Why the Garden Club Couldn8[1].PDF

Transcript

1 W uldn’t Save hy the Garden Club Co Yo ungsto wn: Civic Infrastructure and Mobilizatio n in Eco no mic Crises SEAN SAFFORD, MIT MIT-IPC-LIS-04-003 2004

2 The views expressed herein are the authors’ responsibility and do not necessarily reflect those of the MIT Industrial Performance Center or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

3 Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown: in Economic Crises Mobilization Civic Infrastructure and Sean Safford Massachusetts Institute of Technology Draft: March 22, 2004 Acknowledgements: This research was conducted with generous sup port from the MIT Industrial - - Sloan MIT Institute and a MIT Performance Center , Richard Lester, Director, as well as the Cambridge - BPS research grant. Ezra Zuckerman, Chris Ansell, Isabel Fernandez Mateo, Michael Piore, Sarah Kaplan, Forrest Briscoe, Dan B reznitz and Richard Locke provided extremely valuable advice. Thanks T and om , Roberto Fernandez also to Paul Osterman, Peter Marsden, Gary Herrigel , Mashall Ganz Sloan - Kochan. Participants at the MIT Industrial Performance Center Doctoral Research Seminar, MIT Institute for Work and Employment Research Seminar, European Group on Organization Studies, the Organizations and Markets Seminar at Harvard University and the Society for the Advancement of Economics who provided feedback on earlier drafts. - Socio 46 of 1 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

4 ABSTRACT This paper seeks to understand how the structure of civic relationships shapes trajectories of economic matched Rust Belt cities: Allentown, Pennsylvania and change through an examination of two well - Despite s Youngstown, Ohio. haring very similar economic histories, Allentown and Youngstown have - since the 1970s. The paper analyses how nevertheless taken dramatically different post industrial paths the social networks shape the intersection of economic and civic for and possibilities strategic choice actors in response to two that were critical in historical junctures of key organizational mobilization . The analysis shows that differences in the way that ’ cities the civic and shaping economic trajectories relationships intersected facilit ated collective action in one and impeded it in the other. economic in contrast However, to much of the literature on “social capital” the results suggest the downsides of network density, particularly in times of acute economic crisis. Rather, it is more importa nt that the — and mobilization — ionships facilitate interaction structure of social relat across social, political and economic divisions. 46 of 2 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

5 At the height of America’s industrial era, Allentown, Pennsylvania and Youngstown, Ohio were known as places that “worked ” both in terms of the men and women toiling in the cities’ factories and in terms functioning communities. In 1977, however, those - of the intangible qualities of life that attend well steel making images were shattered as — the — entere d an extended period of acute cities’ core industr y restructuring and decline. By 1983, both had taken on the moniker of the Rust Belt and faced what were likely to abandon the cities appeared to be similar fates: c vicious cycle ompanies and workers in a ve once prosperous communities - out shells (Bluestone and Harrison that threatened to lea hollowed however, it is clear that the cities have actually taken very different paths. 1982). Twenty years later, 1 Allentown has emerged as a community on the “high - road” of economic grow th while Youngstown remains a poster child for post - late 200 3 , Allentown’s unemployment rate was industrial decline. In 8 % compared to Youngstown’s which stood at 6 .8 %. Average wages in Allentown were 10% higher 4. than Youngstown’s. Thirty - one entrepren eurial companies in Allentown had garnered $1.8 billion in venture capital funds over the course of the 1990s compared to 15 firms and just $ 80 million in 2 Youngstown. Allentown’s central cities have grown by 35% since 1980 while Youngstown’s have decline d . I n the recent economic downturn, Allentown has retained many lucrative jobs as firms have consolidated operations into the region while Youngstown has suffered further job losses as more production has slipped away to the American South, Mexico and mor e recently, China. T his paper seeks to understand why these two places which shared remarkably similar histories have such different post industrial trajectories since the 1980s. Drawing on insights from proceeded down - ocial embeddedness theory s vetter 1985; Powell and DiMaggio 1990; Romo and Schwartz 1995) , (Grano I argue that differences in the underlying structure of inter - organizational relationships in the two cities shaped strategic choices and possibilities for mobilization among key organizat ional actors the and that these differences were the source of the regions’ economic divergence . Specifically , I show that differences in the relationship between two kinds of inter organizational networks - — one economic, the other civic — ays which ultimately facilitated beneficial interactions in Allentown combined in different w precluded them in Youngstown. In Allentown , civic relationships tied actors who were not and otherwise economically connected while i n Youngstown civic ties compounded connections among actors who were already economically well connected . Moreover, in Allentown key economic leaders concentrated their civic participation in a few prominent organizations whereas in Youngstown community leaders’ participation was spread thin among a large number of civic commitments. 1 Throughout, “Allentown” and “Youngstown” refer to each city’s respective three county Metropolitan Statistical - Easton (PA) and Youngstown - Bethlehem - Areas: Allentown Warren (OH). 46 of 3 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

6 Con centrated and narrowly focused forms of civic participation evident in Allentown provided dedicated forums in which concerns of the community could be deliberated and provided an organizational and institutional infrastruct ure within which collective action could be taken. In Youngstown, the structure of social relationships provided a less robust set of social resources on which to take collective action. The findings shed light on debate surrounding the s role of networ k density and social capital. M ost formulation of social capital associate superior regional outcomes with dense “networks of civic s engagement” fostered by “civil associations” of all kinds. “The denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit” ( Putnam 1993). S uch thought to provid . trust and solidarity as well as enhanced ready access to information e networks are rs to focal actors to the extent Burt (1992) social capital brings information from other acto argues that the research that this relies on a reciprocal outflow of information, the entire network benefits. Yet, presented here lends support to detractors of the communalist approach to social capital showing that ation among focal groups within a community may also lead to fragmentation of the strong identific broad er whole. Social structures in which too much solidarity prevails among subgroups can spilt the broader aggregate into ‘warring factions or degenerate into rent - seeking special interests groups (Foley and Edwards 1996) developed through an in depth empirical examination of two critical junctures in The se argument s are the cities’ that the shifting in the 1950s apparent had become economic histor it shared First, ies . ography of the steel industry combined with institutional changes affecting the price of shipping steel ge to customers was likely to undermine each region’s ability maintain their positions as centers of steel in bo production. In response a course , economic leaders th cities commissioned consultants to outline However, the of action. In both cases, the reports that resulted had very similar recommendations. Key very different kinds of collective action emerged in response . historical record makes it clear that actors in Allentown came to support the consultants’ conclusions and took action to implement them. In Youngstown, on the other hand, reports were largely ignored. Instead, political outside consultants’ leaders pursued a set of policies which they assumed to be in the best interest of the city’s core economic The elite, but ultimately failed to win the support of those actors when it came to implementation. ich struck second critical juncture examined is the response of the two communities to the upheaval wh the steel industry in 1977 resulting in massive plant closings in both cities. In Allentown, key actors were able to convene in the immediate aftermath of that crisis in order to craft a coherent set of policies 46 of 4 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

7 which were successfully implemen ted. In Youngstown, a highly fragmented set of responses emerged, none of which was ultimately pursued. The paper is organized as follows. The next section provide some background on social networks and s of the methodology. The section that follows describes theories of economic change as well a discussion their divergence since the Allentown and Youngstown’s emergence as centers of manufacturing and Next, two historical junctures which emerged simultaneously in the cities’ histor ies the 1970s and 1980s. elicited . To lend support to the claim that differences in social and the different responses these events structure contributed to the divergent strategic observed, social network data were gathered on two kinds of social ties: (1) economic linkages as measured by board interlocks among large companies, and (2) civic links measured through common organizational representation on prominent civic organizations’ se data were gathered on the structure of relationships as they prev ailed prior to boards of directors. The 2 . two the critical historical junctures in 1950 and 1975 The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings and implications for theory and policy. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND relationships Regional economies can be seen as intricate, overlapping systems of inter - organizational ) 6 create stable tend to Organizations ; Markusen 1994, 199 . (Lauman, Galaskiewicz and Marsden 1978 because relationships characterized by trust and rich exchange of information with specific partners associated with opportunistic behavior reduce search costs and alleviate risk s (Dore relationships can 19 7 3; Powell 1990). Over time, these relationships accumulate into a network containing a repository of spective partners (Powell, Koput and infor mation on the availability competence and reliability of pro Gulati ). Gargiulo and 1999 These structures are ‘sticky’ in the sense that structures Smith - Doerr 1996 ; and their paths persist over time congealing into long - term patterns of inter - organizational interactions. he aggregate, ocial a parcel of S region’s social capital. In t - inter - organi zational relationships are part - in capital refers to the resources available to act which derive from their location in the structure of ors social relationships (Adler and Kwon 20002); the expectations for action within a given community that affect the economic goals and goal seeking behavior of its members (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). The concept of social capital has a long history in social science generally (see Portes 1998; Ad ler and Kwon 2002 for reviews) and economic development in particular (see Woolcock 1998; Woolcock and 2 lso gathered on organizational ties in 2000. Subsequent research will analyze these data in more detail. Data were a 46 of 5 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

8 Narayan 2000; DeFillipis 2002). , however, to separate perspectives on how social capital It is useful affects relational economic outcomes into two camp s. Communitarian approaches , associated mainly with the work of Robert Pu tnam (1993; 2001) , argue that social capital creates higher levels of trust which to , information exchange cooperation and norms of reciprocity which ease transaction costs and facil itate collective action thereby increasing living standards and economic development in developed and developing countries. The second camp might be labeled a social mobilization approach. A ssociated with Theda Skocpol and colleagues ( Skocpol 1996; Skocp ol, Gans and Munson 2002; Crowley and Skocpol 2001; see also, Foley and Edwards 1996, DeFilippis 2001) , the social mobilization camp takes issues with arguing that it glosses over real, and often sharp, conflicts ” Putnam's assessment of “ civil community ong groups in civil society. The importance of social capital, according to this camp, am i s in the e l cognitive and resource constraints which derive from the concrete relationship among various factions ability of acto rs to draw on these concrete relationships to of interest within a community and the v e actions which allow individual constituencies within the community to realize the mobilize collecti power needed to attract and control capital (DeFillipis 2001). The two perspectives on social capital lead to very different assumptions about how the structure of tended to focus on the social networks affects regional outcomes. Putnam’s trust centered approach ha s notion of network density. n which painted a picture of a region i Saxenian (1990) , in a similar vein, dense social networks allowed specialist firms to innovate and react flexibly to challenges. Grabher and Stark (1994), in their synthesis of the literature on transformation among post - Soviet economies, assert these networks as the fundamental eco nomic unit. “Dense social networks,” they argue “facilitate the development of uniform subcultures and strong collective identities” which, in turn, “promote cohesiveness while hindering the ability to gain information and mobilize resources from the envi ronment” (Grabher and Stark 1997, p. 537). These networks provide the coordinating mechanisms that direct the social, economic and political changes within which the economic change unfolded in the post - soviet era. Similar arguments have been applied to mature industrial regions (Amin and Thrift on the other hand, have tended to P 1994). ower and conflict centered perspective on social capital, — focus on the fragmentation of community social structure and the coalitions one might think of them which prevail at as overlappi — ng pockets of social capital within the larger community of social ties centric” structures facilitate - specific times and places. Locke (1995) argued that decentralized “poly Padgett and Ansell’s (1994) discussion of the conflict resolution and deliberation across political divides, rise of the Medici to power in Renaissance Florence showed the advantages conferred on actors situated at the intersection of overlapping networks. 46 of 6 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

9 D ts of both camps, with very few espite the widespread use of network concepts among adheren exceptions, analysts have shied away from gathering empirical data on the actual structure of network ties in making their arguments (Staber 2001a; but c.f., Castilla 2003). A growing body of work within economic sociology which incorporates the analysis of social networks to explain important historical phenomena suggests there might be considerable value in doing so. Gould’s (199 1 ) research on the Paris Commune of 1871, for instance, showed how the multiplex structure of networks among combatants based on their home arrondissement and guard division influenced combatants’ commitment to the and colleagues cause. McAdam ( McAdam 1988 ; Fernandez and McAdam 1988) employed network analysis to understand the forces that drove re In the line cruitment to the Mississippi Freedom Summer. with this body of research , the goal of this paper is to bring the analytic techniques of social network analysis to bear how social structure is invoked during concrete historical events which shap e regional economic trajectories. Specifically, it seeks to understand how the density of social ties in a community oes To what extent d affect the response of community actors when faced with acute economic crises . cris n the face of crisis? To what extent do density facilitate collective action i e s reveal underlying social fissures? contribute to the How does the intersection of various dimensions of network relationships ability — or inability — of a community to mount an adequate response? METHOD OLOGY methodological T he strategy employed in answering these questions draws on historical comparison, specifically the method of similarity (Skocpol and Somers ; Paige 1999; to generate grounded theory Locke 1995). Under ideal conditions, the method of similar ity dictates comparing two contexts that are similar with respect to all potential explanations except for (a) the variable one is trying to explain and (b) the proposed explanation for those outcomes (Mill 1843 [1976]). In reality, of course, it is never possible to achieve an exact match; many mitigating circumstances inevitably muddy the water. Comparative approaches, therefore, cannot “prove” a given finding. Nevertheless, when rigorously conducted, the to emerge which can be c providing explanations alternative plausible method allows insights ontrasted to compelling (if not conclusive) evidence in support of the claims being made. The key is careful case selection and a full accounting of the similarities and differences between cases. because they shared remarkable similarities with Youngstown were selected for analyses Allentown and respect to several potential alternative explanations which might also explain divergent regional model testing the rate at which outcomes. The cities were initially identified through a statistical average 46 of 7 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

10 five year period among the 38 “rust belt” metropolitan statistical areas - wages increased over a twenty (defined as cities with populations of less than 10 million residents in the eight states bordering the Great Lak es ) . Independent socio - economic measures included manufacturing as a percent of total - employment in 1975; change in manufacturing as a percent of employment, 1975 2000; percent decline 1987 in manufacturing 1977 - ; percent completing high 1983; percent decline in manufacturing 1983 - American 1975; school 1975; change in percent completing high school 1975 - 2000; percent African - percent change African - American 1975; number of Fortune 500 company headquarters 1975; and, log with y being e — ß+ population in 1975. The model took th e form of a standard linear regression — y = X - the log change in average incomes 1975 2000 (standardized across regions using regional Consumer Price Indexes as a measure of inflation). X contained the vector of independent variables. Predicted 2 hen plotted against actual outcomes. Allentown and =0.37) were t values from this model (r Youngstown emerged as outliers in this analysis with Allentown falling above predicted outcomes and Youngstown below. Tables 1a and 1b provide some very basic indications of the cities comparability show ing aggregate descriptive statistics concerning the population and industrial composition of both cities in 1950 which is the beginning of the period discussed in this paper. Beyond policy relevance, the location of these cities within the Ru st Belt offers a number of its obvious methodological advantages for comparative analysis . The circumstances that gave rise to the American Rust Belt — the westward expansion of the United States which coincided with the Second Industrial Revolution — mean that many com munities in the region have common economic, social and political 1 (Page and Walker 199 origins ) . Moreover, the centralized, oligopolistic structure of the industries which took hold there centered on steel and automobile production – ensures that vari ous shocks – which rocked core industries descended upon communities simultaneously. Both in terms of the timing of their development as centers of manufacturing, the nature of the manufacturing that took place within them, with respect to the narrative thr ust of their histories and finally with respect to various crises each faced within those histories, the cities share remarkable similarities. The core of the research is based on archival research and a careful reading of secondary historical accounts s urrounding the socio - political processes surrounding exogenous shocks which struck both regions simultaneously. However, t o gain objective insight into the nature of the key hypothesized on structure of inter locking directorates. An — networks data were collected — difference social interlocking directorate occurs when a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another organization (Mizruchi 1996). Board interlocks have long been a way of examining back to stemming from studies of community elite structures (Laumann, community networks reaching 46 of 8 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

11 Marsden and Galasckiewics 1977; Galaskiewicz 1979) and have been used to examine mechanisms of nd Schwartz corporate control (Burt 1980) financial institutions role in corporate governance (Mintz a 1981) and processes of isomorphic diffusion (Useem 1984; Davis 1991). Interlocking has also long been recognized as at least partially a location driven phenomenon (Kono, Palmer, Friedland and Zafonte 1998). As such, corporate board interlock s have been used as a means of capturing social cohesion among community elites (Mills 1956; Mace 1971) and, in the critical literature as a means of observing have also capitalist class integration (Domhoff 1967; Zeitlin 1974; Palmer 1983; Useem 1984). Interlocks been used to analyze the mechanisms by which business and government elites band together to generate economic and population growth becoming ‘urban growth machines’ (Logan and Molotch 1987). The role of board interlock data presented in this p those elements of social structure aper is to illuminate which may underlay observed differences between the two regions. The data were gathered in such a ically, way as to provide as much leverage as possible in deciphering questions concerning causality; specif they are gathered on relationships which existed prior to the outbreak of the crisis that are analyzed. causality; that would prove However, it is important to be clear that the network data are not sufficient to ion than is available. Nevertheless, in combination with a deep require finer grained data collect understanding of the historical processes which unfolded, the network data do help provide important insight into the fine grained nature of social structure and thus contribute to building t he paper’s overall argument concerning the importance of social structure in shaping regions’ outcomes. With this caveat in mind, then, we can now turn to a discussion of the empirical setting. ALLENTOWN AND YOUNGSTOWN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE n and Youngstown emerged as industrial centers during America’s Second Industrial Allentow Revolution. By the Second World War, both had reached near full employment producing goods from y the end of the 1950s, signs of steel, concrete and cloth destined for both civilian and military use. But b trouble were becoming apparent as companies in both places faced strategic decisions that were likely to have significant — consequences for the regions’ inhabitants. By the 1970s, those fears had negative — nufactures began closing operations in both cities. This section lays the groundwork come to pass as ma for the analyses presented in the second half of the paper by providing a brief history of the origins, growth, decline and subsequent divergence of the two cities. 46 of 9 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

12 O rigins In 174 3 the borough of Bethlehem on the south bank of the Lehigh , Moravian missionaries established , it had been joined by two settlements at Allentown and Easton bringing the 750 River Valley. By 1 based investors built the Lehigh - region’s population to about 15,000 residents. In 1829, Philadelphia Canal which served as a route for central Pennsylvania coal on its way to New York City and Philadelphia. The canal’s monopoly over transportation in and out of the Lehigh Valley spurred a g local businessmen to create an alternate rail route parallel to the canal. This line, movement amon which opened in 1846, became the core of the Lehigh Valley Railroad which would go on to become a major line linking the East Coast to the interior Great Lakes. The e stablishment of a small iron mill built in 1857 and located in South Bethlehem led the Lehigh Valley Railroad to locate the junction of its second line connecting the region directly to Philadelphia nearby. The mill was the seed from which the to become the second largest steel producer in the United States Bethlehem S teel Company grew (Folsom, 1982.; Vadasz, n.d.). followed a similar The Mahoning Valley — including the cities of Warren, Niles and Youngstown — developmental pattern. Settled by missionaries from Connecticut, Warren, located fifteen miles north of Youngstown, became the capital of the Connecticut Western Reserve in 1800. In 1802, a small iron mill hians. was erected in Poland, south of Youngstown, becoming the first blast furnace west of the Appalac In 1852, coal and limestone were discovered in the town of Struthers just south of Youngstown leading to the construction of several more substantial furnaces. Industrial activity and a favorable geographic ected the region to Cleveland and Pittsburgh, seventy miles in location attracted rail lines which conn either direction north and south, as well as to New York and Chicago, approximately 800 miles to its east on’s growing and west. Proximity to raw materials, the river and its favorable position on the nati network of railroads led to the establishment of several more iron mills which soon dotted the valley , Jenkins 1990). 1978 (Ingham - The discovery of the steel making process and Andrew Carnegie’s climb to become its most forceful advocate led to a period of consolidation throughout the industry which led many of Youngstown’s small iron mills to be converted into integrated steel mills. In 1894, Carnegie’s National Steel Company Works. The local sellers of the Ohio purchased the largest of Youngstown’s integrated mills, the Ohio Works reinvested the windfall from that sale to create two new steel companies in Youngstown. The first was quickly sold to Republic Steel making it the third largest steelmaker in the United States after Bethlehem St eel. Republic’s Youngstown Works were the company’s largest capacity mills leading the company to move its headquarters from New Jersey to Youngstown soon after the purchase. The other 46 of 10 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

13 locally owned and operated company, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, was founded in 1900 and remained fifth largest steel maker (Youngstown Sheet and Tube, 1950; Republic Steel 1944; Lynd as the nation’s 1987). Andrew Carnegie and U.S. Steel also influenced the trajectory of steelmaking in Allentown, but in a somewhat different way. By 1900, Bethlehem Steel’s original founders had grown the company to a respectable size. They were approached that year by one of Andrew Carnegie’s protégés, Charles nd made a foreman. Schwab. Schwab had been pulled from factory floor by Carnegie at the age of 18 a Within ten years, at the age 28, Schwab was in charge of the entire company; the leading light of a cadre of young men under Carnegie’s supervision. But a falling out in 1900 had led to Schwab's departure. In return for his resignatio n from the company, Schwab had received a substantial financial payout which he hoped to invest in a new venture that he could control according to the principles he developed at US st Coast; a region in which U.S. Steel. He settled on Bethlehem Steel because of its proximity to the Ea Steel had relatively little market share. Schwab quickly consolidated control over the company. By the end of the First World War, steel companies were the largest and most important employers in ning Valleys representing 19% and 28% of total employment respectively. both the Lehigh and Maho But in neither place was steel the region’s sole economic driver. Allentown, for instance, was just as well known for its concentration of cement companies including Lehigh Portland which appeared Cement among the Fortune 500 for many years (Table 2). Also, in 1900, the Mack brothers moved their truck assembly company from New York to Allentown. Mack Trucks became the dominant heavy truck ear earlier, in 1899, the Packard brothers founded both a car manufacturer in the United States. Just a y company as well as another firm which produced electric motors and harnesses located in the city of , but the wire harness Warren, north of Youngstown. The car company quickly moved to Detroit remained. Packard Electric became the largest employer in Warren although it too became a b usiness division of General Motors in 1932. Its success drew other electronics firms to the region including ungstown was also home to a large number of several major facilities owned by General Electric. Yo steel consuming companies including Mullins Manufacturing, a major munitions and equipment manufacturer. - driven prosperity drew large waves of migration to the cities in the 1910s and 1920s. Manufacturing Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Finns, Italians, Greeks, Irish and Syrians settled in working class Poles, neighborhoods such as the First and Sixth Wards of Allentown, South Bethlehem, and Youngstown’s Brier Hill. By the 1930s, labor organizers affiliated with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) were actively recruiting in these neighborhoods. The steelmakers had resisted such attempts 46 of 11 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

14 reaching back to the disastrous Homestead strike of 1892. But in 1937, U.S. Steel by far the largest — producer in the industry — surprised the industry when it announced that it would sign a union contract. But the next seven largest companies — including Bethlehem, Republic and Youngstown Sheet and Tube — refused thus touching off the “Little Steel” strike of 1937, one of th e first mass industrial actions in American history. Six pickets were killed in a violent clash with company security forces outside Youngstown Sheet and Tube mill during the walkout and ten more were killed at an altercation near Chicago. The workers ev entually capitulated, but the union maintained and eventually won its first contract from Bethlehem in 1942, followed weeks later by contracts at Republic and Sheet and Tube. steelmakers relented in part because of the coming of World War II during wh ich the companies The prospered producing steel for tanks, munitions and ships (Jenkins 1990; Bruno 1999; Fones - Wolf and Fones - Wolf 1998). Post - War Prosperity and Crisis By the 1950s, economic clouds had emerged to cast a shadow over both of the cities’ futu res. Initially, primary close proximity to were in the cities’ inland locations had been considered desirable because they — raw materials of the steelmaking process rich deposits of which were — coal, coke and limestone located in the nearby Appalachian moun tain range that lay between the two cities. But as early as the 1880s, steelmakers in both the Lehigh and Mahoning valleys had turned to others sources in order to ing. In enriched with more carbon and less phosphate necessary for high quality steel mak - find coal Youngstown, the new source of coal was the Mesabi range in the northern Great Lakes. Bethlehem Transporting the materials inland to Steel sourced its coal form company owned fields in Cuba. rials onto rail. New integrated mills located Allentown and Youngstown required transferring the mate directly on the coasts or on the shores of the Great Lakes were much easier to reach. Moreover, since shoreline facilities w ere generally built later, the companies were also able to incorporate logistical mo re efficient layouts and install newer equipment (Allen 1952). For years, these short comings had overcome due to the complicated set of pricing rules which had poin - taken hold in the industry. By the 1940s, prices were determined according to the “base t” formula in which costs were assessed according to their geographic distance from particular points of production rather than being allowed to float on according to market forces. Since Bethlehem and Youngstown were base points in the system, shipping c - osts were constrained to be lower than actual costs. However, communities alike. the system was eliminated in the 1950s causing concern among steelmakers and steel Locational in A erupting finally came to a head in the late 1970s and accumulated problems llentown and Youngstown in the summer of 1977 following negotiations between the United Steelworkers and major 46 of 12 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

15 steel industry employers. The union’s bargaining goals focused on securing wage and job guarantees in the face of the increasing market share of imported steel makers. The industry, which was in the midst of just such a downturn as negotiations were getting underway, was in a strong position to resist these xpected demands. However, an unanticipated surge of consumer demand in anticipation of what was e to be a lengthy strike changed the dynamic. The orders dried up steel producers’ reserves leaving the industry in a substantially weak bargaining position. With temporarily large profits showing on the in the Union’s favor. A settlement was reached in July. books, Federal mediators pushed a settlement However, the companies’ paper profits quickly dried up and by the fall, the creditors began openly expressing their nervousness (Lynd 1987; Buss and Vaughan 1987; Strohmeier 1986). ickly translated into restrictions on lines of credit that forced companies to respond. Nervousness qu Allentown was the first to feel the effects. Earlier that year, a severe winter storm in Western New York and a flood in central Pennsylvania had struck two of the Be thlehem Steel’s outlying facilitie that s generated large unforeseen financial burdens. As demand dropped in late August, the company’s leadership was compelled to take action. The company announced the closure of operations in western New York State and central Pennsylvania. The surprise came with the announcement of 800 layoffs collar headquarters workforce. Layoffs among production workers in - among the company’s white Allentown followed soon after. By 1983, half of the steel workforce in Allentown wa s on nearly 4,000 workers. The crisis erupted more violently in Youngstown. On unemployment — Youngstown, the parent of Youngstown Sheet and Tube, - September 17, 1977, the directors of the Lykes ldest of the company’s facilities in the announced the closure of the Campbell Works, the largest and o area. The decision immediately threw 5,000 workers onto the streets. A year later, Republic announced it too was closing down much of its Youngstown operations affecting another 2,000 workers. Relentlessly, 1979 brought yet another announcement from U.S. Steel that it was closing its Youngstown facilities. In total, nearly 10,000 steel workers had lost their jobs by 1983 (Lynd 1987; Buss and Vaughan 1987; Strohmeier 1986). The crisis, which lasted from 1977 to 1983, represented the most acute period in what had actually been - term decline in the importance of manufacturing to the two communities. From a peak of about a long yment from 50% of employment in 1950, manufacturing had already declined as a percent of total emplo around 35 percent in 1977 as shown in Figure 1. Between 1977 and 1983, however, the slope of the downward curve increased. By 2000, manufacturing accounted for just 16% of employment. 46 of 13 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

16 The Empirical Puzzle: Post Industrial Divergence - In a pr escient book on the competitiveness crisis facing the United States in the early 1980s, Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison (1982) argued that multi - pronged industrial policy was necessary to counter the dehumanizing effects of deindustrialization. In ad dition to rebuilding the social safety net and reforming labor and employment law they called for policies that would nurture “sunrise” industries such as electronics and bio - medical technology while addressing challenges facing “sunset” industries such as steel and automobiles. Their program for supporting new industry included fostering “’public - private partnerships” between the companies manufacturing projects for which there are potentially profitable growing markets and the government that ‘targets’ f inancial and regulatory policy to help those 6). As for easing sunset industries’ transformation, - companies grow” (Bluestone and Harrison 1982: 245 Bluestone and Harrison suggested transforming existing plants and equipment to new uses or, where the maintenance of old facilities which remain economically viable if only for lack of a possible, based response to reinvigorate them. community - Leaders of both Allentown and Youngstown were intimately aware with the choices that Bluestone and Harrison described . And, given the remarkable similarities surrounding the cities’ emergence and growth, one would expect the aftermath of their mutual economic crisis to have followed similar paths. that Allentown has in many ways However, this has not been what has transpired. Indeed, it is apparent embodied Bluestone and Harrison’s vision of a community that succeeded by striking a high road - strategy of facilitating the growth of “sunrise” industry and smoothing the transition from sunset ones. gstown have largely been frustrated. Similar efforts in Youn As the data in Figure 1 indicate manufacturing remains more prominent as a percent of total employment in both cities than in the rest of the United States and has actually increased in Youngstown 90s. Nevertheless, stark differences are apparent with respect to the since in the late 19 of kinds manufacturing that take place in them. In Youngstown, steel, auto manufacturing, cement, textiles and apparel continuing to account for about 81% of total income derived from manufacturing in the city (Figure 3). Allentown, on the other hand, seems to have shed its old industrial stock almost entirely. based income in 1970, today they - While these five industry segments comprised 77% of manufacturing sum to only 28%. 4 and 5 give an indication of what has taken their place. Figure 3 shows that knowledge Figures industries of the 1980 and 1990s including electronics, instruments and specialty - intensive growth chemicals have increased dramatically over this period of time in A llentown. Just as important, 46 of 14 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

17 Allentown has also experienced significant growth in ‘high - end’ service sector including finance, insurance and real estate services. As shown in Figure 4, in both cities, these jobs accounted for less than 5% of jobs in 1970 . But today the numbers in Allentown are close to national levels with one in six workers in the Lehigh Valley employed in the health or education sectors while employment in these sectors remains stuck at the same levels as before in Youngstown. Automob iles, transportation equipment and some specialty steelmaking represent the bulk of the city’s manufacturing base and the service industries which have emerged in Youngstown are concentrated at the lower end of the skill nt inroads in Youngstown in recent years. In the 1990s the region range. Call centers made significa became home to a cluster of private and publicly owned prisons. Finally, the differences in the cities’ economic trajectories have had an impact on standards of living. Figure 6 shows in come growth in the cities since the 1970s (adjusted for regional CPI with 1984=100). Allentown and Youngstown essentially tracked each other until around 1977 with both above the national average. Indeed, until the mid 1980s, wages were on average higher in Youngstown than in - Allentown. But by 2000, the cities had diverged significantly with average wages in Youngstown several thousand dollars below both the national average and Allentown’s. Thes e data generate to the empirical puzzle which this paper seeks to explain: how is it that two communities which shared such similar historical patterns of development and which faced such similar crises in the deindustrialization of the 1970s and 80s have take such different trajectories in the decades n? since the TWO CRITICAL HISTORICAL JUNCTURES presented suggests two key moments in which actors’ networks may have played The narrative just : (1) the response to the growing concerns in the 1950s outcomes important roles in shaping the cities’ g geographic logic of the industry away from inland locations and (2) the aftermath of around the shiftin the crisis which erupted in 1977. This section turns to the historical for clues as to how actors in the two structure may have shaped those responses. responded to these crisis and how underlying social cities Addressing the Future: Reinforce Basic Industry or Diversify in the 1950s y the 1950s, nearly a century of exploitation had depleted much of the regions’ coal reserves while the B ce that had made it possible to manufacture high quality steel using innovation of electric arc furna cheaper, lower quality varieties of coal had allowed steelmakers to source the key input of coal from civic leaders in Minnesota and the northeast coast of South America. The historical record shows that 46 of 15 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

18 both communities commissioned consultants reports during this time to look into these challenges and propose courses of action. In Youngstown, reports commissioned in 1941, 1947, and 1955 by the New Industries Committee of the Greater Yo ungstown Area Foundation, a group whose membership included several prominent members of the city’s economic elite. Similar report was commissioned separately by Bethlehem and Allentown Chambers of Commerce in 1951 and 1953 respectively. These reports su pplied leaders in both communities with remarkably similar information about the challenges they faced and suggested remarkably similar interventions in response. An academic paper on ions Youngstown’s economy published in 1952 is illustrative of their conclus . Noting that Youngstown production costs were approximately 55% higher than in Cleveland 70 miles to the northwest and 19% : more than Pittsburgh, the report offered the following In large measure, the future of [Youngstown and its surround area] ma y be determined by forces beyond their own control because local operations are only a small part of the total capacity of the major companies operating in this area. On the other hand, local interests have it within their own power to initiate actions wh ich may be the deciding factors in the continued industrial development of the region. There are at least three possible solutions for the problems faced... The first is to increase the size of the local market by the encouragement of steel fabrication in the Valley. The second is industrial diversification. This could be accomplished by encouraging the development of a variety of new industries in the region to take advantage of its latent possibilities. ely beyond the control of the Valley itself Finally, the third solution and one which is larg is a reduction in steel production costs. In 1955, a Pace Associates report commissioned by a group of business leaders in Youngstown, for instance, noted the lack of industrial space suitable for light manufac turing in the region and suggested the regional airport and an area near Youngstown State University as possible locations (Woodward, 1941; Pace Associates 1955). aneously struck in The cities’ diversification efforts were accelerated by a pair of labor strikes that simult both Allentown and Youngstown — and other steel towns nationwide — in 1956 and 1959. With the country coming out of a recession in 1956, the steel industry had recorded record profits. Bargaining between the industry and the unions neverth eless quickly bogged down. For the first time, all of the — including Bethlehem, Republic and Youngstown Sheet and Tube industry’s major employers — sat down together to reach a joint agreement. Although prepared to give substantial wage increases, the - - nies wanted wages locked in for a five compa week strike year period. The union refused and a three ensued. The settlement was favorable to the workers. Reached under pressure from the administration election that fal - of President Eisenhower who was facing re l, it called for a three year contract, pay increases and a twice yearly cost of living which brought the total increase in pay to approximately 30% - 46 of 16 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

19 over the life of the agreement. Smaller companies including Bethlehem, Sheet and Tube and — Republic — were fr ustrated by the outcome. Faced with increased labor costs, the companies felt compelled to pass the costs on to consumers. Increasingly, however, those consumers were turning to cheaper foreign produced steel as an alternative (Rogers 1952) local The massive s teel industry strikes of 1956 and 1959 catalyzed action in response on concerns about the viability of the steel industry in both places . In Youngstown, despite the mounting and apparent need for change, diversification - oriented elements of the cons ultants’ reports went unheeded (Walker 1981). Instead, with the backing of the region’s banks, steel companies and labor unions, Youngstown’s sought time U.S. Congressman, Michael Kirwan - — Congressional delegation — led by the city’s long uild a canal linking Lake Erie to the Ohio River Valley through Youngstown. The federal funding to b proposal came up for approval in the U.S. Congress in 1961 and received initial support. But it was d competition as well as by ultimately quashed by the intervention of rail roads interests which feare politicians in bordering states who questioned the benefits of the massively expensive proposal. In Allentown, the strike catalyzed a very different set of actions on the part of the community’s leadership. The first was a de cision on the part of Bethlehem Steel to construct a new research facility overlooking both the main steel plant and Lehigh University. This facility, the on South Mountain Research Labs, was the first of what would become a large contingent of corp Homer orate research and development laboratories located in the city. The stated goals of the company in doing so was to shift into higher value added production. The second and perhaps more lasting impact was the creation of the Lehigh Valley Industrial Park ;, then a new concept in economic development. A small group of - Airport and came up with a Bethlehem Easton investors eyed a large parcel of land near the Allentown - plan to develop it into an office park that could attract small to medium sized companies. In pitching the park to the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce, one of its investors, Frank Marcon, made the link to economic diversification explicit stating that it was “imperative that we go out for the greater diversification of our industry” (Stainbrook and Beste 2002). Responding to the Competitiveness Crisis When the crisis finally arrived in the fall of 1977 inflicting painful challenges for each of the cities it had already been inevitably touched off responses from civic leaders. Consistent with the patterns that established, the nature of these responses differed dramatically. In Youngstown, it was characterized by extreme fragmentation, infighting and ultimately inaction. In Allentown, a relatively unified coalition emerged and was able to tak e a number of key actions. 46 of 17 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

20 The first and most notable response to the crisis to emerge in Youngstown came from a group known as the Ecumenical Coalition. Shortly after the first mill closure announcement in 1977, workers and t a local union hall to express their rage as well as their fears. A resolution community activists gathered a was drafted under the title “Save the Mahoning Valley” which called for reforms to environmental and atement garnered over trade policies which workers pinned as the cause of the shut down. The st 100,000 signatures from area residents in just three days. Buses were hired to carry a large contingent of steelworkers from the area to deliver the statement to policymakers in Washington. At a meeting early on in this process, a m ember of the Youngstown Board of Education stood up and posed the question “Why don’t we all put up five thousand bucks and buy the damn place?” Led by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Youngstown, James Malone, and his Episcopalian counterpart, John Burt, the Ecumenical Coalition took up the suggestion and soon hired a staff to develop and lead just such an effort. They found Staunton Lynd, an attorney, former Yale professor and activist who had led training for the Mississippi Freedom Summer and then became a prominent and vocal opponent of the Vietnam War. Lynd contacted Gar Alperovitz, a Washington, DC based economist and an advocate of community ownership as a response to economic dislocation. Together, they crafted a plan based on the idea of e mills into community property by creating bank accounts into which community members turning th could deposit funds that would convert into stock once the new company was underway. The funds, he plants. There coalition however, could not cover the entire cost of purchasing and modernizing t (Lynd 1987; Feutchtman therefore also sought federal funds and loan guarantees of up to $500 million 1989) . The Coalition’s plan, however, failed to catch on among local politicians. In 1978, two additional groups emerged to advance competing proposals. One was led jointly by Youngstown Mayor J. Phillip Richley the Mahoning Valley Economic — and by Congressman Charles J. Carney. Their organization chnology had an agenda of creating a national center for steel te Development Corporation — development as well as potentially building a new steelmaking facility designed to support the city’s remaining steel production facilities. A third already existing agency, the Western Reserve Economic which called for federal funds to help modernize Development Agency, also contributed a plan remaining facilities. Finally, in 1980, yet a fourth group emerged to represent the interests of several of Youngstown’s affluent Southern suburbs. This group sought state funds to create a new office and industrial park out of the brownfield site of one of the region’s largest former steel mill sites. As the economic crisis in Youngstown worsened over the next several years, these various proposals and their — battled for attention and funds at the — backers state and federal level. Strikingly absent from the deliberations, however, were the leaders of region’s remaining major employers. In the end, with the 46 of 18 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

21 exception of the construction of a light industrial park at one the closed steel mills, none of the four proposals were ever fully or effectively implemented (Buss and Vaughn 1987). The crisis and the community’s response played out very different in Allentown. Early on, a group of the city’s most important economic leaders — mainly the CEOs of its rema ining major companies and banks gathered to address the crisis facing the region. As the crisis worsened in Allentown, this group — of leaders began crafting a response. Building on ties to labor and to local government, two proposals — rose to the top. The first involved an extension of a major highway Interstate 78 — which ran through the city. Improving existing portions of the road along with the construction of a new by - pass route through the city promised to ease transportation to New York City and its suburbs in Northern New y Jersey. Walter Dealtre , the owner of a local chain of tire outlets and a member of various corporate and civic boards in the area, lead an effort to push legislation that would ensure the construction took place. osal concerned a new initiative then being developed by the State of Pennsylvania The second prop known as the Ben Franklin Technology Partnership, which was meant to generate endogenous growth through partnerships between industry and research universities. Local busine ss leaders, including y Plosila at the time. Dealtre was a vocal , spoke with Walte r Plosila , the State’s Secretary of Commerce dogenous growth, an approach which contrasted with the more popular strategy of advocate of en Plosila creating investment incentives desi gned to attract large employers which , among others, derided private partnerships that would build on the - as “smokestack chasing.” The idea was to create public e new technologies state’s higher education infrastructure to support existing companies seeking to engag as well as to generate new ones. Initially, the Ben Franklin program’s creators planned on establishing three centers, one in Philadelphia, another in Pittsburgh and a third covering the rest of the state to be located at State College near Pennsylvania State University. The local group in Allentown, however, succeeded in advocating for a fourth located near Lehigh University. In addition to creating links called for a private between university researchers and the business community, the plan in Allentown venture capital fund which would be run in conjunction with the Ben Franklin center. The fund drew investments from several of the community’s companies and several wealthy individuals. and 1975 INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: 1950 a set of network To establish what differences, if any, exist between the cities’ networks I employ analytic techniques. As the preceding narrative makes clear, the cities shared remarkable parallels in terms of the timing and magnitude of their economic, social and political development. However, 46 of 19 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

22 despite the surface similarities between these two places, important differences existed with respect to the social and economic networks in which people and organizations were embedded. The section ta from two of the periods: 1950 and 1975. The section that follows builds on the findings presents da developed here to analyze their effect on the regions’ outcomes. organizational networks, board interlock data were gathered To ascertain the structure of inter - he list of actors considered for inclusion in the networks include the officers and directors of all major T companies, banks, and utilities as well as the officers of major universities, civic and cultural 3 Ties between these actors are derived from organizations, religious officials and government o fficials. 3 An interesting challenge arose with respect to coding data pertaining to prominent wives. The data, generally, were coded in such a way that any tw o individuals with the same first and last names are assumed to be the same individual. However, in the 1950 and 1975, many women took their husband’s first and last names in formal Bethlehem Steel CEO Eugene Grace is settings. For instance, the wife of Sheet and Tube CEO Frank Purnell or generally listed as Mrs. Frank Purnell and Mrs. Eugene Grace. As John Strohmeyer (1986) makes clear in his book y were on Bethlehem Steel’s rise and fall, these were not simply polite formalities. Wives’ roles in the communit taken quite seriously: “Conforming to the corporation’s mores does not end with the executive. His wife (very few women have achieved executive status at Bethlehem Steel) is all but given a script to follow. Her wardrobe, topics of , general appearance, drinking habits, skills as a hostess and certainly her devotion to her conversation husband’s career are carefully scrutinized... “The cloistered role for the wives back in the fifties and sixties reflected the cultural insecurity of the officials then the highest paid industrial managers in the country. Although most were college company’s graduates, the need to establish social credentials was paramount and the role models were eagerly sought. No woman sent tremors through ambitious steel famil ies more than that wife who came to the company with a Seven Sisters’ degree, a collection of heirloom silver and a lineage of old money. This type was e home free. She could do as she pleased, join the organizations she chose, and always be accepted at th highest company level. “For the majority of wives, however, such license was an unavailable luxury. For them membership partisan League of Women Voters was taboo (although they coveted and sought in even the non - enrollment in the Junior League). The L adies’ Auxiliary of St. Luke’s Hospital, church work, and family duties were the approved ways to use spare time. Later, during the seventies and assuredly in the eighties The right to pursue opportunities broadened to include working with youth services and health agencies. their own careers also became acceptable. Lucky was the organization that captured the attention of the steel chairman’s wife. A whole retinue of eager volunteers was sure to follow. When Marge Foy, wife of Chairman Lewis Foy who h eaded the company from 1974 to 1980, plunged into volunteer work with the American Cancer Society, the local chapter became the biggest fund raiser in the state. This was due in 1986 pp. 47 49) - part to the support she received from steel executives’ wives.” (Strohmeyer, This raises a difficult question for data collection with a direct bearing on the outcomes we seek to gauge: to treat wives in the data as serving in their own right or as extensions of their husband’s social obligations? I e latter when women are listed using their husband’s first and last name, the assumption is — have chosen th made that she is essentially acting in her husband’s capacity. Where women are listed under their own names, they are counted as separate individuals. A dummy var iable in the data, notes wherever a civic tie is attributable to a wife’s participation in this way are included in all analyses which follow. 46 of 20 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

23 two - mode affiliation data gathered on membership as officers and/or directors of all organizations considered to be in the boundaries of the cities’ networks. A tie is recorded between any two organiz ations when individuals affiliated with them serve together as officers or directors of the same organization. Ties are classified as either economic or civic depending on the organizations involved. The definition ic ones follows criteria first used by Laumann, Marsden and of “economic” organizations versus civ Galaskiewicz (1977). Economic organizations are those for which maximizing either shareholders’ or members’ profits are primary goals. Civic organizations are those for which the primary goal is to improve the community in some way. These criteria contain considerable ambiguities. In particular, the categorization of several organizations was unclear either because their goals are indefinite or because their emphasis has shifted over time. Uti lities, banks and unions could be considered both profit - maximizing and community oriented. Hospitals’ and universities’ goals, on the other hand, have - arguably changed over time with onset of managed care and the potential for profit derived from ed research in universities. The criteria in these cases rested on a judgment about likely sponsor intensions of those who would agree to serve on the boards of directors of such organizations. I included hospitals and universities in the civic category since me mbers of their boards of directors are more likely than not to view participation on those boards as primarily civic in nature. I included the banks, utilities and unions in the economic category since board members are more likely to sit on those boards for instrumental purposes having to do with either their own or their organizations’ interests. Two additional dimensions were taken into consideration with respect to defining the boundaries of the network: time and geography (Laumann, Marsden and Prens ky, 1992). Data were gathered at two 4 moments in time: 1950 and 1975. prior These years were chosen because they occur just the two to events offer some leverage with respect to the direction of causality. , therefore identified for analysis and, In term s of geography, the boundaries of the network were limited to organizations falling within the Warren, - Bethlehem - - Easton, Pennsylvania and Youngstown metropolitan statistical areas of Allentown Ohio. 1950 f the economic organizations included in the analysis Table 3 presents data describing characteristics o nine organizations that met examined in the two communities in 1950. In 1950, Youngstown had thirty - the criteria for inclusion while Allentown had 37. The data on first blush appear somewhat lopsided 4 Where necessary, data from the years either immediately before or after the target dates were substituted. 46 of 21 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

24 with respect to the sizes of organizations. This is primarily due to the fact that Bethlehem Steel at this time (and, indeed, subsequently) was about twice the size of the comparable companies in — Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Republic Steel. H Youngstown owever, combining these two organizations’ assets would yield a company of similar size to Bethlehem Steel. Indeed, including all of the steelmaking manufacturers in Youngstown would yield a steel industry that was somewhat larger — and therefore than Allentown’s. Thus for all intents and purposes, the cities’ roster of organizations can be considered roughly equivalent. — the universe on which this network is based Figures 7a and 7b present a graphical representation of the board interlocks among economic organizations in the two cities in 1950. Organizations are represented by dots next to the name of the organization. A line appears whenever at least one individual from an organization appears on the board ization. For example, if the CEO of Mahoning National of directors or as an officer in another organ Bank sits on the board of Youngstown Sheet and Tube, this appears as a tie between the two organizations. Several differences are immediately apparent. Youngstown’s graph (Figure 7b) is dominated by a densely connected group of organizations. In Allentown (Figure 7a), on the other hand, two distinct groups are evident. As Table 4 shows, the most central actor in Youngstown’s network i n 1950 was Union National Bank rlocks with other economic which had a total of 16 direct inte network on the left side of the organizations in the city. In Allentown, the most central organization in the graph is Bethlehem Steel with five interlocks. The central organization in the network on the right of Lehigh Coal and Navigation; the company founded in 1824 to build and administer the canal the graph is that ran alongside the Lehigh River which led to the region’s initial economic development which has six interlocks in the network. s, data were gathered on the membership of boards of directors and To establish the role of civic tie officers of civic and community organizations. Particular civic organizations were chosen for inclusion comparability across in such a way as to be as comprehensive as possible while at the same time offering the two cities; these are listed in Table 5. Figures 8a and 8b show the networks among organizations with the civic ties included. Again, important differences are apparent. Perusing the figure, it seems evident that civic ties incr ease the density of the network in Youngstown. Indeed, it is difficult from the graph to clearly discern any structure at all beyond the tight clump of ties existing in the center. A very ivic ties unites the disconnected parts different picture emerges from Allentown’s graph. First, adding c of the network which existed when only economic ties were included. Second, the network structure itself is quite orderly. Indeed, it seems apparent from the figure that civic organizations are linking wise disconnected economic elements of the network. across other 46 of 22 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

25 The data in Table 6 provide a statistically significant test of multiplexity in the two networks. The test is a modification of a procedure developed by Borgatti and Feld (1994) to measure the strength o f ties. is created in which a tie of 1 is recorded between The test has three steps. First, a proximity matrix A any organizations that share members (the number of ties between organizations is ignored for this A analysis). Second, the matrix is transpos ed ( A’ ) and then postmultiplied by . The data contained in the cells of the resulting matrix is a count of the number of times that each pair of rows in A has a 1 in AA’ the same column, indicating that the two actors are connected to the same third part y. Finally, the QAP technique is used to compute the Pearson correlation between while at the same time AA’ and A 5 assessing the significance of the correlation. The correlation is a statistically significant measure of the he network. This procedure was conducted on the data in three different mean strength of ties within t ways as indicated in the table. The data in the first column shows the strength of economic ties only. The second column presents a measure of ties derived from joint membership on civic organizations; that is, a tie in A is recorded wherever two economic organizations both send individuals to sit on the which indicates a tie between A board of the same civic organization. Thus a 1 appears in the cell in Mack Truck and Bethlehem Ste el if both organizations each have a representative on the United Way board of directors. Finally, the data in the last column present the strength of interorganizational ties when both economic and civic ties are included in the same matrix. The results show that, in Youngstown, ties are extremely strong — above 0.8 — for all three measures. In again, — Allentown, on the other hand, the ties are equally strong for both economic and civic networks around 0.8 networks are combined. These results but the strength of ties is cut in half when the two — represent an important finding. In Allentown, the civic ties among elites in 1950 connected actors who otherwise connected economically. In Youngstown, on the other hand, civic ties amplified were not actors who were already well connected. This suggests that civic organizations in the contacts among two cities played very different roles in terms of how social capital was organized and used. Specifically, perusing the complete network structure for Allentown in Fig ure 8a suggests that civic organizations may have played a role bridging among otherwise disconnected organizations in the community. Further which evidence of this is presented in Figure 9. The graph shows the eigenvector centrality scores — 5 The QAP procedure is used in order to overcome the obvious co linearity of the data which would lead to spurious - correlations significance measures using conventional techniques. The procedure compares the observed correlation om correlations generated according to the null hypothesis of no relationship between the with a distribution of rand p value is given by the proportion of random correlations that are as large as or larger than the observed - matrices. The ws and columns (together) of the input matrices, and then correlating the correlation. It does so by permuting the ro permuted matrix with the other data matrix. This process is repeated hundreds of times to build up a distribution of correlations under the null hypothesis. 46 of 23 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

26 provide an in dication of the degree to which organizations act as brokers bridging between other organizations while simultaneously “controlling” for the centrality of those organizations’ ties — of the top six civic organizations in each city. The raw centrality scores were transformed to add to 1.0. The graph indicates that, in Allentown, a few civic organizations — particularly the city’s two largest — colleges occupied very central positions within the network compared to the parallel group of civic organizations in You — the region’s two Red Cross chapters as well as the CEO dominated ngstown Greater Youngstown Foundation — which were largely undifferentiated from each other in terms of their bridging roles. 1975 Table 7 presents data describing characteristics of the econ omic organizations in the two communities in 1975. Youngstown had 27 organizations that met the criteria for inclusion while Allentown had 29. Again, mitigating for the differences between Bethlehem Steel and the larger but more fragmented steel industry in Youngstown, the networks are roughly equivalent. Figures 10a and 10b show the graphical representations of the board interlocks among economic organizations in 1975. Although it is less dense ll connected with several apparent than in 1950, Youngstown’s network (Figure 10b) remains we overlapping ties. Allentown’s economic network (Figure 10a) has become more connected with Pennsylvania Power and Light (the local power utility) serving to connect the two previously disconnected groups of companies. Turning next to the networks with civic ties included, the data in Figures 11a and 11b indicate a relatively similar pattern to the one that existed in 1950. Once again, Youngstown’s network is densely connected with numerous civic and economic organizati ons occupying a tight core of organizations at its center. Allentown’s network retains the relatively orderly structure. Table 8 shows the normalized centrality scores for the top 15 most central economic actors in each of the networks. Data from the mul tiplexity test prove out these observations. Again, while the ties are relatively strong in both cities when economic and civic ties are considered separately, the strength of ties declines when the two kinds of relationships are considered together in Al lentown but remain high in Youngstown. Finally, considering the brokerage of the top five civic organizations in each city (Figure 12) again shows important differences. In Allentown, a handful of organizations — specifically Muhlenberg College as well as the local chapter of the Boy Scouts — have much higher scores than other organizations while in that city’s most central civic organization the Youngstown Garden Club, the s — Youngstown none of out stand — Butler Art Institute and the Youngstown Chamber of Commerce . 46 of 24 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

27 DISCUSSION the historical comparison and network data just presented . Three salient facts can be concluded from First, despite the remarkable parallels that surrounded the cities’ emergence and growth as industrial centers, they have nevertheless diverged dramatically since the competitiveness crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Second, the political processes which emerged around at two key historical moments ly unified set of differed dramatically with the responses in Allentown coalescing around a relative community Balkanizing along the narrow interests of a powerful - oriented actions and Youngstown’s faction. Thus, despite having access to the same information and ideas, the implementation of those as very different. Finally, social networks exhibit significant ideas into policy and strategic action w differences with respect to configuration of multiplex economic and civic ties in the two cities. In connected Youngstown, the networks among economic organizations in the 1950s and 1970s are densely and, in particular, the multiplex economic and civic ties overlap indicating that actors’ civic relationships connected actors who were already well connected. In Allentown, economic ties were deeply s linked the relatively disconnected economic actors. fragmented. However, civic associational tie Furthermore, there are important differences between the cities with respect to the structural position of erges as particular civic organizations. In Youngstown, no one organization or set of organizations em particularly prominent. In Allentown, on the other hand, a few civic organizations emerged at various points as places where socially important actors gathered. are at least the communitarian approach to social inconsistent with findings h would suggest whic T he — that Youngstown — a community which possessed dense interconnections among the city’s core elite nalyzing the structure of civic ties in Instead, a should have been the more successful of the two. Allentown and the role they played in that co mmunity when compared to Youngstown would seem articular civic organizations emerge as playing key more in line with a social mobilization perspective: p roles connecting otherwise disconnected groups within the wider community. In some ways, these ations resemble the position the Medici assumed in Florence organiz as described by Padgett and Ansell : they were members of both of the “camps” or network cliques in the community, but were not (1993) either camp in particular. Yet the role these necessarily civic organizations played in connecting these of interested in the way the Medici’s seem to have been; indeed, their role seems largely - groups was not self to have emerged as an unintended consequence. 46 of 25 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

28 was vital in shaping the Allentown Intended or not, the role these few key civic organiz ations played cities’ post - industrial trajectory . In Allentown, serving on the boards of organizations like the Boy Scouts and local universities provided local economic actors who did not have intersecting economic oriented identities and values. - inte rests a forum in which to develop, enact and reproduce community This is suggested by the fact that much of the staff for both the most powerful organizations to have y Partnership whose members are CEOs of the Lehigh Valle — emerged from this period of uncertainty major area companies, as well as of the eventually independent Lehigh Valley Industrial Parks was recruited primarily from among the ranks of Boy Scout staff. In Youngstown, on the other hand, the data show the most prominent civic organization to be the Youngstown Garden Club. This organization was populated mainly by the wives of the business elite in Youngstown. Perusing the list of names it becomes clear that a associated with it and other prominent civic organizations in Youngstown, number of names are repeated: Wick, Campbell, Tod and Stambaugh; the names of the families that founded the original steel mills in the late 1850s; families that had settled in a small neighborhood near then turned their attention to founding and running the city’s prominent the center of Youngstown and banks (most importantly, Union National Bank) and elite cultural institutions such as the Butler Art Institute (located near the corner of Wick and Campbell Streets). Youngstown’s dense economic and social core was populated by the third and fourth By the 1970s, generations of the city’s original elite; relatively little “turnover” had occurred. Yet, it is also clear that by lies maintained their names and faces in the this time those ties had grown increasingly brittle. Fami community through such memberships, but their time and effort were spent outside of it. The implication is that, although the network indicates a strong and highly dense network, in fact the ties ttle. When, ultimately, those ties were tested during the crisis of the 1970s, the dense core were quite bri played no significant role in the formulating a response and, indeed, was largely destroyed by it. Instead, the network on its periphery. These elements of the the response was left for the disjointed elements of — network, however, lacked the history of interaction particularly through the forum of civic which existed in Allentown. By the time the crisis hit, it was too late to establish — associational ties those ties. The fragmented response that emerged was a reflection of the underlying weakness of the community’s social networks. CONCLUSION This paper has addressed one aspect of how social capital influences trajectories of economic change focusing mainly on how the configuration of economic and civic relationships influences collective action. It examined two well matched cities which simultaneously faced acute economic crisis in the late 46 of 26 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

29 1970s and early 1980s. The data show that these cities emarkably parallel histories — which shared r — have had very different experiences since those crises erupted. Allentown can be characterized as having adhered to the “high - road” which has involved the transformation of existing companies to make them al scale, attracting inward investment of high - skill jobs and the emergence of a competitive on a glob strong entrepreneurial sector. Youngstown, has suffered from an inability to develop on the other hand, a coherent approach to attracting inward investment, a lack of entrepr eneurship and the inability of major local employers to transform in ways that benefit the community. The results speak to the literature on social capital which highlights the importance of civic organizations. The data presented here suggest that civi c organizations play very different roles depending on the broader networks within which they are embedded. In Allentown, a few key organizations including the Boy Scouts and local universities became focal points in which key actors the most were able t interact toward addressing problems facing the community. In Youngstown, G arden organizations like the failed to in part play such a role lub and the Red Cross C central civic who interacted within them had a multitude of other social, econo because actors mic and civic opportunities to interact. Rather then being forums of interaction, then, these were simply places where social status was affirmed. In the end, this may have done more harm than good by strengthening the to assert narrow interests over those of the community more broadly. ability of a small group of actors Moreover, these ties ultimately proved extremely brittle leaving the community without strong leadership when it was absolutely necessary to have it. The rich picture painted here is nec essarily only a part of the overall tableau. Subsequent research will pursue the question of how embeddedness in these networks affected strategic choices at the s we organizational level and how those choices have helped to produce the community level outcome 6 Nevertheless, what it does suggest is that moments of conflict observe today. - ridden crisis have the potential to fundamentally alter the structure of social networks as the victor’s relationships come to the 6 n the strategic choices of organizations including large employers, universities and This research focuses o important civic associations. It is worth noting, for instance, that the severity of the shutdowns was not necessarily losures among the top twenty steel producers, Deily (1991) found predestined. In a multivariate analysis of plant c that plant and equipment age were the most significant factors driving closure decisions. Controlling for these and making the decision to close its older other factors, her analysis found that Bethlehem Steel held off longer in plants while Youngstown Sheet and Tube closed its facilities earlier; they represented the two extreme outliers in her analysis of major steel companies. In the case of Bethlehem Steel, the plant that stayed open lon ger than its ‘natural’ lifespan (thus driving the results) was the home plant in South Bethlehem. Conversely, in the case of Youngstown Sheet and Tube, the decision to close the facilities was surprising (and anomalous from the the fact that the company had invested in equipment upgrades within ten ysis) due to perspective of Diely’s anal years of the announcement. Indeed, this fact had lulled many in the community to believe that the company was likely to remain an active part of the city’s economic future. 46 of 27 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

30 fore and become entrenched in practice. The ebb and flow of utilization, combination and confrontation creates the unique patterns of relationships that are characteristic of a given community. configuration . This pa is key of social capital in shaping these dynamics also per Th is paper shows that the suggests an important element of what makes civic society vibrant: particular organizations must connect actors who are not otherwise well connected in order to serve as a focus of civic engagement. The anding how agency and social capital interact to explain results therefore move us closer to underst y highlighting the ways in which actors negotiate emergent social divergent socio b economic histories - orders and adapt them in the process. This has important implications for policy. Rather than s imply increasing the number of civic organizations or even participation in them, it suggests that what is most important is how social capital is deployed, called upon and realized by actors within communities eFilliipis 2001) in the context of emerging global (Bourdieu 1986; Emirbayer and Goodwim 1994; D realities communities are increasingly forced to confront. 46 of 28 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

31 REFERENCES Adler, P.S. and S.W. Kwon. 2002. “Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept” Academy of Management 27 (1): 17 - 40 Review and N. Thrift. 1994. “Globalization and Regional Development” Ponte 50(7 - 8): 67 - 81 Amin, A. Bluestone, B. and B. Harrison. 1982. The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry oks . New York: Basic Bo _____. 1992. Structural Holes: the Social Structure of Competition . Cambridge: Harvard University Press Borgatti , S.P. & S.L. Feld. 1994. “How to test Granovetter's theory of weak ties.” Connections 17 (1): 45 - 46 How Class Works in Youngstown Bruno, R. 1999. Steelworker Ally: . Ithaca: Cornell University Press Burt, R.S. 1980a. “ Models of Network Structure” - 141 1980 Annual Review of Sociology 6: 79 _____. 1980b. “Cooptive Corporate Actor Networks: A Reconsideration of Interlocking Directorates Involving American Manufacturing” Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (4): 557 582 1980 - ” Environment and Planning C Buss, T.F. & R.J. Vaughan. 1987. “Revitalizing the Mahoning valley - 446 5(4): 433 Castilla, E.J. 2003. “Networks of Venture Capital in Silivon Valley” International Journal of Technology Management 25 (1 - 2): 113 - 135 Crowley, J.E. and T. Skocpol. 2001. “The Rush to Organize: Explaining Asso ciational Formation in the United States, 1860s - 1920s” American Journal of Political Science Davis, GF. 1991. “Agents without Principles – the Spread of the Poison Pill Through Intercorporate Network” Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (4): 583 - 613 Closing Decisions — The Case of Steel” Rand Journal of Dei ly, ME. 1991. “Exit Strategies and Plant - Economics 22 (2): 250 - 263 DiFillippis, J. 2001. “The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development” Housing Policy Debate 12(4): 781 806 - 67. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice - Domhoff, G.W. 19 Who Rules America? Hall Dore, R. 1973. British Factory, Japanese Factory; the Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations . London: Allen & Unwin Fernandez, R.M. and D. McAdam. 1988. “Social Networks and So cial - Movements – Multiorganizational Fields and Recruitment to Mississippi Freedom Summer” Sociological Forum 3(3): 357 - 382 Foley M.W. and Edwards B. 1997. “The Paradox of Civil Society” Journal of Democracy 7 (3): 38 - 52 Folsom, B.W. 2001. Urban Capit alists – Entrepreneurs and City Growth in Pennsylvania’s Lackawanna - and Lehigh Regions 1800 1920 Fones - - Wolf. 1998. “Conversion at Bethlehem: Religion and Union Building in Wolf, E. & K. Fones - 395 - Steel: 1930 42” Labor History 39(4): 381 Galaskiewicz, J. - 1979. “Structure of Community Organizational Networks” Social Forces 57 (4): 1346 1364 Grabher, G & D. Stark. 1994. “Organizing Diversity: Evolutionary Theory, Network Analysis and Postocialism” Regional Studies 31(5): 533 - 544 Granovetter, M. 1973. American Journal of Sociology 78(6): 1360 - 1380 “The Strength of Weak Ties.” Gould, R.V. 1989. “Power and Social - Structure in Community Elites” Social Forces 68 (2): 531 - 552 _____. 1991. “Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871.” American 729 Sociological Review 56 (6): 716 - American Gulati R. and M. Gargiulo. 1999. “Where do Interorganizational Networks Come From?” 104 (5) 1439 Journal of Sociology 1493 - Ingham, J.N. 1978. n Elite The Iron Barrons: A Social Analysis of an American Urba . Steel Valley Klan: the Ku Klux Klan in Ohio’s Mahoning Valley Jenkins, W.D. 1990. 46 of 29 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

32 Kono, C., D. Palmer, R. Friedland & M. Zafonte. 1998. “ Lost in space: The geography of corporate 103 ( - 911 interlocking directorates” American Journal of Sociology 4): 863 Remaking the Italian Economy Locke, R.M. 1995. . Ithaca: Cornell University Press Mace, M.L. 1971. Directors: Myth and Reality . Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press Mills, C.W. 1956. The Power Elite . New York: Oxford University Press Putnam R. D. 1993: Princeton: Princeton Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy University Press _____. 2001: Bowling Alone New York: Simon and Schuster Romo, F.P. and M. Schwartz. 1995. “The Embeddedness of Business Decisions: The Migra tion of Manufacturing Plants in New York State: 1960 - 1985” American Sociological Review 60 (6): 874 - 907 Laumann, E.O., J. Galaskiewicz & P.V. Marsden. 1978. “Community Structure as Interorganizational Linkages” Annual Review of Sociology 4: 455 484 - ann, E.O, P.V. Marsden and J. Galaskiewicz. 1977. “Community Elite Influence Structures: Laum - 594 Extension of a Network Approach.” American Journal of Sociology 83(3): 631 - Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1992 Logan, J.R. and H.L. Molotch. 1987. Urban Fortun es: the Political Economy of Place . Berkeley: University of California Press Lynd, S. 1987. “The Geneis of the Idea of a Community Right to Industrial Property: Youngstown and Pittsburgh: 1977 - 1987” Labor History 74 (3): 926 - 958 Markusen, A. 1994. “Studying Regions by Studying Firms” Pr ofessional Geographer 46 (4): 477 - 490 Geography _____. 1996. “Sticky Places in Slippery Space: A Typology of Industrial Districts” Economic 72(3): 293 313. - McAdam, D. 1988. Freedom Summer rsity Press . New York: Oxford Unive On the Logic of the Moral Sciences - Mill, J.S. 1843 [1976]. “A System of Logic” . Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Mintz, B. and M. Schwartz. 1981. “Interlocking Directorates and Interest Group Formation” American - 869 Sociological Review 46(6): 851 Mizruchi, M.S. 1996. “What do Interlocks Do? An analysis, critique and assessment of research on interlocking directorates.” Padgett, J.F. and C.K. Ansell. 1991. “Robust Action and the Rust of the Medici: 1400 1434 ́ American - Journal of Sociology 98(6): 1259 - 1319 Palmer, D. 1983. “Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates and Intercorporate Coordination” Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1): 40 - 55 Pace Associates 1955 al Revolution in the Page, B. and R. Walker. 1991. “From Settlement to Fordism: the Agroindustri American Midwest” Economic Geography 315 67(4): 281 - Paige, J.M. 1999. “Conjuncture, Comparison and Conditional Theory in Macrosocial Inquiry” - 800 American Journal of Sociology 105 (3): 718 Portes, A. 1998. “Social Capital: Its Orig ins and Applications in Modern Sociology” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 1 - 24 Portes, A. and J. Sensenbrenner. 1993. “Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social 98(6): 1320 Determinants of Economic Action.” American Journal of Sociology - 1350 Pow Research in ell, W.W. 1990. “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization” Organizational Behavior 12: 295 - 336 Powell, W.W., K.W. Koput and L Smith - Doerr. 1996. “Interorganizational Collaboration and the Administrative Science Quarterly 41: Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology” 116 45 - . Harvard University, Baker Library. Republic Steel Corporation. 1944. Republic Goes to War Rogers, A. 1952. “The Iron and Steel Industry of the Mahoning and Shenango Valleys” Eco nomic Geogrphy 28(4): 331 342 - 46 of 30 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

33 Saxenian, A. 1990. “Regional Networks and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley” California Management Review 33 (1): 89 - 112 Skocpol, T. and M. Somers. 1980. “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry” Comparati ve Studies in Society and History 22(2): 174 - 197 Skocpol, T., M. Ganz and Z. Munson. 2000. “A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Volunteerism in the United States.” American Political Science Review 94(3): Staber, U. 2001a. “The Structure of Networks in Industrial Districts” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25: 537 - 552 Lehigh Valley Industrial Park: a 2002 Perspective . Bethlehem: Stainbrook, G.H. and P. Beste. 2002. Lehigh Valley Industrial Parks . Pittsburgh: University of Strohmeyer Crisis in Bethlehem: Big Steel’s Struggle to Survive , J. 1986. Pittsburgh Press The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Political Activity in the U.S. and Useem, M. 1984. U.K. New York: Oxford University Pres s Vadsz, TP. The History of an Industrial Community: Bethlehem Pennylvania . Ph.D. Diss, Claremont Graduate Walker, J.E. 1981. A City Tries to Save Itself: Youngstown, Ohio School Woodward, 1941 Woolcock, M. 1998. “Social Capital and Economic Development : Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Theory and Society Policy Framework.” 27 (2): 151 - 208 Woolcock, M. and D. Narayan. 2000. “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research 249 - and Policy” World Bank Research Observer 15 (2): 225 Youngs town Sheet and Tube Corporation. 1950. 50 Years of Steel: The Story of Youngstown Sheet . Harvard University, Baker Library and Tube Company: This is America lass” Zeitlin, M. 1974. “Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist C - American Journal of Sociology 79: 1073 1119 46 of 31 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

34 TABLES Table 1a. Demographic and Economic Descriptive Statistics: 1950 Allentown Youngstown Metropolitan Area Population 437,824 528,498 Population of Major Cities 208,728 218,186 Mean Years of Scho oling 8.9 9.7 High School Graduates 35% 29% Employed in Steel 20% 36% Median Income $ 3,360 $ 3,447 Table 1b. Industrial Composition: 1950 Allentown Youngstown 4% Agriculture 5% 0% 1% Mining 0% 5% Construction Manufacturing 55% 52% Tr ansportation 7% 7% 18% 17% Wholesale 2% 2% Finance 5% Business services 5% Professional Services 8% 7% Table 2. Companies in the 1954 Fortune 500 Allentown Youngstown Republic Steel (28) Bethlehem Steel (11) Mack Truck (258) Youngstown S heet and Tube (70) Mullins Manufacturing (485) Lehigh Portland Cement (429) 46 of 32 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

35 Table 3. Economic Organizations Descriptive Statistics (Standard Deviations): 1950 Allentown Youngstown No. of Economic 37 39 Organizations Average Age 54 (30.3) 41 (2 0.9) 5,789 (18,824) 5,635 (13,809) Employees 5,691 (14,490) Stockholders 7,782 (21,313) $58,128,721 $49,141,948 Income ($229,508,180) ($133,255,344) $40,836,463 $66,660,345 Assets ($202,947,043) ($88,762,391) 40% (0.21) Insiders 39% (0.16) Family 9% (0.15) 11% (0.19) No. of Officers 7 (3.1) 8 (4.2) No. of Directors 9 (2.9) 10 (3.7) Table 4. Economic Organizations: Normalized Eigenvector Centrality Allentown Youngstown Merchants National Bank 0.316 Union National Bank 0.200 Allentown National 0.199 Bessemer Securities Co. 0.310 Bank Bethlehem Steel Y. & Southern Railroad 0.196 0.270 Heilman Boiler Works 0.267 Mahoning National Bank 0.189 Allentown - Bethlehem Gas 0.261 Youngstown Steel Car 0.189 Y. Weldin Bethlehem National Bank 0.258 g and Eng. 0.188 Penn. Power & Light 0.236 Dollar Savings 0.185 Lehigh Valley Transit Co. Mullins Manufacturing 0.180 0.220 Lehigh Valley Trust 0.215 Niles Rolling Mill Co. 0.180 Traylor Engineering 0.215 Youngstown Steel Door 0.178 Lehigh Coal an 0.214 Commercial Shearing 0.176 d Navigation Air Products & Chemicals 0.208 Y. Sheet & Tube 0.176 Lehigh Portland Cement 0.200 Home Savings and Loan 0.175 46 of 33 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

36 Table 5. Civic Organizations: 1950 Allentown Youngstown f University Women Allentown Art Museum Am. Assn. o Allentown Chamber of Commerce American Legion Boy Scouts Allentown Hospital Allentown Old Home Week Cmt Butler Institute Allentown Redevelopment Auth. Chamber of Commerce Christ Mission Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce Bethlehem DAR Fresh Air Camp Bethlehem Library Goodwill Industries Greater Y. Area Foundation Bethlehem Municipal Band Junior League Bethlehem Recreation Cmsn. Mahoning V. Industrial Council Boys Club Red Cross Cedar Crest College Citizen's Urban Renewa l Rotary Community Chest Trumbull Library United Way Girls Clubs of Bethlehem Historic Bethlehem Y. Metro. Area Dev. Corp. Youngstown Area Heart Assn. Lehigh County Historical Society Muhlenberg College Youngstown Hospital Bd. ty Bar Northampton Coun Youngstown Hosp Women's Bd Youngstown Sesquicentennial Weisenberg Church Table 6. Multiplexity: 1950 Strength of Strength Economic Economic of Civic and civic n Obs combined Ties Ties 0.447 Allentown 0.886 0.88 54 2862 3162 .783 0.763 56 Youngstown 0 0.805 46 of 34 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

37 Table 7. Economic Organizations Descriptive Statistics (Standard Deviations): 1975 Allentown Youngstown 27 29 No. of Orgs Average Age 82 (38.2) 53 (28.9) 4,624 (8,672) 7,612 (25,284) Employees 13,222 (29,773. 9) 16,177 (42,184.1) Stockholders $428,859,577 $266,490,700 Income ($476,114,809) ($1,225,921,381) $458,602,696 $360,944,296 Assets ($586,611,174) ($982,824,681) Insiders 38% (0.23) 28% (0.19) Family 7% (0.14) 13% (0.21) 12 (7.0) No. of Officers 10 (4.8) No. of D 11 (5.3) 12 (6.7) irectors Table 8. Normalized Eigenvector Centrality of Economic Organizations: 1975 Allentown Youngstown First Valley Bank 0.456 Dollar Savings 0.319 Penn. Power and Light 0.361 Mahoning National Bank 0.312 0.300 Commercial Shearing 0.331 Bethlehem Steel Merchants National Bank GF Business Equipment 0.292 0.245 First Natl. Bank of Allentown 0.220 Union National Bank 0.286 Air Products 0.206 Home Savings and Loan 0.278 Union Bank & Trust of Beth. 0.190 Ajax Magnethermic 0.238 0.211 Bethlehem Acceptance Corp. 0.189 Youngstown R& D Corp Lykes AFL 0.173 CIO - Youngstown 0.211 - Emmaus Building and Loan 0.169 Ohio Edison 0.206 Lehigh County 0.168 Youngstown Steel Door 0.200 Mack Trucks 0.166 AFL - CIO 0.195 Youngstown Sheet & Tube State Legislatures 0.187 0.163 46 of 35 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

38 Table 9. Civic Organizations 1975 Youngstown Allentown Economic Development Mahoning County Medical 4H Allentown Art Museum Society Program Committee Allentown Human Emmaus Bicentennial Manpower Planning Council A. Phillip Randolph Institute ons Committee Relati Committee Emmaus General Allentown Planning Masons AAUW Commission Committee Masons Anniversa ry American Cancer Society Emmaus Girl scouts Allentown Public Library Committee Allentown Redevelopment Mayor's Human Relations Emmaus Interclub American Heart Association Authority Coordinating Committee Committee Allentown School Board Big Brother Red Cross Episcopal Trustees Historic Bethlehem Black People's Convention Research Club AAUW Hospital & Health Council of the Greater Lehigh Bethlehem Authority Boy Scouts Rotary Valley Bethlehem Citizens Joint Planning Commission United Appeal Boys Clubs Committee Northampton - Lehigh Bethlehem City Center L ehigh County Historical Butler Institute United Negro College Fund Society Authority Lehigh County Industrial United Way Campaign Canfield Fair Bethlehem DAR Development Authority Committee Bethlehem Housing Urban Catholic Charities Lehigh University League Authority Western Reserve Economic Lehigh Valley Committee Chamber of Commerce Bethlehem Library Development Agency Bethlehem Planning Western Reserve Transit Lehigh Northampton - Community Corporation Commission Authority Airport Authority Bethlehem Redev elopment Community Development Northampton Lehigh - Youngstown Club Transportation Authority Authority Council Community Improvement Bethlehem Schools Muhlenberg College Youngstown Garden Club Corporation Northampton County Bar Blue Shield Advisory Board Youngstown Hospital Coterie Club Association Northampton County Youngstown Hospital Council of Churches Boy Scouts Association Hospital Authority Citizen's Urban Renewal Northampton County Youngsto wn Hospital East Side Civic Club Enterprise Republican Committee Women's Board Youngstown Planning and Public Committee for the Ecumenical Council Community Chest Humanities Administration Committee Youngstown Society for the Goodwill Industries Easton Authority United Way Blind Wo men's Club of Easton Public Library Youngstown State University Kiwanis Bethlehem Mahoning Citizens Action YMCA Easton Schools Coalition 46 of 36 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

39 Table 10. Multiplexity: 1975 Strength of Strength Economic Economic of Civic and civic Obs n combined Ties Ties Allentown 0 .871 0.532 0.301 54 2862 0.619 0.724 0.771 3162 56 Youngstown 46 of 37 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

40 FIGURES Figure 1a. Illustration of Network A Figure 1. Manufacturing as a Percent of Total Employment 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1987 1996 1995 1992 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1947 1950 1954 1958 1960 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1994 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 Allentown United States Youngstown Figure 2. Steel, Autos, Textiles, Apparel and Cement as a percent of manufacturing employment: 1969 - 2000 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1997 1999 1985 1983 1989 1991 1993 1981 1995 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1987 United States Youngstown Allentown 46 of 38 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

41 Figure 4. Electronics, Instruments and Specialty Chemicals as a percent of manufacturing employment: 1969 - 2000 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1981 1997 1995 1993 1991 1987 1985 1989 1999 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1983 Youngstown United States Allentown Figure 5. Finance, Insurance and Real Estate as a percent of total employment 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 1997 1999 1985 1991 1983 1987 1993 1989 1995 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 Youngstown Allentown United States 46 of 39 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

42 r: 1969 - 2000 Figure 6. Average Earnings per Worke ) (adjusted for regional CPI, 1984 dollars $34,000 $32,000 $30,000 $28,000 $26,000 $24,000 $22,000 $20,000 1971 2001 1993 1989 1995 1997 1999 1969 1991 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 Youngstown Allentown US 46 of 40 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

43 Figure 7a. Economic Interlocks: Allentown 1950 Figure 7b. Economic Interlocks: Youngstown 1950 41 of Safford – Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown Page 46

44 Figure 8a. Allentown: Economic an d Civic Organizations, 1950 Figure 8b. Youngstown Economic and Civic Ties: 1950 Civic Economic Organizations Organizations 42 of 46 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

45 Figure 9. Civic Organizations Normalized Centrality: 1950 0.07 Allentown Lehigh University 0.06 0.023 0.06 Muhlenberg Col lege Historic Bethlehem 0.01 0.007 Citizen's Urban Renewal 0.05 Boys Club 0.004 Allentown Hospital 0.001 Community Chest 0.001 0.04 Youngstown Red Cross Trumbull 0.025 0.03 Red Cross Mahoning 0.023 Gtr. Y. Area Foundation 0.016 0.005 Youngstown Chamber 0.02 0.002 Christ Mission Fresh Air Camp 0.002 0.01 0.002 Goodwill Industries 0 4 2 5 7 3 6 1 Youngstown Allentown 46 of 43 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

46 Figure 10a. Allentown Economic Organization Interlocks: 1975 Figure 10b. Youngstown Economic Organization Interlocks Page 44 46 Safford – Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown of

47 11a. Economic and Civic Organizations: Allentown, 1975 Figure Figure 11b. Economic and Civic Organizations: Youngstown, 1975 Civic Economic Organizations Organizations 46 of 45 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – Safford

48 Figure 12. Civic Organizations Normalized Centrality: 1975 0.35 Allentow n 0.3 0.297 Muhlenberg College 0.25 Boy Scouts 0.138 Lehigh County 0.103 0.2 Historical Society 0.018 Allentown Planning 0.017 Bethlehem Citizen's 0.01 0.15 Youngstown 0.1 Youngstown Garden Club 0.021 Butler Institute 0.016 0.05 Chamber of Commerce 0.015 0.009 United Appe al 0.008 0 United Way 1 6 5 2 4 3 0.008 Youngstown Hospital Youngstown Allentown 46 Safford 46 Page Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown – of

Related documents

Annual Energy Review 2011   Released September 2012

Annual Energy Review 2011 Released September 2012

D / E I A - 0 3 8 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) E | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 1 2 O 1 1 0 2 w e i v e R y g r A n n u a l E n e . r a / v o g e a i e . w w w

More info »
Software Design Specification

Software Design Specification

Software Design Specification Z-Wave Application Command Class Specification SDS13781 Document No.: Version: 11 The document describes the Z-Wave Command Classes and associated Commands Description: u...

More info »
Monthly Energy Review – April 2019

Monthly Energy Review – April 2019

DOE/EIA ‐ 0035( 2019/4 ) April 2019 Monthly Energy Review www.eia.gov/mer

More info »
untitled

untitled

G:\M\16\LEWIGA\LEWIGA_014.XML ... (Original Signature of Member) TH CONGRESS 116 ESSION 1 ST S H. R. ll To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modernize and improve the Internal Revenue Service...

More info »
ab2222

ab2222

COMMUNITIES THAT RELY ON A CONTAMINATED GROUNDWATER SOURCE FOR DRINKING WATER STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE January 201 3

More info »
Skills volume 1 (eng)  full v12  eBook (04 11 2013)

Skills volume 1 (eng) full v12 eBook (04 11 2013)

OECD Skills Outlook 2013 FirSt rESultS FrOm thE SurvEy OF ADult SkillS 2013

More info »
A/HRC/39/CRP.2 in Word

A/HRC/39/CRP.2 in Word

/HRC/39/CRP.2 A September 2018 17 only English Human Rights Council Thirty ninth session - 10 28 September 2018 – Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Report of t...

More info »
U.S. Mexico Canada Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors

U.S. Mexico Canada Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors

United States International Trade Commission U.S. -Mexico -Canada Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors April 2019 Publication Number: 4889 Investigation ...

More info »
cfpb hmda regulation c redline 2019 proposed amendments

cfpb hmda regulation c redline 2019 proposed amendments

DC 20552 1700 G NW , Washington, Street May 2, 2019 Unofficial Redline of the HMDA NPRM’s Proposed Amendments Regulation C to On May 2, 2019 , the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau) issued ...

More info »
UNSCEAR 2008 Report Vol.I

UNSCEAR 2008 Report Vol.I

This publication contains: VOLUME I: SOURCES SOURCES AND EFFECTS Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to the General Assembly OF IONIZING RADIATION Scie...

More info »
vol9 organic ligands

vol9 organic ligands

C HERMODYNAMICS HEMICAL T OMPOUNDS AND C OMPLEXES OF OF C U, Np, Pu, Am, Tc, Se, Ni and Zr O ELECTED WITH RGANIC L IGANDS S Wolfgang Hummel (Chairman) Laboratory for Waste Management Paul Scherrer Ins...

More info »
s 2017 81

s 2017 81

S /2017/81 United Nations Security Council Distr.: General 31 January 2017 Original: English Letter dated 27 January 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security ...

More info »
Microsoft Word   2018 PIA Handbook Final.docx

Microsoft Word 2018 PIA Handbook Final.docx

THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT Handbook 2018

More info »
Pro Tools Reference Guide

Pro Tools Reference Guide

® Pro Tools Reference Guide Version 9.0

More info »
FY 2019 PB Green Book

FY 2019 PB Green Book

NATIONAL BUDGET DEFENSE ESTIMATES FOR FY 201 9 OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRE TA RY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) APRIL 201 8

More info »
Are institutions informed about news?

Are institutions informed about news?

287 – Journal of Financial Economics 117 (2015) 249 ScienceDirect Contents lists available at Journal of Financial Economics www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec journal homepage: $ Are institutions informed ...

More info »
RIE Tenant List By Docket Number

RIE Tenant List By Docket Number

SCRIE TENANTS LIST ~ By Docket Number ~ Borough of Bronx SCRIE in the last year; it includes tenants that have a lease expiration date equal or who have received • This report displays information on ...

More info »
BUFR TABLES RELATIVE TO SECTION 3

BUFR TABLES RELATIVE TO SECTION 3

15 May 2019 – Ver. 32.0.0 FM 94 BUFR, FM 95 CREX BUFR TABLES RELATIVE TO SECTION 3 BUFR/CREX Table B Classification of elements – X Comments F Class 00 BUFR/CREX table entries 0 Identification Identif...

More info »
Little”

Little”

The Economic Benefits of More Fully Utilizing Advanced 2 201 M ay Practice Registered Nurses in the Provision of Health An Analysis of Local and Statewide Effects on Care in Texas: Business Activity T...

More info »