. * ••^•L and^^^^H^H the the CIA's chief CIA OTS had spent | years as a SERE Instructor who JPRA, led the interrogation with officer with first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance training. JPRA personnel, The of 288 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002. from The class included eight students occurred November seeking CIA become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the were who to 289 involved CIA training program process. 65 hours of instruction and training The interrogation least enhanced techniques, including at interrogation two interrogation techniques CIA's on the legality had whose been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the "abdominal slap" and not the press." Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training "finger there materials, CIA records of any CIA officer raising objections to the techniques being are no 290 the in syllabus. included from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails 6. Despite Adequately Screen Recommendation to Interrogators in 2002 and 2003 Potential NovemberB the 2002 formal after the completion of On first ; J Legal, asked CTC attorney H trainin^lass7^^^^^|CTC all it known now on, CTC/LGL must vet from personnel who are to "[m]ake that 291 observing or teaching - or otherwise associated with - the class." enrolled in, added: "Moreover, will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific we unless personnel use of enhanced techniques the we have ourselves vetted in 287 December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target IntenrogationandExpioitation (HVTIE) Training to: Seminar 02 (pilot running) at 4. See also email from: IH1HHHH; 12-18 [REDACTED], Nov subject: Formation a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial [REDACTED], of 8:30 and August 30,2002, at date: AM. requirements); plan training 288 2002, Training Report, High December Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training 4, Value 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running). Seminar 289 4,2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and December (HVTIE) Training Exploitation Seminar Nov 02 (pilot running), at 15. 12-18 200 [REDACTED]; email from: HHf^^Hft example, subject: HVT training; See, for October 10, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: ^B^H^^Iffcc: date: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: HVT trainine^date^ctober 10,2002; November 1,2002, [REDACTED]; Memorandum Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from Chief, Renditions Group, for: CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation Course, REFERENCE: Memo for D/CTC from dtd 26 Aug 02, Same Subject. C/RG/CTC, 291 Email to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], from: ||^HHH^HL|CTC/LGL; EYES date: November 2002, at 03:13:01 FM. As [REDACTED],^^^^^^^H~subject: ONLY; above, Gul Rahman likely froze described death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of to November^, email, however, appears to have 2002. drafted before the guards had been found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211 in ^^^^BiHK guards observing Gul Rahman alive the the morning of November 2002. Gul describing Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least H^^^ after ^^^^^H's email. No records could be identified to provide impetus for ^^^H^'s email. the 11 ii i M 11 j^H i II i II Page 58 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 58

88 UNCLASSIFIED 7NOFQRN top secret; are them their qualifications and suitability for what are satisfied and with that practiced lawful only when measures correctly by clearly unusual are that records their suitability for demonstrate role. The whose personnel clearly will not be that dissimilar from the checks that vetting provided by process are OIG, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive the OS, the interrogators and training of aggressive and certainly awards, selection 292 vetting a similar process." warrants chief of CTC, ( ) Rodriguez, objected to this approach, The Jose stating: think into CTC/LGL should or would want to get not the business of "I do that observers, instructors others that are involved in this vetting participants, or not tell job. Your job is to is simply all what are the program. your It for conducting interrogations per the authorities standards acceptable legal 293 and agreed upon by the White House." obtained from Justice to later Contrary made by CIA Director Michael (^FS^IBHHH^^^) statements questioning other that "[a]ll those involved in the officials of detainees are and CIA Hayden 294 screened for demonstrated professional carefully and maturity," chosen CIA and judgment suggest the vetting sought by did that take place. The Committee records not CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA's reviewed and Detention most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee Interrogation Program, of identified backgrounds include notable derogatory information personnel a number whose their information, for employment, their access to classified question and calling into eligibility cases, in activities. In nearly all interrogation the derogatory information participation their CIA to the CIA prior to was assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and known the Program. group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had Interrogation This inappropriate interrogations, in had workplace anger management issues, and detainee engaged 295 admitted to sexual assault. reportedly had of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site 7. Bureau 2002, I" December Renditions Group sent a team of the CIA's in interrogators SITE COBALT to engage DETENTION interrogations. The trained to recently proposed by that team for interrogation three detainees at DETENTION SITE plans at least 292 ^^^^^^^KHCTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; from: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], Email cc: EYES ONLY; date: November2002, at 03:13:01 PM. [REDACTED],subject: 293 Email RodriguezTto^HH^H^H|, |CTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], from: Jose 04:27 ^fl^H^HFsubject: ONLY; [REDACTED], November 2002, at EYES [REDACTED], date: PM. 294 Transcript of hea 255 the information at length in described Committee Study in The is Volume 111. 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 59 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 59

89 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and COBALT included than a month the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the quantity. Less after that for clothes to be removed in a facility called was described to be 45 also plans detainees' CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the degrees Fahrenheit. 296 as Value." described CIA "Medium to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers (TS^^^^mH^^^/NF) Prior Federal COBALT. of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE the from Bureau 297 November through November 2002, the visit, CIA officers in Country Following 2002, along that Bureau of Prisons assessments, Federal with recommendations and (remarked the had "made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day training, at the facility operations are and made the detention site a "more secure and safer working environment for performed," 298 officers." I n O 2002, officers at CIA 4, met with (TS/fl^HH^IHP^^) December Headquarters the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more individuals their inspection of from about 299 and their training of H|B COBALT staff. SITE During that DETENTION security the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and meeting, stated that was "absolutely no talking inside the facility," that the guards do not interact there 300 the and that "[e]verything is done in silence and [in] with dark." the According to a prisoners, "they officer, Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that CIA were 'WOW'ed'" at the first by the facility, because: "They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, i.e., constant noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards white a light on head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an wearing their detainees wall being shackled to the cell, or floor, and interrogation constantly is nothing of cell (concrete and bars). There starkness like this in the the each Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the Federal and assessment their collective mission that in spite of all this sensory it was in the not being treated were humanely [sic]. They deprivation, detainees that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard explained 301 and staff did not mistreat the detainee[s]." force our CIA the of December 2002, the By Renditions Group that had end visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility's initial "baseline conditions" involved much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact so 296 31118 DIRECTOR 297 detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons CIA visit to the detention site. CIA 298 [REDACTED] (271626Z NOV 02) 30589 299 Email [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | from: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. 300 Email [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | from: of subject: with [REDACTED]; & Federal Bureau Meeting Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. SO 301 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5,2002. 1 //NOFORN Page 60 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 60

90 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ interrogations. The thus recommended that "experts and authorities other than the on the team conditions, crafted review the interrogation process and process" and that a individuals who the 302 conducted. taken CIA Headquarters does not appear to have legal action on these review be recommendations. CIA CIA Detainees in Country | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the Places 8. The for Detention MON Standard c continued of 2003, ) In CIA spring to hold detainees at the the in Country J who were known not to meet the MON facilities for detention. CIA standard officer [CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country | ^H^B^H in an email, officers writing: they happen have 3 or also where to can lock up people They 4 rooms [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the discretely for questions I bring over - no rooms asked. It is very useful for whoever guys COBALT] shouldn't be in [DETENTION SITE housing for one that isolated or reason still need to be kept another and held in secret but 303 detention." ( TS / i ^^^^^^^^^ B ^ NF ) CIA cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four detainees to Country | facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention these 304 the under MON. CIA facilities were established in Country four detention In total, indicate that CIA SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during records DETENTION period of its operation between September 2002 and^B2004, while DETENTION SITE the held detainees GRAY between 2003 and ••12003. The CIA later eight two which CIA facilities in Country j: DETENTION SITE ORANGE, established held other between •••(2006; and 34 detainees and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which |^B2004 305 12 detainees betweenHBj 2006 and 2008. held 302 CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT, Detainee/Prisoner management, 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this December recommendation. 303 from: [CIA OFFICER 1]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Thanks and Email re: List of Query I^HI^^^^^^B d ETAINEES; date: March 14,2003. 304 The cables did not explain any legal basis for detaining individuals who did not meet the detention requirements of the MON. HEADQUARTERS September 17,2001, 38836J HEADQUARTERS! I); mm^^m- alec •• 305 information. for III Volume See additional //NOFORN I SECRET//! TOP 499 of 61 Page UNCLASSIFIED 61

91 UNCLASSIFIED TOP Tenet Establishes Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; 9. DCI First of Program at CIA Headquarters Does Not Formal Consolidation Administration CIA Among Resolve Disagreements Personnel in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul In late January 2003, interrogations use a gun and a drill in the CIA of of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Rahman the in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and (described later 306 for program. guidelines In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA confinement the U.S. that facility would have to meet detention prison standards, the expected any personnel signed in January 2003 set forth confinement standards for a detention guidelines minimal The guidelines required only that the confinement be sufficient to meet basic facility. facility needs, meaning that health a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees even were shackled in complete darkness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and kept 307 notable the winter months, met the standard. heat without during also the quarterly assessments of guidelines The required of the facilities. at first quarterly review detention detention facilities covered the conditions The from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE period 308 as as at COBALT, SITE BLUE in a different country, Country |. DETENTION At that well DETENTION housing BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was time, SITE detainees. found the site review team five that conditions at DETENTION SITE Nonetheless, "the —including three purpose-built "holding units"—met the minimum standards set by BLUE the CIA" in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations, brushed their once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a teeth Amenities such solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading week. as rugs, the Korans were available depending on prayer detainee's degree of materials, and 309 with cooperation interrogators. quarter 2003 review first found that conditions at The also SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing "significant DETENTION such weekly space heaters and improvements" medical evaluations. The review noted that a as replace facility construction in Country f| to under DETENTION SITE COBALT, and new was this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, "will be that leap a quantum forward" "[it] will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing, because 310 appropriate and laundry facilities." shower, DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened lighting, in • 2004. Although some of the cells at DETENTION SITE ORANGE included plumbing, 306 Guidelines Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 on Intelligence, 2001, George Tenet, Director of Central by January 28, 2003. September signed 307 on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Guidelines Memorandum of Notification of 17 Presidential September signed by George Tenet, Director 2001, Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003. of 308 CIA document titled, Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22, 2003. 309 CIA titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions CIA document Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May for 22, 2003. 310 CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22, 2003. mi 11 in i MM ^ M ^ MW ^ M ^ oforn Page 62 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 62

92 UNCLASSIFIED //NO FORN TOP SECRET//^ undergoing interrogation kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than detainees were 311 toilet facilities. 2003 January listed 12 The interrogation DCI's guidelines director be with could approval of the used of CTC, including that techniques" "enhanced prior for "prolonged two—use and the abdominal slap—that had not been of diapers periods" the The "enhanced techniques" were only OLC. be employed by "approved by evaluated to use with [a] specific detainee." interrogators guidelines also identified "standard for The sleep up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud techniques"—including deprivation exceed and of diapers "generally not to use 72 hours"—that required isolation, the music, "whenever feasible," and directed that advance use be documented. The "standard approval their were as "techniques that do described incorporate physical or substantial techniques" not pressure." The guidelines provided psychological description or further limitations on the use no 312 enhanced or standard interrogation techniques. of either the the Although were prepared as a DCI interrogation guidelines of death Gul the and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on to reaction Rahman al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been 'Abd al-Rahim did CIA sites. The guidelines, for example, detention not address whether at employed 313 314 as the "rough take down," interrogation techniques use of cold water showers, such and the prolonged deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of light techniques" feasible," the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant "standard "whenever of discretion to determine who could be subjected to amount CIA's "standard" interrogation the techniques, those techniques could be applied, when when it was not "feasible" to request and advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines, throughout much 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could, of discretion, strip naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours, at their a detainee 315 the repeatedly with cold douse water —without approval from CIA Headquarters and detainee "feasible." judged Headquarters approval was not CIA In practice, CIA if those officers routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior personnel 316 approval. | 3741 312 Memorandum on Pursuant to the Presidential Conducted of Notification of 17 Guidelines Interrogations 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003. September 313 For of the "rough takedown," see Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, a description BIHI from January 2003, Subject: Death Investigation 28, RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. - Gul 31A One cold water shower was described by a CIA linguist: "Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the guards at OFFICER l]]'s direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias. [CIA to than on-site linguist], the entire process lasted no more According 20 minutes. It was intended to lower [the conclusion Rahman's was not for hygienic reasons. At the and of the shower, Rahman was moved to one resistance of the four sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or overnight with his hand chained over his head." See Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), CIA 27, April 2005. 315 dousing was not designated by the Water as a "standard" interrogation technique until June 2003. In CIA January 2004 water dousing was recategorized by the CIA as an "enhanced" interrogation technique. 316 Volume III for additional information. See 11 ii 11 ii i i j^^^U^Mm^BvNm-onN Page 63 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 63

93 UNCLASSIFIED TOP The DCI guidelines also included the first (TS^HI^^l^^^H^^) interrogation to recordkeeping, that, for "each interrogation session in which requirements related instructing the technique a "substantially contemporaneous an enhanced field is employed," prepare the nature duration of the such technique employed, and identities of forth setting record... each 317 to the those Headquarters approval cable." present, In practice, these and a citation required 318 not guidelines were followed. program. also were to the administrative As noted, There (^flHI^B^) changes 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the on December 3, 319 maintenance and CIA detention and interrogation facilities. all Prior to that management of was timc^hcintcrrogation the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to "joined program at involved another attorney who was directly CTC in the Legal, I^B^^^IITC although the CIA OIG that she "was never sure program group in CTC was responsible for informed what 321 320 after activities." formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group, Even interrogation the particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and tensions continued, continued role, and the Renditions Group, DUNBAR's designated as the which 3,7 (302126Z JAN DIRECTOR (311702Z JAN 03). Despite the formal record DIRECTOR 03); the the 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on June use of the CIA's enhanced requirement, keeping CIA's at CIA detention sites was not necessary, stating: "First, the decline in reporting over time interrogation techniques use the enhanced techniques, which the Study characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually on of was the the program. In early 2003, a process of put in place whereby interrogators requested reflects maturation in advance permission interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for for reporting extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approved plan." in detailed explicitly the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 As required record keeping, in and "the and duration including each such technique employed, the identities of those present, nature a citation to of the Headquarters approval cable." That required was never revised. requirement 318 Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques listed techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those the were employed, did they integrate the specific techniques into narratives of the interrogations. As the techniques nor CIA's program of the use of the descriptions enhanced interrogation techniques were interrogation continued, CIA increasingly summarized form, providing little information on how or recorded the techniques were applied in when an There are also few CIA records detailing interrogation. rendition process for detainees and their during the to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee transportation on their rendition comments experiences photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the and hooded detainees the CIA by aircraft were typically by with their hands and feet shackled. photographs, transported detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, The these headsets were typically affixed to a and detainee's with duct tape that ran the circumference head the detainee's head. CIA detainees were placed in of diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either strapped into during the flights, or laid down and strapped to the floor of the plane horizontally like cargo. See seats the photographs among CIA materials provided to renditions Committee pursuant to the Committee's CIA of requests, as well as CIA detainee reviews in Volume III for document information on the transport of CIA additional detainees. 3,9 DIRECTOR••(032336ZDEC 03) 320 b |HHIH y Interview of [REDACTED! and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector [REDACTED], General, August 20,2003. Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was February 2003, by Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, handled interview report of Office the of the Inspector General. 321 As noted, the CIA's Rendition Group is variably known as the "Renditions Group," the "Renditions and "RDG." Detainees the "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and Group," i mi in i"^^BMBBH^BBIi mi imi 11 Page 64 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 64

94 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 322 chief As late as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, operating outside CIA's interrogator. management of Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE of the direct the 323 dispute of detainees. conduct The reviews extended to and psychological to both interrogate Renditions Group's leadership considered the interrogation which practices. The waterboard, Interrogations was not certified to use, ^B^B^B "life threatening," and of Chief as the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a complained to 324 Renditions the "running a 'sissified' interrogation program." was At the same result, Group r their the Renditions Group andB^B f° CTC criticized use of painful CIA time, personnel 325 well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT. stress positions, as r were a so concerns eie ' about possible conflicts of interest (T&^iBBBiflBB^^) ^ 30, to SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January contractors, 2003, a cable from CIA related the stated that "the individual at the interrogation site who Headquarters the techniques administers is not same person who issues the psychological assessment of record," and that only a staff the 326 not issue an assessment of record." a contractor, In June 2003, however, psychologist, could interrogate DUNBAR to DETENTION SITE BLUE to deployed KSM, as and were SWIGERT 327 assess KSM's "psychological stability" and "resistance well as As described later to posture." summary, contractors had earlier subjected KSM the the waterboard and other CIA in this to interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to enhanced SITE an prompted DETENTION OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that BLUE b 322 Office y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], [BH^^^^Bl' of the Inspector General, April Interview of February 21, 2003, interview report, ^BBI^BB, Office of the Inspector General. Hammond 3, 2003. SWIGERT, told DUNBAR of Inspector General that there was "intrigue" between the RDG and him and the Office and were emails coming to [DETENTION "there BLUE] that questioned [his] and [SWIGERT]'s SITE qualifications." See Interview of Hammond DUNBAR, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 4, 2003. February 323 Email cc:J fan: to: e: W^^^mma^m^ for IC Psychologists ^^JRDG R Tasking expressed date: [SWIGERT]; at 5:23:29 PMnl^^^HOMS June concern that "no and [DUNBAR] 20,2003, the field would credit professional and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the in [SWIGERT cc: ^^^ enhanced (See email from: their measures." subjects of 00 Re: BH^ |; subject: for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at Tasking PM.) The CIA's June 2013 2:19:53 Response that CIA "Headquarters established CTC's Renditions and Detentions Group CTC/RDG as the states December entity CIA detention and interrogation sites in all 2002, removing any latent institutional responsible for confusion." 324 Interview [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, by to 'd The February of interrogations, ^^BIHIK 21, 2003. the Inspector General that the waterboard was chief overused with Abu Zubaydah and KSM and was ineffective in the interrogations of KSM. (See Interview of by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, March 27, 2003.) One doctor and stated in using the waterboard interrogation technique interrogations that "has a huge bias involved CIA the waterboard b/c he's not approved to use it. The reverse is true of the contract against guys [SWIGERT and psy to: ^^^^Bl^k have interest in favor of it." See email from: BIHHHI> who a vested DUNBAR] cc: subject: re: More; [REDACTED]; at 08:11:07 AM. ^^ date^prim^003, 325 March 10, interview report of Office of the Inspector General. Interview of |B 2003, Inspector ACTED] [REDACTED], Office of the and General, February 27, 2003. Interview ^•^•HbWRED ufHHH' by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. March Inspector 24, report of ^^^HH, Office of the interview General. 2003, 326 DIRECTOR •• (301835Z JAN 03) 112168 (301822Z J UN 03) 11 ii Ij^MI^^^BB^BB I II I II 11111 Page 65 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 65

95 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN data them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as collected "[a]ny by 328 management then informed the be of always suspect." interrogators will that "no professional in the field would the [SWIGERT and Renditions Group credit judgments psychologists assessing the subjects as their enhanced DUNBAR's] later of 329 the end of their deployment, in June 2003, measures." SWIGERT DUNBAR provided At and assessment KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by their of forthcoming interrogator him" who would assess how to he is and experienced known "an 330 there are differing consequences for cooperating "remind not cooperating." him In his that or to draft Inspector General Special the HH^BOMS noted that "OMS response Review, about conflict of interest... were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the concerns individuals same EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its applied an of detainee implicitly proposed continued use and the technique - at and resilience, effectiveness reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could a daily compensation not 331 the use technique." and of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri Detention Interrogation D. The Disagree 1. CIA CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Interrogators with Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Cooperation; Techniques 332 'Abd assessed by the CIA to be an al- al-Rahim al-Nashiri, in "terrorist who was "intimately involved" planner" planning both the USS Qa'ida operations bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United Cole 333 while mid-October 2002. Emirates He provided information in in the custody of a Arab 334 government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf, foreign and was then rendered by the 328 The which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site psychologists, email, that, "[although guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and stated these arrogance and evolve into unproductive conflict in the field." See email narcissism responsibilitie^efo^dieir to: (^^^HIIB ^^HHHHH; subject: IH r DG H^HH^^H; from: DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM. Psychologists 329 Email ^^^^^^^^^^to^^ from: Tasking for Psychologists DUNBAR and ^^TTsubjecrReTBBfcRDG IC June date: 2003, at 2:19:53 PM. SWIGERT; 20, 330 12168 (301822Z JUN 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response ••• "In practice, by April 2003, [CIA] states: staff had taken over almost all of the psychologists of support to the RDI program. As it concerned provisions [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because they were asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated" occasionally example, added). June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For CIA's in June 2003, SWIGERT and (emphasis The provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they DUNBAR interrogated. had 331 for from General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], Memorandum Inspector | re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and M.D., ^^Medical Services^ [REDACTED], Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13. 332 For information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim more in Volume III. al-Nashiri 333 ALtC^pi^^^^HIHH 11357 (02I242ZDEC02);HBH 367.101 See •^••••LALECj For disseminated inli Mil i in i i i ^^^^^^^^^^B oa I IIA •^^^^••CIA •• |. For other reporting from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see i mi in i BMBB^^B i mi inn 11 Page 66 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 66

96 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ to DETENTION COBALT in Country | on November 2002, where he was held CIA SITE 335 before to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November 2002. for being • days transferred al-Nashiri CIA's interrogated using the GREEN, enhanced At DETENTION SITE was 336 three including the waterboard at least subjected times. being In techniques, interrogation to when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu December 2002, Zubaydah 337 DETENTION SITE BLUE. rendered were to total, was subjected to the CIA's enhanced In al-Nashiri (^WKKBKM^) during at least four separate periods, with each interrogation typically ending techniques period 338 from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri assessment compliant and cooperative. an with was at CIA Headquarters disagreed with these assessments, with the Officers chief of ALEC deputy Station, commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should HH^H, 339 make in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance. "sweeping Officers not statements" sought enhanced reinstate the use of the CIA's Headquarters interrogation techniques at CIA to actionable their that al-Nashiri had not yet provided on intelligence on imminent based belief 340 attacks. after al-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE, CIA Shortly interrogators at detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his the Headquarters and answer questions, while CIA to personnel judged his engagement willingness based on the specific actionable intelligence he compliance provided (or the lack thereof). had For in December 2002, interrogators example, CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was informed "cooperative and truthful," and that the "consensus" at the detention site was that al-Nashiri was 70866| For intelligence, see \ disseminated | 335 02) [NOV [11243 |29768 |NOV 02); | (I 336 02); NOV | \ 112581 | 02); HNOV 11246| for See, example, |112841 02); | NOV | NOV 02) |11270 02); ^^MNOV 11263 NOV H^B 322 111 1112931 02); | NOV 02); | NOV 11294| 111 3221 113591 | DEC 02); 02); | DEC I11352| (J^^^DEC 02) 178275 338 Al-Nashiri's at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records. As described time standard time procedure at COBALT at the elsewhere, included total light deprivation, loud continuous operating records, music, dietary manipulation. Based on CIA and the other four "enhanced interrogation" periods isolation, of al-Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December 5-8, 2002; December 27,2002-January 1, 2003; January 2003; and January 15-27, 2003. See •^•10030 (111541Z DEC 02); ^^^M 10078 9-10, DEC02)J|^Bl0140 (191729Z JAN 03). (211733Z (031727ZJAT^rALECl^| 339 from: •I^^HK to: ••••I [REDACTED]; cc: Email [REDACTED]; follow-up; [DETENTION SITE BLUE] [REDACTED], date: December 15, subject: ___ 2002. 340 for example, ALEC ••(072315Z See, 02); ALEC ••(130352Z DEC 02); ALEC DEC (180247Z DEC 02); ALEC ^^|(191729Z JAN 03); CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: BLUE], Unauthorized at [DETENTION SITE Techniques (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003. See Interrogation also CIA Office of Inspector General report, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 2003) (2003-7123-IG), released on May 7, 2004. - October im 11 III i'i mi hi i Page 67 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 67

97 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRiawBI^^^BM^^^HflNQFQRN 341 who "withholding important threat information." detainee" Officers was "a compliant not ALEC at CIA Headquarters responded: CIA's from Station the that al-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads... "it is inconceivable to us his able capture other terrorists based on to leads and to thwart are When we based on his reporting, future will have much more confidence that he plots we 342 on some level." genuinely is, indeed, cooperative multiple debriefings, DETENTION SITE after follow-up Later, again wrote that they had "reluctantly concluded" that al-Nashiri BLUE providing officers was and explanations" to questions provided rational CIA Headquarters and therefore "logical by recommended "against resuming enhanced measures" unless ALEC Station had evidence they 343 was A cable from the detention site stated: lying. al-Nashiri proof lying or intentional withholding, however, we tangible of "without enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except believe employing show that will be punished whether he he or not, thus eroding [al-Nashiri] cooperates remaining desire to continue cooperating... [The] bottom line is that we any [al-Nashiri] think and if subjected to indiscriminate and is being cooperative, either measures, is a good chance he will enhanced fold up and prolonged there cooperation, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by cease enhanced statute. a decision to resume Therefore, measures must be the 344 in fact and not general feelings." grounded 2. CIA Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Headquarters Threatens al-Nashiri a Gun and a Drill Interrogator with DETENTION BLUE chief of Base sent two the SITE After to the interrogators States because of "prolonged absences from family" and the back United measures are no longer required for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarters sent "facUha^nhanced [CIA OFFICER 2], a CIA officer who had not been trained or qualified iHHI^^H 345 interrogator, DETENTION SITE BLUE to question and assess as an al-Nashiri. to 341 10030(1115412 DEC 02) 342 ALEC 02) DEC (180247Z 343 02) 10085 (230906Z DEC 344 10085 (230906Z DEC 02) 345 10040 (122122Z DEC02^rior to tCI A OFFICER 2's] deployment, CIA records ancl included about [CIA OFFICER 2's] anger management, HHHIH> numerous concerns more personnel on HHH [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CIA For in the information III. with program issues in their background, see Volume similar The CIA's June 2013 Response states alarming that: some of the | officers mentioned in the Study—^ available excluded—much derogatory information was not in fact the to senior managers making assignments | of [." NotwithstandingtheCIA's June 2013 assertion, as detailed in Volume HI, senior to managers aware of concerns related to Bl^^B [CIA OFFICER 2] prior were his deployment. mi 11 in i ^^BB^BBBMBBiyNftrrnm Page 68 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 68

98 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ In (TS^^I^^^^^H^NF) following a meeting at CIA Headquarters late December 2002, against use CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the al-Nashiri, resuming the to discuss of 346 RDG CIA's —the entity that managed the H^^H^^Hft Detention and the chief of sending to [CIA OFFICER 2] to the detention site Interrogation Program—objected I^Mi and "had through the interrogation training" been because "had he because not some colleagues that [BH^HjCIAOFFICER 2]] was too confident, had a heard from had and later learned from other CIA officials that temper, some securityissues7^^^M^^| operations 2]] OFFICER of at "[CTC chief [CIA over BLUE] holidays." •••toldthe Office of Inspector SITE [DETENTION the "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators General that OFFICER too with al-Nashiri and that [HHH [CIA lenient 2]] was sent to being were 347 BLUE] to [DETENTION the situation." SITE 'fix' cia 2) HH OFFICER 2] arrived at DETENTION SITE [ on December and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation BLUE B 2002, [CIA al-Nashiri despite the fact that thereafter, OFFICER 2] on shortly techniques been trained, certified, or approved to use had CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. not the OFFICER wrote in a cable to 2] Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds [CIA CIA to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators well to administer "various continue degrees mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some of 348 rewards.'" 'minute learned that It was these interrogation sessions, later during OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of [CIA DETENTION SITE the BLUE of Base, who also had not chief trained and qualified as an interrogatoi^ised a series been of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example, [CIA OFFICER 2] al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his placed 349 for and a half days. approximately Later, during the course of al-Nashiri's head" two a pistol he [CIA OFFICER 2] placed blindfolded, near al- while was debriefings, 350 operated a cordless drill near al-Nashiri's Nashiri's head Al-Nashiri did not provide and body. 351 information during, or after, threat interrogations. additional any these 3A0 described, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred As as the "Renditions Group," the to "Rendition, and Interrogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records. Detention, 347 Purposes, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism 2003-7123-IG, | Interview Report, 23, 2003. February 348 10140 (031727Z JAN 03) MMM to: ^••HiH subject: EYES ONLY - ONLY from: April FOR date: January - MEMORANDUM In an ADDO/DDO; 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on 22,2003. Intelligence hearing, Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[prolonged stress standing the naked, head. chained above the head..." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the position, Stress arm[s] See are of the EITs, positions nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator." part Senate Select Committee on and Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 350 See, for CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation example, 29, Techniques SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October [DETENTION 2003; email from: [DETENTION SITE at BLUE] COB to: subject: EYES ONLY - flHHIHB ONLY - MEMO ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003. FOR 351 For additional details, see Volume III. Illl I I III I JM^^BBMBBB'/'NOFORN Page 69 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 69

99 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET// //NQFORN 1 on a report from CTC, the CIA Office of Inspector General (TSZ/^^^^J^^^JiWF) Based of these incidents, and issued a report of investigation in the conducted a review interrogation 352 later Office of Inspector General 2003. described additional allegations of fall of The 2] against by [CIA OFFICER al-Nashiri and other techniques unauthorized used slapping al-Nashiri multiple times on the back of the head during interrogators, including that would mother implying be brought before him and sexually abused; interrogations; his using smoke face; giving al-Nashiri a forced bath al-Nashiri's a stiff brush; and cigar in blowing stress positions that caused cuts and bruises using in the intervention of a improvised resulting officer, was concerned that al-Nashiri's shoulders who be dislocated using the medical would 353 by When interviewed stress the positions. of Inspector General, the DETENTION Office SITE chief of Base stated he did not object to using the gun and drill in the interrogations BLUE he believed OFFICER 2] was sent from CIA Headquarters "to resolve because [CIA [CIA matter cooperation" and that he believed al-Nashiri's OFFICER 2] had the of 354 use the interrogation techniques. own The chief of Base added that his permission on-site to was he on this and "the pressure approval felt from Headquarters to obtain imminent threat based 355 2004, 9/11-style attacks." from In April on m [CIA OFFICER information al-Nashiri 356 chief of Base were disciplined. 2] and the Contractor 3. CIA Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Recommends Techniques Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Against Techniques Might "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the CIA Program a "Train Wreak [sic] Waiting to Happen " As 352 CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at Office of BLUE], October 29,2003. SITE (2003-7123-IG), [DETENTION 353 of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA Office 2004. (2003-7123-IG), May 354 Investigation: Inspector General, Report Office of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at CIA of SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October [DETENTION 2003. 29, 355 Office of General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at Inspector CIA BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003. SITE [DETCNTION 356 OFFICER 2) received a one-year [CIA of Reprimand, was suspended for five days without pay, Letter and prohibited from promotions, within-grade step was quality step increases, or permanent salary increases, increases during that one-year period. The decision did not affect |HHH| [CIA OFFICER 2's] eligibility to receive Exceptional Awards, bonuses, or non-monetary forms of recognition. See I Performance OFFICER retired from the CIA on [CIA 2] 1) On 20, 2005, the CIA director of transnational issues, aware June [CIA OFFICER 2's] problematic of background, HIHH [CIA OFFICER 2's] employment approved a CIA contract because the project was on 'mission critical" and "no other contractor with the needed skills was available." ( See I Letter received Base of chief of i The a two-year a ten-day and without suspension Reprimand was , and the from awards bonus any receiving from prohibited reprimand. of period the during CIA On 2003, to prior the implementation of the prohibitions, this individual See the from retired CIA. TOP SECRETA 7NOFORN Page 70 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 70

100 UNCLASSIFIED TOP BLUE DETENTION a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge al- to SITE conduct the enhanced use of the CIA's for interrogation techniques and Nashiri's suitability additional plan his The resulting interrogation interrogation. proposed that recommendations develop for would have the "latitude to use the full range the enhanced exploitation and interrogators of measures," that "the use of the water board would require additional support interrogation adding CIA to Grayson SWIGERT. According fellow the interrogation plan, once the from" contractor predictability" eliminated "sense of control and al-Nashiri's and established a interrogators had level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation "desired 357 and a debriefing phase once again. techniques transition to proposed plan for al-Nashiri on the receiving interrogation CIA's chief of interrogations—whose presence had January2l720037^^^^^^H, the 358 CIA tremble in fear al-Nashiri —emailed to colleagues to notify them that previously prompted "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way he had had] the due to serious reservation[s] [he program about the current state of interrogation with and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, ^H wrote, "[t]his is a affairs" 359 wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens." train •• drafted for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a a cable of concerns he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the number that disseminated CIA cable—which does not appear to have been The to record." Headquarters SITE BLUE—included the following: DETENTION have serious reservations with the continued use "we enhanced techniques of with and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held [al-Nashiri] three difficult in very for conditions, both physically and mentally. It months that assessment the prior interrogators of [al-Nashiri] has been mainly is the truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use enhanced technique[s] clear indications that he [is] withholding without cease info may cause him to and cooperation on any important is excessive [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion level. whether he cooperates or that not, will continually be subjected he enhanced techniques, therefore, what is to the incentive for continued cooperation, Also, both C/CTC/RG [Chief of CTC who RDG HVT Interrogator [HH^Hfe and ••I^^^Hl [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in Hpanuary, believe continued departed 360 methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically." enhanced sees 359 Email from: Despite this notification, 360 Email from: ••• 7NOFORN TOP SECRET// Page 71 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 71

101 UNCLASSIFIED TOP draft The cable from | also raised "conflict of concerns, stating: responsibility" is the use of the psychologist of an interrogator. The "Another area concern as ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as role of the a check to the interrogator from any unintentional excess of on the interrogator prevent the cause psychological harm to permanent subject. The which pressure might is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions medical officer harm might Therefore, the medical officer and the that the subject. serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of should psychologist not note that [the proposed plan] contains a psychological responsibility. We by [DUNBAR] which psychologist assessment interrogation carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR], We have a problem with him is to be 361 conducting simultaneously." both roles CIA Rather than the cable that was drafted by | (TS/^^^I^^^^V^F) releasing CIA's a plan the use of the reinstitute enhanced interrogation approved to Headquarters al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, techniques placing against and 362 sleep deprivation position with his arms a standing over his head. in CIA cables him affixed subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, describing times, "put in the at 363 handcuffed and shackled." standing According to cables, CIA interrogators decided position, symptoms al-Nashiri "hopefully stabilize his physiological to and prevent to provide clothes 364 deteriorating," noting them in a cable the next day from al-Nashiri was suffering from a that head which caused his body to cold for approximately ten minutes during an shake 365 interrogation. (^^/^l^^^^fl^WlNF) in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five Beginning CIA detention before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on different facilities 366 2006. In the interim, he was diagnosed 5, some CIA psychologists as having September by 367 no disorder, "major while others found depressive" symptoms of either "anxiety" and 368 He was a difficult illness. uncooperative detainee and engaged in and belligerent repeated acts, attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his including to: 161 Email HHHi ^^HH, [REDACTED], | from: [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR [REDACTED], from NASHIRI; 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel January CIA's Office of Medical Services raised the date: same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to in participate process. the interrogation 362 (201659Z 03 JAN DIRECTOR JAN (230008Z 03) •• DIRECTOR 363 03); JAN (241203Z 10289 ~ 03) 10296 10306 Mj^M 03), JAN (251I13Z (261403Z JAN 364 (261403Z JAN 03) 10309 365 (270854Z JAN 03) 10312 366 HEADQUARTERS SEP 06); (03I945Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS 1242 (050744Z | ^^^^ 06) SEP (051613Z 367 03); See, for example, ^^^^11247 (141321Z APR | 04); DEC (111700Z 1_959 I 05); " 2038 (21155? (251133ZMAR III! I " 03); MAY (191640Z 11701 1756 03). SEP (I90800Z 365 04); AUG (021841Z 1502 ^^^^ APR 06); 2709 ••• (271517Z | 3910 (241852Z JAN 06); 06) (271517Z 12709 APR TOP SECRET/^ //NOFORN Page 72 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 72

102 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN SECRET//^ TOP 369 Over years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his a period cell. of 370 al-Nashiri and insomnia. of At one point, pain launched a short- complained bodily food, and 371 resulted in the CIA lived feeding him rectally. hunger strike that force October 21 months after the final 2004, use of the In (TSZ/miB/W) documented interrogation techniques CIA's al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract enhanced against DUNBAR another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided interrogator and has actionable that "the probability that he and much more to "essentially information," no 372 Over detention course of al-Nashiri's is low." and interrogation by the CIA, the the contribute his 145 reports based on intelligence debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided disseminated CIA on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots, information on completed and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of details operations, 373 CIA's provide the information that the not ALEC Station sought Al-Nashiri operation. did al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA] and believed 374 attacks capture additional operatives." future thwart and and Country to with CIA Detention Facility | Relating the Arrival of New E. Tensions the Detainees ) According to CIA records, three weeks after | ( detention Country | agreed to host a CIA of facility, the CIA leadership and political U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was informed the 369 1142 (041358Z AUG 06); 06); 1029 for example, (291750Z JUN See, 05); (301235Z 3051 SEP 04); SEP (180742Z 1716 (111600Z AUG 04); AUG 05); 2673 (021451Z 2474 JUN 05); (251622Z (291750Z JUN 06); 04). SEP 1716 (180742Z 370 | 04); NOV 1880(140917Z 04); JUL 1356 (011644Z example, for See, 1959 04); (111700Z DEC (111700Z 1962 1959 (121029Z DEC 04); 04); DEC NOV (031835Z 1091 | 03); (211558Z JAN 2038 H^^H 04). (271440Z MAR 04); JAN 1266 (052309Z 371 (231644Z MAY 1202 04) MAY (231709Z 1203 372 al-Nashiri's intelligence final years of In the detention, most of the 1843 OCT (271356Z ^^^^ 04) for June involved showing al-Nashiri photographs. In requirements 2005, the DETENTION SITE al-Nashiri it was chief BLACK suspended even these debriefings because of "the very, very rare moment" that al-Nashiri Base would recognize a photograph, and because the debriefings often were the "catalyst" for his outbursts. See \ 2474 JUN 05). (251622Z 373 While in the custody of a foreign government, prior to his rendition to CIA custody, al-Nashiri provided still prior details terrorist plots in which he was involved multiple to his detention, including the attacks against the on USS Cole and the MV Limburg, plans to sink oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, plans to attack warships docked at a Dubai ports and Jeddah, and his casing of Dubai amusement park. This information was disseminated in in from al-Nashiri while he was in the 70866 disseminated . For intelligence, see 374 ALEC /NOFORN SECRET/, TOP Page 73 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 73

103 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 375 that this initiative" from Country ( officials. "risking As was the case in other host he of hear any in ambassador told by the CIA not to speak with Country other State countries, the ( was 376 about the arrangement. official Department of the CIA (TS/^^^HBBBB^jPHPrio^^jje facility in Country (, | opening detention warned possible legal actions against CIA Legal, of countries practices "take a different view of the detention and interrogation in employees that 377 of by further recommended against the establishment [theCIAj." CIA facilities employed He 378 that m^^^^^^^^mmmi^^l^ in countries was not heeded and, in December 2002, the two individuals then being advice by detained in Country ( (Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) were the CIA 379 Country to transferred (, agreement to host a CIA detention facility in Country | (^S/^l^mm^/NF) The ongoing Country between multiple, ( and the CIA. Country I'sflfll created difficulties relative a written Understanding" covering the of roles and proposed "Memorandum 380 the CIA and d^B^lfc which the CIA ultimately refused to sign. responsibilities of detainees, months detention site began hosting CIA the Country ( rejected the transfer after Four which included Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The decision was of^^^^HH the only the U.S. ambassador intervened with after political leadership of Country (on reversed 381 CIA's behalf. the The following montiMheClAprovided $| million to Country B's 3X2 an which officials, speaking for ^^HH ~ d the after ( political leadership, that Country ( was now flexible with regard to the Country indicated 383 facility of the facility and when the detainees would eventually be closed. CIA The number at which was describedby the CIA as "over facility, was nonetheless closed, as had been capacity," 384 in [the fall of] 2003. previously agreed, According officials CIA cables, years later, HH^^HVNF) in to and I reacted they acknowledged was ^^^^Jwhich 386 wcrc officii "extremely upset" at the CIA's inability to keep secrets and were "deeply disappointed" in not having had more warning 375 [REDACTED] 376 DIRECTOR T 377 10640J ••• 378 insisted he redacted in The Committee Study prior to the Study CIA the beingrelocatedtothe Senate from the off-site research facility. U.S. 379 78275||^BDEC02) 380 18881 [REDACTED] 381 [REDACTED] 26661 382 HEADQUARTERS f 383 [REDACTED] 3280 •••^•H- According to the cable, the CIA Station speculated that the change of million..." position least somewhat attributable... to our gift of "at was 384 See Volume I for additional details. 385 [REDACTED] 7526 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) 386 7849 ([REDACTED] [REDACreD]^^^^^^^^^ [REDACTED] 11ii' hi i III i I'IIimi i Page 74 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 74

104 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 387 Bush's acknowledgment of the CIA program. of President The CIA September 2006 public part, j the Station, for " described its the b] to » ser a ous ow as 388 bilateral relationship. and of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Detention F. The Interrogation Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior 1. Ramzi Bin CIA to to Rendition Custody al-Shibh September 2001, As bin 15, was assessed as early Ramzi CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacks and an associate of the 9/11 by the 389 H| another terrorist, Hassan Ghul, targeting Pakistani officials While hijackers. 390 bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on unexpectedly 11, 2002. captured On September 391 bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government, BHU- September 2002, five months on February |, 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the Approximately later, st 392 B^H custody, becoming of 41 the CIA detainee. CIA to custody Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at with As Headquarters—often in ALEC Station—overestimated the information bin CIA would al-Shibh have to within al-Qa'ida, writing that bin al-Shibh "likely has critical information on access 393 attacks locations of senior al-Qa'ida upcoming operatives." Later, after bin al-Shibh was and for using CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the an estimated 34 days, the interrogated CIA's ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida and was 394 not know details about al-Qa'ida's plans for future attacks. in In another parallel, a position to Headquarters CIA's and directed the continued use of the at CIA enhanced officers requested against CIA al-Shibh when techniques detention site personnel recommended interrogation bin 395 such ending measures. 387 9210 [REDACTED] SEP 06) (231043Z 388 7839 ([REDACTED]). Email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: BOMBSHELL; [REDACTED] subject: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; from: CIA Prisons in Email date: [|; date: [REDACTED], Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: 1 think [Country to [REDACTED], date: [REDACTED]. had react 389 SEP BH|92537 (15SEP 01) (222334Z ALEC 01); 390 (111551Z SEP 02). Tire CIA represented to policymakers ALEC (292345Z AUG 02)-ALEclBHi a result the of EITs" Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin inaccurately—that "as use of others- and summary of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh." See section of this ultimate on the the in role capture a "key played that al-Shibh 11 for additional details. "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" and Volume 20744 ^HH See 393 ALEC (15SEP01); 92557 02); ALEC (222334Z SEP 01); | ALEC (130206Z SEP 97470 MAR 02 2813172 > JUL | (270132Z ( 02); 394 (302240Z JUN 05) ALEC 395 ALEC 03) I (131444Z FEB I//NOFORN SECRET//! TOP Page 75 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 75

105 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETfl^^^^^B^^^^^M/WQgQRN Ramzi bin was initially interrogated by a foreign (TSZ/^m^^^^^p^F) al-Shibh 396 While Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence government. officers at CIA five officers of detention in foreign government custody, CIA his in that production from months 397 officers al-Shibh's reporting. satisfied Those CIA bin wrote that bin al- were country with provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including Shibh had potential on threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow information future Peninsula. planning operations in the Arabian potential The CIA ancUtLNashiri's for Airport also noted that they found bin al-Shibh's officers to be generally [in-country] information 398 they "found few cases whereheopenly/clearly that facts." and In a cable accurate misstated Headquarters, the CIA officers to CIA [the country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in H^ being concluded, "overall, he provided what was needed." The same cable stated that bin held] interrogation was to other interrogations they had participated in, and that the al-Shibh's similar confront effective was having information available to tool him when he tried most interrogation 399 provide incomplete information. concluded Personnel at CIA Headquarters to mislead in or that derived most significant intelligence 2005 from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his the in CIA government custody, which was prior to his rendition to detention custody and foreign 400 use the the enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA's of Proposes Interrogation 2. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Plan Immediate Use of Nudity and for Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees (TS/^^H^^^^^^^WF) Despite aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in the i 111111,1 Inn al-Shibh's cooperation, officers at CIA Headquarters decided the CIA i mi' • H custody DETENTION bin al-Shibh and render him to obtain SITE BLUE in should of 401 | February |, 2003, in anticipation of On al-Shibh's arrival, interrogators at the Country bin site, led by the CIA's chief interrogator, IH^HHK detention an interrogation plan prepared 402 al-Shibh. for The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters bin the relied enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees to use upon near CIA's 403 language. identical 3% MBkjJi551ZSEPi02) ALEC 397 DIRECTORIES DEC 02) HHH (240845Z FEB 122888 03) 122888 (240845Z FEB 03) 400 According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the "most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on potential future attacks background information related to al-Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. According to the was Ramzi of al-Shibh provided "useful intelligence," including an "overview CIA, the plot" that was then used in bin (302240Z inteiTogation other detainees. ( See ALEC jHH of JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the the majority of this information in mid-October 2002, while in foreign government custody. See CIA f I. See also \ |22695T 104071 1103611 403 included Khaled Shaykh This 10654 (030904Z MAR 03)); Hambali | Mohammed 1310 (101825Z SEP 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri Abd al-Latif al- Barq]|^^^|l2348 Hambali and (152049Z AUG jj^^^BI^M); Mil Mill — Page 76 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 76

106 UNCLASSIFIED TOP interrogation plan that immediately following the The proposed medical psychological upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be assessments and conducted 404 dislocation." The proposed sensory dislocation included shaving "sensory al- subjected to bin room face, him to loud noise in a white and with white lights, keeping head Shibh's exposing and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and shackling him "hand "unclothed him foot arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed and with 405 weight his arms)." his Contrary to CIA representations made later to the with to support to detainees always offered the opportunity were cooperate before being that Committee to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated subjected bin al-Shibh would that be shackled with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with nude 406 or of his level of cooperation any According to a cable, only after interrogators assessment determined "initial his interrogators resistance level [had] been diminished by the that the 407 the questioning and interrogation phase begin. would conditions" The interrogation phase described in the plan included near (TS^^^I^^^^^I^NF) interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep constant the In interrogation plan stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation deprivation. addition, would be used, including the "attention techniques walling, the facial hold, the facial grasp, slap... abdominal slap, cramped confinement, the standing, stress positions, sleep wall deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of 408 resistance." on (TS/Z^^^^^^lj^BiVNF) this interrogation plan, at least six detainees versions Based of for shackled placed in the standing position and sleep deprivation, or stripped were nude, other subjected enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an to CIA 409 in Five of these detainees were 2003 naked in the standing position interrogator shackled 410 hands above their head immediately after their medical check with These interrogation their 1758 | al-Libi ; Adnan 1267 Hassan (| 03)); Gliul 2179| AL-TURKI and 10361 10361 Volume 11 for detailed information |. See CIA representations to on 10361 Con; 407 10361 408 10361 409 Abu (DIRECTOR i^^B FEB 03)); Asadullah Yasir al-Jaza'iri | included This | MAR 03)); Suleiman Abdullali 35787 i 135558 MAR 138576 |36023 ^^^BAPR03)); Abu Hudhaifa | | 03); |MAY 03)); AUG 03)); and Majid Khan Hambali 39077 (241242ZMAY03)~^^^^^feHiHI (271719Z MAY 03)). ^^46471 4,0 additional information, see Volume III. In an April 12,2007, Senate Select Committee For Intelligence on hearing, Levin asked the CIA Director if die CIA Senator allegations in an International Committee of the disputed Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[prolonged stress standing position, naked, armfs] the chained head..." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, above and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator." Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing Transcript, dated April (DTS #2007-3158). 12,2007 11111111111 M iii i mi Page 77 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 77

107 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRMWB^^MMB^^^P/NQEQRN typically plans reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the made no 411 believed the information. to detainee was possess Continued of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Urges Use 3. CIA Headquarters Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Was Cooperative interrogators at DETENTION SITE CIA assessed (^S^^^^^^H^NF) When BLUE 412 was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks that bin al-Shibh disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's CIA Headquarters sought techniques, to elicit the information failed by CIA which interrogation enhanced 413 Febinary 11, Headquarters. interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for 2003, that On questions Station "85 percent certain [bin al-Shibh ] will be was to answer," in order to verify ALEC able 414 level The cooperation al-Shibh's bin interrogators stated that information from Abu of and al-Nashiri that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new Zubaydah suggested trusted links significant information given his high-profile or to the September assignment with 415 al-Shibh They further stated that bin 2001, had "achieved substantial notoriety 11, attacks. 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to after 416 more a bystander information as an active participant." than as CIA's Station disagreed with the assessment of the The ALEC site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered detention Zubaydah al-Nashiri by Abu were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin al- and proximity Shibh actionable information due to his have to KSM and CIA Headquarters' must belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC Station wrote: base "As BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long [DETENTION SITE withholding been misleading information to and/or deliberately providing [a in government]... From our optic, it is interrogators his foreign focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: imperative What are the to 1) attacks for the US and 2) Who and where planned the operatives next are 417 the United States." inside 411 See Volume IE for additional information. 4,2 10452 03) (121723Z FEB 4,3 ALEC (131444Z FEB 03) 414 the (111754Z The Committee was informed that 03). CIA's standard practice during 10446 FEB interrogations was to ask questions to which interrogators already knew coercive answers in order to assess the the detainee's of cooperation. Hie Committee was further informed level only after detainees were assessed to be that cooperative did interrogators ask questions whose answers were unknown to the CIA. See, for example, Transcript of SSCHIearing, April 2007 (testimony of CIA Director Michael Hayden) (DTS #2007-3158). 12, 415 ••• (121723Z FEB 03). In June 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh participated with KSM in an interview 10452 (112136Z with television network on the 9/11 attacks. DIRECTOR al-Jazeera SEP 02). the 10452 (121723Z FEB 03) 417 ALEC HB (131444Z FEB 03). Contrary to the statement in the CIA cable, as described, CIA officers in the rendered country bin al-Shibh was held prior to being Ramzi to CIA custody wrote that Ramzi bin al-Shibh where had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential i mi III i ^^bimIBI '"i "in 'iii Page 78 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 78

108 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ The ALEC cable stated that bin al-Shibh had "spent (TS/fllHH^BP^F) Station with [KSM]," "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable extensive time and on strongly that Binalshibh was involved in efforts "HQS behalf of KSM to that added believes place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded: identify and Binalshibh uniquely think positioned to give us much needed "We is inside to thwart large-scale attacks us the United information help critical we want to do our utmost to States, it as soon as possible. Good and get 418 luck." CIA officers at DETENTION SITE (TS/Z^HHIH^NF) therefore continued to BLUE the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately use three additional after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, weeks 419 holds, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling attention Bin al-Shibh did not facial grasps, "large-scale information on "operatives inside the United States" or the attacks provide sought 420 the United States." inside Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign 4. Information Inaccurately Interrogations; to CIA Government Interrogators Apply the Attributed Not Enhanced to Bin Al-Shibh When Techniques Addressed As "Sir" CIA's Interrogation When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain and cia recor (TSA'HIBH^) indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION ds of BLUE Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware SITE the intelligence bin al-Shibh had questioning previously provided in foreign government custody, even though | an I^HBHli^^^l ^ intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by d CIA. the occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that On multiple previously bin from interrogations of information al-Shibh while he was contained disseminated bin government the faulty understanding that under al-Shibh was providing in foreign custody, 421 information. new threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow airport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential future in that Arabian Peninsula. The CIA officers in operations country also noted that diey found Ramzi bin the "found information be generally accurate, and that they to few cases where he openly/clearly misstated al-Sliibh's facts." The CIA officers in l^l^H concluded, "overall, [Ramzi bin al-Shibh] provided what was needed." See MM 22888 FEB 03). (240845Z 418 ALEC (131444Z FEB 03) ^^^ M 419 for example, ••• 10525 (200840Z FEB 03) and ••• 10573 See, FEB 03). For further (241143Z detail, the detainee review of Ramzi see al-Shibh in Volume III. bin 420 See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume ID for additional information. 421 See, example, CIA | for the government's interrogators' "plan 1(describing foreign Binalshibh to clarify his to ask that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, anc^iadJarrah could not agree statements on the wisdom of targeting nuclear facilities"); 10568 (231514Z FEB 03); ••• 20817 | •; ^Hi CIA |||I|M|1 11111 H^MMB mi Page 79 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 79

109 UNCLASSIFIED TOP al-Shibh Ramzi to interrogation techniques and was bin subjected CIA that approved by CIA Headquarters. not interrogators used confinement conditions of were interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to the CIA's enhanced and on occasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to perceived disrespect, several asked. an or before a question was questions The CIA's enhanced to respond interrogator's were applied interrogation bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as techniques when when noted bin al-Shibh had a "blank stare" on his face, and when bin al- "sir," interrogators 422 of pain. the Further, despite CIA policy at complained time to keep detainees Shibh stomach darkness light constant purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total for to heighten his under security 423 of fear. sense CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to (TS/fl^H^H^NF) the recognize psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA onset of that bin social isolation and his anxiety long-term the CIA would by al-Shibh's assessments, using its enhanced interrogation techniques return him. The symptoms included to against 424 and attempts at self-harm paranoia, insomnia, April 2005, a CIA psychologist visions, In that bin al-Shibh "has remained in social isolation" for as long as two and half years and stated on isolation a "clear and escalating effect having his psychological functioning." The was the continued, "in [bin al-Shibh's] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously officer past high-functioning his deterioration over the making several months individual, a relatively 425 more The psychologist wrote, "significant alterations to RBS'[s] detention alarming." 426 must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance." environment On September 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo 5, 427 428 his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications Cuba Bay, After CIA from 109 intelligence reports The the CIA GFS/jm^^^^^^^/NF) disseminated 429 which of Ramzi A CIA assessment, bin included intelligence from his interrogations al-Shibh (242026Z FEB 03); 10627 (281949Z FEB 03) 10582 (191750Z The 03). 10521 cable referred to keeping bin al-Shibh in darkness as a "standard FEB technique." 18, same cable states that during the night of February interrogation 2003, the light went out in bin The the cell that "[w]hen security personnel arrived to replace and bulb, bin al-Shibh was cowering in the al-Shibh's corner, shivering. Security personnel noted that he appeal ed relieved as soon as die light was replaced." 424 1759 OCT 04); HEADQUARTERSHI|(040023Z NOV 05); I^H^H 1890 (021319Z (061620Z NOV NOV 04); |^^Hll930 (140915Z DEC 04); | (171225Z 04); (111319Z APR 05XHMB2210(141507Z APR 05)T^Hi^| 2535 (051805Z JUL 05); 2207 (120857ZJUL05)~HB^BH AUG (291304Z ^^^^•2589 05); •••I1890 (171225Z NOV 2830 ICRC NOV CIA document entitled, 04h^^B^Bl893(200831Z Talking Points for 04); Rebuttal, | "Detainee •••T^^^^|2210(141507Z APR 05); ^[051805Z JUL 05); 221Q (141507Z APR05)j^^HM2535 JUL05)~B^^^B2830 (291304Z AUG05);| (051805Z (061620Z 2210 (141507Z APR 05) 1930 DEC 425 APR 05) 2210 (141507Z 426 2210 APR 05) (141507Z 427 •• (031945Z SEP 06)_ HEADQUARTERS 428 I J^H REPORT - 24 MAY 07: DAILY SITE 08) 18904 (182103Z APR 429 additional information. See Volume II for TOP SECRET/d 1//NOFORN Page 80 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 80

110 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ in foreign custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and time government 430 subjected CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, after concluded that: to being the al-Shibh's] have on the 11 September attacks [bin been "Much of statements media of details could be found in many accounts of the and speculative, the appeared before he was detained. In attacks few instances where his that the was and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the reporting unique has the sketchy on some aspects of he 9/11 plot, perhaps in information... been His downplay role in the plot. his information on individuals is non- order to he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a specific; 431 The quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003." role... overall Detention G. The Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Interrogation of to Pakistani in Limited Information; Rendered Custody, CIA Custody Held 1. KSM Provides COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced at DETENTION SITE Techiiques Interrogation to of KSM was attributable The a single CIA source who (T&V^^^^Hfl^/NF) capture 432 to the CIA's attention in the spring first 2001 came The source IHIHII^^HHHl of HH the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani led interrogated from time of his capture on custody 1, 2003, to March |, 2003, and was the March by officers and Pakistani officials. According CIA CIA records, while in Pakistani custody, to KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive 433 interrogation used. techniques While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the being 434 of Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Usama he did provide limited information on locations bin leaders had operatives who al-Qa'ida already been captured. KSM's willingness to various and their when with information about confronted capture—-behavior noted by discuss operatives officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout CIA subsequent detention KSM's 435 in CIA custody. and interrogation Less than hours after KSM's capture^anticipating KSM's two an sent email COBALT, interrogations, chief of SITE HHH^K DETENTION at arrival the the Headquarters the to CIA line, "Let's roll with with new guy." The email requested subject 436 to "press [KSM] for threat info right away." CIA Later that day, permission Headquarters authorized to a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against use 430 interrogation was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced al-Shibh techniques at DETENTION Ramzi bin BLUE. SITE 431 •• (302240Z JUN 05) ALEC 432 For details, see section of this summary on the capture of more and additional information in Volume II. KSM 141403 (020949Z MAR 03) 141484 (031315Z MAR 03) ^^^^^^ 141564 (041307Z 03);H^^^^B41592 (051050Z MAR 03). For details on KSM's MAR detainee in custody, see the KSM detention review in Volume III. Pakistani 436 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: I^Hii^^H subject: Let's Roll with the new guy; date: 1,2003, at 03:43:12 AM. March mi ii III i mi "in i Page 81 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 81

111 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I from The did not require that non-coercive interrogation KSM. CIA cable Headquarters 437 KSM's March |, 2003, two days before first. arrival at the detention techniques On be used 438 an interrogation plan for KSM approved Headquarters site, CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's According CIA to techniques DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the enhanced interrogation at abdominal began. was subjected to facial and KSM slaps, the facial grab, of questioning KSM standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, and stress positions, 439 dousing Interrogations also ordered the rectal rehydration of water Chief of of of need, a procedure that the chief a determination interrogations would without KSM medical 440 illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee." later At the characterize as interrogation the psychologist on-site concluded that the the team would likely have day, of end by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into more success 441 will with battles interrogator." of KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody the included accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having an provided during initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA been the 442 provided or worthless information. believed false detainees 437 DIRECTOR 03) MAR 012240Z •138 03); 34354 MAR DIRECTOR | 03) MAR 439 34491 MAR (051400Z 03) 440 03); 34491 (051400Z MAR | Interview of [REDACTED] |, by and 2003. of Inspector General, [REDACTED], March the Office 27 441 34575 442 Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, "Khalid by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, Surrounded April KSM also named three individuals who, he said, worked on an al-Qa'ida anthrax program that was 3,2003. in had "earliest stages." They were led, he said, by "Omar" who still been arrested in the country of | its The group included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See I^^H^H^^^^HI 34475 ^^HH^M^^I') KSM also later state that "YazidjMedal-Qa'ida's anthraxeffortT(5ee^^^Hl0769 (120937Z MAR 03).) Yazid would Sufaat, who had been in I^^H [foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspected of articipating in chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: al-Qa'ida [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 2003, COORD please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, noon at 09:05 AM; email from: FOR subject: by [REDACTED]; subject: Re: RESPONSE - INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO [REDACTED]; to: YAZID BINLADINASSOCIATE date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM; USAMA SUFAAT; WMD; i^^^^HI^H from: SUBJECT: Re: KSM on to: date: March 12, 2003, at email [REDACTED]; AM.) A draft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states 08:28:31 "Sufaat's own claims to [foreign that government] and personal background tracks with KSM's assertions." (See "KSM Guarding Most authorities 2003," Information," the President Only 18 March "For stamped 0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March Sensitive labeled On April 3, 2003, an IICT analysis stated that 2003.) "likely judges that information related to Sufaat already KSM has compromised since his arrest." (See been Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, "Khalid Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that "^^HlHI [a foreign government Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Yazid's involvement in al- holding provided anthrax early 2002," although that information was not by at the time to the CIA. (See Qa'ida's program Directorate of Intelligence; "Al-Qa"id£^nthraj^ogram^racks Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; CIA New Insights Yazid Sufaat's Credibility ^HHH^HI^V' (DTS #2005-3264).) Al-Filistini was later into to and captured the CIA. While being subjected detained the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques he by changed his description of al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also made known al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that "we never Samr anthrax." At the time, he was being subjected as to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he "told lying, the According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said "1 made the anthrax." Asked if he was truth." al-Barq said m mi 1 iii i BWBl^BBMMBi in 1 Page 82 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 82

112 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ On March 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at (^^••••••^F) 5, COBALT, KSM subjected to nudity and sleep deprivation. On March DETENTION SITE was 443 also additional rectal rehydration, to which was subjected 5, 2003, KSM helping to "clear a person's head" and effective I^^^^Hm, KSM described as in getting 444 6, 2003, adopted a '"softer Mr. March persona" after the On to talk. Rogers' concluded that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM interrogation team 445 up." this session KSM was described as "more cooperative," and the day's to "clam During 445 the session held to date" by "best interrogation team. deemed During was the interrogation KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he this as the protector of period described 447 That information resulted in the capture and children. detention of two innocent his CIA 448 individuals. The CIA Transfers 2. to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard KSM Prior His Arrival to hours of capture, ALEC Station successfully argued Within KSM's interrogation contractors DUNBAR should take over the and of KSM upon SWIGERT CIA that 449 DETENTION SITE BLUE. 3, On March KSM's 2003, CIA Headquarters approved arrival at indicating an interrogation KSM "will be subjected to immediate interrogation plan that in that interrogation techniques will increase and intensity from standard to techniques," "the he was. that CIA interrogators "demonstrated the penalty for lying," al-Barq again stated that "I made the After anthrax" then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. ( See 1015 (012057Z and because 03).) days later, al-Barq stated AUG he had lied about the anthrax production "only Two he thought that that what interrogators wanted." (030812Z was 03). AUG 443 ^••••^^•34575 444 I I I MBBBBi to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], subject: Re: Departure; date: 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: ••^^•Bto![REDACTED]; cc: March date: March at 4:51:32 PM. B^M^Ksubject^Re^Update; 6,2003, (O61751Z MAR 34614 (071551Z MAR M^^^Jmgammm 34573 03); 446 (061751Z 03); 34614 (071551Z MAR 03) 34573 MAR 34569 447 (061722Z KSM his reporting as "all lies." ^H^HI^^^^H June described MAR 03); In 2004, (130801ZJUN 04). 1281 445 two individuals, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullali Khan, entered CIA custod^i^pnUjn^uly 2003 The and August released in respectively, and February 2004, respectively. ( See 57 J 2 were from: to: [REDACTED]JREDACTED]^ubiect: email H^HHH of [DETENTION release ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; and planned SITE document, "Additional Details for DCIA on Sayed Habib's Arrest and CIA The CIA's June 2013 Detention.") Response that die detention of the two individuals "can states be considered 'wrongful' after the fact, not in the only light of credible information available at the time and in a context in which plot disruption was deemed an urgent national priority." CIA's June 2013 Response further states that KSM's reporting on March 6, 2003, was The because, Khalid the time, "[CIA] assessed that "credible" Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had moved to a more at CIA cooperative his interrogation progressed." A review of as records indicates that the CIA subjected posture KSM to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the following day^h^se of the techniques continued until the March included 183 applications of and waterboard. See 1071.1 25, 2003, 449 | Interview of of April Inspector General, Office 3, , by [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED], to: | Email 2003. ; from: [REDACTED], cc: ^BH^MB; I [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | subject: KSM planning; date: March 1, 2003, at 07:07:33 AM. I, [REDACTED]; I I ^^^BB^^BPB^BVNOFORN I I I Illl of 83 Page 499 UNCLASSIFIED 83

113 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN enhanced with [KSM's] level of resistance, until he indicates initial techniques commensurate 450 On the day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the cooperation." March |, 2003, on described use of the waterboard the KSM as inevitable: medical on-site officer here apparently looks to use the water board in two different "[T]he team is as regression of One and control in which it is used up front contexts. a tool as The vet information on an is to needed basis. aggressively. second and various pressures from home vs Given is happening on the ground, I the what the expectation is that [KSM] team's [be] getting treatment think will in between. I don't think they believe that it will be possible somewhere to entirely the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and avoid interests. It interesting dynamic because they are well aware of the allied is an take the the team vs. it will detainee. The requirements coming from toll on 451 breadth in terms of unbelievable and detail." really home are OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the Meanwhile, enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation CIA's at These sent to the medical personnel were the detention site. The technique. guidelines included a warning that the risk of guidelines waterboard was "directly related to number of the exposures may well accelerate as and increase," that concerns about cumulative exposures effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total number of "perhaps 20 in a week." CIA records indicate that, as of the waterboard exposures, KSM's the at DETENTION SITE BLUE, of interrogation team had not reviewed the day arrival 452 guidelines draft OMS at DETENTION arrived BLUE at approximately 6:00 KSM SITE local time on March |, 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep PM 453 position. 6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had deprivation At KSM KSM DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared from for the CIA's enhanced traveled with techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters' approval to begin the interrogation 454 455 at detention site received the approvals process 7:18 PM The at which point interrogation 456 interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM the 1 (TSZ/flHI^^^^S^ March |, 2003, and March 9, 2003, contractors ) Between DUNBAR, enhanced a CIA interrogator, H1HHH, used the CIA's and SWIGERT and attention against techniques nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the KSM, interrogation including (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR 110654 was initial The 03). MAR | (041444Z for approval and SWIGERT CIA interrogator March The authorization was extended to DUNBAR on |, 2003. DIRECTOR 451 [REDACTED]; to: from: Email cc: subject: |; Technique; date: March 3:51:09 at |, 2003, AM. 452 to: Email from: [REDACTED]; date: Technique; Re: subject: |; 2003, March at 3:22:45 PM 453 ^HH 10711 454 H^H 10705 455 DIRECTOR 10711 SECRET/, TOP //NOFORN Page 84 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 84

114 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFOKN TOP SECRET// and grab the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and insult slap, 457 There debriefers present. According to the CIA interrogator, during KSM's walling. were no began at BLUE, SWIGERT and DUNBAR first SITE threatening KSM's first day DETENTION 458 Legal, later told the inspector general children. that H^H^^TC 459 were so long threats the threats were "conditional." as On March 9, 2003, KSM these legal 460 indicating Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose information were plotting together Padilla fabricated that some he on April 23, 2003, he "felt as pressure to produce information about because, explained 461 the his States in the initial phases of in interrogation." operations United March 2003, Chief of ALEC Station | i) On Deputy ALEC officer, arrived at DETENTION SITE a second Station |, and serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone BLUE from CIA to call conveying views of the CIA's Deputy Director the Operations James Pavitt on Headquarters of 462 of KSM the Pavitt later told interrogation inspector general that he "did not recall the specifically that a detainee be waterboarded right away," but he "did not discount that ordering According recall records of the interview, "Pavitt did possibility." saying, 'I want to know to 463 The and I want to know it fast.'" he what on-site medical officer later wrote in an knows, email that the CIA interrogators "felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was 464 more that it be used early and often." or less demanding Includes Waterboards Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting at Significant KSM CIA 3. The Information Fabricated March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected (TS^^H^^^Ht^F) the first of his 15 On to waterboarding The first waterboarding session, sessions. lasted 30 minutes (10 separate which than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed more previously the a horizontal stress position that had not of been approved by CIA use by 465 The chief of Base, worried about the legal implications, prohibited Headquarters. on-site the 10732 10725| |10711| (100917Z MAR 03) 10741 |10731| 458 Office of the Inspector General, April 30, |, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Interview of | the Inspector General, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of 2003. Interview | of 22, 2003. October 459 Interrogation Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention Inspector General, Program (2003-7123-IG), CIA and 2004. January 460 (092308Z 10740 03), disseminated as | 10741 (100917Z MAR MAR 03) 461 mmm 11377 (231943Z APR disseminated as | 03), 462 Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 2003. ' 4fi3 of James Pavitt, by and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, Interview ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ 2003. April date: More; |; subject: to: cc: from: PM. 10, 2003, 5:59:27 at MAR (102320Z 03) 110752 I//NOFORN SECRET//! TOP 85 of 499 Page UNCLASSIFIED 85

115 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETfl^^^BBB^^M^MtoQgQRN officer from on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable medical reporting 466 traffic. 1 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow (TS^HHH^HV^ March ) Wharf his KSM stated that he showed a sketch in Canary notebook of a Airport and plotting. 467 Ammar major business district in London) to (a al-Baluchi. Canary He also in building Wharf 468 directing prospective pilots to study at flight provided statements and stated that about schools, 469 involved in the Heathrow Plot. al-Tayyar KSM retracted all of this information Jaffar was 470 his indicating There are no CIA records in that these and other retractions later detention. assessed to false. were be on March 2003, The from KSM 12, the Heathrow Airport (^S/^I^^Hiij^l^^/NF) reporting was deemed plotting the time by CIA interrogators to be an effort by KSM to avoid discussion at of plotting the United States and thus contributed to the decision to subject KSM to two inside 471 sessions that During these sessions, KSM ingested a significant amount of waterboarding day. distended records that KSM's "abdomen was somewhat CIA and he expressed water water. state 472 abdomen was pressed." water KSM's gastric contents were so diluted by when that the the officer concerned was "not medical about regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM's present 473 intoxication was, however, concerned about water officer and dilution of esophagus." The 474 requested that the interrogators use saline electrolytes future waterboarding sessions. and in The officer later wrote to ^^^^HiOMS medical KSM was "ingesting and aspiration [sic] that a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the new technique we are basically doing a series of near 475 drownings." the day, KSM was also subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap, During 476 slap, and walling. abdominal that 2003, KSM 13, denied after al-Qa'ida had March On again for inside the United States, CIA interrogators decided on a "day of intensive operations planned ARfl [REDACTED]; from: Email to: SITREP Re: MEDICAL | subject: date: AM. 11,2003, at 8:10:39 3/10; March 110798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as I 10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as | disseminated 10778 (121549Z MAR 03), as 11214m722312^UN 03); 22939 (031541Z JUL 04); MAR 03), 10883(1821272 as disseminated 471 10787 (130716Z MAR 03). The CIA would ••• represent that the information KSM provided on the later Heathrow plotting was an example of the effectiveness of the waterboard interrogation technique, listing the Heathrow Plot one of the "plots discovered as a result of EITs" in a briefing on the waterboard for the President as 2007. 06 document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard in November November 2007," dated See 6 in 6, with the notation November document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 2007, preparation for POTUS meeting." the 472 10800 (131909Z MAR 03) 473 Interview of IHttHH, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. 474 (131909Z MAR 03); Interview of | 10800 and [REDACTED], | by [REDACTED] May 15, 2003. Office of the Inspector General, cc: to: from: date: More; |; subject: April original. 10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. Emphasis in the 03) MAR (130716Z 110787 SECRET//! TOP I//NOFORN Page of 86 499 UNCLASSIFIED 86

116 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 477 sessions." the first of three waterboarding sessions that day, interrogators waterboard During KSM's responded breathe during the sessions by holding KSM's lips and directing efforts to to 478 site, According to a cable from the detention his KSM "would begin at mouth the water upward with his two index fingers as signaling water pouring approached the by pointing the limit." cable noted that "[t]his behavior indicates The the subject remains time established that 479 become familiar with key alert of the process." and CIA records state that KSM has aspects and when he was secured to the waterboard for the second session of the day, "yelled twisted" resigned nothing tolerating the board and stated he had "appeared new to say" about but to 480 inside plots States. United terrorist the that to third Prior session of the calendar day, the on- (TS^^HIHIH^NF) waterboard medical officer raised concerns that the site session—which would be the fourth in waterboard 14 hours—would the limits included in draft OMS guidelines that had been distributed exceed 481 previous Those draft guidelines stated that up to three waterboard sessions in a the afternoon. 482 was had At the time, KSM period been subjected to more than 65 24-hour acceptable. the water the four waterboarding sessions between during afternoon of March 12, applications of and the morning of March 13, 2003. In response to a request for approval from the chief 2003, CTC attorney assured detention site personnel that the medical officer of Base, 483 and/or guidelines have been approved these fully coordinated." incorrect "is that 484 email to the detention site authorizing the additional waterboarding session sent Despite an from BUB that the detention site personnel would receive a formal authorizing indications At no cable, from CIA Headquarters was provided. such the end of the day, the authorization medical officer wrote ^H||H|OMS that "[t]hings are slowly evolving form [sic] OMS being viewed as institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to the the benefit a safe manner and keeping everyone's butt out of trouble." The maximizing in was no noted communication with longer his officer "viewed with medical that 485 was On of March 13, 2003, KSM the subjected to his third waterboard suspicion," afternoon of that calendar day and fifth in 25 hours. CIA records note that KSM vomited during session 485 after and procedure. the 477 ^^^B MAR 03); ^^^B 10790 (130946Z MAR 03) 10804 (140710Z 478 of Interview [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ^^BBBBK the Inspector General, April 30, of by The interviewee was 2003. interrogator for KSM at the CIA detention site. a CIA 479 10790 MAR 03) H^H (130946Z 480 10791 (131229Z MAR ^^^B ^^^^^^^^ 03) [REDACTED]; to: Bi^^^^B; cc: BI^BH Jose Rodriguez; subject: re: Eyes Only - Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13,2003, at 11:28:06 AM. 482 to: Email [REDACTED]; cc: HI^BB^BiB subject: Re: MEDICAL S1TREP from: BHHHH^ March 12, 2003, at 2:09:47 PM. 3/10; date: Jose cc: ^B^H^HI' HB^^^^H. from: to: subject: Re: EYES ONLY - Legal and Political Quandary; date: March 13, 2003, at 8:01:12 AM. Rodriguez; 484 Email ^^^BBBi; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, BHBHHBBIHI from: subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13, i^BBBHB: at 08:28 AM. ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ 2003, 485 cc: from: [REDACTED]; to: Email ^^^^H^Hflft subject: Re: State cable; date: written March 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had at that "I am going the extra mile to 13,2003, cc: to handle this in a non confrontational manner." Email from: [REDACTED]; to: try 12, |; subject: SITREP 3/10; date: March MEDICAL 2003, at 5:17:07 AM. Re: 10803 (131929ZMAR 03) I MI III I 'I MI HIM 11 Page 87 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 87

117 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN (^S^imBpMP) Headquarters began reevaluating the use of Shortly thereafter, CIA from technique. a March 14, 2003, email to an interrogation the waterboard According not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the interrogator who was seems to that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s] "|o]verall view be" 487 program of the CIA interrogation chief responded in agreement, deputy compliance." The "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm adding that with greater than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue is far waterboard the the The chief further suggested that deputy waterboard was gain..." of risk vs. that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made counterproductive, stating "consider COBALT, as a result, the CIA should and the possibility" that SITE at DETENTION 488 of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well." introduction The email the in which sentiments were expressed was sent to HIHfl^^H' the CTC attorney these the interrogation KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the overseeing of 489 KSM for another 10 days. of continued waterboarding 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for On to confirm March failing 490 intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts signals "nuclear suitcases." in references to obtain signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate Subsequent 491 the that threat was an orchestrated scam suitcase KSM was waterboarded a second nuclear that al- after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on time day 492 nuclear waterboarding During the Qa'ida sessions that day, the application of the capabilities now technique evolved, with the interrogators further using their hands to maintain interrogation a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible 493 for ingest all the water being poured. KSM At one point, SWIGERT and DUNBAR waited to 494 KSM before pouring water over his mouth. to for talk 487 Email from: ^^^^^H; to: cc: | [REDACTED], of Summary re subject: [REDACTED]; - Sessions Waterboard KSM • As 14, March date: 03; Mar 14 HRS of 1000 10:44:12 AM. ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ at 2003, to: •UK cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ^maiHronr^^^^^H; re Waterboard of KSM j^^^HHTsubject: Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 MAR 03; date: March Summary 2003, at PM. 14, 02:02:42 489 detailed review See these sessions in Volume III. of 490 (151510Z MAR 03); ••• 10841 (152007Z 10831 03); ^HH 10849 (161058Z MAR MAR of Interview by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office 03); the Inspector General, of May 15,2003. 491 The original reporting, that al-Qa'ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be based on effort by unknown Yemenis to sell "suitcase weapons" to al-Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida operatives concluded an as the a scam. See 74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated was and that offer •• (092349Z DEC 04) HEADQUARTERS 492 10841 (151510ZMAR MAR 03); BH^ 10831 ••• 03) (152007Z 493 3/15; [REDACTED]; to: ••^^•ftccj^H^^^^PB; subject: Re: Email as of AM from: Sitrep date: 15, 2003, at March A.M. hiterviewof^H^^||||[^^OwREDACTED] and [REDACTED], 3:52:54 Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See also interviewof^BiHHI^l. by [REDACTED] and The [REDACTED], the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. of descriptions of the use of the waterboard Office interrogation technique against KSM were provided by these two on-site medical officers. 494 15, of HlH^H, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May Interview 2003. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 11 ii 1111 i BBI^^^M^^MBI 'urn Page 88 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 88

118 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ the afternoon March 17, 2003, and into the morning of ) On of 2003, March exchanged emails with the medical officer ^HUHflllH' 18, HIHHOMS, H|, on of KSM. According to waterboarding the BLUE the at DETENTION SITE 495 "moved even further from the waterboard model." interrogation technique had SERE wrote: also recall that the though, [waterboard] produced anything "Truthfully, I don't WB AZ [Abu Zubaydah] any earlier than another technique might actionable in may have. different with KSM, but that is still as much a statement of This be the anything we don't seem to study - since question as we go... as else faith many more days of constant it's repetitions, with the evidence of been WB through of them not being actionable most but rather that 'he progress intel like he's weakening.' The WB may actually be looks best; just don't like the 496 religion." to base it on March 18, KSM was confronted with the reporting of On 2003, 497 government, in the custody of a foreign then who regarding plotting against Khan, was Majid inside the United States, information that gas had not previously discussed. In stations KSM the DETENTION SITE BLUE personnel noted session, "KSM will selectively lie, assessing that partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will provide be found out and held not accountable." the other hand, they wrote that "KSM appears more inclined to make accurate On 495 Re: limitations of WB - draft thoughts; date: Medical subject: [REDACTED]; to: | Email from: at PM. 01:11:35 March 17, 2003, 496 18; March Oct date: 18, |; subject: to: cc: | [REDACTED]; from: Email ^ 2003, at 10:52:03 AM. 497 Majid Khan, who was arrested on March 5, 2003, provided extensive information prior to being rendered to CIA custody. This information on lyman Faris, Uzhair (Paracha) and his father, Aafia Sidiqqi, his transfer of included funds to Zubair, and his discussions with KSM regarding various proposed plots. Majid al-Qa'ida a Bangkok-based provided locate to the CIA in its efforts to also Ammar al-BaluchiJncluc^^ al- Khan assistance MAR •H^|l3765 J^££^B^^J3697_(0S()730Z Pakistani. 03); APRO^BBI^W^44684 APR 03); (161423Z (250633Z 144244 MAR 113678 •^^• 13785 (260251Z MAR (070724Z 03); ^Hlii3826 (190715Z MAR 03)IBBHH 13833 (200454Z MAR 03)T^^^Bl38901 03); ] (071322Z 113686 (271244Z MAR03)~^BHB 13932 3710 MAR03)~^^^H was MAR being rendered to CIA custody, Majid Khan After subjected by the CIA to sleep (081218Z 03).) nudity, and dietary manipulation, and may have been subjected deprivation, an ice water bath. to [39077 MAY 03); •^••MHHHl 39099 (281101Z MAY ( (271719Z Intelligence, for Senate Select Committee on ], Briefing March 14, 2008; f the 141772 (121230Z JUL03);email 1 to: [REDACTEDL^^^^^^H' subject, hope the and not for through quickly for this guy... this does comes look good"; date: June 30,2003.) A approvals enhanced 2006 CIA email stated that Majid Khan said he "fabricated June of his early [CIA] interrogation reporting to a lot stop... he called 'torture.'" According to the email, Khan what that he was "hung up" for approximately one stated day in a sleep deprived position and that he provided "everything they wanted to hear to get out of the situation." (See email [REDACTED] [REDACTED], from: [REDACTED], H^ljj^^Hsubject^ljHfrequest [REDACTED], prozac; date: June 16, 2006.) As for detailed in this summary and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA inaccurately attributed information provided by the Majid foreign government custody to in CIA interrogations of KSM. Khan 11111111111 11 III I ^^MMMBI^MB MI Page 89 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 89

119 UNCLASSIFIED TOP when he people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG disclosures believes 498 his responses." checking for the day, additional information on provided same (TSZ/fll^^im^^^/NF) KSM The 499 of which he would recant in 2004 Heathrow Airport also discussed plotting, much KSM again, the detention site personnel to prompting to the "all-purpose" al- al-Tayyar Jaffar refer KSM had "woven... into practically every Tayyar each time with a different whom story, 500 Majid KSM al-Tayyar in his discussion of included Khan's gas station plot, After had role." wrote in an email that "[t]oday KSM working with Majid debriefer [al-Tayyar's] 501 London crowd, the day before Padilla the get the point." yesterday Beginning the Khan, - you of March 18, 2003, KSM began evening of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing a period 502 would last for seven and a half days, or approximately 180 hours. position, which March 19, the interrogators at the detention site decided On 2003, 503 due KSM's inconsistent information about Jaffar al-Tayyar's KSM passport. to waterboard to the CIA after assuming his position on to waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose According cables, and appeared "somewhat frantic," stating that he "had been forced to control" and ma[k]e up lie, 504 Jaffar al-Tayyar because of his interrogators. stories KSM then stated that his about" on a "complete role in Majid Khan's plotting was reporting fabrication" and that al- al-Tayyar's as had compromised as an operative and that Tayyar a result, al-Tayyar could not be used been 505 a terrorist operation that In response, the interrogators told KSM for they only wanted to hear 506 hin^peak revealing information on the next attack. if he Deputy Chief of ALEC Station was told the general that it was around this time that contract interrogator later inspector and that had stated seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, "he was 'going to go to school DUNBAR not 507 measures According to CIA records, the interrogators then "devote[d] all on this to guy."' [KSM] issue the single pressuring of the 'next attack on America,'" including attention grabs, on 508 slaps, water dousing, and additional waterboard sessions. insult walling, March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected to On CIA's the enhanced techniques throughout the day, including a period of interrogation questioning "intense 10884 (182140Z MAR 03) ^^^^^^ ^^ 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as H 22939 (03I541Z JUL 04). CIA review records CIA officers believed that KSM's recantations were credible. See KSM detainee that in indicate Volume III. (182140Z MAR 03) 10884 301 Email from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: March date: REQUEST; JAFAR subject: [REDACTED]; ; to: 18,2003, at 08:16:07 PM. 502 03); MAR ^^™3l0884 (182140Z 10888 (260835Z 10999 03); MAR (190805Z MAR (240950Z ^^^P 03) MAR 10969 03); 503 MAR 03);" (191503Z '^^^10892 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 3041 03) MAR (201037Z 10902 505 (191513Z 10894 03) MAR (201037Z 10902 03); MAR 506 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 507 of Interview the 3, April by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of General, Inspector 2003. 508 I 10902 (201037Z MAR 03); | MAR (191524Z 110900 (191907Z MAR 03); 10896 03) SECRET//! TOP MMBI^BBBBBI MINIUM Page 90 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 90

120 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 509 walling." was described as "|t|ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins, and KSM 510 as on the back of his head. and He also suffered from pedal edema resulting well as wrists, 511 extended having concluded that there was After further movement" in the standing. from "no detention site personnel hung a picture of KSM's sons in his cell interrogation, a way to the as his concerning where they are, who has them, [and] what is in store for "[heighten] imagination 512 them." The KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22, of waterboarding by was a misreading of intelligence provided on Majid Khan byDcnut^Chief of 2003, based Station HHH^H- According to a cable ALEC the CIA's HHHH> Khan, from who in foreign government custody, had stated that KSM wanted to use "two to three was Black American converts who were currently training in Afghanistan," to unknown Muslim that on attacks" in the United States, and gas "KSM was interested in usim^^ "conduct stations 513 US status to assist with this operation." Upon anyone receipt of this reporting, with in email wrote "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan [sic] ... an 514 [KSM] to be hatin' life on Mukie one." this However, her subsequent questioning of is going which was based on Khan's actual reporting, not was about potential operatives already in KSM Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said—that KSM directed him to make contact 515 with in the United States African-American According to CIA records, in a converts session that for hours and involved the use of the CIA's enhanced "contentious" lasted KSM to recruit denied" any efforts techniques, African-American Muslim interrogation "flatly 516 day, KSM was Later in the then facing the threat of a second converts. waterboarded. session, KSM "relented and said that maybe he had told waterboarding that he should see Khan if he make contact with members of the Black American Muslim convert community." could CIA sleep then returned KSM to the standing The deprivation position without a interrogators 517 waterboarding session. second 1 day, The next (l^/Z^^HV^ March ) 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to 22, "intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on African- American Muslim threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional or converts MAR 10921 (211046Z 03) 03); MAR 10916(2108452 | 10916(2108452 MAR 03) (2019182 MAR 03) 110909 512 Interviewof^HHm and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector [REDACTED] October by General, 22,^003 _^^^BI0917(210907Z MAR 03). 1 (201434Z MAR 03) 113839 514 DETENTION S1TE •^^^•H; from: [REDACTED] OFHC&^MB^ Email to: BLUE]; subject: Re: sent Majid March 20, 2003, at 03:40:17 PM. The ^^Hcablewas formally date: to DETENTION SITE Khan; BLUE via ALEC •• (210015Z MAR 03). 10932 (212132Z MAR 03) 10922 03) MAR (211256Z | 10932 MAR 03); (212132Z 03) MAR (212132Z 10932 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET//! Page 91 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 91

121 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 518 519 later, KSM stated that he was "ready to talk." waterboarding. He told the CIA hour An he interrogators Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American had that sent he with had been prompted by discussions a mission a London-based Muslim converts, said 520 stated in Montana. had KSM also bodyguards that he tasked Majid whose shaykh families attending Muslim conferences in the United States to "spot and Khan potential with assess 521 assist in the gas station plot. who In June 2003, KSM admitted that he extremists" would story and Abu Issa al-Britani the Montana, explaining that he was "under fabricated about told measures' made these claims and simply he his interrogators what he 'enhanced when S22 wanted to hear." recruit In August 2003, KSM reiterated that he had no plans to thought they 523 or use Muslim" converts operationally. "black In December 2005, he denied ever American 524 Majid recruit converts or attend Islamic conferences. Khan asking to fifteenth March KSM underwent his 2003, and final On 24, (TS^HI^^^^B^F) session due to his "intransigence" in failing to documented suspected waterboarding identify Bakr operations in the United States, and al-Azdi having "lied about poison and Abu for 525 programs." in KSM was described biological the session as being "composed, warfare stoic, 526 and resigned." That evening, detention site received two reports. The first (^••M) the the reporting the Khan, who was still in of custody of a foreign government, on recounted Majid who Uzhair, the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business, and ran 527 on Uzhair's According to Khan, his meetings father. the two were facilitated by Ammar with 528 the The second report described al-Baluchi. reporting of lyman Faris, who was in FBI custody, on to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and exploration of plans a plot 529 trains an attack in Washington, D.C. and KSM, whom detention site to derail conduct 530 as in" by the new reporting, then described stated that Uzhair's father, Sayf personnel "boxed 531 United to smuggle explosives into the agreed States. had As described al-Rahman Paracha, (221506Z MAR 03); ••• 10950 (222127Z MAR 03). One 10941 from DETENTION cable SITE hypothesized that KSM was lying in order to force the CIA interrogators to apply the CIA's enhanced BLUE techniques: from enhanced measures resulting interrogation his lying in [sic] details could be a resistance "[T]he apparent strategy the interrogation from threatening issues... [KSM's] keep willingness to provoke and incur the to use of enhanced measures may represent a calculated strategy to either: (A) redirect the course of the interrogation; or (B) to to cultivate some doubt that he had knowledge of any current or future operations against the US." attempt 10950 MAR 03). See (222127Z [10950 (222127Z MAR 03) 03), disseminated as 10948 (2221017. MAR 03), ] 10942(2216102^1AR as disseminated (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as 10942 (222049Z 03) 12095 JUN (041938Z AUG 12558 03) 31148 (171919Z DEC 05); | as disseminated 05), DEC (171919Z [31147 (241122Z MAR (242321Z 10983 110972 03); MAR 03) 03) 110983 (242321Z MAR 03); MAR 10974 (241834Z the the of this summary and Volume II on ' See Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifuliah sections Paracha. 113890 •^^^•IRJHHH (242351Z MAR 03) 10984 (24232 IZ | (242226ZMART)3)~H^Ml0983 03) MAR [10983 (24232 IZ MAR 03) [ 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminated as | 11II I I III I VNOFORN Page 92 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 92

122 UNCLASSIFIED TOP in this the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement elsewhere summary, 532 In reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence confirming existed. Faris's and would as an effort to "stay obvious/general" describe "provide Terrorism later Committee on 533 enable the US little thwart attacks." information that might to the of sleep deprivation, which exception for one With (TS^^^^^^I^^^NF) continued the use of the CIA's more interrogation techniques against KSM stopped abruptly day, enhanced 534 24, There are no CIA records directing the interrogation team to cease using on March 2003. enhanced nor techniques against KSM, CIA's any contemporaneous the interrogation 535 the explaining decision documentation Use of the CIA's 4. After Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the the Enhanced Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and CIA Information Fabricating (T&fl^^^^B/NF) April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on On produced an of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded Terrorism assessment withholding Lies." concluded that KSM was assessment or lying about of The by a Bodyguard and operatives targeting the terrorist States. It also identified contradictions plots United 536 KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources. between April 24, 2003, FBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking On FBI KSM to direct in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S. access 537 Despite commitments from DCI Tenet to personal Mueller that access would cities. Director the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby be forthcoming, FBI would the 532 smuggling to cable, KSM did not volunteer the According one plot, but rather was asked about it by purported interrogators. (See ALEC (052230Z MAY 03). All parties to the purported plot - Paracha and Ammafal- Baluchi - denied agreement had been reached. DIRECTOR MIH(181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as any 39239 (301600Z 13588 (171505Z JUL 03); ••••^•••^••^••H MAY03)il^M III! "9Z JUN 03),disseminated as •^^•I^B^HH^^HHI 39239 II [JTrr III! 03); ALEC HH (301600Z APR 03).) With regard to the explosives smuggling reporting, the MAY (012248Z chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email: "again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable former knuckleheads... why in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular 'smuggle' are conus hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to explosives with a suitcase and hundred bucks ancUjot that it just everything right here, this may be true, but needed seems damn odd to me." See email from: he to: i^Hi^H,•••i^^n subject: see highlight: again, ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM. another Threat 10985 03). "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's MAR Reporting - Precious Truths, 533 (242351Z by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3,2003. Surrounded 534 Sleep was extended for an additional day, although it was deprivation by "catnapping." See \ interrupted 10999 (260835Z MAR 03). 535 For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume III. 536 "Khalid Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded Muhammad's a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, Shaykh by 3, 2003. April n 537 H. J°h James L. Moseman; |; cc: Pavitt; Email from: in FBI Access to KSM; |; subject: Mueller's Interest Jose Rodriguez; date: April 24,2003, at 10:59:53 AM. k/NOIORN SECRET//! TOP Page 93 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 93

123 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN not access to KSM until his anticipated transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither be provided 538 nor knew at the time that the transfer would not occur until September 2006. the the CIA FBI on and KSM frustrated the CIA 2003, a 2003 July Between April On May 7, 2003, after more than two number of conflicting reporting, ALEC of fronts. months that "consistently wavers" on issues of KSM location, protectors, and concluded Station UBL's that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] hosts, and actionable 539 June intelligence." CIA Headquarters indicated that it "remained] highly 12, On 2003, is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating that suspicious KSM 540 issues." pictures At the end of April 2003, KSM was shown information on the CBRN of captured al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, after which he provided additional recently Ammar 541 wrote plotting in Karachi. to ALEC Station related in a May 20, 2003, cable information their "[w]e consider that long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern, KSM's especially this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been as in following on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, diligent up 542 plans." in the attack involved probable other operatives and n May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and I bin Attash (zsmmmmrn) Khallad reporting contradicted KSM's statements about the that Airport plotting and provided Heathrow 543 that KSM had not provided. included After KSM was confronted with this information Deputy reporting, of ALEC Station wrote in an email, "OK, that's it... Chief knows again and ONLY ADMITS details when he lies we know them from someone yet he 338 for: James L. Pavitt; ^H^HH^K Jose Rodriguez; | Memorandum 2003, from: Update: Director Mueller - DCI Tenet Conversation on KSM; date: June 4, subject: H^^^^HR at 05:47:32 Note for: James L. PM. from: cc: Jose Rodriguez, Pavitt; subject: Director Mueller Plans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In addition to FBI, senior CIA officers, including CTC's representatives to the FBI, complained about the the on the of intelligence derived from CIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had limitations dissemination analysis. a "serious CTC's representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as counterterrorism concern." on The that interrogation compartmentation of stated information resulted in He the He dissemination could in in information being "missed." that also stated that the CIA's delays result of information prevented him from providing to the FBI compartmentation insight into the value/credibility "some of intelligence ( See interview of HHHHH> by Office of the Inspector General, reports." were 18, the other CIA officers expressing these concerns Among the deputy chief of CTC's Al- August 2003.) Department, who told the OIG that limited Qa'ida to operational traffic "has had an impact on [analysts'] full access knowledge activities, and thus their analysis." of Memorandum for the Record; subject: (See Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Center Al-Qa'ida Department; July 28,2003.) The Director of Analysis at described analysts' limited access to information as a "continuing problem." (See August 18, CTC Director Memorandum Record, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, the of Analysis, Office of the 2003, for General.) The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of Inspector information operational the "full cadre of analysts" from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result, prevented intelligence] losing ability to look at [foreign analytic in a timely manner." See interview of "we're ••, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12,2003. 539 ALEC MAY 03) ^••C072002Z 540 DIRECTOR^— JUN 03) (121550Z 541 APR (301710Z 11448 (301141Z APR 03) 03); 542 ALE c HHH (022012Z MAY 03). See information in this summary and Volume II on the "Karachi Plot" for additional information. 543 See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on the the detainees provided. reporting 11 ii 11111 B^M^BBB I ii I II i Page 94 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 94

124 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 544 else." 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002 On April Masran bin who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding reporting from Arshad, KSM plot. that bin Arshad had been detained, Wave" stated, "I have the "Second Informed 545 he is not in my mind at all." it In response, ALEC Station noted that forgotten about him, that debriefing progression towards full concerned status is not yet apparent "remain[e]d KSM's 546 inside to threats to US interests, especially relation CONUS." most, In June it counts in where three months after the CIA had 2003, using its enhanced interrogation techniques almost stopped KSM, ALEC Station and RDG officers met senior least twice to discuss concerns against at 547 lack cooperation. KSM's about As an ALEC Station cable noted at the time, "KSM's of of behavior the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then pattern over only and pressed that others have been caught things have likely admitted the admitting when 548 officer for In an email, one CIA is a cause noted that "what KSM's doing is plot, concern." typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], fairly others are doing what makes and 549 their situation - pretend cooperation." sense in about the 2003, after KSM's explanations of how to decrypt (TSyVl^^^^^^H^^) fall numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did phone identify the operative as not "Issa or by his true name, Dhiren al-Hindi," yielded no results, and after KSM Barot) misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station mm stated an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good in noting that "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and information," KSM 550 on numbers." to Later, after KSM's transfer us DETENTION SITE "misleads telephone forthcoming Station that KSM "may never be fully ALEC and honest" on the BLACK, wrote 551 UBL's whereabouts. topic Despite repeated challenges, KSM of that he lacked maintained 552 UBL's location. information on Memorandum for: from: subject: ^^HH^HR 2003 detainee date: Action 12, branch; (emphasis in the original). June 545 1319 APR (191445Z 03), disseminated as | 546 03) ^^^^^^ ALEC^H^222153ZAPR 547 cc: 1, [REDACTED], Email ftomT^^^^^^^^^^JoHHHI^Hi' I [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | [REDACTED], I, [REDACTED]; subject: Khallad & KSM Detainee Case Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM; ALEC ^•|(302258Z 03). JUN 548 ALEC^BB(302258ZJUN 03) 549 fromT^^H^^B; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | to: Email subject: Re: [REDACTED], passive restraint - please let me know if you [REDACTED]; KSM's comments for have to the DCI; date: June 24,2003, at 1:27:06 PM. a memo 550 from: Email to: [ REDACTED ]~ cc ^HH^^H^^^F^^^^HH^H subject: KSM and Kliallad Issues; ~^H^^H'' date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM. 551 ALECMM(111932Z 03) NOV 552 Ayman NOV 03). KSM, who 10400 with (161754Z al-Zawahiri the day before his March 1, was 2003, capture, first informed the CIA of this fact more than a month later, on April 3, 2003. See H^H 11139 (051956Z 03). APR 11 II 11111 I II I II Page 95 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 95

125 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN i on KSM was SITE (m^BHH^) I transferred to DETENTION 553 554 on March 2006, DETENTION and to BROWN military detention to | 2005, SITE U.S. 555 September 5, 2006. at Guantanamo The Bay, disseminated 831 intelligence Cuba, on CIA the of KSM over a period of 3.5 interrogations While KSM provided more from reports years. than any other CIA detainee intelligence 15 percent of all CIA detainee reporting (nearly reporting), records indicate that KSM also received the most intelligence intelligence CIA and attention interrogators, debriefers, analysts, CIA senior CIA and from requirements as noted, a significant amount of the disseminated intelligence leadership. Further, reporting KSM the CIA identified as important threat that was later identified as from reporting 556 fabricated. Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program H. The CIA I. Fifty-Three the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 Detainees Enter early CIA from 2002 to 2008, detainees 2003 was the held While active period of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the the detainees most 119 by Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were the into custody in 2003, and of the identified brought the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced 39 detainees techniques, interrogation subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and 17 were were The enhanced interrogations during that time 2003. primarily used at August CIA's 557 COBALT and DETENTION SITE BLUE. DETENTION Other interrogations using the SITE a CIA enhanced techniques took place at interrogation in Country at which CIA's 558 one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water. at least (TSZ/jl^^^^H^m^^NF) In CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the 2003, enhanced interrogation against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a CIA's techniques 559 facility. In two of those cases, CIA detention approved the use of the CIA's CIA Headquarters |; HEADQUARTERS 2218 SEP 06) 12214 (050539Z 556 KSM See review in Volume IIL detainee 557 more information, see detainee reviews and reports in For III for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Muhammad Umar Volume 'Abd aka Asadallah, Abu Khalid, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Abu Yasir al-Rahman Suleiman al-Baluchi, Abu Hazim, Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim, Ammar al-Jaza'iri, Khallad bin Attash, Abdullah, Farik Ben Laid aka Abu Hudhaifa, Majid Khan, Mohd Dohman bin Amin aka Abu Zubair, Samr Hilmi Abdul Saidi Latif al-Barq, Bashir bin Lap aka Lillie, and Riduan bin Isomuddin aka Hambali. 558 For Hudhaifa was subjected to this technique at Abu safehouse. ( See email from: [REDACTED]; example, the [REDACTEDj^ubiect^Iemo; date^arcin5^004.) The incident was reported to the CIA inspector general. to: cc: email ^^fl^^^fl; to: IHHI^^I' [REDACTED], HH^HH- from: See 17, 2004, at 11:24 AM. See also claims related to the treatment of subject^u^elcon^t^arch Briet in r " Majid Khan. g f° See the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Interrogation Implementation Intelligence Agency Secret Detention and Central Program, March 14, 2008. of 559 DIRECTOR (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (040049Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR •• 03) (252003Z 03); DIRECTOR (162224Z MAY 03); HEADQUARTERS •• (102352Z SEP MAR 11 ii ii 11 B^^^^^BHB^j^jorofiN 11 Page 96 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 96

126 UNCLASSIFIED i //NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ interrogation techniques they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention enhanced before 560 sites. Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country | and DETENTION SITE The 2. CIA | Country VIOLET in into an agreement with the [ ) The CIA entered a CIA detention facility In host | to in Country invited the CIA Station in Country | to identify ways to CIA the | Headquarters support anc "demonstrate to HHHfl Country * the highest levels of the [Country | m in | to we cooperation appreciate their that and support" for the detention government deeply 562 The responded with an $| Station "wish list" H^I^B^H^H rogram. million 563 CIA Headquarters provided the Station ; $| with more than was million 564 the purposes of the subsidy. requested CIA detainees were transferred to for 565 SITE Country | in the fall of 2003. BLACK DETENTION in the to ambassador in Country | sought 2003, In August U.S. was Department State that the State Department officials aware of the CIA contact to ensure facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-a-vis the [Country |] detention 566 government." U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible, The about that one at the State and including the secretary of state, was informed no the Department, CIA facility in Country Describing detention CIA's position as "unacceptable," the the ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security Advisor" describing authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's the techniques met and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not interrogation "legal 567 CIA the secretary of state. program with Headquarters then sought the to discuss the of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador. intervention Deputy Secretary told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that Armitage 568 would be caught they when an ambassador raised concerns. unaware not 1 (ISfHIHM Nearly a year later, in ) 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee May abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in 569 Country on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods. | to In the seek information | sought 2004, U.S. ambassador to Country when documents authorizing the fall of the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again program, 500 (040049Z MAR 03) 03); DIRECTOR DIRECTOR (012214Z •• MAR 5fil [REDACTED] 60040 562 HEADQUARTERS 563 5759 [REDACTED] 564 HEADQUARTERS 565 According in arrived detainees Country CIA Headquarters, from a cable | to HEADQUARTERS ^•,2003. 566 [REDACTED] 567 [REDACTED] 568 from: |] [Country to: call DDCI-Armitage Re: on ; subject: Email 2003. date: Facility; Detention AugustH, 5fi9 04 [REDACTED] 6762 (•••MAY //NOFORN SECRET/. TOP Page 97 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 97

127 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET// //NOFORN 1 to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the "strong made remarks" the Council] with regard to process" CIA Security clearance/coordination NSC [National CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program. and According to program 570 intelligence derived from the program. of the it is unclear how the f value the While were resolved, ambassador's later joined the chief of Station in making a concerns he to |'s on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The presentation Country interrogation points describe the CIA's enhanced not techniques, but talking did presentation "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation represented we would not have that measures, in the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh overcoming and other equally succeeded Muhammad] 571 The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations resistant HVDs." to made and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the U.S. policymakers "Guraba the the "Second Wave Plot," and the Plot," Cell"; as well as Plot," "Heathrow "Karachi to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha intelligence Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam related al-Pakistani, Sajid and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation Badat, noted that the president of Mohammed, also United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention the 572 to would not accidentally disclose the information. facilities ensure he obtained a Country the CIA country, the approval of W^i^^^^^^^^^w/NFMrt separate ^| and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before the 573 to ambassador. the As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request U.S. CIA informing |'s to the ambassador, Country brief ^^^^^^B^^^^^ind the I Headquarters 574 would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention facility. irobably Afterl (delayed briefing for the to the of the CIA Station, which wanted political approval prior to the | months, consternation | official outside amvaUrfCI^letainee^^heJ^^^^^^^^^^HI^^I Country of aw are of described as mt^^^m^^^mmam the the 576 approved. "shocked," but nonetheless the concluded had mid-2003 that its completed, but still By CIA growing cell" Country | was insufficient, given the "holding number of CIA detainees unused in program and the in the interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention CIA's 577 CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the country. site. The CIA The 570 Lotus message from Chief of Station to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from: Notes [REDACTED], cc: |; to: [REDACTED], | [REDACTED]; DepSec ADCI Points |; subject: Call to Talking Armitage; date: at 7:40:43 PM. for The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "with regard to the Study's claims that the State Department was 'cut out' of information relating the program, the record shows that the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State... to aware operational." the sites at the time they were were As detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA of the records secretary of state was not informed of the CIA detention site locations. During meetings with indicate the CIA in the summer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was not provided, documentary evidence to support the assertion the CIA's June 2013 Response. in 571 II sections of See summary and Volume relevant for additional details. this 572 HEADQUARTERS •BjElDACTED] 573 [REDACTED] 641051 514 [REDACTED] [ 30296 575 See I for additional details. Volume 576 [REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED] 577 HEADQUARTERS top-SEGS^IHHHII^^HHH^^O^ Page 98 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 98

128 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP SECRET// for support offered the ^H^H^I to "show appreciation" for the | also million $| to 378 to however, the | According a CIA the program. cable, 579 the plan to construct the |." While was approved by the of Countr expanded facility complex mechanisms | | developed to provide $| million to the | in order | in Country B complicated the arrangements. | when B requested an update on planning for the CIA the Country site, he detention the planninghadbeen wastoldj^—-inaccurately—that 581 In ^^B^^^Kwhen the facility received its first CIA detainees, discontinued. Country the the HHfl^^l of that | "probably has an informed ClA^^B^^^Bl notion [regarding the facility's] actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is incomplete "582 of some center, Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 3. At CIA Without Authorization Headquarters of CIA from ^^^^B/ZNF) spring cables 2003 and afterwards describe the multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with the CIA's and interrogation guidelines. CIA officers at DETENTION SITE detention principally by of Interrogations HHHI—also described a number COBALT—led Chief by in that were not approved activities CIA Headquarters. CIA of interrogation cables failed to respond, inquire, or investigate: Headquarters revealing the • Cables CIA's chief of interrogations used water dousing against that interrogation including cold water detainees, ice water baths, as an with technique and/or 583 without prior approval from CIA Headquarters; 578 HEADQUARTERS | 579 [REDACTED] 4088 | 580 Volume details. I for See additional 581 5293 [REDACTED] 582 See additional Volume 111 for [REDACTED] 5417 detainees in Count: details on 583 (201220Z 38596 MAY 03); 03 MAY 39042 38557 (191641Z MAY 03); JUN [39582 (041743Z 03) ' 39101 MAY 03). ••• J _ (201225Z MAY 03); 38597 interrogation technique in June 2003. Water dousing was categorized as a "standard" III 'ill III! 499 of 99 Page UNCLASSIFIED 99

129 UNCLASSIFIED TOP and records that CIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone • Cables indicating enhanced CIA's subjected to rectal rehydration, the interrogation techniques were 584 necessity, that others were threatened with medical it; without evidence of and required of or more interrogators, who four practical that noting • Cables groups their CIA interrogation "certification," were allowed to apply the experience to acquire 585 techniques against a single detainee; a group and as CIA's interrogation enhanced 384 w . See and [REDACTED] (051400Z MAR 03) 34491 Intervie of the Inspector General, March 27, Office of [REDACTED] the ^ 34575 from: cc: subject: Re: Update; [REDACTED]; to: email date: In (222045ZJUL03)?^^^Hmi5]H^^HBri. at4:51:32PMT^^|ij2385 the rectal rehydration or feeding of al-Nashiri, KSM and Majid Khan, described elsewhere, there is addition to at of "rectal fluid resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids." (See leasUm^-ecord Abt^ubaydahreceiving originally Marwan was subjected to what was M^H referred to in a •1H10070 al-Jabbur but was later cabl^^^enema," to be rectal rehydration. (See acknowledged email to: ^•^•^^^B[REDACTED], [REDACTED], from: [REDACTED]; subject: TASKING - March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.) [REDACTED], Re: with al-Shibh, Attash and Adnan al-Libi were threatened bin rectal rehydration. (See | bin Ramzi Khallad (222045Z JUL 03); from: •^•jHHH to: | Hi^t 2385 Medical H(047); subject: date: March |, 2004.) CIA medical officers discussed HI^E Evaluation/Update "[w]hile as of rehydration control. As one officer wrote, a means IV infusion is safe and effective, rectal behavior were impressed_with the ancillary effectiveness we rectal infusion on ending the water refusal in a similar case." of (See to subject: Re: (048); fromJII^HI^HHHIl; the February same officer provided a description of The procedure, writing that "[regarding the date: 2004.) tube, if you place it and open up the IV tubing, the flow rectal self regulate, sloshing up the large intestines." will Referencing experience of the medical officer who subjected the to rectal rehydration, the officer wrote that, KSM "[w]hat I infer is that you get a tube up as far as you can, then open the IV wide. No need to squeeze the bag - let t0 the email from work." Hi (See and [REDACTED], 27,2004, Subject: Re^^H(048)3The same HI^H, February which included a previous application of the technique, in of "we used the largest Ewal exchange email a description (See email from: [REDACTED]; to •^^•^^••^[REDACTED], [sicUub^we had." subject: Re-^^HI^^HHHIi (048); date: Febmary [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; feeding 11:42:16 As described in the at of the rectal PM.) of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al- 2004, context "in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than Nashiri (See ^H|^|l203 (231709Z torso." MAY Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was "pureed" and 04).) CIA's infused. (231839Z SEP 04).) The ^^^••(^^••3240 June 2013 Response does rectally (See address the use of rectal feeding with CIA detainees, but not the use of rectal rehydration as a "well defends acknowledged technique." CIA leadership, including General medical Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt, Counsel was also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two detainees at DETENTION SITE CIA attorney was asked to follow up, although CIA records do not COBALT. of any the inquiry. CIA records indicate that one of the detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later indicate resolution with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic diagnosed prolapse. See email from: rectal [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS to at the from this Morning, dateT^^^^^^^^K GC 12:15 PM; email from: to: Update [REDACTED]; cc: ^^^^••^REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the at GC Morning^late^^H||Hi^^H< Update 1:23:31 PM; email from: to: this the cc: subject: Re: ACTIONS from [REDACTED]; GC Update this Moming ••^^•jREDACTED]; REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: December!, 2003, at 10:47:32 AM; •• 32231 HEADQUARTERS | 585 example, for See, MAY 03); 38584 (121722Z 38130 (201133Z MAY 03); 38161 MAY (121714Z ' 38127 SECRET//^ TOP 7NOFORN 100 of 499 Page UNCLASSIFIED 100

130 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFQRN TOP SECRET/^ revealing that CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA Cables the 586 not CIA detention sites. designated | that were as detainees of CIA interrogated four the with half 2003, In the first their lower extremities: two detainees had a broken foot, medical detainee complications in one 587 CIA one had a prosthetic leg and detainee interrogators shackled each a sprained had ankle, in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until of these detainees assessed could they personnel not maintain the position. The two detainees that medical that stress a broken also subjected to walling, were positions, and cramped had each foot the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced confinement, despite 588 were techniques because of the medical condition of the detainees. requested interrogation not of Headquarters react to the site's use not these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques CIA did the lack of despite approval. Over course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were the 589 to more of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. one CIA records subjected or there CIA at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more that indicate were techniques approval. CIA Headquarters interrogation This count includes enhanced without techniques, were who the use of some approved but were subjected to unapproved detainees for as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals techniques, use any of the to techniques. count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as This 590 The the CIA at the time they were applied. or by 17 detainees who "enhanced" "standard" 38126 03); MAY (201216Z | 38595 03); | (131326Z MAY 03). MAY (121709Z 586 35341 Bi^^^^^^^^B 39098 example, for See, I |39042(^^MMAY03); email [REDACTED]; to: from: [REDACTED]; M I I ^^MB^B 391011 subject: MAY 03);(051225ZMAY 03);(271719Z MAY 03); (281101Z MAY 03). ^39099 587 For see detainee reviews for Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah; Abu Hazim al-Libi; more details, Abd and Khallad bin Attash. aka al-Karim; Al-Shara'iya 388 detainees were Abu Hazim al-Libi and Al-Shara'iya aka Abd The two al-Karim. 589 a conservative estimate. CIA records suggest that is CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques may have This the been used against five additional detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT in 2002, which would also the bring number CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to 44. Those additional of for were who was approved R], the CIA's enhanced detainees [DETAINEE techniques, but whose records do not refer to the use of the techniques (ALEC interrogation (HH ^BH B))l Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad Al-Maythali, whose records Ayub t^Hacl^)l^jlccpJ)uUioUhe refer 28132 application of sleep deprivation j^B^^HI^^^H (101143Z OCT 02); 27964 (071949Z OCT 02)); Bashir Nasir Ali al Marwalah, who later told debriefers that, when he was first captured, he to stand up for five days straight and answer questions" and "was also forced to strip naked and "had 14353 23152lz APR in interrogator" (fllHBHIHH ( stand of a female 03)); and Sa'id Salih Sa'id, front by later debriefers that he was "mistreated and beaten who Americans while blind-folded and stripped down to told See underwear in HIH " also ^H^^I^H^H 13386 (090154Z JAN 03)). See his detainee reviews in Volume III more information. for 590 count, June 2013 Response objects The the Committee's CIA's arguing that "[n]o more than seven detainees to received enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval." The CIA's June 2013 Response then asserts not diat Study miscounts because it confuses the use of standard techniques that did "the require prior approval at the TOP Page 101 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 101

131 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ NOFORN k/ to techniques without the approval of CIA Headquarters were: Rafiq Bashir al- were subjected 592 593 S94 591 Tawfiq Nafi Shaukat, al-Bihandi, Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi, Nasir Hami, Hikmat Awad 596 595 Abu Badr, Rabbani Gul Rahman, aka Abd al-Rahim al- Ahmad Muhammad Ghulam were administered with enhanced techniques that did." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is time they prior to January 2003, the CIA had not yet designated any technique as a "standard" technique. inaccurate. First, deprivation 2002, included in the August 1, sleep OLC memorandum approving the use of the CIA's was Because among techniques Abu Zubaydah, the Committee included, on the 17, CIA detainees interrogation enhanced to sleep deprivation without CIA Headquarters subjected prior to January 2003. In January 2003, authorization sleep under a specific time limit was categorized as a "standard" CIA interrogation technique. Second, deprivation January 2003 state that advance CIA Headquarters approval was required for "standard" techniques the guidelines cases For reason, the Committee did not include feasible." where CIA interrogators failed to obtain "whenever this in advance, but did acquire approval within several days of initiating the use of the authorization "standard" techniques. water dousing was not characterized as a "standard" technique until June 2003. (See Finally, DIRECTOR•^|(302126ZJAN03);DIRECTOR•• DIRECTORHB1(2115I8ZJIM03); (311702Z 03); 39582 (041743Z JUN 03).) In numerous cases prior to June 2003, water JAN an was described in CIA cables as explicitly "enhanced" interrogation technique. (See, for example, dousing DIRECTOR (101700Z FEB 03).) The Committee thus included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to water dousing to June 2003 without CIA Headquarters authorization. The distinction between standard and prior interrogation techniques, began in January 2003, was eliminated by CIA leadership in 2005. See enhanced which Volume for additional details. I and Volume III 591 between al-Hami subjected to 72 Bashir of sleep deprivation was his arrival at DETENTION SITE Rafiq hours 28297 his October 2002, interrogation. See COBALT HHHUH^H and 592 Tawfiq Awad al-Bihani was subjected to 72 hours of sleep deprivation between his arrival at DETENTION Nasir COBALT See his October 2002, interrogation. SITE ^^^KKI^^Ut/M 28462 ^ and 393 from from October CIA noted that Shaukat was "tired cables his regimen of limited sleep deprivation." See 2002 29381 ^^uft^^rab^i^harisi underwent at least two 48-hour sessions of sleep deprivation in October 2002. See HHHHHHHH 29036 29352 ^HHiHHi' and 595 blankets subjecte^^orce^tanding^ttention grasps, and cold temperatures without was in Abu Badr See ^^^BHH 29963 November 596 interrogators used sleep deprivation, facial slap, use of CIA (including cold cells and cold showers), "hard cold takedowns," manipulation, nudity, and light deprivation on dietary Rahman. See \ Gul of ^^HI^Hl [CIA OFFICER December 2002; ^^H^^^^^Hlntervie^Oiammond DUNBAR, January 9, 2003; Memorandum for Deputy Director of OperationirfroiTi^^^^^^^^^B, January 2003, Subiect^eatMnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA 28, a Detainee General, Inspector Investigation, Death of Report (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005; and of CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October May 7, 2004. 2003), I III I IIII I ^Ol-OliN Page 102 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 102

132 UNCLASSIFIED k /NOFORN TOP ^ SECRET// 597 598 599 600 601 al-Shibh, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Ramzi Abu Khalid, Asadallah, Laid bin Nashiri, bin 603 604 605 602 Abu Abu Hazim, Abd Sayyid Ibrahim, al-Karim, Abu Yasir Duhman aka Hudliaifa, 607 606 Suleiman In every case and al-Nashiri, the unauthorized al-Jaza'iri, except Abdullah. 597 approximately subjected to unapproved nudity and al-Rahim two-and-a-half days of sleep Abd al-Nashiri was December 2002, with his arms shackled over his head for as long as 16 hours. See email from: deprivation in SITE BLUE] to: subject: EYES ONLY - [DETENTION •••••••••; 2003. - MEMO date: January 22, ADDO/DDO; ^^^^ I^^Hl ONLY FOR 598 hold was used against Ramzi bin al-Shibh multiple times without approval. See HH^fll 0415 The facial 10429 (101215Z 03); ^HH 10S73 (241143Z FEB 10582 •• FEB 10633 03);(252002Z 03); 10602 FEB FEB 03); (262020Z (242026Z FEB 03);and^H| 10704 (071239Z MAR 03). (011537Z MAR 599 used water dousing, nudity, and cramped confinement Interrogators Asadallah without having sought or on received from CIA Headquarters. Bathing detainees did not require authorization by CIA authorization however, as in CIA cables, the application of "bathing" in the case of Asadallah was done Headquarters; described was was as an interrogation technique. Nudity and also used in conjunction with water punitively used See and an interrogation technique^vitho^ from CIA Headquarters. as \ dousing/bathing later 34310 and ^HM^^I^H 34241 600 al-Hawsawi was subjected to water dousing without approval from CIA Headquarters. See \ Mustafa (08 I207Z APR 03). Wm^m 601 Interrogators deprivation against Abu Khalid prior to seeking authorization from CIA Headquarters, sleep used i failed obtain such aulimn iliini to i ^^BUBBBjHB^II 35193 and then and 35341 H^HIHliU'^ Abu Khalid ^lim been in CIA custody for 17 days prior to had the of the technique. Advance authorization from CIA Headquarters use therefore "feasible," and thus required was under the guidelines. 602 Abu Hudliaifa was subjected to baths in which ice water was used, standing sleep deprivation for 66 hours that was discontinued to a swollen leg attributedtoprolo:^^ (Se^mail due and [REDACTED], IH |; to: j^flHHlHK Report; date: 2004; CIA Office of Inspector General M- 2005-8085-IG; March telecom; our MAY and 39042 39098 03).). No request or approval for the use of standard 139101 MAY or interrogation could be located in CIA records. enhanced techniques 603 his suffered Abd a foot injury incurred during who capture, was subjected to cramped al-Karim, from stress positions, and walling despite CIA HeadquartersJiavin^ioUipproved their use. See confinement, •• 03); DIRECTOR and DIRECTOR HHHHI HMAY elM despite also had a foot injury incurred during his capture, was subjected to walling, who CIA Abu Hazim, having approved its use. not See 36908 and Headquarters ( 37410 (291828Z APR 03).) Nudity, dietary H^HHII^^flH^M and facial grasp were used on manipulation, Abu at least 13 days prior to receiving approval. 37411 (291829Z APR 03); Hazim (291828Z ^^•^^^HHBh^lO 03); | APR III I II ^MMMIl I i 03). I I 11 605 CIA cables indicate that Sayyid Ibrahim was subjected to sleep deprivation from January 27, 2004, to January 30, 2004, which the 48 hours approved by CIA Headquarters. See HEADQUARTERS (272155Z exceeded 04); •^•JAN 04); ••••1303 JAN ^^••l303j^|||ijAN04)^^^^|Mil298 jANT)4)r||HHn^lHHw 606 March 2003 interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri was "bathed," a term During technique. to water dousing, used was considered at the time to be an enhanced interrogation describe ( See which 35558 03).) Water dousing had MAR been approved, and the subsequent not request, by DETENTION SITE BLUE, to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Jaza'iri, did not include water See 10990 ^I^I^^^B dousing. 607 enhanced approvals to Interrogators the CIA's requested interrogation techniques on Suleiman Abdullah, use including water dousing. CIA Headquarters then approved other techniques, but not water dousing. (See 36559^^•HH DmECTORHH^HHHBlSuleiman 1 nonetheless subjected to Abdullah dousing. See 371171 was water III i mi 11 i mi him i Page 103 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 103

133 UNCLASSIFIED TOP / ^ SECRET/ 1//NOFORN interrogation detailed in CIA cables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or techniques were 608 against personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques. take the action CIA CIA does examples in which include interrogators list GFS/^^H^I^B^NF) This not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the were authorized to 609 that from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair diverged techniques in a manner the detailed, interrogators developed methods of applying whose waterboard in a as and, KSM, differed from how the technique had manner been used and how it had been that previously to Department of Justice. This count also excludes additional allegations of the described the 610 of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. use unauthorized the course of the CTA's Detention and Interrogation Program, Over the were CIA's to the detainees enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained numerous subjected training noted, As did not conduct its first the course until November 2002, interrogators. CIA 611 at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques. by which time DCI's The January 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 28, 608 The 2013 Response states that the CIA "conducted at least 29 investigations of RDJ-related conduct, CIA's June wide-ranging a of the program... one involved the death of an Afghan national who was beaten by two plus reviews individual Department was prosecuted by the The of Justice and convicted of a felony charge. contractor. involved while case who slapped, kicked, and struck detainees a contractor they were in military custody. Another involved contractor was terminated from the ... [T]he had his security clearances revoked, and was placed on a CIA, contractor list." However, the two specific examples provided in the CIA's June 2013 Response refer to watch who 2013, never part of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On November 6, detainees the CIA were a list Detention, "IG Investigations Concerning provided Interrogations, and Renditions." The list of 29 included of Detention that directly related to the CIA's were and Interrogation Program. Four additional 14 investigations investigations were related to detainees who claimed they had been subjected to abuse in transit from CIA custody to U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay. The remaining 11 investigations were unrelated to die CIA's custody and Interrogation See DTS #2013-3250. Detention Program. 609 chief placed a broomstick behind the knees of interrogations, when Zubair was in a CIA of Zubair on his knees on the floor. Although stress positions had been approved stress Zubair, the use of the position for was approved. See April 7,2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel, not Rendition, Detention, and broomstick CIA Programs, at 22. Interrogation 610 KhajJia^laimecUhaUr^lav 2003, he was subjected to immersion in a tub Majid was filled with ice and that water. See Briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Implementation ( March Intelligence Detention and Interrogation Program, dated Secret 14, 2008.) While CIA of Central Agency do not confirm bathing or water dousing, Chief of Interrogations subjected Abu Hudhaifa to cables email (unauthorized) water" bath at the same where Majid Khan was held. (See "icy from: | an to: [REDACTGDMREDACTED], telecon; date: our from: [REDACTED] to: | email subject: Memo; datel^^^m^-) Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad al-Maythali were described a^ioUiavin^lept^lthough it from CIA records whether CIA interrogators kept them awake. (See is unclear (101143Z 02) and ^127964 (071949Z OCT 02).) 128132 OCT Nasri Ali al-Marwalah told debriefers at Guantanamo Bay that he was "tortured" at DETENTION SITE Bashir with of days COBALT continual standing and nudity. (See ^HBH^BHI^I 14353 (231521Z APR five that Sa'id Sa'id likewise informed debriefers at Guantanamo 03).) he was "beaten" while blind-folded in CIA Salih custody. (See I^HI^HHHI 13386 (090154Z JAN 03).) Sixteen other detainees were held at DETENTION SITE between September and December 2002, a period during which exposure to the COBALT nudity enhanced techniques such as sleep deprivation and CIA's cannot be determined based on the interrogation lack of details in CIA cables and related documents. 611 December 2002, Training Report, High Value 4, Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Target Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running). mi III i ^MMMBMBMB^QFonN 11 Page 104 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 104

134 UNCLASSIFIED TOP be "may by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees," raised the employed only 612 of used by unapproved interrogators. approved The January 28, additional issue techniques did the explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use guidelines 2003, DCI not techniques, that techniques interrogation were not previously CIA's "standard" including as and later be reclassified would "enhanced" interrogation "standard" considered that the DCI guidelines required only that "all personnel directly engaged in the techniques. Rather, be "appropriately that they review the guidelines, and that they receive interrogation" screened," 613 in of the guidelines. the "appropriate training" implementation Authorizes Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Headquarters 4. CIA Water Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding Application of approved Headquarters to use water dousing, nudity, CIA requests that slap, dietary abdominal despite the fact and the techniques had not been the manipulation, 614 the Interrogators of Justice by reviewed used the water dousing technique in Department ways. various COBALT, detainees were often held down, naked, on a At DETENTION SITE form floor, the tarp pulled up around them to with a makeshift tub, while cold or on tarp the 615 poured on them. refrigerated Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were water was These in standing sleep deprivation position. the same detainees were naked, shackled 616 in rooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 subsequently Fahrenheit. placed degrees 612 BB1302126ZJAN 03); (311702Z JAN 03). For example, on May |, DIRECTOR DIRECTOR grabs, intemigator]B|^|BH three facial attention applied fiv^aciaHnsul^laps, and three 2003, CIA slaps to Abd al-Karim, under the supervision of CIA abdominal ^Hj^^^^^BlCIA OFFICER 1], interrogator (See 37821 BiBlH^^H-) BH had not been approved by CIA Headquarters ^HBH approval the enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Karim; to employ had only been provided for | CIA's [CIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (See DIRECTOR | B-) On interrogatorI^^BBIB' under die supervision of BB^^^I' conducted an •• CIA facial Abd which interrogators used the facial attention grab, in insult slap, and abdominal of interrogation al-Karim been had Bi^^^^^Bfl^B 38583 ^^^B^BBfr) I^^B slap against al-Karim. (See In CIA to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abd al-Karim. Headquarters approved by example, SITE COBALT requested onHB^^HDETENTION for certified interrogators another approval and fCIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against ^^^Bl t0 bin for three other interrogators, Bi^^^^^^l' Khallad Attash, and senior the use the direct supervision of techniques certified interrogator [|^|Bl-" (See \ also "under Later that day, CIA Headquarters approved the use of CIA's enhanced 38325 participation techniques Khallad bin Attash, but the approval cable did not include approval for against interrogation I hy H^B or I under (See MAY (162224Z H'S BBl DIRECTOR supervision. enhanced interrogation techniques on bin landused the CIA's 2003, 18, and 17 03).) On May facial grabs, facial |. including and slap^abdomhw insult Attash under the supervision of 03); (191641Z MAY | 38557 dousing. See water 3g59? MAY 03). ____ (201225Z 613 (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR BBl (311702Z JAN 03). DIRECTOR DCI guidelines provided The no information, other than to note that the screening should further "from the medical, psychological, and be security standpoints." r 1 DIRECTOR See, for example, '" (101700Z FEB 03). 615 In case of Abu Hudhaifa, and allegedly Majid Khan, interrogators placed the detainee in an the tub in a actual CIA when employing water dousing B^H included ice water. that 616 CIA cable records often describe die detainees as naked after the water dousing, while other records omit such detail. Volume III for additional information. See 111 11111 mi Page 105 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 105

135 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN 1 617 detainees were water doused while placed on a waterboard. Other Although suggest accounts approved the of the "water dousing" interrogation technique on several CIA Headquarters use it extensively or a number of detainees without seeking used detainees, interrogators on 618 from Headquarters. authorization obtaining prior CIA April on 2003, and April 6, 2003, sessions In interrogation 5, interrogator and another interrogator used the water dousing senior CIA detainee DETENTION al-Hawsawi at on SITE COBALT. AI-Hawsawi later technique Mustafa wrote session CIA interrogator, who a different that al- the described to have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that "could be Hawsawi might 619 the waterboard." An email from the interrogator stated that: indistinguishable from process did al-Hawsawi - he described the prompt and the table on "We not own. As you know, I have his reservations about watering them in a serious prone because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the position of the board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on effect water with in poured floor, his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the water the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board. to the effect, real problems with putting one of them on the water board for 'dousing.' I have Putting him a head down attitude and pouring water around his chest and in if it is continued is just to the water board, and close may lead to face too 620 us." problems for Several incident later, the (TSZ/^H^^^H^/NF) was referred to the CIA inspector months inspector general A December 6, 2006, investigation. general report summarized the findings for of this investigation, indicating that water was poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the floor in a prone which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogator quoted in the position, 621 "can waterboarding." easily The OIG could not corroborate whether al- report, approximate strapped was the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE Hawsawi to to of interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi the the CIA's enhanced COBALT. Both techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God interrogation the while , using account; to: | [REDACTED] Al-Hawsawi Incident; November 21, 2003. , subject: date: 618 additional For Volume III see details, [REDACTED] account; | ^EmaiHrom: ^^^HHI^^HHI subject: Al-Hawsawi ^HHHI'^^^^^^I: date: November 21, 2003. Incident; ^"Emai^oni: account; H^^^^^J^sing[REDACTED] 2003. subject: Incident; date: and^^l^^^H; 21, Al-Hawsawi Volume III of the November Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in the full Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard interrogation technique at Committee The with device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, COBALT. a bottle of unknown pink waterboard a watering (filled solution of the way to the top) and two can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In thirds meetings between the Committee staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details well of the include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as to as the waterboard's presence at photograph, DETENTION SITE COBALT. 621 CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004- 7604-1G, 6, 2006. December mi n III i j^BM^BI^^BU^oroRN Page 106 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 106

136 UNCLASSIFIED k/NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ was being on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the water poured of the Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the cold temperature water. inspector its made clear to him. The was general report also that purpose waterboard and experience reflected "the way water indicates was done at that al-Hawsawi's dousing COBALT]," that this method was developed and guidance from CIA SITE [DETENTION with 622 the CIA's Office of Medical Services. CTC attorneys and the During time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on (T^S/Z^^^l^m^/N^) same Abu in a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee 2003, Hazim had also waterboard April the 623 in a way that approximated waterboarding. been a linguist in water doused ^flH Country^HHI until m 2003, told the OIG that: from 2003, a cloth dousing used on Abu Hazim, water covered Abu Hazim's "when was CIA [^HHf [ cold OFFICER 1]] poured face, water and on Abu directly Hazim's to disrupt his breathing. [The linguist] said that when Abu face turned blue, Assistant [^^^^Bl removed the cloth so Hazim Physician's 624 Hazim that could Abu breathe." inspector was allegation the CIA reported general on This (TS/VHHI^^H^/NF) to 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible August violation on September 18, criminal 622 Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004- CIA OIG December 6, 2006. 7604-1G, 623 accusation related to an additional detainee was included in An 6, 2012, Human Rights Watch report a September entitled, Into Enemy Hands." The report asserts that documents and interviews of former detainees "Delivered CIA states that "only three men in US custody had been waterboarded." Specifically, the report contradict claims Mohammed detailed aka Abd al-Karim, "provided diat and credible testimony that he was waterboarded Shoroeiya, According repeated during US interrogations in Afghanistan." occasions to the report, Mohammed Shoroeiya on stated that a hood was placed over his head and he was strapped to a "wooden board." The former CIA detainee stated that being strapped to the waterboard, "then they start with the water pouring... They start to pour water after point where feel like you are suffocating." As detailed in the full Committe^tudy, Mohammed to the you 011 A ril rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE aka Abd P was I- 2003. Shoroeiya, al-Karim, al-Karim, there CIA records of Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd no being subjected to the waterboard at While are SITE the full nature of the CIA interrogations at DETENTION SITE ^•H remains DETENTION largely Detainees at DETENTION SITE were subjected to techniques that were not recorded unknown. standing, traffic, periods of sleep deprivation, required multiple loud music, sensory deprivation, in cable including isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, extended and "rough treatment." As described^/olume III nudity, of tire Study includes a CIA photograph of Committee wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE As a detailed in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard interrogation technique at DETENTION SITE waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of The and pink two thirds of the way to the top) (filled a watering can resting on the wooden beams of unknown solution In meetings between the Committee staff and die CIA waterboard. the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to in explain details of the photograph, to include the buckets, the and watering can, as well as the waterboard's solution, presence at DETENTION SITE In response to the allegations in the September 2012 Human Rights in Watch CIA stated: "The agency has been on the record that there are three substantiated cases the which report, detainees subjected to the waterboarding technique were the program." See "Libyan Alleges Waterboarding under by CIA, Report Says," New York Times, September 6,2012. 624 6, IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December CIA 2006. 2004-77717- 16. VNOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 107 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 107

137 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET; FO RN WO 625 to Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia. the The inspector 2004, 10, U.S. linguist's that no corroboration of the was allegation, stating, concluded there general report that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim's face during "[t]here dousing or is no evidence water 626 impaired." breathing that his was the Information Fabricates Subjected to While CIA's Enhanced Hambali 5. Being Interrogation Techniques the 1° of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian (TS^H^^HIH^F) summer 627 628 and Hambali. (These captures are Lillie, later in this Zubair, operatives: discussed 629 section entitled, "The Capture of Hambali.") summary in the In August Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA (TS/^^m^l^H^lNF) 2003, 630 in that Hambali was cooperative Despite the interview process without custody assessments use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less "the enhanced measures," the CLA requested and obtained approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation interrogators 631 on a month after his transfer to CIA custody. Hambali In late 2003, techniques approximately most interrogators the significant information he had provided to recanted during the Hambali of be the enhanced of techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to CIA's use interrogation 632 According to a CIA cable: credible. 625 IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December CIA 2006. 2004-77717- 6, 16. 626 December Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated Disposition 6, 2006. 2004-77717- CIA IG 16. 627 84854 87426 (111223Z AUG 03). Lillie was subjected to the 87617 enhanced CIA's techniques almost immediately upon his arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, on interrogation in 2003. and "placed in a cell H^a^strippe^nii^Iothing," the standing sleep deprivation position, August in darkness." ( See 1242 (151914Z AUG 03).) A day later an interrogation plan for Lillie, including use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, was submitted to CIA Headquarters on the 2003. ( 1243 (152049Z AUG 03).) CIA Headquarters approved the use August See enhancecUntOTOcationtecliniques day, Lillie on the following CIA's August 2003. (See of the on count (IHH 03).) As described, die Committee's H of detainees subjected to HEADQUARTERS AUG techniques did not include detainees such as Lillie, who were subjected to the unauthorized "standard" CIA's techniques to authorization from CIA Headquarters, but for whom authorization from CIA Headquarters was prior shortly advance As noted, the January 2003 guidelines required acquired approval of such techniques thereafter. feasible." "whenever cable also noted that CIA contractor Hammond The had arrived at the detention site and was DUNBAR participating in Hambali's interrogations as an interrogator. The "psychological assessment" portion of the cable was attributed a CIA staff psychologist, however, and not to DUNBAR. to 632 CIA interrogating Hambali in November 2003 wrote about Hambali's "account of how, through officers was read statements and constant repetition of questions, he to made aware of what type of answers his him questioners wanted. [Hambali] said he merely gave answers that were similar to what was being asked and what he subsided inferred or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure interrogator or he was told that the information he the gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." The cable states, "Base came assesses admission of previous fabrication to be credible. [HambaliJ's admission [Hainbali]'s after three TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 108 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 108

138 UNCLASSIFIED TOP k/NOFORN SECRET//^ had provided false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on "he the and to an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] himself ... give 633 wanted hear." questioners assessed to the later suggested that the misleading answers and (WmH^^^F) CIA officers to that interrogators cited in their requests CIA use the CIA's interrogation resistance to techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, Lillie, may enhanced interrogation been interrogation, to have but rather the result of issues related to culture and not resistance 634 English their language poor skills. Techniques, of Use Enhanced Interrogation the CIA Headquarters the 6. After CIA's of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Questions to U.S. Detention Transferred Custody Held for An Additional Four Years Military and the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan In October 2003, in his mid-fifties who was believed to have national Usama bin Laden in his escape assisted 635 Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001 through After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, the Khan was as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his Arsala described dogs to and killing his sons and family." According depicting CIA hallucinations mauling and Khan that Arsala interrogator] was responsible for killing them "stated feeding cables, [the 636 to the dogs." them 637 was subsequently allowed to sleep. Arsala Two days later, Khan however, the returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to interrogators using hours deprivation, interrogators stopped sleep the CIA's enhanced 21 additional of of daily debriefing sessions with [the case officer] carried out almost weeks in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali] entirely has warmed to [the case officer's] discussions with consistently and has provided to [the case officer] him, additional information that he had avoided in die past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to [the case about his fears and motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali] officer] to [the officer] as his sole confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind..." See looks case following (301055Z This cable appears to have been retransmitted the 03). day as HHI^I 1142 NOV 03). 1144(0108232DEC f 33 ' NOV 03) ^^^^ ^^^ ^^•1142(3010552 (1106062 03); 03)j^^^^BH)75(1118282 OCT 1072 1142 (301055Z NOV 03); OCT DEC 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). After an Indonesian (081459Z 03); was deployed to debrief Hambali, the debriefer "got the distinct impression [Hambali] speaker just responding was 'yes' the typical Indonesian cultural manner when they in do not comprehend a question." The CIA cable dien [sic] noted that, "|j]ust to clarify, [the Indonesian speaking debriefer] then posed the same question in Indonesian," and "[w]ithout pause, replied with a direct contradiction, claiming that on 20 September 2001, he was in [Hambali] 2004 not 1075 (111828Z OCT 03).) A January (See cable stated that "Lillie is of Karachi, Qandahar." value," adding that "[h]is English is very poor, limited we do not have a Malay linguist." See \ and 1604 JAN 04). See also detainee reviews (191232Z Volume 111 for additional information. in 635 WASHINGTON | 636 1006Z 03). The information was also released in | OCT interrogations I48122MMHB. indicate that tire CIA's records of Arsala Khan resulted CIA in one disseminated intelligence report, derived from information Khan provided the day he experienced the DC hallucinations. via CIA WASHINGTON ^MlM^M, • See 637 OCT 03) MI ii III I I II II i in 1 1 Page 109 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 109

139 UNCLASSIFIED TOP B//NOFORN SECRET/M techniques "|d|uc lack of information from [Arsala Khan| pinning him directly interrogation to 63 5 Three days after the reporting about Khan's hallucinations, and after the to a recent activity." ' of subjected to the additional 21 hours Khan standing sleep deprivation had interrogators already initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cablc slating that RDG and the Office of (beyond the believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep Medical Services 639 the hours becausc of his hallucinations. beyond 56 deprivation approximately a month of detention and the extensive () of After use CIA's interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, enhanced CIA concluded that the the the Arsala Khan "detainee not appear to be the subjcct involved in... current plans or activities docs against personnel or facilities," and recommended that he be released to his village with a U.S. 640 payment. interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT instead transferred him to cash CIA four custody, he was held for an additional military years despite the development of U.S. where intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan significant aided had 641 Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan's family. Usama bin Year Reports DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA 7. A "Unsettling Discovery After Whom We Holding a Number of Detainees About That We Know Very Little" Are l[1 thc fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the CIA detainees held in Country raising concerns about both thc number and types of being being held thc CIA. CIA officers in Country | provided a list of CIA detainees to detainees by that resulting thc observation by CIA Headquarters in they had not previously CIA Headquarters, thc names of all 44 CIA detainees being held in that country. At had direction of CIA thc Headquarters, Station in Country ("completed an exhaustive scarch of all available records thc 2003 attempt develop a clearer understanding in an thc [CIA | detainees." A December to of cable thc Station in Country from CIA Headquarters stated that: | to "In thc proccss of this research, we have made thc unsettling discovery that we arc holding of detainees about whom we know very little. Thc a number of been | detainees in [Country || have not majority debriefed for months |CIA them in cases, for over a year. Many of and, appear to us to have no some further intelligence value for (thc C1AJ and should more properly be turned for over ]U.S. military], to [Country || authorities or to third countries the to further and possibly prosecution. In investigation cases, there docs not a few appear to be enough evidcncc to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact 642 thc thc detainees should be released." case, Page I I Oof 499 UNCLASSIFIED 110

140 UNCLASSIFIED K/NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ Records indicate all of these CIA detainees had been kept in (TSZ/f^^Hlim^NF) that The solitary of these detainees were later released, with some vast confinement. majority 643 for been held in detention. payments having receiving CIA in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators 8. CIA Support Detention Sites to of the Interrogations Detainees the CIA 2003, sufficient personnel and Throughout (TS/^^mm^F) lacked to conduct debriefings and interrogations adequate Country Because of this translators in shortage, of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not personnel a number debriefed arrival anyone for days or weeks after their or at CIA detention interrogated by 6,14 CIA Country As noted in a cable from the in Station in Country in April 2003: facilities J. is supporting "Station debriefing and/or interrogation of a large number of the individuals... is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us and 645 process a timely manner." them to fully in Psychological, Behavioral Issues Medical, and I. Other Take Precedence Over Medical Care 7. CIA Interrogations Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in CIA While 2002 "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way July 646 by use of exacerbated [enhanced interrogation] methods," these CIA Headquarters the take CIA the interrogation process would that "precedence" over Abu informed interrogators 647 care. Beginning Zubaydah's on August 4, 2002, Abu medical was kept naked, fed a Zubaydah "bare liquid diet, and subjected to the bones" use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation non-stop 648 techniques On 15, 2002, medical personnel described how Abu Zubaydah's August 649 resulted "steady deterioration" of his surgical wound from April 2002. in On interrogation the 643 included Habib Zarmein ("a nominal payment"), Modin This Mohammed ($H|), and Ali Nik Saved Awadh See 111 for additional details. Saeed Volume MA For information, see Volume III. detailed 645 36229 (060943Z APR 03). See ^^BHHI^H detainee reviews for Lillie, Hambali, Mustafa al- also Hawsawi, Suleiman Abdullah. and 646 Central John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, for Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, See Memorandum Attorney General, Office of Assistant Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative." Legal 647 1 ALEC HlH( 82321Z JUL 02) 648 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information, as well as email from: [REDACTED], to: and [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54 HHIHH AM. 649 email to OMS stated: "We are currently providing absolute minimum wound care (as evidenced by the steady An practice of wound), [Abu Zubaydah] has no opportunity to the any form of hygienic self care (he's deterioration filthy), the physical nature of this phase dictates multiple physical stresses (Ilia reaction to today's activity is I bare believe for the superior edge separation), and nutrition is culprit bones (six cans of ensure daily)." See the and from: [REDACTED], to: HHHHH email [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, 06:54 AM. at 11 ii 11 ii 11 Page 111 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 111

141 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN August officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah's wound had undergone 20, 2002, medical 651 650 to Abu Zubaydah's eyes began one deteriorate, Later, of "significant" after deterioration. a test of Abu Zubaydah's other eye, stating that the request was "driven CIA officers requested vice intelligence concern for AZ." The cable relayed, "[w]e have a by our humanitarian needs 652 and to see, read ability write." his upon lot riding CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each In April 2003, 653 while escape capture and were placed in casts. a foot CIA cables requesting broke trying to two the enhanced interrogation techniques on the CIA's detainees stated that the use the of "forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical interrogators would 654 concerns injury)." to Notwithstanding medical detainees'] related to the [the (due shackling of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced injuries, both 655 prior to interrogation CIA Headquarters approval. techniques obtaining In the of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional case officer examined Hazim and recommended that he avoid all weight bearing medical Abu 656 an five weeks due to his broken foot. for In the case of Abd al-Karim, additional activities on 18, a CIA physician assistant recommended that 2003, avoid extended standing April al-Karim 657 couple of weeks." x-rays Six days later, on April 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed for "a foot, a broken him with of al-Karim's foot, and recommending no weight bearing and diagnosing 658 Despite for a total of three months. use crutches these recommendations, on May 10, of the | 10647 (201331Z AUG 02); ^HH 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); (250932Z 110679 02) AUG 651 02). that Abu Zubaydah ultimately lost the eye. See 11026 Records OCT indicate (070729Z 10679 AUG 02); MB^l 11026 (250932Z OCT 02) (070729Z 144147 APR 03) 36862 (181352Z APR To accommodate Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled Abu during sleep the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent standing deprivation, normal detainees' patterns." For water dousing, the of injured legs would be "wrapped in sleeping disruptions HHI The were approved. See DIRECTOR requests ^^^^fl^H; DIRECTOR | tic." alas 655 regard to Abu Hazim, on April 24, 2003, an additional CIA Headquarters approval cable was sent to With to use SITE interrogator I^I^^^^IH authorizing DETENTION the attention grasp, facial insult COBALT the abdominal dousing, and sleep deprivation up to 72 hours; water cable did not approve the use of slap, slap, or the facial hold. ( See DIRECTOR walling the lack of approval, walling was Despite used Abu Hazim on April 28-29, 2003, and the against hold was used on April 27, 2003. (See facial 37410 (291829Z APR 37411 (291828Z APR 03); 03); approved (021309ZMA^3^A 2003, CIA Headquarters cable 10, walling and the facial 37509 May (See DIRECTOR MAY 03).) Abd al-Karim was also subjected to unapproved CIA grasp. detainee's interrogation enhanced the detention site initially indicated would not be used due to the techniques that injuries. approval from CIA Headquarters, CIA Without subjected Abd al-Karim to cramped interrogators confinement on April 19-20, 2003; stress positions on April 21, 2003; and walling on April 21, and 29, 2003. (See 37152 231424z APR 37121 ( 03); (221703Z APR (250948Z 03); 37508 (021305Z MAY 03).) On 37202 APR 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters May an expanded list of CIA enhanced interrogation techniques that could be approved used against Abd al-Karim, including walling and stress positions. See DIRECTOR |H MAY 03). 656 ^^M ^HB MAY 03) DIRECTOR 657 36862(181352Z APR 03) 658 DIRECTOR TOP SECRET// 7NOFORN Page 112 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 112

142 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ CIA interrogators that both Hazim and al-Karim were "strong mentally and 2003, believed 659 to to sleep in the sitting position." [their] On May 12, 2003, a different physically due ability who the not been involved in assistant, previous examinations determining CIA physician had it was the to avoid weight bearing, stated that for his "opinion" that Abu need the detainees Abd al-Karim's injuries were "sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the Hazim's and 660 deprivation further He sleep reported that he had "consulted with [CIA's standing position." officer Medical secure phone and OMS medical via concurred in this Office of Services] 661 Headquarters approved the use of assessment." sleep deprivation against both standing CIA 662 shortly As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep detainees thereafter. deprivation Abu 52 hours of standing sleep underwent from June 3-5, deprivation. Hazim 663 2003, Abd and underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on al-Karim 664 2003. May 15, CIA detainee was left in the standing sleep deprivation (TS^HH^HH^NF) Asadallah stress a sprained when Asadallah was placed in Later, positions on his despite ankle. position complained of discomfort and asked to sit. Asadallah was told he knees, not sit unless he could 665 questions he answered truthfully. Detainees Issues Psychological and Behavioral CIA 2. Exhibit Psychological behavioral problems experienced by CIA (TS/fl^HHH^B^^) and who were detainees, in austere conditions and in solitary confinement, also posed held 6591 03) MAY (131326Z 138161 (150541Z MAY 03); | 38262 660 I 38161 (131326Z MAY 03) 66! MAY 03) 38161 (131326Z fi62 for | MAY 03) and Hazim; DIRECTOR | MAY 03) Abu for DIRECTOR See | Abd al-Karim. c 03) 139656 (060955Z JUN » 39582 (041743Z 03); | JUN 664 (170652Z MAY 03) 38365 665 Asadallah was also placed in a "small isolation box" for 30 minutes, without authorization and without discussion of how the would affect his ankle. (See 34098 technique 34310^HHHHH-) 34294^^^^•H^nli^Hi^^^HHI records contain information on other detainee medical complaints (see Volume III), those records also While CIA medical detainee could be underreported in CIA complaints records. For example, CIA that medical suggest consistently report that CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh medical no medical complaints. However, records had interrogation indicate that when bin al-Shibh had records complained of ailments to CIA personnel, CIA previously was subjected to he CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and told by CIA interrogators that his medical the condition not of concern to the CIA. (See ••• 10591 (252002Z FEB 03); ••• 10627 (281949Z was 03).) Michael testimony on April 12, 2007, CIA Director FEB Hayden referenced medical care of detainees in In testified the the ICRC report on CIA detentions. Hayden of to the Committee: "The medical section of the context ICRC report concludes that the association of CIA medical officers with the interrogation program is 'contrary to international standards medical ethics.' That is just wrong. The role of CIA medical officers in the detainee of detainee. is always has been and always will be program ensure the safety and the well-being of the and The to placement medical officers during the interrogation techniques of an extra measure of caution. Our represents medical officers do not recommend the employment or continuation of any procedures or techniques. The allegation in the report a CIA medical officer threatened a detainee, stating that medical care was conditional on that administered cooperation false. Health care has always been blatantly based upon detainee needs. It's neither is policy nor practice to link medical care to any odier aspect of the detainee program." This testimony was incongruent CIA records. with KM II HI I mi in Page 113 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 113

143 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 666 management CIA. challenges For example, later in his detention, Ramzi bin al-Shibh the for and psychological including visions, paranoia, insomnia, and exhibited behavioral problems, 667 to psychologists linked bin al-Shibh's deteriorating mental state self-harm. attempts at CIA 668 inability cope with his long-term detention. and Similarly, 'Abd al-Rahim al- isolation his to and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult Nashiri's unpredictable the engaged to manage. Al-Nashiri for in repeated belligerent acts, including detainees CIA 670 659 attempting to assault detention site personnel food and trying to damage throwing tray, his 671 cell. the Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused in CIA staff of drugging or items his 672 his complained of bodily pain and insomnia. and As noted, at one point, al- poisoning food Nashiri a short-lived hunger strike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him launched 673 An October 2004 psychological assessment of al-Nashiri was used by the CIA to rectally. its discussions National Security Council officials on establishing an "endgame" advance with 674 program. In July 2005, CIA Headquarters the concern regarding al-Nashiri's for expressed 675 Days and uncooperative attitude." state depression later a CIA psychologist "continued of 676 al-Nashiri was on the "verge of a breakdown." assessed that in until 2004, and continuing Beginning his rendition to March Majid military Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, at Khan engaged in a series of U.S. custody strikes and attempts at self-mutilation that required significant hunger from CIA attention detention personnel. In response to Majid Khan's hunger strikes, site personnel medical 666 For additional details, see Volume III. 067 ••• 1759 (021319Z OCT 04); HEADQUARTERSB|^1(040023Z NOV 05); | (171225Z NOV NOV 04); H^^HTl93p (061620Z DEC 04); | 04); (140915Z APR 2207 (051805Z JUL05); 05)i^^^HB2210(141507Z (111319Z APR05)~|^H|2535 AUG 1890 (171225Z NOV (120857ZJUL05)T|^^^H2830(291304Z 12589 05); 1893(200831Z NOV 04); CIA document 04); "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, 12 ^^^^• entitled, APR 05); •^••2535 (051805Z JUL 05); ••• 2210 April200F~HHHh210(141507Z APR05X^HJBB2535 (051805Z JUL05)!^Mlll^l 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); | (141507Z (061620Z APR 05) DEC 1930 2210 (141507Z 2210(1415072 APR 05); 2535 | 05); JUL (051805Z 12830 (291304Z AUG 04); SEP (081609Z U691 | 04); 1716 (180742Z SEP (020752Z JAN 1998 05) JAN (151735Z 2023 05); JUN 05); (3019462 2515 I 11150 NOV 03) (282019Z JUN (291750Z 11029 06); | [1142 (0413582 AUG 06); AUG04); (111600Z 11543 11716(180742Z SEP 04) \ I 3051 SEP 05); (301235Z (291750Z 06) JUN 11029 671 See, example, for JUN 05); 12474 (251622Z 12673 (021451Z AUG 05); 04). SEP (180742Z 1716 672 See, for example (011644Z JUL 1356 ••^^•1880 (140917Z NOV 04); | 04); DEC 04); I 'I ll III ' HI 1959(1117002 ^MB 1959 (111700ZDEC04); I Mil 2038 1091 (031835Z NOV 03); | (211558ZJAN05)^^^BHH^H (052309Z JAN 04); MAR 04). 1266 673 •|^^|1203 (231709ZMAY04)i^HlM| 1202 (231644Z MAY04). CIA records indicate that at least five were subjected to rectal rehydration or rectal feeding: Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, detainees See Shaykh Majid Khan, and Marwan al-Jabbur. Mohammad, Volume III for additional details. Khalid 674 Email from: to: [DETENTION SITE BLACK|j|B cc: j 2004. subject: for Endgame Views; date: October 30, Assessments/Request Interrogator 675 HEADQUARTERS (282217Z JUL 05) 676 CIA Sametime exchange, dated 29/JUL/05 08:01:51 - 08:50:13; between and I TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN Page 114 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 114

144 UNCLASSIFIED mi Bi^^^M^BBBB i mi i in11 1111111 various implemented fluids and nutrients, including the use of a techniques to provide that the intravenous fluids. CIA records indicate of Majid Khan and provision nasogastric tube 677 and was permitted to infuse cooperated fluids and nutrients himself. with the feedings the three the CIA developed a more weeks, treatment regimen After approximately aggressive 678 rectal Majid Khan was then subjected to involuntary "without unnecessary conversation." rectal hydration, included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day, Majid and feeding which and consisting hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, of raisins, was "pureed" "lunch Khan's tray," 680 679 followed. Additional rectal feeding and hydration of infused. In sessions and rectally his hunger strikes, Majid Khan engaged in acts of self-harm that included attempting addition to 681 682 on two occasions, attempt an to cut to chew into his arm at the inner elbow, wrist an his 683 cut a vein in the top of his foot, attempt and an attempt to cut into his skin at the elbow joint to 684 a filed using toothbrush. Interrogation Seeks the CIA's Detention and of Program in 2003 CIA Reaffirmation J. The About the Humane Treatment of 1. Administration Raise Concerns at Statements Detainees CIA Possible Lack of Policy About for CIA Interrogation Activities the Support several occasions in early 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott On expressed concern to the National Security Council principals, White House staff, and Muller might of that the CIA's program personnel be inconsistent with public Department Justice from the Administration that the U.S. statements treatment of detainees was Government's 685 CIA General Counsel Muller therefore "humane." to verify with White House and sought Department of Justice personnel that a February 7, 2002, Presidential Memorandum requiring the 686 U.S. treat detainees humanely did not apply to the CIA. military Following those to (161628Z SEP 3184 04); 04)J SEP | 3183 (161626Z SEP 3196 04); (201731Z \ 04); (181558ZSEP 13190 04); SEP (211819Z 3206 3197 (201731Z SEP 04); (161621Z 3181 04) SEP (120625Z SEP | [3135 04); SEP (230552Z \ 3237 04) 3240 (231839Z SEP 04) (261734Z SEP 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "rectal 13259 is a "well technique medical rehydration" to address pressing health issues." A follow-up CIA acknowledged "[fjrom provided 25,2013 (DTS #2013-3152), states that October a health perspecti ve, Majid Khan document on uncooperative on 31 August 2004, when he initiated became strike and before he underwent rectal a hunger rehydration... assesses that the use of rectal CIA is a medically sound hydration technique..." The rehydration assertion that Majid Khan was "uncooperative" prior to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding is inaccurate. As described in records, prior to being subjected to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding, Majid Khan cooperated CIA the himself. feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients with nasogastric 4242 3694 NOV 04); Hi^HIHiHHi MAR (191550Z \ 05); (301800Z (221213Z 05) [4250 MAR 3724 (031723Z DEC 04) \ 3835 DEC 04) (260659Z |4614 (071358Z JUN 05) 685 February 12,2003, MFR from Scott Muller, Subject: "Humane" treatment of CIA detainees; March 7, 2003, Memorandum for from Muller, Subject: Proposed Response to Human Rights Watch Letter. DDCIA 686 [sic], January Draft Memorandum for Scott Mueller 9, General Counsel of the Centra] Intelligence Agency, 2003, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, re: Application of the President's 1 mi BB^^B^B 1 mi inn 111111 Page 115 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 115

145 UNCLASSIFIED TOP in discussions White House press secretary was advised to avoid using the term early 2003, the 687 personnel. of al-Qa'ida and Taliban detention discussing when "humane treatment" the also engaged in discussions with the In mid-2003, CIA officials the Defense, of Justice, and attorneys in the White House on whether Department Department of with made the U.S. Government complied that certain requirements be representations could of the Convention Against Torture, namely that the treatment of detainees was arising out 688 constitutional the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. with In consistent standards in the 2003, inter-agency discussions, William Haynes, numerous general counsel of June late after of Defense, responded to a letter from Senator Patrick Leahy stating that it was the Department 689 compl^vittUhes^jtandards. According to a memorandum from the CIA's to U^SjDolicy August 1, 2002, OLC opinion provided a legal Legal, the 690 for "safe CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. harbor" The August 1, 2002, the opinion not, however, address the constitutional standards described in the letter from did Haynes. William after the White House made a number of statements In July 2003, that the treatment of detainees was "humane," suggesting CIA asked the national again U.S. use for reaffirmation of the CIA's policy of its enhanced interrogation security advisor During the time that request was being considered, CIA Headquarters stopped techniques. 691 requests CIA officers to approving the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. use from Headquarters of CIA interrogators, with CIA stand-down, approval, instead used Because this applications of the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques. These "standard" repeated were but techniques not considered to be as coercive as the CIA's "enhanced" coercive, beyond techniques. this time, sleep deprivation At 72 hours was considered an interrogation February 7, 2002, Memorandum on the Geneva Convention (HI) of 1949 to the Release of an al Qaeda Detainee to the Custody the CIA. The memorandum stated that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of under Geneva, that Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a of war and not detainees to al-Qa'ida or Taliban did conflict, apply 687 DOJ Memorandum for the March from Subject: meeting with 2003, and NSC 18, Record Adviser. Legal 688 to: Scott March 18, 2003, email from: HHHHH; See, for Muller; subject: Memorandum for example, Record - Telcoi^itl^LC^ate: March 13, 2003^mailfronrScott W. Muller; to: Stanley M. Moskowitz, John the Interrogations; Moseman; A. Rizzo, H^^H^B subject: John date: April 1,2003, at H. cc: PM; to: Scott Muller; cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 1:18:35 and [REDACTED]; letter law on Interrogations; Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention Black subject: Interrogation Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel; of April 17, 2003. date: 689 June 25, 2003, Letter from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense to Patrick Leahy, United Senate. States 690 House Memorandum for the Record from Subject: White 2003, Meeting on June 30, Techniques (DTS #2009-2659). Enhanced 691 for example, email from: HH^^^H; to: See, and [REDACTED]; subject: FYI - Draft [REDACTED] Paragraphs the DCI on the Legal Issues on Interrogation, for requested by the General Counsel; date: March 14, as 2003; June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/2003Q626-3.htm; email John Rizzo; to: John Moseman, from: subject: Buzzy cc: Muller, William Harlow; Krongard, Today's Washington Post Piece on Scott Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003; July 3, 2003, Memorandum for National Security Advisor Intelligence from of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Director Agency's Interrogation Program. 11 ii 11 ii i i Bjj^^^^^^^^BMfVNOFonN Page 116 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 116

146 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ interrogation technique, sleep deprivation under 72 hours was defined as a "enhanced" while interrogation "standard" avoid using an "enhanced" interrogation technique, technique. CIA To Khallad two Attash to 70 hours of standing sleep deprivation, subjected hours CIA officers bin bin maximum. allowing him four hours of sleep, the Attash was subjected to an than less After hours of standing sleep deprivation, followed immediately by 20 hours of additional 23 seated 692 sleep deprivation. most Unlike CIA's interrogation program, during the of during the CIA Headquarters seeking policy reaffirmation, the CIA responded to infractions that time was program in the reported through CIA cables and other communications. interrogation as the of the interrogations program in chief does not appear to have Although RDG, investigated or reprimanded for training interrogators on been abdominal slap before its use the 693 was training significant numbers of new interrogators to conduct interrogations on approved, 694 compliant or conducting large numbers of water dousing on detainees potentially detainees 695 or authorization; certification the CIA removed his requesting to conduct without obtaining the late 2003 for placing a broom handle behind in knees of a detainee while interrogations July 696 was in a stress position. CIA that Headquarters also decertified two other detainee n interrogators, 1] and HHH< > [CIA the same period, OFFICER 697 those official records of why no decertifications occurred. there although are The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the 2. Security National Council, that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Represents of Life, Loss Possibly Extensive "; Policymakers Reauthorize Program (¥S4|HHHIiOn July 29, 2003, DCI Tenet and CIA General Counsel Muller attended a meeting Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice, Attorney with Ashcroft, and House Counsel Gonzales, among others, seeking policy General White 692 Attash one leg, which swelled during standing sleep deprivation, resulting Bin the transition to seated sleep has in manipulation was subjected to nudity and dietary also during this period. See 12371 He deprivation. JUL 03); ••• 12385 (222045Z JUL 03); and 12389 (232040Z JUL 03). (2I2121Z en i j j Curriculum, November 2,2002, at 17. x ra ng alK HVT n and Curriculum, November 2,2002, at 17. 6M Training HVT 695 for example, 10168 (092130Z JAN 03); Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of See, Interrogations for Puqwses, April 7, 2003; CIA Office of Inspector General, Counterterrorism Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities(September2001 - October 2003) (2003- Special T^S^GlJi^a^MMjBII^H 10168 (092130Z JAN 03)JIHHH||H|H 340981 | 34179 (262200Z 03); ^^^^^^^^^^342941 FEB (101742ZMAR 03); 134310^^^^^^^^^•34757 and (161321ZMAR03). 135025 696 2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel: April Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs at 22; 7, CIA for Chief,via Memorandum LegaHrou^hief, CTC/RDG. July 28, 2003, CTC Subject: of former Interrogator. Document not signed by ^HH Decertification he was "not because available for signature." 697 via Memorandum for Chief, ^HH- July ^•CTCLegalfrom Chief, CTC/RDG, See [CIA 28, of former Interrogator, signed Decertification OFFICER 1] on July Subject: 2003, 2003; and April 7,2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs 29, via Memorandum for Chief, at 22; ^H CTC Legal from Chief, CTC/RDG, July 28, 2003, Decertification of former Interrogator. Subject: mi 11 III i BMB^B^B I mi

147 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ NOFORN k/ its coercive interrogation program. The presentation included a list of the CIA's reaffirmation of enhanced interrogation CIA General Counsel Muller also provided a standard and techniques. representation waterboard including the inaccurate technique, the interrogation description of 698 against KSM 119 times and Abu Zubaydah 42 that it had The presentation been used times. Security principals in attendance that "termination Council this program will National warned of loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA officers further noted that 50 percent of CIA result in reports on were derived from detainee reporting, and that "major threats intelligence al-Qaida the and because of the use of averted" CIA's enhanced interrogation countered were attacks CIA provided specific examples of "attacks averted" as a result of using the techniques. The enhanced interrogation including references to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, CIA's techniques, 699 Plot, Heathrow Wave Plot, and Iyman Faris. the As described later in this the Second and in greater detail in Volume II, summary, claims were inaccurate. After the CIA's these presentation, President Cheney stated, and National Security Advisor Rice agreed, that the Vice 700 was policy in carrying out its interrogation program. executing CIA Administration Security principals at the July 2003 briefing National The Council it was "not necessary or advisable to have a full Principals Committee initially concluded 701 for reaffirm to Program." review A CIA email noted that the official reason and meeting the having briefing was to avoid a full disclosures, but added that: not press to us from some of the "it is clear meetings we had with [White House] runup Counsel the [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary of State] that 698 of that KSM received at least 183 applications indicate the waterboard technique, and that Abu CIA records received at least 83 applications of the waterboard Zubaydah In April 2003, CIA Inspector General John technique. Helgerson General Counsel Scott Muller about the repetitious asked of the waterboard. In early June 2003, use White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and the Vice President's Counsel, David Addington, who were aware of the inspector general's asked Muller whether the number of waterboard repetitions had been too high in light concerns, OLC guidance. question prompted Muller to seek information on the use of the waterboard on Abu of the This KSM. by See interview of Scott Muller, and [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and Zubaydah ( John August General, and email from: Scott Muller; to: 20, Rizzo; cc: [REDACTEDl^Offic^fth^nspector 2003; [REDACTED]; subject: "Report from [REDACTED], trip (Not proofread, as usual)"; date: June |, 2003, 05:47 PM.) As Muller told the OIG, he could not keep up Gitmo with cable from CIA detainee interrogations and instead received monthly briefings. According to OIG traffic specifically of Muller "said he does not know interview, how [CIA guidelines on interrogations] changed records the he does not get that far down into the weeds," and because detainee is different and those in the field have "each some ( See interview of Scott Muller, Office latitude." the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.) Despite this of record and others detailed in the full Committee Study, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that the CIA's "confinement conditions treatment of high profile detainees like Abu Zubaydah were closely scrutinized at all and of from the outset." levels management 699 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 August 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003. July 700 Scott 2003, August for the Record from 5, Muller, Subject: Review of the Interrogation Program Memorandum on 29 July 2003. A briefing slide describing the "Pros" and "Cons" associated with the program listed the following perception under "Con": (1) "Blowback due to public heading of 'humane treatment,'" (2) "ICRC continues to the attack USG policy on detainees," and (3) "Congressional inquiries continue." See Volume II for additional details. 701 of 5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review August Interrogation Program,July 29, 2003. TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 118 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 118

148 UNCLASSIFIED K/NOFORN / ^ TOP SECRET/ would blow stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going Powell his 702 on." Advisor Rice, however, subsequently decided National (TS/^H^^^I^^^/NF) Security Donald State of and Secretary of Defense Colin Rumsfeld should be Secretary that Powell 703 CIA interrogation program prior to recertification of the covert action. briefed on the As both then formally briefed on the CIA program for the first time in a 25 minute described, were 704 September 2003. on briefing 16, that 4, September records indicate 2003, CIA officials may On CIA provided Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and their staff directors have a briefing 705 Administration's reaffirmation of the program. regarding Neither the CIA nor the the has a contemporaneous on the content of the briefing or any confirmation that Committee report occurred. briefing the and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, K. Additional General, Congress, Oversight Inspector the U.S. Supreme Court and Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense /. ICRC Informs the Official CIA the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to that the Inaccurate Provides Disappear"; Information on CIA Detainee to the CIA Department of Defense 2004, the In January sent a letter to | ICRC indicating that it was aware that the United States Government was holding unacknowledged detainees several facilities in Country | "incommunicado for extensive in of time, to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture, periods subjected 706 CIA, possible recourse." of According to the deprived the letter included a "fairly while any 707 of CIA detainees to whom the ICRC had not had access. complete This prompted list" CIA Headquarters conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA to 708 least CIA subsequently transferred at custody. 25 of its detainees in Country | to The the 709 and foreign governments. The military also released five detainees. U.S. CIA 702 Email from: Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003. John 703 August Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program, July 5,2003, 29, 2003. 704 from CIA Memorandum for the September 26,2003, Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program. Record 705 September 4,2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing 706 Letter from | 6,2004, January 707 HEADQUARTERS I 708 | HEADQUARTERS 709 See, for example, DIRECTOR^^M^^^^^^M; DIRECTOR | I; DIRECTOR HHI^ 1696 f~ I; HEADQUARTERS |; HEADQUARTERS f 12335 123081 |1001 | I //NOFORN SECRET//I TOP of 499 Page 119 UNCLASSIFIED 119

149 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN The a factually incorrect description to the CIA provided Defense Department of the 18 CIA detainees transferred to U.S. military concerning of one 2004. as transfer letter described CIA detainee Ali Jan March "the most trusted custody in The was Haqqani AQ target of the USG)" who top captured in the village bodyguar(U)f Jaluluddin (a 710 Although there was an individual named of orUun^H, Jan captured in 2002. Ali 7 of 2002 village the ^CIArecords indicate that he was not the detainee June i held the CIA in the Country ^^HH^H facility. The Ali Jan in CIA being was custody by early during 2003, circa the U.S. military operation in apprehended August 712 indicate Afghanistan. Paktia CIA records Valley, that Ali Jan was Zormat Province, to CIA custody after his transferred phone rang while he was in military custody, and the satellite 713 the caller was speaking in Arabic. translator After his transfer to U.S. military indicated 714 Ah eventually released on July |, 2004. Jan custody, was the being formal complaint about detainees to In response ICRC's officials Country in access, State Department | without met with senior ICRC kept ICRC in Geneva, and indicated that it was U.S. policy to encourage all countries to provide officials 715 access detainees, including Country ICRC (, While the State Department made these to directing representations ICRC, the CIA was repeatedly the the same country to deny official to ICRC access to the CIA detainees. the June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. In ambassador that countmcMlehverademarche, "in in demanding [the country] provide essence full access to all [country detainees," which included detainees being held at 715 the CIA's These conflicting messages from the United States Government, as well as behest. ICRC pressure the country for failing to provide access, created significant tension increased on 717 United and the country in question. the States between year, in advance of a National Security Later that Council Committee on September 14, 2004, officials meeting the Department of Defense Principals from the CIA to inform the CIA that called Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz would not Deputy support CIA's position that notifying the ICRC of all detainees in U.S. Government custody the harm an national security. According to would internal CIA email following the call, the U.S. CIA's secretary defense had listened to the of arguments for nondisclosure, but believed deputy that it was time for full notification. The email stated that the Department of Defense supported the U.S. position that there should be full disclosure to the ICRC, unless there Government's The compelling military necessity or national security. of email added that the were reasons 710 4, Rodriguez, Letter from Jose March Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center to Thomas O'Connell, 2004, Conflict. Secretary Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity of Assistant 180219 12296(101709Z _| 2296(101709Z 714 Details in June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale. 7,5 2348 716 HEADQUARTERS whose countries period, same this L During in were nationals CIA custody were issuing demarches. issued Country to J a demarche and 2004, B in a demarche issued to the See U.S. in 2004. 2274 F •••i^H- 93291 and 717 I. Volume information, more For see ^^^^^^^^^^^•//NOIOHN I HI II III I Page 120 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 120

150 UNCLASSIFIED TOP of Defense not believe an adequate articulation of military necessity or national Department did warranting security that "DoD is tired of 'taking hits' for CIA nondisclosure reasons existed, position that government "should not be in the U.S. of causing people 'ghost and detainees,'" the 718 to 'disappear.'" meetings communications numerous the within Despite and to 2004, United States throughout not formally respond the the January 6, branch executive did 719 until June 13, 2005. 2004, ICRC letter Leadership 2. Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program CIA Calls Inaccurate, with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to and "Imbalanced " Responds Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector Limit Further General The of the Inspector General (OIG) was first CIA's Office in the Detention and Interrogation Program of November 2002, nine months informed CIA's Abu after became the CIA's first detainee. As described, the information was Zubaydah conveyed the DDO, who also informed the OIG of the death of Gul Rahman. In January by the DDO requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized 2003, further against the al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Separately, techniques OIG "received interrogation 'Abd covert some were concerned that certain that Agency activities at an information employees detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights," according to overseas 720 OIG's Review. the Special During the course of the OIG's interviews, numerous CIA officers (TSZ/UHmfim/^F) concerns of the CIA's lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation expressed about 721 Zubaydah. Other CIA officers expressed Abu about the analytical assumptions concern 722 interrogations, as well as the lack driving language and cultural background among of 718 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: position on ICRC notification; date: September 13, 2004. [REDACTED], DoD's 719 13, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC June verbale. note 2005, 720 2003) Special and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October Counterterrorism Review, Detention 7 May 2004, (DTS #2004-2710). (2003-7123-IG), 721 chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site told The OIG that "[t]he Reports the Officers not know what was required of them, analysts were not knowledgeable of the target, translators were did report native speakers, and at least one not the [chiefs of Base] had limited fieldexperience/\Sec Interview Arab of of [REDACTED], of the Inspector General, May 20, Office According to ••••• of CTC Legal, 2003. there was no screening procedure in place for officers assigned to DETENTION SITE GREEN. See interview of by [REDACTED] [REDACTED, Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003. See and General, interview Office of the Inspector HHHHHBI< March 24,2003. also of 722 addition to the statements to the OIG described above, In the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, CIA regarding officers more general concerns. As noted, expressed assumptions at CIA Headquarters that the Abu Zubaydah "knew everything about Al-Qa'ida, including details of the next attack" reflected liow "the 'Analyst the vs. ha[d] been around from 'day one."' {See interview of^^^^^^^^H^^ Office of issue Interrogator' Inspector February 27, 2003.) According General, Chief of InteiTogations^^^^^^BTsubject matter experts to often provided interrogation requirements that were "not valid or well thought out," providing the example of Mustafa (See interview of^^^^^^B^ffic^^h^nspectorGeneral, April 7, 2003.) Senior CIA al-Hawsawi. mi 11 in i i mi inn i Page 121 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 121

151 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 723 members teams. of Some CIA officers described pressure from CIA interrogation the use Headquarters enhanced interrogation techniques, which they attributed to faulty the to CIA's 724 of know. what As the chief should RDG, | about analytical assumptions detainees OIG in a February 2003 interview: stated to the know not about al-Qa'ida and as a result, Headquarters "CTC does a lot of what al-Qa'ida represents to them, constructed analyst^ave 'models' that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject [•i^n noted it needs. matter questions sent from CTC/Usama bin Laden experts The the (UBL) based on SIGINT [signals intelligence] and interrogators to are When that is incomplete or wrong. times the detainee intelligence other often respond to the question, does assumption at Headquarters is that the not the is holding and 'knows' more, and consequently, Headquarters detainee back resumption EITs. This difference of opinion between the recommends of and Headquarters as to whether the detainee interrogators is the is 'compliant' type ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to. [^^HlHl of the waterboard used 'recklessly' - 'too many times' on Abu believes was faulty [DETENTION based in part on GREEN], SITE at Zubaydah 725 intelligence." the OIG that interrogators "suffered from a lack of substantive interrogator from told requirements Headquarters," that "in every case so far, Headquarters' and of what the detainee should know is CIA model told the OIG that "I do not want to beat a man up based on flawed." Headquarters says he should what know," that, "I want my best shotonsomething he (the detainee) knows, not a fishing expedition on commenting he 2003.) know." ( See interview of Hi^^^Hft Office of the Inspector General, April 30, things Two should told were OIG tilaUequiremen ts interviewees sometimes based on inaccurate or improperly translated intercepts, the March of Office of the Inspector General, interrogator 24, 2003; Interview of |_ jfc^ntemew [former chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site], Office of the Inspector General, 29, 2003. May 723 One that several interrogators with whom he had worked insisted on conducting interrogations interviewee noted interview demonstrate over the detainee. ( See dominance report ofHim|, Office of to their in English General, March 17, 2003.) The CIA's June 2013 Response the that "[t]he program Inspector acknowledges to challenges in identifying sufficient, qualified staff -- particularly language-qualified face - as continued personnel imposedbyAgency involvement in Iraq increased." requirements of 724 toH^BBHl Legal, According "[t]he seventh floor [CIA leadership] can complicate the process CTC [and of that interrogations are the silver bullet mindset CIA leadership is] expecting immediate results." because the Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003.) Senior Interrogator (Setunterview chief the of Khallad bin Attash, who, he told the OIG, was determined by the provided of Base at example DETENTIO£^ITEBLUE to "warrant" the CIA's not interrogation techniques. According to enhanced debriefer ^HH called ALEC Station and told them to "go to the mat" in advocating for the use of the CIA's enhancecHntem5gation techniques, that bin Attash was holding back information. ( See interview of claiming HI^Hil Office Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) the described the "inherent tension ^HHHB of occasionally exists between officers at the that facilities and those at Headquarters who view the interrogation detainee^r^ithholding provided the example of information." Yassir al-Jaza'iri. (See interview Abu of^^H Office of the Inspector General, May 8, 2003.) H^H^l also described disagreements on whether to detainees to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a "field versus Headquarters issue." subject August (See Office of the Inspector General, of 18, 2003.) As described, interviewees also interview described pressure from CIA Headquarters related to the interrogations of KSM and Abu Zubaydah. 725 2003. of Office of the Inspector General, February 21, Interview Mil II I I I Page 122 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 122

152 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECREifl^^—/WQEQRN One (TS^l^^^^VNF) informed the OIG that senior interrogator, CIA differences the interrogators at the CIA detention sites were not Headquarters between and official is According to "all of the fighting and criticism the done over part of record. 726 things into cables," and that CIA "[cjables reflect and that are 'all rosy.'" is not phone the put is described elsewhere, and reflected in the final OIG Special (WiB^H^) As officers Review, numerous other topics with the OIG, including conditions at CIA discussed of COBALT, the video taping interrogations, interrogations, the SITE specific DETENTION the program, and concerns about the lack of an "end administration for CIA detainees, of game" as impact of possible public revelations concerning the existence and operation of the as well the 727 and Program. Detention CIA's Interrogation 2004, the CIA inspector general circulated for comment In January offices within CIA a draft of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and to various the Review Among the OIG Special matters, described divergences Program. other Interrogation CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as applied and between described to the the as of in 2002, the use of Justice techniques, and oversight problems Department unauthorized to DETENTION SITE COBALT. The draft related Special Review elicited responses from OIG the deputy director for operations, the deputy director for science and technology, the CIA's of responses— Counsel, and the Office of Medical Services. Several of the Office General those Scott CIA General Counsel particularly Muller and CIA Deputy Director for from inspector James highly critical of the Pavitt—were general's draft Special Review. Operations General Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed of OIG Special "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly" the Review, 728 documents. Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt CIA that the OIG from wrote our Review come to the "conclusion that have efforts have thwarted attacks and Special should lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our saved successes." Pavitt to his response a document describing information the CIA obtained attached a result that the lawful use of EITs" that stated, "[t]he evidence points clearly to the fact "as of terrorist the of such without we and our allies would [have] suffered major use techniques, 726 Office of the Inspector Interview April 30, 2003. General, 727 DDO Pavitt described possible public revelations related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program as "the CIA's nightmare." Interview of James Pavitt, Office of the Inspector General, September 21, 2003. worst out to records of an interview with DCI Tenet, "Tenet According that if the general public were to find OIG believes about program, many would believe we are torturers." this added, however, that his "only potential moral Tenet dilemma would be if more Americans die at the hands of terrorists and we had someone in our custody who interview possessed could have prevented deaths, but we had not obtained such information." See that information of George Office of the Inspector Tenet, memorandum dated, September 8,2003. General, 728 See CIA Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program Special dated February 24, 2004 (2003-7123-IG). Review, 11(11111111 11 iii i ^^MMBM^^BB mi Page 123 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 123

153 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 729 involving thousands, of casualties." hundreds, A review of CIA records found attacks if not 730 representations Pavitt materials were almost entirely inaccurate. that in the the inaccurate on the operation, conveying information Edition to of the CIA program, CIA leadership continued to impede the management, and effectiveness Goss efforts the program. In July 2005, Director to oversee sent a memorandum to the its in OIG to "express several concerns regarding the in-depth, multi-faceted review" of inspector general CTC. the CIA director wrote that he was "increasingly concerned about the CIA's The that of work on CTC's performance," adding OIG's "I believe it makes impact the cumulative complete existing reviews... before opening new ones." Director sense added, "[t]o my to Goss Congress satisfied that you are meeting its is with regard to the CIA's knowledge, requirements" 731 Interrogation Program. the At the time, however, Detention and chairman of the Senate vice Select on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the CIA program, in Committee because of aspects of the program that were not being investigated by the Office of part the 732 CIA April 2007, General. Director Michael Hayden had his "Senior Inspector In only individual CIA who was accountable the to the CIA director— Councilor"—an within a review of the inspector general's practices. Defending the decision to review the OIG, conduct CIA that the Committee the there were "morale issues that the [CIA] director needs to be told "bias" of," the review had uncovered instances of that among OIG personnel against mindful and 733 Detention and Interrogation Program. the In 2008, the CIA's director announced the CIA results his review of the OIG to the CIA of force and stated that the inspector general had work "chosen to take a number of steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the 734 transparency investigative process." of the CIA Does Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess 3. The Not of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques the Effectiveness CIA's May final OIG Special Review included a The (T^m^F) 2004 the CIA's DDO conduct recommendation of the effectiveness of the CIA's that a study techniques 90 days. Prompted by the within the CIA tasked two interrogation recommendation, CIA officers to lead "an informal operational assessment of the CIA detainee senior program." The were tasked with responding to 12 specific terms of reference, including an reviewers and of of each interrogation technique effectiveness environmental deprivation" assessment "the 729 to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February Memorandum Detention 2004, the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism with and 27, Interrogation (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes Program' CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and of Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. 730 p II. ddit] Volume i information, see ona a or 731 J. Goss, Memorandum for Inspector General 21, Porter 2005, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re: July from IG Work Impacting the CounterTerrorism Center. New 732 Transcript business meeting, April 14, 2005 (DTS #2005-2810). of 733 Bob for Committee Record, "Staff Briefing with Memorandum Deitz on his Inquiry into the Investigative the Practices of the CIA Inspector General," October 17, 2007 (DTS #2007-4166); Committee Memorandum for the in Record, Meetings with John Helgerson and Bob Deitz from late 2007 and early 2008" (DTS #2012-4203); "Notes Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Staff Briefing with CIA Inspector General John Helgerson" (DTS #2007- 4165). 734 Letter from DCIA Michael Hayden to Senator John D. Rockefeller TV, January 29, 2008 (DTS #2008-0606). 111 ( " MBM^^^BHBMI i ii 11111 > Page 124 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 124

154 UNCLASSIFIED k/NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 735 if any deprivation should be "added, modified, or discontinued." techniques to determine or a CIA According the reviewers, their review was based on briefings by memorandum to from discussion played three senior CTC managers who "a key roles in running CTC personnel, with the program," a review of nine documents, including and OIG Special Review CIA the detainee article by the CIA contractors who developed the CIA's enhanced interrogation and an 736 DUNBAR Grayson SWIGERT. techniques, As described in this summary, Hammond and contained more Volume II, these documents in numerous inaccurate representations in detail and operation and effectiveness of the CIA program. regarding are no records to indicate the There two CIA officers reviewed the underlying senior cables and intelligence records the interrogation to the representations. Their resulting assessment repeated information found related the in documents to them and reported that the "CIA Detainee Program is a success, provided unique and intelligence at the tactical level for the benefit of policymakers, providing valuable and The CIA's covert action operators." fighters, assessment also reported that war the and and handling detainees were "adequate for clear," and that the regulations procedures had responded swiftly, fairly, and completely to deviations from the structured program 737 to the assessment came program. the conclusion that detention and Nonetheless, by activities be conducted by the CIA, but not "experienced U.S. law interrogations should officers," stating: enforcement Directorate of Operations (DO) should not be in "The business of running the prisons 'temporary detention facilities.' The DO should focus on or core its mission: clandestine intelligence operations. Accordingly, the DO should continue to hunt, capture, and render targets, and then exploit them for intelligence and leads once in custody. The management of their ops and interrogation be conducted by appropriately incarceration should law experienced because that is their charter and enforcement officers, U.S. 738 training and experience." the they have noted that the CIA The required significant assessment program at when the CIA was already stretched a time Finally, the authors wrote that they resources thin. believe" that the president and congressional "strongly members should receive a oversight 735 Operations 12, for Deputy Director for Memorandum from Chief, Information May 2004, Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations with Operations, subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee PrograiiL"^^^^ the Director [^ay 2004, Memorandum for Deputy 736 for Operations from Chief, Information 12, Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program." The CIA's June 2013 Response the contractors "[w]e die Agency erred in permitting the diat to assess the effectiveness of enhanced states, acknowledge They should not have been considered for techniques. a role given their financial interest in continued such contracts CIA." from 737 Director 2004, Memorandum May Deputy 12, for Operations from Chief, Information for Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations re Review of CIA Detainee Program. For additional information, see Volume II. Operational 738 May 2004, Memorandum for Deputy 12, for Operations from Chief, Information Director Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations Operational Review of CIA ^ ' ™ re VNOFORN SECRET/ TOP Page 125 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 125

155 UNCLASSIFIED TOP on comprehensive "[g]iven the intense interest and controversy surrounding the update program, 739 detainee the issue." officer 2005, Goss forwarded On senior DCI 26, January (TSA^^^^HH^F) the 740 John Helgerson. review The DCI asked to the review would satisfy Inspector General whether 741 for an independent review of recommendation program. general On January inspector the the the inspector general responded 28, the senior officer review would not satisfy the 2005, that 742 fo^uUndependent The inspector general also responded to a recommendation review. CIA by the results of studying interrogations would raised concern that human experimentation, stating: amount to was did OIG there not have in mind doing "1 fear a misunderstanding. What guinea on human beings. research we are recommending additional, pig the Agency undertake a careful review of its experience to date in using is that various the that it draw conclusions about their safety, techniques and move that CIA officers as we guide ahead. We make etc., can effectiveness, because we have found that the this over the decades recommendation Agency continued get itself in messes related to interrogation programs for one has to reason: we do not document and learn from our experience - each overriding of generation to improvise anew, with problematic results for officers is left are as officers for our Agency. Wc individuals not unaware that there our and subtleties to this matter, as the effectiveness of techniques varies among are with over as administered, in combination time, one another, and individuals, 743 All the more reason to document these important findings." so on. 1° November and the CIA responded to National December 2004, CIA's Rice's the effectiveness of the about enhanced interrogation Advisor Security questions asserting that an effectiveness review was not possible, while highlighting techniques by "[k]ey intelligence" the CIA represented was obtained after the use of the CIA's of examples prepared techniques. December 2004 memorandum The for the national interrogation enhanced advisor entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," security begins: 739 from 2004 Deputy Director for Operations for Chief, Information 12, Memorandum May and Operations Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Center, Henry re Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program. Operations 740 See I for additional information. Volume 741 from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss, | Email [REDACTED], Rizzo, John Rodriguez, Jose |; cc: subject: DCI Question Regarding [REDACTED]; date: 2005. 28, January Report; ; OIG 742 Porter Email from: John Helgerson; to: Goss,] Rodriguez, [REDACTED], Rizzo, John Jose |; cc: [REDACTED]; Question DCI subject: Regarding ;OIG 2005. 28, January Report; 743 to: Goss,] John Porter from: Email Helgerson; Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. The CIA's June 2013 the Response "[a] systematic study over time of that effectiveness of the techniques would have been maintains encumbered by a number of factors," including "Federal policy on the protection of human subjects and the impracticability establishing an effective control group." of 11 ii 11 ii i i ^BBBBBMi^^B^NoronN Page 126 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 126

156 UNCLASSIFIED k/NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ Requested: None. memorandum responds to your request for an "Action This of independent intelligence efficacy of using enhanced the study foreign What is no conduct such a study. to we There way interrogation techniques. if [sic] set forth below the intelligence the Agency can do, however, obtained who, their interrogations, were not providing any before from detainees 744 [value]." intelligence of information a section of the memorandum entitled, (TS^flH^^HZ/NF) the CIA Under "Results," asserts the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of memo that approach, capture enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] interrogation a comprehensive has The of then lists examples terrorists." "[k]ey intelligence collected additional memorandum which HVD applying interrogation techniques," after led to "disruptefed] from interrogations plots" and the "capture terrorist additional terrorists." The examples include: the "Karachi [of] Plot," "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" plotting, the identification of the "the Guraba the the identification "Issa al-Hindi," the arrest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, "Hambali's Cell," of on of al-Tayyar, the "Dirty Bomb" plot, the arrest information Sajid Badat, and Capture," Jaffar or on CIA records do not indicate when, Pakistan. if, this memorandum was information Shkai, 745 the national security advisor. provided to CIA A subsequent dated March 5, 2005, concerning memorandum, security meeting CIA director and the national the advisor on the CIA's an upcoming between in completing the OIG recommended review progress the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced of interrogation states, "we [CIA] believe this techniques is much needed and should be study headed up by highly respected national-level political figures with widely recognized reputations 746 for fairness." independence and March 21, the director of the CTC formally proposed the On 2005, to an ribbon' commission... with a charter 'blue stud^u^^^ "establishment of independent 747 CIA then ElTs." the processofestablishing^ began The and panelists briefings and papers from CIA received Both Interrogation participated the CIA's Detention and who Program. BHI [the personnel in panelist] wrote: "It is clear first our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the from program deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the is program, enabling credited with overall the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional are intelligence and a high volume of useful collect on al-Qa'ida (AQ)... There are terrorists, accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD 744 December CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," 2004 "Effectiveness the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." Subject: of 745 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from December of Central Intelligence," "Director Subject: of the CIA Counterterrorist "Effectiveness Techniques." Italics in original. Interrogation 746 March 5,2005, Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor re CIA Proposal for Interrogation Independent the Effectiveness of CTC of Program's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. Study 747 March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI Detention, Counterterrorism re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Center, and Interrogation Programs. VNOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 127 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 127

157 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/d y/NOFORN interrogations." observed, however, that "[n]either my background nor field of expertise He also themselves particularly of interrogation techniques, taken to lend judgingtheeffectiveness 748 individually second panelist] concluded that [the is no collectively." HH1 or "there answer objective question of efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some way to the about the program based on CIA personnel assessments general "the quality of observations" of intelligence by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced the provided" he epistemological "here enters the techniques, problem. We can never interrogation wrote: been whether this intelligence could have not extracted though alternative procedures. know or 749 within been." organization firmly believe it could not have from Spokesmen the CIA Wrongfully Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for 4. The Detains Officer Involved of the draft CIA dissemination General Spccial After the Inspector early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to Review the CIA's enhanced interrogation in use adhered closely to the language of more DCI guidelines. Nonetheless, CIA techniques the indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters records to fail to properly monitor continued justifications the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justification for the use of for 750 CIA's interrogation techniques on particular detainees. the enhanced For example, January 2004, the CIA rendered German on the Khalid citizen a Country | facility used by al-Masri CIA for detention purposes. The to rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA's ALEC Station that "al-Masri knows key that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives that pose a information threat of or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning serious violence 751 activities." cable did not state that The al-Masri himself posed a serious threat terrorist Khalid or death, the standard required for detention under the September 17, 2001, of violence of Notification (MON). Memorandum January CIA from Country | on cables 27, 2004, and (^S/^^^HHi^^^) debriefing 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri "seemed bewildered on why January has been sent to this he 752 753 and was "adamant that [CIA] prison," the wrong person." particular Despite doubts has from CIA officers in Country | about Khalid al-Masri's links to terrorists, and RDG's concurrence with doubts, different components within the CIA disagreed on the process for those 754 release. later described by the CIA As general, officers in ALEC Station his inspector to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose continued to U.S. interests and that a threat 748 to Goss, 2005 from 2, Director September Memorandum CIA re Assessment of EITs Porter Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II. 749 September 2005 Memorandum from BIHIH1to the 23, Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Honorable Agency re Response to Request from Director for Assessment of EIT Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II. 750 additional information, see Volume III. For 151 752 753 754 (0223412 APR 04) Page 128 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 128

158 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFOKN TOP SECRET^ should be while those in the CIA's Division did not want to notify monitoring required, 755 government rendition of a German citizen. about Because of the significance the German the al-Masri National settled the matter, concluding that Council should the Security of the dispute, 756 Germans should be told be repatriated al-Masri's rendition. and that the about B, Khalid al-Masri was transferred 2004, Country | On May from 757 al-Masri arrived CIA officers released to ^^If and sent him toward him After crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he a fake border 758 illegally. the time of his release, al-Masri At provided 14,500 had entered was 760 759 as his belongings. well as Euros, 1 ^^) July 16, 2007, the CIA inspector general issued a Report of (TS/VHUIH^^HB On al-Masri, the and detention of Khalid rendition concluding that "|a]vailable Investigation on information did intelligence provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri," not 761 the "Agency's prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified." and On October 9, 2007, that CIA informed Committee that it "lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri," the the associated the operations officers that al-Masri was by with terrorists who that judgment and to U.S. interests "was not posed by available intelligence." The CIA director a threat supported decided no further action was that against then the nonetheless warranted chief of ALEC Station, who advocated for deputy rendition, because "[t]he Director al-Masri's strongly that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that, believes standards, they performance that meets reasonable from CIA leadership must stand when result the officers who make them." The notification behind stated that "with regard to also counterterrorism in general and the al-Masri operations in particular, the Director believes matter the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those 762 that them." under connect 755 CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid Office of July (2004-7601-IG), al-Masri 16,2007. 756 of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid CIA Office IG), 16,2007. (2004-7601 al-Masri July 757 25071 ^^^HI^^HM 758 | ^^^42655 759 2004 exchange rates, this Using to approximately $17,000. May amounted 760 Hl^l 42655 | 761 Office of Inspector CIA Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid General, al-Masri July 16, 2007. (2004-7601-IG), 762 the a second CTC officer named | and OIG's Report of Investigation, the in Referring | to to Congress stated that the director "does not believe notification the performance of the two named CTC that... officers below a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, fall diligence as defined in CIA's Standard for and Employee Accountability." The notification also stated that there was a "high threat environment" at the time of die rendition, which essentially identical to the one in which CTC employees, including the two in question here, "was prior had criticized for not connecting the dots sharply to 9/11." The notification acknowledged "an previously been legal justification, which failed to meet the standard insufficient in the [MON]," and referred to the acting prescribed general the task of assessing legal advice counsel personal accountability. Based on recommendations from the and inspector general, the CIA "developed a template for rendition proposals that makes clear what information is required, including intelligence basis for that information." (See Congressional notification, with the subject, the and "CIA OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition to Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri," Response dated October 9, 2007 (DTS #2007-4026).) The last CIA detainee, Muhammad Rahim, had already been rendered of to CIA by the time of this notificatior^ni^IA^un^Ol^esponse points to a review custody analytical 11111 mi 11111 Page 129 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 129

159 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ /NOFORN k Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL Ghul 5. Hassan Provides CIA's to Interrogation Techniques Use Facilitator—Prior the of Enhanced Hassan authorities foreign mmm^mm captured 76J Kurdistan Region on January 2004. identity After his Ghul was confirmed on in the Iraqi 764 Ghul rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at January 2004, was 765 site 2004. on The detention January interrogators, who, SITE DETENTION COBALT CIA according did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent to records, 21 reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul at least intelligence 766 two he spent at the facility. the days from s detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in (TS/JHHHIHI^NE) II, A Volume records that the most accurate CIA detainee indicate on the facilitator who led to CIA reporting bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul—prior to the use of the CIA's Usama 767 interrogation Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in [the] techniques. enhanced we out al-Masri rendition, but states that, "[n]onetheless, the concede that it is difficult in arising of training understand how the Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to hindsight it, determine that a to correct legal contributed, and in the end only hold accountable three CTC interpretation two of whom flawed attorneys, only an oral admonition." received 763 MM JAN 04) HEADQUARTERS 7

160 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETfl^^^^BM^^MM^NQPQRN and area," was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [al- that Peshawar "it 769 768 described as UBL's "closest assistant," Abu who al-Kuwaiti Kuwaiti]." Ghul Ahmad one chief operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as al-Qa'ida's of three couriered to messages of 770 Ghul individuals further speculated that: likely with UBL. would be minimal, and that the group likely "UBL's security apparatus with somewhere in Pakistan... Ghul speculated a house a family lived in likely handled all of that needs, including moving Abu Ahmed UBL's 771 to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]..." out messages this (VVj^mmmW) period, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced During same techniques, provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu interrogation Ghul (including Faraj in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd al- his al-Libi role Abu Rabi'a, Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Shaik 'Abd al-Rahman al- al-Iraqi, Hadi Hamza Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives. He Najdi, provided Abu also on locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa'ida leaders information the 772 other as in as on the visits of Pakistan, leaders and operatives to Shkai. Shkai, living well 773 on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports, Ghul's reporting earlier that Shkai valley served as al-Qa'ida's command and control reporting confirmed the 774 these exodus from Afghanistan. the Notwithstanding 2001 facts, in March after center group's Bakos stated: ".. .honestly, Hassan Ghul.. .when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally wasn't was there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He sitting handcuffed to conversation. anything. was—he was having a free flowing He And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish forthcoming See ( was." he how papers about sort of their interpretation of the story and the unusually high number of intelligence Given www.cfr.org/countei1errorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.) a short disseminated in such CIA time period, and the statements of former reports officer Bakos, the Committee CIA requested additional information from the CIA oil Ghul's interrogation prior to entering CIA custody. The wrote Hassan on Gul that suggesting October 25, 2013: "We have not identified any information in our holdings information was Hassan first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in [foreign] custody." No on provided while DTS #2013-3152. Ghul's intelligence reporting detention. in U.S. military See 768 04) AN HEADQUARTERS 169 04) AN 770 04) AN 771 04) ^^^^^^^^^^^ JAN HEADQUARTERS 772 AN 1654 04); JAN JAN 04); ^^^^^^^^^^ 04) AN 04); AN AN 1644 04); 1 JAN 04); 1655 04); AN 1679 04); AN JAN 1656 04); AN AN 1650 04); AN 1657 JAN 04) AN 1690 774 to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: Email from: [REDACTED]; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ December 30,2005, at 8:14:04 AM. II i n i II i 11 ii 11 499 of 131 Page UNCLASSIFIED 131

161 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET// ^ 1 //NOFORN represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai the 2005, CIA 775 techniques. the CIA's enhanced interrogation of the "after" use was acquired of questioning at DETENTION SITE After two days COBALT dissemination 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was of to DETENTION SITE and the transferred 776 to CIA records, upon arrival, BLACK. was Ghul and barbered, stripped, According "shaved placed the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans and in 777 hands two hours. the The CIA interrogators at his detention site then requested to lower after CIA's interrogation the techniques on Ghul, writing: to use enhanced Ghul's] team based on [Hassan interrogation reaction to the "[the] believes, contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. initial interrogators military him there are limits to the physical have convinced team can him. The interrogation with believes the interrogators contact have employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift approval and paradigm he what Ghul's] expects to happen. The Jack of these [Hassan of to [sic] limit the team's capability may collect critical and increasd measures 778 in a timely manner." reliable information 779 CIA the request the same day. (TS^mim^^m^NF) Headquarters approved 780 experienced 59 deprivation, hours Hassan Ghul of hallucinations, but was told Following sleep that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his by a psychologist himself and he should calm himself by telling that his experiences are normal and condition," 781 subside when he decides to be truthful. will The sleep deprivation, as well as other enhanced 783 782 interrogations, did Ghul's hallucinations. continued, Ghul also complained of back pain as 784 asked a doctor, to but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would and see A [Ghul] confirmed as telling the truth." was cable states that "[interrogators told stop when they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful [Ghul] 785 CIA information." physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing A physiological including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness' "notable fatigue," mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are and to his hanging position and extreme secondary 775 Bradbury 2, Memorandum for March 2005, from Legal Group, DCI Steve Countertenorist Center, re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Italics in original. For additional see Volume II. representations, 04) AN AN 04) 04) AN JAN 04) JAN 04) JAN 04) 04) JAN JAN 04); | 1312 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response | JAN "medical that hallucinations states during sleep deprivation, when personnel intervened to ensure a occurred detainee would be allowed a period of sleep." As described in this summary, and more extensively in Volume III, detainees CIA that medical personnel did not always intervene and allow indicate to sleep after experiencing records hallucinations. 784 1299 ••• JAN 04) [ 1299 JAN 04). See Volume III for similar statements made to CIA detainees. 1 II I II 11 1 BMjj^^^B^^Bi^B MI '! II M mi i Page 132 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 132

162 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ of sleep but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital degree deprivation," 786 an heart beat" that the cable linked to Ghul's fatigue. signs," "occasional despite premature as Ghul no actionable threat information, and provided detailed later in this Throughout period, much of his reporting on the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his this summary, to reporting use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no prior the 787 of on UBL facilitator Abu information al-Kuwaiti. Ahmad Nonetheless, on other substance Committee 5, CIA provided a document to the the entitled, "Detainee Reporting on May 2011, Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the Abu enhanced CIA's techniques and who provided "Tier One" information "link[ing] interrogation 788 Ahmad Ladin." to Hassan I liul i and Abu Bin 789 released. ^ later Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's 6. Other Detainees Enhanced Techniques; Officer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Interrogation CIA Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs Anything 2004, CLA In March took custody of an Afghan national who the the sought a U.S. military base because he had at same name (Gul Rahman) as had employment 791 to be targeting U.S. an individual forces in Afghanistan. believed During the period military in which Afghan was detained, the CIA the signals intelligence of their true target obtained communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in custody was the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for not 792 a month was released with a nominal payment. before approximately he of transferred after two detainees were spring to CIA In the 2004, using CIA and CIA Headquarters approved, proposed, the CIA's enhanced custody, interrogators techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to interrogation 793 information could identify inconsistencies provide the other detainee's story. in After that the detainees approximately 24 hours shackled in spent standing sleep deprivation both had 794 Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA position, CIA The two sources. detainees tried to contact the CIA on multiple had prior to their detention to inform the occasions CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA | 786 l^m JAN 04) 1308 787 See II for additional information. Volume 788 CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document See chart "Background Information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page Detainee entitled, entitled, Reporting on Abu "Detainee al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). Ahmed 789 2441 ••••••I; HEADQUARTERS ••••l^^l 1635 [1712 ••••••THEADQUARTERS | 190 791 individual detained and the individual believed to The targeting U.S. forces were different from the Gul be Rahman who died at DETENTION SITE COBALT. 792 ^•••••1 2035 793 ([REDACTED]) 794 1 11 Bm in I II MI Mil II I I Page 133 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 133

163 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN | were until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA's not translated 795 techniques. enhanced interrogation period early 2004, CIA interrogators During in this same a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. CIA Headquarters interrogated Adnan al-Libi, against the of the CIA's enhanced techniques use al-Libi, but indicated that approve not did use "standard" interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of interrogators could 796 CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep sleep deprivation. a combined of 24 hours, and 48 hours, with hours, three hours of sleep deprivation 46.5 sessions 797 sessions. between Beginning April 2004, a number of media outlets published late in Abu detainee at the Department of Defense-run of Ghraib prison in Iraq. The photographs abuse reports media members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus caused on detainee On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues issues. Department of and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a with Defense point and its detention reference interrogation activities. In a response to a contrasting for said, a Committee CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin member, "we are not question from in [the CIA program] to do anything authorized what you have seen in those like 798 In response, a member of the Committee said, "I understand," and expressed photographs." CIA's understanding, with past CIA briefings thc the Committee, that the "norm" of consistent to interrogations "transparent law enforcement procedures was had developed to such a high [that] level... that you could get pretty much what you wanted." The CIA did not correct the Committee member's that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to misunderstanding 799 used law enforcement. by techniques U.S. Resumes CIA Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the Use of the The Suspends 7. an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Techniques on Fabricated, Single on Based Information Source by May the OLC, (TSZ/H^^^^^^m^/NF) led 2004, Assistant Attorney General In then Goldsmith, informed the CIA's Office of General Counsel that it had never Jack opined formally on whether use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA's program was the 795 HEADQUARTERS | see and AL-MAGREBI, information For on AL-TURKI | ([REDACTED]). more III. Volume 796 See I and II, including HEADQUARTERS^^HJH|^^^^^^ In November 2003, CIA Volume H^^|^|^fsuggesting Counsel Muller sent an email to General "changing the sleep deprivation line Scott a^sicUjetweer^nhanced and standard from 72 to 48 hours." ( See November 23, 2003, email from Scott Muller to cc: HHHIHfc Rizzo, Subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident.) On January 10, 2004, CIA Headquarters John considered CIA sites of the change, stating that sleep deprivation informed 48 hours would now be detention an over enhanced" technique. See HEADQUARTER£^^B(101713ZJAN 04). interrogation 1888 MAR 04); 1889 (091836Z MAR 04). (09.1823Z There is no indication in CIA records that CIA Headquarters addressed the repeated use of "standard" sleep deprivation against al-Libi. For more information, see Volume III detainee report for Adnan al-Libi. Adnan 798 Transcript Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). hearing, 799 hearing, Transcript Select Committee on Intelligence Senate May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). of 11 ii 1 1 in i ^^ M ^^ BB ^^^ Bvnofqrn Page 134 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 134

164 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 800 with standards. U.S. Goldsmith also raised concerns about consistent constitutional the divergences enhanced interrogation techniques, as described in the CIA's between proposed the memorandum, actual application, as described in their CIA Inspector August 1, and 2002, 801 In Tenet May 2004, DCI Review. suspended the use of the CIA's General's late Special from interrogation pending updated approvals techniques, the "enhanced" "standard" and 802 June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet OLC. a formal memorandum suspending the use issued the On of 803 pending policy and legal review. interrogation The same day, the CIA CIA's techniques, 804 Council. from the National Security program of National Security reaffirmation the sought responded, noting that the "next logical step is for the Attorney Advisor to Rice General 805 legal analysis now in preparation." the complete relevant On 2004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an (T&V^^^^^^B^P) June believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa'ida individual 806 plans the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election. to In October 2004, the attack source who the information on the "pre-election" threat and implicated Gul and CIA provided March to information. However, as early as the 2004, CIA officials admitted fabricating others 807 about the validity of internally CIA source's information. expressed doubts the July 2004, the CIA met 2, National Security Advisor Rice, On with National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the other general the attorney deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA's enhanced and 808 CIA Janat Gul, techniques, The on represented that CI A interrogation specifically re y 25 Opinion 2004, Talking Points for DCI Telephone Conversation with Attorney General: soo Legal DOJ's ; Ma Goldsmith Counter-terrorist (CT) Interrogation. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack CIA's Program III to L. Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710). 801 May 27, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to General Counsel Muller. 802 May 2003, Memorandum for the Record from subject: Memorandum of Meeting with the 24, Regarding DOJ's that DOJ has Rendered No Legal Opinion on Whether CIA's Use of Enhanced DCI Statement Director would Standards. Memorandum for Deputy Constitutional for Operations Techniques meet Interrogation of Central Intelligence, June 4, 2004, re: Suspension of from of Interrogation Techniques. Director Use 803 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for 4, from Director of Central Intelligence, re: June Operations of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On Suspension 2, 2004, George Tenet informed the President that he June intended resign from his position on July 11, 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004. to 804 June 2004, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, re: Review of CIA 4, Interrogation Program. 805 Tenet, Memorandum for the Honorable George June 2004, Director of Central Intelligence from Condoleezza J. Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, re: Review of CIA'interrogation Program. 3121 139254 1 HHH^H^^HBI 807 a March of the CIA's Bin Ladin Unit wrote in chief 2004, email that the reporting was "vague" The former "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence." He suggested that the reporting and be an easy way [for al- "would Qa'ida] test" the loyalty of the source, given al-Qa'ida's knowledge thay^edjhreatreporting to panic in "causes to: Wasliington." (See email from: ^•flHM; ^HI^IHHH' I^HI^^^H. [REDACTED], I; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; date: March at 06:55 AM.) ALE^tatioiMrfficer expresse

165 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRE^Mi^M^^^MM^OPOBN have saved lives," that more than half of the CIA detainees would not "interrogations American 809 they using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, were and cooperate until interrogated interrogators methods, use a full range of enhanced interrogation CIA it is that "unless can from will CIA to obtain current threat information be Gul in a timely unlikely that able 811 810 was manner." yet in CIA custody. not Janat Gul July 6, National Security Advisor Rice sent a On 2004, to DCI that the CIA was "permitted stating use previously approved to Tenet memorandum methods for Janat Gul, with the exception enhanced the waterboard." Rice interrogation of "to [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance assist the Attorney General and NSC offered from on an expedited basis" and noted the CIA's agreement to provide Principals additional information the waterboard technique in order for the Department of Justice to assess its about Rice's memorandum documented that the CIA had informed her that "Gul legality. further information a result preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as has of likely about 812 ties close involved in these alleged plots." individuals to Gul's July 20, 2004, National Security Council on In a meeting including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA principals, use its to enhanced techniques—again, with the exception of the waterboard—on Janat Gul. interrogation a legal also Department of Justice to prepare the opinion on whether the CIA's They directed interrogation techniques were consistent with the enhanced and Fourteenth Amendments to Fifth 813 Constitution. the On July 22, 2004, U.S. General John Ashcroft sent a letter to Attorney Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the August 1, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S. 2002, or any or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat Constitution statute 814 For remainder of 2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three Gul. the Gul, Sharif and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—with individualized detainees—Janat al-Masri, 815 the Department of Justice. approval from being rendered to CIA custody on July 2004, Janat Gul After subjected was the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep to 816 and grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, attention walling, facial until he deprivation, holds, 809 the time of this CIA representation, the CIA At held at least 109 detainees and subjected at least 33 of them had (30 percent) to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 810 July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. CIA Request for Guidance Regarding George of Janat July 2, 2004. Interrogation Gul, 811 For details, see Volume III. additional 812 to 6, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, July to the President for National Security Affairs, 2004, Assistant the George Tenet, Director of Honorable Intelligence, re Janat Gul. Central 813 July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, "Principals Meeting relating to Gul on 20 July 2004." Janat 814 or letter did The provide legal analysis one-paragraph substantive discussion of the interrogation techniques. not Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22,2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4). 815 details. Volume III for additional See Page 136 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 136

166 UNCLASSIFIED k/NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 817 auditory hallucinations. and According to a cable, Janat Gul was "not experienced visual time oriented and told CIA officers that he saw "his wife and children in the mirror or place" to 818 questioning in the white noise." their The voices of Janat Gul continued, heard and had CIA ceased using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for several although the days. 819 cable, "[Gul] asked to die, or just be killed." to After continued According a CIA with 2004, on August 19, sessions CIA detention site personnel wrote that the Gul, interrogation 820 threat believe [Gul] is withholding imminent not information." does On "team interrogation 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed" to possess August information, threat that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that and 821 On day, August 21, 2004, CIA interrogators resumed using the CIA's information." that 822 techniques Gul. to Gul continued not interrogation provide any reporting on enhanced against 823 On by the CIA source. pre-election described August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators the threat a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul sent not possess all that [the CIA] "may 824 to know." believes The interrogators added that "many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida him 825 derived single source reporting" (the are source). CIA Nonetheless, CIA interrogators from According to Gul on the pre-election threat. continued to an August 26, 2004, cable, question after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed 826 to remove given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep. his In October 2004, the diaper, conducted a^BIHI the CIA source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of CIA of the CIA pre-election threat. I^^HH^^HR for the source admitted to attack planning 827 information. a foreign Gul was subsequently transferred to fabricating government. On the 828 CIA Janat Gul the been released. had that information Janat provided the threat never the CIA originally (^S/lllllHifr^) Gul the National Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor told the use of the CIA's enhanced did interrogation against Gul producc the techniques threat information that could save "immediate American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the techniques. As elsewhere in this summary, the CIA's justification for employing its described to interrogation Janat Gul—the first detainee on be subjected to the enhanced techniques following the May 2004 suspension—changed over time. techniques having initially cited After Gul's of the pre-election threat, as reported knowledge the CLA's source, the CIA began by representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the 829 of threat, thereby disproving the credibility the the CIA source. existence of 829 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Re: Bradbury, Deputy Assistant Attc ~ ' "' May 30, 2005, Principal Application of VNOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 137 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 137

167 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NQFORN 1 0n 2004, 11, midst of the interrogation of Janat Gul in August the wrote enhanced CIA attorney HH^H^I techniques, a letter CIA's interrogation using the General Dan Levin with "brief biographies" of four individuals to Acting Assistant Attorney time hoped detain. Given the requirement at the to that the CIA seek individual CIA the whom the Department of Justice before using approval CIA's enhanced interrogation from the against the CIA letter states, "[w]e are providing these preliminary techniques a detainee, on preparation request for a legal opinion a future their subsequent in for biographies CIA control." Two of the individuals—Abu Faraj al-Libi interrogation Hamza Rabi'a— in and not been captured, and thus the "biographies" yet no reference to their interrogations had made need to use or the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha the al-Pakistani, in foreign government custody. His debriefings by a foreign government, | was were described the letter as "only moderately effective" because Abu ^^^^H^I^H^I, in "distracting that questioning him] with noncritical information was is truthful, but is Talha [those Ahmed related planning." The fourth individual, operational Khalfan Ghailani, was also not to government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials inforeign to letter, According Ghailani's foreign government debriefings were "ineffective" the The Ghailani knowledge of current threats." "denied letter described reporting on because had pre-election threat—much of which came from the CIA the the context of all four source—in 830 Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj individuals. were eventually rendered to CIA custody al-Libi and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (TSZ/I^^^^^^^B^NF) On after the CIA had initiated a September 2004, the of source who had reported on CIA pre-election threat, but review the counterintelligence the CIA source's the CIA took custody prior Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA to of 831 would also have information about reported threat. had Intelligence provided by source the al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of Sharif 832 CIA intelligence reports. than After entering CIA custody, Sharif al-Masri expressed 30 more intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating that he was frightened of interrogations because his 833 been being interrogated in while The CIA nonetheless tortured he had approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of sought 834 failure to provide information on the pre-election threat. his (^FS/^^^^^m^plNF) After a week of interrogating al-Masri using the approximately enhanced techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with CIA's interrogation States Obligations Under United 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Article Used in the Interrogation of High Value at Qaeda Detainees, at 11. See section of this summary and Volume II Interrogation entitled, that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Assertion Techniques Help Validate CIA "The Sources." 830 Letter from to Dan Acting Assistant Attorney General, Counsel, General |, Assistant Levin, 2004. 831 WASHINGTON |MAR 04). See HEADQUARTERS ! See, for example, |; and | 24611| 3191 |3192| I; HEADQUARTERS] |3194| TOP SECRET//] VNOFORN 499 Page 138 of UNCLASSIFIED 138

168 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP SECRET// ^ CIA auditory that al-Masri had been "motivated to interrogators hallucinations, reported 835 repeated his arrival. the Despite al-Masri's of descriptions of torture in at time '" ipate" transferred al-Masri to that government's custody after , the three CIA approximately S 836 of detention. months CIA al-Masri, case Janat the and Sharif of the CIA's requests in As Gul advice on the use of the for enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed OLC CIA's Ghailani based on the fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same Khalfan were 837 CIA Gul and Sharif al-Masri, Ghailani Janat experienced auditory source. Like also 838 deprivation. hallucinations As described in following summary, after having opined sleep this legality using the CTA's enhanced interrogation of on these three individual on the techniques the OLC did not opine again on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program until May detainees, 2005. 8. Country^Detains the CIA's Behalf Individuals on of facility in Country | began in Consideration (TS/flHHHB/NF) a detention the CIA sought to transfer Ramzi bin al-Shibh from the custody of a foreign 2003, when 839 CIA to which had not yet informed the government custody. a clandestine leadership CIA's request to establish the detention facility in country'spolitical of surveyed potential sites for the facility, while the CIA set aside $| million for its Country 840 construction. the CIA arranged for 2003, patch" involving placing two In a "temporary detainees (Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) within an already existing CIA 841 be until the CIA's own facility could facility, built. | detention That spring, as the Country 842 was offering millions of dollars in subsidies to in Countries and |, CIA 13289For more see Volume III, detainee report for information, al-Masri. Sharif 837 Levin, from Counsel, CIA, to Dan General ActingAssistant Attorney See ^^^^^^^^^Associate letter 25, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). (Note: At various times General, this period^H^Bis identified as August during CIA general counsel and IHBr^TC Legal). associate also a letter from Assistant both See Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, September 5, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). A CIA General sent the to email CIA's request for advice from the OLC indicated that the judgment that Ghailani had prior of his plotting was speculative: "Although Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, knowledge terrorist him role al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai as respected as October 2003 may have provided in some recently knowledge ongoing attack planning against the about States homeland^uidtheoperatives involved." ( See United email from: ^HHH CTC/UBLDiHHBI^I (formerly ALEC^^^HflH; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza [REDACTED]; to and date: August 10, 2004.) Ghailani was rendered Faraj; CIA custody on September ^2004. (See Rabi'a Abu H^HBIfH.) The CIA began using 3072 enhanced interrogation techniques its on on September 17, 2004, as the CIA Ghailani initiating its counterintelligence review of the source who was provided the false reporting on the pre-election threat. Sec 3189 (181558Z SEP 04); HEADQUARTERS 04); 838 [REDACTED] 32211 839 [REDACTED] 22343] 840 \ HEADQUARTERS 841 HEADQUARTERS | 842 While CIA Headquarters offered $| million to Country | for hosting a CIA detention facility, | the precluded opening of the facility. OnlyJilmillionwasti^ CIA Station for support to the llll I I III — Mill llllll I Page 139 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 139

169 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECREm^^^^M^l^^^MtfNQgQRN Country in Station CIA Headquarters directed the CIA big" about CIA think how 843 Headquarters could support Country |'s | initially Station After the that proposals, reiterated the directive, adding Headquarters the modest submitted CIA relatively 844 Station h^BJ>003, the Station shouk^jrovid^i a more expansive "wish list." proposed 843 H^^I^IH Hlflsubsidy payments, intended subsidies. part as in million in 846 of the CIA detention compensation rose as high as million. for By support program, after extension of five months beyond the originally agreed upon timeframe 2003, an CIA al-Shibh activities in Country |, both bin concluding and al-Nashiri had been for detention 847 at | to the CIA detention facility Country Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. out transferred of Supreme Court Action in the 9. U.S. of Rami r Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Case Detainees Guantanamo Bay to Country | from in September the CIA held a number of detainees Beginning 2003, on detention grounds of, but separate from, the U.S. military facilities facilities at at CIA the 848 and In early January 2004, the CIA Bay, the Department of Justice began Guantanamo Cuba. the possibility that a pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Rasul v. discussing might grant Bush, habeas rights to the five CIA detainees then being held at a CIA detention facility at corpus CIA "advise asked the CIA Station to although if additional funds may be needed to Headquarters beyond." [the viable over the coming year and keep CIA Headquarters added, "we cannot have enough facility] blacksite hosts, and we are loathe to let one we have slip away." Country [ never hosted CIA detainees. See HEADQUAR [REDACTED] iHHfllillH HEADQUARj 5298 843 on ••i^H 03). In an interview ALEC the CIA program, noted that the had program same "more money than we could possibl^pen^^hought, and it turned out to be accurate." In the $(,000,000 "in that stated he interview, case, gave we one and Myself [Rodriguez] Jos6 We it counted never I'm about to count not hundred one contained dollar bills, that kind of money for a receipt." The boxes did not the identify of of million. recipient transcript the Oral History Interview, Interviewee: See (RJ) - October 2006, 13, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Interviewer: ALEC ALEC 846 DTS #2010-2448. See 847 [REDACTED] 2498 848 April 2003, Memorandum for Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from |, Chief Renditions Center, Chief of Operations, and Counterterrorist Request Relocate High-Value Detainees to an Interim Subject: to Chief, at Guantanamo. See also DIRECTOR I^^^^HIflH- CIA detainees Detention held at Facility were facilities Guantanamo Bay, DETENTION SITE MAROON at DETENTION SITE INDIGO. ( See two and Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Coverage Period: ^BBM^^^B.) A third Quarterly detention facility, SITE REDl CIA DETENTION 3445 13897 1 9754 September 1, 2006, Memorandum of Agreement and the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Between Intelligence Agency (CIA) Concerning the Detention by DOD of Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. mi M III i B^B^^MMi^Ml^oFonN Page 140 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 140

170 UNCLASSIFIED k /NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 849 Bay. after these discussions, CIA officers approached the | Guantanamo Shortly determine in Country be willing to host these CIA detainees, who would if it would | to again 850 custody an already existing Country | facility. 2004, By January CIA the remain in within 851 to agreed for a limited period of time. arrangement | in Country this | had Counsel Scott Muller asked the General Meanwhile, CIA Justice, the National Security Department and the White House Counsel for advice of Council, the CIA detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay should remain at Guantanamo on whether five 852 be pending the Supreme Court's decision. or After consultation with the U.S. Bay moved recommended in 2004, the Department of Justice February that the CIA move solicitor general detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay pending the Supreme Court's four 853 resolution case. of The Department of Justice concluded that a fifth detainee, Ibn Shaykh the did not to be transferred because he had originally been detained under military al-Libi, need 854 had declared to the ICRC. and Nonetheless, by April 2004, all five CIA been authority 855 CIA Guantanamo Bay to other from detention facilities. transferred were detainees Shortly after placing CIA detainees within an already existing (TSZ/^^^^^^H^-INP) | facility arose second time, tensions Country between the CIA and Country | fora 856 of cries hear to claimed facility H 2004, |. In a Counti in detainees CIA from other detainees presumed pain to be in the 857 approached the When facility. CIA chief of Station the m [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in [REDACTED]; cc: from: Scott W. Muller; to: Email date: January |, 2004. Gitmo; 850 See HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] 1845 The CIA's long- term facility Country which the CIA Station in Country 1 had warned was a drain on the Station's resources, in | not completed. See [REDACTED] 1785 been yet had 851 [REDACTED] 16791 852 McLaughlin, John Tenet, George |; cc: [REDACTED], | Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, GITMO; at Detainees CIA subject: date: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | February 2004. 853 [REDACTED], cc: McLaughlin, John Tenet, George Pavitt, from: Scott Muller; to: Email James date: CIA Detainees at GITMO; |; subject: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | February |, 2004. 854 [REDACTED], | cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, James Muller; to: Scott from: Email Pavitt, | Detainees , subject: CIA date: at GITMO; I I [REDACTED],11 I | ll| II February 2004. 13698 [REDACTED] 1898|~^ 856 the CIA's interactions with For details of additional for example, [REDACTED] 16791 See, Country see Volume I. 857 Among the detainees making this claim was Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who had previousl^eei^endered from CIA custody to Libyan national, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported while inmHcustody that Iraq A supporting of and providing assistance with chemical and biological weapons. Some was this information al-Qa'ida Nations, cited Secretary was in his speech to the United by and was used as a justification for the 2003 Powell invasion of Iraq. Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted the claim after he was rendered to CIA custody on February 2003, told claiming had been tortured by the mH|, and only he them what he assessed they wanted to hear. For that more details, see Volume III. While in Counfryl^^ibHol^I^ebnrfer^iat the "sobbing and yelling" he m mi MI i i' MBBJJ^^BMPWBB"! n u < i H Page 141 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 141

171 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN 1 accounts of the CIA detainees, the stated with "bitter | about the 858 the was being "tested." dismay" There were also counterintelligence bilateral that relationship CIA who Ramzi bin al-Shibh, to had attempted to influence a Country detainee concerns relating 859 concerns contributed to a request from | These | officer. the CIA to remove all CIA detainees from Country 2004 for | chief Station in Country | again (TSiV^^H^^^^^H/ZNEMi^^^^BsOM^whcntta of from detainees allegations approachedlhe^^^^B^HH^Il^lll^HH^with CIA mistreatment of Country | detai neesj^^^B in the facility, the chief of Station about the Headquarters, angry that, as he reported to CIA response "starkly illustrated the received an challenges [ofj inherent to the According of Station, Country | saw the CIA as ririef 861 unappreciative recipients of their | and "querulous By the of cooperation." end with between and Country | deteriorated, particularly CIA regard to the relations 2004, 862 The intelligence detainees cooperation. transferred out of Country | i CIA were 863 2005. -) Beginning in ^^^ 2005, the | | insisted, over the CIA's opposition, to in Country Country j|'s on brief the to establish a more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility, which was under effort A from phone call to the construction. Vice President Cheney to proposed complicated support CIA operations in Country | was solidify by the fact that Vice President for Cheney had not been told about the locations of the CIA detention facilities. The CIA wrote that there was need" to "eliminate any possibility that [I^^^^^^H] could a "primary or implicitly to the existence of a black site in [the country]" during the call with explicitly refer 864 the There are no indications that president. call occurred. The mj^J^ of the vice | nonetheless approved the unilateral CIA detention facility, which cost million, but Country 865 never by the CIA. was By 2006, the CTA was working with Country | to used 866 what described as the decommission project. "aborted" was him heard reminded of what he previously endured in | and had it sounded him to like a prisoner been tied up and beaten. See [REDACTED] 1989 \ 858 [REDACTED] 20101 855 [REDACTED] 2010 860 that CIA's June 2013 Response 2317 The "[i|t was only as leaks [REDACTED] states the program began to emerge that detailing partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.' foreign As above, the tensions with described Jwere unrelated to press leaks. Country 86 ' [REDACTED] 2602 862 [REDACTED] ••••••; and [REDACTED] 31281 BH^^^HI' Country | officials refuse^oprovidetheCIA with 2783 information, counterterrorism including information obtained through CIA-funded See [REDACTED] 312811 863 HEADQUARTERS I 864 HEADQUARTERS 865 [REDACTED] and CTCdBRDG, of the Program." "Evolution 866 [REDACTED] 3706 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) //NOFORN TOP SECRET//I Page 142 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 142

172 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ Pace of Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, L. The CIA CIA Marginal, General Describes Lack of Personnel; Underperforming" Inspector Problem" As Debriefers "Ongoing games," CIA began fall "end officers or 2004, In the of considering of detainees in CIA custody. A the CIA presentation for National Security final disposition draft dated 19, 2004, identified the August of ongoing indefinite principals Council drawbacks the CIA, including: the need for regular relocation of detention the "tiny pool of by detainees, host available "due to high risks," the fact that "prolonged detention without potential countries" [and] increases HVD health, psychological problems of curtails intel process likelihood legal of the U.S. government if legal process were delayed flow," denied, and the criticism or that delay would "complicate, and possibly the the prospects of successful likelihood reduce 867 these detainees." prosecutions CIA of talking points produced a month later state that draft transfer Department of Defense or Department of Justice custody was the "preferred endgame to 13 detainees in [CIA] control, none of whom we believe should ever leave USG for currently 868 custody." (TS/^^^^^^^^^^/NF) end of 2004, the overwhelming majority of CIA the By Study—had of identified in the Committee 119 already entered CIA custody. detainees—113 the of the detainees remaining in custody were no longer undergoing active interrogations; Most they infrequently rather, questioned and awaiting a final disposition. The CIA took custody were detainees six between 2005 and January 2009: four detainees in 2005, one in 2006, new of only 869 CIA's one—the detainee, Muhammad Rahim—in 2007. and final at In CIA detainees were being (TSZ/^^lf^^^^l^NF) in three countries: 2004, held DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country |, at the Motility |in Country 1 as well as at detention facilities in Country |. DETENTION SITE VIOLET in 870 Country early 2005. | opened On April 15, 2005, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE in in Country the management of RDG an email expressing his concerns about the BLACK | sent and He program in general. site commented that "we have seen clear indications the detention fatigue Headquarters are experiencing mission elements vis-a-vis their interaction various that the program," resulting in a "decline in the overall quality and level of experience of with personnel," and a decline in "level and quality of requirements." He wrote that deployed detainees of of time most of the CIA length had been in detention, "[the] detainees because the been all but drained of have intelligence," and their remaining value was in providing actionable "information can be incorporated into strategic, that think pieces that deal with analytical motivation, structure and goals." The chief of Base observed that, during the course of the year, the detention from an intelligence production facility to a long-term detention site transitioned included raised which of new challenges." These challenges "a the need to address facility, host 867 PowerPoint Presentation, CIA Detainees: Endgame Options and Plans, dated August 19, 2004. CIA 868 CIA 2004, DRAFT Talking Points for die ADC1: Endgame Options and Plans for 17, Detainees. September 869 Abu al-lraqi Ja'far Abu in Jan, Ibrahim al-Magrebi, Munthir and took custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi The CIA Abd 2005, and 2006. in al-Iraqi al-Hadi 870 Country 2003. existing an within held were detainees CIA in arrived Countr detainees first The 2003, again additional For 2004. H to | from Country in | facility j^i and then beginning in I. information, see Volume 1//NOFORN TOP SECRET/, Page 143 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 143

173 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN the progressive effects of long-term solitary confinement on detainees" and ongoing "natural and 871 behavioral problems. £ DETENTION to the personnel respect ) With SITE BLACK, the at of wrote: chief Base what appears to be a lack of "I am at Headquarters to concerned at resolve the the brightest and most qualified field for service at [the to deploy officers Over the course of the detention year the quality of personnel site]. last and protective officers]) has declined significantly. With (debriefers [security are debriefers, mediocre, a handfull [sic] are exceptional and to most regard a few are basically incompetent. From what more can determine there than we established as to the selection methodology debriefers. Rather than is no of for their best, look seem to be selecting either problem, managers underperforming new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever officers, to be and able to deploy at any given time. We see no evidence seems willing is to given thought deploying an 'A-Team.' The result, quite that being I dare the of mediocre or, production say, useless intelligence... naturally, is have seen a similar deterioration in the quality of the security personnel We deployed to site... If this program truly does represent one of the agency's the secret then it defies logic why inexperienced, marginal, most activities and/or officers with potentially significant underperforming problems deploy permitted to [counterintelligence] to this site. It is also are form that immediately inact [sic] some important of rigorous training we 872 program." A CIA OIG audit completed in June 2006 "found that personnel assigned to detention facilities, for the most part, complied with the standards CIA-controlled guidelines in out their duties and responsibilities." The OIG also found that, and carrying the staffed of debriefers, the facilities were for with sufficient numbers and "except shortage described of lack of debriefers, however, was The as "an ongoing problem" types personnel." the program. According to the audit, there were extended periods for 2005 when the CIA's in DETENTION ORANGE in Country | had either one or no debriefers. At least twice in SITE summer in 2005, the chief of Station the that country requested additional debriefers, warning of 2006, that could suffer. Months later, in January collection the chief of Base at the intelligence detention site advised CIA Headquarters that "the facility still lacked debriefers to support intelligence collection that critical requirements were 'stacking up,' and that gaps requirements, quality debriefing were impacting the quantity and detainees of intelligence reporting in the of 873 make the work of future and more difficult." would debriefers ^mailfrom: (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: [REDACTED] General Comments; date: April 15, 2005. subject: ^EmaUfrom: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: | i^HH subject: Comments; date: April 15, 2005. General 873 Under Audit, Report Detention Facilities Operated of the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of CIA-controlled Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. As further described in the mi iii iii i"MH^^BBBBM"!iiiiimii Page 144 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 144

174 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOF O RN TOP / ^ SECRET/ Legal and Challenges in 2005 M. Operational Justice 1. Department for the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Renews of Approval 2005 in Techniques May general the acting May attorney new for 2005, On 10, assistant issued two legal memoranda. The OLC, analyzed whether the individual Steven Bradbury, first the 13 enhanced interrogation techniques—including waterboarding, CIA's well as a of use as interrogation techniques number had been used in 2003 and 2004, but had not been of that in original August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum—were consistent with the criminal analyzed die 874 torture. The second memorandum considered the on use of the CIA's prohibition combined 875 the Both legal memoranda concluded that interrogation use of the CIA's enhanced techniques. interrogation techniques did not violate the torture enhanced statute. On 26, 2005, the CIA inspector general, who had been May with the OLC memoranda, wrote a memo to the CIA director recommending that provided two seek CIA's legal guidance on whether the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques the additional 16 of met the standard under Article conditions of the Convention Against and confinement 876 The inspector general noted that "a strong case Torture. be made that the Agency's can interrogation authorized are the kinds of actions that Article 16 undertakes to techniques adding no the use of the waterboard may be "cruel" and "extended detention with prevent," that would most considered 'degrading' in clothing cultures, particularly Muslim." The inspector be was further that the analysis of conditions general equally important, noting that the urged inspector general's staff had "found a number of instances of detainee treatment which arguably 877 violate on cruel, inhuman, and/or degrading treatment." the prohibition Study, the General audit described how the CIA's detention facilities were not equipped to Committee Inspector with food care. The audit described unhygienic detainees preparation, including at a facility with a provide medical of and that a physician assistant attributed symptoms noted acute gastrointestinal illness and "rodent infestation," experienced by six staff and a detainee giardiasis food and water contamination. The audit further identified to insufficient covering possible detainee escape or the death of a detainee. guidelines 874 See for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven Memorandum Legal G. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Principal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application Bradbury, of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee. 875 Counsel, John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General for Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven See Memorandum Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, Ci. Re: Application 2005, of 18 §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques That May U.S.C. Used in the Interrogation of Be High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 876 May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, Concerning re: Additional Approach to Department of Justice for Legal Guidance on Interrogation Recommendation Techniques. 877 May 26,2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, Interrogation re: for Additional Approach to Department of Justice Concerning Legal Guidance on Recommendation Techniques. 1 ,ii III ii'BBBI^MBB^W" "iHI mi Page 145 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 145

175 UNCLASSIFIED nil I III I I llll Illll I I On May 2005, a third OLC memorandum examining U.S. (TS/V^^^^^^^^/TNF) 30, 878 the Torture was completed. Convention The conclusions in this obligations under Against largely about the CIA's representations based the effectiveness of the CIA opinion on were obtaining unique and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence." in interrogation program later in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA's effectiveness As described almost inaccurate. were representations entirely Faraj 2. to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Al-Libi Abu Subjected the Memorandum U.S. Obligations Under on Convention Against of Department Justice Subjects Abu Torture; Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation CIA Faraj When Complains of Hearing Problems Techniques He al-Libi, 2, when Abu Faraj May al-Qa'ida's chief of On 2005, was captured in Pakistan, the operations, had not yet issued the three aforementioned May OLC 879 memoranda. 2005 CIA officers described Abu Faraj al-Libi's capture as the "most legal 880 al-Qa'ida Khalid Shaykh Muhammad." capture Shortly after al-Libi's important since CIA might discussing the possibility that Abu Faraj al-Libi the be rendered to capture, began 881 custody. U.S. of 2005, days before On rendition four Abu Faraj al- May the to CIA custody, Director of CTC Robert Grenier asked CIA Libi Porter Goss to send a Director memorandum the national security advisor and the director of national intelligence "informing to of Abu CIA's plans to take custody of them Faraj al-Libi and to employ interrogation the 882 24, medically safe." if warranted On May and 2005, the White House informed the techniques CIA that a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting would be necessary to discuss the of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, but the use 883 schedule of the principals was delaying such a meeting. of CIA Director Goss travel one officers would as planned, indicating that he CIA call the principals instructed to proceed not inform that, if Abu Faraj al-Libi was found and to be cooperating and there individually them no contraindications to such an interrogation, he would were the use of all of the CIA's approve enhanced techniques other than the waterboard, without waiting for a meeting of interrogation 878 See for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven Memorandum Legal G. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Principal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application Bradbury, of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. the 879 see on Abu Faraj al-Libi's detention and interrogation, information Volume III. For more 880 HEADQUARTERS®®! (251840Z MAY 05) 881 for See, example, |^^Hl0851 2005). 7, meetings on May 6 and | (describing 882 | May Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence , 2005, via Acting Deputy Director, Central Agency, Intelligence Agency, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations from Robert Grenier, Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi. re: 883 | Robert Grenier, Email Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], to: John I^^^HH e RED ACTED], •^•••l; cc: | [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24, 2005. ^o^fiN 11 iii i BBB^^BMIlMM mi Page 146 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 146

176 UNCLASSIFIED k/NOFORN SECRET//^ TOP 884 Abu al-Libi was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE the principals. Faraj 885 2005, and transferred to May SITE BLACK on May ORANGE on DETENTION 886 2005. formally CIA Director Goss May notified National 0° 2005, (¥S//|HjHBH#NF) Stephen Hadley and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte Security Advisor 887 Faraj would be rendered to the unilateral custody of the CIA. Abu Director Goss's that al-Libi stated: memorandum "[s]hould resist cooperating in CIA debriefings, and pending a Faraj Abu no psychological or of contraindictations [sic], to finding medical I will CIA trained and certified interrogators to employ interrogation, authorize or more of the thirteen specific interrogation techniques for which CIA one received recently legal opinions from the Department of Justice two signed techniques, of (OLC) that these Counsel both individually (DOJ), Legal Office 888 are collectively, used and lawful." memorandum from Director Goss described Abu Faraj al-Libi (TSZ/flH^l^^^lNF) The and third important position in al-Qa'ida, most "playfing] a leading role in as holding the al-Qa'ida's global operations, including attack planning against the US homeland." directing al-Qa'ida's Faraj also described as possibly overseeing was "highly compartmented al-Libi Abu 889 efforts." anthrax May 2005, one day after al-Libi's arrival at DETENTION On for BLACK, interrogators received CIA Headquarters approval CIA the use of the CIA's SITE 890 interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi. enhanced CIA interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi on May 28, 2005, two days before interrogation OLC issued memorandum analyzing whether the techniques violated U.S. obligations the its 891 Convention the Torture. under Against interrogated Abu CIA al-Libi for more than a month The Faraj the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On a number of occasions, CIA using applied techniques CIA's enhanced interrogation interrogators to Abu Faraj al-Libi when he the 884 [REDACTED], Robert Grenier, John Mudd, to: [REDACTED], | Email from: cc: JREDACTED ], HHI^HH Hi!!' ^^^^• date: [REDACTED], subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; [REDACTED], May 24, [REDACTED]; 2005. 885 ^ 886 19 887 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi. Director, 888 Memorandum Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from for Interrogation Porter Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Director, Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi. Goss, 889 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from Plan Porter Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Director, for Abu Faraj al-Libi. Goss, 890 HEADQUARTERS | 891 2336 MAY 05) (282003Z MI 11 III I I MI HIM I Page 147 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 147

177 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN 1 a loss of hearing, repeatedly telling him to stop pretending he could not hear complained of 892 Although indicated that they believed al-Libi's complaint was an well. the interrogators Abu after al-Libi was fitted for a hearing aid technique, his transfer interrogation resistance Faraj 893 the Bay in 2006. custody Despite Guantanamo repeated and extensive use military to U.S. at enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, CIA Headquarters of the CIA's insist throughout the summer and fall of 2005 that Abu Faraj al-Libi was continued to techniques. and the renewed use of the for The use of the information pressed withholding interrogation techniques against Abu Faraj CIA's was eventually discontinued enhanced al-Libi CIA stated that they had no intelligence officers demonstrate that Abu Faraj al-Libi because to continued withhold information, and because CIA medical officers expressed concern that to additional of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may come with unacceptable use 894 or psychological After the discontinuation of the CIA's enhanced medical risks." the facilitator asked Abu Faraj al-Libi about UBL techniques, Abu Ahmad al- interrogation CIA 895 896 denied for Abu Faraj al-Libi first knowledge of al-Kuwaiti. time. Kuwaiti the Acquires Two Detainees from the U.S. Military 3. CIA Another in issue (TSyy^l^HH^) late 2005 was related to the U.S. Department legal the involvement detention activities. In September 2005, CIA CIA and the of Defense's in 897 Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on this Department of and the U.S. subject, military to transfer two detainees, Ibrahim Jan agreed Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, to CIA custody. and Both were held by the U.S. military without being registered with the ICRC for over 30 days, 898 pending to CIA custody. their The transfer of Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi took place transfer Department notwithstanding concerns that the transfer would be inconsistent with of State the by secretary of state that U.S. made in Iraq would remain committed to the statements forces 899 conflict, including the Geneva armed of law Conventions. I 892 05) 12499 (262123Z TUN I 893 894 from: to: ^^^^^^^H^cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],| Email [REDACTED]7^^^^Hfr IHllHlH subject: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], to DDO Tasking of 7 July on Abu Faraj Interrogation; date: July 8,2005, at 06:16 PM. | Response 695 DIRECTOR (121847ZJUL05); HEADQUARTERS ••^•(•lAN 04); •• 20361 m| JAN •• DIRECTOR (291232Z (040522Z MAY 04) 04); 896 ^Hi 29454 (131701Z JUL 05) 897 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning DOD Support to CIA with Sensitive Capture and Detention Operations in War on Terrorism. the 898 See from: [REDACTED], to: ^^H^HM, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: email [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD Request for ••I, email of not to be issued ISN numbers. The HVTs stated: "In conjunction with discussions between CIA and a list DoD over the weekend regarding our request to have the military render Ibrahim Jan to our custody and NOT a list issuing ISN number, DoD has requested CIA provide an of HVTs to whom, if captured, the military him should NOT issue TSN numbers" (emphasis in original). See HH^Hl505_HHH| OCT 05). 899 Guidance 2005 Memorandum for Joint Staff (fllM^Ht fo^^^^HHIHjHM^ Interim July Regarding (^ TOP SECRE^I^^^BM^^BM^NQPORN Page 148 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 148

178 UNCLASSIFIED TOP ate 2005, the period the U.S. Senate was debating the I" ' during 900 Act inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment," bailing the Detainee Treatment "cruel, 901 Ja'far its enhanced interrogation techniques. to A draft Abu al-Iraqi CIA subjected (PDB) stated that Abu ja'far al-Iraqi provided Presidential no information Daily Brief "almost be to locate former colleagues or disrupt used plots"—the type of information could that attack the CIA, and the CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation sought by 902 Later, statement that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information that techniques. the was used former colleagues or disrupt attack plots" locate deleted from the draft to be could 903 Ja'far al-Iraqi remained in CIA PDB. until early September 2006, when he custody Abu was 904 military custody in Iraq. to transferred U.S. to Seeks Game" for CIA in Early 2005 Due "End Limited Support From 4. The Detainees Partners Liaison 900 from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; Email cc: ^^HHH [REDACTED]; Subject: McCain Amendment on Detainee Treatment; date: October [REDACTED], at 12:37 6,2005, PM. 901 to Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to records, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, According CIA nudity, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water abdominal with 44 degree slaps, dousing water 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing for for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, Fahrenheit position experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to and a sitting and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided position, The more and was returned to the standing position. thinner sleep deprivation was extended to 102 with blood After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi hours. subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, was after CIA Headquarters informed interrogators that eight which was the minimum rest period between sleep hours deprivation sessions exceeding 48 hours. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also experienced an edema on his due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles. SeeW^B^M 1810 head |DEC05);H|Hl813^^HDEC05);H|||Hl819^^HpEC05)|J||[^Hl847 | DEC 1848 DEC 05); HEADQUARTERS^^® ••fDECO?). See 05); Hi on additional al-lraqi in Volume PI. Ja'far Abu information December Date: titled: Draft ALT ID#: -2132586. 13, Goss notified the national security advisor that he had authorized the use of 2005, Director CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi because "CIA believes that Abu Ja'far possesses the considerable operational about Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi." See December 1, 2005, Memorandum for the information Porter Security of National Intelligence, from Director Goss, Central Intelligence Agency, National Advisor, "CountertetTorist Interrogation Techniques." subject, 903 PDB titled: Date: December 2005, ALT Draft the 20051217 on Abu Jafar al-Iraqi. ID: the change to PDB draft PDB, one of the interrogators involved in Urging Abu Ja'far al-lraqi's interrogation wrote, "If we allow the Director to give this PDB, as it is written, to the President, I would imagine President would say, 'You asked me to risk my presidency on your interrogations, and now you the me of that implies the interrogations are not working. Why do we bother?' We think the tone give the PDB this be conclusions, Some of the should based on our experts' observations, should be amendedThegkissis tweaked. full full, half empty, and is getting more half every day." See email from: [REDACTED] not to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subiectjPDBon [AbuJa'far date: December 15, 2005, at 12:25 AM. al-lraqi]; 904 about June 2007, inaccurate information 2031 the effectiveness of the CIA's In enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was provided to the Committee. See CIA Response to Record, Senate on Intelligence Questions for the Committee June 18, 2007 (DTS #2007-2564); \ Select 32732 ••• OCTOsn^BHB 32707^HH OCT05kMMM 32726 ••• OCT 05); 11 ii 11111 i M I ii Page 149 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 149

179 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN (TSA^^^H^^HB^P) the CIA again sought an "endgame" policy for its early 2005, its detainees, with host governments and its difficulty in identifying unstable citing relations 905 for facilities. host Talking points prepared detention the CIA to CIA additional countries with the national security director made the following appeal: for a meeting advisor needs President of the United [the and Principals urgently "CIA States] to establish a long-term disposition policy for the Committee direction 12 detainees we hold in overseas detention sites. Our liaison High-Value (HVD)s 905 [REDACTED] are deeply concerned by sites host press who partners these they are increasingly skeptical of the [U.S. government's] leaks, and keep to their cooperation... A combination of press leaks, commitment secret of alleged [U.S. government] detainee abuse, and the international scrutiny that perception government] policy on detainees lacks direction is [U.S. eroding partners' trust in U.S. resolve to protect their identities and our roles. If government] plan for long-term [detainee] supporting a [U.S. liaison not the handful of soon, partners who does emerge disposition ask us to close down our facilities cooperate their territory. Few may on are to accept the huge willing associated with hosting a CIA countries risks site, so shrinkage of the already small pool of detention candidates willing could us to curtail our highly successful interrogation and detention force Fear public exposure may also prompt previously cooperative program. of partners not to accept custody of detainees we have captured liaison and interrogated. of a clear, publicly announced [detainee] Establishment of - one by [the President 'endgame' the United States] and sanctioned supported by Congress - will reduce our partners' concerns and rekindle their 907 enthusiasm the US in the War on Terrorism." for helping Tn March talking points prepared for the CIA director for a (^PS/^^^^^^^HI^NF) 2005, the it was: Security Council Principals Committee stated that with discussion National 905 contributing 2013 Response The that an "important factor" June to the slower pace of CIA detention CIA's stales was al-Qa'ida's relocation to the FATA, which "made it significantly more challenging [for the operations Pakistani government] mount capture operations resulting in renditions and detentions by the RDI program." A review of to records other the Committee found that legal, policy, and CIA operational concerns dominated internal by detainees aboutthe In deliberations CIA officers asked officials to render two program. to CIA 2005, an one IBH d one m|. neither detainee was transferred to CIA custody. CIA officers noted that obtaining custody of detainees held by a foreign government during period was becoming increasingly difficult, highlighting that | this 2006, In March Director testified to the Committee that lack of space was the limiting factor in taking custody of additional detainees. Goss HEADQUARTERS®® •••HE ADQUARTERS MUmM^M^email from: See cc: [REDACTED]nHMHiHBBi, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: for [REDACTEDUREDACTEDL pis: D/CIA coord, talkingpointsJ^H^^HH^I re rendition of J 6702|H^^|^HhEADQUARTERS and transcript of Senate Select Committee on briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). Intelligence 906 to by the Text prior to provision redacted Committee members at the U.S. Senate. CIA 907 See CIA document dated, January 12,2005, entitled, "DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor." I'll Mill B^BUW^^^^B^OFO^N Page 150 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 150

180 UNCLASSIFIED k/ NOFORN TOP /^ SECRET/ a matter of before our remaining handful of current blacksite hosts "only time [U.S. concludes on [detainees] lacks direction and... government] that policy ask Continuation to depart from their soil... hosts] of status [the blacksite us relationships tensions these very valuable in and cause will quo exacerbate withdraw their critical support and cooperation with the [U.S. them to 908 government]." period, the U.S. solicitor general, however, expressed During this if CIA they were transferred back to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that might be concern detainees 909 an habeas petition and have access to to attorney. file Meanwhile, the National entitled a Council continued to discuss a public roll-out, Security as described later in this summary, and 910 engaged the media directly in order to defend and promote the program. the CIA question of to do with the remaining detainees in CIA The what the remained 2005, during which time throughout CIA pursued agreements custody unresolved 911 countries to establish clandestine CIA detention facilities. The with Detainee additional Act on passed by Congress Treatment December 23, 2005, as part of the National Defense was Act the Fiscal Year 2006. That day, Authorization CIA suspended its interrogation program for 912 As described later in this summary, in again. 2006, the CIA informed the National February Security Council principals that the CIA would not seek continued use of all of the CIA's 913 enhanced interrogation techniques. Stories and CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees 5. Press the the Facilities of CIA Detention in in Countries | and | Result Closing that October the CIA learned 2005, Washington Post reporter (TS/Z^^^^^I^I^/NF) In Priest had information about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, H||| Dana ^^Hii^^^^^^^^^l^HBI^H^^^I' ^he a then prevent with Post in which it sought to Washington the newspaper from negotiations the 914 on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. publishing information that Fearful 908 Disposition CIA Points for Principals Committee Meeting on See Talking of High-Value Detainees, Long-Term 8 March 2005. 909 to: in from: counsel J°l See Rizzo; subject: Meeting this am with WH email on endgame planning; date: 14,2005. ^^^^^^^^ January 910 Email [REDACTED], John fromJHMH^H; toJ^^^HHjccJ^REDACTEDJ, ^^^^nHMH Re: Brokaw Take A. Rizzo, subject: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. In 2006, Vice President date: expressed reservations about any public Cheney release information regarding the CIA program. See of Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED], CIA C/CTC|^|, subject, "9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees." 911 Negotiations Countries | and | to host CIA detention facilities are described with this summary, and in in greater detail in Volume I. 912 HEADQUARTERS (232040Z DEC 05) 913 the Talking Points for 10 February 2006 Un-DC re Future of DDCIA CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, |; HEADQUARTERS Page 151 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 151

181 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/d y/NOFORN the CIA recommended the 915 CIA Department of Defense custody. to When the of immediate transfer detainees rejected the proposal, the National Security Council directed the CIA to Department of Defense 916 and U.S. ambassadors, one in Meanwhile, another in prepar^ther options. two briefed whether State Rice had been of on the impending inquired BH, Secretary article and sought to speak to the secretary herself to ensure that the CIA Washington Post not authorized. CIA documents, Secretary Rice was to aware of the program was According 917 lieu the facilities were located. where In detention of a phone call from CIA countries specific the CIA recommended that the State Department's Counterterrorism Coordinator Secretary Rice, 918 CTC DDO, Henry Crumpton, call and ambassadors. former The Washington Post the 919 article about CIA detention sites on November 2, 2005. published an publication of Washington Post article resulted in a The the A^nite^tatesfrom^^^BBBBI, also suggested that | to which demarche 920 jeopardy. contribution The be States also in United 921 a demarch^om^^^^^^HHI- According to a CIA cable, U.S. received to "if another shoe were to drop," there would be representatives ramifications with U.S. relations considerable on a number of issues that for rights. on in the area of human credibility The representatives also "questioned depended U.S. 922 gravity of this potential problem is fully whether in Washington." the appreciated 915 transfer other put forward by the CIA The options of CIA detainees which the CIA were anticipated would release the detainees after a short period. The CIA also proposed its own outright release of the D/CIA at See CIA document entitled detainees. Talking Points for use | Principals Meeting (2005). 9,6 HEADQUARTERS •• •••H^H 1)17 of Dr. J.D. Crouch for telephone calls to Ambassadors in [REDACTED] Talking possibility for Points regarding Dana press article; email from: Priest forthcoming [REDACTED], [REDACTED], to: J; cc: [REDACTEDUREDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want to [REDACTED]; to 06:45 SecState^date^^H|^m, at speak PM. the 918 Email ^^^M^HTtoT[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], from: subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want to speak to the SecState; date: [REDACTED]; October 24, at 06:45 PM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: 2005, [REDACTED], •••H, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACT^DUREDACTEDUREDACTED]; subject: Phone call from S/CT Amb. Hank Crumpton to Ambassador in ^BH^B^Hldate: November 1,2005, at 6:13:21 PM. After the press revelations, the U.S. ambassador in Country | asked again about whether the secretary of subsequent had | to briefed, prompting the CIA Station in Country state note in a cable that briefing U.S. officials outside been See CIA be a significant departure from current policy." "would [REDACTED] •• [REDACTED 1 of the 9,9—^ See "CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons," the Washington Post , November 2, 2005. See cable at HEADQUAR | to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at HEADQUARB^^^MM^BandHEADQUAR |; cables to and cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUA r HH^^^^HI^H. |; 754 Memorandum from D/CIA Goss to Hadley, Townsend and Negroponte, 52485 33053 S3053 TOP SECRET/, '/NOFORN Page 152 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 152

182 UNCLASSIFIED K/NOFORN /^ TOP SECRET/ The CIA how the Washington Post story created (TS/Z^HHIB^^A^^) catalogued its bilateral relations with ^^^H allies and determined that: tensions in counterterrorism costs our reassess the benefits and to of is prompting partners "[t]he article [U.S. government] and cooperating These services have with the CIA. high-impact operations with CIA against... targets, aggressive, conducted no longer expect the services to be as including We »923 or aggressive cooperative. and officers stories on the CIA's Detention press Interrogation Program led CIA that informed to prohibit from providing "information that could lead to the the B government detention rendition al-Qa'ida or other terrorists to U.S. Government custody for of or 924 CIA and the Department of Defense." including interrogation, Media leaks also created tensions with countries that (TS/d^^B^F) hosted or had continued host CIA detention facilities. For example, leaks prompted Country | officials to to their intent communicate directly with the Departments of Justice and State. They convey to 923 demarched U.S. government. late As formally as B 2009, the then the the with Director Panetta the "problem of | raised secret detention facility" that Country CIA "tested and strained" the bilateral partnership. The I^^^HIH of Country | also stated had 926 assurances needed that future cooperation with the CIA would be safeguarded. that were publication the Washington Post article, | After of 927 the closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within | hours Country | demanded CIA The 928 ^^ remaining CIA detainees out of the facility shortly thereafter. transferred the 923 [REDACTED] | ™ See email from^HHH^^MuoJREDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^^HHH [REDACTED]; subject: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], See not Intel; date: April 7, 2006, at 04:12:59 AM. - draft also September 2, 2006, Fax from do forward sensitive Steve Bradbury, John DD/CTC, in, Steve Cambone, forwarding September 1, 2006 to Bellinger "Anticipated Reactions to the Public Announcement Foreign the US Secret Terrorist Detention Memorandum, of begun raising legal and policy concerns related to [any potential] support and assistance to the Center." in CIA and interrogation operations in Marcl^00^J|»fficet^ndicatecUhaUhey believed rendition, detention, Rights International Civil and Political on and the prohibited the Covenant aiding or assisting in these CIA operations. For additional backgroundori^B legal concerns about • from I^^Hjto. and see email from: [REDACTCDLCOS Detention, John A. Rizzo^c^REDACTED], Renditions visit at subject: more from ^HlHI I^^HH HH^HK ; date: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; 11:09 AM. ^^^^^ 925 of According to CIA records, the fallout." Country | was "very angry" "[REDACTED] article press reports, which, he believed, would be "exploitedbyradical elements" to "foment increased about hostility toward |] government." [REDACTED] DIRR •• [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] •• [Country reporting CIA [REDACTED], state that the press records would "put considerable strain on the further relationship." ( See "[REDACTED] article fallout.") Despite this record, and other records in the full Committee program Study, June 2013 Response states: "[w]e found no evidence that the RDI CIA's in any way negatively the affected US relations overall with Country 926 [REDACTED] 2328 •••••P 927 7885 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) [REDACTED] 928 [REDACTED] 4895 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) llll 'ill III I "I llll Mill I Page 153 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 153

183 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN | Country refused to admit CIA detainee Mustafa | ^^^^^^^^^ officers to a local despite earlier discussions with country representatives Ahmad al-Hawsawi hospital 930 emergency be handled. understood While the CIA medical the abouUiow a detainee's would given to a CIA detainee in a local hospital reluctance media reports, CIA HH officers' place t0 the "willingness of HH originally participate as Headquarters also questioned 931 regard with of emergency medical care." provision After failing to gain agreed/planned to 932 the of Defense from the CIA was forced to seek assistance from three assistance Department with in medical countries to al-Hawsawi and four other CIA detainees providing third-party care ailments. Ultimately, themillion for acute th^reatment of |^H^an(^HHHHj^paidthe^^^^^^H|||riapproximateh 34 I^HI^^^^^H^ $•1 foiMh^reatmentof made arrangements for | and 935 tobetreatedin^HH The medical issues resulted in the closing : 936 of DETENTION Country] in 2006. SITE The CIA then transferred its in VIOLET to CIA SITE BROWN. At that point, all detainees detainees were remaining DETENTION 937 Country in located | 1 CIA's the ^^) on the Meanwhile, Detention and Interrogation (T^yV^H^^^^^H pressures brought about by the Washington Program story prompted the CIA to consider new options Post 938 it called the "[d]windling pool partners willing to host CIA Blacksites." among what CIA a detention renewed earlier efforts to establish The facility in Country The CIA had thus H^^^^HH provided million to Country |'s $| in preparation for a potential CIA earlier detentior^ite^rompting the chief of Station to comment, "Do you realize you can buy [Country 939 l^o^^^^l?" December 2005, the chief of Station in Country | met with the On was not about the CIA's detention of terrorists in his who concerned wanted include that the CIA interrogation program did not but the use of country, assurances l 929 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]). See also HEADQUARTERS HI ' HEADQUARTERS | [REDACTED]). ([REDACTED] 930 [REDACTED] 50141 931 f __ HEADQUARTERS 932 CIA Request Letter to DOD for Medical Assistance, dated 2006, from DCIA Porter Goss. This See was cable four days after the CIA Headquarters letter noting the emerging difficulties in relying on host- written and medical See also CIA document entitled, Summary care. Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on country OMS Participation in the RDI Program. While the document is undated, it includes information updated through 2007. 933 TO FOR TREATMENT," date not listed. SecCI^(^umen^ntiHed^COMPENSATION MEDICAL 934 "COMPENSATION CIA document entitled, •^^•7719 TO LIAISON FOR See also TREATMENT," date not listed, which MEDICAL that the total compensation provided was $|HH' indicates 935 on and of Chief of Medical Summary Reflections OMS Participation in the RDI Program. Services 935 See additional details. I for Volume 937 4118 HEADQUARTERS 938 CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detainee, and Interrogation Program; dated | See "Un-DC" 2006, February slides. Meeting 939 History Interview, Interviewee: (R-D - October 13, 2006, Interviewer: Transcript of Oral [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and i ^^^^^Mi^B^MyNoronN 11>i iii ii Page 154 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 154

184 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP ^ SECRET// 940 agreed to a request from the chief his approval, the | In torture. providing 941 CIA an also The reached inform U.S. ambassador in Country to the of Station not country, Country to establish a CIA detention facility in that country agreement with another 942 U.S. of Country | not to inform the leadership ambassador there the The with arranged and did not detain individuals in either country. CIA ultimately 2005, October before the publication of the In late days temporarily article, asked a separate country, Country to CIA house | the Post Washington 943 The chief of CIA briefed the U.S. detainees. in Country who requested Station ambassador 944 Security Council and the White House National bricfech)iUh^>lan. the There are no that be records to indicate CIA briefing occurred. Country |'s then provided the approval, seeking assurances that the CIA would develop a contingenc^lar^r^as^he while 945 site in the press. was While the CIA Station and the ^I^^HI^^H detention exposed CIA Headquartersdirectedthat a i Country considered n detention facility be established in long-term CIA th^ountr^Countt^|s^H|^^HB a plan build a CIA detention to IHIHIH^^^^HI^^^HI^^H' but approved facility 946 ongoing concerns about the lack of a CIA "exit strategy." noted his lack of emergency medical care for detainees, the issue that The Country forced of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in closing was raised repeatedly in had the context of the construction of the CIA the facility in Country On March 2006, detention CIA requested that the CIA Station Headquarters Country | ask Country | to arrange discreet in access to the nearest hospital and medical staff. The cable stated that the CIA "look[s] forward 947 to a favorable to commencing with the construction of our detention facility." response, prior nonetheless Construction the facility without the issue of emergency medical care began on resolved. the 2006, after the deputy chief of been CIA Station in Country the having In with of and an OMS officer met RDG, officers, the Station reported deputy chief 948 establishment proximal emergency medical care the to the site was "not tenable." that In of at chief representative informed the OMS of MHI^^^^^I^HH 2006, July an Headquarters that the facility in Country | "should not be activated without a clear, CIA 949 plan committed provider coverage." medical for

185 UNCLASSIFIED TOP By the a CIA team visited the Country | detention site in late GIS/ZHI^^^HH^P) time CIA 2006, invested million in the new facility. Describing the absence of had the already care of as "unacceptable," the chief medical RDG recommended in adequate emergency options 950 construction be abandoned for this reason. that The following day, an memo a draft efforts of the same memo described the issue as a "challenge," but did not edited version recommend 951 cease construction of the facility. the The resulting CIA detention facility, which that CIA cost CIA's was never used bythe CIA. Press reports about the eventually would million, Interrogation and that appeared in and H eventually forced the CIA Detention Program 952 the unused facility to the Country | government. of to pass possession In early January 2006, officials at the Department of Defense (^PS^I^^^^H^^/NF) CIA informed that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had made a formal decision not to officers 953 any at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. CIA At the time, the accept detainees holding its detainees in was two remaining facilities, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, in CIA 28 954 DETENTION ORANGE, in Country |. SITE In preparation for a meeting Country and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 6, 2006, CIA Director Goss was provided a with indicating document the Department of Defense's position not to allow the transfer of CIA that cripple to custody at Guantanamo Bay "would military legitimate end game detainees U.S. 955 the CIA. planning" The talking points for that for suggested that Director Goss tell meeting Secretary that the: Rumsfeld Government viable for "only US 'endgame' custody of these most continued dangerous terrorists is a transfer to GTMO... [a]bsent the availability of GTMO and DoD custody, CIA will necessarily have to begin eventual those detainees longer producing intelligence to third countries, transferring no care to detainees," and concluded that CIA detention facilities were not equipped inpatient provide to provide for the care detainees. The audit team did not visit medical facility in Country but stated, with regard emergency to country, Country that "CIA funds have been wasted in to another and equipping a medical facility constructing that later determined not to be a viable option for providing inpatient care for detainees." See Report of Audit, was Detention 17 Operated Under the CIA-controlled September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report Facilities CIA's 2005-0017-AS, No. 2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. The June supervised the 14, CIA's Renditions and Detention Group. 2006, Memorandum for the Record, to: C/CTCHH- from: C/CTC^^^RDG, re: Site Visit to 1 Recommendations. 951 Site Record, to: C/CTC|^H, from: C/CTC|^H/RDG, re: the Visit Memorandum for Recommendations (2). to II^HiHi^riand 952 Notification: Central IntelligenceAgency Response to Host Country Government Congressional to Vacate Order an Facility, (DTS #2009-3711); SSCI Memorandum for the Inactiv^Blacksit^Detention for CIA RDI Program Background Brief Record, Leon Panetta, 2009. Document, 953 DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA Detainees on GTMO. 954 custody." Memo, "As of 01 January 2006, there were 28 HVDs in See CIA As noted above, DETENTION CIA SITE VIOLET in Country | would be closed in 2006. 955 Take DCIA Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Talking CIA Detainees GTMO. on 111111 ii M 111 MBI^^^^^BBMi 11 Page 156 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 156

186 UNCLASSIFIED k/NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ may release or [the CIA itself may need to] outright release which them, 956 them." declined to reconsider his decision not to Secretary After Rumsfeld of Bay, detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo transfer CIA officers allow the CIA talking the the president. CIA officers prepared to points for Director elevating proposed issue 957 with the president Goss the "Way Forward" on the program on January 12, 2006. to meet on talking recommended that the CIA director "stress that absent a decision on the long- The points program issue 'endgame') we are stymied and die called could collapse of its own term (so 958 There are no records to weight." whether indicate Goss made this presentation to the Director president. and 2006, CIA transferred detainees from its custody to In 2005 the countries, nine at least including to the U.S. military in Iraq. Many of these ^^^mi^^^^^^^lB^aswell as 959 CIA were By May 2006, the released. had 11 detainees whom it had detainees subsequently as candidates for prosecution by a U.S. military commission. The remaining identified detainees 960 as having "repatriation options open." were described and CIA to the CIA Detention Changes Interrogation Program Following 6. The Considers Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld the Following passage (TS/Z^HHHI^NF) of the Detainee Treatment Act in December the the 2005, conducted numerous discussions with CIA National Security Council principals the about modifications to the program that would be acceptable from a policy and legal standpoint. In February 2006, points prepared for CIA Director Goss noted that National Security talking Stephen Hadley: Advisor be accepting of the criteria CIA will use before "asked a detainee informed to CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program, its into that he believed CIA had in the past accepted detainees it should not stating 961 have." The CIA director proposed future criteria that would require not (TSZ/^im^l^/NF) that that detainees meet the standard in the MON, but only they possess information about CIA nations, to citizens of the United States or other threats and that detention in a CIA facility the 956 DC1A Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA Detainees on GTMO. 957 Way for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Points Forward on Counterterrorist DCI A Talking Detention and Interrogation Program. Rendition, 958 Way Talking for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Points Forward on Counterterrorist DCIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program. 959 See Volume 1 for additional details. 960 May Deputies Committee (Un-DC) Meeting, Preliminary Detainee End 18,2006, Options. For additional Game information, see Volume I. 961 DCIA Talking Points for 9 February 2006 Un-DC, re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, and Program - Detainees. Interrogation mi 11 in i i nii imi i Page 157 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 157

187 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/^ 962 ^ppropriate exploitation. for A few months later, Legal, wa intelligence Acting Assistant General Steven Bradbury suggesting a wrote to Attorney suggested applying enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA's new for the modified standard "the specific detainee is believed to possess standard intelligence of high value was that critical States." the proposed modification included While requirement that a detainee United to the the intelligence of high value," it represented an expansion of CIA authorities, insofar have "critical detention of interrogation the an individual with information that "would assist as it covered and an most of al-Qa'ida of [sic] leadership associated terrorist organization," the senior in locating detainee was not assessed to have knowledge of, or be directly involved in, imminent even if that 963 terrorist threats. the Security Council principals also Discussions National with a March 2006 CIA resulted for an interrogation program involving only seven of the in proposal enhanced interrogation techniques: sleep deprivation, nudity, CIA's manipulation, facial dietary 964 slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab. grasp, This proposal was not acted upon at facial time. The for sleep deprivation of up to 180 hours, however, raised concerns among the proposal 965 Security principals. National Council the April 2006, the CIA briefed the president on the "current (TS/^l^^m^^^NF) In status" CIA's and Interrogation Program. According to Detention internal CIA review, this of the an the first time the CIA had briefed the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation was 966 techniques. previously noted, the president expressed concern at the April 2006 briefing As a diaper, the a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in of and forced to go to the about "image 967 himself." bathroom on On 29, (^^/^m^HI^^NF) 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the June commission case v. Rumsfeld, concluding that the military Harridan convened to try Salim of 962 DCIA Talking Points for 9 February 2006 Un-DC, re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition. Detention, and Interrogation - Detainees. Program 863 Letter Legal HH^^^^I to Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, May 23, 2006. from HHHCTC Memorandum General John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy #2009-1809); Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, (DTS for of G. Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office Steven Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re: from Bradbury, of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of a Application Value High Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009J8K) al Tub9), citing Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney i CIA Counsel, from Assistant General Counsel, Legal (Jan. 4, 2005) ('January 4 General^ffice of Fax'); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior [^•B General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy from G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Steven Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re: General, Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy al Bradbury, Counsel, Agency, from Steven G. Intelligence Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Central Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United General, Obligations Under Article 16 of States the Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Convention Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al be Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). 964 DCIA Points for 9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting. Talking 965 9 March the Memorandum from [REDACTED], C/CTCH, re: for 2006 Principals Committee Record Meeting on Detainees. 966 See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Meeting with the President," dated ApriI 8, 2006. 967 Email Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; from: ^•IHIH; subject: Dr. [SWIGERT's] 7 June cc: meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006. 11 H I M I I Page 158 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 158

188 UNCLASSIFIED K/NOFORN SECRET//^ TOP at Guantanamo was inconsistent with statutory requirements and Hamdan, a detainee Bay, was the The implication of the decision Conventions. that treating 3 of Geneva Common Article inconsistent with the requirements of Common a detainee 3 would constitute in a manner Article federal law. CIA attorneys analyzed the Hamdan criminal noting that it a violation of decision, 968 impact on "current CIA interrogation practices." memorandum Their could have a significant that referenced Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury had the "preliminary also Acting CIA that 'calls into real question' whether opinion could continue its CT ... view the involving enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA's enhanced interrogation program techniques "could construed as inconsistent with the provisions of Common interrogation be 969 to personal dignity' and violence upon life and person." 3 prohibiting Article 'outrages The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a (TS/Z^^B^^^^^BZ/NF) memorandum draft impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced on the 970 enhanced CIA did not use its techniques. interrogation techniques again interrogation The the 2007, which time the OLC had interpreted July Military Commissions Act, signed by until by president on October 17, 2006, in such a way as to allow the CIA to resume the use of the the 971 techniques. the Disposition CIA Detainees and the End Final of CIA's Detention and N. The of Program Interrogation Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and 1. President Program Interrogation significant discussions throughout 2006 among the National After Council principals, the Department of Defense ultimately agreed to accept the transfer Security 972 of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. of a number (U) On 6, 2006, President George W. Bush delivered a public speech acknowledging September the United had held al-Qaida operatives in secret detention, stating that the CIA had that States "alternative interrogating of procedures" in an these detainees, and describing employed set 973 from detainees while in CIA custody obtained As described later in this information those the speech, which was based on CIA information summary, vetted by the CIA, contained and 968 June memorandum CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa the 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." CIA from 969 memorandum from the CIA's Office CIA General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." of 970 from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: Email Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary John of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to die Central into July Agency's 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, of 29, 2009 (DTS Intelligence Use #2010-1058). 971 for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Memorandum Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Central Bradbury, Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Principal July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the Counsel, War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Value Techniques Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High May al Qaeda Detainees. that 972 See Volume I for details on these discussions. 973 to September 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions 6, Try Suspected Terrorists. 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 159 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 159

189 UNCLASSIFIED TOP inaccurate statements, regarding the significance of information acquired significant especially 974 detainees effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques. from and CIA the speech, to president announced the transfer of 14 detainees the Department of (U) In the of at and the submission to Congress Bay proposed legislation on Defense custody Guantanamo 975 As all other detainees in the CIA's military had been transferred to commissions custody 976 the had no detainees in its custody at the time of the speech. other nations, CIA International to of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access The CIA Detainees 2. Committee Transfer Custody U.S. Military Their in September 2006 After to U.S. 14 detainees arrived at the the military base at (TS/^^After CIA Bay, they were Guantanamo in a separate building from other U.S. military detainees and housed 977 the operational control of the CIA. remained In October 2006, the 14 detainees were under meetings with ICRC and described in detail similar stories regarding their detention, allowed the provided and in CIA custody. The ICRC while information on these treatment, interrogation 978 the CIA. CIA Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo emailed the claims director and to CIA 8, leaders, following a November other 2006, meeting with the ICRC, stating: senior what described albeit in summary form, us, the detainees allege "[a]s to does not sound that far removed from the actually the ICRC, for its reality... part, to find their stories largely seems having put much stock in the credible, fact that the story each detainee has told about his transfer, treatment and conditions of was basically consistent, even though they had been confinement 979 with throughout their detention by us." each incommunicado other In February the ICRC transmitted to the CIA its final report (TS^I^^^^^^B^P) 2007 CIA "Treatment 'High Value Detainees' in Fourteen Custody." The ICRC report on the of that "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include concluded of descriptions and interrogation techniques - singly or in combination - that amounted treatment 980 and/or or degrading treatment." inhuman Notwithstanding Rizzo's comments, to torture crucl, CIA disagreed with a number of the the findings, provided rebuttals to the ICRC in ICRC's 974 See Volume I and Volume II for additional information. September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists. 976 Volume III additional information. See for 977 entitled for CIA Director visit to CIA December 2006, Memo Guantanamo Bay Background Guantanamo, Detainee Detention Facility. High-Value m Email ' from: to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], ^^^^^^HHCTC/LGL; BUj^K^^^^^MTlREDACTED], [REDACTEDl Ji^—^H. [REDACTED], date: [REDACTED]; ••••[; subject: 8 November2006 Meeting [REDACTED], ICRC reps; cc: with November 9, 2006, at 12:25 PM. 979 Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, Michael J. Morell; cc: date: [REDACTED]; 8 November 2006 Meeting with ICRC Reps; Fw: November 9, subject; 2006, at 12:25 PM. 980 February 14, 2007, Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, from | International of the Red Cross, | Committee mi ii 11 i B^^M^^Bz/NOHHtN Page 160 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 160

190 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ and informed Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical or threatened writing, the faulty abuses and analysis in the report undermine its overall legal and assumptions 981 of acquired by The New York Review was Books and posted on credibility." ICRC report The 982 April to in The Committee found the ICRC report website be largely the Review's 2009. 983 contained CIA information records. interrogation consistent with in Military Future the Program Following the Considers Commissions Act CIA 3. The of in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court As of Hamdan v. noted, case prompted OLC to withdraw a draft legal memorandum on the impact of the Rumsfeld the 984 Act CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the The administration Treatment Detainee on the CIA would need new legislation to continue to use the CIA's enhanced determined that 985 techniques. Military Commissions Act addressed the issues raised by the interrogation The issue decision the president the authority to provided an Executive Order detailing Hamdan and conduct under Common Article 3 of permissible Geneva Conventions. The bill passed the the 986 September 28, 2006, and the House of Representatives the following day. Senate on On November when Abd Hadi al-Iraqi was rendered to (TS/^^^H^^^^B/TNF) |, 2006, had the Order and an updated OLC memorandum Executive not yet been draft custody, CIA 987 Abd prepared. al-Iraqi was consistently assessed al-Hadi being cooperative, Although as 981 on the February 2007 ICRC Report on Comments Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA the Custody. At a Committee Hearing on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden emphasized die close relationship CIA the CIA with the ICRC ("I believe our contacts with the ICRC have been very useful. I have met withj had CIA. for Cross, on several occasions at Red It appears that | I, die the and he's promised to bring his gear with him next time he 1 is a runner to Langley so that we can comes jog the compound."), but emphasized the errors in on ICRC report, stating: "While CIA appreciates the time, the effort, and good intentions of the ICRC in forming its report, numerous false allegations of physical or threatened abuses and legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall credibility." ( See SSCI Hearing faulty dated April 2007 (DTS# 2007-3158).) As is described in more detail in Volume II, Director Transcript, 12, significant to regarding the ICRC report included Committee inaccurate information. the statements Hayden's 982 and detainee reviews and reports in See Assets/nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/022/icrc—report.pdf Volume III. 983 disputing in and OMS prepared a number CIA documents RDG the ICRC allegations. See document officers of "CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the entitled, of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' Treatment in CIA See Volumes I and III for additional information. Custody." ,o: 984 Email [REDACTED]; cc: John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary from: ^HHI^K date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. oi Hamdan Decision; 985 Assistant Attorney General Bradbury Acting the Department of Justice's Office of Professional told Responsibility that officials from the Departments of State, (OPR) and Justice met with the president and Defense, officials from the CIA and the NSC to consider the impact of the Hamdan decision, and that it was clear from die outset that would have to be enacted to address the application of Common Article 3 and the War Crimes legislation to 22, CIA interrogation program. As the OPR report noted, " Hamdan directly contradicted OLC's January Act the opinion of the White House and the Department 2002 Defense, which had concluded that Common Article 3 did to Department apply captured members of al Qaeda." See to of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; not Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Terrorists, Intelligence of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Suspected Use July 29, 2009 (DTS Agency's #2010-1058). 986 S. 3930 passed the Senate by a vote of 65-34 (Record Vote Number: 259) and the House by a vote of 250-170 law (Roll It was signed into 508). on October 17, 2006. no. 16361 11 ii 11 i BBBBUBmiiM oi m i i Page 161 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 161

191 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations interrogators also 988 in believed his ^^HHHI The February 2007 supported this of high-value targets. CIA 989 discussions CIA Headquarters about the possible use prompting the CIA's conclusion, of at month, techniques By the end of the him. however, the CIA had interrogation enhanced against was "insufficient intelligence...that [Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi] possesses actionable determined there 990 justify use .to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. of' information.. the a panel In October interrogators recommended that of 2006, CIA interrogation enhanced abdominal slap, cramped confinement, nudity, CIA four techniques—the waterboard—be eliminated, but that the and of the interrogation techniques be the remainder 991 authorized this the CIA would have Under proposal, to subject detainees to retained. been manipulation, sleep deprivation, dietary facial slap, the facial grasp, the attention grab, the walling, positions, and water dousing. There are few CIA records describing the panel's stress or the response to its recommendations. The panel proposed dropping two deliberations, CIA's enhanced slap—that techniques—nudity and the abdominal CIA's the CIA of the interrogation that proposed in March 2006, while recommending had the CIA retain three director retaining techniques— walling, stress positions, and water dousing—that had not otherwise been other 992 for requested retention. of CIA Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage Modified the 4. The Develops Commissions Act Military In the spring of 2007, the OLC completed a draft of a legal (TS^^^^^H^^^/NF) opinion concluding the use of the CIA's seven proposed enhanced interrogation techniques—sleep that slap, nudity, manipulation, facial grasp, facial dietary abdominal slap, and the deprivation, attention grab—would be consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Military Commissions Act. This draft generated significant disagreement the the between advisor, John Bellinger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney State Department's legal to resulting Secretary of State Rice refusing Bradbury, concur with the Steven General in 993 proposed Executive Order. 988 for ^^^^ 1335 (0219462 NOV 06) See, example, 06); 1340 (041114Z NOV 06) NOV (041805Z NOV 06); (071318Z 1370 (230910Z NOV 06) 1574 (040918Z DEC 06) (271250Z NOV 1703 1860(1816222 06); DEC JAN ^^1^1956 (151211Z 07); 07); (081606Z JAN 07). 2007 (251057Z JAN 989 (081633Z 07) 2065 FEB ^Email from: |CTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED], subject: to ask needs occur on EITs for we before What FEB |; HEADQUARTERS (272015Z 9,2007. February 07); date: 991 from CIA Director, for Memorandum 23, October See 2006, |, Chief, 992 5e

192 UNCLASSIFIED I //NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ unc J in an effort to gain Secretary Rice's support, the CIA (TSy^HHIHHW^^) 2007, contractors SWIGERT DUNBAR to brief Secretary Rice on the CIA's asked CIA and that about Secretary Rice expressed her concern During the use interrogation program. briefing, the a detainee in the standing position for shackled purpose of sleep and of nudity being to CIA records, in early July 2007, after the capture of Muhammad deprivation. According Rice indicated that she would not concur with an interrogation program that Rahim, Secretary to but would not continue to object she the CIA's proposed interrogation nudity, that included reduced to six of the enhanced program techniques listed in the draft OLC if it was interrogation (1) deprivation, (2) dietary manipulation, (3) sleep grasp, (4) facial slap, memorandum: facial 994 slap, the (6) abdominal attention grab. (5) and Muhammad 5. Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA 's Rahim, the CIA's Provides No Intelligence Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Rahim 25, June facilitator Muhammad 2007, was On (TS/^^^^^^H^B^^) al-Qa'ida 995 captured Based on reports of debriefings of Rahim in foreign government custody in Pakistan. likely intelligence, personnel assessed that Rahim CIA possessed information related other and 996 of Usama bin Laden and to the al-Qa'ida leaders. location On July 3, 2007, Acting CIA other General John Rizzo informed Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury that Counsel CIA opinion anticipating a "new guest," and that the CIA "would need the signed DOJ the was 997 of 'in a matter days.'" Rahim was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION Muhammad 998 2007. Country | on HI^^^IMy l> in SITE Upon his arrival, CIA BROWN interrogators had a single discussion with Rahim during which he declined to provide answers to 999 questions to the United States and the locations of top al-Qa'ida leaders. about Based threats interaction, CIA reported that Rahim was unlikely to be cooperative. As a on this interrogators we the agree off the track and rails... that CIA should not be doing detention, rendition, interrogation." and is to a CIA leadership meeting that day in which the Committee's April 12, 2007, hearing would be Referring mmHI want that: "I discussed, to take that [criticism] on by letting all know how importan [sic] this stated is... kappes what the leaderships [sic] position is from hayden, [hearing] and jose... in case there is some and i am bullshit and rumblings among comopcnnt |sic - "componenT^hieft^ome of which corrosive, mumbling seeing." Sametime communication between and12/Apr/07, 09:50:54 to 09:56:57. ^^^^^^^^ 994 Email from: to: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo etc.; subject: EIT briefing for SecState on June 22, date: June 22, 2007; July 3, 2007, Steven Bradbury, Handwritten Notes, "John Rizzo"; email from: 2007; A. Bradbury; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with John date: Rizzo; 3,2007. July (251634Z JUN 07); 6439 7516 11199 996 of titled, CTC/RDG CIA for Possible Rendition memorandum Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007. The Planning document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled CTC/RDG 2463 Planning Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007. See also Possible (201956Z JUL 07). for 997 ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Email front: John A. Rizzo; to: Bradbury; July 3, 2007. date: 6439 2432 I^^HrUL 07) '/NOFORN SECRET/, TOP Page 163 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 163

193 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN result, Michael Hayden sent a letter to the president formally requesting that the CIA Director the Executive interpreting the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow president issue Order interrogate techniques. using the CIA's enhanced interrogation to A classified the CIA Rahim CIA's from that the use of the concluding six enhanced interrogation opinion legal OLC for use on Rahim (sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, techniques proposed abdominal attention and the slap, grab) did not violate applicable laws was issued on facial slap, 1000 the unclassified Executive Order was issued accompanying same day. 2007. 20, The July had been described by the CIA as "one Although a handful of al-Qa'ida facilitators Rahim of 1001 Bin Ladin and Zawahiri," directly Rahim for in a CIA cell without being working remained for a week, while questioned interrogators waited for approval to use the CIA's enhanced CIA 1002 against him. interrogation techniques interrogators initially optimism about their ability to CIA expressed techniques. from the CIA's enhanced interrogation using A cable information acquire Rahim the CIA detention site stated: sent from on site, with experience in almost every HVD [high- "Senior interrogators interrogation conducted by [CIA], believe the employment of value detainee] with measures would likely provide the impetus to interrogation shock [Rahim] his current resistance posture and provide an opportunity to from 1003 his to begin truthful participation." influence behavior CIA interrogators present at the CIA detention site began Four 1004 the enhanced interrogation applying on July 21, 2007. techniques According to CIA CIA's facial the "employed interrogation measures of interrogators slap, abdominal slap, and records, facial hold, and explained to [Rahim] that his assumptions of how he would be treated were 1005 wrong." interrogators emphasized to Rahim that "his situation was the result of his The he would in this position until interrogators chose to remove him from it, and he deception, stay 1006 correct misstatement." cable According to the always describing the could a previous then fabricate to Rahim information: interrogation, threatened he several reiterated the session that times would make up "[Rahim] during if interrogators pressured him, and that he information at the complete was 101)0 Central 16, from Michael Hayden, Director of the letter Intelligence Agency, to President George W. July 2007, Executive Order 13440, July 20, 2007; and Bush; for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Memorandum Intelligence from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Agency, Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Acting July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al to Detainees. Qaeda 1001 memorandum titled, "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007." CIA subsequent document unsigned, and the author is unknown. A was version, with identical text, was titled The "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007." 1002 2445 JUL 07); ••• 2463 (201956Z JUL 07); ••12467 (181104Z JUL 07) (211341Z 1003 2463 (201956Z JUL 07) 1004 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 1005 (211341Z JUL 07) 2467 looe 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 164 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 164

194 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ of the and they could even kill him if they wanted. mercy interrogators to Interrogators they would not allow him to die [Rahim] emphasized that he could them information, but that give would, because then not he 1007 truth." interrogators eventually, tell the of Rahim using the CIA's enhanced During the interrogation 1008 deprivation to eight extensive sleep subjected sessions, was techniques, interrogation Rahim 1009 the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial as well as During to slap. deprivation Rahim was usually shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper sleep sessions, 1010 to Rahim's diet was almost entirely limited of water and liquid Ensure shorts. a pair and 1011 interrogators would provide Rahim with a cloth CIA further cover himself as an meals. to to For example, a July 27, 2007, cable cooperate. the CIA detention site states incentive from when Rahim showed a willingness to engage in questioning that "historical information," about 1012 a large towel to cover his torso" as a "subtle reward." he was CIA interrogators "provided Rahim a variety questions during these interrogations, seeking information about the asked of 1013 not leaders, which he did al-Qa'ida provide. of current location senior 1007 JUL 07) 2467 (211341Z 1008 July to 104.5 hours of sleep deprivation from Rahim 21, 2007, to July 25, 2007. Sleep was subjected was stopped when Rahim "described visual and auditory hallucinations." After Rahim was allowed to deprivation sleep for hours and the psychologist concluded that Rahim had been faking his symptoms, Rahim was eight to to 62 hours of sleep deprivation. A third, 13 hour session, was halted due subjected a limit of 180 hours another deprivation a 30 of sleep day period. (Scf^^^B 2486 (251450Z JUL07)J^HM 2491 (261237Z JUL during JUL 07)JH|| JUL 07); |HMp501 (271624Z (261834Z 07); HM^02(281557Z JUL 07); and 2496 2508 (291820Z JUL 07).) On August 20, 2007, Rahim was subjected to a fourth sleep deprivation session. After lasted 104 hours, CIA Headquarters consulted with the Department of Justice and a session that with "[tjermi this point is required to be consistent at the DCIA Guidelines, which limit sleep that nation determined an aggregate of 180 hours in any deprivation any 30 day period." ( See HEADQUARTERS to repeat AUG Between August 28, 2007, and September 2, 07).) Rahim was subjected to three additional (240022Z 2007, deprivation sessions of 32.5 hours, 12 hours, and 12 hours. ( See ^BB^^64^291552Z AUG 07); sleep (311810Z AUG (010738Z SEP 07)~and|^^H 2666 (020722Z SEP 07).) •M2661 07);H^H2662 lasting CIA described, an eighth sleep deprivation session, interrogators 138.5 hours, in November As conducted 2007. AUG 07); 2554 (071453Z );J (281557Z JUL 2502 07 JUL 12467 07)^ (211341Z 07) SEP 2671 (061450Z 2654 AUG (301659Z 07); \ 12558 (081511Z AUG 07); 07); (291820Z 2508 JUL 07); 2554 (071453Z AUG 07); JUL (261834Z 12496 AUG 07); V (241158Z 2626 07); AUG (281606Z 2644 07); 12558 (081511Z AUG | 2661 (3118I0Z AUG 07); (29 SEP (020738Z 2662 07); 2645 I552Z AUG 07); 12666 (030722Z SEP 07) 07) JUL 2467 (211341Z 07) AUG (201528Z 12615 2570 | 07); AUG (101155Z 2501 (271624Z JUL 07) 07 JUL (211341Z 12467 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); JUL | 07); (231419Z 12476 12502 (281557Z JUL 07); AUG 2554 07); (071453Z \ 07); (291820Z [2508 JUL 2558 (081511Z AUG 07); AUG (241158Z 2626 07); 12570 (101155Z AUG 07); 2644 AUG 07) (281606Z AUG (301659Z 2654 07); (29I552Z AUG 07); 2645 07); AUG (311810Z 2661 SEP 07); 2666 (030722Z SEP 12662 07); [ (020738Z SEP in DUNBAR Muhammad CIA 07). participated (061450Z 12671 Rahim's interrogation contractor to August 29, 2007. See Volume III for additional details. sessions from August 9, 2007, ^^^BBB^BBBBW^NfiFORN 11 ii 11 ii 11 499 of 165 Page UNCLASSIFIED 165

195 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN On 2007, CIA Director Hayden approved an September 8, 1014 Muhammad detention. Rahim's The Director of the National Clandestine extension of CIA disagreed the approved extension, writing: Rodriguez Service Jose with because I do not concur with extending Rahim's detention for "I did not sign us days. believe the tools in our tool box will allow not to another 60 I do 1015 resistance techniques. J.A.R." Rahim's overcome after the September 2007 extension, CIA personnel were (^S^HHH^^fr^U?) Shortly stop use to of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim. Rahim was directed the 1016 for with minimal contact with CIA personnel cell approximately six weeks. in left his then 10, 2007, Rahim's interrogators reported to CIA Headquarters that Rahim had On September 1017 the corrective measures available to HVDIs "demonstrated have become that physical 1018 bearable." The use of the CIA's and interrogation techniques on Rahim predictable enhanced on November 2, 2007, resumed a sleep deprivation session that lasted until November 8, with 2007, a total of 138.5 hours. This sleep deprivation session, the longest to which Rahim had for subjected, was eighth and final session. Rahim was also subjected to dietary been his 1019 this during manipulation period. 1 According to (^SyVH^^mHIH records, intermittent questioning of Rahim CIA ^^) Rahim December 2007, when all questioning of 9, ceased for nearly three weeks. continued until this time, CIA detention site personnel discussed and proposed new ways to encourage During cooperation. proposals new Rahim's included suggestions that Rahim could be told that These family, of might be passed to his interrogations or that | audiotapes his 1014 memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central CIA Agency, Subject: 7,2007, Intelligence Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim. September 1015 approval CIA Record Sheet with Signatures for Routing of the Memorandum, "Request to Extend Detention and of Muhammad Rahim," September 5, 2007. J.A.R. are the initials of the Director of the NCS, Jose A. Rodriguez. 2697 (121226Z 07); CIA memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism SEP to Director, Intelligence Agency, October 31, 2007, Subject: Request Approval for the use of Center, Central Techniques; ••(101710 SEP07). During this period, contractor Interrogation HEADQUARTERS Enhanced recommended two approaches. The first was increasing Rahim's amenities over 8-14 Grayson SWIGERT days returning the use of EITs." The second was to from an interrogation approach that in effect "before "switching to a 'battle of wills,' to a 'recruiting* approach that amounts the adversarial contest inherent in framing the sidesteps session an interrogation." SWIGERT noted, however, that the latter approach "is apt to be slow in producing as since would requirements would not be immediately serviced, and "it information" work best if [Rahim] intelligence be See indefinitely." ( believe^i^yill email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED] and ir^CIA^ustody ancl Some Hammond DUNBAR; subject: m^mm thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation cc: next steps; date: September 17,2007, at 4:05 PM.) The CTC's deputy chief of operations replied that, "It's clear that the approach isn't going to work and the more we try variants on it, the more it allows [Rahim] to 'harsh' he will won^^iequestion is whether that perception believe be conveyed in Scenario 2." See email from has to: ^MB^B |l I ll I II 11| Grayson SWIGERT, Hammond [REDACTED] [REDACTEDL^^B^M. [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Some thoughts on [Rahim] DUNBAR, interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:28 PM. 1017 Detainee Interrogators (HVDI) High Value 1018 SEP ^^^ (101306Z 07) 2691 1019 07); 2915 (081755Z NOV 2888 Due to the time zone difference, (022355Z NOV 07). sleep deprivation session began it was November 2, 2007, at CIA Headquarters, but November 3, 2007, at when this site. the detention 1 iii i 'MBBWBBI 'NIII i III i m i'i 11 of 499 166 Page UNCLASSIFIED 166

196 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ was cooperating U.S. forces. On December | Rahim with 1020 CIA the detention site to stand down on the proposals. Headquarters 18, 2007, directed and of Mohammad Rahim detention interrogation The CIA's 1021 intelligence reports. resulted On March H 2008, in Rahim was no disseminated Muhammad the to where ^^^^H^^H took CIA of Rahim. by jj^B custody transferred Rahim to the custody of at The|HHlgovernment immediately point Rahim transferred back to CIA custody and rendered by the CIA to U.S. which was 1022 at Bay. custody military Guantanamo Review of Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of 6. CIA After-Action and Use Greater Techniques of Rapport-Building Techniques Interrogation Recommends Interrogations CIA in Future 21, 2008, and April On 2008, the CIA's RDG convened April 22, review of an after-action CIA's interrogation of Muhammad Rahim. According to summary the documents, CIA review panel attempted to determine why the CIA had been unsuccessful in the useful information Rahim. The summary documents emphasized that the acquiring from that the to Rahim's unresponsiveness were factors interrogation team's lack primary contributed CIA's of decision to use the the enhanced interrogation techniques of knowledge Rahim, after the short "neutral probe" and subsequent isolation period, the lack of clarity immediately whether the non-coercive techniques described in the Army Field Manual were permitted, about team's multiple to confront Rahim with incriminating evidence, and the use of the inability interrogation of despite the lack improvised any indication that these approaches approaches 1023 recommended might The summary documents effective. that future CIA interrogations be should incorporate rapport-building techniques, social interaction, loss of predictability, and 1024 deception extent. to The documents also recommended that the CIA conduct a a greater DEC 07); 3144(2704402 13097 (141321Z DEC 30981 DEC (311016Z 07); 3165 DEC 07); 1 13151 (291607Z (180120ZDEC07) JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS | 13166 (011404Z 1021 Volume and Volume III for additional information. II See indicate that Rahim depart I^^^^^^^^ERecords 1^1^^8408 time in nominal^^^Bcustody. See Volume III for additional details on this transfer. his 1023 Undated Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED); Undated CIA CIA with titled Action Review: HVDI Assessment, After attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Memorandum, [Rahim] Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Learned as Walling E1T, and Memorandum from | an to 9, CTC, May IB 2008, Subject: Results Director, After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation. A of document drafted by one of the participants prior to the review suggested that "intense legal/policy scrutiny" was also a negative however, this point was not mentioned in any of the post-review summaries, except in the factor; of interrogation confusion over whether particular context methods were legal. The summary documents discussing strategies, that officers devised and implemented several different state one after another. According to one of CIA the documents, "[t]hese varied strategies were implemented due to frustration and concern regarding the lack of intelligence production." 1024 Review, Memorandum, titled Undated CIA author (REDACTED), Undated CIA After-Action Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons ModificationofSleep Learned Recommendations Concerning the Panel Deprivation and Reinstatement of Review INI II III I 'B^BBI^M^^^B// NUI 'OHN Page 167 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 167

197 UNCLASSIFIED TOPSIX I/, IM l/NOFOHN survey techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries of interrogation 1025 to interrogation methods. in an develop effort effective the Rahim detainee in the CIA's Muhammad CIA last was Program."®* Interrogation Detention and Related to Company 7. CM by SWIGERT and DUNBAR Contracting Expenses Formed contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central CIA (TS^^^^^^^H'/NF) the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002, role in used and techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005 | then the 1027 ["Company to providing interrogators for addition CIA's interrogation program, Y"|. In the was granted a sole source contract to provide Company psychologists, debriefers, Y operational 1028 at CIA detention sites. security Under personnel contract, Company Y was tasked and the conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees with learn about the terrorist mind set to 1 was named the 'Terrorist Think Tank" or "T (this "), developing | project 1029 and history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. writing Later strategies, the their ihc note that—on behalf of of CIA—Company Y officers participated descriptions services and interrogations held in foreign government custody detainees served as in the of 11 10 of those governments and the CIA. intermediaries '" between entities 2006, of value By the base contract for their company, with all the 1031 exercised, in excess of $180 million. hired As of May 2007, Company Y had options 11 was CIA of officers, many former whom had previously been involved with the CIA's staff operating and Program, Company Y's chief Interrogation officer was the former Detention Walling as an BIT, and Memorandum from | | to Director, May 9, 2008. SubiectMteults of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation. CTC, 5 I0 CIA Memorandum, lilted After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA - Undated with [Rahim Action Review: I tVDI Assessment, After attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons titled [ Memorandum, Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification Learned Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Review of as EIT. Walling an 102(1 Volume See for additional information. III 11)37 mure information on CIA contracting with For Y]. see Volume I [Company ln 8 Letter toH^^^^^^^^HHHB YJ.altn: Hammond DUNBAR from [REDACTED], - [Company Not re of Officer, Authorization to Proceed Confirmation to Exceed (ATP/NTE): email from: Contracting Verbal to: | REDACTED); ]REDACTED), [REDACTED]: [REDACTED], subject: Contractual Steps with SWIGERT& DUNBAR; date: March 2, 2005; Next 18. 2005, Letter from March [ KEDACTED|, Y |. re Letter Contract low Email from: subject: dale: June 17, 2005. at 11:08:22 AM^maiHromri^^^^^^B to: [REDACTED!. [REDACTED]: cc: ^HH^^^H [REDACTED], REDACTED[REDACTED], subject: PCS CTC officer to [Company Y 1 [REDACTED]: ("One of the primary functions is to develop and set-up what location] call the 'Terrorist Think Tank' we (previously to the DDO and ADDO) which briefed be critical as we develop our will date: July 12.2005. at 10:25:48 AM: Justification Date: 28 February 2006. Justification For Other Than Full And Open Competition. [Company Y], Contractor: 1030 Report, example. [Company Y] Monthly report, February 2006; See. Y| Monthly for March 2006; [Company [Company Y| Quarterly. 01 Jan - 31 March 2007. ll>: Contractor: " Date: 25 July 2006, Justification For Other Than Pull and Open Competition, Justification [Company YJ. INI I I III I ^^^^^^^^^^^B^NUI'OUN Page 168 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 168

198 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NQFORN RET// TOP SEC of the of the CIA supervising the Renditions and chief division In Detention Y hired at least | CIA security protective officers to addition, Group. Company staff Y's In March 2006, a list of projected contracts. and contractors Company CIA work on 1032 Detention Group included H separate within CIA's Of those Renditions and positions. [73%] for contractors, the majority of were were contractors from || positions, whom 1033 By June Y. RDG reported having | staff officers and Company 2007, 1034 2008, contractors. a total of H positions, with | staff ofTicersand B| [85%] had RDG By 1035 the CIA. to according contractors, 1 The CIA's contract (TS^j^^^HHH^^ with Y was terminated in mid-2009. ) Company the of the company's creation in 2005 through time close-out of its contract in 2010, From the CIA paid Company Y more the $75 million for services in conjunction with the CIA's than 1036 Interrogation Program. Detention The CIA also certified Company Y's office in and Compartmented Information (SCIF), which required as a Secure Facility access to be and provided Company Y to to CIA internal officer detailed a CIA at its facility. In 2008, the CIA computer an additional payment to networks authorized Y approximately $570,000, after Company Y of that it had incurred costs for Company indicated countersurveillancc of its officers when conducting in the press in conjunction with the program. The CIA agreed to a $5 million appeared other contract company that covered, among the expenses, criminal for indemnification 7 in representation for firm | law | Y hired Company prosecution. a prominent 1038 million billed the CIA $1.1 2007, for legal and from 2007 through 2012 per its expenses 1039 agreement. Part indemnification of these expenses included legal representation at a 1040 Committee by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November 2008. staff Under the briefing indemnification contract, CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses CIA's the 1041 2021. through 1032 Staff & Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006. DO/CTC«/RDG Projected 1033 2006. DO/CTCMH'RDG Contractors, updated as of March 15, Staff Projected & 1034 June 4, 2007, RDG, Mission Summary. CTC confirmation, received by telephone on November 16, 2012. 1035 1036 DTS DTS #2012-4008. CIA paid Company Y $612,000 in 2010 for contract close-out costs. In a #2009-1258; 2009 to the CIA also informed the Committee that, in addition to payments March Company Y, notification, SWIGERT received Hammond DUNBAR had Grayson $1.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively, as and representations individuals. elsewhere, the notification includes inaccurate noted about the effectiveness of the As CIA program. See Congressional Notification, March 18, 2009 (DTS #2009-1258). 1037 Email [REDACTED], CTC^M; to: Hammond DUNBAR, Grayson SWIGERT; cc: from: i^^HH^H [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Copy of [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Indemnification Agreement; date: July 13, 2007, at 02:22 PM; email from: [REDACTED], Chief, Contract Signed Division; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED), Law Waiver [REDACTED]; Fw: Modified Indemnification [REDACTED], New AR 7-17 subject: Memo, Agmt... Too?; date: November 13,2007, at 10:32 AM. 1038 Email from: to: subject: Billing, May-December 2007; date: [REDACTED]; 12,2008, 06:42 PM. August at 1039 from the CIA regarding Response Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008). Contract 1040 See #2009-0572. DTS 1041 Response from the CIA regarding Contract Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008). 111111 iiii j^BB^BBlMi^MI 11" 11111 Page 169 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 169

199 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 8. The and Interrogation Program Ends CIA's Detention December (U) fewer than nine months after Director Hayden told the European 5, On 2007, a CIA CIA's Interrogation Program was not and program, but the Detention Union that House-Senate conference for the Fiscal "America's 2008 Intelligence program," the Year voted include an amendment that to coercive interrogation techniques Act Authorization banned the Army Field Manual on and Intelligence Collector Operations as the established Human 1042 all U.S. government interrogations. standard The conference report passed interrogation for 1043 House the Senate with bipartisan majorities. the and both March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence (U) Act for Fiscal Year On Authorization that coercive interrogations. In a radio banned explaining the decision, the 2008 address stated "[t]he bill Congress sent me would take away one of the most valuable tools in president the war terror—the CIA program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives." on the use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, President Bush stated that Addressing of it allows reason" program "has been effective is that CIA the CIA to use "main the the procedures to question a small number specialized the most dangerous terrorists interrogation of careful The president stated that the supervision." program had a "proven track under CIA and that the CIA obtained "critical intelligence" as record," of the CIA's enhanced a result interrogation related to the Camp Lemonier plotting, the Karachi plotting, the Second techniques president plotting, Heathrow Airport plotting. The the then repeated a warning the Wave and had previously provided to the White House, that CIA "restrict the CIA to [interrogation] to 1044 the [Army] Field Manual," "could cost in lives." methods As is described in this American summary, and detailed more extensively in the full Committee Study, the CIA's representations to the White regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the House of the plots were inaccurate. thwarting referenced failed March by a vote of 225-188, the House of Representatives 2008, to override 11, On (U) 1045 veto. presidential the In (T&V^IHHI^H^^) and January 2009, CIA officers briefed the December 2008 team President-elect Barack Obama on for CIA's Detention and Interrogation transition the CIA Director Hayden prepared a statement that relayed, "despite Program. you have heard what or read a variety of public fora, these [enhanced interrogation] techniques and this program did in 1042 Authorization 07); House Report 110-478 - Intelligence MAR Act for Fiscal DIRECTOR ••(152227Z lh 110 Year Congress (2007-2008), Section 327. 2008, 1043 H.R. passed the House of Representatives on December 2082 2007, by a vote of 222-197 (Roll No: 1160) 13, and passed the Senate on February 13,2008, by a vote of 51-45 (Record Vote Number: 22). 1044 See Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," The New York Times, dated March 8, 2008. Located, among "Text: places, www.nytiines.com/2008/03/08/washington/08cnd-ptext.html. For an example of a previous CIA other at to the White House with similar assertions, see CIA Memorandum for the briefing "Review of Interrogation Record, Program 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General on Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; with briefing Counsel slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program." dated July 29, 2003. The CIA document provided to the participants of states, this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." For additional commentary, see "Termination "Veto of Bill on CIA Tactics Affirms Bush's Legacy," The New York Times, dated March 9, 2008. 1045 Lh House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 117 of the 1 i0 Second Congress, U.S. Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01 PM. TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 170 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 170

200 UNCLASSIFIED 7NOFORN TOP SECRET; 1046 The materials included inaccurate information on the operation and work." prepared as the and Interrogation Program, as well Detention the same set of of CIA's management the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation examples that the CIA had of techniques 1047 over several years. to The examples policymakers were nearly entirely provided provided inaccurate. n 22, January (TSZ/fl^^B^^^H^^) 2009, C> Obama issued Executive Order President 13491, required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that which operates The not operate any such detention facility in the future." it currently Executive and... prohibited from U.S. government employee Order using interrogation techniques other than any 1048 on Army Field Manual 2-22.3 the Human Intelligence Collector Operations. those in ioi6 qa Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover named with Seating title, "D/CIA Conference Room memorandum Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama the a.m." Security Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 National The briefing book includes the previously Team mentioned, "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same 15, intelligence in the document of the same name, but dated April found 2005. claims 1047 p defied information, see Volume IT. or 1048 The Executive Order also stated that the FBI and "other Federal law enforcement agencies" could "continu[e] to voluntary use non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit authorized, statements and do not Page 171 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 171

201 UNCLASSIFIED TOP Intelligence Acquired CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of III. and Enhanced Interrogation to Multiple the CIA's Techniques Constituencies CIA A. Background Effectiveness on Representations authorizations in 2009, obtain policy order through From 2002 to 1049 CIA made a series of representations to officials at the White House, and legal approvals, the Justice, the the Congress, asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation Department of and unavailable effective necessary to produce otherwise and intelligence techniques were uniquely 1050 government could not obtain from other sources. further The CIA that represented the U.S. representations were also made by the CIA to other elements of the executive branch, to include the 1049 Xhe.se the the National Intelligence. As described in this Study, of Department of Justice first approved of Office Director of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on August 1, 2002. the use 1050 From 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 2003 through plots techniques set of examples of terrorist a specific "disrupted" and terrorists captured that interrogation provided CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation the CIA techniques. representations asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation further was unique, unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: techniques otherwise Counsel representations Department of Justice Office of Legal the Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, CIA in (1) on a series of highly specific CIA representations on which type of intelligence acquired from the use of relied the CIA's interrogation techniques to assess their legality. enhanced CIA representations referenced by the the The include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain OLC "critical," "vital," "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and "[the disrupt" The OLC memorandum further states that threats. CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that and terrorist CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United the (See States." for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Memorandum of Steven Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office Bradbury, Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: G. Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Be of Justice of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA Department Office the the intelligence acquired from the use of of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. on type representations documents and the President's September 6, Citing speech describing the CIA's interrogation program CIA 2006, was on CIA-provided information), the OLC based states: 'The CIA interrogation program— (which memorandum in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security and, Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President of the plans [on 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist 6, we could not get anywhere else, explained September program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central the Agency, Intelligence Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal from Act, July Counsel, Re: Application of the War Crimes 20, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 2007, of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 (3) or that of Enhanced Techniques of one kind use another had produced significant intelligence represented "the that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and which warned policymakers that information of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for "[t]ermination Program Record Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation from on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA the Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) September draft The (4) to the Office of Inspector General CIA's Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: response "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has evidence almost saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The certainly points clearly to 11 ii 11 ii i i M^^^MMj^BMiVNoroim Page 172 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 172

202 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ the CIA's interrogation techniques "saved lives" and "enabled the CIA to disrupt that enhanced capture additional and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on terrorist plots, terrorists, 1031 effectiveness used these representations of Justice to assess The al-Qa'ida." Department of without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks the fact that not if of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, involving hundreds, thousands, IG for re (S) Comments to Draft subject: Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention Director Deputy Operations; Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum and Interrogation CIA's of Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for re Successes Counterterrorism assesses Leon February 2009, which state that the "CIA in that the RDI program worked and Director CIA Panetta interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, the [enhanced timely intelligence from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by of the acquired "Tab means." CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, See 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- other ( and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid I8FEB.2009" Shaykli Muhammad including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and (KSM)," with associated "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," Effectiveness," documents, references," Key Chart: Attachment," and "supporting Impacts to include "Background on "Background Intelligence Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on on Key entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), which provides a list of "some of the March 18,2009, the and plots" that the CIA had attributed to captures use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation key disrupted and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from techniques, in this detainees program not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See Volume II for additional CIA would obtain asserting CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to the unique, representations that unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." otherwise 1051 other documents that contain the exact, or similar CIA representations, see: (1) CIA memorandum Among for the "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, Record, Program," August 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation 5, dated July 29, 2003, presented to dated senior White House officials with additional briefings using die slides as documented in September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record the Scott Muller, CIA Interrogation Program. (2) CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from from Subject: with CIA's for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, Director the subject line, "Comments to Pavitt, James Deputy Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, Draft IG CIA's of Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. (3) CIA "Successes Counterterrorism on Intelligence. Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source "Khalid Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13^004; Directorate of to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, "H, Materials on KSM fax Abu Zubaydah. H " This and report widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community and a copy of this report was provided to the Senate was 31,2009, Committee on July 15, 2004. On March Intelligence former Vice President Cheney requested Select on declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August the 24, 2009. CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence/^ubiect: (4) in "Effectiveness CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included the email from: to: of and subject: techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr. Rice explaining value of the interrogation techniques." (5) CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of the Counsel, Department Justice, dated March 2,2005, from IHIHl^l, i^H Legal Group, DCI Legal of Interrogation subject: of the CIA Counterterrorist "Effectiveness Techniques," (6) CIA Counterterrorist Center, for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA "Briefing Detention Interrogation Program." (7) CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 and DCI Meeting Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee PC: (HVDI) Techniques." (8) CIA "Briefing Interrogation Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the DepartmentofJustice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47 AM. CIA fax to DOJ Command Center^latec^prim, 2005, forHH|, Office of Legal (9) U.S. Legal of Justice, from ^H Counsel, Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: Department CIA Materials and Abu Zubaydah, included KSM Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: of Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah.; (10) CIA Against Intelligence Reporting Pivotal for the War "Detainee Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA Assessment, 1 ii III i BBH^BIMB^B^B mi 1 mi inn i Page 173 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 173

203 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 1052 whether interrogation techniques were legal; the policymakers at the White enhanced CIA's these representations—and legal analysis by the Department of Justice—to House used the The provided House officials on June 1, 2005. White Intelligence Assessment at the was records to indicate was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, SECRET//NOFORN classification level Cheney Vice the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly former President requested entitled, redactions 24, 2009. (11) CIA memorandum August "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist with released on Interrogation Program," dated December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J. Detention and Assistant to President/National Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the Hadley, the Advisor, President/Homeland John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, and Security Ambassador Operations the of the Detainee Program to CT Loss and Analysis." (12) CIA briefing "Impact Attachment, of May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF document TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 dated STAFF for of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs." Briefing Chief dated briefing entitled, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update," document 11 July 2006, internal document (13) CIA within CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006.. saved POINTS FOR DCI MEETING." .TALKING (14) document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist CIA Program," and Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, Interrogations "CIA the by W. Bush acknowledging and describing George CIA's Detention and Interrogation speech 2006, President well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the Program, as Terrorist Value Program." (15) CIA classified statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on High Detainee Intelligence by Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central General Agency, 12 April 2007, and Intelligence, provided Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence accompanying Detention Agency Interrogation Program." (16) CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate and on Appropriations, on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on Committee Subcommittee the 26, 5:39:48PM,entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of at $jj| Million reduction in CIA/CTC's October 2007, and Detention Program." (17) "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard Rendition November 2007," dated November 06 6, 2007, the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." with CIA (18) Briefing Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, for and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," Detentions, named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 January 2009." (19) CIA briefing documents for Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic Leon "Key Intelligence Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." attachment, and document include on RDI Program" agenda, CIA Briefing "EITs and Effectiveness," with documents The "DCIA "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key associated documents, Chart: and Impacts "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Intelligence Attachment," on (20) Disrupted." faxed to the Senate Select Committee CIA Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at Plots document entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258). See also CIA representations detailed in 3:46PM, memorandum Senior John A. Rizzo, OLC Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven for Bradbury, Principal Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application G. Deputy Torture States Article 16 of the Convention Against Under to Certain Techniques that May Be of United Obligations in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Used and OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting Detainees; General Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Counsel, of Office General, Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Legal Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of Value al Qaeda Detainees. High 1052 See this summary addressing representations to the Department of Justice, as well as Memorandum section of from Rizzo, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Acting Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, for John of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation Office al Qaeda Operative; Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, of Senior General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Deputy Re: Attorney of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Office Application of United States Obligations Under General, Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Detainees; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Qaeda General, Agency, G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Steven Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, from 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva of Conventions Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation to High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 174 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 174

204 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 1053 whether interrogation program should be approved as a matter of policy; the and assess CIA Congress members the CIA representations in overseeing and assessing the program, relied of on 1054 crafting funding, providing related and legislation. 1053 Record August 5, 2003, CIA documents, for the the from Scott Muller from a other Among see. Memorandum Security Council Principals Meeting with the subject, "Review of Interrogation Program July 29,2003, National on 2003," well as the accompanying briefing slides, "CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003"; March 4, 29 as July Program. Vice Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation President CIA document, dated March for 2005, Briefing "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and 4, 2005, Program"; CIA document, entitled, Interrogation May 2006, entitled, BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for dated 2, and Staff President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention the Interrogation Programs; CIA document of Chief to Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the entitled, "DCIA "sent 6 in DCIA Nov. was preparation for POTUS meeting"; and CIA Briefing for Obama National document to "Renditions, Interrogations and Team- (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing Detentions, Security Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 January 2009." RDI on 1054 Among other see: (1) CIA testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on April documents, 2002, regarding Zubaydah's initial interrogation; (2) CIA written answers to Committee Questions for the 24, Abu (3) August regarding results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogations; 2002, CIA testimony to SSCI on dated Record, 15, 2002, regarding covert detention facilities and results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation; (4) CIA cable September 5, 27, September briefing to Chairman Bob Graham and Vice Chairman Richard Shelby and their documenting 2002, the regarding CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah; (5) staff directors Memorandum for the Record documenting February 4, 2003, briefing to SSCI Chairman Pat Roberts and CIA staff Committee regarding the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program; (6) CIA testimony to SSCI on directors (7) 5, the capture and initial interrogation of KSM; regarding CIA witness testimony to SSCI on March 2003, 19,2003, regarding KSM's interrogation; (8) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on April 1, 2003, regarding March capture; Intelligence April 3, 2003, KSM's Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat (9) entitled by Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded reporting, a Bodyguard "Klialid testimony provided the SSCI of Lies," April 7, 2003; (10) CIA to to SSCI on April 30, 2003, regarding detainee on reporting; (11) CIA testimony to SSCI on June 25, 2003, regarding KSM interrogation; (12) CIA testimony to SSCI on 30, 2003, regarding CIA detainee threat reporting; (13) CIA testimony to SSCI on September 3, July regarding i^Hfl^i including CIA detention authorities; (14) CIA prepared briefing for 2003, authorities, entitled, Roberts Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV Vice "CIA Interrogation Program: DDO Pat and Chairman 04 September 2003"; (15) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on May Talking 2004, regarding CIA role in Points, 12, at Ghraib prison; (16) SSCI staff notes for July Abu CIA briefing to Chairman Pat Roberts and abuses 15,2004, Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV regarding the status of the CIA interrogation program; (17) CIA testimony Vice on regarding 13, 2004, to SSCI CIA and the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; (18) Hand-written notes of September Rodriguez Chairman Rockefeller IV recording a briefing by Jose D. on March 7, 2005; (19) CIA Vice John for the Record, Subject: Sensitive Issue -Counterterrorism, October 31, 2005, regarding briefing for Memorandum Majority Detainee Bill Frist regarding the Senate Treatment Act, and email exchanges between John Rizzo, Leader "Re: required Re: Sen. Frist subject: for briefing on impact of Immediate records Amendment"; October 31, 2005, and associated McCain concerning CIA briefings for Senators John date: McCain, Thad Cochran, Ted Stevens, and John Cornyn; (20) SSCI Memorandum for the Record, March 8, 2006, documenting CIA of March 7, 2006, to staff on status of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program; briefing 15, CIA Goss testimony to the SSCI on March Porter 2006, regarding the status of the CIA's (21) Director and Interrogation Program; (22) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on September 6, Detention regarding Program, CIA's Detention and Interrogation 2006, prior to Senate consideration of the Military the Act testimony 2006; (23) CIA Director Michael Hayden Commissions to the SSCI on November 16, 2006, of passage the Detention and Interrogation Program, following CIA's of the Military Commissions Act of regarding 2006; (24) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on April 12, 2007, regarding the CIA's Detention CIA and and a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross; (25) CIA fax from Program Interrogation employee to U.S. Senate Committee on [REDACTED] Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover Appropriations, sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points and Appeal Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition the Detention Program"; (26) CIA Director of Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on December 11,2007, regarding the public revelation of the CIA's 11111111111 mi 11 in i Page 175 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 175

205 UNCLASSIFIED MI I I MI HIM I 11111 In CIA to the executive and legislative branches, the (i^S/^I^H^^HB^^) presentations that CIA had consented to, or endorsed, the CIA's interrogation other represented parties enhanced example, review of the CIA's a policy interrogation techniques an program. As during CIA informed a subset of the National Security Council principals that the use in July 2003, the interrogation enhanced was "approved by the attorney general," and was of the CIA's techniques same to and HPSCI leadership." In the SSCI presentation, the CIA disclosed "fully the the CIA interrogation program "had represented significant intelligence that produced that in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." The CIA then provided information had, interrogation "attacks a direct result of the CIA as program, and warned of examples averted" "[germination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly policymakers that 1055 extensive." CIA was asked by White House officials to review and When the CIA's further the effectiveness of the for enhanced interrogation techniques in provide evidence the CIA responded that it was "difficult, 2004, impossible" to conduct such a review, but if not assured House officials that "this program works," "the techniques are effective," and the White 1056 produces The "results" provided by the CIA consisted of the "disruption" program "results." CIA plots capture of specific terrorists. The the further represented that terrorist and of specific acquired as a result of the CIA's the interrogation techniques was unique information enhanced 1057 "otherwise These specific CIA claims unavailable." an especially important role and played of videotapes of the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri; (27) CIA Director destruction Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on February 5, 2008, regarding waterboarding and CIA public the prior vote on February 13, 2008, on Senate Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act interrogations, to would have prohibited any member of the U.S. Intelligence Community from that interrogation techniques not using authorized the U.S. Army Field Manual. by 1055 on the Record: Memorandum of Interrogation Program for 29 July 2003." Memorandum prepared by "Review CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending the meeting included July director of CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National the the Attorney Condoleezza House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; White General John Ashcroft; Advisor Rice; Security Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the Acting Security Assistant National John Council, Bellinger. 1056 Points for the National Security Council CIA "Talking points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting talking entitled, Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," PC: March 4, 2005, for a March dated 8, 2005, See also CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor Rice entitled, "Effectiveness of the meeting. Counterterrorist Techniques," dated December 2004. Interrogation CIA p of 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding die effectiveness 1057 the CIA's enhanced rom interrogation provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that techniques use CIA to information obtained from the attributed of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA the representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see-. unique, Legal CIA the Department of Justice Office of in Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, (1) representations relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations which the type of intelligence acquired from the use of on the enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their CIA's The CIA representations referenced by the legality. OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," "vital," and unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect "otherwise that disrupt" threats. The OLC memorandum further states and "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that terrorist the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United Intelligence States." See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central ( Agency, from IMI i i i BB^^BB^BUB^OFORN ii Page 176 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 176

206 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1058 Department legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. of in the Justice's Justice Department that an analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced documents of stated May Principal Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Assistant 30, 2005, Re: Bradbury, Steven G. Deputy States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques Application of United Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the that May Be which Office Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20,2007, of also relied on CIA of Department Justice the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. representations on documents Citing the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program CIA and based (which information), the OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program— on was CIA-provided serve its of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to particular, this paramount interest [security in and, use by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ... of the the President Nation] As [on 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, September explained A. has innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John saved Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central program the Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Intelligence Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Deputy Counsel, 20,2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 July Geneva Conventions Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value of the to Council (3) for members of the National Security briefings in July and September 2003, Detainees.) CIA al Qaeda that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of which kind or another had produced significant represented one information had, in the view of CIA that saved lives," and which warned policymakers intelligence professionals, "[tjermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensi ve." (See August 5,2003 Memorandum that the Review from Scott Muller, Subject: for of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Record Program, July September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Interrogation 29,2003; Muller, and Memorandum for the Record from 26,2003, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) Briefing; September The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review (4) the CIA program, which asserts: of "Information CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has [the States almost countless American lives inside the United saved and abroad. The evidence points clearly to certainly the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, not thousands, of casualties." ( See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, if Director for subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention Deputy Operations; February Program" February 27, 2004; attachment: date: 24, 2004, Memorandum Interrogation and 2003-7J23-IG; CIA's Countertenorism Detention and Intenogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA re Successes of Panetta which February 2009, Leon state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and die in Director that techniques effective in producing foreign intelligence," and were "[mjost, if not all, of interrogation] [enhanced timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or the by other reported means." See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Piogram- ( from and "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived attachment, Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 18FEB.2009" graphic Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Shaykh with Attachment documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Effectiveness," (AZ and KSM)," associated on to Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," "Background include "Background Key to Key on Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed Captures the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on and March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), which provides a list of "some of the key captures disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation and the and assesses that most, if not all, of "CIA timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this techniques, states: would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See Volume II for additional CIA program representations asserting the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, that unavailable lives." that "saved otherwise intelligence 1058 May II for detailed See The OLC's Volume 30, 2005, memorandum relied on the CIA's infonnation. representations in determining that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques did not violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition executive conduct that "shocks the conscience," indicating that this analysis was a on context-specific its fact-dependent question." The OLC also linked "highly analysis of whether the use of the and the enhanced techniques was "constitutionally arbitrary" to interrogation representation by the CIA that the CIA's program produced "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence." (See Memorandum for Intelligence John Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Rizzo, Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal A. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office ofLega^ounsel^a^0^005^e: Application of United States 11111111111 im IIi i iJJM^^B" ii Page 177 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 177

207 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETZ/M^^^^^M^^^B^/NOFORN techniques was context-specific, fact-dependent question" and interrogation a "highly importance of CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation highlighted the the quantities otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence," "substantial techniques produced of 1059 for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." and were "largely responsible to Review the of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation B. Past Efforts Effectiveness Techniques Detention in which the CIA's During and Interrogation (TS/^^^^^^^^^^VNF) the period operational, from 2002 to 2009, there were three reviews that addressed the Program was the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: (1) the CIA Office of Inspector effectiveness of review Review, May 2004; (2) an internal in conducted by two senior Special General released in 2004; and (3) a 2005 "Blue Ribbon" panel consisting of two individuals not CIA officers had the According to CIA records, as of the spring of 2007, the CIA CIA. not employed by 1060 studies on the effectiveness other interrogation techniques." any "conducted of Each of the previous reviews (TS/^H^^^H^I^NF) on interviews with CIA relied personnel in the program, as well as documents prepared by CIA personnel, which involved that the interrogation program was effective, and that the use of the CIA's represented CIA techniques terrorist "enabled the CIA to disrupt interrogation plots, capture enhanced had Techniques Article of Under Convention Against Torture to Certain 16 that May be Used in the Obligations the of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.) The CIA provided examples of the purported effectiveness of the Interrogation enhanced to techniques in response CIA's a request from the OLC. According to an email from B interrogation Steven Legal Assistant Attorney General Deputy Bradbury explained that BHB^TC Principal the standards under Article 16 [of the Convention Against Torture] require a balancing of the "because examples need government's information, it would be quite helpful if we had any case studies or for to the demonstrate value of information produced the the program." £eeemail^ronr^M(BBBB; to: ^^^B by [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; date: March 2, 2005, 2:32 PM. 10 .TO other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda dated May 30,2005, Among July 20, The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum repeats additional CIA representations, including that and 2007. techniques to essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary interrogation detect and disrupt "enhanced remain to threats" emerging the use of the techniques "led and specific, actionable intelligence." The July 20, such that OLC memorandum states that the ".. .use of enhanced interrogation techniques is intended to service this 2007, interest of paramount the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable [security CIA's citing to the President that the representations enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence," CIA "we could not get anywhere else," and that "the use of such techniques saved information lives by American revealing about planned terrorist plots." information submitted el draft response to 1060 for the Record a by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions after an April 12, 2007, hearing on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA draft response states the CIA Ribbon Panel, consisting of two outside reviewers, was the only independent review of the Blue of on CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "CIA had not conducted any other studies effectiveness the effectiveness final [the] interrogation techniques." The the CIA response to die Committee states: "The 2004 of reviewed Office the Inspector General report that of CIA's counterterrorism detention and interrogation CIA activities recommended a non-CIA independent experts' review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EIT each and the necessity for the continued use of regarding technique. As a result, CIA sought and a determination to ancl agreement of Mr. BBIBB review, Mr- ^Bi^B^BB obtained conduct an independent the which is A also as the Blue-Ribbon Panel report. Their individual reports are provided at Tabs known and B." IIII ii i i W^^^JBJI^^B.yNorrmN M Page 178 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 178

208 UNCLASSIFIED y/NOFORN TOP SECRET/^ 1061 terrorists, a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." and CIA additional collect 1062 "[t]his that CTC could not have gotten any other way." is personnel represented: information no any in CIA records that are of the past (TS/^ll^m^^/NF) There indications the independently the intelligence claims related to to CIA's use of its attempted reviews validate techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and in enhanced interrogation such, previous As review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the documents. no subjected acquired detainee during or after being a CIA to the CIA's enhanced was from CIA or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to interrogation United techniques, the government unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable. States ("otherwise of of Representations Regarding the Effectiveness Origins the CIA's Enhanced C. The CIA Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," Interrogation "Captured and Terrorists" Before the took custody of its first detainee, CIA attorneys (TS^^^^^^^H^^NF) CIA definitions limits interrogations and the legal coercive of torture. On the of researched 2001, CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys circulated a draft legal November 26, 1063 "Hostile Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." memorandum The entitled Interrogations: torture listed considered to be techniques by a foreign government memorandum interrogation a specific nongovernmental organization, including "cold torture," and positions," "forced "enforced exhaustion," "sensory deprivation," "perceptual deprivation," "social physical "threats and "conditioning techniques," and "deprivation of deprivation," humiliation," 1064 on The described various prohibitions draft torture and the potential sleep." memorandum of "necessity" as a legal defense against use of torture, stating: charges "[i]t therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid would, to of officials who tortured U.S. obtain information that saved prosecution many lives... A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of torture in of our obligations under international law, with consideration light to the and to international opinion on our current given circumstances 1001 (1) of Inspector General, Special Review Office Detention and Interrogation See: CIA - Counterterrorism May 2004; (2) May 12,2004, Program, for Deputy Director for Operations from (2003-7123-IG), Memorandum Information Center, and Henry Crumpton, Operations National Resources Divisions | Chief, Chief, Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject via "Operational Review of CIA Detainee line, Program"; (3) Blue Ribbon Panel Review, including a September 2, 2005, Memorandum from and to 23, Porter Goss, CIA, entitled "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness," and a September Hl^l 2005, Director from Porter the Honorable Memorandum Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled, to Assessment to from Director for request of EIT effectiveness." "Response 1062 See, among other examples, a June 27,2003, Inspector General interview with^TC^hief of Operations, HB^HH^I' The of that interview (2003-7123-IG) states: "[Hi^^^^H .stated that the record the Al-Qa'ida been very effective. .. [HIHHHl views has intelligence as the main criteria Agency's program the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed forjudging to take other terrorists off the CTC street to prevent terrorist attacks. This is information and CTC could not have gotten any other way." that 1063 N for ber 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations ovem Officers." This document includes information regarding Paragraph 4. CIA 1064 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA See Volume I for additional information. Officers." 1 1 11 i 11 ii ^^M^MMBMBI <" i i " Page 179 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 179

209 UNCLASSIFIED TOP against campaign very unwilling to call the U.S. to terrorism—states may be 1065 lives." saving thousands of in when torture task for it resulted 2002, a CTC attorney researched the impact of the On February 1, 1066 Geneva the on future CIA interrogation activities. (GC) The application of Conventions wrote: attorney then and enjoys GC coverage, detainee the optic becomes "If is a POW the defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, how legally saves ultimately that [a named CIA attorney]'s papers but lives. I believe most and necessity defense are the two anticipatory obvious reflecting on self 1067 available." defenses Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) included the "necessity defense" (U) The Counsel, 1, to the White House memorandum determining, among other 2002, August in its "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation things, that 1068 might methods the criminal prohibition against torture. that The OLC memorandum violate" states: appears to that under the current circumstances the necessity defense "It us allegation successfully response to an in of a Section be maintained could ...Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess 2340A violation. 1065 added. 26, 2001, Draft of Legal November Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Italics Appendix, for CIA Officers," at 1. The CIA would later repeat both claims, representing to senior officials Considerations and the of Justice that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence that Department lives," issued that this intelligence was otherwise unavailable. Further, on August 1, 2002, OLC "saved an and but form opinion, in the unclassified, of a memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, non-public 18 whether interrogation methods would violate certain U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. The memorandum analyzing provides a similar rationale for the necessity defense, stating, "certain justification defenses might be available that would potentially criminal liability. Standard criminal law defenses of necessity and self-defense could eliminate interrogation methods to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United justify needed its "even The memorandum later concludes: and if an interrogation method might violate Section citizens." States any or couk^jrovideiustifications that would eliminate self-defense criminal liability." necessity 2340A, I0M from: [REDACTED]; to: •^•H^HI and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning"; Email February 2002. date: 1, 1067 added. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Italics the date: 2002. In response to a request from 1, Department of Justice's Office of Questioning"; February Responsibility (OPR), the CIA provided two memoranda Professional dated November 7,2001, the other - one undated of which discussed the necessity defense. The - neither report states: "Although the CIA Office of OPR General Counsel (OGC) told us that these were the only CIA memoranda in its possession on interrogation policy, some of information we obtained from the CIA suggested otherwise. In an internal email message dated the I, Attorney from CTC attorney [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] referred to '[CIA February 2002, papers defense.'" on necessity and anticipatory self [REDACTED]] See Department of Justice, Office of reflecting of Responsibility, Investigation into the Office Report. Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Professional Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, pp. 31-32. 2009, 1068 President, Alberto R. Gonzales, Memorandum to the for from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Counsel General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, "Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C 2340-2340A," U.S. Federal Torture Statute. the III! II III I ^^^^^^^^B^^BIVNOROHN Page 180 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 180

210 UNCLASSIFIED I// NOFORN TOP SECRET/ /^ could enable United States to prevent attacks that information that the their or September 11 attacks in the magnitude. equal potentially surpass could that might occur during an interrogation would pale to Clearly, any harm the compared avoided by preventing such an attack, insignificance to harm 1069 hundreds or thousands of lives." could which take to a report by the Department of Justice Office of (TS^^^^^m^^l^NF) According (OPR), Responsibility in July 2009, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Professional released the "acknowledged CIA may have indirectly suggested the new sections [related Yoo John that and possible defenses, including the necessity defense] by to Commander-in-Chief authority what in happen him a case where an interrogator went 'over the line' and asking would that violated Yoo also told the OPR statute." he drafted those relevant sections. inadvertently the senior Department of Justice lawyer at the time, Patrick Philbin, informed the OPR that Another he when that the sections were superfluous and should be removed, Yoo responded, told Yoo John it in CIA's former Deputy General Counsel The Rizzo told the OPR "They there." want 1070 did not request the addition of the sections. the In his response to the OPR report, CIA that time General Bybee stated that the "ticking Jay bomb" that could justify the Attorney Assistant defense was, in fact, a "real world" scenario. According to Bybee, "the OLC attorneys necessity the on 1, 2002] Memo had been briefed on [August apprehension of Jose Padilla on the working 1071 2002. Padilla was believed to have built and planted a dirty bomb." August The May 1, 8, al memorandum the "[interrogation of captured that Qaida operatives allegedly states 2002, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track Padilla and to detain him upon allowed 1072 1073 into the United States." inaccurate. This information was his entry 1069 Italics Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales. Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for added. under 18 §§ 2340-2340A, pp. 39-41. On December 30, 2004, the OLC issued a new Interrogation U.S.C. the entirety. 1, 2002, memorandum in its superseding The OLC wrote that "[b]ecause the memorandum August President's [the 1, 2002] memorandum concerning the August Commander-in-Chief power and the discussion in defenses to liability was - and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that follows. potential Consideration of bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive the for United not engage in torture." (See Memorandum personnel James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney that States Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. General, 2340-2340A). No CIA detainees were subjected to §§ the enhanced interrogation techniques between the issuance CIA's the December 2004 memorandum and May of 2005, when the OLC opined on the application of the federal prohibition on torture to the techniques. 1070 Department Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal of Intelligence Memoranda Relating to the Central Issues Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Counsel's Concerning Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29,2009, p. 51. Interrogation 1071 Bybee at 74, n. 6, cited in the OPR response, at fn. 171. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Report Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to on tlie Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' Agency's Suspected Terrorists, July 29, Central Intelligence 2009. 1072 Re: R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Alberto Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Memorandum for 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. under 1073 Plot of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings section and the See of Padilla. Capture Jose 7NOFORN SECRET/ TOP Page 181 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 181

211 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFQRN (TS/^^^^^^^^^/NF) issuance on August 1, 2002, of a second OLC With the 1074 to Abu the CIA initiated the use of its enhanced memorandum specific Zubaydah, detainees the Abu Zubaydah and other CIA subjected to the After CIA interrogation techniques. made increasingly stronger assertions about techniques, effectiveness of the CIA's the CIA the 1075 that the CIA interrogation asserting "saved lives," eventually program, interrogation program the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was necessary, as the and that 1076 could have been acquired in any other way. not intelligence obtained the Many by the CIA about the representations of made in CIA's the techniques were first made enhanced the spring of of effectiveness interrogation evolved over the course of 2003 year and into early 2004. In April 2003, CIA officers and the the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that CIA's who had been subjected to the told KSM, between March |, 2003, and March 25, techniques was still not fully cooperative. For 2003, example, April 3, 2003, more than a week after the CIA had discontinued the use of its on interrogation techniques KSM, thc deputy chief of ALEC Station, ^HH enhanced on there OIG had made "remarkable progress," but KSM was "a lot the that informed be done." did not cite any specific intelligence more from KSM in this to obtained 1077 context. months 27, 2003, more than (^FS/^H^^^^H^NP) June after the CIA had On three using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, CTC Chief ceased Operations of | told OIG that he was convinced that KSM "knows more and is just the 1(174 Intelligence Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central John Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Memorandum for General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1,2002, Interrogation of Attorney Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, al Tab 1). 1075 Record, documents, see CIA memorandum for Among other "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July the 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Memorandum to the dated General from Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27,2004, with the Inspector James Detention "Comments IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Draft and Interrogation Program' line, to subject "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, dated 24, and the September 6, 2006, CIA-vetted speech 2004; the President on the CIA's Detention and February by Program. Interrogation l07e See, other examples, interview of James Pavitt, by and [REDACTED], Office of the among from: General, 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; 21, James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Inspector August subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Operations; Program" 2003-7123-IG; February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of date: 27, Counterterrorism and Interrogation Activities; and a June CIA's 2003, Inspector General interview of Detention e Chief of Operations CTC, Th stated record of that interview states: "[^IH^Hi] the that the AI-Qa'ida program has been very effective. views the intelligence as the main Agency's has forjudging of the program; specifically, intelligence that success allowed CTC to take other terrorists criteria the the street and to prevent terrorist attacks. This off information that CTC could not have gotten any other way." is 1077 of of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Interview by the Inspector General, April 3, Office 2003. On April 21, 2003, a CTC analyst told the IG that KSM "has not provided anything significant to date." ( See interview by and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 21, [REDACTED] to On 30, 2003.) one of KSM's interrogators pointed April "information on hijackings, bridges in New York, 2003, and nuclear plants," and information on hidden uranium, which was never found. See interview of HH 2003. by and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, [REDACTED] 11 ii M ^MBHBBBI^BI I ii I II 111 Page 182 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 182

212 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1078 us the right questions." waiting then provided two examples of to for ask the had until he was asked specifically about provided matters by CIA KSM not information that the "tallest building in California" plot (also interrogators: as the "Second information on known and inclusion of a building in Canary Wharf as the in the plotting against Wave" plot), a target 1079 Asked if he could Heathrow Airport. any instances in which information from CIA think of had to the arrest of a terrorist, HHHH stated only that Majid Khan provided detainees led 1080 led the arrest of Iyman Faris by the FBI. information This that was inaccurate, information to 1081 was in Khan custody when he provided information on Iyman Faris. not as Majid CIA represented to the OIG that the CIA's interrogation (TS^H^B^H^VNF) was "very effective," and that the intelligence obtained from CIA detainees was "the program criteria main success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed forjudging the prevent take off the street and to terrorists terrorist attacks." also to other CTC OIG that the information obtained from CIA interrogations was "information that told the CTC 1082 gotten any other way." not could have for June On President Bush issued a statement 26, the United Nations International (U) 2003, in Support of Victims of Torture. That statement—referenced in multiple news articles— Day that relayed the: of is to the "United elimination committed torture and we States world-wide leading this fight by example. 1 call on all governments to join with the are States the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, and United and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent investigating, 1083 cruel and unusual punishment." other The following after the Washington Post published an article day, Administration's detainee CIA Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo called John on the policy, to legal the National Security Council. According to an email from Rizzo the advisor Bellinger, CIA officers, Rizzo called Bellinger to: to other senior hijack OIG KSM was asked about the plan to that an airplane in Malaysia and fly it into the | told Library Tower in Los Angeles, which the CIA the learned from another detainee. That detainee was Masran bin had Arshad, was in foreign government custody. told the OIG that KSM "provided information on who Heathrow/Canary about option, buUioHmtiUersonnel at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] asked him the a Wharf with he of an I-beam." picture Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting drew Chief of See OperationsJHI^I^mi, Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. ^^^^^^^^Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, | Counterterrorist Center date: 27 June 2003. See sections of this summary and Volume II on the (2003-7123-IG); of and Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group, Thwarting the Thwarting of the the Airport Wharf Canary Heathrow Plotting. and Counterterrorist for Record; subject: Meeting with |, Memorandum of Operations, the Chief Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. 1081 See section of this summary and Volume 11 on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris. HI^^H^^^I 1082 the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, for Memorandum Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. 1083 June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html. mil 11 iii i MBBI^B^M^^B i mi mi I Page 183 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 183

213 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the "express our the piece, the Presidential statement on the UN Administration in particularly Support as Victims of Torture as well in a quote from the International Day of prisoners Press Scott McClellan that all Secretary being White Deputy House 1084 USG are being treated 'humanely.'" held by the Rizzo that the view While the presidential statement did (TS/T^^^^^^^^BZ/NF) expressed to to "we can't live with," Rizzo conveyed anything senior CIA leaders that it appear contain not be appropriate for us "might seek written reaffirmation by some senior White House well to >1085 Agency's ongoing practices... the to continue. that official are On July 3, 2003, DCT George (TS^^^^^^^^^B^NF) sent a memorandum to Tenet National Advisor Condoleezza Rice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration's Security for the detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum support CIA's the was sought because: that reaffirmation stated responses to inquiries and resulting media "recent Administration reporting the position have created Administration's impression that these about the techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer [interrogation] 1086 as approved matter." a policy the While was preparing to meet with CIA White House on the (TS/Z^H^^H^H^^) the of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate reaffirmation about information "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the the leadership. as as to senior CIA OIG, These inaccurate representations described the well "thwarting" of specific plots and the capture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation of CIA detainees the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. and July 16, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station ?) On 2003, asserted again OIG. In this interview the that KSM interviewed by | was that helped lead to the arrest of' Iyman "provided Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al- information Faris, 1087 and Ammar al-Baluchi. Majid These Khan, were almost entirely Marri, representations J 1AJJO inaccurate. 1084 from: John Rizzo; to: John cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Email Policy; subject: Post Piece on Administration Detainee Washington date: June 27, 2003. Harlow; Today's cc: 1085 John Email to: John Moseman,H|^^^H' from: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Rizzo; Detainee subject: Washington Post Piece on Administration Harlow; Policy; date: June 27, 2003. Today's lose j J. | George 2003, CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Director of Central Intelligence y u Agency's with Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Subject: Interrogation Program. See also Scott Tenet the Memorandum for the Record; subject: Review of Interrogation Program on Muller, July 2003; date: 5 August 29 2003(OGC^C^003-50078). 1087 Memorandum the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, for Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. Counterterrorist 1088 See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; the Identification Identification of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha; the Arrests and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri; die and Capture of Majid Khan; and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Ammar al-Baluchi). 11ii iii i ^^^BBBMMBB^^TYWN ii Page 184 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 184

214 UNCLASSIFIED I //NOFQRN TOP SECRET// informed also information from CIA the OIG that of "provided Al-Qa'ida plots," including: a terrorist plot in detainees information a wealth about Pakistan; a plot the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Israel; a plot against against Arabia Saudi against Canary Wharf; Heathrow to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station Airport and a plot against "tallest building" in California; a plot against the bridges; and a plot; a plot suspension 1090 1089 supplies. this Much of plot information was inaccurate. to According to poison water "[o]n records, of whether actual plots had been thwarted, [HH^ft opined OIG the question had operatives in many of the above plots the been arrested, [CTC had], in since that involved the operation[s]." IHHfl provided a list to the OIG of terrorists^aptured and effect, thwarted the with they were associated. None of which individuals listed by were plots the 1091 a result of reporting from captured detainees. as CIA During same period in 2003, CIA officers were compiling this information for leadership. On July 18, 2003, die chief of ALEC Station, Bl similar CIA on an ALEC Station officers requesting information to the "value and wrote email m^H, 1092 detainee information on behalf of the impact" Renditions Group (RDG), of which CIA CIA 1093 wrote compiled senior CIA leadership. being for that "[o'Jne way to he stated was now is to provide input to assist on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the RDG detainees," particular "reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the in 1094 portion etc." of The first suspects, ofthcresponse^ompiled by ALEC identity terrorist was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station, who wrote that CIA Station detainee "plays a key role in our reporting to identify and capture al-Qa'ida terrorists^ ability including those who were planning to attack inside the United States." In an email, IHIH wrote that ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or "[t]he FBI resulted the successful capture/detention of several terrorists," and that the use of to the in enhanced acquiring techniques was "key" to CIA's this information on these the interrogation CIA As operatives "previously unknown" to the of and the FBI and operatives. examples by CIA detainees, cited Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Majid Khan, identified I 1089 for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center |, Memorandum Station; 17 July 2003. ALEC date: 1090 sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots; See Thwarting of the the Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plotting; the Identification, Capture, Airport Arrest of Iyman Paris; the Capture of and Majid Khan; the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group; and the KSM detainee review Volume III. in (the listed (gas station and poison plotting), lyman Faris Khan suspension bridge plot, as well as 1091 Majid shopping mall plot), Khallad bin Attash (the Heathrow plot), Masran bin a possible (the "tallest building" Arshad plot), Ammar al-Baluchi (the plot against the U.S. consulate in Karachi). See and sections of tliis summary relevant and Volume II for additional information. 1092 As noted, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, Detention, Interrogation Group," "RD1," and "RDG" in CIA records. and 1093 Email from: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: | [subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM. 1094 from: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: | Email fsubject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM. I//NOFORN TOP SECRETFLBBI^^M^R" Page 185 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 185

215 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1095 1096 and Sayf These representations were inaccurate. Paracha. Iymai^aris, al-Rahman concluded: im email information saved countless American lives inside put, has "Simply detainee abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa'ida the have US and would launching attacks in the US additional that the information in succeeded and these detainees through the use of enhanced measures obtained key from was this It is our assessment that if CIA loses the ability to unlocking information. use be measures in a responsible way, we will not and to interrogate enhanced 1097 effectively this to war." able prosecute The RDG information ALEC Station to relayed in July 2003 (TS/^^^HHH^^) from CIA leadership also included information from for assessment entitled "Significant a CIA 1098 Detainee That document included information that was largely congruent with Reporting." records. It that KSM provided details on the Heathrow Airport Plot and the Karachi CIA stated bin only confronted with the capture of Khallad being Attash and Ammar al- Plots after 1099 that with regard to plots inside the Baluchi; States, KSM had only admitted United plots to that been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell had interrogators to he thought they wanted CIA hear"; and that KSM generally only provided "what 00 known in" by information already "boxed to CIA dcbriefers." when This information information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month. On July 2003, as a result of DCI Tenet's July 3, 2003, request 29, reaffirmation of CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices, Tenet and seeking the National Counsel Muller General a briefing for a subset of the Scott Security CIA conducted 1095 Email from: I, [REDACTED] [REDACTED1,1[REDACTED], | value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 I; subject: email from:] PM; DO_CTC_ALEC Groups, | Chiefs | |, [REDACTED], value of detainees; date: July Re: 2003, at 3:57:45 PM. I; subject: 18, 1096 sections of See summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the this Capture of Jose Padilla; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; and the Identification and of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha. Arrests 1097 Italics Email from: I^^^^^^^LloLMBMI^^m DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs added. |, [REDACTED], July date: ; subject: of value Re: 18, detainees; PM. 3:57:45 at 2003, 1098 Email ^H from: Group | , DO_CTC_ALEC Chiefs, cc: subject: Re: value [REDACTED], detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 of PM. See CIA document "Significant Detainee Reporting." 1099 See of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of section Karachi Plots, and the KSM detainee review the in Volume III. 1100 Email from: I 3:57:45 [REDACTED], subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at cc: PM. also "Signifi^nt Petmi^e^i^OT See Page 186 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 186

216 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRI^/^MMMBM^MMB^noforn 01 principals." to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA Council According to "detainees of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced the subject use 1102 that in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." information significant intelligence had, briefing of the "results" CIA using the CIA's (TSAflmi^HH/WF) The provided heading: techniques slides with the briefing "RESULTS: MAJOR interrogation enhanced in The slides represented that KSM provided information THREAT "[ajttack plans INFO." on US other US landmarks"; "[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles; against Capitol, plants"; subways, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power reservoirs, and the towers, trains, against Canary Wharf Plot." The slides also represented that "Heathrow identified Iyman and KSM 1103 These Khan and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha. "Majid family," representations were Faris, the 1104 inaccurate. largely CIA slides represented that "major threat" information The was obtained the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee 'Abd al- from al-Nashiri regarding Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz." This representation was Rahim "US 1105 indicated omitted The CIA slides further facts. that "major threat" and material inaccurate obtained from the use of information CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against was the detainee bin al-Shibh—specifically that bin Ramzi "[identified Hawsawi" and CIA al-Shibh 1101 Memorandum Interrogation the Record, "Review of CIA Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA for slides Counsel dated August 5, 2003; briefing Muller, entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated General Scott 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those July the meeting included the director of the attending CIA, Tenet; the CIA general counsel, Scott George Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Rice; Muller; White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Philbin; and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger. Patrick 1102 CIA the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA Memorandum for dated Scott dated August Counsel 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," Muller, General 5, 29, presented to senior 2003, House officials. July White 1103 Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA CIA Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program ," dated General 29,2003, to senior White House officials. July presented 1104 records indicate that the "attacks," "attack plans," and "targets" discussed by KSM were CIA known to the well Intelligence prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, Community were merely ideas for attacks that were or proposed, but never operationalized. The CIA briefing slides made no mention of KSM withholding or fabricating information during after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See relevant sections of this and detainee and as well as the KSM II, review in Volume III. summary Volume 1105 records indicate that al-Nashiri provided details on multiple CIA plots—including plans to target ships terrorist in the of Hormuz—prior to his CIA detention and Strait use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. the With regard to the targeting of ships in the Strait of Hormuz, this information was provided by al-Nashiri while he CIA was foreign government custody and was disseminated in in intelligence repoitsp^rtolusCI^detentiwi. still {See •••36595•••••^^^•36726 For disseminated intelligenceTreg^^^^^^^^^^BgZIA For other reporting from al-Nashiri while in foreign government custody ••••• 70868 disseminated intelligence, see \ ^t^^^^K^^K^^^^^^K^eeaho detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III. 11111111111 mi i III i ii Page 187 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 187

217 UNCLASSIFIED TOP "major threat" on "[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew provided information 1106 representation and omitted material facts. Centers." was This inaccurate the In [that] were countered threats attacks context "[m]ajor of and slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained averted," the use the CIA from enhanced techniques against Khallad bin Attash interrogation an "[a]ttack CIA's of the on 1107 in Karachi." This representation was inaccurate. against The CIA slides U.S. Consulate that further threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's represented "major resulting techniques detainee Abu Zubaydah, CIA in the interrogation on enhanced [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid," as well as information on "[a]ttacks "[identification banks, of on 1108 aircraft industries." These representations were inaccurate. petroleum and subways, briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies The (TSZ/HI^^H^^^/NF) in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in detailed for CIA briefings for part, 1106 was linked the September 11,2001, attacks and targeted by the CIA and other intelligence Al-Hawsawi to (See agencies 02), CIA ^jjjjf (032022Z WASHINGTON prio^^ir^^hibh|scapture. 1HF(232012ZMAY (051408Z 02); DIRECTOR |||(231756Z APR 02); ALEC 17743 AP^02); MAR JUL 03^A1-Hawsawi's arrest on March 1, I^H was unrelated to any reporting from CIA (16182.1Z 2003, ( ALEC (161821Z JUL 03).) With regard See the referenced "attacks," no operational plots detainees. to targeting sites referenced were ever identified by the CIA. Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 the that "most significant" intelligence derived from Ramzi bin al-Shibh was obtained prior to his rendition to CIA the and enhanced use of the CIA's custody interrogation techniques. According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the the attacks "most from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on future reporting was background information related to al- significant" Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. (See ALEC •• (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the majority this information in mid-October 2002, while in the custody of a foreign government and prior to of transferred to custody. (See CIA •• ^flHHI^H) See also detainee review of Ramzi bin al- being CIA Volume in III. Shibh 1,07 section of this summary and Volume II See the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots. CIA officers in the on of the referenced reporting from bin Attash: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] wrote was chilling-[CIA had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information or through officers] of of and Ba Attash prior to their transfer out interviews Karachi." This cable also stated, "[a]s noted in al-Baluchi threat cables, December 2002 HConsulate became aware of the in to Consulate officials." See severalprevious ••• 14510^HH|^H. 1108 For information on the "[identification of [Jose] Padilla," see the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla. Richard Reid was arrested in the 2001, of to Abu Zubaydah's capture. See multiple open source reporting and Department December Justice prior including, Indictment, States v. Richard Reid materials, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, United potential January Abu Zubaydah provided information on 2002. places al-Qa'ida might target, including banks 16, and subways, shortly after his capture to FBI interrogators, months prior to the use of the CIA's "enhanced of interrogation August 2002. See Federal Bureau in Investigation documents pertaining "to the techniques" interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on detainee Intelligence cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). See also Abu Zubaydah by review in Volume III. 11ii 11111 III III Page 188 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 188

218 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 1109 of and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, State as well as for Assistant Secretary Powell 1110 Jack Goldsmith. General Attorney of subsequent the OIG received (T&^H^^^HI^B^^) CIA interviews personnel, Detention CIA about the CIA's other and contradicted that information representations chief of the Branch of thc Interrogation Group at CTC described at Program. The UBL the of Majid Khan and lyman Faris were arrests to reporting from CIA how length unrelated 11,1 deputy director for law detainees. for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division The enforcement the how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for told OIG 1112 of al-Rahman Paracha. for The chief of targeting and special requirements capture the Sayf Department the former chief of al-Qa'ida Abu Zubaydah Task Force, CTC's and Zubaydah the "the often-cited example of that identifying Padilla is not told OIG 1113 who According to "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah^iot tell us quite accurate." Padilla was, information alone would never have led us to Padilla." H^^^i stated that the his had told CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing Pakistanis the 1114 got relaying, "[i]n essence, CTC pair, lucky." on information the any the same time, however, CIA personnel (TS/T^^^I^H^iiVNF) inaccurate At provided of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced the techniques to the OIG. The examples interrogation chief of the Al-Qa'ida Department of CTC told the OIG that "KSM gave us Majid deputy Khan 1115 Paracha." and Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM Uzair led to of Majid Khan, which in turn capture" to the capture of Hambali. McLaughlin "led the represented that "the capture of Richard Reid was also of modus operandi information a result 1116 1117 Zubaydah." obtained These representations were inaccurate. [Abu] from In addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership (TS^H^^^m^B^NF) made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation 1,09 Memorandum the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088). for CIA Interrogation 16 September 2003. The Memorandum for the Record drafted by John Bellinger Slides, Program, a "detailed to provided by the CIA. See John B. Bellinger, ID, Senior Associate Counsel to the refers handout" Legal Council; National Security and Memorandum for the Record; subject: Bxiefing of President Advisor, Detainees; and regarding Interrogation of High-Value Rumsfeld date: September 30, 2003. Secretaries Powell 1110 W. the Memorandum for Scott Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 Muller; " ^^^^^^ (OGC-FO-2003-50097). ^^^^^ 1111 L of the Branch of Interview UB chief Group, by Office of the of the General, July 30, 2003. Inspector I,12 Interview mtmB, by Office of the Inspector General, August 5, 2003. of II,3 with August Memorandum for the Record, meeting 19, flflH^^^R Office of the Inspector 2003, General. 1114 August 19,2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with l^^flHHI^K Office of the Inspector General. This was not included in the IG Special Review. information 1115 Al- Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center the Memorandum for Department; date: 28 July 2003. Qa'ida 1116 of John E. McLaughlin, by Interview and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, [REDACTED] September 2003. This information was included in the 5, July 2003 briefing slides. Richard Reid was CIA's arrested in December 2001, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah. 1117 See section in this summary and in Volume II on the Capture of Majid Khan; the Capture of Hambali; and the the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha. See also the KSM detainee review in Volume III. the Richard arrested prior to was capture of Abu Zubaydah. Reid mi II in i ^^^BH^^MMU^NQi'PiiN Page 189 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 189

219 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN program the "critical threat information" that could only be acquired by using that highlighted enhanced interrogation against CIA detainees. Jose Rodriguez, then CTC the CIA's techniques lives CIA "the use of EITs has saved that and prevented terrorist director, the OIG told 1118 operations DCI McLaughlin told the OIG from he "believes the use occurring." Deputy that 1119 to CIA's efforts in the war on critical proven DDO Pavitt stated that has of EITs terrorism." was "invaluable to U.S. national security," that "American lives have been saved as the program information of from detainees," and that the CIA "has been able to obtain a result received 1120 EITs." been obtained without the use of have would According to OIG that not information Tenet stated he "firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the records, DCI enhanced EITs, saved many lives." Tenet added that the use of the CIA's has of use techniques "extremely valuable" in obtaining was amounts of critical interrogation "enormous threat and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any information," 1121 other way. On January 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson (W/^^^HB/ZN^) 2, of provided Special Review, entitled "Counterterrorism Detention and the a draft OIG draft senior officials for comment. The to Special Review, which Program," Interrogation CIA on numerous interviews was CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG, based of the of the CIA's Detention and origins Program, the detention sites that described Interrogation operational at the time of the review, were the guidance that had been provided on both and interrogation detention. The draft also identified a number of unauthorized interrogation and 1122 a number used, that and concluded that, in been of cases, CIA interrogations techniques had 1123 beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal went of 1 August 2002." "well opinion 1118 of of E. Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Interview Jose the Inspector General, August Office 12, 2003. 1119 Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 5, 2003. 1.20 Pavitt that by "September, October and November" of 2002, "they saw a clear benefit" to the use of also stated Pavitt, interrogation Abu Zubaydah (Interview of James on by H^HI^H and enhanced CIA's techniques of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003). [REDACTED], Office 1.21 of Tenet, Interview [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September, by George 2003. 1122 the draft described interrogators placing example, on a detainee's artery, conducting mock For pressure blowing cigarette or executions, smoke into a detainee's face, using cold water to interrogate detainees, and cigar subjecting to a "hard takedown." In an interview conducted after Gul Rahman's death at DETENTION a detainee interview COBALT, described a "rough takedown." The DUNBAR report stated: "According to SITE Dr. there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each [DUNBAR], had a role during the one takedown it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened and door of [a detainee] cell and rushed in the screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They They him although punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that slapped it was obvious they were not trying to and were him hit as they could, a couple of times the punches as forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a hard couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). [The detainee] did acquire of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention." a number should DUNBAR after "something like this is done, interrogators that speak to the prisoner to 'give them stated something to think about.'" See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from Rahman, January Subject: Death Investigation - Gul 2003, pp. 21-22, paragraph 34. 28, 1123 CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004. TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN Page 190 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 190

220 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRfeT//^^^^^—//NOFOKN draft report the inaccurate examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced The repeated 1124 that conveyed by CIA officers to OIG personnel, had but techniques interrogation been concluded: nonetheless some of the operatives for of above-mentioned plots, "[w]ith capture the the these plots have been thwarted it is not if they remain viable clear whether or were in the first place. fabricated Review did not if they or even This 1125 that any plots were imminent." evidence uncover these reviewing (TS/Z^H^H^^B^/NF) Special Review, including the OIG's the After draft enhanced about of the CIA's effectiveness interrogation techniques^he conclusions qualified the began preparing a highly critical response. In CIA's for that response, CTC preparation Legal,requested information that could be used as |CTC additional interrogation the of the CIA's enhanced for techniques from CTC evidence effectiveness sent an personnel. seeking "a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by email the of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques." use that he compile the information, "emphasizing that hundreds or noted would U26 innocent have been saved as a result of of use of those techniques.. .." lives In thousands our email, that it was "critical" emphasized the information "establish a separate that links between die application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production direct of intelligence that enabled the saving of innocent lives," that the intelligence obtained directly techniques the the CIA's enhanced interrogation of be "significantly different in nature after use the intelligence acquired before the use from the enhanced techniques," and that the of information "absolutely ironclad" and "demonstrably be by cable citations, analytical supported 1127 or what have you." need further noted that "[w]e can expect to pieces, to present these to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney data and quite to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely General, possibly concluded, the is not an exaggeration to say that He future of the program, and verifiable." "[i]t the consequent innocent lives, may depend substantially upon of input you the saving 1128 provide." 1124 Special Review draft stated that KSM "provided information that helped The to the arrests" of Sayf al- lead Rahman Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, and Majid Khan, and that KSM's information "led to the Paracha, and Review of Iyman Faris. The draft Special investigation also stated that information from Abu prosecution" and Zubaydah to the identification" of Jose Padilla lead Binyam Muhammad. Finally, the draft included the "helped "plots" described by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station during her July 16, 2003, interview. Most of the inaccurate would remain in the final version of the Special Review completed in May 2004. representations CIA (2003-7123- General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program See Inspector January 1G), 2004. 1,25 Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program CIA (2003-7123-IG), January 2004. 1126 Email from: to: Muller, John Rizzo, | Scott subject: "For the response to the IG report"; date: February 4, 2004, at 1:04:03 PM. 1127 to: from: subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: Email [REDACTED]; 10,2004. February 1128 t0: Email [REDACTED]; subject: Addition from: KSM/AZ and measures; date: on February 10, 2004. As described in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the examples 111111 111 iii i mi " 11 Page 191 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 191

221 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN Responding request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC to the an Station intelligence from KSM in which she wrote, email sent describing 1129 serve The content of email would [sic] as a template foward "let's be leaning." CIA program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation on which future justificationsforthe 1130 based. stated that "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's techniques were email of saved has several hundred, possibly thousands, at lives." She then alone information least KSM "identified" Iyman Faris, "who is now wrote time in the US for his support to that serving and a photograph" of Saleh al-Marri, "whom the FBI suspected of some al-Qa'ida," "identified information," al-Qa'ida, whom we had no concrete against adding that al- with but involvement now being held on a material witness warrant." Marri email stated that KSM "is H^^^'s information" Majid Khan, who "is now on custody," "identified a mechanism for "provided in 1131 smuggle explosives into the US," and "identified" Jaffar al-Tayyar. al-Qa'ida to also email that "[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu represented grew into is now our most cooperative detainee," and that Abu Zubaydah's Zubaydah] what 1132 These helped saved lives." concrete that representations were results "produced information 1133 As almost she had in an interview with entirely OIG, inaccurate. the chief the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, refuted this of writing in an email that Abu former view, "never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information," that Abu Zubaydah discussed Zubaydah Padilla prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "he never Jose 1134 Separately, intel to get them." gave actionable Deputy Chief of ALEC Station really us were provided over the following years to the President, the Congress, the compiled of Justice, and the Department American public. 1129 Email to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], from: re Addition on |; subject: and measures; date: February 9, 2004. ^d's email KSM/AZ began: "here is my draft contribution... it's late, I'm tired, so it's not especially elegant... welcome any fact correcting I got but let's be foward [sic] leaning." The inaccurate information included in the email was wrong, in the formal response to the OIG. used CIA's 1130 and DD^esponsetothe OIG wereusedasthe template for talking points on subsequent the email from: to: HH^^^I^flH; subject: for See, program. -- RE: Addition re EDITED KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector Final on Decembe^004); December 6, 2004; date: from: | Genera^eviev^o^ape^fo^ondoleezz^ic^n email to: Wmm^ H •^••i; cc: ^^^HH^V subject: HH Final on Addition re EDITED KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector - RE: date: review points in November 2005); talking November 4, 2005. General for 1131 response to email, one CIA officer asked whether "re the jaffar al-tayyar stuff, In [sic] we didnt alreadWiave See email from: [REDACTED]; to: th^ulhiairu^frOT cewmm^m, on > subject: HIH; I^HHHH and measures; KSM/AZ February 10,2004, at 09:38 AM. date: 1132 Email from: IH|Hi|^H|; to: cc: ••H^H, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |; subject: re on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Addition 1133 the of this summary and Volume II on sections eight primary CIA effectiveness representations and See relevant prominent CIA representations of effectiveness. 12 other 1134 Email to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], from: ^^^^^•jdinRMuddJRED [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], ACTED], [REDACTED]~|H[|^^|, subject: Re: [REDACTED], Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Please Report^ate: February 10, 2004. As noted, in an August 19, 2003 B^H Memorandum for the Record detailing ; S interview with the Office of the Inspector |]HHI' |HH told the OIG that "the often-cited General, example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate," and that "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us that who was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." Noting Padilla the Pakistani government 11II I III I ^^^Bl^^^^JBI/mOFORN I Page 192 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 192

222 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ additional inaccurate from CIA personnel in ALEC | forwarded information 1135 1136 1137 CTC Station al-Nashiri, to and Hambali. KSM, Legal to related 2004, Pavitt submitted his formal response 27, DDO On February Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. to the OIG draft Pavitt CIA not to "shy away from the conclusion OIG our efforts have thwarted attacks the urged that lives," and to "make it clear as well that the EITs (including the and have saved waterboard) 1138 our successes." indispensable Pavitt's memorandum included an attachment been to "Successes describing Counterteirorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," of the CIA's The CIA's interrogation techniques were necessary. the attachment stated: why and enhanced received from detained terrorists "Information a result of the lawful use we as interrogation ('EITs') has almost certainly saved of enhanced techniques and lives the United States American abroad. The evidence countless inside clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, points and our we had the CIA about Jose Padilla and Ills partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, told stated, "[i]n CTC got lucky." This information was not included in the draft or final OIG mH essence, Review. Special 1,35 was by Heathrow related to die information Airport plotting and stated that "[o]nly forwarded The labeled enhanced KSM "admit that the sketch of a beam did Canary Wharf in his notebook was in after measures" an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself to show fact AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf - another liJce in the World Trade Center- would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside." The email those stated in KSM "identified the leading operatives involved also both the UK and Saudi cells that would support that of operation." representations were inaccurate. See the section These this summary and Volume II on the the Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III. 1136 The by stated that, "subsequent to the application of enhanced measures," the information forwarded operations more about operational planning, "to include ongoing details" against both the US "learned in-depth CIA interests in Saudi Arabia." This representation omitted key information provided by al-Nashiri and foreign Saudi in custody prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See and 'Abd al-Rahim al- government the detainee review in Volume HI. Nashiri 1137 information forwarded by stated that, "after die use of enhanced measures [Hambali] provided The some that the wrap-up of an al-Qa'ida cell in Karachi, to of whose members were destined to be the led information wave attack pilots inside the US after 911... [Tjheir identification and subsequent detention saved hundreds second summary This was inaccurate. See the section of this representation and Volume II on the Thwarting of of lives." to: Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group. (See email from: I^^HHH' the multiple cc's; EDITED—Re: Heathrow plot subject: from KSM; February 10, 2004, at 2:38:36 Ph^Theemainncluded tli^ollowin^ext: "Here is insight date: and Below were forwarded emails from text BH^H. See email from: Heathrow." this to: B^^H^I^^^^^^^^^^Hjsubj ect|H^athro^)lot insight li^H^I^H? KSM; from February 10, 2004, at n| lllll II Hf^^^^Bl to: •^^H^R HH date: 02:59 subject: 5 andfinaNRejal-^shiri; date: February 12, 2004, at HH PM; OGCrebuttalpart to: forwarding email from: ^ I; subject: Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 10, 2004, at 06:11 PM; email from: HH^^^^H; to: 'mm; subject: Reporting; date: February 10, 2004, at **immediate—Hambali AM. 11:43 1138 for: Inspector General; from: James Memorandum Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Pavitt, Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); Memorandum date: 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, 27, re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism February Detention and Interrogation Activities. 11II I III I ^B^Jj^^^B^^BVMUFOHM I Page 193 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 193

223 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN allies suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not would [have] 1139 casualties." thousands, of to attachment repeated much of the The Pavitt's (mflHBHHW memorandum in Chief of ALEC Station email contained information inaccurate Deputy Abu Zubaydah, as about as the additional information ALEC Station personnel KSM and well KSM, and Hambali. In Pavitt's memorandum, al-Nashiri, intelligence success on provided every 1140 with some version of the phrase, "as a result of the lawful use of claim was preceded EITs." information to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum Inaccurate provided 1141 The version of the OIG's Special Review. in final relevant portion of the included the was 1142 much of the inaccurate information, has Special declassified. Review, including been ^mmCTC anticipated AS Legal to 2004, much of the 10, provided email, the inspector general on the February information of the CIA's "effectiveness" interrogation techniques was later provided to enhanced policymakers the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's and 1143 interrogation enhanced techniques. 2004, the National Security Council was considering late as ?) In for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations "endgame" that would options campaign disclosures the "effectiveness" of the CIA about CIA talking points prepared include program. 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that "[i]f in December cleverly, could disclosure of intelligence results done heighten the anxiety of terrorists at selected the about of USG methods and underscore sophistication seriousness of American large the 1144 prosecute aggressively the War on Terrorism." commitment The following month, the to 11,9 Memorandum Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re for: (S) Comments Draft IG Special Review, to Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); "Counterterrorism date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Activities. Interrogation 1140 Memorandum General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) for: Inspector Interrogation Draft Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Special Program" (2003-7123-IG); to Comments IG 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism date: February Interrogation and Detention Activities. 1141 information CIA records found that almost all A the of in the Pavitt memorandum was inaccurate and review of by CIA interrogation and intelligence records. unsupported CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA officers The "generally accurate information [to the Inspector General] on the operation and effectiveness of the provided accurate and rare exceptions, [CIA officers] provided "with assessments to the OIG." program," that 1142 CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and The Program," was Interrogation declassified redactions in May 2008. On August 24, 2009, with portions of the Review that were redacted in some May 2008, were unredacted and declassified. 1143 H^^^H in an email: "We can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel wrote IG some on the Hill, to the Attorney General, and quite possibly to the President at at the point, and they must and absolutely email ( See be from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ verifiable." this measures; and 10, 2004.) As detailed in date: Study, the CIA consistently used the same February "effectiveness" case studies. The eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists are examined as in this in greater detail in the full Committee Study, and are 12 other prominent examples diat the CIA summary, has cited in the context of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. to 1144 Points for the DCI: DOD Proposals to Move Forward on Transfer of HVDs Talking Guantanamo, 16 December 2004. iiii 11 ii 11 BBBBBi^BBi^^TORN Page 194 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 194

224 UNCLASSIFIED TOP proposed that public information campaign include details on the "intelligence gained CIA the 1145 saved interrogations." in There was no immediate decision by the National and lives HVD an the for CIA detainees or about proposed public information Security Council "endgame" campaign. Detention the success of the CIA's that and Interrogation Program be asked information on anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The compiled in included draft claims relating to the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow first effectiveness 1146 shoe and the identification of a second plotting, bomber. the A plotting, Karachi Airport sought to limit the information provided to what subsequent already in the public draft was 1147 assertions about Issa al-Hindi, Iyman Faris, included Sajid Badat. and That day, record and Director of CTC Philip Mudd told that "we either get out and sell, Deputy we get or hammered, has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, which 1148 1149 up The following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media. our messes budget." 1145 Talking for Weekly Meeting with National Security DCI 12 January 2005; included in email Advisor, Points fromOI^ACn^ HHHH> subject: 2005, NSC for 1/14; date: Coord 11, Talkings at 03:33 PM. on January 1146 draft stated that the "Second Wave" plotting "was uncovered during The initial debriefings of a senior al- the Qa'ida that the Heathrow plotting "was also discovered as a result of detainee debriefings," that the detainee," plotting detainees," revealed during the initial debriefings of two senior al-Qa'ida Karachi and diat the CIA "was from: form detainee "learned of' the second shoe bomber. (See email [sic] to: debriefings [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], • I, [REDACTED]7Bi^^^M![REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED; cc: |; subject: FOR IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: summary of impact of detainee program; date: 13, 2005, at 5:21:37 PM.) These claims were inaccurate. See relevant sections of this April and Volume summary II. 1147 draft al-Hindi, who had been referenced in the Issa Commission Report, stating that "[pjrior The discussed 9/11 the U.S. Government was not aware of Issa's to KSM's activity, nor did we know his true reporting, casing It that "KSM's reporting was the impetus added an intense investigation, culminating in Issa's identity." for and arrest." The draft also included two identification that had not been in official public documents, but examples had described in press stories. The first was that "KSM led U.S. investigators to an Ohio truck driver named been Faris." confessions second was that "KSM's Iyman were also instrumental in determining the identity of Saajid The Chief the shoe bomber. (See email from: HHH second of Operations, ALEC Station; to: |BHI Badat," [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], MBMW, ^^MBBB. [REDACTED], [REDACTED], •••^••^••••H, [REDACTED], 6:46:59 Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at interview: PM.) As described elsewhere, these claims subject: Brokaw incongruent with CIA records. At least one earlier media account were KSM's purported role in the arrest of of Iyman was provided in a book by an author who Faris extensive access to CIA officials. (See Ronald Kessler, had The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.). The CIA's cooperation with the author is described in elsewhere as well as in more detail summary, the full Committee Study. this in 1148 communication, between John P. Mudd and I^^HHIH, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to Sametime ^^^^^^ 19:56:05. 1149 | from: Email I; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, | Take interview: Brokaw Re: |; subject: one; date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. k/NOFORN TOP SECRET// Page 195 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 195

225 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SRCRIvtVy^^^^^—//NOFORN On April 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an (TS/Z^^^^^^HI^P/fl^) 20, public anticipated the "effectiveness" of the still-classified CIA campaigns official promote 1150 response, Legal, expressed concern that In |HHH|CTC program. while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are "the nearly the most striking examples cited, not lives Referencing KSM's reporting on saved." Faris, noted that of examples Iyman making ourselves look silly if the best we can do "we Brooklyn Bridge - perhaps we risk is the omit examples rather than 'damn ourselves with faint praise.'" H^I^H' should specific the the plot as an example, made Airport following suggestion: "Can offered Heathrow who Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative - 'while [Office can't provide details' (or of we we 'the program has produced intelligence can) has directly saved 100's/1000's of maybe that and other innocent lives'?" H^KHji then attached American originally compiled in claims February for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote, 2004 "some of actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful described the 1151 1152 such The examples were inaccurate. of techniques." use June 24, 2005, Dateline NBC aired a program, accompanied (TS^^m^) On by online which quoted CIA Director Goss and articles, Director of CTC Mudd, as several Deputy as anonymous "top American intelligence officials." Among other claims, NBC well reported that capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh "le[d] ultimately" to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin the 1153 54 information was inaccurate." Attash. This end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of At the of again interest at detainees CIA for public disclosures on the "effectiveness" spurred the the CIA's interrogation techniques. Specifically, enhanced action on the Detainee congressional Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment") prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the Director of Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the National to continue use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information CIA to attorney be garner that support. The CIA to described the "striking" would required campaign the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment similarities the situation in between and in in which the Israeli Supreme Court 1999, "ruled that several... techniques were Israel had permissible, but require some form of legislative possibly and that the Israeli sanction," so See CIA document entitled, "INTERROGATION PROGRAM DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING," from April 2005. " cc: Rizzo; from: H^^^^^l^ohn Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—Com mentsDueto^Bjme by COB TODAY Thanks; Interrogation April 2005, at 5:10:10 PM. date: 20, 1152 the the of this summary See Volume II on sections Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the and Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash). 1153 "The evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June frightening the 2005. Ronald Kessler published a book with which 2003, CIA cooperated that stated "intercepts and 24, In developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... information the CIA to trace [KSM]." The allowed Kessler also stated that the bin Attash capture was book "result" of interrogations of KSM. This information is the incongruent with CIA records. See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. See also John A. to cc: Scott W. Muller, Rizzo; 22, subject: CIA [REDACTED]; War; date: January Re: 2004, at 09:28 AM). at 1154 See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the Khallad Thwarting the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of of bin Attash). Page 196 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 196

226 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 1155 "ultimately legislative authority for a few specific techniques." government The got limited then wrote: CIA attorney a political became it became incumbent on the this reality "Once here, preserve put facts, if it wanted to some these publicly to Administration forth date, powers. Administration has refused to put forth any specific Yet, to the significant it adduced as a result intelligence using any of examples of could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or technique that even historical Not stuff from three or four years ago. What degrading. any to to from the utter failure drawn offer a specific are conclusions be no such proof exists? That the Administration does not justification: That legitimacy the the political process on this issue? Or, that need to recognize of is right use these techniques really to not important enough to reserve the 1156 compromise historical even the intelligence?" justify of As described more detail in the full Committee Study, the (TS^Hiimilli^NF) in Detention legislative continue the CIA's to and Interrogation sought Administration support chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President Program, and speech, The was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, Bush. which and inaccurate about the CIA program representations the effectiveness of included numerous CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. the CIA's vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA The "validation" which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support documents, of passages speech. For example, the CIA "Validation the Remarks" document specific of the following: includes the detainees in this program has given "'...questioning information that us has innocent lives by helping us to stop new saved - here in the United attacks States and across the world.'' CIA concurs with this assessment. Information from detainees prevented - among others West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment - the 1155 The also described the Israeli precedent with regard to the "necessity defense" that had been CIA attorney Israeli CIA and the Department of Justice in by and 2002. The CIA attorney wrote that the attorneys invoked 2001 Court specifically considered the 'ticking time bomb' "also and said that enhanced techniques Supreme scenario not be pre-approved for such situations, but that if worse could to worse, an officer who engaged in such came activities assert a common-law necessity defense, if he were ever prosecuted." ( See email from: could to: A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, [REDACTED]; John Re: McCain^late^December 19, 2005, at 10:18:58 AM.) At the [REDACTEDl^ubject: the CIA attorney and time, were m^|CTC Legal, the working in former Office of the Director of National the Intelligence. The OLC, in its July 20,2007, memorandum, included an analysis of the Israeli court case in the context of that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were "clearly authorized and justified by concluding memorandum authority" of the Military Commissions Act. See a result for John A. Rizzo, Acting legislative as Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. General Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Bradbury, General, of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Office of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Application Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by die CIA in the Interrogation of Value al Qaeda Detainees. High 1156 cc: [REDACTED]; Email John A. Rizzo; from: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, | to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: McCain; date: December 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AM. 11 MI II 11 I II II I HI 11 Page 197 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 197

227 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN building United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United in the plots against in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These Kingdom, and targets 1157 have thousands." undoubtedly attacks would killed of the CIA "validation" documents reflect (TS^flHHHH^NP) Multiple iterations before speech it was being prepared. One week as the scheduled speech, a to changes the the draft speech made inaccurate claims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the passage in Ramzi and al-Shibh of the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the capture bin the KSM, not explicitly connect these claims to did use of the CIA's enhanced of but capture In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA interrogation proposed the techniques. officers language the speech: following for to year, from Zubaydah same the CIA information the trail of one of "That led accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information KSM's Zubaydah together from with from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa'ida's 9/11 attack information and theimportanceof With the knowledge that KSM was the planning KSM. partners 'mastermind,' mounted an planned Pakistani and 1158 in resulted eventual capture and detention." that operation his August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations (^^/^HI^^H^/NF) CIA The to to the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor support other CIA records, cables any 1159 the assertions. support 1157 in original. CIA Validation of Remarks on Emphasis Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft Detainee #15. described in the relevant sections of this summary, and more extensively in Volume II, these claims were As inaccurate. 1158 from: Email ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: | subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, I; 08:56 AM. at 1159 description cited describe Abu Zubaydah's June The cables of a meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh 2002 (acquired prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah), and Abu Zubaydah's August the same meeting (after the use of the techniques). (See CIA 2002reportinediscussing JUN 02); August 2002).) Neither cable—or any other CIA record—indicates a (101514Z ••^•••(21 Abu al-Shibh's reporting on his meeting with bin al-Shibh and bin between capture. The connection Zubaydah's CIA also cables include information, which was available to the do prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, cited not KSM's "importance." The cited cable describes Abu Zubaydah's April 2002 reporting, prior to the use highlighting CIA's of the techniques, identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the "mastermind" of the 9/11 enhancecHnterrogation include (See The citations did not 2002).) cables referencing information attacks. April to the CIA about KSM that was obtained prior to the capture available Abu Zubaydah, including information on of KSM's "Mukhtar" and KSM's role in the September alias 2001, attacks, as is detailed elsewhere in this 11, summary. The cables also did not support the claim that information provided by Abu Zubaydah or Ramzi bin al- Shibh led the capture of KSM. One cited cable related to the identification by Ramzi bin al-Shibh, while bin al- to wasui^oreier^overnment cited of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali as "Ammar." [The cable was Shibh as custody, H^H^^^^^^H- 20790.] later, the actual cable was 20700 As described elsewhere in determined information summary, this not captured as a result of KSM related to Ammar al-Baluchi. The email exchange was listed two cables directly related to the capture of KSM. The first cable, from approximately a week before KSM's KSM. capture, CIA's operational use and value of the asset who led the CIA to the The cable stated that described the the asset gained relationshir^^^ to KSM, was "based access on The cable stated that CIA Headquarters [the continues impressed with the evidence of be asset's] access to ^HI^MiKSM associates,! to (See DIRECTOR | |.) The second cable TOP SECRET//^ 1 //NOFORN Page 198 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 198

228 UNCLASSIFIED I //NOFORN TOP ^ SECRET// Within a few the passage in the draft speech relating to the (TS/T^^^^^^^^V/NF) days, Ramzi bin and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA's enhanced captures of al-Shibh Abu capture to the against of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The interrogation techniques Zubaydah Ramzi now from Abu Zubaydah and information bin al-Shibh with draft updated credited the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh "help[ing] in updated The speech stated: Mohammed." draft was "Zubaydah these [interrogation] questioned [zoo-BAY-da] using on soon he provide information began key al-Qaida and procedures, to information that helped us find and operatives more of - including capture responsible the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah those for one of KSM's accomplices in the Nine-Eleven [zoo-BAY-da] identified - a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB], The attacks information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. [zoo-BAY-da] together these terrorists provided information that helped in the And two Sheikh execution operation that captured Khalid the of and planning 1160 Mohammed." CIA "validation" document concurring with An updated the passage a modified list of CIA cables provided "sources" to support the passage. proposed as citations to Abu Zubaydah's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation Cable 1161 were techniques Like the previous version, the CIA's updated "validation" removed. information did to any cables demonstrating that cite from Abu Zubaydah "helped document not 1162 the capture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh." lead Similarly, to of the cables cited to support none the indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah passage Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in and foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) "helped in the described KSM's stating that it was "based on Ideational information" provided by the asset. (See capture, l^mmm.) Neither the two cables cited to support the claim made any 41351 of in Abu to bin al-Shibh, or any other detainee Zubaydah, CIA or foreign government custody. The reference Ramzi of KSM, including the role of the asset (referred to herein as "ASSET X") is detailed elsewhere in this capture ,o: and g reatcr detail in the full Com mittee Study. Sec e inailfrom^HHIB 5 summary [REDACTED], in cc: ^^HHflffsubject: Source our AZ [REDACTED]; ^^^BH date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM. paragraphs', 1160 Detainee Pronunciation original draft. CIA Validation of Remarks on brackets Policy, Wednesday, 6 in September 2006, Draft #15. 1161 The document cited a cable on Abu Zubaydah's August 2002 description of his meeting with Ramzi bin al- Shibh, but the previously cited June 2002 cable related to Abu Zubaydah's description of the same meeting, not the was before Abu Zubaydah was subjected to provided CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See which 1102 with meeting his on the cable Abu Zubaydah's August 2002 reportin The information included in describing (Sec to capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. unrelated was al-Shibh bin Ramzi die I-) The CIA document also cited as a "source" a cable describing the capture of bin al-Shibh with no mention of Abu Ramzi Zubaydah's The details of (See bin al-Shibh's capture are reporting. described elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study. 11ii 111 BBH^BBI^^^^^B iIIiinh ii Page 199 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 199

229 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN J163 and operation that captured [KSM]." execution As described elsewhere in planning the of 1164 claims. records to support these CIA are there no this summary, documents validating the president's speech (TS/Z^^^m^^^^l/NF) The CIA addressed that likewise unsupported by the CIA's were cables. For example, the passages other cited an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA's speech included the on of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003. representations effectiveness stated: speech The custody, KSM was questioned in the CIA using these "Once our by he soon provided information that helped us stop another procedures, and on attack United States. During questioning, KSM told us about planned the CIA al he knew was in operative custody - a terrorist named another Qaeda Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver Majid to $50,000 for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, individuals working as of Southeast Asian affiliate known Qaeda's 'J-I.' CIA officers leader the al with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had confronted Khan to delivered operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical been an Based and for this operative. number on that information, description contact was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that Zubair 1165 lead capture of Hambali." to helped the cited support As passage, the CIA for a June 2003 cable (TS^i^^BHW) this 1166 Khan interrogation Khan in which Majid Majid discussed Zubair. a CIA The of describing "validation" document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have CIA in that Khan provided this information while Majid foreign government custody, prior revealed 1167 reporting from KSM. to the 1103 The document included a previous! CIA of of cable relating to the capture cited KSM that made no mention from ( See CIA reporting detainees. The CIA document also 41351 •^•••H) "Ammar." previously cable describing bin the identification of cited As described in the section included al-Shibh's summary, as well as in Volume II, on the Capture of KSM, KSM was not captured as a result of information of this Ammar relatedto (The document cited the cable as 20700, as noted, the actual cite was al-Baluchi. The connection cable also cited an analytical product whose relevance was limited to the 20790.) CIA KSM DI al-Aziz (Ammar al-Baluchi). (See between Serial Flier CTC 2002-30086CH: CIA analytic report, and Finally, Threads: Advances in Understanding 11 September.") Recent the document included a cable that "Threat was unrelated to the content of the speech. See sections this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid of Mohammad Shaykh (KSM). 1165 Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. Presidential wi Remarks Validation of " on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15; CIA | |13678 MAR 03), disseminated as (070724Z Further, the June 2003 cable, W^^KK^^B' DIRECTOR HHI (122120Z JUN 03), cited by the CIA as validation, makes no reference to reporting from KSM. foreign Khan on March 5, 2003 and was in captured government detention until being transferred to CIA was custody on May 2003. See details on the detention and interrogation of Majid Khan in Volume III. i IMI III I I mi inn 11 Page 200 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 200

230 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ September 6, President Bush delivered the speech based On 2006, 1168 information. September 8, 2006, the chief of the on the CIA-vetted On H^^^^H^H, of had participated in the CIA's validation CTC, the Department in who In "final document" for possible updates or changes. the an email, speech, distributed validation e ur d the recipients to "[p]lease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very g mm 1169 important document." 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the On September as the to the capture of KSM, as well related the relevance of the CIA cables in speech passage the validation document to cited the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a in support cable Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of describing supported the claim that CIA "Ammar" al-Shibh's reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. bin officer wrote: The "I presume information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi's the regarding Ammar?? that actually help lead us to KSM?? not admission Did did double-check section, but we may want to who this and provide sure this also cables this actually 'assisted us'. This how seems to be a additional on critics in the press seem to be picking on. I will do some digging on my point 1170 as own well." There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer's (TS/Z^^H^^^^V/NF) As about sourcing were further addressed. inadequate described in this summary, comments the in more detail in Volume II, there are no CIA records and support the passage in the speech to related the capture of KSM. to the After press accounts challenging aspects of the speech speech, became the subject of internal discussion amongsomeCIAofficers. On September 7, 2006, the chief of IHHH Department in CTC, sent an email stating: "The the Times has a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Defending the NY posted the the asserting that, after the use of in CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, passage speech U(i8 for 2009, Marc Thiessen, the speechwriter responsible 29, President Bush's September 6, 2006, On April wrote: "This was the most carefully speech, speech in presidential history - reviewed by all the key players vetted from individuals who ran the program all the way up to the director of national intelligence, who personally the president. attested accuracy of the speech in a memo to the the And just last week on Fox News, former CIA to Director Michael Hayden said he went back and checked with the agency as to the accuracy of that speech and reported: 'We by our story.'" See Marc Thiessen, "The West Coast Plot: An 'Inconvenient Truth,'" The stand Review £pri^^200^ National u Email to: | from: ® [REDACTEDL^^HHHn^HHi^B> [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! •IHHHHHH; verify the Please attached; September 8, 2006, at 06:28 PM. date: 1,70 [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; to: ^••••H; cc: Email from: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^^^B|^^^^H, H i subject: Re: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! 9:16:15 Please Attached; date: September 11, 2006, at the AM; attachment Nl: CIA Validation of Remarks verify on Detainee Policy Final (Draft #15). The email also identified as unrelated one cable that had been cited as a bin source corrected a transposed number of the cable describing Ramzi and al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar." Page 201 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 201

231 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN Abu information "that helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh," m Zubaydah provided explained: knew al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; Ramzi "...we bin us activities on his recent gave that—when added however, AZ information point, us him. Again, on this information—helped we were other into track jm the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh." very careful and statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided "information (TS/fl^HHB/NP) HH's not recent "helped [CIA] track him," was that supported by the al-Shibh's] activities" on [bin in the CIA's "validation" document, or any other cables record. HHHN email cited CIA not the other representation in the president's speech—that address Zubaydah did Abu 1172 Ramzi bin al-Shibh. "identified" New York Times The also challenged the representation in article the that Abu Zubaydah "disclosed" that KSM was the "mastermind behind the 9/11 speech and used alias 'Mukhtar,"' and that "[t]his was a vital picce of the puzzle that helped the attacks Times community KSM." As the New York pursue article noted, the 9/11 intelligence our pointed to a cable from August 2001 that identified KSM as "Mukhtar." In her Commissioijiad acknowledged identifying August 2001 report email, KSM as "Mukhtar" and the additional on the drafting of the speech: provided information 28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA's] Bi [database] does show a report "[0]n [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim's brother Zadran told him that from Moreover, was being called 'Mukhtar.' now we were suspicious that KSM KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some reporting indicating was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to he 1173 White the 28 August report escaped our notice." House, the although to ^mmi^i^ from: imm, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]^^MIK^^MBBnREDACrED], Mark Mansfield, as Questions subject: Zubaydah's identification of KSM about "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, [REDACTED]; Abu A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in the New York Times, by 2006. Mazzetti, Mark entitled, Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" included comments by CIA "Questions defending article assertions in the President's speech. The officials stated: "Mr. Bush described the the 'safe, techniques on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been interrogation lawful and effective,' and he asserted that used torture had not been used. .. .Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin al- Shibh as accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the an months Mr. Zubaydah's capture." attacks before 1,72 are no CIA records to support these claims. See the section of this There on the capture of Ramzi bin summary al-Shibh, well as a more detailed account as Volume II. in from: m^H; to Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDL^^^Bf^i^^HnREDACTED], KSM [REDACTED]; about Abu Zubaydah's identification of Questions as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, subject: 2006. There are no CIA records indicating what was "explained" to the White House. The CIA validation " document concurred w"' " " " officially idation of Remarks on Detainee provided Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Di TOP SECRET/ 7N0F0RN Page 202 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 202

232 UNCLASSIFIED TOP with 20-20 thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not commission, hindsight, 1174 fact didn't." that alter the we In to York Times article, the New was concerned addition the (TS^HHHHI^^'^) CIA by Ron Suskind in Time Magazine that also challenged about assertions in the an article the 1175 In of bin al-Shibh and KSM. captures Ramzi a September 11, 2006, email, about speech the of the HHHfl Department in CTC, ^H^HI^HL wrote: "[wje are not the chief [Abu Zubaydah] exact locational information, merely that he provided us with claiming provided not helped targeting efforts." email did our address the that information in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh and representations in information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture" of bin al-Shibh. With that the acknowledged the of KSM, ^HlH^s email capture that Suskind's assertion that regard to key was a cooperative source" was "correct as far as "the but the priority with which we it goes, 1]76 changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of 9/11." pursued KSM email did address the representation in the president's speech that Abu Mfl's not and with al-Shibh, "helped in ttanalanmng bin execution of the along Zubaydah, Ramzi captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." H^^l's statements about the captures operation that 1177 al-Shibh KSM are not supported by CIA records. bin of Ramzi and which president's 6, 2006, speech, September was based on (TS/V^I^HIIIII^^^/NF) The information and vetted by the CIA, was CIA-provided first detailed, formal public the 1178 the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. representation The about t0 1174 Email 1 from: I^^HHB Mansfield, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]7H^H7^^^^B> [REDACTED], Mark [REDACTED], subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: [REDACTED]; 7, September 2006. 1175 the Story of the al-Qaeda 14; Their torture The Unofficial CLA was wrong - in more ways than you might by think, Ron Suskind, Time, 18 September 2006. 1176 Email •^^••l; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], from: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; URGENT: FOR YOUR COMMENT: DCIA Questions on [REDACTED], subject: 08:23 Article; 11, 2006, at September PM. date: Suskind the 1177 section of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin See and the Capture of Khalid the al-Shibh Mohammad In 2007, CIA officers also questioned (KSM). passage in the President's September 6, Shaykh the speech concerning the disruption of plotting against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. 2006, the section of this See summary Volume II on the Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting for additional information. and 1178 inaccurate other public statements that relied on made information provided by the CIA. For President Bush as described elsewhere in this summary, on March example, 2008, President Bush vetoed legislation that would 8, have interrogations to techniques authorized by the limited Field Manual. The President's veto message to Army the House of Representatives stated that "[t]he CIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized inteirogation program for who possess the most critical information in the war on terror has helped the United States terrorists the a number including plots to fly passenger airplanes into attacks, Library Tower in Los Angeles and prevent of Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London." (Sec message into the House of Representatives, President to George Bush, March 8, 2008). The President also explained W. veto in his weekly radio address, in which he his referenced the "Library Tower," also known as the "Second Wave" plot, and the Heathrow plot, while representing Marine that program "helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. CIA camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U .S. the consulate in Karachi..." (See President's Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed the in this described more fully hiVolumell^I^represer^ and role of the CIA's summary, llll I I III I ^^^^BPM I llll Mill I Page 203 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 203

233 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN inaccurate the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and representations in its speech relied upon by the OLC in also July 20, 2007, memorandum on The broadcasts. was of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise the legality use was the techniques the effective in "producing substantial quantities of otherwise that of 79 intelligence."" unavailable About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Representations D. CIA Specific CIA Against Detainees CIA made the general representations about the While numerous of its enhanced interrogation effectiveness CIA representations on specific detainees techniques, focused exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002, almost 1180 KSM, March 1, 2003. detained and on Zubaydah /. Abu full As detail in the described Committee Study, the CIA in greater significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the provided CIA's decision use the newly developed CIA "enhanced interrogation techniques" on Abu Zubaydah to 1181 by and doing so. These representations were provided effects the CIA to the CIA OIG, the of enhanced interrogation techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow, Djibouti and Karachi plots were inaccurate. 1179 OLC memorandum, with other OLC memoranda relying on inaccurate CIA representations, has been The along inaccurate as May 2004 OIG Special Review containing the information provided by CIA officers. declassified, has for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Memorandum Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Intelligence Principal Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War Deputy 3 of Act, Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article the the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques Crimes that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14). 1180 See II for additional information on CIA representations. Volume 1181 General; Among see Memorandum for: Inspector other from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for documents, Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 24, Program" February 27, 2004; attachment: February date: 2004, Memorandum re Successes of (2003-7123-IG); CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Int *' ' '•' TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN Page 204 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 204

234 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 1183 1184 1185 1182 White Justice, House, Congress, the and the American public. Department the of include that: Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed "the general US The representations (1) 1186 what would be unable to 'do and was necessary"; lacked 'weak,' resilience, population was stopped cooperating with U.S. (2) personnel using traditional Abu Zubaydah government 1187 use Abu interrogation team believed (3) Zubaydah's of the techniques; interrogation the interrogation techniques would result in critical information on terrorist CIA's enhanced 1188 plotting; and (4) the and of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu operatives use 1189 effective intelligence from Abu Zubaydah. in eliciting These Zubaydah critical was supported by internal CIA records. not representations are representation that Abu Zubaydah "expressed [his] belief The CIA general population the was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what that US goals" necessary' the terrorists from succeeding in their prevent is not supported by CIA was to 1182 otlier documents, see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on Among July 29 2003." prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides Memorandum CIA Interrogation " dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; and Briefing entitled," Program, President 2005, CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA document dated March 4, Vice entitled, for Cheney: Vice and Cheney: CIA Detention for Interrogation Program." ____ "Briefing President 1183 for Among March 2, 2005, Memorandum documents, Steve Bradbury from H^^^^HR HH otlier see Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Legal 1184 Among documents, see CIA classified statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, other Agency, by V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Michael 12 April 2007; and accompanying provided General Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Senate Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." Director Hayden stated: "Now in June [2002], after Intelligence he four about interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where months refused to cooperate and he shut down. of He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was made in learning anything of intelligence value." being Tab p CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" 9/2/2006, see 2 of CIA Validation of Remarks on 1185 example, or September ^^^ Policy, Detainee 6,2006. 1186 example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from |H Legal See, for Counterterrorist "Effectiveness DCI of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." Group, Center, 1187 Release: ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Sec, "During initial interrogation, Abu for example, gave some information diat he probably viewed as Zubaydah Some was important, however, including nominal. that Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This Khalid names, allowed comb previously collected intelligence for both to opening up new leads to this identification us plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It terrorist clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah was possessed deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, a great soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing he months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also Presidential Speech September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. on 1188 also DIRECTOR •• (031357Z AUG 02). See in Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for As detailed Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated August 1, 2002, and John entitled "Interrogation al Qaeda Operative," which states: "The interrogation team is certain [Abu Zubaydah] has of he information he refuses to divulge. Specifically, that is withholding information regarding terrorist additional networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United States against our interests overseas." or 1189 of documents, see Office Among the Director other National Intelligence, "Summary of the High Value of Terrorist Detainee Program," September 6, 2006; and CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Legal Justice, 2, 2005, from flUHUHH, HI March Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject dated T of the CIA Counterterroris" "Effectiveness ' "" 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 205 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 205

235 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 1190 August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA's al-Qa'ida Plans and Organization records. On "we Group records that 'he declared that America was weak, and lacking in have wrote: no was our not have the will to 'do what did necessary' to prevent the that resilience society and 1191 their goals.'" terrorists In a CIA from communication that same day, succeeding in Sametime Station wrote, "I can find no reference officer AZ being deifant [sic] and ALEC a CIA to weak... in fact everything I have read declaring he used a non deifiant [sic] America indicated strategy." response, the chief of the H^^IH Department in CTC, resistance In but certainly said of AZ for years, that don't know why..." The "I've wrote: heard replied, "probably a combo of [deputy chief of ALEC Station, CI^AOi^Station officer ll^HB... and at that." The chief the HHI^I •IH^^B I'll agree, the completed "yes, believe so... and exchange, we shall pass over in Department writing 1192 silence." (TS/^^^^HHU^P) CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating The debriefers using interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA with traditional 119 1 interrogators June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's In recommended that Abu Zubaydah - early records. weeks in isolation while the interrogation team spend traveled ^H "as a several members of [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow keeping team needed time off for a break means the to attendtopcrsonal matters IH^^H," as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu and 1194 with Zubaydah CIA Headquarters. from As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent officers total, of and all of July 2002,47 days in 2002, in isolation. When CIA officers next much June Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques, interrogated 1195 the Prior including to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information waterboard. activities, relationships, capabilities, and on al-Qa'ida in addition to information on its plans, 1196 structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics. leadership Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the 1197 CIA's techniques. enhanced Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information interrogation 1,90 See, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from ^Hl Legal for example, Counterterrorist Counterterrorist of the CIA "Effectiveness Interrogation Techniques." DCI Group, Center, and subject: from: to: change August AZ"; date: language 30, 2006, at 06:32 PM. "Suggested for and 1192 13:15:23 HHHI< 30/Aug/06 ^Hl^l to 19:31:47. communication, Sametime 1193 ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial intenogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some See that information probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh he 'Mukhtar.' (KSM) 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker the This identification allowed us to Mohammad was previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new comb to this terrorist plotter—leads that leads eventually in his capture. It was clear to resulted interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of his information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation, Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also Presidential Speech on September 6, program based that CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel, that states: "We knew 2006, Zubaydah had more on used that save innocent information But he stopped talking... And so, the CIA could an alternative set of lives. procedures." 1,94 10424 (070814Z JUN 02) 1195 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, to include CIA email [REDACTED] dated March 28, 2007, 04:42 PM, the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today." with 1196 well See in Abu Zubaydah detainee review, as reporting as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated charts March 2005. The same information was included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." 1197 See reporting charts in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111. 11ii ii iii i Page 206 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 206

236 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRES//^^^^—flNQFORN attack next United States—and operatives in the United States—provided the basis in on the the for that was "uncooperative," as well as Zubaydah the CIA's representations for CIA Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation determination that Abu "compliant" and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he techniques to become stop CIA stated that Abu Zubaydah could The the application of the withholding. was further interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names CIA's enhanced of 1198 United States or information to stop the next attack. in At no point during or operatives the provide use CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah the this type after the of 1199 of information. 1 (T&BHI^HIIiH^ CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team The ^) the use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information believed of is also operatives United States and terrorist plotting the incongruent with CIA records. on in Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department While and of Justice officials that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed Abu White House in, information threats to, and al-Qa'ida operatives terrorist the United Zubaydah possessed on 1200 CIA officials further represented that the interrogation States. had concluded that team The use of aggressive methods "is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the the more innumerable needed safeguard the lives of to innocent men, women, and critical information within the United States and abroad," and warned "countless more Americans may die children 1201 we AZ to tell us what he knows." unless However, according to CIA cables, the persuade can that at detention site had not determined the the CIA's enhanced interrogation team interrogation were required for Abu Zubaydah to provide such threat information. Rather, the techniques this team assumption is the objective of "[o]ur operation is to achieve a high wrote interrogation of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning degree 1202 to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided." threats (^S/VHIIH^^^B^P) The representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced CIA techniques on Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information interrogation Abu 1198 10586 AUG 02), which states: "In truth, [Zubaydah] can halt the proceedings at See any (04.1559Z providing on revelations by the threat which may save countless lives." truthful time 1195 Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume in. See 120,1 detailed in DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02). The CIA further represented: (1) that the enhanced As phase interrogation Abu Zubaydah's interrogation would likely last "no more than several days but could last up of would days," the use of the [enhanced interrogation techniques] "that be on an as-needed basis and that to thirty (2) all of these techniques will necessarily be used," (3) not the CIA expected "these techniques to be used in some that sort escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard, of not necessarily ending with this technique," (4) though "that although some of these techniques may be used more than once, that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques lose their effectiveness after several repetitions," and (5) "that steps will be taken to ensure generally [Abu the injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods." See that Abu Zubaydah Zubaydah's] review how detailed information for detainee these statements proved almost entirely inaccurate. See also for Intelligence for Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central John Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Memorandum Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative. 1201 DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02) ^^^^^^^ •• 1202 [REDACTED] (231043Z JUL 02); email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 73208 July subject: from [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: and 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM; Addendum [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02). Additional assessments by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah was Zubaydah not axe described in the Abu information detainee review in Volume 111. withholding mi 'ii III i 1 ioi i m i'i Page 207 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 207

237 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN on terrorists plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records. and terrorist did not the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation Abu Zubaydah provide in and the next attack and operatives on the approved—information justified techniques were 1203 to CIA records, Abu United provided information on "al-Qa'ida States. Zubaydah According and plans, in addition to information on "its leadership activities, capabilities, relationships," 1204 decision-making training, and tactics." processes, This type including structure, personalities, provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's of information was 1205 techniques. At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced enhanced interrogation in did provide information on al-Qa'ida cells Zubaydah the United interrogation techniques Abu 1206 plans for terrorist attacks against the United States. a Further, States or operational of indicates Zubaydah's intelligence reporting review that more intelligence quantitative Abu disseminated of Abu Zubaydah's first two months were interrogation, before the use reports from special enhanced techniques and when FBI interrogation agents were directly of the CIA's than were derived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which participating, the included use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17 non-stop 1207 Nonetheless, August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that days. on 1203 Abu review in Volume III. Participants in the detainee of Abu Zubaydah also wrote See Zubaydah interrogation Zubaydah "probably reached the point of cooperation even that to the August institution of 'enhanced' Abu prior -a missed because of the narrow focus of development questioning. In any event there was no measures the that the waterboard produced time-perishable information which otherwise would have been evidence See Reflections Summary and unobtainable." of Services on OMS participation in the RDI CIA program. 1204 entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated March 2005. See also paper Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared CIA "Abu 9 August 2006." on 1205 Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March See 2005; as well "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." as 1206 See Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. Abu 1207 March was taken Abu CIA custody on Zubaydah 2002, and was shortly thereafter hospitalized until into April 15, 2002. Abu Zubaydah returned to DETENTION SITE GREEN on April 15, 2002. During the mondis of April and 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support and unable to speak May Zubaydah communicated with FBI special agents in writing), Abu Zubaydah's interrogations (Abu primarily the 95 In February 2008, the CIA identified reports. "key intelligence and reporting derived" in intelligence resulted Zubaydah. The three items identified by the CIA were all acquired from April and May of 2002 by FBI Abu in Abu was placed in isolation from June 18, Zubaydah to August 4, 2002, without being asked interrogators. 2002, questions. After 47 days in isolation, the CIA reinstituted contact with Abu Zubaydah at approximately 11:50 any on AM 4, 2002, when CIA personnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his August personnel leaving naked. Without asking any questions, CIA Zubaydah made a collar around his neck towel, Abu a towel and used the collar "to slam him against a concrete wall." Multiple enhanced interrogation techniques with the were until 6:30 PM, when Abu Zubaydah was strapped to the waterboard and subjected to non-stop used waterboard "numerous times" between 6:45 PM and technique PM. The "aggressive phase of interrogation" 8:52 using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques continued for 20 days. ( See Abu Zubaydah treatment chronology in Volume III.) the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah's reporting resulted in 91 During CIA reports, than the first two months of his fewer detention. (See Abu Zubaydah detainee review intelligence four III.) Specifically, for information on Abu Zubaydah's initial walling, see CIA email dated March 28, in Volume at PM, 2007, with the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today," which states that 04:42 against Abu "a collar was used to slam him claims a concrete wall." The CIA officer wrote, "While we Zubaydah do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time confirmed that this did indeed happen. For the a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at die site after the walling on the concrete wall." record, Abu the assessment of the "key intelligence" from CIA's Zubaydah, see CIA briefing documents for Regarding Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key "DCIA Intelligence Reporting Derived from / ' ™ lammad (KSM)" (includes and TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN Page 208 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 208

238 UNCLASSIFIED TOP CIA's enhanced techniques were effective and "producing meaningful the interrogation 1208 Shortly in October 2002, CIA records indicate that President thereafter, results." however, in was Brief (PDB) that "Abu Zubaydah resisted providing Bush a Presidential informed Daily the becoming in early August, probably in cooperative hope of until information useful more conditions." The PDB made no improving to the CIA's enhanced his living reference 1209 the represented to other senior policymakers Subsequently, CIA techniques. interrogation of and that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were the Department Justice 1210 elicit critical information from Abu Zubaydah. successfully For example, used a March to in CIA to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information 2, 2005, memorandum Abu from the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and Jose Padilla was acquired only Zubaydah on obtained 1211 representation interrogation This CIA techniques." was repeated [enhanced] "after applying 1212 communications with and the Department of Justice. CIA The in numerous policymakers by 20, CIA was inaccurate. On the evening of April provided 2002, prior to the the information Effectiveness," RDI agenda, CIA document "EITs and Program" witli associated documents, "Key on Briefing Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and Intelligence "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: KSM)," Attachment," "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted."). and 1208 On 2002,|H|^|CTC Legal, met with NSC Legal Adviser John Bellinger August 30, John Zubaydah's email from: John Rizzo; to: (See Moseman; subject: Meeting with Abu to discuss interrogation. Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3, 2002; ALEC 052227Z SEP 02.) According to NSC Legal documenting the he "noted that we had employed the walling techniques, email meeting, also waterboard, box, some of the other methods which along had been approved by the Attorney confinement with and "reported that while the experts at the General," and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the site recent it did appear that the current phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John sessions, 30 to: subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser, Moseman; August 2002; date: September 3,2002.) Rizzo; John email did not provide any additional detail on what was described The Bellinger with respect to either the use of to the or the "results" of the interrogation. It techniques from CIA records whether the CIA ever informed is unclear the NSC legal adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about attacks against the United States or operatives tasked to commit attacks in the U.S., during future die use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. or after of l2W •• 02) (181439Z ALEC OCT 1210 2006, included in the representations September 6, eventually speech, in which the These were President's "We knew that Zubaydah had more President that could save innocent lives, but he stopped stated: information so CIA used an alternative set of procedures... the was questioned using these procedures, and talking... Zubaydah he began to provide information on key al Qaeda operatives, including information that helped soon find and us capture of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11"'." These representations were also made to more "faced Committee. 6, 2006, Director Hayden testified that, September with the techniques and with the the On of what he did not know was coming, Abu Zubaydah decided that prospects had carried the burden as far as he Allah required him to carry it and that he could had the burden down and cooperate with his interrogators." (See put transcript of briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336).) Director Hayden's Statement for the Record for an April 12, hearing stated that: "[a]fter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most 2007, Senate sources on al-Qa'ida." See statement for the intelligence Select Committee on Intelligence from important of Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563). CIA 1211 Italics original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of in Center, dated Justice, from HH^^^^H HH Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist March subject 2,2005, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 1212 Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda dated May 30, 2005, and July The July 20, 2007, memorandum - now declassified - states (inaccurately) that: "Interrogations 20,2007. once Qaeda techniques were employed—revealed two al of Zubaydah—again, operatives already in the enhanced building States planning to destroy a high rise apartment United and to detonate a radiological bomb in and Washington, D.C." See Volume II, specifically the section on the "Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings of Plot" die capture of Jose Padilla, for additional details concerning the inaccuracies and this statement. mi III i iiiiiiiiiii ii Page 209 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 209

239 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRESfl^^^^BM^^^^MflNQEQRN of the enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to use CIA's 1213 who rapport building interrogation techniques. FBI were officers using Muhammad Khalid 2. (KSM) Shaykh Study, more in the (TS/^I^^^I^^^^NF) Committee detail the CIA in described As full information to provided on the effectiveness of the CIA's significant inaccurate policymakers techniques the interrogation of KSM. in representations were interrogation enhanced These APR 02). Despite requests by the Senate Select Committee | J0091 Intelligence, the (210959Z on has corrected the record on this assertion. On September 8, 2008, the Committee submitted Questions for CIA never (QFRs) opinions the CIA from a hearing on the legal Record issued by the Department of Justice's Office of to the of on CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Because the time constraints, the CIA agreed "to Counsel Legal back several questions from take that [the CIA was] unable to answer at the hearing." On the topic of the Members effectiveness die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the Committee asked "Why was this information of to Padilla], was not obtained through the use of EITs, included in the 'Effectiveness Memo?'" CIA [related which for to contain coinpleteckesponses provided these Questions for the Record. The CIA's answer thiju^view records reported was: ttHH^D simply inadvertently Legal this wrong. Abu question to this provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by Zubaydah FBI 10091)." The the Committee received this response, despite numerous requests. Instead, the CIA responded with a letter dated never 17, numerous stating that the "CIA has responded to October written requests for information from SSCI on 2008, that topic CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program]," and [the "[w]e are available to provide additional this briefings on this issue to Members as necessary." In a letter to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Chairman Rockefeller wrote, CIA's refusal to respond to hearing Questions for the Record is unprecedented and is "[t]he unacceptable." Senator wrote a separate letter to CIA Director Michael Hayden stating, "I want simply Feinstein The know 1 to the October 17, 2008 reply., .appalling." that CIA did not respond. (See: (1) Senate Select you found on Intelligence Questions for the Record submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden on September Committee 8, 2008, a request for a response by October 10,2008 (DTS #2008-3522); (2) CIA document prepared in with to Select for the Record" submitted by the Senate response Committee on Intelligence on September 8, "Questions Chairman 2008; from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence letter John D. Rockefeller IV, dated October 29, (3) 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); (4) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman John Rockefeller IV, dated October 29,2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); D. Committee (5) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from member, Dianne Feinstein, dated October and letter 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4235).) In February 30, a senior CIA officer wrote: "AZ 2004, never gave 'this is the plot' type of information. really claimed every plot/operation he had knowledge of and/or He was working on was only preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he never really from: gave get them)." See email to cc: actionable [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^BBjliKoh^^ud^rredacted], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [ REDACTED L UHIHK subject: Please 10, Read CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February - Re 2004). 11 ii 1111 i WBBMMIB^^^P^FftnN Page 210 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 210

240 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1214 1215 1216 by OIG, the the White House, to the Department of Justice, the the provided CIA 1218 1217 and the The representations include that: (1) KSM provided Congress, public. American the or prior to the use of intelligence CIA's enhanced actionable information little threat 1219 the CIA overcame KSM's interrogation through the use of the techniques; resistance (2) 1220 techniques; (3) the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique CIA's interrogation enhanced 1221 "recanted from KSM; in eliciting (4) KSM effective little of the particularly was information had provided, and KSM's information was "generally accurate" and information" he 1222 (5) made a statement to CIA personnel—"soon, you will know"— "consistent"; KSM believed attack upon his arrest; and (6) KSM imminent "the general US indicating an was 1214 documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Among other re Comments subject: to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Operations; (S) Successes date: 27, (2003-7123-IG); attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re February of Program" 2004; Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. CIA's 1215 other Among see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July documents, Memorandum prepared CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides 2003," by White Interrogation July 29,2003, presented to senior dated House officials; Briefing for "CIA Program," entitled, Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA Vice dated March 4, 2005, entitled, President document for President Cheney: CIA Detention and Vice Program," and "DCIA Talking Points: "Briefing Interrogation 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. Waterboard 6 in preparation POTUS meeting." for I2,fi Among see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from | other documents, CIA Group, Center re: Effectiveness of the Counterterrorist Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Legal DCI 1217 other documents, see CIA classified Statement for the Among Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Record, provided General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying by April Select on Intelligence hearing transcript for Committee 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Senate Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." 1218 See, example, CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" (related to the President's speech) 9/2/2006; Tab 2 of for Validation of on Detainee Policy, September 6, 2006; and speech by President Bush on September 6, CIA Remarks 2006. 12,9 "National Security Advisor," from to of Central Intelligence,^ubiect^^^ CIA memorandum "Director the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: "Effectiveness of to: subject: value and on March December at 5:06:38 PM. date: document dated 6,2004, 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for techniques"; CIA President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA Talking Points entitled, Vice Points "Talking for March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques." 10 CHIEF briefing May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR dated OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 CIA document 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: May Rendition, Detention and Interrogation CIA Programs." 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI March CIA Center Effectiveness of the re: Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Counterterrorist 1220 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,'^jubject^^^^ "Effectiveness of CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: the and ^HI^^^^H subject: on ^^^^^^^^^^^ B March December at 5:06:38 PM; date: document dated 6,2004, 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for techniques"; CIA President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefing document Vice May 2, 2006, dated entitled, FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief "BRIEFING Staff to the of President Bolten: CIA Rendition, Josh and Interrogation Programs." Detention 1221 See, for example, transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 1222 "Khalid Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," authored by [REDACTED], Shaykh CIA Detentions, for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB; and Briefing on (RDI)" Interrogations 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing including RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced "Tab materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect - 11:30 Barrack Obama National Security Team Tuesday. 13 January 2009; 8:30 [sic] a.m." 11 ii 11111 i II i II Page 211 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 211

241 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1223 'weak,' and would be unable to 'do what was necessary." population lacked was resilience, not by internal CIA records. are supported These representations CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided (TSZ/^^^^I^H^^F) While the of or intelligence prior to the use actionable the CIA's enhanced information threat little CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, within interrogation few minutes" of first being questioned by CIA techniques "a 1224 This fact was omitted from CIA representations. interrogators. material CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM's resistance to (TS/JIII^I^^^^^^/NF) The 1225 using by enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA's CIA records do not interrogation the multiple this the contrary, there are To CIA records describing the support statement. of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM's cooperation. ineffectiveness March On the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on 26, 2003, was a possible as likely lying and engaged in an effort "to renew KSM KSM, described 1226 the April 2, 2003, stance." Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism resistance On "Precious an of KSM's intelligence entitled, assessment Truths, Surrounded by (IICT) produced of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding information or a Bodyguard 1227 about and operatives targeting the United States. lying During and after the use plots terrorist expressed enhanced techniques, the CIA repeatedly interrogation concern that KSM CIA's of the lying and withholding information in the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, was 1228 1229 interests and plotting against U.S. Nuclear) in Karachi, Pakistan, programs, Radiological, 1230 1231 Heathrow Airport, plotting Abu Issa al-Britani, against as well as the "Second Wave" plotting against "tallest building in California," which prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to the in a cable April 22, 2003, that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression note dated debriefing to is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation full threats to US towards status 1232 especially inside interests, CONUS." 1223 from Memorandum March Steve Bradbury 2005, Legal Group, DCI 2, for Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Counterterrorist Techniques. Interrogation 1224 (051400Z MAR ^^^•••^•134491 03) 1225 "Director "National Security CIA from to of Central Intelligence," Subject: memorandum Advisor," of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in "Effectiveness from: email anc H^HH; on value ' subject: date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 techniques"; CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for PM. Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the FOR Josh CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs." President Bolten: 1226 11026 (271034Z MAR 03) ••• 1227 Lies," Muhammad's "Khalid Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Shaykh Threat Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), April 3, 2003. 1228 DIRECTORi^H (121550Z 03) JUN 1229 ALEC ^M(022012Z 03) MAY 1230 Memorandum for: |; subject: detainee branch; 12 June 2003. Action date: 1231 ALEC (210159Z OCT 03); email from: ^^M subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16,2003, at 5:25:13 PM. 1232 •• (222153Z APR 03) ALEC TOP SECRET//! /ZNOFORN Page 212 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 212

242 UNCLASSIFIED 1//NOFORN TOr SECRET// The (TS/T^^^^^I^B^NF) that the CIA's waterboard CIA repeatedly represented 1233 particularly information from KSM. technique This interrogation effective was in eliciting including supported records. Numerous CIA personnel, CIA members not is representation by expressed their of KSM's that the waterboard interrogation technique interrogation team, belief on The on-site medical officer told the KSM. general that after three or ineffective was inspector it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM "hated it but four days 1234 could KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station knew manage." he to inspector that KSM "figured out a way the deal with [the mm told general 1235 she relayed waterboard]," a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM... in and b^onfrontin^KSM Majid and theemails^in other words stuff... with Khan the using 1236 sources. information Legal, fl^l^HHIflK told the from other 1237 that the waterboard inspector of limited use on KSM." general A KSM interrogator told "was 1238 general that KSM had "beat the system," the and assessed that KSM responded to inspector 1239 comforts of importance" and not to "confrontational" approaches. and The "creature sense wrote Abu a Sametime communication that KSM and later Zubaydah "held back" interrogator in adding the the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, of "I'm ostracized whenever despite use 1240 two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back." I suggest those In April told the inspector general that the waterboard had "not been very 2003, use on also "questioned how the repeated He of the waterboard was effective KSM." 1241 from 'beating the bottom of categorically feet,' or from torture in general." different my (TS^H^^^HIH^NE) CIA repeatedly represented that The had "recanted little of KSM the information" he had provided, and that KSM's information was "generally accurate" and 1242 "consistent." assertion is not supported by CIA records. Throughout the period during This 1233 See, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency for example, Interrogation April 12, 2007 (SSCI #2007-3158). and Program, Detention 1234 by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May Interview of 15,2003. ^^^^^^^ b 1235 General, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Office of Interview Inspector and April 3, y the ^^^^^^^ 2003. /05 2/Ma 1236 and REDACTED [ l.° Communication, y Sametime ' 14:51:48 to 15:17:39. The BHH^HH Khan, Khan to confronting KSM with the reporting of Majid refers then in foreign government "Majid stuff' ^^^^^^^^^^ custody. 1237 of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and Interview Office of the Inspector [REDACTED], General, 20,2003. August b 1238 of y [REDACTED] and Interview Office of the Inspector General, October [REDACTED], 22, 2003. 1239 ^^^M 11715 (201047Z MAY 03) ^^^^^ 1240 Sametime and •|^^BU5/Aug/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. The Communication, it's also following statement from ^^^H^H: "I think die a dangerous message to say we Sametime includes do almost the same without measures. Begs the question- then could did you use them before?" why 124 Inspector Interview by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of ' of General, April 11 the and 13, 2003. 1242 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," was authored by [REDACTED], CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB. CIA for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Briefing on (RDI)" Interrogations 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing including RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced "Tab materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/C1A Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack Obama National Security TeamTuesdayJ3Jan^ 11:30 a.m." [sic] Illl II III I I H'l Ml I Page 213 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 213

243 UNCLASSIFIED TOP was which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided subjected KSM to fabricated of would later acknowledge was he and recant. much which inaccurate information, and recantations covered his activities immediately before Specifically, KSM's fabrications his 1244 1243 an individual whom he described as identity protector of his children, the of capture, the a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and plotting location of against the 1245 KSM fabricated significant information, which he would later recant, related to Hassan Ghul. 1246 stating and Jose Padilla were plotting together, al-Tayyar linking al- al-Tayyar, that Jaffar 1247 1248 plotting Tayyar and to Majid Khan's to Heathrow and producing what Airport plotting, officials as an "elaborate tale" linking al-Tayyar described an assassination plot against CIA to 1249 Jimmy Carter. former KSM later explained that "he had been forced to lie" about President 1250 due pressure from CIA interrogators. al-Tayyar KSM recanted other information about to the 1251 Airport information regarding the targeting, including additional Heathrow plotting, the 1252 tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight operatives, and KSM provided the schools. information Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) on he would later recant, significant that 1253 Abu Issa al-Britani to Jaffar al-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot. including linking 1254 interrogators additional waterboarding, direct KSM told CIA of that he had sent threat Under 1255 al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts. Abu In June 2003, Issa "under stated fabricated the story because he was he 'enhanced measures' when he made KSM 1256 claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear." these KSM 1257 also tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States, stated which he that he 34513 MAR 03); ^^^Bl 1139 (051956Z APR 03) (052246Z 34569 (061722Z MAR 03); 1281 (130801Z JUN 04); |5712 from: [REDACTED^ •^H^HTton^HB^IHI' planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; iect: date [REDACTED MAR 03)^HHi 10762 (U2020Z (102258Z 03), disseminated as | 10751 MAR (121932Z AUG 04); §^|20873 (08163IZ MAR 04); ••20873 (081631Z MAR 04); 123796 •• DIRECTOR 04); DIRECTOR |^H(101847ZMAY 04) (101847Z MAY 10741 disseminatedas|BB||||^R (092308ZMAR03), (100917Z MAR [10740 I^HH 03);_ALECBHi(120134ZMAR03) (182127ZMAIU)3),disseminated as11717 (201722Z MAY H 10883 disseminated as •••10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 03), (191513Z 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) MAR 110894 (231205Z MAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR 03) 10959 03); (201037Z 03); 10959 (231205Z MAR MAR | 110902 MAR (222127Z 10950 03), disseminated as \ 111377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated | as 110798 (131816Z MAR 114420| 11717 ( •• 03); MAY MAY | (192314Z (201222Z 03); (272231Z JUN 112141 | as disseminated 110778 (121549Z MAR 03), 03); (272231Z 12141 JUN (031541Z JUL 04); •••• 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated 122939 asj 110828 MAR 03), included as (151310Z of disseminated intelligence ( part l March 17, 2003, interrogation; •••! 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 1171V (201722Z 03), disseminated as IHI^HHi. MAY (221506ZMAR03);H||| 03) (222127Z MAR 10941 10950 (2216I0Z MAR 110942 disseminated as B^H 10948 (222101Z MAR 03), 03), disseminated as | 112095 (222049Z 03) JUN (2216I0Z 110942 03), disseminated as | MAR N H I M I i M i >i < ii Page 214 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 214

244 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1258 recant. May 3, 2003, CIA officers recommended revisiting the information would later On "he "during of his interrogation process," noting that stages has told us provided earlier KSM had some things during this that to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some he said phase 1259 may be suspect." information of this 1 ^ H ^ also ^) The CIA (TS/ V referred to a comment made by KSM HIHH repeatedly he still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent while was 1261 1260 the inspector general, reports the national security advisor, In and the attack. to 1262 Justice, among of the CIA represented that: Department others, United about attacks planned against the asked States, he coldly "When future 'Soon, you will know.' In fact, soon we did know - after we initiated replied 1263 measures." enhanced comment CIA records indicate that KSM's CIA was interpreted by Contrary representations, to with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use CIA future officers his 1264 chip" with more senior CIA officers. as cooperation a "bargaining with Finally, attributed to KSM, along CIA Abu Zubaydah, the (TSZ/HHH^HB*'^) the that "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to statement 1265 in to prevent the terrorists from succeeding necessary' their goals." what There are was 'do CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu no made these statements. Zubaydah 1258 I 31147 (171919Z DEC 05), 05); | 13t 148 (171919Z DEC 11255iU0419382^UG 03); • as disseminated 1259 KSM's MAY detailed in Volumes II and III, As claims that he fabricated 11487 03). (031551Z credible to CIA officers. Other information collection supported these claims. appeared intelligence 1260 Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy for: for Operations; subject: re (S) Memorandum Director to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorisin Detention and Interrogation Comments (2003-7I23-IG); Program" date: 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism February and Activities. Detention Interrogation 1261 memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,^ubject^^^ CIA of Interrogation CIA Counterterrorist "Effectiveness Techniques," included in email from: to: the and subject: on date: December 6, techniques"; at 5:06:38 PM. 2004, 1262 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from ^|, ^H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. re: 1263 Email to: HH^^^H; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], from: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. HHH^^H^B!subject: for: Memorandum Inspector from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for General; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Operations; Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-1G); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 24, ^^^^^^^ Activities. l2 « •••• 41592 (051050Z 03); ^••^•416m051329^AR 03) MAR 1265 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve BradburyfromlB||[^^^H, ^H Legal Group, DCI Countertenorist re: Effectiveness of the CIA Couiiterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Center 11ii 11111 ^^MBBBI^^MBi 'inn Page 215 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 215

245 UNCLASSIFIED mi in i IMi^M imi inn i 11 Effectiveness Claims a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence" E. CIA Regarding CIA (TSA^^^^^^m^/NF) the CIA's enhanced interrogation represented The that 1265 the "a high volume of critical intelligence of on al- techniques in collection resulted 267 evaluated the Qa'ida.'" volume" of intelligence collected "high compiling The Committee by number sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports of the 119 the total from 1268 detainees. CIA known CIA informed the GES/^HI^Him^/NF) that its interrogation program The Committee successful developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced was in CIA reporting. in September 2006, example, Director Michael intelligence disseminated For the following testimony to the Committee: Hayden provided "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the Bayh: Senator interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important enhanced [CIA's to the country, at one point information to 50 percent of our information up about I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?" al-Qa'ida. Hayden: "Over sir." Director 8000, only "And has come from, I guess, this thirty individuals." Senator Bayh: yet description iti 1266 i" " in this CIA representation is addressed in the section of this summary concerning the cl ca acquisition of actionable intelligence after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the reported represented the enabling CIA CIA to thwart terrorist plots and capture specific terrorists. See Volume II for as information. additional 1267 other documents, see CIA Memorandum for the National Security Advisor (Rice) entitled, Among of Techniques," CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation "Effectiveness December 2004; CIA Memorandum to the the CIA Office Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the Legal Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," March 2, of 2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," March 4, CIA talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 2005; Meeting PC: of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, DCI Effectiveness briefing to entitled, "Briefing for Chief of Staff CIA the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, notes 2005; briefing Interrogation dated May 2, 2006; CIA Programs," document, entitled, "DCIA Talking and Detention, Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation Points: document was "sent to the DCIA 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." Also included in additional briefing documents referenced and Nov. in summary. described this while CIA multi-source intelligence reports are included in the Committee Study, the quantitative analysis 1268 in this is based on sole-source intelligence reporting, summary these reports best reflect reporting from CIA as detainees. Multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. As described above, a common report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA multi-source were at CIA detention site. A report detainees be produced regardless if detainees were or a specific not able would to identify provide information on the or As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS individual. (202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used which in the three intelligence reports, two of of were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay dissemination detainees," while the third "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world information sporting Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific events." provided by one CIA detainee. Page 216 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 216

246 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1269 Hayden: 96, aU 96." "No, Director sir, CIA In April testified that the CIA's Director 2007, Hayden most "for - intelligence," and that it is "the purpose successful existed one interrogation program by American intelligence today" for "preventing attacks, program al- being conducted disabling 1270 hearing Director Hayden again suggested that this CIA interrogation program At Qa'ida." the 1271 obtaining intelligence from was CIA detainees. successful A transcript of that hearing in all the exchange: included following reports "General the 8000 intelligence Of that were Snowe: Hayden. Senator you said, by 30 of the detainees." provided, as 1272 "By 97, ma'am." Director Hayden: all suggestion The all CIA detainees provided information that (TSyT^^^^^^^^H/ZNF) that in intelligence reporting is not resulted by CIA records. CIA records reveal that 34 supported percent the 119 known CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly 70 percent of fewer than intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA 15 produced nearly to CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the 20 percent produced subjected records, intelligence reports, while 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. While the no Detention did Interrogation Program CIA's produce significant amounts of disseminated and reporting sole-source intelligence reports), this reporting was overwhelmingly intelligence (5,874 from a small subset of CIA detainees. For example, of derived 119 CIA detainees identified the in the 89 percent of all disseminated Study, reporting was derived from 25 CIA intelligence detainees. Five CIA detainees produced more than 40 percent of all intelligence reporting from the CIA's and Interrogation Program. CIA records indicate that two of the five Detention 1273 were to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. not detainees subjected Primary CIA's Effectiveness Representations—the Use of the Eight Enhanced F. The CIA and "Enabled CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" Techniques "Capture Interrogation the Terrorists" Additional 1274 through 2009, From the CIA consistently and 2003 repeatedly represented its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce that 1269 Central Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Senate Central Intelligence Agency, on the Select Director, Intelligence Detention, Interrogation and Rendition Program, Agency 6, 2006 (SSCI #2007-1336). At September the time this statement was made there had been at least 118 CIA detainees. 1270 Senate Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Select Program, 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). Interrogation April 1271 Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Senate Interrogation Program, 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). April 1272 the Committee Senate Intelligence, Hearing on Select Central Intelligence Agency Detention and on Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 1273 See intelligence reporting data in Volume TL detainee 127,1 enhanced represented The 2002 that the CIA's CIA interrogation techniques were necessary and effective. in The Committee analysis focuses on CIA representations^^ during which time the CIA imii 11ii III i BB^^^^MBMB imi 11 Page 217 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 217

247 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ NOFORN I// that "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, critical intelligence a high-volume and intelligence on al-Qa'ida." The CIA further stated that the of collect critical interrogation a result use of the CIA's enhanced the techniques could information acquired of as 1275 ("otherwise by government in any other way U.S. unavailable"). acquired been the not have of counterterrorism "successes" the CIA attributed to the use of provided CIA's enhanced specific examples the interrogation techniques. 1275 2003 20 representations included in this See From CIA through 2009, the CIA's of list summary. the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques representations a specific set of regarding included of plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from examples terrorist asserted of interrogation techniques. CIA representations further enhanced that the intelligence obtained use the its use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in from the Among other CIA representations, see : (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office "saved lives." a series Memorandum, May 30, 2005, which relied on dated of highly specific CIA representations of Legal Counsel the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their on legality. The representations referenced by the OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation CIA was "necessary" obtain "critical," "vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was techniques to The the to "detect and disrupt" terrorist threats. government OLC memorandum further states for U.S. "essential" CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible that "[the for a subsequent within the United States." ( See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy attack preventing Bradbury, Central Agency, from Steven G. Intelligence Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Counsel, General Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of General, Convention the Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in die Interrogation of High Value al Against Justice Detainees.) representations in the Department of CIA Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum Qaeda (2) July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of dated CIA's techniques. interrogation the Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech enhanced the was interrogation program (which describing based on CIA-provided information), the OLC CIA's particular, memorandum CIA interrogation program—and, in "The its use of enhanced interrogation states: techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable ...As die President explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us intelligence. about terrorist we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.'" ( See information plans Agency, John Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Rizzo, from Steven G. Bradbury, for Memorandum A. Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Principal Deputy the Treatment Act, Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques Crimes Detainee Value Be May the CIA in the Interrogation of High Used al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for that by of the National Security Council in July members September 2003 represented that "the use of Enhanced and Techniques one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA of program saved warned policymakers that "[termination of this and will result in loss of life, professionals, lives," extensive." ( See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of possibly Program Interrogation 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, on and 2003, for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; Memorandum September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the CIA Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of Special almost lawful enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has of certainly saved countless American lives the use the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, inside and [have] allies would we suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." our (S) Memorandum Inspector General; from: (See Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re for: James Comments Draft IG Special Review, to Detention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; "Counterterrorism date: February 27, 2004; attachment: Febmary 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February Interrogation RDI which that the "CIA assesses that the 2009, program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] techniques state were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired or from this program would not have been discovered in reported by other means." (See CIA briefing detainees documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Ta" " " ' " ' 8FEB.2009" and graphic TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 218 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 218

248 UNCLASSIFIED TOP CIA also that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced The represented was interrogation specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific examples techniques of a result captured use of the CIA's techniques. terrorists of as the a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for example, For (TS^H^^^^^H^NF) in advisor, the the wrote that there was "no way to conduct" an national security CIA of foreign intelligence efficacy of the enhanced interrogation study "independent using stated, "[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that techniques," program but this and techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." To illustrate the works the 11 the techniques, the CIA provided interrogation examples of "|k|ey of effectiveness CIA's from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," nine of intelligence collected 1276 specific referenced or the capture of specific terrorists. plots Similarly, under which terrorist briefing heading, as a Result of EITs," a CIA Discovered prepared for President Bush the "Plots 2007 states, "reporting statistics alone in November not provide a fair and accurate measure will of the of EITs." Instead, the CIA provided eight "examples of key intelligence effectiveness from CIA interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other collected detainee the seven referenced specific terrorist plots or which capture of techniques," interrogation of 1277 terrorists. specific Committee 20 The CIA documents that include CIA (IS^m^F) selected enhanced about of the CIA's effectiveness interrogation techniques from representations the through 2009. The 20 CIA documents, which were consistent with a broader set of CIA 2003 made this representations period, include materials the CIA prepared for the White during and "Key Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," attachment, Intelligence "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated including "Key documents, Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Intelligence "Background Impacts and "supporting references," to include Attachment," on Key Captures and Plots Chart: Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of [DUNBAR]," of the captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced "some key and all, "CIA assesses that most, if not techniques, of the timely intelligence acquired from interrogation stating: by this would not have been discovered or reported in any other means." See Volume II for detainees program CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced additional techniques enabled the CIA to obtain interrogation unique, unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." otherwise 1276 Security document. See CIA memorandum to "National original Advisor," from "Director of Central Italics in Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterter^^ included Intelligence," email in t0; from: and subject: on IHHHHK 5:06:38 of techniques"; date: value 6,2004, at interrogation PM. The email references the attached December "information paper to Dr. Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques." The document includes the following: The Plot," "The Heathrow Plot," The "Second Wave," "The Guraba Cell," "Issa al-Hindi," "Karachi "Shoe Talha Capture," "Jafaar al-Tayyar," "Dirty Bomb Plot," "Hambali's Bomber," and "Abu al-Pakistani," Pakistan." "Shkai, 1277 CIA document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 See 2007," dated November 6, 2007, November with notation the document was "sent to DCIA the 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." The document Nov. states, under the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," that "reporting statistics alone will not provide a then fair measure of the effectiveness of EITs," and accurate provides a list of "examples of key intelligence and collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques...The Wave'...Hambali's Capture...The Guraba Cell...Shoe Bomber...Issa al-Hindi...Jafaar 'Second al-Tayyar... The Karachi Plot...The Heathrov^lot^italic^dded)^^^^^^ 11(>| 111111 MI III I 11 Page 219 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 219

249 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECREIW^^^^^^M^^^MFLNQFQRN the Department Justice, the Congress, the CIA Office of Inspector General, as well as House, of of President national security team, and the public. The Committee incoming members Obama's 20 documents: following selected the CIA Reaffirmation 2003: Briefing September Seeking Policy CIA of the and 1. July Documents Program from White House Officials, "Review of Interrogation CLA Interrogation 1278 Program." 2. February CIA's Response to the Draft Inspector General Special Review, CIA The 2004: Draft Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation to IG "Comments attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Program,'" and 1279 Interrogation Activities." Preeminent CIA Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh 3. July Intelligence 2004: Muhammad: 280 on Al-Qa'ida.'" Source 2004: CIA Memorandum for the President's National Security 4. December Advisor, 1281 the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." "Effectiveness of 2005: CIA for the Office of Legal Counsel, "Effectiveness of the 5. March Memorandum 1282 Interrogation Counterteirorist CIA Techniques." CIA "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation 6. March 2005: 1283 Program." 1278 for the Record, "Review of Interrogation CIA on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA memorandum Program Counsel Scott Muller, dated General 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated August July 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Additional briefings are detailed in September 4, 2003, 29, for Memorandum the CIA Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, Record from Scott Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program. 1279 CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 2004, widi the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention 27, Interrogation Program' IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and and (2003-7123 dated 24,2004. Activities," February Interrogation 1280 of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh CIA Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13, Directorate Muhammad: fax to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, "Hi, Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. |H" 2004; report was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community, and a copy of this report was provided to the This Select On on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. Senate March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney Committee publicly requested of this Intelligence Assessment, which was declassification released with redactions on the August 24,2009. 1281 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness of CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: the ar| Hl^^^^^lB subject: on value mHIHHi d date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email techniques"; the attached "information paper to Dr. references Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques." 1282 CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, of from Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness Legal the CIA m Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 1283 CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA and Interrogation Program." Detention 11II 11111 I II III Page 220 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 220

250 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 2005: CIA Points for the National Security Council, "Effectiveness of the 7. March Talking 1284 Interrogation High-Value (HVD1) Detainee Techniques." provided "Briefing the Value of Detainee Reporting" on to the CIA Notes 8. April 2005: for Department OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced of Justice the 1285 techniques. interrogation CIA "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah" and additional CIA documents 9. April 2005: the provided of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the to Department 1286 interrogation enhanced techniques. CIA's 2005: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War 10. June 1287 Against Al-Qa'ida." of 2005: Document entitled, 11. CIA CIA's Counterterrorist Detention December "Future Interrogation Program," with the attachment, "Impact and the Loss of the Detainee of Program CT Operations and Analysis," from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen to Assistant to President/National Security Advisor, Frances Townsend, Hadley, the the Security Advisor, and Ambassador John to Assistant President/Homeland 1288 of National Intelligence. Negroponte, the Director of 2006: Briefing for the President's Chief CIA Staff, "CIA Rendition, Detention 12. May Interrogation Programs," on the effectiveness of the CIA's and interrogation enhanced 1289 techniques. 1284 DC1 entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 Points Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High- CIA Talking Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Value Techniques." 1285 from "Briefing on die Value of Detainee Reporting" CIA Notes the CIA to the Department of Justice on faxed April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. ^^^^^^ 1286 CIA to DOJ Command Center, dated April 22,2005, for HUGHS' Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. fax of Justice, ^H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: H, Materials Department from "Khalid Abu included CIA Intelligence Assessment Zubaydah, Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent of KSM and on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah." Source 1287 CIA Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which Intelligence the records was provided to White House officials on CIA 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at indicate June SECRET//NOFORN level was more broadly disseminated on classification 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, June former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with on August 24, 2009. redactions 1288 Detention "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist entitled, and Interrogation Program," dated CIA memorandum 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to December J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Stephen Security Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to Advisor, President/Homeland Security Advisor, Ambassador John the D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations Analysis." and 1289 "BRIEFING document dated May 2, CIA entitled, briefing FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE 2006, PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs." 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 221 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 221

251 UNCLASSIFIED TOP /^ SECRET/ NOFORN I// 2006: CIA Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence, "Detainee 13. July 1290 Update." Intelligence Value CIA 2006: the President's September 6, 2006, speech, September documents 14. supporting effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program, on representations including the Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist "DRAFT including: Potential "CIA of Remarks on Detainee Validation and Program," Interrogations Policy," 1291 High Value Terrorist Detainee "Summary of the Program." April CIA Director Michael Hayden's Testimony to the Senate Select Committee 15. 2007: 1292 the of the CIA's interrogation program. describing effectiveness on Intelligence 2007: CIA Talking Points for the 16. Appropriations Committee, addressing October Senate effectiveness the CIA's Detention and of Program, entitled, "Talking the Interrogation Appeal of Points Million Reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention the 1293 Program." November 2007: Director Talking Points for the President, entitled, "Waterboard 06 17. CIA interrogation on of the CIA's waterboard effectiveness the 2007," November 1294 technique. 2009: CIA Briefing for President-elect Obama's 18. Security Transition January National 1295 value of the CIA's "Renditions, the and Interrogations (RDI)." on Team Detentions, February 2009: CIA Briefing 19. CIA Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the for CIA's interrogation techniques, including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- enhanced Abu "Key Reporting Derived from and Zubaydah and Khalid 18FEB.2009," Intelligence Muhammad (KSM)," "EITs and Effectiveness," Shaykh Intelligence Impacts "Key Chart: (AZ and KSM)," "Background Attachment Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: on 1290 CIA briefing document entitled, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update," dated 11 July 2006, internal document saved within records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING." CIA 1291 CIA July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist document dated Policy," and Validation of Remarks on Detainee "CIA drafts supporting the September 6, Interrogations Program," speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 2006, as an as Program, unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the well Value Detainee Program." High Terrorist 1292 classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided CIA General Michael by V. Hayden, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April Director, and accompanying Senate Select Committee on 2007; Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12,2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." 1293 Senate CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. from Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on CIA fax with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent Defense, October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed on entitled, Points Appeal of die Million "Talking in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program." reduction 1294 "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007 with die notation the preparation document to DCIA Nov. 6 in "sent for POTUS meeting." was 1295 CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including 1 January named "RDG Copy-Briefing on "" * " " "Tab "13 7," 2009." TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 222 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 222

252 UNCLASSIFIED I //NOFORN TOP ^ SECRET// and Attachment," Captures and Plots Disrupted," among other CIA "Background on Key 1296 documents. Memorandum for the Chairman of the CIA Select Committee on 20. 2009: March Senate on the "Key Captures and Disrupted Intelligence, Gained including representations Plots 1297 RDI Program." in from HVDs the identified 20 documents, the Committee the the CIA's Prom (^SZ/HmiH^^B^^) CIA frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists that the CIA eight most enhanced information use of the CIA's the interrogation techniques: from acquired to attributed Cited Examples of Plots "Thwarted" Eight Most Frequently Referenced X Number the CIA as Evidence for and Terrorists Captured Provided by of Times in the 20 CIA of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation the Effectiveness Documents Techniques The the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and Thwarting of 17/20 1 Jose of Capture the Padilla 17/20 of the Karachi Plots 2 The Thwarting the Thwarting the Second Wave Plot and The Discovery of 18/20 3 of the al-Ghuraba Group The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot 17/20 4 Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi and the 7/20 lyman and Arrest of Capture, Faris The Identification, 5 17/20 Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat The 6 Wharf Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary The 20/20 7 Plotting 18/20 8 The Capture of Hambali (TS/T^^H^^^HpWF) The Committee sought to confirm that the CIA's representations about the frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists were most with the than six million pages of CIA detention and interrogation records consistent more the the Specifically, to Committee assessed whether the CIA's provided Committee. its enhanced interrogation techniques produced unique, otherwise representations that 1298 capture that led to the unavailable of specific terrorists and the "thwarting" intelligence of 1296 Briefing briefing Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA for on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and CIA documents attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived graphic Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykli Muhammad from (KSM)," "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" Includes CIA document "ElTs and Effectiveness," with agenda, associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Chart: Disrupted." Plots 1297 document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled, CIA Gained and which includes "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots [DUNBAR]," From HVDs in the RDI "[SWIGERT] Program" (DTS #2009-1258). 12S>8 p enhanced 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's rom interrogation provided a specific set of examples of techniques plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that terrorist the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of" its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA MI 11 III I IIIinn Page 223 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 223

253 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN representations that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation further asserted unique, techniques and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: otherwise was unavailable, Memorandum, in of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Department dated May 30, 2005, representations the (1) CIA a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of which relied on interrogation the to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the CIA's enhanced techniques was that of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques use "necessary" to obtain "critical," include OLC the "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" "vital," the U.S. government to "detect and for disrupt" threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that and terrorist a subsequent believes program is largely responsible for preventing this attack within the United CIA the that See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from States." ( G. Bradbury, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Steven Principal Convention of Obligations Under Article 16 of the States Against Torture to Certain Techniques Application United May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in that the Department Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA of on the of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. representations type describing documents President's September 6, 2006, speech the the CIA's interrogation program CIA Citing and based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program— (which was in particular, use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security its and, unavailable by substantial quantities of otherwise producing intelligence. ...As the President Nation] of the [on September 6,2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, explained program (See saved innocent lives.'" the Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central has Agency, from G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Intelligence Steven the 20, July Application of the War Crimes Act, 2007, Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 Counsel, Re: Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used of the the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value by al Qaeda (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 Detainees.) kind that use of Enhanced Techniques of one "the or another had produced significant intelligence represented information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from will Muller, Subject: of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Scott Review Record, 29,2003; 2003, CIA Memorandum for the 4, Subject: Member Briefing; and July Program, September 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The September 26, to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: CIA's response of CIA] as a result of the lawful use received... enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has "Information [the certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to almost the fact without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks that for: hundreds, thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum not Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, involving if Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention Deputy Interrogation February 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: and 24, 2004, Memorandum Program" of documents Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing re Successes for CIA CIA's "CIA Leon Director February 2009, which state that the Panetta assesses that the RDI program worked and the in [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other intelligence (See CIA documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- means." briefing from graphic "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived attachment, Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 18FEB.2009" and Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Shaykh with Effectiveness," documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," associated on to Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," "Background include "Background Key to Key on Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed Captures the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on and March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, of which of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use a list the provides CIA's interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that enhanced if not all, of the timely intelligence most, acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See the Volume additional CIA representations asserting that for CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the II CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 11 ii 11 i i i II i II i Page 224 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 224

254 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 1299 plots were The Committee found the CIA's representations to be specific accurate. unsupported inaccurate records. by and CIA the Below the CIA's eight most frequently cited (^FS^mm^l^F) summaries are of of and terrorists, as well as a description plots the CIA's claims "thwarted" of examples captured for and the CIA representations were inaccurate and unsupported by CIA an explanation why 1300 records. the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot Thwarting the Capture of Jose Padilla 1. The of and CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation Summary: The effective techniques necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, were and and the disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, to save lives. Over a period enabled CIA which CIA provided the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with, and the capture of, of years, the as Jose for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Padilla, evidence received CIA inaccurate. The CIA first were reporting on the terrorist These representations posed by Jose Padilla from a foreign government. Eight days threat Abu Zubaydah later, provided on the terrorist plotting of two individuals, whom he did not identify by information name, to special agents. Abu Zubaydah provided this information in April 2002, prior true FBI August of enhanced interrogation techniques in CIA's 2002. The plots commencement the to the Jose Padilla were assessed by the Intelligence Community to associated infeasible. with be 1299 has represented that it has provided the Senate CIA Committee on Intelligence with all CIA records The Select to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This document production phase related more than three lasted years was completed in July 2012. The records produced include more than six million pages of material, and records the the interrogation of detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from including detailing of was detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor interrogation it requested to provide-—intelligence records that CIA In unrelated the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. were other words, this Study was completed without to direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law derived information, and other methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this enforcement is included the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA within the context of documents directly material in the For Detention and Interrogation Program. to example, a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters related CIA collected interrogators detention site could cite SIGNALS intelligence a CIA by NSA, or include a CIA to CIA at source report on a particular subject, with a request to question the CIA detainee about the reporting. HUMINT direct the to While NSA report, or the CIA HUMINT report, may not have been provided, it may still be access in of Study because it appeared in the CIA Headquarters requirements cable relating to the questioning included this detainee. related such, there is likely significant intelligence a CIA to the terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and As unrelated other examined in this report, that is matters to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program intelligence and within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the Select Committee Intelligence for this Study. As is detailed in the near 6800-page Committee Study, the on found cited, there was significant intelligence in CIA databases to enable the capture of the terrorists Committee that "disrupt" "thwarted," terrorist plots represented as and without intelligence from the CIA interrogation program. the intelligence Had been provided with access to all Committee available in CIA and Intelligence Community the databases, it is likely this finding would be strengthened further. Finally, as of March 2014, the White House had not yet approximately 9,400 documents related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program— provided detention equivalent than .2 percent of CIA less and interrogation records—pending an Executive Privilege to determination. The Committee requested access to these documents in three letters dated January 3, 2013, May 22, did 2013, 19, 2013. The White House December not respond to the requests. and 1300 See Volume II for additional information and analysis. llll II III I MIIIMIIII Page 225 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 225

255 UNCLASSIFIED TOP I//NOFORN SECRET//^ Details: The Bomb/Tall Buildings plotting refers to Further Dirty involving terrorist Jose Padilla. Padilla and his associate, Binyam U.S. plotting citizen "Dirty conceived after locating information, derived from what the Mohammed, Bomb the Plot" H-bomb," satirical article" entitled "How to Make an "a on a computer as CIA described internet 1301 early 2002. at a Pakistani The article instructed safe bomb makers to house in would-be by it "in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around enrich uranium placing 1302 Padilla possible for 45 minutes." as as and Mohammed approached Abu head your fast early 2002, and later KSM, Zubaydah their idea to build and use this device in the United in with 1303 1304 Zubaydah States. believed the plan was viable, Abu but KSM provided nor Neither KSM to tasked and conduct, an operation using natural gas Padilla create explosions in funding for, to 1305 1306 United States, later tall buildings as the "Tall Buildings Plot." in the known (210703Z 02) and CIA Document, Subject: "CIA Statement Summarizing Significant 10090 APR information Jose (21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02}." For more About on the Internet article that Information Padilla enriching uranium by "putting recommended a bucket and twisting it around one's head to enrich it," see it into 2^ow Make an H-Bomb" and [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04). See also email from: [REDACTED!, to Group; to: and multiple ccs, including subject: "Re: |^MOTA/CTWG/CBRN [REDACTED] 2003, KSM AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, on at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's Re: homework [REDACTED]: position on Padilla and Mohammed's plotting. According to CBRN email: "Padilla and group's the had an article off a satirical web site called 'How pulled make an H-bomb' which is based on a Binyam/Zouaoui to Journal of Irreproducible Results article. The article was intended to be humorous and included instructions 1979 as placing uranium by such liquid uranium hexaflouride in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and enriching While it head as fast as possible for 45 minutes. your it appears that Padilla and Zouaoui took the swinging around seriously, Zubaydah recommended that they take their (cockamamie) ideas to (I believe) KSM article Karachi. It in was that point that KSM told them to focus on bringing down apartment buildings at explosives, (in other with words: your day jobs)." U.K. keep noted "that I courts 1302 Email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: "Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium Device' Information"; April 23, 2002, at 08:25:40 PM. The email states, "CIA and Lawrence Livermore date: Lab have that the article is filled with countless technical inaccuracies which would likely result in National assessed of a nuclear attempting to follow the instructions, and would definitely not result in death explosive the anyone also 2281 (071658ZMAY 04). See device." [REDACTED] 1303 APR (210703Z 02) ^^••10090 1304 APR 02); 11086 (261140Z CIA^^B 02). See also Padilla statement noting Abu (290925Z APR "chuckled at the idea," but sent Padilla and Muhammad to Karachi to present the idea to KSM. See fax Zubaydah from Pat Department of Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, Rowan, with subject "Jose Padilla." 2007, line: 1305 APR See also DIRECTOR •• (290925Z (041637Z). 02); ^HH 10091 (210959Z APR •• CIA [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04); and DIRECTOR (101725Z MAR 04). 02); 1306 For background on the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plotting, see fax from Pat Rowan, Department of additional on Justice Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, Security August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose National Padilla." The document states: "Jose Padilla is a United States citizen who has been designated as an enemy combatant by President and has been detained by the military since June 9, 2002. Padilla is commonly known as the detainee bomber' intelligence from a senior al Qaeda early [Abu Zubaydah] and Padilla's l\e 'dirty because accomplice [Binyam Muhammad] indicated that he had proposed to senior al Qaeda leaders the use of a intended dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb,' against United States targets, or interests, and he was detained by the radiological more partly that basis. Based on later and on complete intelligence, including Padilla's own statements .military / during military detention, it now appears that Padilla re-entered the United States after he accepted a mission from al Qaeda leaders, from Klialid Sheikh Mohammad ('KSM'), the emir of the attacks of September 11, to specifically States destroy more high-rise apartment buildings in the United or through the use of natural gas explosions one triggered by timing devices, and had received training, equipment and money for that mission." See also other buildings, records the plotting as targeting tall apartment describe without reference to a radiological or "dirty" that bomb. For example, a July 15, 2004, CIA intelligence report titled, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent mi 11 II II ^BBiBMI^^^B^/NOFORN Page 226 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 226

256 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETfl^^^^^^^B^BMflNQFQRN capture of, the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated The and Padilla, is one the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as with Jose of Over effectiveness CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. the a period of the evidence for of prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, years, CIA documents of represent Department the identification and/or the capture of Jose Padilla, and the Justice Buildings" disruption "Dirty Bomb," and/or the "Tall the plotting, as examples of the and/or of intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation how "[k]ey 1307 "enabled had disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." to techniques" CIA further represented the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation that The CIA 1308 unavailable" and "saved lives." "otherwise was techniques Al-Qa'ida," noted: "From late 2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots, Source on high-rise early plan to send al-Qa'ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in 2002 including an buildings an unspecified major US city." Similarly, in Intelligence Community report titled, "Khalid apartment an Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," noted: "Binyam Shaykh stated Muhammad his debriefings that his and Padilla's objective was to topple a high-rise building with a during explosion in ( See Community Couiiterterrorism Board, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat gas Chicago." by Shaykh Reporting—Precious Tmths, Surrounded Threat a Bodyguard of "Khalid Assessment, Muhammad's Number IICT-2003-14, April 3, 2003.) The unclassified ODNI "Summary of the High Value Lies," Report Program," 2006, September 6, Detainee states that, "[w]orking with information from detainees, Terrorist released States. disrupted to US up tall buildings in the United a plot KSM later described how he had directed the blow to ensure the buildings were high enough to prevent the people operatives above from escaping out of the trapped windows, ensuring their deaths from smoke inhalation." thus 1307 Legal CIA Memorandum to the Office of in Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Italics included Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security Counterterrorist entitled, Points Council for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee "Talking other (HVDI) Interrogation March 4, 2005, as well as multiple Techniques," CIA briefing records and dated memoranda described in Volume II. 1308 p enhanced 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's rom interrogation provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that techniques CIA attributed information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA the to of asserted intelligence obtained from the use the the CIA's enhanced interrogation further that representations unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." techniques other CIA representations, see: was Among CIA in the Department of Justice Office of representations Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, (1) Legal relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of which CIA's their interrogation techniques to assess the legality. The CIA representations referenced by die enhanced include that use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," OLC the for "otherwise actionable intelligence" that was "essential" unavailable the U.S. government to "detect "vital," and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states and "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that that the believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United CIA Deputy {Sec for John A. Rizzo, Senior Memorandum General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from States." Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques United Qaeda May in the Interrogation of High Value al Used Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the that Be of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on Department CIA representations the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. on 2006, CIA and the President's September 6, documents speech describing the CIA's interrogation program Citing (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— and, in its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security particular, unavailable Nation] producing substantial quantities of otherwise by intelligence. ... As the President of the explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, Central the has saved innocent lives."' (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, program 1 ii ii 11 'bubbi^^^^bb mi 1 ii 11 i hi 11 Page 227 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 227

257 UNCLASSIFIED TOP For example, prepared for Vice President Cheney in (TSiVl^^^m^^l^NF) a document a March advance National Security Council principals meeting states, under a section 8, of 2005, that: RESULTS," entitled "INTERROGATION interrogation techniques , of part of a "Use DOJ-authorized enhanced as has enabled us to disrupt terrorist comprehensive interrogation approach, plots... Plot: Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed planned Operatives .. .Dirty Bomb a 'dirty in detonate the Washington DC area. Plot bomb' to build and 1309 Zubaydah." Abu Source: disrupted. from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office Intelligence Legal Agency, of July 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 Counsel, 20, Conventions Value Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Geneva of the to (3) National briefings for members of the Detainees.) Security Council in July and September 2003 al Qaeda CIA or "the of Enhanced Techniques of one kind use another had produced significant intelligence represented that that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and information policymakers that "[tjennination of warned this will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from program Muller, Subject: of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Scott Review Record, 29, 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the September Subject: Member Briefing; and July 2003; Program, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: September Interrogation Program.) (4) The 26, CIA response the Office of Inspector General draft Special to of the CIA program, which asserts: CIA's Review [die CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use "Information enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has of almost saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to certainly fact major without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered the terrorist attacks that hundreds, casualties." not thousands, of involving (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, if to Deputy Operations; subject: re (S) Comments for Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention Director and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA CIA's Leon Panetta Febmary 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the Director in "[m]ost, techniques in producing foreign intelligence," and that effective if not all, of interrogation] were [enhanced intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not the been discovered or reported by other timely have (See briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, CIA 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- means." "Tab and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived 18FEB.2009" Abu Zubaydah and Khalid from Shaykh (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Muhammad Attachment with "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: documents, (AZ and KSM)," Effectiveness," associated on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background "Background on Key and on Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Captures Plots March 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," 18, in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, located which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence interrogation or from this program would not have been discovered in reported by any other means." See acquired detainees II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation Volume enabled the techniques CIA obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." to 1309 for CIA March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing document Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and dated Interrogation Program." The briefing document further represented that: (1) "Prior to the use of enhanced measures the against [sic] like KSM and Abu Zubaydah- resistors two most prolific intelligence producers in our skilled control- we acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence"; and (2) "[CIA] would not have without succeeded overcoming the resistance of KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and other equally resistant HVDs in the application EITs." of x TOP SECRETZ/I^^^^^^^MBM^OFORN Page 228 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 228

258 UNCLASSIFIED TOP the July 2007, Department of Justice Office of Legal Likewise, 20, memorandum on CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used CIA- Counsel (OLC) the Jose and to describe the threat posed by al-Qa'ida on the success of provided information Padilla 2007, interrogation to date. The July 20, techniques OLC memorandum the CIA's enhanced states: interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced "The CIA techniques—is intended serve this paramount interest [security interrogation to by substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable Nation] of the producing CIA believes that this program 'has been a key reason why intelligence. The has failed launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 al-Qa'ida to We understand that use of enhanced techniques has September 2001'... significant intelligence that the Government has used to keep the produced safe. Nation the President explained [in his September 6, 2006 speech],' by As us information terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the giving about understand saved .For example, wc lives'.. that enhanced has innocent program proved particularly crucial in the interrogations of interrogation techniques Muhammad Khalid Abu Zubaydah... Interrogations of Shaykh and once techniques were employed—revealed two Zubaydah—again, enhanced mo already in the United States al-Qaeda operatives planning to destroy a and high apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in rise 1311 £>.C." Washington, April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC On 1312 memoranda. to the partial declassification of this and other memorandum in response The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb plotting, the thwarting of the Tall Buildings plotting, and/or the capture of Padilla in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department Jose 1313 between and March 2009. July of Justice 2003 1310 added. records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided information on "two Italics already operatives CIA was United neither Binyam Muhammad nor Jose Padilla While "already in the United States," die in the States." description appears to be a reference to Jose Padilla OLC Binyam Mohammad, as the OLC then makes and reference the "Dirty Bomb" and "Tall Buildings" plotting. to 1311 Italics See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from added. of Steven Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office Bradbury, Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: G. Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. that 1312 See Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts "Waterboarding to it "took CIA] until 2007 to consistently stop referring that [Padilla's] 'Dirty Bomb' plot—a plan [the CIA] [the concluded early on was never operationally viable." As noted, the CIA continued to refer to the "Dirty Bomb" plotting through and confirmed die information publicly in 2009. 2007 1313 from of See prepared briefings and memoranda list 2003 through 2009 with representations on the CIA effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in Volume 11. iiii ii III i imiiHIi Page 229 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 229

259 UNCLASSIFIED TOP TS ^ ^^^^^^^ i ^ NF ) A review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found ( H use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of that the the Buildings the the Dirty Bomb or Tall of plotting. CIA records or thwarting "Jose Padilla" there was significant intelligence in indicate databases acquired prior to—and that: (1) CIA CIA's and Interrogation Program to fully Detention Jose Padilla of—the independently identify 1314 to disrupt any terrorist plotting associated with him; as a terrorist (2) Abu threat and information plotting the terrorist provided of two individuals who proposed an idea Zubaydah on Bomb" to conduct did not identify their true names; (3) Abu Zubaydah attack, a "Dirty but 1315 using special agents who were FBI rapport-building techniques, to this provided information more than three months prior in April the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved enhanced 2002, to 13.4 example, ^^^BHHHIHil^^^^B CIA document entitled, "CIA Statement Summarizing See, for 02)";10972 Information Padilla {21:10 hrs.- 8 June Jose (12031Z APR 02); ALEC Significant About (23I837Z APR 02); and •H (120948Z APR 02); among other records. 10976 13.5 Bureau of documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Federal Investigation letter provided Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover the dated July 20, 2010 (DTS# and to Zabaidah" also 10092 (211031Z APR 02). While Abu Zubaydah 2010-2939). subjected to sleep See was and prior to this date by the CIA, he had nudity allowed to sleep shortly prior to being questioned deprivation been this matter by the FBI special agents, who were exclusively using rapport-building interrogation techniques on when the was acquired from Abu Zubaydah (who was covered with a towel). The sleep deprivation and information deprivation as this period differed from how sleep during and nudity were implemented after nudity implemented CIA developed, and the Department of Justice approved, the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" in the 2002. Rather than being placed in a stress position during sleep deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake August interrogators. by nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI questioned Records further indicate that during breaks in being the interrogations, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See also 10116 (250731Z APR 02), which describes sleep deprivation as a period of "no sustained sleep" with "cat naps between interrogators." this cable further "Like many medical students, the subject appears to handle 76 plus hours of limited sleep The states: problems" also added). The use of nudity during this period few differed from future uses of nudity, as with (italics SSCI was when interrogated by the FBI. See also covered Staff interview of FBI Special Agent Ati Abu Zubaydah April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (transcript at DTS #2008-2411). Ali Soufan Soufan, described events to Abu Zubaydah's provision of information related to the "Dirty Bomb," stating: "He was prior on badly was dehydrated. I remember we were putting ice He his lips. And he didn't have any injured, injured. control, so we were cleaning him. And the reason bowel telling you some of these disgusting things is because I'm it helped rapport with the guy in this short period build time." Later, Ali Soufan described the provision of of information related to the Dirty Bomb plotting, stating: "When I was going in, he was totally naked. I refused to go and antl and So I took a towel. And interview I naked. [REDACTED], every time we went in he had to him covered And I [wouldn't] go. It's as simple as that." See also section of transcript stating, "So we went back. be or about start to him. We took some Coke, we and we start talking about different things. We flipped him talking tea, different and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came things, to his senses and he started cooperating back again. And this is when he gave us Padilla." (Abu Zubaydah provided information concerning the Dirty Bomb name plotting Padilla's kunya , but did not provide the Jose "Jose Padilla." As described in this summary, Jose and Padilla's name had already been provided to the CIA by a foreign government that identified Padilla as a U.S. review citizen of being engaged in possible terrorist activity.) See also Abu Zubaydah detainee suspected in Volume III. 11 II II I I I —I III II Page 230 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 230

260 UNCLASSIFIED TOP 1316 techniques"; (4) the Intelligence Community internally assessed that the interrogation and 1317 1318 1319 and plots were infeasible as envisioned. Buildings" "Dirty Bomb" "Tall 1316 enhanced its approval of the CIA's finalized interrogation techniques, including Department of The Justice wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the waterboard, as well as other walling, facial slaps, 1, See August Volume I and Volume III for additional details. Beginning on August 4, 2002, techniques, on 2002. non-stop August Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the 20,2002, concurrent use of the CIA's extending and through techniques, including at least 83 applications of the waterboard. CIA records indicate that enhanced interrogation of use CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ceased on August 30, 2002, when Abu Zubaydah received the the clothing. 13,7 in Volume II, to include: (1) email from: [REDACTED], intelligence chronology See HH^Hft [REDACTED] multiple ccs, including and subject: "Re: to: ^•OTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, [REDACTED]: CIA's Re: explaining group's on Padilla and Mohammed's plotting: "Padilla and Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article CBRN position is web called 'How to make an H-bomb' which a satirical based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results off site The article was intended to be humorous..."; (2) email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; article. subject: "Note Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium Device' Information"; date: April 23, 2003, at 08:25:40 PM; and to U.K. court relaying that "[Binyam Mohammed] at the outset said there was no Dirty Bomb plot (a (3) records at has to his defense lawyers)" (UK Judgment, maintained 39). According to U.K. legal he consistently position Mohammed] said ... that he had seen a file on a computer in records, and decided it was a joke - "[Binyam Lahore of instruction included adding bleach to uranium 238 in the and rotating it around one's head for 45 part a bucket (UK Judgment, at 11). On June 10, 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced, "We have minutes." a known to who was exploring a plan captured build and explode a radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty terrorist in the States." The statement continued: "In apprehending A1 Muhajir as he sought entry into the bomb,' United attack we disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to have the United States by exploding a radioactive United States, bomb.' Now, a radioactive 'dirty bomb' involves exploding a conventional 'dirty that not only kills victims in bomb the vicinity, but also spreads radioactive material that is highly toxic to humans and can cause mass death immediate we injury. infonnation available to the United States government, From know that Abdullah A1 Muhajir is an and A1 Qaeda operative and was exploring a plan to build and explode a radioactive dirty bomb. Let me be clear: We know from independent and corroborating sources that Abdullah Al Muhajir was closely associated with A1 multiple and that an Al Qaeda operative he was involved in planning future terrorist attacks on innocent American Qaeda as other the .. .1 commend the FBI, the CIA and States. agencies involved in capturing Abdullah Al in United civilians he could act on his deadly plan." See Transcript of the Muhajir General John Ashcroft Regarding before Attorney Transfer Abdullah Al Muhajir (Born Jose Padilla) to the Department of of as an Enemy Combatant, on the Defense 10, 2002. June 1318 Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to See attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs. terrorist also U.S. of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of Department See dated as Weapon in Apartment Buildings," a Terrorist August 4, 2008. Gas Natural 1319 CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA "concluded early on" The the "dirty bomb" plot was that "never viable." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "it took [the CIA] until 2007" to stop operationally citing the bomb" plot in its representations about "dirty effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. the This is incorrect. The CIA referred to the disruption of this plotting in a representation to the Department of Justice in July 2007, representations to Congress in late October 2007, and confirmed this information to the press in in to 2009. fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] CIA U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, April See on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Subcommittee faxed of "Talking Points Appeal Document the Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and entitled, that Program." also the July 20, 2007, Office Detention Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum, which states See of "interrogations Zubaydah— again, once enhanced techniques of employed —revealed two al-Qaeda operatives were already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in D.C." (italics added). As described elsewhere in this summary and in the full Committee Washington, partial Study, 21, 2009, in response to the April declassification of OLC memoranda that month, a CIA on spokesperson confirmed the CIA stood by the "factual assertions" in die OLC memoranda. See "Waterboarding June Saved Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's Washington 2013 Response further states "[d]espite the L.A.," imprecision of our language, we continue to assess it was a good example of the importance of intelligence derived 1111111111 iiii IIII BI^^^MBMBMi 11 Page 231 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 231

261 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET// k/NOFORN Prior capture of Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002, the CIA to the to was posed by Jose Padilla. In early 2001, U.S. government records indicated the alerted threat a lost came U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report the passport. These records Padilla that a Jose to Padilla provided a "sketchy" story about overstaying his Pakistani visa and indicated that Jose was "allegedly Islamic law in Egypt." A search of the State Department's that he studying which and was conducted at the time, System resulted in "multiple" Lookout Consular Support 1320 Padilla." hits State Department records for that Jose Padilla had sought a "Jose confirmed passport the U.S. Consulate in Karachi in February 2001, and was subsequently provided new at 1321 on 2001. with March a replacement 21, FBI 15, December CIA provided the 2001, with documents On (TSAm^^^^K'/NF) the Afghanistan from a purported al-Qa'ida-related safe house. Included in the obtained in binder 180 training camp application forms entitled, "Mujahideen Identification Form / were terrorist 33-year-old Applicant application form for a then An individual with the alias New Form." Abdullah al-Muhajir" from "America" was among the "Abu "Al-Muhajir's" form—dated forms. July 2000—listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth; 24, skills to English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and language include 1322 the marital status. and Yemen; individual's detainee program." As described in this summary and throughout the full Committee Study, in its efforts to from the authorization approval policy legal for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented obtain and the intelligence was obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (not the that referenced program"), and that the information obtained was unique and otherwise unavailable. "detainee 1320 The Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is used by State Department passport agencies, post, and Consular passport inspection perform name checks on visa and to applicants to identify individuals who are, border agencies for issuance or require other special action. Source: www.state.gov ineligible 1321 A 16, 2001, email entitled, "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla," states that a "Jose Padilla," with a date February Karachi of 18, 1970, came to the U.S. Consulate in of birth to report a lost passport. The email notes that October "his story is really-sketchy-been traveling here long enough to overstay his Pakistani visa, but speaks no Urdu, and is allegedly studying law in Egypt." A March 5, 2001, email in CIA records, entitled, "The continuing Jose Islamic saga!" states there are "multiple CLASS hits" (Consular Lookout and Support System) for a Jose Padilla that sketchy author and I both agree there is something "[REDACTED] about the guy." On March The writes Padilla. State Department records indicate that Jose Padilla 21, provided with a replacement passport. See 2001, was included materials provided by the CIA to in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including documents the from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]: cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "Lost passport case- email Padilla"; date: Jose February at 4:46 AM, included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on 16,2001, [REDACTED]; second [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: from: subject: "The continuing Intelligence; email Padilla saga!"; date: March 5, 2001, at 10:09 AM; U.S. State Department travel records Jose by the identified Department Justice; letter from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Department of Defense, of James Comey, U.S. Department to of Justice, dated May 28, 2004. 1322 Italics added. Jose Padilla's Fingerprints would later be found on the forms. See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See also FBI Washington 101514Z include on Jose and email from: [REDACTED]; to: O0APR07)/|Summ^ Padilla," in Raid Meeting with FBI SA "Pakistan Pakistan at the subject: Evidence- date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which time"; the raids recovered a copy of "Padilla's Muj pledge form." See notes also open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer numerous He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to Testifies be Padilla's," New York Times , dated May 16, 2007; "Key Padilla evidence got to CIA in Afghan pickup," Streets Associated 28, 2007; and "Terror Suspect's Path from March to Brig," New York Times, dated April Press, 24, 2004. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA could not locate information on this form in CIA other databases. to testimony of a CIA officer at Jose Padilla's federal trial, the binder and According material were I MI III I BMBBI^B^BM I IM NM 11 Page 232 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 232

262 UNCLASSIFIED 1 //NOFORN TOP SECRET^ April 10, the CIA disseminated a cable with intelligence On 2002, the derived documents obtained during the raids in which Abu Zubaydah exploitation from of mid-March in cable is a translation of a letter from CIA 2002 that Included the was captured. individual. The cable states that references CIA believed this a 33-year-old English-speaking the be in "a martyrdom operation." involved translation disseminated states: might individual The from Argentina, he speaks Spanish, English and "There he is 33 years old, he is a brother Arabic, and two little children. He is a great brother. He knows business and studies is married has 1323 looking self defense, he is a good [in] man." He language. trains English next day, April 11, 2002, the (TS/ZI^^IHiHK^) was provided with The CIA from officials on a 33-year-old U.S. citizen Pakistani "Jose Padilla," with a information named of birth of October 18, 1970, who was briefly detained by Pakistani officials on April 4, date 2002. The government provided a copy of Jose Padilla's U.S. passport and relayed that Pakistani Padilla had his travel visa, and that there were inconsistencies with Jose Jose overstayed would and CIA's wrote that they The provide the appearance accent. Padilla's "Jose Padilla" to the State Department's Regional Security information and "would on Officer, 1324 officials] on this matter." with The [Pakistani of birth and travel information follow-up date with Jose Padilla's passport matched information on the "Mujahideen Identification included (33-year-old "American" referenced as "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir") the CIA had Form" 1325 to on December 15, 2001. the provided FBI On 12, 2002, Pakistani officials provided additional (TS/JB^^^^^^^B/ZNF) April to the CIA's specifically that they had detained a U.S. passport information holder named Padilla and a British passport holder named "Fouad Zouaoui" (later identified as Jose depart Muhammad), had suspiciously attempted to who Pakistan. According to the CIA Binyam cable, Pakistani authorities provided the information on the pair "due to concerns about possible 1326 terrorist The cable noted that Pakistani authorities had to release Padilla, but that activity." 1327 associate detention. remained (When questioned further, the Pakistani authorities Padilla's in a CIA Jose to CIA officers in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The CIA officer testified at by Padilla's trial provided source in he through the material, the blue binder was placed after a sealed box and provided to the FBI in that, sorted Pakistan. See referenced open source reporting. Islamabad, 1323 ALECj|M APR 02) (102327Z 1324 information (12031Z As noted, the State Department already possessed 02). of concern HH^^10972 APR to Jose Padilla. related 1325 Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and See of the pledge form. See a translation also Washington 101514Z (10APR 07), "Summary Chronology of Intelligence on Jose FBI and email Padilla," from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI S A in Pakistan at the time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of "Padilla's Muj form"; and numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given pledge 'Pledge York Said to be Padilla's," New Qaeda Times, dated May 16,2007. Form' 1326 that (120948Z ^HIH 02). The official cable states 10976 the Pakistani official and his office "has not APR received the full details, and he is passing this onto [the CIA] H| due to concerns about possible terrorist activity." from The 2013 Response states that the reporting June the Pakistani government that a Pakistan-based U.S. CIA's citizen named Jose Padilla was engaged in possible terrorist activity was "unremarkable at the time," and that the CIA the report as a "routine 'illegal traveler'" report. viewed 110972 (12031Z APR 02); {••llW76( 120948ZAPR(E) Page 233 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 233

263 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I 1328 suspected Jose Padilla of being "an al-Qa'ida member.") stated The information they that "Fouad Zouaoui" potential terrorists had been provided by the identifyingJosePadilla and as State Headquarters, Stations, and the CIA Department's CIA's to several CIA 1329 Using in April 12, 2002. (RSO) by the identifying Officer Karachi Regional Security Padilla's passport, provided by the information government the CIA's f in Jose Pakistani CIA and the CIA's Headquarters conduct "| that H requested Station using th^iame^Jose Padilla" and the other identifying information database search) 1330 The requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's | provided. CIA's 1331 a result, Padilla's associate, Fouad Zouaoui. the As for by April 12, 2002, do Station same was already alerted that a named U.S. citizen, "Jose Padilla," had spent significant time the CIA 1332 was and "possible terrorist activity." in in Pakistan engaged days Jose the CIA was informed that U.S. citizen Eight (TS/^^^^^^^Hp/NF) after evening engaged "possible terrorist activity," on the was of April 20, 2002, Abu Padilla in told Zubaydah special agents about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a FBI uranium-based device in the United States (the "dirty bomb"). Abu Zubaydah stated explosive not he did plan was viable and did not know the true names of the two individuals, believe the 1333 information of the pair. provide This descriptions was acquired after Abu did physical but confronted with emails that indicated Abu Zubaydah Zubaydah sent two individuals to was had 1334 from FBI agents who acquired this The special Abu Zubaydah believed it KSM. information 1335 as provided of rapport-building interrogation techniques. was Abu Zubaydah would a result mfl See FEB 03), which details a follow-up exchange between | DIRECTOR (162003Z Pakistani officials. personnel and 1329 (12094SZ 02); 10972 10976 APR APR 02) (12031Z ••• 1330 were no records identified to There that the CIA informed the FBI at this time that U.S. citizen "Jose indicate Padilla" engaged in "possible terrorist activity." As described was Volume II, once alerted, the FBI identified in links between Jose Padilla and FBI counterterrorism subjects, including an individual who reportedly paid for Jose Padilla's travel Pakistan to attend a terrorist training camp. to (12031Z APR 10976 (120948Z APR 02) 110972 02); II APR additional reporting in the Volume See intelligence chronolog 110976 (I20948Z 02). 1333 provided the names of the individuals as Talha al-Kini and Abdallah al-Muhajir (| Abu Zubaydah (210703Z APR 10090 02)). APR 10096 (221545Z (180515Z 02); 110063 APR 02) 1335 communications to FBI Headquarters See April 2002, as well as May 13, 2009, Senate Judiciary FBI in testimony of FBI Special Agent Committee Soufan on the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In the CIA's June Ali 2013 die CIA states the CIA's representation that Abu Zubaydah provided the information after the "use Response, "Abu enhanced was accurate because, techniques" Zubaydah revealed this of DOJ-approved interrogation after having been subjected to sleep deprivation, which would be information as an enhanced categorized interrogation once the program was officially underway." technique described in detail in the Abu Zubaydah As detainee review in Volume III, when Abu Zubaydah was discharged from a hospital in Country the CIA sought to deprive Abu of sleep and to cease Abu Zubaydah's interaction with the FBI special agents who had been Zubaydah hospital. Abu acquiring information from him at the and Days later, after this new CIA interviewing Zubaydah was implemented, the CIA reversed this decision and the approach was allowed to question Abu Zubaydah FBI again. the use of sleep deprivation during this period Further, from future uses of sleep deprivation and had differed ceased by the time of the referenced FBI interview, as the CIA had determined diat Abu Zubaydah's ability to focus onquestions and coherent answers appeared compromised. ( See 10071 (190827Z APR 02) and provide that ••H APR 02).) Ali Soufan testified (250731Z Abu Zubaydah provided information about the 10116 "Dirty Bomb" plot only after he (Soufan) re-initiated a more traditional interrogation approach with Abu Zubaydah, again stating, then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah "We inn IIII III I ^MMMBB^BBI i MI M i Page 234 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 234

264 UNCLASSIFIED TOP be subjected the "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" until August not to 1336 than later. 2002, three more months the hours this information, CIA two dissemination of of to Headquarters and select CIA Stations cables sent officenTmi^^^Biim^l CIA thc similarities between Abu Zubaydah's reporting calling their request from attention to and 2002, information on Jose Padilla and Fouad Zouaoui, for had not yet been acted April 12, which 1337 receiving offices. travel A upon alert was then initiated for by Padilla based on the the Jose information by the Pakistani government. Padilla was located and previous provided 1338 agent United States by an FBI special the on May 8, 2002, back escorted to unknowingly arrival in the United States Padilla was found Upon be carrying $10,526 in U.S. currency, his to 1339 to report. he Padilla was interviewed failed taken into FBI custody on a an amount and talking and gave us important actionable intelligence. This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called started bomber.'" 'dirty Senate Judiciary Testimony, transcript at: (See The assertion the CIA's June 2013 http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=38428wit_id=7906.) in comments incongruent CIA records. See senior CIA analyst additional on the draft CIA Inspector is with Response Review from February 10, 2004, stating: "Padilla and the dirty General plot was prior to enhanced and Special bomb never gave us actionable intel to get them"; CIA really response to Committee Questions for the Record he draft an OLC memorandum suggesting that information on Jose Padilla was acquirecHrom Abu Zubaydaji concerning enhanced interrogation techniques, with the CIA response stating that the CIA's Legal after information simply this wrong. Abu Zubaydah provided reported on Jose Padilla while ^•l inadvertently interrogated by the FBI 10091)"; CIA testimony from CIA Director Hayden on April 12, 2007, being "In CIA 2002, stating, began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in the interrogation of Abu August 6, Zubaydah"; CIA-vetted speech by President Bush on September the 2006. See also SSCI Staff interview of and FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (Ali Soufan: "So we went back. And start talking to him. We took some Coke, tea, and we start talking about different things. We flipped we about different H and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came back to his senses and he started him things, And us is when lie gave again. Padilla.") (DTS #2008-2411). cooperating this 1336 how, detainee See in Volume III that details Zubaydah after Department of Justice approval in Abu review 2002, die CIA began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah on August 4, August including 2002, waterboard. See also^^JKM 10644 (201235Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED]; the and ^^Hijl^i subject: "Re: So it begins"; date: August [REDACTED]; 2002, at 09:45 AM. to: 4, 1137 APR 02). See also ALEC •• (220238Z APR 02); ^HH^036(220348Z (220802Z 11041 APR02)Tandl|HBI APR02). 11042(220921Z 1338 to documents, see letter from the Among addressed other SSCI Staff Director Al Cumming, dated June 24, CIA 2002, and entitled, "Arrest of Jose Padilla." After being detained in Pakistan, Binyam Mohammad was rendered by the CIA 2002, where he was held^^^^HHl government. On January July 1 Binyam transferred to CIA custody was 2004, Mohammad 630 •••••l 1339 from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on Fax 15, subject with August line: "Jose Padilla," includes a Department of Justice memorandum that is based 2007 Padilla on lIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogations of primarily disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 29 2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizin^ignificant (6/4/02), a D1A about Information of 8 June 02 ['CIA Summary']; Jose Info Memo from HBHH (11/13/03); and Padilla an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03). See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 2002 (DTS #2002-2603). 12, mi 11 in i i "in i Page 235 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 235

265 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/M^^^BBB^^^B/^oforn 1341 1340 witness exploitation of Jose Padilla's pocket litter warrant. and phone material The connections revealed terrorists, including subjects of FBI terrorism to significant known 1342 United in investigations the States. and associate, Binyam Padilla debriefings, In separate his had no intention of engaging in terrorist plotting, but proposed the Mohammed, maintained they plot in to depart Pakistan, avoid combat in Afghanistan, and return "Dirty Bomb" order 1343 home. errors CIA officers identified several in the CIA's Over years (IS^BII^B^) the "effectiveness" of the CIA's representations interrogation techniques in concerning enhanced to Abu Zubaydah reporting pertaining to Jose Padilla and Padilla's alleged plotting. relation the Task one the chief of the Abu Zubaydah representation, Force wrote to Bf to such Ir^sponse in 2002 that "AZ's info alone would never have ^^Hcrc us to find [Jose Legal allowed 1344 Mohammed]." and In 2004, she sought to Binyam inaccurate CIA Padilla correct again, telling colleagues: representations 1340 Notification, "Arrest of Jose Padilla," dated June 24,2002 (DTS CIA WHDC •• (242226Z #2002-2866); MAR Discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20, 2003, and SSCI Transcript "Staff Briefing 03). the Federal of Investigation on the Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 11, 2002 (DTS #2002-2598). by Bureau 1341 litter to material acquired on a person upon a search and may include Pocket identification cards, notes, refers numbers, or tiles, photographs, phone any other material in the person's possession. tickets, computer 1342 About Subject "CIA Statemen^ummarizim^jignificant Information Document, Jose Padilla (21:10 CIA See 8 June 02}," email from [REDACTED] to August 2, 2002, at hrs.- PM, with the 3:54:17 subject "Re: Padilla's travel history," and fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security line: to fax at CIA CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla." The Division [REDACTED], a Department on Justice memorandum that is based primarily includes 29 IJRs of the joint FBI-military of July of disseminated from May 5, 2003, to interrogations 9, 2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief Padilla Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); Statement Summarizing Significant Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 ['CIA a CIA a DIA Info from BHHl U l/l 3/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status" Summary']; Memo 12,2002 also "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June transcript (DTS #2002-2603), in which See SSCI (11/11/03). informs the SSCI that, based on his the book confiscated in ^^^^^B. Padilla "did have connections CIA address extremists, within the United States both outside the U.S." to Islamic and 1343 Department of Justice memorandum referenced in chronology in Volume See that is based primarily on 29 II IIRs the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9,2003; a FBI of "Jose Binyam Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and document Padilla (6/4/02), a CIA FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); Muhammad Statement Summarizing Significant Information about an Memo Padilla 8 June 02 ['CIA Summary']; a DIA Info Jose fromBBHHI (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose of Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03). ^^^^^^^ 1344 See memorandum from: ^^I^^I^^H; to: subject: "AZ information"; date: CIA to: at See also February 10, 2004, emailfom^^HB^IBB 01:18:50 BB PM. Jul^0^2002, cc: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], ^^^^^^^Bjohnl^tudd, [REDACTED], IBBBi: [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ••Bl; subject: Please [REDACTED], 12, - Re Read to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004. In a SSCI transcript dated June CTC Response 2002, "Detention of Jose Padilla" (DTS #2002-2603), entitled, CIA acknowledged it had information on Jose the Padilla prior to reporting from Abu Zubaydah. A CIA officer stated: "the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring [Padilla] our attention, given the recent raids...there was enough information indicating that his travel was to enhanced suspicious, us on alert. This suspicion was put during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which to occurred on 21 April." This is the only known CIA representation that did not fully attribute information on Jose Padilla CIA interrogations. to 11II I I III I ^^BHB^B^^^^B'VNOLOHM Page 236 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 236

266 UNCLASSIFIED TOP never really 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every "AZ gave had plot/operation and/or was working on was only knowledge he of and the plot was prior to enhanced bomb he and dirty preliminary. (Padilla 1345 actionable intel never get them)." really gave us to October the chief of 2005, CBRN (Chemical, i) In CTC's ( and Nuclear) Group wrote, under the heading, Biological, Put All Your Radiological, "Don't in Bucket": Uranium One Padilla we'll able to successfully expunge be and the Padilla: never "Jose plot from the lore of disruption, but once again 'dirty like to go on bomb' I'd record Padilla admitted that the only that he came up with so-called the reason bomb' was that he wanted to get out of Afghanistan and figured that if 'dirty up he came something spectacular, they'd finance him. Even KSM says with had a screw He's a petty criminal who is well-versed in US Padilla loose. arm). (he's sheet as long as my a rap Anyone who believes justice got criminal build an IND or RDD by 'putting you in buckets and spinning can uranium clockwise your head to separate the over is not going to them uranium' 1346 nuclear capabilities." advance al-Qa'ida's CIA other (TS^HH^NF) U.S. government assessments also called into and on the plotting, which was loosely based Buildings" attacks that were conducted question "Tall in September 1999 using conventional explosives. The "Tall Buildings" plotting did in Moscow 1347 not use of conventional explosives. envision Instead, the plotting envisioned using the As natural destroy high-rise residential buildings. to planned, the Intelligence Community gas 1348 the plotting was not viable. stated: An August 4, 2008, U.S. government assessment assessed "On the the idea is simplistic, if not amateurish... the probability of an efficient fuel air surface, 1349 is explosion low." was on a material witness warrant from May Padilla detained Jose June 9, 2002, when he was transferred to U.S. military 8, 2002, and designated an to custody combatant." January 3, 2006, Jose Padilla was On to U.S. law enforcement "enemy transferred ,34S from:HHMp; to: •••••H; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Email ^^^^^^•^ohnRMudd^ ACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [RED IG [REDACTElTTl^^^^^H; Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft Please [REDACTED], subject: date: February 10, 2004. Report; 1346 email from: [REDACTED] C/CTC/OTA/CBRNG/RNTB; to: multiple See subject: "Re: Urgent: recipients; Unclassified Sheet for David Shedd"; date: October 6,2005, at Fact PM. 04:35 1347 See additional details in Volume II. 1348 See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to terrorist attacks Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs. in 1349 included review of the Tall Buildings plotting Community in CIA records with references to See Intelligence attacks in Russia in September 1999 against terrorist buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs. apartment See U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, also Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of Tobacco, Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4, 2008. The latter document states that: on "If of the plot is to cause death and destruction idea the same scale as had occurred in Russia, then Padilla's the methodology comes into question. The probability of causing this magnitude of death and destruction using natural gas conventional explosives] wouf " [versus TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN Page 237 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 237

267 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I tried in federal court. On August 16, 2007, Jose Padilla and two co-defendants, custody and and Adham were found guilty of three criminal offenses relating to Kifah Hassoun Jayyousi, 1350 from 1993 to November 1, 2001. The activities case against Jose terrorist support October Afghanistan on at a terrorist training camp in attendance in the fall of centered Padilla his terrorist training camp application form acquired by the CIA 2000—specifically, the and to FBI in December 2001. The form was found to have Jose Padilla's fingerprints, provided the 1351 identifying to include his date of birth, as spoken, and travels. languages On as well data prison. 2008, Padilla was sentenced to 17 years in 22, On September 19, 2011, the January Jose th Appeals Circuit Court of U.S. 11 the sentence was too lenient in part because it did not ruled 1352 account Jose Padilla's prior criminal offenses, take in After being in Pakistan, Jose Padilla's associate Binyam (TS^^^^^^^^^^B^NF) detained on the the CTaMB^^I rendered July fl< 2002, was he was held by by Mohammad where On 2004, Binyam Mohammad was January to CIA government. rendered 1353 On May 2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to the custody of the custody. U.S. 1354 in Afghanistan. military On September 21, 2004, he was transferred to Guantanamo Bagram, 1355 Cuba. Mohammad was then transferred from Binyam military custody to the Bay, U.S. Kingdom on February 2009. United 1356 representing l^^^mi^l^^^l. Binyam Mohammad sued the government Lawyers documents United to of the the release of Kingdom relating to his whereabouts and compel 1357 after his initial detention in April 2002. 2010, In February treatment a British court compelled the "of a summary of the torture" to which Binyam Mohammed was subjected release 1350 ALEC 17, 2002), with references May FBI WASH and CIA reporting to [. Upon Jose Padilla's arrest, Padilla was found to be 2001, possession of the phone from in of Hassoun, | number Adham prosecutors material providing terrorists. U.S. support focused on more |; and to 70 intercepted phone calls between the defendants during the 1990s, but provided no information than the trial at related plotting in the United States. See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for defendants, to Jose "Without as well as open source news reports, including including a plot, is Padilla guilty?," Christian Padilla, Padilla Monitor, Science 19, 2007; and "The others on trial in dated case," Christicui Science Monitor »dated July May 29, 2007. 1351 An Assistant U.S. Attorney involved in the prosecution stated, "The narrative is fairly clear that Padilla was recruited to overseas to participate in jihad." See U .S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for go including including Padilla, as well as open source news reports, defendants, "Without a plot, is Padilla Jose trial Christian Monitor, guilty?," July 19, 2007; and 'The others on Science in Padilla case," Christian Science dated Monitor, dated May 29,2007. 1352 See open sources, to include press articles such as, "Court Says Padilla Prison Sentence Too Lenient," Reuters, dated September 19,2011. 1353 1334 ^ 1355 (281655Z SEP 04) ^^^^^^^^•12520 1356 Terrorism Watch, March 10, 2009, Guantanamo Detainee 's Torture Claims Could Impact Bilateral Relationship with UK. 13,7 [REDACTED] 3174 (311725Z JUL 08) 11 ii 11111 i im II Page 238 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 238

268 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN SECRET//^ TOP detention. during fall of 2010, the British government awarded Binyam Mohammed a In his the 1358 in reported compensation. million £1 of Karachi Plots Thwarting The 2. the Summary: The CIA represented (TS/Z its enhanced interrogation ^^^H^m ^NF) that effective necessary to produce critical, and unavailable intelligence, were techniques otherwise the CIA which disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period enabled to the provided the thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) as evidence for the effectiveness of years, CIA enhanced CIA techniques. These CIA's representations were inaccurate. of the interrogation explosives Plot(s) Karachi with the confiscation of was and the arrests of Ammar The disrupted and Khallad bin Attash in April 2003. The operation and arrests were conducted al-Baluchi by unilaterally and were unrelated to any reporting from the CIA's Pakistani authorities Interrogation and Detention Program. The Karachi Plot(s) refers to terrorist plotting that further Details: Karachi a variety and Western interests in the U.S. area, to include the U.S. targeted of named hotels near the airport and beach, U.S. vehicles traveling between the Consulate, subject and U.S. diplomatic housing, U.S. personnel airport, to potential sniper the Consulate 1359 well as Pakistan's Faisal Army Base. indicate CIA records attacks, the CIA became aware as that initial as early as September 2002, and plotting it was disrupted in April 2003, when of the 1360 remaining plot leaders were arrested in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities. the While the leaders were captured in the process of procuring explosives, they maintained that plot were still the process of locating vehicles, a safe house, and suicide operatives at the time in they 1361 of their arrest. of of Karachi Plot(s) The the the eight most thwarting is one cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness frequently the CIA's of 1362 techniques. enhanced Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and interrogation to the policymakers, intelligence officials, and provided Department of Justice represent senior "fk]ey Karachi as an example of how the intelligence collected from HVD interrogations Plot(s) after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and capture 1358 Among open sources, see "Compensation to Guantanamo detainees 'was necessary,"' BBC News UK, other 16, November 2010. 1359 intelligence chronology in Volume II and 11454 (3017102Z See 03). APR 33804 (190956ZSEP02); [REDACTED] 34513 (052246ZMAR03);45028 J; DIRECTOR BE 1361 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR MAY 03) and DIRECTOR IHfli MAY 1362 targets terrorist plots encompassed a variety of The Karachi in the Karachi area associated with U.S. potential and Western interests. Although the plotting involved multiple targets, the plotting is most often referred to as the "Karachi Plot." 11 II 11111 I II II I II I Page 239 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 239

269 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 1363 additional CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the terrorists. The 1364 interrogation "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." techniques CIA's enhanced was 1363 in to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Italics CIA included Memorandum points March 2005. See also CIA talking 2, for National Security Techniques," Interrogation Counterterrorist from Points for 10 Council 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee entitled, "Talking March Techniques," March 4, 2005. Interrogation (HVDI) dated effectiveness through the 2003 representations regarding the 2009, of the CIA's enhanced 1364 CIA's From provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that interrogation techniques CIA attributed information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA the to asserted representations intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation that further the Among unique, and resulted in "saved lives." unavailable, other CIA representations, see\ was techniques otherwise representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (1) dated May 30, 2005, CIA Memorandum, relied a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use on which of CIA's interrogation techniques to assess their legality. enhanced CIA representations referenced by the the The include that the use of the CIA's OLC interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," enhanced "vital," "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and disrupt" terrorist The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that and threats. a subsequent believes program is largely responsible for preventing this attack within the United CIA the that See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from States." ( G. Bradbury, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Steven Principal Convention of Obligations Under Article 16 of the States Against Torture to Certain Techniques Application United May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA that in the representations Department Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA of of on of intelligence acquired from the use type the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. representations the CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program Citing was OLC on CIA-provided information), the (which memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— based [security in its use of enhanced interrogation and, intended to serve this paramount interest particular, techniques—is of the by producing substantial quantities of Nation] unavailable intelligence. ...As the President otherwise explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program saved innocent lives.'" ( See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central has Agency, from G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Intelligence Steven Detainee 20, Application of the War Crimes Act, the Re: Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 July 2007, Counsel, Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High of the Geneva Value Detainees.) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 al Qaeda (3) or "the of Enhanced Techniques of one kind use another had produced significant intelligence represented that that had, in the view of CIA information saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of professionals, this will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." ( See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from program July Muller, of Interrogation Program on 29 Review 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Scott Subject: July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and Program, September 26, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 2003, Special response the Office of Inspector General draft CIA's Review of the CIA program, which asserts: to "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to saved our fact the use of such techniques, we and without allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks the that hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." ( See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, involving Director subject: Operations; Deputy re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention for Interrogation 2004; 2003-7123-IG; date: Februaty 27, and attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum Program" (5) re Successes Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) CIA's CIA briefing documents for CIA of Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of techniques not timely acquired from detainees in this program would the have been discovered or reported by other intelligence means." ( See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- Derived 18FEB.2009" attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting graphic from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid and Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including * " la, CIA document "EITs and TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN Page 240 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 240

270 UNCLASSIFIED I//NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ example, For the CIA prepared and provided a in November 2007, points of CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding set the to talking 1365 Technique." The document includes a section Interrogation Enhanced the Waterboard as a Result of EITs," which states entitled, statistics alone will not "Plots Discovered "reporting and measure of the effectiveness of EITs." The document then provides a accurate provide a fair Intelligence Derived through use of EITs," stating: "Key of list of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a "CIA's use approach, interrogation CIA to disrupt terrorist comprehensive has enabled are collected of key intelligence following from CIA plots... The examples applying the waterboard along with other interrogations detainee after ...The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks interrogation techniques: Pakistan US other US interests in and was uncovered Consulate the against initial interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi during the 1366 confirmed and KSM." later by (TS/y^^l^^m^/NF) a CIA-prepared briefing for Vice President Cheney on Likewise, CIA's enhanced techniques in March 2005, under a section of the briefing die interrogation RESULTS," asserts: called, "INTERROGATION enhanced interrogation techniques, "Use part of a DOJ-authorized of as approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, comprehensive interrogation terrorists.. additional Karachi Plot: Plan to conduct attacks capture .The in US and other US interests the Pakistan. Plot disrupted. against Consulate with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and Effectiveness," KSM)," "Background Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on the Key Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on on Captures 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee March at DTS #2009-1258, databases which a list of "some of tire key captures and disrupted provides that the CIA had attributed to the use of the plots" CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See detainees II for CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the Volume additional obtain "saved otherwise unavailable intelligence that to lives." CIA unique, 1365 Mukasey 2007, On Bush nominated Judge Michael 17, to be Attorney General of the September President States. In October 2007, at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mukasey United to as whether he believed waterboarding declined an interrogation technique was unlawful. On October 30, say Committee Mukasey written questions from the Senate Judiciary to on the issue of waterboarding, 2007, responded "As described in your letter, these techniques seem over the line stating: on a personal basis, repugnant to me, or, and probably seem the same to many Americans. But would are different from real life, and in any hypothetical legal opinion the actual facts and circumstances are critical." ( See October 30, 2007, Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, to Patrick J. Leahy, Edward M. Kennedy, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Herb Kohl, Dianne Feinstein, Senators L. D. E. Schumer, Richard J. Durbin, Benjamin Charles Cardin, and Sheldon Whitehouse.) On Russell Feingold, 6, 2007, days prior to a Senate vote to confirm Mukasey, the November provided a set of talking points to the CIA CIA for use with the President in a meeting director the CIA's use of the waterboard interrogation technique. about See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." document 1366 Points: See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Italics Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November added. 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." I IIII III I B^^BMMMM I MI HIM 11 Page 241 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 241

271 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I Bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi. KSM also provided info on Sources: Khallad 1367 after him capture photos of Ammar and Khallad." the we plot showed provided inaccurate representations regarding the CIA similar (TS/^^^^HI^^I^NF) The Karachi Plot(s) in 17 of the 20 documents thwarting to policymakers and the of the provided 1368 July 2003 and between 2009. Justice of Department March CIA operational cables and other documents found A review of CIA's that interrogation techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in the enhanced the of Plot(s). CIA records indicate that Karachi Karachi Plot(s) was thwarted disruption the the of operatives and the interdiction by the explosives by Pakistani authorities, specifically arrest of 1369 CIA had information regarding the The terrorist plotting as (^FS/JIH^^^^^B/ZNE) Karachi 1370 September 11, 2QQ2. that On early day, as conducted b> a raid an Pakistani al-Qaida safe °f Pakistan, uncovered "perfume letter," named as such because the term in Karachi, the was as The letter, written in May 2002, word. from KSM to Hamza is used a code "perfumes" 1371 member who was killed in the al-Zubayr, a known KSM's letter to al-Zubayr al-Qa'ida raids. "Dear we have the green light for Brother, hotels," and suggests "making it three states, the 1372 one." instead By early October 2002, the CIA had completed a search of the names of many in letter" in its databases and found "perfume of the individuals who "had identified the roles in support of the operation" were assigned by Pakistani authorities during the arrested l3fi7 March added. briefing for Vice President Cheney, Italics CIA 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice dated President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." 1368 See of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the list of the enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in effectiveness CIA's II. Volume and 1369 The CIA's June 2013 DIRECTOR 45028 reporting that CIA concedes the impact of the the [the CIA] acquired from detainees on Response "mischaracterized Karachi plots," and acknowledges that the Karachi plotting was "thwarted by the arrest of the operatives and the the interdiction explosives by [Pakistani authorities]." The CIA does not dispute that Pakistani authorities arrested of al-Baluchi information Khallad bin Attash independently, and that Ammar from the CIA's Detention and and CIA's Program no role in die arrests. The Interrogation June 2013 Response states, however, that CIA played detainee reporting "revealed ongoing attack plotting against the US official presence in Karachi that prompted the Consulate to further steps to protect its officers." This statement is incongruent with CIA records. In response take reporting Karachi by the CIA, CIA personnel in to the wrote: "[wjhile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin cited most was [CIA officers] had become aware of chilling- of this reporting either through previous information Attash] or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." The CIA 2002, personnel further reassured addressees that, in December Karachi the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took in increased steps to protect U.S. Consulate personnel. See Volume II for additional information. 1370 p detailed information, see Volume II. or 1371 ALEC •• (032142Z OCT 02) 12535 (050557Z OCT 02); 11050 (101207Z OCT 02)J Page 242 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 242

272 UNCLASSIFIED 1/7NOFOKN SECRET// TOP 1373 At person in the letter, Khallad bin Attash, a known al-Qa'ida operative, least raids. one 1374 large. remained at Karachi plotting remained disrupted unilaterally What of the was a result of a criminal lead. On April 2003, Pakistani authorities, by Pakistani authorities as a report received explosives and weapons were to specifically H^H^I^^^HHK that 1375 truck a specific location in Karachi. a pickup Pakistani authorities made in be transported to intercede, and, on arrangements 29, 2003, they intercepted the vehicle and confiscated to April detonators, ammunition. The driver of the vehicle provided the location where explosives, and of were leading to the capture delivered, several operatives, including explosives being the and Khallad bin Attash, as well as to Ammar discovery of another explosives al-Baluchi the A captured individual stated that the third had belonged to Hamza al-Zubayr, cache. explosives known and now deceased al-Qa'ida operative, as well as others residing in the home raided the 1376 11, the "perfume letter" was discovered. on September 2002, where arrested, While was asked by a Pakistani Ammar being al-Baluchi that intentions his seized explosives. Al-Baluchi responded regarding he was about officer the 1377 the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. planning In to government custody—and prior attack foreign rendered CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation to being to Karachi al-Baluchi provide information about the to plotting to a techniques—Ammar continued 1378 officer who was using rapport-building interrogation techniques. foreign The government provided information al-Baluchi on the plotting included the surveillance conducted, by Ammar was targets, envisioned exact method of attack that and considered for the U.S. Consulate the the and other hard targets. Ammar al-Baluchi discussed the use of a motorcycle with a in Karachi then to the perimeter wall of the consulate and breach how the operatives would seek to bomb 1379 that breach with a vehicle filled with explosives. exploit Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin 1373 ALEC OCT 02). See also CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, "Threat Threads: (0302054Z 11 September Still Under the Radar." Most Plotters 1374 (0302054Z See also CIA paper dated January ] 1, 2002, entitled, 02). Threads: OCT ALEC "Threat the Radar." Plotter^til^nder MostUSeptember 1375 indicate the CIA was the result of criminal leads and was records interdiction to reporting from CIA detainees. any unrelated I DIRECTOR See 1376 I DIRECTOR The CIA's June 2013 145028 maintains on KSM's reporting Response die thwarted "perfume letter" plotting was separate from the "plots that Because with and interrogation of Ammar and Khallad." arrest CIA records did not make this disrupted the and the fact that the operations, to at distinction, some extent, shared targets, operatives, and the same set of least explosives, operations are linked in this the Study. 1377 1 45028 DIRECTOR I ,378 Given the threat to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations. A May 2, 2003, CIA cable 4291) that, because of Ammar al-Baluchi's "strong reticence towards the U.S.," CIA states via were foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi the video feed. The cable notes officers observing a foreign government officer who had developed rapport that Ammar al-Baluchi was conducdng all the with questioning obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi on and plotting against U.S. interests in Pakistan, as the well as other matters. 1379 The June 2013 Response claims that "Ammar CIA's Khallad provided new information on other attack and plans in Karachi after entering CIA custody and undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques," and that "[d]uring diat his interrogation in CIA custody and after enhanced techniques commenced, [Ammar] revealed first the plan 11II MMI^^^M MI I II 11111 Page 243 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 243

273 UNCLASSIFIED TOP remained in government custody for approximately H weeks, with Ammar al- Attash foreign 1380 a lesser Attash Baluchi—and —responding to questions on a variety of matters, extent to bin 1381 plotting. the including Karachi Attash Ammar and (TS/iflH^^^I^^/NF) bin al-Baluchi were 2003, May On Khallad custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation rendered to CIA 1382 The the CIA disseminated two intelligence reports on the Karachi techniques. next day, 1383 Attash. Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin of the The reporting from Plot(s) interrogations (1) al-Qa'ida was targeting Western interests in relayed including the U.S. that: Karachi, and housing in a specific neighborhood of Karachi; and (2) the attack could Consulate Western were as "late May/early June 2003," but the plotters as still in the process of occurred early have 1384 house, and the suicide operatives at the time of finding arrest. vehicles, These a safe their intelligence were used to support CIA representations in finished disseminated reports 1385 products, points, briefing documents, and talking Bash's September 6, intelligence President to use a motorcycle bomb and a car was in a single, coordinated attack at the end of May or early June, and he bomb pointed the location on the Consulate's perimeter wall where the attack would occur." The information in the to June 2013 is inaccurate. Ammar al-Baluchi provided the referenced information while in foreign CIA's Response to prior CIA custody and being subjected entering the CIA's enhanced interrogation custody, to government i venthethreat to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to techniques. in the interrogations. A May 2, G participate CIA 14291) states that, because of cable al-Baluchi's "strong reticence towards the 2003, Ammar .S.," CIA officers were observing the foreign government U of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The interrogations cable that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammar al-Baluchi was conducting all notes This questioning intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi. obtaining included information about the the and bomb plotting against the U.S. Consulate, as well as motorcycle-car on plans to potentially target information Westerners a specific housing area in Karachi. According in the information obtained, surveillance by the plotters to "had confirmed a U.S. presence significant enough to warrant such an attack." Ammar al-Baluchi further stated that he had caijacking a U.S. Consulate vehicle and loading it with explosives to target the Consulate, and considered on the idea to attack the U.S. Consulate with a helicopter, stating that he did not follow through elaborated initial see idea he believed it would take too long to this an operative for that type of attack ( because with train May 2003). Later, the foreign government officer 2, Ammar al-Baluchi as "more chatty" than 14291, described bin Attash, and detailed how, while in foreign government custody Ammar al-Baluchi "acknowledged plans Khallad U.S. airport, officials at the to attack the Consul General's Residence and the Consulate itself." The Consulate CG's government that "both the Consulate and the explained residence" required a "tiered attack of foreign officer car bombs which would breach the perimeter" of the targets. The foreign government officer also stated successive that, based Ammar al-Baluchi's comments on his casing efforts, it was inferred that Ammar al-Baluchi had on areas sought Americans at their residences in specific target of Karachi. See 19647 ^^^^^APR to 04). ^^^^^^^^ Records indicate that Khallad bin Attash was less cooperative (Ammar al-Baluchi was as "more chatty"), but nonetheless provided information in foreign government custody on described surveillance he United States government vehicles in Karachi, among other information. conducte^gainst the 1381 (•••APR 03); DIRECTOR ^^•••APR 03); •••I14291 (May 2, ^•^^•45028 04). CIA records indicate that Ammar al-Baluchi was providing 19647 information significant the foreign government officer conducting the questioning who had developed rapport to Ammar al-Baluchi. with 1382 [REDACTED] ; [REDACTED] 38389 38325 1383 DIRECTOR (^^•MAY03); DIRECTOR •• (^^•MAYCB) ^^M 1384 DIRECTOR Hi MAY 03); DIRECTOR MAY 03). DIRECTOR •• noted that Khallad Attash indicated that they had identified one suicide operative so far. bin 1385 September speech validation efforts for the President's See 6, 2006, speech acknowledging the CIA's CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. In the speech, President Bush stated that "Terrorists held in CIA custody... bombs helped a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi using car stop and motorcycle bombs." See also, Page 244 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 244

274 UNCLASSIFIED TOP speech that Karachi Plot(s) was "thwarted," "disrupted," or "uncovered" as a result of 2006, the enhanced interrogation However, within 24 hours of the dissemination of the CIA's techniques. cable CIA Karachi responded in an official in that the reports, personnel these intelligence the CIA detainees information disseminated was already known to the CIA acquired from and Consulate officials. The cable stated: U.S. and from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling- [CIA "[w]hile reporting had become of most of this reporting either through previous officers] aware through information al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior of interviews or 1386 of Karachi." out transfer to their in Karachi reassured addressees that, in CIA personnel Consulate the Karachi took increased steps to U.S. in threat Consulate U.S. on similar terrorist personnel reporting. According to the protect based Americans in the referenced housing area had cable, been vacated from the "area for already several the potential for "attacks targeting Americans at the airport" had been months," several months and new procedures and security measures had been put in "recognized ago," 1387 terrorist associated with the potential risks attacks. minimize to the place noted, in November 2007, the CIA prepared (TS/T^^^^I^^H^NF) provided a set As and points the CIA director for an "upcoming to with the President regarding the of talking meeting Enhanced Interrogation Technique." Under a section entitled, Waterboard Discovered as "Plots a Result EITs," the document lists the "Karachi Plot," stating the disruption was the result of of applying intelligence CIA detainee interrogations after from the waterboard along "key collected other interrogation techniques," and that the plotting was with uncovered during the initial " 1388 Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar of and later confirmed by KSM." interrogations al-Baluchi While Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, are no CIA records to indicate that either was ever subjected to there CIA's waterboard technique. KSM did provide information on the plotting, but the interrogation by the personnel to be withholding information on assessed plotting, more than a month was CIA against CIA using its enhanced interrogation techniques stopped KSM. In late April after the CIA interrogators confronted KSM with photographs demonstrating that Ammar al- 2003, other CIA the June 2005 among Intelligence Assessment entitled, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the documents, to Against records indicate this document was provided CIA White House officials on June 1, War Al-Qa'ida." A slightly modified version of this Intelligence 2005. was broadly disseminated within the Intelligence Assessment Community June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, on Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of former this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24,2009. The assessment represents that reporting" resulted in the "[r]evealing of the Karachi Plots," stating: "When confronted "detainee debriefings information Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during by that al-Qa'ida was planning with provided the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the to attack Airport, and Western housing areas." The footnote Karachi for claim cites the May 2003, this intelligence report detailingth^dmissioi^nade by Khallad bin disseminated Attash while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteirogation techniques (BBII^^B) as its source. I38G 14510 cable also stated, "As noted in several previous cables, in This to 2002 became aware of the threat December Consulate officials." ^^BConsulate 1387 Him 14510 1388 Italics added. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November POTUS 6, 2007, the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for with meeting." 11 ii 11 i i "i i II i Page 245 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 245

275 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN I Khallad bin Attash had been captured. When the CIA interrogators asked what Baluchi and and Ammar Attash were "up to" in Karachi, KSM provided information Khallad al-Baluchi bin 1389 in CIA's KSM's belated reporting prompted the targets ALEC regarding potential Karachi. a cable write stating: to Station to see that KSM "We made these new admissions of were disappointed only in Pakistan after seeing the capture photographs planned Ammar al- attacks of and We consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] Baluchi Khallad. may be especially as this omission concern, well have to a serious information lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent cost following up American in unrelated leads that led to the criminal of Ammar, bin Attash, and on capture probable operatives involved in the attack plans... other put, KSM has Simply had opportunity to come clean on this threat and, from our optic, he every withheld the until he was confronted with evidence deliberately information already know about it, or soon would we about it from Ammar and knew that reporting provision the Pakistan threat of - only after he KSM's Khallad... made aware of the capture of the attack planners - is viewed as a clear was of of and deliberate withholding illustration threat information continued 1390 he had not yet been compromised." which believed TS / I ^^^ H ^ WF ) Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, and KSM remained ( CIA in custody their transfer to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until September in 1391 2006. All three remain in U.S. military custody. 3. The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group Summary: The represented that its enhanced interrogation CIA were effective necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, techniques and the save to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and enabled lives. Over a period which CIA the CIA the "discovery" and/or "thwarting" of provided Second Wave plotting and of years, the "discovery" of the al-Ghuraba group as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced the interrogation techniques. representations were inaccurate. The Second Wave plotting was These individuals. with and identification of key arrest The arrests and identifications disrupted the (30114IZ APR 03); 11454 (301710Z APR 03). As described 111448 detail in the in intelligence in Volume II, KSM was rendered to chronology custody on March |, 2003, and was immediately CIA subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On March 5, 2003, he was "confronted" with the "perfume letter," which point he discussed the letter and its recipient, Hamza al-Zubayr. KSM had not yet been at to was waterboard. As described, Hamza al-Zubayr subjected killed in a September 2002 raid against al-Qa'ida- the had related KSM stated that Khallad bin Attash houses. been responsible for obtaining operatives for the safe Hamza al-Zubayr operation. At the time KSM provided this information, a separate cable stated that KSM (052246Z "continued that he has any [knowledge of] ongoing operations." See [REDACTED] 34513 deny MAR to 03); (062312Z MAR 02); [REDACTED] DIRECTOR (061929Z MAR 03); f 34575 | 03); 34566 (061646Z MAR 1345751 (052246Z MAR03). 34513 (022012Z MAY 03) 3425 (050726Z SEP 06); | 11242 (050748Z SEP 06); | (050539Z 12214 SEP 06). SECRET//! TOP y/NOFORN Page 246 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 246

276 UNCLASSIFIED I// NOFORN TOP /^ SECRET/ unrelated to reporting acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced were any against CIA Likewise, the al-Ghuraba group was identified interrogation techniques detainees. not who custody. CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced by a detainee in CIA was Second fabricated on both the information Wave significant techniques interrogation provided al-Ghuraba group. plotting and the "Second Further plotting refers to Details: Al-Qa'ida's Wave" United KSM strike the by Coast of the to States with airplanes using non-Arab efforts two West While intelligence reporting often conflated the "Second Wave" plotting, KSM passport holders. 1392 plotting the separate efforts. two Neither of the two efforts was assessed to be viewed as identifying KSM engaged in the process of still suicide operatives and as imminent, was training for potential participants when each effort was disrupted through the obtaining pilot 1393 identification the suspected operatives and or planners. operational arrest of al-Ghuraba by group was established in late 1999 The (^S/Z^H^BI^^^^/NE) student jailed (JI) primarily Islamiyah educate the sons of leaders JT leaders and to groom the Jemaah to for potential students and operational roles in JI. Some members of the al-Ghuraba leadership group completed militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at reportedly 1394 universities in Despite CIA representations to the contrary, intelligence and Islamic Karachi. 1592 Second Group intelligence chronology in Volume / Al-Ghuraba including, among other See Wave II, (20211Z JUN 03) and cable note on "Draft Intel: documents, Details his Thinking on DIRECTOR KSM Efforts Target California," included as an attachment to an email from to a distribution list and to CIA OTA in the Directorate of Intelligence, dated June 30, 2003, at 06:25 PM. for 1393 See chronology in Volume II for detailed information. See also statements by United States intelligence on officials, a February 9, 2006, White House briefing as "the West Coast Terrorist Plot by government such Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism." At this briefing Frances the White emphasized how "collaboration with our international partners" had "disrupted terrorist networks House Coast" the around serious al-Qaeda plots." Using the "West world plot as an example, Townsend stated that: and "Klialid Shaykh Mohammed was the individual who led this effort. .. .The cell leader was arrested in February of 2002, and we begin—at that point, the other members of the cell believed that the West Coast plot had been as [and] was going forward... the lead guy is arrested, which disrupts it in February of '02." When asked cancelled not this belief could be accurately described as a disruption given the whether by some that "it never got about plotting my enough disrupted," Townsend stated, "there is no question in be mind that this is a disruption." See also far to 23, 2007, White House Press Release, entitled, "Fact Sheet: Keeping America Safe From Attack," which states, May Also Broke Up Other Post-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and "We it into until tallest building on the West Coast." As described in the Study, KSM was not detained fly March 1, the The "[t]he June 2013 Response acknowledges that 2003. Study correctly points out that we erred when we CIA's from that 'learned' of the Second Wave plotting we KSM and 'learned' of the operational cell represented comprised of students from Hambali." The CIA's June 2013 Response describes the inaccurate representation as "imprecision" by CIA, but nonetheless states that the CIA "continue(s) to assess this was a good example of the the contends—for of from the detainee program"; and derived the first time—that Hambali's importance intelligence "was a critical factor in the disruption of al-Qa'ida's plan to conduct a 'Second Wave' attack." As described capture throughout the Study, in its efforts to obtain legal authorization and policy approval for die CIA's Committee intelligence interrogation the CIA represented that the techniques, referenced was obtained "as a result" of enhanced the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (not the "detainee program"), and that the information obtained was of unique unavailable. As detailed in this summary and in Volume II, the capture otherwise Hambali was and unrelated the use of the to enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA's 139,1 Reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba group was similar to the Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)'s connected Masapakindo, organization. Masran bin Arshad was Pakindo, to Pakindo, and while in foreign aka government custody, explained that "in 19"" ' " ' la] established a secret Malaysian 7NOFORN TOP SECRET/ Page 247 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 247

277 UNCLASSIFIED TOP source reporting the group was not "tasked with," witting, or involved in any open indicate 1395 KSM's plotting. Second aspect of Wave disruption "discovery" "Second Wave Plot" (also The of and the 1396 along and "West "Tallest Building Plot"), Coast Plot" with the associated the as known the capture identification, the al-Ghuraba "cell," is one of the eight most frequently discovery, and of provided the CIA as evidence for the by of CIA's enhanced cited examples effectiveness 1397 Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared interrogation and provided techniques. for intelligence the and policymakers, Department of Justice represent the to senior officials, discovery thwarting "Second Wave" plotting and the identification, discovery, or of and the how al-Ghuraba members as an example of the "[k]ey intelligence collected from of arrest group after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled HVD to disrupt inteiTogations CIA Association as 'Masapakindo' to help facilitate a steady pipeline of PAS religious and military Student known to from to Pakistan, sometimes continuing on Malaysia Afghanistan, but ultimately returning to trainees traveling This student association for children of PAS members also was intended to serve as a general Malaysia. support structure PAS students who were undergoing Islamic religious training in Pakistan and India. Masapakindo's for was based Karachi, Pakistan." See also February 27, 2004, Memorandum for CIA Inspector headquarters in "Comments James CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled Pavitt, to Draft IG Special Review, from L. General and Interrogation Program," which contains a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled, Counterterrorism Detention CIA's "Successes Detention and Interrogation Activities." See also CIA Intelligence Product of Counterterrorism in "Jemaah Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda Counterterrorism Pakistan," dated April 18, entitled, Islaniiya: Although this report makes numerous references to the al-Ghuraba group, it does not reference the 2008. group's potential in KSM's Second Wave attack. As described in this summary, and in greater detail in engagement intelligence II, CIA representations, a wide body of to reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba Volume contrary was not "discovered" as a result of KSM's reporting, nor was the al-Ghuraba group "tasked" with, or witting group and any of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. See also KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003, aspect of, the chronology in Volume II, to intelligence [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03). include 1395 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of Deputy States Obligations Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be United Under memorandum the High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. The of states: "Use of enhanced in Interrogation Used led to critical, actionable intelligence such techniques, the discovery of the Guraba Cell, which was however, as with KSM's planned Second Wave executing against Los Angeles." tasked attacks 1396 to the "Second Wave" attacks appeared in public news reports shortly after September 11, 2001, References in Zacarias to sometimes Moussaoui. See, for example, The Washington Post, "Suspected Planner of 9/11 reference investigators Captured after Gunfight" (09/14/2002) ("Some Pakistan have theorized that Moussaoui, Attacks in laptop computer contained information about crop dusting, may have been part of a second wave of terror whose nd or plan attacks The New York Post, "2 instead."); Plot Tied to Moussaoui" (09/06/2002) ("French a back-up lh be officials that Zacarias Moussaoui was never meant to are the '20 reportedly hijacker' but was to be part claiming of a 'second wave' of terror."); The Los Angeles Times, "Officials Skeptical as Detainees Say Sept. 11 was First in a Trio" (10/01/2002) Sept. 11 attacks may have been planned as the first of three terrorist strikes in the United ("The U.S. each and more devastating than the last, bigger officials said Monday, citing recent States, progressively with captured Al Qaeda operatives Since days after Sept. 11, authorities have said they were interviews about a possible 'second wave' of attacks."). Similarly, on May 6, 2006, an affidavit filed by Moussaoui concerned was stated, part of another al-Qaeda plot which was to occur after September 11, 2001." "I 1397 A November 21, 2005, Newsweek article entitled, "The Debate Over Torture," referenced a member of the Senate Select on Intelligence stating that "enhanced interrogation techniques" worked with KSM to Committee was an terrorist plot, which the magazine indicated thwart the "Second Wave" plot. The article included al-Qa'ida the following: "A career CIA official involved with interrogation policy cautioned Newsweek not to put too much not credence such claims. 'Whatever briefing they got was probably not truthful,' said the official, who did in wish to be discussing sensitive matters/] identified 11 ii 11 ii i i B^BBBI^^^^M^^FTnm Page 248 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 248

278 UNCLASSIFIED I //NOFORN TOP SECRET//^ 1398 plots" additional terrorists." and The CIA further represented that the terrorist "capture from intelligence enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise the acquired CIA's 1399 lives." unavailable" and "saved 13,8 Legal Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from 2005, Group, March 2, Italics in original. entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Counterterrorist Center, DCI document Techniques." 1399 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the From of the CIA's enhanced 2003 through effectiveness provided set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that interrogation techniques a specific its to obtained from the use of information enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA CIA the attributed asserted that tire intelligence obtained representations the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation further from was otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see. techniques unique, Counsel representations Department of Justice Office of Legal the Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, CIA in (1) on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use which relied of CIA's interrogation techniques to assess their legality. Hie CIA representations referenced by the the enhanced techniques include use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation the was "necessary" to obtain "critical," OLC that and "otherwise unavailable actionable "vital," that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect intelligence" and terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that disrupt" CIA believes this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United the that Counsel, See John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General for Central Intelligence Agency, from ( Memorandum States." Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Steven Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: G. Legal of States Obligations Under Article 16 of United Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques Application the May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the that of Legal Office of Department Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA Justice of on of intelligence acquired from the use type the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. representations the CIA documents and the President's September 6,2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program Citing was OLC on CIA-provided information), the (which memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— based [security in its use of enhanced interrogation and, intended to serve this paramount interest particular, techniques—is of the by producing substantial quantities of Nation] unavailable intelligence. ...As the President otherwise explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get any where else, the program saved innocent lives."' ( See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central has Agency, from G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Intelligence Steven Detainee 20, Application of the War Crimes Act, the Re: Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 July 2007, Counsel, Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used of the the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Geneva by Detainees.) CIA briefings for members of the National (3) Council in July and September 2003 al Qaeda Security that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence represented that CIA in the view of information professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of had, August program in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See result 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from this will Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Scott July Memorandum 2003; September 4,2003, CIA Program, for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 29, 26, Subject: Memorandum for the Record from Muller, September CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 2003, Special response the Office of Inspector General draft CIA's Review of the CIA program, which asserts: to "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') lias almost certainly countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to saved our fact the use of such techniques, we and without allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks the that hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, involving Director re Operations; subject: Deputy (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention for Interrogation 27, 2003-7123-IG; date: February and 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum Program" (5) of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) re Successes CIA briefing documents for CIA CIA's Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of techniques not timely acquired from detainees in this program would the have been discovered or reported by other intelligence means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- Khalid 18FEB.2009" graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and and >UN IIII in 1 1 m II Page 249 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED 249

279 UNCLASSIFIED TOP example, in 2007, the CIA prepared a briefing for For November Under President "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," the CIA a section Bush. entitled, and CIA ' about the "Second Wave" plotting learned the al-Ghuraba group the " represented that 1400 waterboard along only other interrogation techniques." "after applying the with on 2, 2005, the CIA March the Department of Likewise, (TSAfll^H^^B^NF) provided of Legal Counsel (OLC) with Justice entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Office a document Interrogation The CIA memorandum stated that the "Central Counterterrorist Techniques." techniques can that this program works and the you are eff