The 9/11 Commission Report


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2 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 A Declaration of War 47 2.1 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.2 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.3 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 2.5 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 From the Old Terrorism to the New: 3.1 The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ... in the Law Enforcement Community 73 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.3 3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v

3 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi 3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 . . . and in the White House 98 3.6 3.7 . . . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.1 Crisis: August 1998 115 4.2 Diplomacy 121 4.3 4.4 Covert Action 126 Searching for Fresh Options 134 4.5 5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145 5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145 5.2 The “Planes Operation” 153 5.3 The Hamburg Contingent 160 A Money Trail? 169 5.4 6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT 174 The Millennium Crisis 174 6.1 6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182 The Attack on the USS 6.3 190 Cole 6.4 Change and Continuity 198 The New Administration’s Approach 203 6.5 7. THE ATTACK LOOMS 215 7.1 First Arrivals in California 215 7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223 7.3 Assembling the Teams 231 7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics 241 8. “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 254 The Summer of Threat 254 8.1 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266 8.2 9. HEROISM AND HORROR 278 9.1 Preparedness as of September 11 278 9.2 September 11, 2001 285 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311 9.3 9.4 Analysis 315 vi

4 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vii 10. WARTIME 325 10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 326 10.2 Planning for War 330 10.3 “Phase Two” and the Question of Iraq 334 11. FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT 339 11.1 Imagination 339 11.2 Policy 348 11.3 Capabilities 350 11.4 Management 353 12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY 361 12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361 12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 365 12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374 12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383 13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399 13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400 13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407 13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416 13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress 419 13.5 Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States 423 Appendix A: Common Abbreviations 429 431 Appendix B:Table of Names 439 Appendix C: Commission Hearings Notes 449 vii

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6 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page ix LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES p. 15 FAA Air Traffic Control Centers Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector p. 15 Flight paths and timelines p. 32–33 Usama Bin Ladin p. 49 Map of Afghanistan p. 64 p. 148 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed p. 238–239 The 9/11 hijackers p. 279 The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11 The World Trade Center radio repeater system p. 284 The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with deviations p. 288 The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines p. 312 Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77 p. 313 p. 313 American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania Unity of effort in managing intelligence p. 413 ix

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8 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page xi COMMISSION MEMBERS Lee H. Hamilton Thomas H. Kean chair vice chair Bob Kerrey Richard Ben-Veniste John F. Lehman Fred F. Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick Timothy J. Roemer Slade Gorton James R.Thompson

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10 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page xiii COMMISSION STAFF Executive Director Philip Zelikow, Deputy Executive Director Christopher A. Kojm, General Counsel Daniel Marcus, Joanne M. Accolla Samuel M.W. Caspersen Counsel Staff Assistant Melissa A. Coffey Alexis Albion Professional Staff Member Staff Assistant Scott H. Allan, Jr. Lance Cole Counsel Consultant Marquittia L. Coleman John A. Azzarello Staff Assistant Counsel Marco A. Cordero Caroline Barnes Professional Staff Member Professional Staff Member Rajesh De Warren Bass Professional Staff Member Counsel George W. Delgrosso Ann M. Bennett Information Control Officer Investigator Mark S. Bittinger Gerald L. Dillingham Professional Staff Member Professional Staff Member Thomas E. Dowling Madeleine Blot Counsel Professional Staff Member Steven M. Dunne Antwion M. Blount Deputy General Counsel Systems Engineer Thomas R. Eldridge Sam Brinkley Counsel Professional Staff Member Alice Falk Geoffrey Scott Brown Editor Research Assistant Daniel Byman John J. Farmer, Jr. Senior Counsel & Team Leader Professional Staff Member Alvin S. Felzenberg Dianna Campagna Deputy for Communications Manager of Operations xiii

11 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xiv COMMISSION STAFF xiv Lorry M. Fenner Daniel J. Leopold Professional Staff Member Staff Assistant Sarah Webb Linden Susan Ginsburg Senior Counsel & Team Leader Professional Staff Member Douglas J. MacEachin T. Graham Giusti Security Officer Professional Staff Member & Team Leader Ernest R. May Nicole Marie Grandrimo Professional Staff Member Senior Adviser Joseph McBride Douglas N. Greenburg Intern Counsel James Miller Barbara A. Grewe Professional Staff Member Senior Counsel, Special Projects Kelly Moore Elinore Flynn Hartz Professional Staff Member Family Liaison Leonard R. Hawley Charles M. Pereira Professional Staff Member Professional Staff Member L. Christine Healey John Raidt Professional Staff Member Senior Counsel & Team Leader John Roth Karen Heitkotter Senior Counsel & Team Leader Executive Secretary Peter Rundlet Walter T. Hempel II Counsel Professional Staff Member Lloyd D. Salvetti C. Michael Hurley Professional Staff Member Senior Counsel & Team Leader Kevin J. Scheid Dana J. Hyde Professional Staff Member & Team Leader Counsel John W. Ivicic Kevin Shaeffer Professional Staff Member Security Officer Tracy J. Shycoff Michael N. Jacobson Deputy for Administration & Finance Counsel Hunter W. Jamerson Dietrich L. Snell Senior Counsel & Team Leader Intern Bonnie D. Jenkins Jonathan DeWees Stull Counsel Communications Assistant Reginald F. Johnson Lisa Marie Sullivan Staff Assistant Staff Assistant R.William Johnstone Quinn John Tamm, Jr. Professional Staff Member Professional Staff Member Stephanie L. Kaplan Catharine S.Taylor Staff Assistant Special Assistant & Managing Editor Miles L. Kara, Sr. Yoel Tobin Professional Staff Member Counsel Emily Landis Walker Janice L. Kephart Counsel Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison Hyon Kim Garth Wermter Counsel Senior IT Consultant Serena B.Wille Katarzyna Kozaczuk Counsel Financial Assistant Peter Yerkes Gordon Nathaniel Lederman Public Affairs Assistant Counsel xiv

12 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xv PREFACE We present the narrative of this report and the recommendations that flow from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Ten Commissioners—five Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nation’s capital at a time of great partisan division—have come together to present this report without dissent. We have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suf- fering in the history of the United States.The nation was unprepared. How did this happen, and how can we avoid such tragedy again? To answer these questions, the Congress and the President created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002). Our mandate was sweeping. The law directed us to investigate “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,” includ- ing those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplo- macy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the Commission. In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate. We have sought to be independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan. From the outset, we have been committed to share as much of our investi- gation as we can with the American people.To that end, we held 19 days of hearings and took public testimony from 160 witnesses. xv

13 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xvi PREFACE xvi Our aim has not been to assign individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned. We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal.The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim world by demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward us and our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and polit- ical pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no dis- Collateral damage is not in its tinction between military and civilian targets. lexicon. We learned that the institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it.We learned of fault lines within our government—between foreign and domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies.We learned of the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront different dangers. At the outset of our work, we said we were looking backward in order to look forward. We hope that the terrible losses chronicled in this report can create something positive—an America that is safer, stronger, and wiser. That September day, we came together as a nation. The test before us is to sustain that unity of purpose and meet the challenges now confronting us. We need to design a balanced strategy for the long haul, to attack terror- ists and prevent their ranks from swelling while at the same time protecting our country against future attacks. We have been forced to think about the way our government is organized. The massive departments and agencies that prevailed in the great struggles of the twentieth century must work together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national power can be combined. Congress needs dramatic change as well to strengthen oversight and focus accountability. As we complete our final report, we want to begin by thanking our fel- low Commissioners, whose dedication to this task has been profound. We have reasoned together over every page, and the report has benefited from this remarkable dialogue. We want to express our considerable respect for the intellect and judgment of our colleagues, as well as our great affection for them. We want to thank the Commission staff.The dedicated professional staff, headed by Philip Zelikow, has contributed innumerable hours to the com- pletion of this report, setting aside other important endeavors to take on this

14 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xvii xvii PREFACE all-consuming assignment. They have conducted the exacting investigative work upon which the Commission has built.They have given good advice, and faithfully carried out our guidance.They have been superb. We thank the Congress and the President. Executive branch agencies have searched records and produced a multitude of documents for us. We thank officials, past and present, who were generous with their time and provided us with insight. The PENTTBOM team at the FBI, the Director’s Review Group at the CIA, and Inspectors General at the Department of Justice and the CIA provided great assistance. We owe a huge debt to their investigative labors, painstaking attention to detail, and readiness to share what they have learned. We have built on the work of several previous Commissions, and we thank the Congressional Joint Inquiry, whose fine work helped us get started.We thank the City of New York for assistance with documents and witnesses, and the Government Printing Office and W.W. Norton & Company for helping to get this report to the broad public. We conclude this list of thanks by coming full circle:We thank the fam- ilies of 9/11, whose persistence and dedication helped create the Commission. They have been with us each step of the way, as partners and witnesses.They know better than any of us the importance of the work we have undertaken. We want to note what we have done, and not done.We have endeavored to provide the most complete account we can of the events of September 11, what happened and why.This final report is only a summary of what we have done, citing only a fraction of the sources we have consulted. But in an event of this scale, touching so many issues and organizations, we are conscious of our limits.We have not interviewed every knowledgeable per- son or found every relevant piece of paper. New information inevitably will come to light. We present this report as a foundation for a better under- standing of a landmark in the history of our nation. We have listened to scores of overwhelming personal tragedies and astounding acts of heroism and bravery. We have examined the staggering impact of the events of 9/11 on the American people and their amazing resilience and courage as they fought back.We have admired their determi- nation to do their best to prevent another tragedy while preparing to respond if it becomes necessary. We emerge from this investigation with enormous sympathy for the victims and their loved ones, and with enhanced respect for the American people. We recognize the formidable challenges that lie ahead. We also approach the task of recommendations with humility. We have

15 Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xviii xviii PREFACE made a limited number of them. We decided consciously to focus on rec- ommendations we believe to be most important, whose implementation can make the greatest difference. We came into this process with strong opinions about what would work. All of us have had to pause, reflect, and sometimes change our minds as we studied these problems and considered the views of others.We hope our report will encourage our fellow citizens to study, reflect—and act. Thomas H. Kean chair Lee H. Hamilton vice chair

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18 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 1 1 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in Tuesday, September 11, 2001, the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to Arlington,Vir- ginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River, the United States Congress was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run. For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey.Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine. 1.1 INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS Boarding the Flights . M A . Boston:American 11 and United 175. Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00 1 flight from Portland to Boston’s Logan International Airport. When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a com- puterized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passen- ger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta’s selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the air- 2 craft. This did not hinder Atta’s plans. Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later, Atta appar- ently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was at 3 It would be another terminal at Logan Airport.They spoke for three minutes. their final conversation. 1

19 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 2 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 2 Between 6:45 and 7:40, Atta and Omari, along with Satam al Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in and boarded American Airlines 4 Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles.The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45. In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in for United Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles.A couple of Shehhi’s colleagues were obviously unused to travel; according to the United ticket agent, they had trouble understanding the standard security questions, and she had to go over 5 Their flight was them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers. scheduled to depart at 8:00. The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta and his colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were operated by Globe Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different terminal, the single checkpoint through which passengers for United 175 passed was con- trolled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to per- 6 form the screening. In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers would have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun. Anyone who might have set off that detector would have been screened with a hand wand—a procedure requiring the screener to identify the metal item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the hijackers’ carry-on belongings.The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons and 7 None of other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight. the checkpoint supervisors recalled the hijackers or reported anything suspi- 8 cious regarding their screening. While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of his hijacking team—Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri—were selected in Boston.Their selection affected only the handling of their checked bags, not their screening at the checkpoint. All five men cleared the checkpoint and made their way to the gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took their seats in business class (seats 8D, 8G, and 10B, respectively). The Shehri brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A, Waleed in 2B), in the first- class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircraft 9 pushed back from the gate at 7:40. Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, boarded Shehri in 2B, Shehhi United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, Ghamdi in 9D).Their aircraft in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C, and Ahmed al 10 pushed back from the gate just before 8:00. Washington Dulles:American 77. Hundreds of miles southwest of Boston, at Dulles International Airport in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., five more men were preparing to take their early morning flight.At 7:15, a pair

20 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 3 3 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles.Within the next 20 minutes, they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf 11 al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi. Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by CAPPS.The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by the air- line’s customer service representative at the check-in counter. He did so because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could he understand English, and because the agent found both of the passengers to be suspicious.The only consequence of their selection was that their checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded 12 the aircraft. All five hijackers passed through the Main Terminal’s west security screen- ing checkpoint; United Airlines, which was the responsible air carrier, had 13 The checkpoint featured contracted out the work to Argenbright Security. closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the security checkpoint. Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the X-ray machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alarm, and they were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not trigger the alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off, a 14 screener wanded him. He passed this inspection. About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Han- jour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the Main Terminal’s west checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the metal detector. A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi cleared the Hazmi metal detector and was permitted through; Nawaf al set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that he was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket, 15 clipped to its rim. When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal Aviation Admin- istration (FAA) later investigated these security screening operations, the screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary.They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees. We asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the qual- ity of the screener’s work to have been “marginal at best.” The screener should have “resolved” what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and 16 Hazmi, it was clear that he did not. At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and were seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B (first class),

21 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 4 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 4 soon followed.The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the 17 first-class cabin. Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Newark: United 93. Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles.Two checked bags; two did checked bag was screened for explo- not. Haznawi was selected by CAPPS. His 18 sives and then loaded on the plane. The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. Like the check- Boston, it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance so there is no points in documentary evidence to indicate when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint, what alarms may have been triggered, or what security procedures were administered.The FAA interviewed the screeners later; none recalled any- 19 thing unusual or suspicious. The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class section. Jarrah was in seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi 20 in 6B. 21 The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights. They were plan- ning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided missiles, loaded M . on the morning of Tuesday, A . with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 September 11, 2001, they had defeated all the security layers that America’s civil aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking. The Hijacking of American 11 American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from Boston to Los Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767. It carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants. Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (includ- 22 ing the five terrorists). The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet.All communications and flight profile data were normal. About this time the “Fasten Seatbelt” sign would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun 23 preparing for cabin service. At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA’s air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmis- sion,ATC instructed the aircraft’s pilots to climb to 35,000 feet.That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or 24 shortly thereafter.

22 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 5 5 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong and Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the hijacking happened. As it began, some of the hijackers—most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who were seated in row 2 in first class—stabbed the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing for cabin 25 service. We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit; FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight. Ong speculated that they had “jammed their way” in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed the flight attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to open the cock- pit door, or to lure the captain or first officer out of the cockpit. Or the flight 26 attendants may just have been in their way. At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta—the only terrorist on board trained to fly a jet—would have moved to the cockpit from his business-class seat, possibly accompanied by Omari.As this was happening, passenger Daniel Lewin, who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed by one of the hijackers—probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated directly behind Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an officer in the Israeli military. He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not real- 27 izing that another was sitting behind him. The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper spray, or some other irritant in the first-class cabin, in order to force the passengers and 28 flight attendants toward the rear of the plane.They claimed they had a bomb. About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency aboard the flight.This was the first of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took action outside the scope of their training, which emphasized that in a hijacking, they were to communicate with the cockpit crew.The emergency call lasted approximately 25 minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about events 29 taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground. At 8:19, Ong reported:“The cockpit is not answering, somebody’s stabbed in business class—and I think there’s Mace—that we can’t breathe—I don’t know, I think we’re getting hijacked.” She then told of the stabbings of the two 30 flight attendants. At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong’s call in North Car- olina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth,Texas, reaching Craig Marquis, the manager on duty. Marquis soon real- ized this was an emergency and instructed the airline’s dispatcher responsible for the flight to contact the cockpit. At 8:23, the dispatcher tried unsuccessfully to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air traffic control specialist in Amer- ican’s operations center contacted the FAA’s Boston Air Traffic Control Center 31 about the flight. The center was already aware of the problem.

23 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 6 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 6 Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because just before 8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the passengers. The microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers said, “Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.”Air traffic controllers heard the trans- mission; Ong did not.The hijackers probably did not know how to operate the cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus inadvertently broad- cast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin public-address channel. Also at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy Sweeney got through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but was cut off after she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight.Three minutes later, Sweeney was reconnected to the office and began relaying updates to the manager, 32 Michael Woodward. At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was “flying erratically.”A minute later, Flight 11 turned south. American also began getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of 33 those who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit. Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed—one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen while the other’s wounds seemed minor; a doctor had been requested; the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit. Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as they 34 could to people on the ground. At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically again. Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle East- erners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English.The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and 35 she did not know how.The aircraft was in a rapid descent. At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first class. Other flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong 36 and Sweeney were reporting the events. At 8:41, in American’s operations center, a colleague told Marquis that the air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and “think he’s [American 11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in New York City].They’re moving every- body out of the way.They seem to have him on a primary radar.They seem to 37 think that he is descending.” At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward,“Something is wrong.We are in a rapid descent . . . we are all over the place.”Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney responded:“We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way

24 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 7 7 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” too low.” Seconds later she said,“Oh my God we are way too low.” The phone 38 call ended. At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade 39 All on board, along with an unknown number of Center in New York City. people in the tower, were killed instantly. The Hijacking of United 175 United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 8:00. Cap- tain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the Boeing 767, 40 which had seven flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight. United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan Airport at 8:14. By 8:33, it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet.The 41 flight attendants would have begun their cabin service. The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked, and at 8:42 the United 175 flight crew completed their r eport on a “suspicious transmis- sion” overheard from another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 11) 42 This was United 175’s last communication with the ground. just after takeoff. The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46.They used knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace (reported by one passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger). They stabbed members of the flight crew (reported by a flight attendant and one pas- senger). Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant).The eye- witness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the plane, from passengers originally seated further forward in the cabin, a sign that passengers and perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. Given similari- ties to American 11 in hijacker seating and in eyewitness reports of tactics and weapons, as well as the contact between the presumed team leaders, Atta and 43 Shehhi, we believe the tactics were similar on both flights. The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on United 175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minute later New York air traffic controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully try- 44 ing to contact it. At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson received a phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His son told him: “I think they’ve taken over the cockpit—An attendant has been stabbed— and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making es. Call United Airlines—Tell them it’s Flight 175, Boston to LA.” strange mov Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and relayed what he 45 had heard. Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in San Francisco, reaching Marc Policastro.The flight attendant reported that the flight had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and

25 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 8 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 8 the hijackers were probably flying the plane.The call lasted about two minutes, after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsuccessfully to contact the 46 flight. 47 At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City. At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call his wife, Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine that the plane had been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flight had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking about storm- 48 ing the cockpit to take control of the plane the hijackers. away from At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter: It’s getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to have knives and Mace—They said they have a bomb—It’s getting very bad on the plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The plane is making jerky movements—I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane—I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building—Don’t worry, Dad— 49 If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God. The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just before it cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so did Louise Sweeney. 50 Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center. At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World 51 All on board, along with an unknown number of people in Trade Center. the tower, were killed instantly. The Hijacking of American 77 American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted by Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois. There were four 52 flight attendants. On September 11, the flight carried 58 passengers. American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20. At 8:46, the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service last routine radio com- 77 transmitted its would have begun. At 8:51, American munication.The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 11 and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger) and moved all the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike the earlier flights, the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters. Finally, a pas- senger reported that an announcement had been made by the “pilot” that the plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any stab- bings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace, though both witnesses began 53 the flight in the first-class cabin.

26 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 9 9 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. Two minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost.The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeat- edly tried and failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also 54 tried, without success. At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned that communications had been lost with American 77.This was now the sec- ond American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground. Shortly before 9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American headquarters concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing a plane,Amer- 55 ican Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide. At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy May 56 and her husband promptly did so. At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She fur- ther indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a minute into the conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully 57 to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft. Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband again. She reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do.Ted Olson asked for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast.The Solicitor Gen- eral then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impending 58 crash. At that point, the second call was cut off. At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at 59 At 9:32, con- 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. trollers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was later deter- mined to have been Flight 77. At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Ser- vice of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House.Amer- ican 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington.The hijacker pilot then 60 advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.

27 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 10 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 10 At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, travel- 61 All on board, as well as many civil- ing at approximately 530 miles per hour. ian and military personnel in the building, were killed. The Battle for United 93 At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport bound for San Francisco.The aircraft was piloted by Cap- tain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were five flight atten- dants. Thirty-seven passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the plane. Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757’s takeoff was delayed 62 because of the airport’s typically heavy morning traffic. The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at 7:45 (Amer- ican 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10 (American 77). Three of the flights had actually taken off within 10 to 15 minutes of their planned departure times. United 93 would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes away from the gate.When it left the ground at 8:42, the flight was after pulling 63 running more than 25 minutes late. As United 93 left Newark, the flight’s crew members were unaware of the hijacking of American 11. Around 9:00, the FAA, American, and United were facing the staggering realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at 64 At the same the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft. time, Boston Center realized that a message transmitted just before 8:25 by the 65 hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase,“We have some planes.” No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with multiple hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere in the world in more than 30 years, and never in the United States.As news of the hijackings filtered through the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to their leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might 66 be at risk. United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness of that hijacking began to spread after 8:51. American 77 was hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. By 9:00, FAA and airline officials began to comprehend that attack- ers were going after multiple aircraft. American Airlines’ nationwide ground stop between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines ground stop. FAA controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked the first two hijackings, requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command Center “get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for the cockpit.”There is no evidence that Hern- don took such action. Boston Center immediately began speculating about other aircraft that might be in danger, leading them to worry about a transcon- tinental flight—Delta 1989—that in fact was not hijacked. At 9:19, the FAA’s New England regional office called Herndon and asked that Cleveland Cen- 67 ter advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit security.

28 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 11 11 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air carriers’ respon- sibility to notify their planes of security problems. One senior FAA air traffic control manager said that it was simply not the FAA’s place to order the air- 68 We believe such statements do not reflect an lines what to tell their pilots. adequate appreciation of the FAA’s responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation. The airlines bore responsibility, too.They were facing an escalating number of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous reports about other flights, as well as a continuing lack of vital information from the FAA about the hijacked flights.We found no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any cock- pit warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. United’s first decisive action to notify its airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not come until 9:19, when a United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitting warnings to his 16 transcontinental flights: “Beware any cockpit intrusion— Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center.” One of the flights that received the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still responsible for his other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning message was not transmitted to 69 Flight 93 until 9:23. By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93’s cross-country trip pro- ceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Head- ing, speed, and altitude ran according to plan. At 9:24, Ballinger’s warning to United 93 was received in the cockpit.Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, Jason Dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement: “Ed, confirm latest mssg 70 plz—Jason.” The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA’s air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring “Mayday” amid the sounds of a physical strug- gle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.The captain or first officer could be heard shout- 71 ing:“Hey get out of here—get out of here—get out of here.” On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93—33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers manip- 72 ulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ee other commercial flights on 9/11 oper- The terrorists who hijacked thr cockpit takeover within 30 min- ated in five-man teams.They initiated their utes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after hijackers. The operative likely intended to only four takeoff and there were round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida’s Orlando International Air- 73 port in August.

29 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 12 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 12 Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA personnel.We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijack- ers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them.We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not 74 have been visible to the passengers. At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the follow- ing announcement to the passengers of Flight 93:“Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting.We have a bomb on board. So, sit.” The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then 75 instructed the plane’s autopilot to turn the aircraft around and head east. The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the 76 hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her. Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from GTE airphones and cellular phones. These calls between family, friends, and colleagues took place until the end of the flight and provided those on the ground with firsthand accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into the World 77 Trade Center. At 9:39, the FAA’s Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard a second announcement indicating that there was a bomb on board, that the 78 While plane was returning to the airport, and that they should remain seated. it apparently was not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those on Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta earlier, may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know how to operate the radio and the intercom. To our knowledge none of them had ever flown an actual airliner before. At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that pas- sengers were making calls but did not seem to care. It is quite possible Jarrah knew of the success of the assault on the World Trade Center. He could have learned of this from messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning of cockpit intrusion and telling of the New York attacks. But even without them, he would cer- tainly have understood that the attacks on the World Trade Center would already have unfolded, given Flight 93’s tardy departure from Newark. If Jar- rah did know that the passengers were making calls, it might not have occurred to him that they were certain to learn what had happened in New York, thereby 79 defeating his attempts at deception.

30 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 13 13 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” At least ten passengers and two crew members shared vital information with understood the plane family, friends, colleagues, or others on the ground. All wielded knives and claimed to have had been hijacked. They said the hijackers a bomb.The hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passen- 80 gers to the back of the aircraft. Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or dead—possibly the captain and first 81 officer. One caller reported that a flight attendant had been killed. One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought the hijack- ers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically ask- ing her caller whether the hijackers had guns.The passenger replied that he did not see one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was found at the aircraft’s crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time.We believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the pas- 82 sengers fought back. Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers’ claim of having a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. One of the passengers who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real. Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs were 83 probably fake. During at least five of the passengers’ phone calls, information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew mem- bers to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided, 84 and acted. At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows:“Everyone’s running up to first class. I’ve got to 85 go. Bye.” The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened to the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sus- 86 tained. In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt

31 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 14 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 14 the assault.The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts, 87 and breaking glasses and plates. At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane. off?” A Five seconds later, Jarrah asked,“Is that it? Shall we finish it hijacker responded,“No. Not yet.When they all come, we finish it off.” The sounds of fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said,“In the cockpit. If we don’t we’ll die!” Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, “Roll it!” Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said,“Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!” He then asked another hijacker in the cock- pit,“Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” to which the other replied,“Yes, 88 put it in it, and pull it down.” The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said,“Pull it down! Pull it down!”The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them.The air- plane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right.The air- plane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting “Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.”With the sounds of the passenger counter- attack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Penn- sylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes’ flying time from 89 Washington, D.C. Jarrah’s objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the American Republic, the Capitol or the White House. He was defeated by the alerted, unarmed passengers of United 93. 1.2 IMPROVISING A HOMELAND DEFENSE The FAA and NORAD On 9/11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).The most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air traf- fic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred in 90 In order to understand how the two agencies interacted eight years 1993. later, we will review their missions, command and control structures, and work- ing relationship on the morning of 9/11. As of September 11, 2001, the FAA was man- FAA Mission and Structure. dated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation. From an air traffic controller’s perspective, that meant maintaining a safe distance between 91 airborne aircraft. . Control Centers Many controllers work at the FAA’s 22 Air Route Traffic They are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center , located in Herndon,

32 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 15 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 15 BOSTON Boston Center New York Center Cleveland NEW Center NEW YORK CLEVELAND YORK Indianapolis Center INDIANAPOLIS FAA Air Traffic Control Centers Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) Otis NORAD Air Force Headquarters Base Langley Air Force Base Continental Aerospace Command Region (CONR) Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector Graphics courtesy of ESRI

33 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 16 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 16 Virginia, which oversees daily traffic flow within the entire airspace system. FAA headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management of the located at FAA headquarters National Airspace System.The Operations Center 92 receives notifications of incidents, including accidents and hijackings. FAA Control Centers often receive information and make operational deci- sions independently of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by the centers in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indi- anapolis. Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going on across the system.What Boston knew was not necessarily known by centers in New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis, or for that matter by the Command Center in Herndon or by FAA headquarters in Washington. Controllers track airliners such as the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 primar- ily by watching the data from a signal emitted by each aircraft’s transponder equipment.Those four planes, like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet, were 93 required to emit a unique transponder signal while in flight. On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft.With its transponder off, it is possible, though more difficult, to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. But unlike transponder data, primary radar returns do not show the aircraft’s identity and altitude. Con- trollers at centers rely so heavily on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns on their radar scopes. But they can change the configuration of their scopes so they can see primary radar returns.They did this 94 on 9/11 when the transponder signals for three of the aircraft disappeared. Before 9/11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commer- cial aircraft’s transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of the controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course.Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts—which 95 could take five minutes or more—were tried and had failed. NORAD Mission and Structure. NORAD is a binational command estab- lished in 1958 between the United States and Canada. Its mission was, and is, to defend the airspace of North America and protect the continent.That mis- sion does not distinguish between internal and external threats; but because threat, it came to define its job as NORAD was created to counter the Soviet 96 defending against external attacks. The threat of Soviet bombers diminished significantly as the Cold War ended, and the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of 26. Some within the Pentagon argued in the 1990s that the alert sites

34 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 17 17 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve their mission, members of the air defense community advocated the importance of air sovereignty against emerging “asymmetric threats” to the United States: drug smuggling, “non-state and state-sponsored terrorists,” and the proliferation of weapons of 97 mass destruction and ballistic missile technology. NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other threats were identified during the late 1990s, including terrorists’ use of aircraft as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commer- cial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise plan- ners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors.The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States—and using 98 them as guided missiles—was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11. Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats, by 9/11 there were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter air- craft on alert. This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD 99 was not postured adequately to protect the United States. In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sector s. On 9/11, all the hijacked aircraft were in NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (also known as NEADS), which is based in Rome, New York. That morning NEADS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters: Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force 100 Other facilities, not on “alert,” would need time Base in Hampton,Virginia. to arm the fighters and organize crews. NEADS reported to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The FAA and NORAD had developed proto- Interagency Collaboration. cols for working together in the event of a hijacking.As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of gov- 101 ernment. FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by “squawking” a transponder code of “7500”—the universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the 102 director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate. If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on

35 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 18 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 18 duty to contact the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to pro- vide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted 103 down NORAD’s chain of command. The NMCC would keep the FAA hijack coordinator up to date and help the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military. NORAD would receive tracking information for the hijacked aircraft either from joint use radar or from the relevant FAA air traffic control facility. Every attempt would be made to 104 have the hijacked aircraft squawk 7500 to help NORAD track it. The protocols did not contemplate an intercept.They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet,“vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft,” where it could perform its mission to monitor the aircraft’s 105 flight path. In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that • the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear; • there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and • the hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile. On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. American Airlines Flight 11 FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane’s failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he 106 kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8:21,American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft.The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking.The supervisor instructed the controller to follow stan- 107 dard procedures for handling a “no radio” aircraft.

36 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 19 19 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish commu- nication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector’s airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look 108 for American 11. At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11: American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay. We are returning to the airport. The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the spe- cific words “we have some planes.” The next transmission came seconds later: American 11: Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make 109 any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet. The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking. He alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him. He redoubled his efforts to ascertain the flight’s altitude. Because the controller didn’t understand the initial transmission, the manager of Boston Center instructed his quality assurance specialist to “pull the tape” of the radio transmission, listen to it 110 closely, and report back. Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Cen- ter managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 had been hijacked.At 8:28, Boston Center called the Command Center in Herndon to advise that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York Center’s airspace. By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8:32, the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters.The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter 111 escort. The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconfer- ence between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that Boston 112 Center could help the others understand what was happening. At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11: Nobody move please.We are going back to the airport. American 11: 113 Don’t try to make any stupid moves.

37 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 20 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 20 In the succeeding minutes, controllers were attempting to ascertain the alti- 114 tude of the southbound flight. Boston Center did not follow the Military Notification and Response. protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of com- mand. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the ini- tiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA’s Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 115 had been hijacked: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a FAA: problem here.We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out. NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise? 116 No, this is not an exercise, not a test. FAA: NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New Y ork City. 117 The air defense of Amer ica began with this call. At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First Air Force and NORAD’s Continental Region. Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to “go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get authorities 118 later.” General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base. But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information:“I don’t know where I’m scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.” Because the hijackers had turned off the plane’s transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World 119 Trade Center. Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to “hold as needed.” From 9:09 120 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.

38 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 21 21 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes’ notice before impact was the 121 most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings. United Airlines Flight 175 FAA Awareness. One of the last transmissions from United Airlines Flight 175 is, in retrospect, chilling. By 8:40, controllers at the FAA’s New York Cen- ter were seeking information on American 11. At approximately 8:42, shortly after entering New York Center’s airspace, the pilot of United 175 broke in with the following transmission: UAL 175: New York UAL 175 heavy. UAL 175 go ahead. FAA: UAL 175: Yeah.We figured we’d wait to go to your center.Ah, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded like someone keyed the mikes and said ah everyone ah stay in your seats. 122 Oh, okay. I’ll pass that along over here. FAA: Minutes later, United 175 turned southwest without clearance from air traf- fic control. At 8:47, seconds after the impact of American 11, United 175’s transponder code changed, and then changed again. These changes were not noticed for several minutes, however, because the same New York Center con- American troller was assigned to both 11 and United 175.The controller knew American 11 was hijacked; he was focused on searching for it after the aircraft 123 disappeared at 8:46. At 8:48, while the controller was still trying to locate American 11, a New York Center manager provided the following report on a Command Center teleconference about American 11: Manager, New York Center: Okay. This is New York Center. We’re watching the airplane. I also had conversation with American Air- lines, and they’ve told us that they believe that one of their stew- ardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft, and that’s all the information they have 124 right now. The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed. At 8:51, the controller noticed the transponder change from United 175 and tried to contact the aircraft.There was no response. Beginning at 8:52, the con- troller made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still no response. The controller checked his radio equipment and contacted another

39 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 22 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 22 controller at 8:53, saying that “we may have a hijack” and that he could not 125 find the aircraft. Another commercial aircraft in the vicinity then radioed in with “reports over the radio of a commuter plane hitting the World Trade Center.”The con- troller spent the next several minutes handing off the other flights on his scope to other controllers and moving aircraft out of the way of the unidentified air- craft (believed to be United 175) as it moved southwest and then turned 126 northeast toward New York City. At about 8:55, the controller in charge notified a New York Center man- ager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked.The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that they were discussing a hijacked aircraft (presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed.At 8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another New 127 York controller “we might have a hijack over here, two of them.” Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager from New York Center told the Com- mand Center in Herndon: We have several situations going on here. It’s Manager, New York Center: escalating big, big time.We need to get the military involved with us. . . . We’re, we’re involved with something else, we have other aircraft that 128 may have a similar situation going on here. The “other aircraft” referred to by New York Center was United 175. Evi- dence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second crash that there had been a second hijacking. While the Command Center was told about this “other aircraft” at 9:01, New York Center contacted New York terminal approach control and asked for help in locating United 175. Terminal: I got somebody who keeps coasting but it looks like he’s going into one of the small airports down there. Center: Hold on a second. I’m trying to bring him up here and get you—There he is right there. Hold on. Terminal: Got him just out of 9,500—9,000 now. Center: Do you know who he is? We’re just, we just we don’t know who he is.We’re just pick- Terminal: ing him up now. Alright. Heads up man, it looks like another one com- Center (at 9:02): 129 ing in. The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the radar data termi- nated over Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, United 175 crashed into the South 130 Tower.

40 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 23 23 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” Meanwhile, a manager from Boston Center reported that they had deci- phered what they had heard in one of the first hijacker transmissions from American 11: Hey . . . you still there? Boston Center: New England Region: Yes, I am. . . . as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy Boston Center: said that “we have planes.” Now, I don’t know if it was because it was the accent, or if there’s more than one, but I’m gonna, I’m gonna reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick. Okay? Appreciate it. New England Region: They have what? Unidentified Female Voice: Boston Center: Planes, as in plural. Boston Center: It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center. New England Region: There’s another aircraft? A second one just hit the Trade Center. Boston Center: New England Region: Okay. Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the 131 military real quick on this. Boston Center immediately advised the New England Region that it was going to stop all departures at airports under its control. At 9:05, Boston Cen- ter confirmed for both the FAA Command Center and the New England Region that the hijackers aboard American 11 said “we have planes .” At the same time, New York Center declared “ATC zero”—meaning that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through New York Center’s 132 airspace until further notice. Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed its con- trollers to inform all aircraft in its airspace of the events in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide.We have found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this request 133 or issued any type of cockpit security alert. The first indication that the Military Notification and Response. NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03.The notice came at 134 about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower. By 9:08, the mission crew commander at NEADS learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military airspace away from Manhattan: Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: This is what I foresee that we probably need to do. We need to talk to FAA. We need to tell ’em if

41 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 24 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 24 this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put ’em over Manhattan. That’s best thing, that’s the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA.Tell ’em if there’s more out there, which we don’t know, let’s get ’em over Manhattan.At least we got some kind 135 of play. The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis the city, the fighters exited their hold- away from fighters were about 115 miles ing pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan. They arrived at 9:25 and 136 established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were con- cerned about refueling. NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Lan- gley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup.The Langley 137 NORAD had no indication fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09. that any other plane had been hijacked. American Airlines Flight 77 FAA Awareness. American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south.Two minutes later, it disappeared completely 138 from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight. The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turn- ing to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane’s projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary tar- gets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the air- line.Again there was nothing.At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electri- 139 cal or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone. Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed.At 9:08, Indianapolis Cen- ter asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft.The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this infor- 140 mation to FAA headquarters at 9:24. By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed.A dis- cussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Com- mand Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facili- ties, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77.They feared

42 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 25 25 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquar- 141 ters of the situation. The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to inves- tigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers 142 The reasons are technical, arising from the way the at Indianapolis Center. software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar cov- erage where American 77 was flying. According to the radar reconstruction,American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known posi- tion.The target remained in Indianapolis Center’s airspace for another six min- utes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center’s airspace at 9:10.As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and south- west along the flight’s projected path, not east—where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to 143 turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77. In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped look- ing for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, nei- ther it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding cen- ters to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 144 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C. By 9:25, FAA’s Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center.They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England American 11 had said “we have some Region knew that a hijacker on board planes.” Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount.A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a “nationwide ground stop.” While this was being discussed by executives at FAA 145 headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25. The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for pri- mary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed” and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service. The aircraft’s identity or type was 146 unknown. Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C- 130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to iden-

43 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 26 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 26 tify and follow the suspicious aircraft.The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to the control tower:“looks like that aircraft crashed into the 147 Pentagon sir.” Military Notification and Response. NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed: American 11. At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still FAA: in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington. Okay. American 11 is still in the air? NEADS: FAA: Yes. NEADS: On its way towards Washington? FAA: That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower.That’s the latest report we have. Okay. NEADS: FAA: I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south. Okay. So American 11 isn’t the hijack at all then, right? NEADS: No, he is a hijack. FAA: He—American 11 is a hijack? NEADS: Yes. FAA: And he’s heading into Washington? NEADS: 148 Yes.This could be a third aircraft. FAA: The mention of a “third aircraft” was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Wash- ington that American 11 was still airborne.We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information. The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported to the NEADS battle commander: Okay, uh, American Airlines is Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now.And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find 149 him.

44 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 27 27 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23:“Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area. . . . [I]f they’re there then we’ll run on them. . . . These guys are smart.” That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York.The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between 150 the reported southbound American 11 and the nation’s capital. At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: “We’re look- 151 This was the first notice ing—we also lost American 77.” The time was 9:34. to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77. At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington:“Latest report.Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, south- west. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.” This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:“Okay, we’re going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House.” He then discov- ered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean.“I don’t care how many 152 . . . Okay. Push them back.” windows you break,” he said.“Damn it. The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the tar- get or the target’s location. Second, a “generic” flight plan—prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Lang- ley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles.Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan 153 instruction to go “090 for 60” superseded the original scramble order. After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but “it kind of faded” over Washington.The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck 154 by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away. Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that

45 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 28 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 28 both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Air- port. Remembering the “we have some planes” remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA’s Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; 155 Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed 156 But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an air- in Cleveland. craft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller.This was 157 the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible 158 screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin.” The controller responded, seconds later: “Somebody call Cleveland?” This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet. The controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times, with no response. At 9:30, the controller began to poll the other flights on his frequency to deter- 159 mine if they had heard the screaming; several said they had. At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency:“Keep remain- ing sitting. We have a bomb on board.” The controller understood, but chose to respond: “Calling Cleveland Center, you’re unreadable. Say again, slowly.” He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. 160 By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters. FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communi- cation with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed it to poll all its centers about suspect aircraft.The Command Center executed the request and, a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that “United 93 may have a bomb on board.”At 9:34, the Command Center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA headquarters.At approximately 9:36, Cleveland advised the Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to inter- cept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was prepared to

46 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 29 29 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” contact a nearby military base to make the request.The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had 161 to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue. Between 9:34 and 9:38, the Cleveland controller observed United 93 climb- ing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out its way.The con- troller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked whether the pilot could 162 There was no response. confirm that he had been hijacked. Then, at 9:39, a fourth radio transmission was heard from United 93: to remain seated. Ziad Jarrah: e you all Uh, this is the captain.Would lik There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet. The controller responded: “United 93, understand you have a bomb on 163 board. Go ahead.” The flight did not respond. From 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided frequent updates to Acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 headed toward Washington, D.C. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93’s transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other air- 164 craft, and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south. At 9:42, the Command Center learned from news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon.The Command Center’ s national oper ations manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at the nearest der. The air traffic control system han- airport. This was an unprecedented or dled it with great skill, as about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft 165 soon landed without incident. At 9:46 the Command Center updated FAA headquarters that United 93 was now “twenty-nine minutes out of Washington, D.C.” At 9:49, 13 minutes after Cleveland Center had asked about getting mili- tary help, the Command Center suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance: talk about United FAA Headquarters: away to go They’re pulling Jeff 93. Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling Command Center: aircraft? FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don’t know. Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to Command Center: make probably in the next ten minutes. 166 FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room. At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about scrambling

47 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 30 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 30 aircraft. Then the Command Center informed headquarters that controllers had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.Within seconds, the Com- mand Center received a visual report from another aircraft, and informed head- quarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 “waving his wings.” The aircraft had witnessed the hijackers’ efforts to defeat the passengers’ coun- 167 terattack. United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from W ashington, D.C. The precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute.The 10:03:11 impact time is supported by previous National Transportation Safety Board mission staff ’s analysis of radar, the flight analysis and by evidence from the Com voice recorder, infrared satellite data, and air traffic data recorder, the cockpit 168 control transmissions. Five minutes later, the Command Center forwarded this update to head- quarters: O.K. Uh, there is now on that United 93. Command Center: Yes. FAA Headquarters: Command Center: There is a report of black smoke in the last position I gave you, fifteen miles south of Johnstown. FAA Headquarters: From the airplane or from the ground? Uh, they’re speculating it’s from the aircraft. Command Center: FAA Headquarters: Okay. Uh, who, it hit the ground.That’s what they’re spec- Command Center: 169 ulating, that’s speculation only. The aircraft that spotted the “black smoke” was the same unarmed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen American 77 crash into the Penta- gon 27 minutes earlier. It had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw the smoke from the crash of United 93, less than two minutes after the plane went advised headquarters of its conclusion down. At 10:17, the Command Center 170 that United 93 had indeed crashed. Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA head- quarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any man- ager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military. NEADS first received a call about Military Notification and Response. United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on 171 radar because it was already in the ground.

48 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 31 31 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington, D.C., sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 10:10, and having no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington or that it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters: “negative— 172 negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over the nation’s capital. The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly at NEADS.The air defenders searched for United 93’s primary radar return and tried to locate other fighters to scramble. NEADS called Washington Center to report: NEADS: I also want to give you a heads-up,Washington. Go ahead. FAA (DC): NEADS: United nine three, have you got information on that yet? Yeah, he’s down. FAA: NEADS: He’s down? Yes. FAA: When did he land? ’Cause we have got confirmation— NEADS: FAA: He did not land. NEADS: Oh, he’s down? Down? Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David. FAA: NEADS: Northeast of Camp David. 173 FAA: That’s the last report.They don’t know exactly where. 174 The The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 10:15. NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their radar scopes.The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijacked. Clarifying the Record The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with pre- existing training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unpre- pared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes’ notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility man- agers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommend- ing a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.

49 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 32 32 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT American Airlines Flight 11 United Airlines Flight 175 (UA 175) (AA 11) Boston to Los Angeles Boston to Los Angeles Boston Boston New York City New York City Takeoff 8:14 7:59 Takeoff Last radio communication 8:42 8:14 Last routine radio 8:42-8:46 Likely takeover communication; likely takeover Transponder code changes 8:47 8:19 Flight attendant notifies AA of Flight attendant notifies UA of 8:52 hijacking hijacking Transponder is turned off 8:21 UA attempts to contact the 8:54 8:23 AA attempts to contact the cockpit cockpit New York Center suspects 8:55 8:25 Boston Center aware of hijacking hijacking 9:03:11 Flight 175 crashes into 2 WTC Boston Center notifies NEADS 8:38 (South Tower) of hijacking 9:15 New York Center advises 8:46 NEADS scrambles Otis fighter NEADS that UA 175 was the jets in search of AA 11 second aircraft crashed into 8:46:40 AA 11 crashes into 1 WTC WTC (North Tower) 9:20 UA headquarters aware that Otis fighter jets airborne 8:53 Flight 175 had crashed into 9:16 AA headquarters aware that WTC Flight 11 has crashed into WTC advises NEADS 9:21 Boston Center that AA 11 is airborne heading for Washington NEADS scrambles Langley 9:24 fighter jets in search of AA 11

50 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 33 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 33 United Airlines Flight 93 American Airlines Flight 77 (AA 77) (UA 93) Newark to San Francisco Washington, D.C., to Los Angeles Dulles Newark Pentagon Shanksville, PA 8:42 Takeoff Takeoff 8:20 Flight 93 receives warning 9:24 8:51 Last routine radio from UA about possible communication cockpit intrusion 8:51-8:54 Likely takeover 9:27 Last routine radio Flight 77 makes unauthorized 8:54 communication turn to south 9:28 Likely takeover 8:56 Transponder is turned off 9:34 Herndon Command Center AA headquarters aware that 9:05 advises FAA headquarters that Flight 77 is hijacked UA 93 is hijacked Herndon Command Center 9:25 9:36 Flight attendant notifies UA of orders nationwide ground stop hijacking; UA attempts to Dulles tower observes radar of 9:32 contact the cockpit fast-moving aircraft (later 9:41 Transponder is turned off identified as AA 77) Passenger revolt begins 9:57 FAA advises NEADS that 9:34 10:03:11 Flight 93 crashes in field in AA 77 is missing Shanksville, PA 9:37:46 AA 77 crashes into the 10:07 Cleveland Center advises Pentagon NEADS of UA 93 hijacking 10:30 AA headquarters confirms 10:15 UA headquarters aware that Flight 77 crash into Pentagon Flight 93 has crashed in PA; Washington Center advises NEADS that Flight 93 has crashed in PA

51 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 34 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 34 More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response.Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military’s capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they over- stated the FAA’s ability to provide the military with timely and useful informa- tion that morning. In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD offi- cials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from 175 This statement was incorrect.There was no hijack to report at 9:16. the FAA. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, 176 This state- NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. ment was also incorrect.The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that Amer- ican 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, 177 D. C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications 178 United 93, or both.These statements were incorrect as about American 77, well.The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.The inac- curate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft. In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost.Then, minutes later, NEADS was told that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the White House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving directly toward Washington, D.C. Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American 77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington, and the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help.They had been respond- ing to a report about an aircraft that did not exist. Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice of the flight’s hijacking at 9:16. By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed. We now turn to the role of national leadership in the events that morning.

52 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 35 35 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1.3 NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT When American 11 struck the World Trade Center at 8:46, no one in the White House or traveling with the President knew that it had been hijacked.While that information circulated within the FAA, we found no evidence that the 179 hijacking was reported to any other agency in Washington before 8:46. 180 Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York from CNN. Within the FAA, the administrator, Jane Garvey, and her acting deputy, Monte Belger, had not been told of a confirmed hijacking before they learned from 181 Others in the agency were aware of it, television that a plane had crashed. as we explained earlier in this chapter. Inside the National Military Command Center, the deputy director of oper- ations and his assistant began notifying senior Pentagon officials of the inci- dent. At about 9:00, the senior NMCC operations officer reached out to the FAA operations center for information. Although the NMCC was advised of 182 the hijacking of American 11, the scrambling of jets was not discussed. In Sarasota, Florida, the presidential motorcade was arriving at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School, where President Bush was to read to a class and talk about education.White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card told us he was standing with the President outside the classroom when Senior Advisor to the President Karl Rove first informed them that a small, twin-engine plane had crashed into the World Trade Center.The President’s reaction was that the inci- 183 dent must have been caused by pilot error. At 8:55, before entering the classroom, the President spoke to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who was at the White House. She recalled first telling the President it was a twin-engine aircraft—and then a commer- cial aircraft—that had struck the World Trade Center, adding “that’s all we know 184 right now, Mr. President.” At the White House,Vice President Dick Cheney had just sat down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a plane had struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The Vice President was wondering “how the hell could a plane hit the World Trade Center” when he 185 saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower. Elsewhere in the White House, a series of 9:00 meetings was about to begin. In the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an acci- dent, the White House staff monitored the news as they went ahead with their 186 regular schedules. The Agencies Confer When they learned a second plane had struck the World Trade Center, nearly everyone in the White House told us, they immediately knew it was not an accident. The Secret Service initiated a number of security enhancements

53 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 36 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 36 around the White House complex. The officials who issued these orders did not know that there were additional hijacked aircraft, or that one such aircraft was en route to Washington. These measures were precautionary steps taken 187 because of the strikes in New York. The FAA and White House Teleconferences. The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00— included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings. At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department.The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only peri- odically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remem- bered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frus- 188 trated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call. At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Sit- uation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40. The first topic addressed in the White House video teleconference—at about 9:40—was the physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agencies. Immediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon.We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior infor- mation that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully 189 under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck. Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters partici- pated in this video teleconference at various times.We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the person- nel involved in managing the crisis did.And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC.As one witness recalled,“[It] was almost like there were parallel decisionmaking processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC . . . and then there was the [White House video . . . [I]n my mind they were competing venues for command teleconference]. 190 and control and decisionmaking.” At 10:03, the conference received reports of more missing aircraft, “2 pos-

54 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 37 37 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” sibly 3 aloft,” and learned of a combat air patrol over Washington. There was discussion of the need for rules of engagement. Clarke reported that they were asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft. Confirmation of that authority came at 10:25, but the commands were already being conveyed in 191 more direct contacts with the Pentagon. Inside the National Military Command The Pentagon Teleconferences. Center, the deputy director for operations immediately thought the second strike was a terrorist attack.The job of the NMCC in such an emergency is to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority—the president and the secretary of defense— 192 and those who need to carry out their orders. On the morning of September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld was having break- fast at the Pentagon with a group of members of Congress. He then returned to his office for his daily intelligence briefing.The Secretary was informed of the second strike in New York during the briefing; he resumed the briefing while awaiting more information. After the Pentagon was struck, Secretary 193 Rumsfeld went to the parking lot to assist with rescue efforts. Inside the NMCC, the deputy director for operations called for an all- purpose “significant event” conference. It began at 9:29, with a brief recap: two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center, there was a confirmed hijacking of American 11, and Otis fighters had been scrambled.The FAA was asked to pro- vide an update, but the line was silent because the FAA had not been added to the call.A minute later, the deputy director stated that it had just been confirmed that American 11 was still airborne and heading toward D.C. He directed the transition to an air threat conference call. NORAD confirmed that American 11 was airborne and heading toward Washington, relaying the erroneous FAA 194 information already mentioned.The call then ended, at about 9:34. * which lasted more than It resumed at 9:37 as an air threat conference call, eight hours.The President,Vice President, Secretary of Defense,Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley all participated in this teleconference at various times, as did military personnel from the White House underground shelter and the President’s mil- 195 itary aide on Air Force One. Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence of the FAA in the teleconference. The FAA representative who finally joined the call at 10:17 had no familiar- ity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers, and none 196 of the information available to senior FAA officials. * All times given for this conference call are estimates, which we and the Department of Defense believe to be accurate within a ± 3 minute margin of error.

55 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 38 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 38 We found no evidence that, at this critical time, NORAD’s top command- ers, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, coordinated with their counterparts at FAA headquarters to improve awareness and organize a common response. Lower-level officials improvised—for example, the FAA’s Boston Center bypassed the chain of command and directly contacted NEADS after the first hijacking. But the highest-level Defense Department officials relied on the NMCC’s air threat conference, in which the FAA did not participate for the 197 first 48 minutes. At 9:39, the NMCC’s deputy director for operations, a military officer, opened the call from the Pentagon, which had just been hit. He began:“An air attack against North America may be in progress. NORAD, what’s the situa- tion?” NORAD said it had conflicting reports. Its latest information was “of a possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of JFK en route to Washington D.C.” The NMCC reported a crash into the mall side of the Pentagon and requested 198 that the Secretary of Defense be added to the conference. At 9:44, NORAD briefed the conference on the possible hijacking of Delta 1989.Two minutes later, staff reported that they were still trying to locate Sec- retary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Myers. The Vice Chairman joined the conference shortly before 10:00; the Secretary, shortly before 10:30.The Chair- 199 man was out of the country. At 9:48, a representative from the White House shelter asked if there were any indications of another hijacked aircraft.The deputy director for operations mentioned the Delta flight and concluded that “that would be the fourth pos- sible hijack.” At 9:49, the commander of NORAD directed all air sovereignty 200 aircraft to battle stations, fully armed. At 9:59, an Air Force lieutenant colonel working in the White House Mil- itary Office joined the conference and stated he had just talked to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.The White House requested (1) the implementation of continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts for 201 Air Force One, and (3) a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, D.C. By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had been no mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been added to the tele- 202 conference. The President and the Vice President The President was seated in a classroom when, at 9:05,Andrew Card whispered to him: “A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack.” The President told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The press was standing behind the children; he saw their phones and pagers start to ring. The President felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was 203 happening. The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes,

56 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 39 39 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” while the children continued reading. He then returned to a holding room shortly before 9:15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television coverage. He next spoke to Vice President Cheney, Dr. Rice, New York Governor George Pataki, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. He decided to make a brief state- ment from the school before leaving for the airport.The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think 204 it imperative for him to run out the door. Between 9:15 and 9:30, the staff was busy arranging a return to Washington, while the President consulted his senior advisers about his remarks. No one in the traveling party had any information during this time that other aircraft were hijacked or missing. Staff was in contact with the White House Situation Room, but as far as we could determine, no one with the President was in contact with the Pentagon.The focus was on the President’s statement to the nation.The only 205 decision made during this time was to return to Washington. The President’s motorcade departed at 9:35, and arrived at the airport between 9:42 and 9:45. During the ride the President learned about the attack on the Pentagon. He boarded the aircraft, asked the Secret Service about the safety of his family, and called the Vice Pres ident. According to notes of the the Vice President:“Sounds like we have call, at about 9:45 the President told a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon.We’re at war . . . some- 206 body’s going to pay.” About this time, Card, the lead Secret Service agent, the President’s military aide, and the pilot were conferring on a possible destination for Air Force One. The Secret Service agent felt strongly that the situation in Washington was too unstable for the President to return there, and Card agreed. The President strongly wanted to return to Washington and only grudgingly agreed to go elsewhere.The issue was still undecided when the President conferred with the Vice President at about the time Air Force One was taking off. The Vice Pres- ident recalled urging the President not to return to Washington.Air Force One departed at about 9:54 without any fixed destination.The objective was to get 207 up in the air—as fast and as high as possible—and then decide where to go. At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service’s operations center that “an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us.” This was the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time. As the offi- cer who took the call explained, “[I was] about to push the alert button when the tower advised that the aircraft was turning south and approach- 208 ing Reagan National Airport.” away from the White House, at 9:34. It American 77 began turning south, continued heading south for roughly a minute, before turning west and begin- ning to circle back.This news prompted the Secret Service to order the imme- diate evacuation of the Vice President just before 9:36. Agents propelled him

57 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 40 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 40 out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker.The Vice President 209 entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at 9:37. Once inside,Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in an area of the tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice President asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connected. He learned in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and he saw televi- 210 sion coverage of smoke coming from the building. The Secret Service logged Mrs. Cheney’s arrival at the White House at 9:52, and she joined her husband in the tunnel. According to contemporaneous notes, at 9:55 the Vice President was still on the phone with the President advis- ing that three planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon. We believe this is the same call in which the Vice President urged the President not to return to Washington. After the call ended, Mrs. Cheney and the Vice Presi- 211 dent moved from the tunnel to the shelter conference room. United 93 and the Shootdown Order On the morning of 9/11, the President and Vice President stayed in contact not by an open line of communication but through a series of calls.The Pres- ident told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time.The line to the White House shelter conference room—and the Vice Pres- 212 ident—kept cutting off. The Vice President remembered placing a call to the President just after entering the shelter conference room. There is conflicting evidence about when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room.We have con- the Vice Pr cluded, from the available evidence, that esident arrived in the room The Vice President recalled being told, just shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58. after his arrival, that the Air Force was trying to establish a combat air patrol 213 over Washington. The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on that concept. The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot.The President empha- 214 sized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President’s military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice Presi- dent and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,“Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.” Then she recalled hearing him say, “Yes sir.” She believed this conversation occurred a 215 few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15.

58 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 41 41 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incom- plete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President’s chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice Pres- 216 ident entered the conference room. At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft—presumably hijacked—heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was get- ting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been track- ing the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return.Thus, the Secret Service was relying on 217 projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania. At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice Pres- ident and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was 218 His reaction was described by asked for authority to engage the aircraft. Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, “in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing.” The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the this authorization on his earlier conversa- inbound plane. He told us he based tion with the President.The military aide returned a few minutes later, proba- bly between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again 219 asked for authorization to engage.The Vice President again said yes. At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called “a quiet moment,” suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the Presi- dent was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had 220 not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two- minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President’s press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft 221 if necessary. Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to 222 this authorization. At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to “engage or “take out” the aircraft. At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat confer- ence call: “I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there’s an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out.The Vice President’s guidance was we 223 need to take them out.” Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the

59 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 42 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 42 inbound aircraft. In the apt description of one witness,“It drops below the radar screen and it’s just continually hovering in your imagination; you don’t know where it is or what happens to it.” Eventually, the shelter received word that 224 away had been a medevac helicopter. the alleged hijacker 5 miles Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93’s hijacking at about 10:03. At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command.The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. It, in turn, was 225 informed by the Secret Service’s contacts with the FAA. NORAD had no information either. At 10:07, its representative on the air threat conference call stated that NORAD had “no indication of a hijack head- 226 ing to DC at this time.” Repeatedly between 10:14 and 10:19, a lieutenant colonel at the White House relayed to the NMCC that the Vice President had confirmed fighters were cleared to engage inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft 227 was hijacked. The commander of NORAD, General Ralph Eberhart, was en route to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, when the shootdown order was communicated on the air threat conference call. He told us that by the time he arrived, the order had already been passed down 228 NORAD’s chain of command. It is not clear how the shootdown order was communicated within NORAD. But we know that at 10:31, General Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast the following over a NORAD instant messaging system: “10:31 Vice president has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them 229 down if they do not respond per [General Arnold].” In upstate New York, NEADS personnel first learned of the shootdown order from this message: You need to read this. . . .The Region Commander Floor Leadership: has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that? Copy that, sir. Controllers: Floor Leadership: So if you’re trying to divert somebody and he won’t divert— DO [Director of Operations] is saying no. Controllers: No? It came over the chat. . . .You got a conflict on Floor Leadership: that direction? Controllers: Right now no, but— Floor Leadership: Okay? Okay, you read that from the Vice President, right? Vice President has cleared. Vice President has cleared us to

60 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 43 43 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per 230 [General Arnold]. In interviews with us, NEADS personnel expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of the order. The NEADS commander told us he did not pass along the order because he was unaware of its ramifications. Both the mission commander and the sen- ior weapons director indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters cir- unsure how the pilots cling Washington and New York because they were would, or should, proceed with this guidance. In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to “take out” hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to “ID 231 type and tail.” In most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force runs from the president to the secretary of defense and from the secretary to the combat- ant commander.The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time that morning shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shootdown author- 232 ity was not discussed. At 10:39, the Vice President updated the Secretary on the air threat conference: Vice President: There’s been at least three instances here where we’ve had reports of aircraft approaching Washington—a couple were con- firmed hijack. And, pursuant to the President’s instructions I gave authorization for them to be taken out. Hello? SecDef: Yes, I understand.Who did you give that direction to? Vice President: It was passed from here through the [operations] cen- ter at the White House, from the [shelter]. OK, let me ask the question here. Has that directive been trans- SecDef: mitted to the aircraft? Yes, it has. Vice President: SecDef: So we’ve got a couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at this present time? That is correct. And it’s my understanding they’ve Vice President: already taken a couple of aircraft out. SecDef: We can’t confirm that.We’re told that one aircraft is down but 233 we do not have a pilot report that did it. As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC when the shootdown order was first conveyed. He went from the parking lot to his office (where he spoke to the President), then to the Executive Support Cen- ter, where he participated in the White House video teleconference. He moved

61 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 44 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 44 to the NMCC shortly before 10:30, in order to join Vice Chairman Myers. Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational awareness when he spoke with the Vice President at 10:39. His primary concern was ensuring that 234 the pilots had a clear understanding of their rules of engagement. The Vice President was mistaken in his belief that shootdown authorization had been passed to the pilots flying at NORAD’s direction. By 10:45 there was, however, another set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement.These fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them by the Secret Service.The 235 first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 10:38. General David Wherley—the commander of the 113th Wing—reached out to the Secret Service after hearing secondhand reports that it wanted fighters airborne. A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instruc- tions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President. The guidance for Wherley was to send up the aircraft, with orders to protect the White House and take out any aircraft that threatened the Capitol. Gen- eral Wherley translated this in military terms to flying “weapons free”—that is, the decision to shoot rests in the cockpit, or in this case in the cockpit of the lead pilot. He passed these instructions to the pilots that launched at 10:42 and 236 afterward. Thus, while the fighter pilots under NORAD direction who had scram- bled out of Langley never received any type of engagement order, the Andrews pilots were operating weapons free—a permissive rule of engagement. The President and the Vice President indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Ser- 237 There is no evidence that vice and outside the military chain of command. NORAD headquarters or military officials in the NMCC knew—during the morning of September 11—that the Andrews planes were airborne and oper- ating under different rules of engagement. What If ? NORAD officials have maintained consistently that had the passengers not caused United 93 to crash, the military would have prevented it from reach- ing Washington, D.C.That conclusion is based on a version of events that we now know is incorrect.The Langley fighters were not scrambled in response to United 93; NORAD did not have 47 minutes to intercept the flight; NORAD did not even know the plane was hijacked until after it had crashed. It is appropriate, therefore, to reconsider whether United 93 would have been intercepted. Had it not crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03, we estimate that United 93

62 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 45 45 “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” could not have reached Washington any earlier than 10:13, and probably would have arrived before 10:23.There was only one set of fighters circling Washing- ton during that time frame—the Langley F-16s.They were armed and under NORAD’s control.After NEADS learned of the hijacking at 10:07, NORAD would have had from 6 to 16 minutes to locate the flight, receive authoriza- tion to shoot it down, and communicate the order to the pilots, who (in the same span) would have had to authenticate the order, intercept the flight, and 238 execute the order. At that point in time, the Langley pilots did not know the threat they were facing, did not know where United 93 was located, and did not have shoot- down authorization. First, the Langley pilots were never briefed about the reason they were ...I’m scrambled.As the lead pilot explained,“I reverted to the Russian threat. thinking cruise missile threat from the sea.You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us. . . . [Y]ou couldn’t see any airplanes, and no one told us anything.”The pilots knew their mission was to divert aircraft, but did not know that the threat came from 239 hijacked airliners. Second, NEADS did not have accurate information on the location of United 93. Presumably FAA would have provided such information, but we do not know how long that would have taken, nor how long it would have taken NEADS to locate the target. Third, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots.At 10:10, the pilots over Washington were emphatically told,“negative clearance to shoot.” Shootdown authority was first communicated to NEADS at 10:31. It is possible that NORAD commanders would have ordered a shootdown in the absence of the authorization communicated by the Vice President, but given the gravity of the decision to shoot down a commercial airliner, and NORAD’s caution that a 240 mistake not be made, we view this possibility as unlikely. NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93. We are not so sure. We are sure that the nation owes a debt to the passengers of United 93.Their actions saved the lives of countless others, and may have saved either the Capitol or the White House from destruction. The details of what happened on the morning of September 11 are com- plex, but they play out a simple theme. NORAD and the FAA were unpre- pared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001.They struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a home- land defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never before encountered and had never trained to meet. At 10:02 that morning, an assistant to the mission crew commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, New York, was working

63 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 46 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 46 with his colleagues on the floor of the command center. In a brief moment of 241 reflection, he was recorded remarking that “This is a new type of war.” He was, and is, right. But the conflict did not begin on 9/11. It had been publicly declared years earlier, most notably in a declaration faxed early in 1998 to an Arabic-language newspaper in London. Few Americans had noticed it. away by the followers of a Saudi The fax had been sent from thousands of miles exile gathered in one of the most remote and impoverished countries on earth.

64 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 47 2 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 2.1 A DECLARATION OF WAR In February 1998, the 40-year-old Saudi exile Usama Bin Ladin and a fugitive Egyptian physician,Ayman al Zawahiri, arranged from their Afghan headquar- ters for an Arabic newspaper in London to publish what they termed a fatwa issued in the name of a “World Islamic Front.” A fatwa is normally an inter- pretation of Islamic law by a respected Islamic authority, but neither Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, nor the three others who signed this statement were scholars of Islamic law. Claiming that America had declared war against God and his mes- senger, they called for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the “individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it 1 is possible to do it.” Three months later, when interviewed in Afghanistan by ABC-TV, Bin 2 He claimed it was more important for Mus- Ladin enlarged on these themes. lims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels.“It is far better for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities,” he said.Asked whether he approved of terrorism and of attacks on civilians, he replied: “We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retalia- tion in kind. We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets.” Note: Islamic names often do not follow the Western practice of the consistent use of surnames. Given the variety of names we mention, we chose to refer to individuals by the last word in the names by which they are known: Nawaf al Hazmi as Hazmi, for instance, omitting the article “al” that would be part of their name in their own societies.We generally make an exception fo r the more familiar English usage of “Bin” as part of a last name, as in Bin Ladin. Further, there is no universally accepted way to transliterate Arabic words and names into English.We have relied on a mix of common sense, the sound of the name in Ara- bic, and common usage in source materials, the press, or government documents.When we quote from a source document, we use its transliteration, e.g.,“al Qida” instead of al Qaeda. 47

65 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 48 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 48 Though novel for its open endorsement of indiscriminate killing, Bin Ladin’s 1998 declaration was only the latest in the long series of his public and private calls since 1992 that singled out the United States for attack. In August 1996, Bin Ladin had issued his own self-styled fatwa calling on Muslims to drive American soldiers out of Saudi Arabia.The long, disjointed document condemned the Saudi monarchy for allowing the presence of an army of infidels in a land with the sites most sacred to Islam, and celebrated recent suicide bombings of American military facilities in the Kingdom. It praised the 1983 suicide bombing in Beirut that killed 241 U.S. Marines, the 1992 bombing in Aden, and especially the 1993 firefight in Somalia after which the United States “left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat 3 and your dead with you.” Bin Ladin said in his ABC interview that he and his followers had been preparing in Somalia for another long struggle, like that against the Soviets in Afghanistan, but “the United States rushed out of Somalia in shame and dis- grace.” Citing the Soviet army’s withdrawal from Afghanistan as proof that a ragged army of dedicated Muslims could overcome a superpower, he told the interviewer: “We are certain that we shall—with the grace of Allah—prevail over the Americans.” He went on to warn that “If the present injustice contin- 4 . . , it will inevitably move the battle to American soil.” ues . Plans to attack the United States were developed with unwavering single- mindedness throughout the 1990s. Bin Ladin saw himself as called “to follow in the footsteps of the Messenger and to communicate his message to all 5 and to serve as the rallying point and organizer of a new kind of war nations,” to destroy America and bring the world to Islam. 2.2 BIN LADIN’S APPEAL IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD It is the story of eccentric and violent ideas sprouting in the fertile ground of political and social turmoil. It is the story of an organization poised to seize its historical moment. How did Bin Ladin—with his call for the indiscrimi- nate killing of Americans—win thousands of followers and some degree of approval from millions more? The history, culture, and body of beliefs from which Bin Ladin has shaped and spread his message are largely unknown to many Americans. Seizing on symbols of Islam’s past greatness, he promises to restore pride to people who consider themselves the victims of successive foreign masters. He uses cultural and religious allusions to the holy Qur’an and some of its interpreters. He appeals to people disoriented by cyclonic change as they confront modernity and globalization. His rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sources—Islam, history, and the region’s political and economic malaise. He also stresses griev- ances against the United States widely shared in the Muslim world. He

66 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 49 49 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM ©Reuters 2004 Usama Bin Ladin at a news conference in Afghanistan in 1998 inveighed against the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam’s holiest sites. He spoke of the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of sanctions imposed after the Gulf War, and he protested U.S. support of Israel. Islam Islam (a word that literally means “surrender to the will of God”) arose in Ara- bia with what Muslims believe are a series of revelations to the Prophet Mohammed from the one and only God, the God of Abraham and of Jesus. These revelations, conveyed by the angel Gabriel, are recorded in the Qur’an. Muslims believe that these revelations, given to the greatest and last of a chain of prophets stretching from Abraham through Jesus, complete God’s message to humanity. The Hadith, which recount Mohammed’s sayings and deeds as recorded by his contemporaries, are another fundamental source. A third key element is the Sharia, the code of law derived from the Qur’an and the Hadith. Islam is divided into two main branches, Sunni and Shia. Soon after the

67 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 50 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 50 Prophet’s death, the question of choosing a new leader, or , for the Mus- caliph Ummah lim community, or , arose. Initially, his successors could be drawn from the Prophet’s contemporaries, but with time, this was no longer possible.Those who became the Shia held that any leader of the Ummah must be a direct descendant of the Prophet; those who became the Sunni argued that lineal descent was not required if the candidate met other standards of faith and knowledge.After bloody struggles, the Sunni became (and remain) the major- ity sect. (The Shia are dominant in Iran.) The Caliphate—the institutionalized leadership of the Ummah—thus was a Sunni institution that continued until 1924, first under Arab and eventually under Ottoman Turkish control. Many Muslims look back at the century after the revelations to the Prophet Mohammed as a golden age. Its memory is strongest among the Arabs. What happened then—the spread of Islam from the Arabian Peninsula throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and even into Europe within less than a cen- 6 Nostalgia for Islam’s past glory remains tury—seemed, and seems, miraculous. a powerful force. Islam is both a faith and a code of conduct for all aspects of life. For many Muslims, a good government would be one guided by the moral principles of their faith.This does not necessarily translate into a desire for clerical rule and the abolition of a secular state. It does mean that some Muslims tend to be uncomfortable with distinctions between religion and state, though Muslim rulers throughout history have readily separated the two. To extremists, however, such divisions, as well as the existence of parliaments and legislation, only prove these rulers to be false Muslims usurping God’s authority over all aspects of life. Periodically, the Islamic world has seen surges 7 of what, for want of a better term, is often labeled “fundamentalism.” Denouncing waywardness among the faithful, some clerics have appealed for a return to observance of the literal teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith. One scholar from the fourteenth century from whom Bin Ladin selectively quotes, Ibn Taimiyyah, condemned both corrupt rulers and the clerics who failed to criticize them. He urged Muslims to read the Qur’an and the Hadith for them- selves, not to depend solely on learned interpreters like himself but to hold one 8 another to account for the quality of their observance. The extreme Islamist version of history blames the decline fr om Islam’s path of golden age on the rulers and people who turned away from the true their religion, thereby leaving Islam vulnerable to encroaching foreign powers eager to steal their land, wealth, and even their souls. Bin Ladin’s Worldview Despite his claims to universal leadership, Bin Ladin offers an extreme view of Islamic history designed to appeal mainly to Arabs and Sunnis. He draws on fundamentalists who blame the eventual destruction of the Caliphate on lead- 9 He repeatedly calls ers who abandoned the pure path of religious devotion. on his followers to embrace martyrdom since “the walls of oppression and

68 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 51 51 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 10 For those humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets.” yearning for a lost sense of order in an older, more tranquil world, he offers his “Caliphate” as an imagined alternative to today’s uncertainty. For others, he offers simplistic conspiracies to explain their world. Bin Ladin also relies heavily on the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb. A mem- 11 executed in 1966 on charges of attempting ber of the Muslim Brotherhood to overthrow the government, Qutb mixed Islamic scholarship with a very superficial acquaintance with Western history and thought. Sent by the Egypt- ian government to study in the United States in the late 1940s, Qutb returned with an enormous loathing of Western society and history. He dismissed West- ern achievements as entirely material, arguing that Western society possesses 12 “nothing that will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence.” Three basic themes emerge from Qutb’s writings. First, he claimed that the world was beset with barbarism, licentiousness, and unbelief (a condition he jahiliyya , the religious term for the period of ignorance prior to the rev- called elations given to the Prophet Mohammed). Qutb argued that humans can choose only between Islam and jahiliyya. Second, he warned that more peo- ple, including Muslims, were attracted to jahiliyya and its material comforts than to his view of Islam; jahiliyya could therefore triumph over Islam.Third, no middle ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan. All Muslims—as he defined them—therefore must take up arms in this fight.Any Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever wor- 13 thy of destruction. Bin Ladin shares Qutb’s stark view, permitting him and his followers to rationalize even unprovoked mass murder as righteous defense of an embattled faith. Many Americans have wondered,“Why do ‘they’ hate us?” Some also ask, “What can we do to stop these attacks?” Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have given answers to both these questions.To the first, they say that America had attacked Islam; America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thus Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when Russians fight with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri Muslims, and when the Philippine government fights ethnic Mus- lims in its southern islands.America is also held responsible for the governments of Muslim countries, derided by al Qaeda as “your agents.” Bin Ladin has stated flatly,“Our fight against these governments is not separate from our fight against 14 These charges found a ready audience among millions of Arabs and you.” Muslims angry at the United States because of issues ranging from Iraq to Pales- tine to America’s support for their countries’ repressive rulers. Bin Ladin’s grievance with the United States may have started in reaction to specific U.S. policies but it quickly became far deeper.To the second ques- tion, what America could do, al Qaeda’s answer was that America should aban- don the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the immorality and godlessness of its society and culture:“It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civ- ilization witnessed by the history of mankind.” If the United States did not

69 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 52 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 52 comply, it would be at war with the Islamic nation, a nation that al Qaeda’s 15 leaders said “desires death more than you desire life.” History and Political Context Few fundamentalist movements in the Islamic world gained lasting political power. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, fundamentalists helped artic- ulate anticolonial grievances but played little role in the overwhelmingly sec- ular struggles for independence after World War I.Western-educated lawyers, soldiers, and officials led most independence movements, and clerical influence and traditional culture were seen as obstacles to national progress. After gaining independence from Western powers following World War II, the Arab Middle East followed an arc from initial pride and optimism to today’s mix of indifference, cynicism, and despair. In several countries, a dynastic state already existed or was quickly established under a paramount tribal family. Monarchies in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan still sur- vive today.Those in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen were eventually overthrown by secular nationalist revolutionaries. The secular regimes promised a glowing future, often tied to sweeping ide- ologies (such as those promoted by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab Socialism or the Ba’ath Party of Syria and Iraq) that called for a single, secular Arab state. However, what emerged were almost invariably autocratic regimes that were usually unwilling to tolerate any opposition—even in coun- tries, such as Egypt, that had a parliamentary tradition. Over time, their poli- cies—repression, rewards, emigration, and the displacement of popular anger onto scapegoats (generally foreign)—were shaped by the desire to cling to power. The bankruptcy of secular, autocratic nationalism was evident across the Muslim world by the late 1970s.At the same time, these regimes had closed off nearly all paths for peaceful opposition, forcing their critics to choose silence, exile, or violent opposition. Iran’s 1979 revolution swept a Shia theocracy into power. Its success encouraged Sunni fundamentalists elsewhere. In the 1980s, awash in sudden oil wealth, Saudi Arabia competed with Shia Iran to promote its Sunni fundamentalist interpretation of Islam,Wahhabism. The Saudi government, always conscious of its duties as the custodian of Islam’s holiest places, joined with wealthy Arabs from the Kingdom and other states bordering the Persian Gulf in donating money to build mosques and religious schools that could preach and teach their interpretation of Islamic doctrine. In this competition for legitimacy, secular regimes had no alternative to offer. Instead, in a number of cases their rulers sought to buy off local Islamist movements by ceding control of many social and educational issues. Embold- ened rather than satisfied, the Islamists continued to push for power—a trend especially clear in Egypt. Confronted with a violent Islamist movement that killed President Anwar Sadat in 1981, the Egyptian government combined

70 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 53 53 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM harsh repression of Islamic militants with harassment of moderate Islamic schol- ars and authors, driving many into exile. In Pakistan, a military regime sought to justify its seizure of power by a pious public stance and an embrace of unprecedented Islamist influence on education and society. These experiments in political Islam faltered during the 1990s: the Iranian revolution lost momentum, prestige, and public support, and Pakistan’s rulers found that most of its population had little enthusiasm for fundamentalist Islam. Islamist revival movements gained followers across the Muslim world, but failed to secure political power except in Iran and Sudan. In Algeria, where in 1991 Islamists seemed almost certain to win power through the ballot box, the mili- tary preempted their victory, triggering a brutal civil war that continues today. Opponents of today’s rulers have few, if any, ways to participate in the existing political system. They are thus a ready audience for calls to Muslims to purify their society, reject unwelcome modernization, and adhere strictly to the Sharia. Social and Economic Malaise In the 1970s and early 1980s, an unprecedented flood of wealth led the then largely unmodernized oil states to attempt to shortcut decades of development. They funded huge infrastructure projects, vastly expanded education, and cre- ated subsidized social welfare programs. These programs established a wide- spread feeling of entitlement without a corresponding sense of social obligations. By the late 1980s, diminishing oil revenues, the economic drain from many unprofitable development projects, and population growth made these entitlement programs unsustainable.The resulting cutbacks created enor- mous resentment among recipients who had come to see government largesse as their right. This resentment was further stoked by public understanding of how much oil income had gone straight into the pockets of the rulers, their friends, and their helpers. Unlike the oil states (or Afghanistan, where real economic development has barely begun), the other Arab nations and Pakistan once had seemed headed toward balanced modernization. The established commercial, financial, and industrial sectors in these states, supported by an entrepreneurial spirit and widespread understanding of free enterprise, augured well. But unprofitable heavy industry, state monopolies, and opaque bureaucracies slowly stifled growth. More importantly, these state-centered regimes placed their highest priority on preserving the elite’s grip on national wealth. Unwilling to foster dynamic economies that could create jobs attractive to educated young men, the countries became economically stagnant and reliant on the safety valve of worker emigration either to the Arab oil states or to the West. Furthermore, the repression and isolation of women in many Muslim countries have not only seriously limited individual opportunity but also crippled overall economic 16 productivity. By the 1990s, high birthrates and declining rates of infant mortality had

71 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 54 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 54 produced a common pr oblem throughout the Muslim world: a large, steadily increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of suitable or steady employment—a sure prescription for social turbulence. Many of these young men, such as the enormous number trained only in religious schools, lacked the skills needed by their societies. Far more acquired valuable skills but lived in stagnant economies that could not generate satisfying jobs. Millions, pursuing secular as well as religious studies, were products of edu- cational systems that generally devoted little if any attention to the rest of the world’s thought, history, and culture. The secular education reflected a strong cultural preference for technical fields over the humanities and social sciences. Many of these young men, even if able to study abroad, lacked the perspective and skills needed to understand a different culture. Frustrated in their search for a decent living, unable to benefit from an edu- cation often obtained at the cost of great family sacrifice, and blocked from starting families of their own, some of these young men were easy targets for radicalization. Bin Ladin’s Historical Opportunity Most Muslims prefer a peaceful and inclusive vision of their faith, not the violent sectarianism of Bin Ladin.Among Arabs, Bin Ladin’s followers are com- Muslims as unbelievers,” , or “those who define other monly nicknamed takfiri because of their readiness to demonize and murder those with whom they dis- agree. Beyond the theology lies the simple human fact that most Muslims, like most other human beings, are repelled by mass murder and barbarism what- ever their jus tification. “All Americans must recognize that the face of terror is not the true face of Islam,” President Bush observed. “Islam is a faith that brings comfort to a bil- lion people around the world. It’s a faith that has made brothers and sisters of 17 Yet as political, social, and every race. It’s a faith based upon love, not hate.” economic problems created flammable societies, Bin Ladin used Islam’s most traditions as his match.All these elements—including talist extreme, fundamen an explosive compound. religion—combined in Other extremists had, and have, followings of their own. But in appealing to societies full of discontent, Bin Ladin remained credible as other leaders and symbols faded. He could stand as a symbol of resistance—above all, resistance to the West and to America. He could present himself and his allies as victori- ous warriors in the one great successful experience for Islamic militancy in the 1980s: the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. By 1998, Bin Ladin had a distinctive appeal, as he focused on attacking America. He argued that other extremists, who aimed at local rulers or Israel, did not go far enough.They had not taken on what he called “the head of the 18 snake.”

72 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 55 55 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM Finally, Bin Ladin had another advantage: a substantial, worldwide organi- zation. By the time he issued his February 1998 declaration of war, Bin Ladin had nurtured that organization for nearly ten years. He could attract, train, and use recruits for ever more ambitious attacks, rallying new adherents with each demonstration that his was the movement of the future. 2.3 THE RISE OF BIN LADIN AND AL QAEDA (1988–1992) A decade of conflict in Afghanistan, from 1979 to 1989, gave Islamist extrem- ists a rallying point and training field.A Communist government in Afghanistan gained power in 1978 but was unable to establish enduring control. At the end of 1979, the Soviet government sent in military units to ensure that the coun- try would remain securely under Moscow’s influence. The response was an 19 Afghan national resistance movement that defeated Soviet forces. Young Muslims from around the world flocked to Afghanistan to join as vol- jihad unteers in what was seen as a “holy war”— —against an invader.The largest numbers came from the Middle East. Some were Saudis, and among them was Usama Bin Ladin. Twenty-three when he arrived in Afghanistan in 1980, Bin Ladin was the seventeenth of 57 children of a Saudi construction magnate. Six feet five and thin, Bin Ladin appeared to be ungainly but was in fact quite athletic, skilled as a horseman, runner, climber, and soccer player. He had attended Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia. By some accounts, he had been interested there in religious studies, inspired by tape recordings of fiery sermons by Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian and a disciple of Qutb. Bin Ladin was conspicuous among the volunteers not because he showed evidence of religious learning but because he had access to some of his family’s huge fortune. Though he took ame known chiefly as a person who gen- part in at least one actual battle, he bec 20 erously helped fund the anti-So viet jihad. Bin Ladin understood better than most of the volunteers the extent to which the continuation and eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended on an increasingly complex, almost worldwide organization. This organization included a financial support network that came to be known as the “Golden Chain,” put together mainly by financiers in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Donations flowed through charities or other nongovern- mental organizations (NGOs). Bin Ladin and the “Afghan Arabs” drew largely on funds raised by this network, whose agents roamed world markets to buy 21 arms and supplies for the mujahideen, or “holy warriors.” Mosques, schools, and boardinghouses served as recruiting stations in many parts of the world, including the United States. Some were set up by Islamic extremists or their financial backers. Bin Ladin had an important part in this

73 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 56 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 56 activity. He and the cleric Azzam had joined in creating a “Bureau of Services” 22 (Mektab al Khidmat, or MAK), which channeled recruits into Afghanistan. The international environment for Bin Ladin’s efforts was ideal. Saudi Ara- bia and the United States supplied billions of dollars worth of secret assistance occupation. This assistance to rebel groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet kistani military intelligence service (Inter- was funneled through Pakistan: the Pa Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISID), helped train the rebels and dis- tribute the arms. But Bin Ladin and his comrades had their own sources of support and training, and they received little or no assistance from the 23 States. United April 1988 brought victory for the Afghan jihad. Moscow declared it would pull its military forces out of Afghanistan within the next nine months. As the Soviets began their withdrawal, the jihad’s leaders debated what to do next. Bin Ladin and Azzam agreed that the organization successfully created for Afghanistan should not be allowed to dissolve.They established what they called a base or foundation (al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future 24 sidered number one in the MAK, by Though Azzam had been con jihad. August 1988 Bin Ladin w as clearly the leader ( emir ) of al Qaeda.This organi- zation’s structure included as its operating arms an intelligence component, a military committee, a financial committee, a political committee, and a com- mittee in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also had an Advisory Coun- 25 cil (Shura) made up of Bin Ladin’s inner circle. Bin Ladin’s assumption of the helm of al Qaeda was evidence of his grow- ing self-confidence and ambition. He soon made clear his desire for unchal- lenged control and for preparing the mujahideen to fight anywhere in the world. Azzam, by contrast, favored continuing to fight in Afghanistan until it had a true Islamist government. And, as a Palestinian, he saw Israel as the top 26 priority for the next stage. Whether the dispute was about power, personal differences, or strategy, it ended on November 24, 1989, when a remotely controlled car bomb killed Azzam and both of his sons. The killers were assumed to be rival Egyptians. The outcome left Bin Ladin indisputably in charge of what remained of the 27 MAK and al Qaeda. Through writers like Qutb, and the presence of Egyptian Islamist teachers in the Saudi educational system, Islamists already had a strong intellectual influ- ence on Bin Ladin and his al Qaeda colleagues. By the late 1980s, the Egypt- ian Islamist movement—badly battered in the government crackdown following President Sadat’s assassination—was centered in two major organiza- tions: the Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. A spiritual guide for both, but especially the Islamic Group, was the so-called Blind Sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman. His preaching had inspired the assassination of Sadat. After being in and out of Egyptian prisons during the 1980s, Abdel Rahman found

74 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 57 57 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM refuge in the United States. From his headquarters in Jersey City, he distrib- 28 uted messages calling for the murder of unbelievers. The most important Egyptian in Bin Ladin’s circle was a surgeon, Ayman al Zawahiri, who led a strong faction of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Many of his fol- lowers became important members in the new organization, and his own close ties with Bin Ladin led many to think of him as the deputy head of al Qaeda. He would in fact become Bin Ladin’s deputy some years later, when they merged their 29 organizations. Bin Ladin Moves to Sudan By the fall of 1989, Bin Ladin had sufficient stature among Islamic extremists that a Sudanese political leader, Hassan al Turabi, urged him to transplant his whole organization to Sudan. Turabi headed the National Islamic Front in a 30 Bin Ladin agreed to power in Khar coalition that had recently seized toum. help Turabi in an ongoing war against African Christian separatists in southern Sudan and also to do some road building.Turabi in return would let Bin Ladin use Sudan as a base for worldwide business operations and for preparations for 31 32 While agents of Bin Ladin began to buy property in Sudan in 1990, jihad. Bin Ladin himself moved from Afghanistan back to Saudi Arabia. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Bin Ladin, whose efforts in Afghanistan had earned him celebrity and respect, proposed to the Saudi monarchy that he summon mujahideen for a jihad to retake Kuwait. He was rebuffed, and the Saudis joined the U.S.-led coalition. After the Saudis agreed to allow U.S. armed forces to be based in the Kingdom, Bin Ladin and a num- ber of Islamic clerics began to publicly denounce the arrangement.The Saudi government exiled the clerics and undertook to silence Bin Ladin by, among his passport.With help from a dissident member of other things, taking away the royal family, he managed to get out of the country under the pretext of 33 By 1994, the Saudi attending an Islamic gathering in Pakistan in April 1991. 34 He no government would freeze his financial assets and revoke his citizenship. longer had a country he could call his own. Bin Ladin moved to Sudan in 1991 and set up a large and complex set of intertwined business and terrorist enterprises. In time, the former would encompass numerous companies and a global network of bank accounts and nongovernmental institutions. Fulfilling his bargain with Turabi, Bin Ladin used his construction company to build a new highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. Meanwhile, al Qaeda finance officers and top oper- atives used their positions in Bin Ladin’s businesses to acquire weapons, explo- sives, and technical equipment for terrorist purposes. One founding member, Abu Hajer al Iraqi, used his position as head of a Bin Ladin investment com- pany to carry out procurement trips from western Europe to the Far East.Two others,Wadi al Hage and Mubarak Douri, who had become acquainted in Tuc-

75 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 58 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 58 son,Arizona, in the late 1980s, went as far afield as China, Malaysia, the Philip- 35 pines, and the former Soviet states of Ukraine and Belarus. Bin Ladin’s impressive array of offices covertly provided financial and other support for terrorist activities. The network included a major business enter- prise in Cyprus; a “services” branch in Zagreb; an office of the Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo, which supported the Bosnian Muslims in their conflict with Serbia and Croatia; and an NGO in Baku, Azerbaijan, that was employed as well by Egyptian Islamic Jihad both as a source and con- duit for finances and as a support center for the Muslim rebels in Chechnya. He also made use of the already-established Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) headquartered in Vienna, whose branch office locations included Zagreb and Budapest. (Bin Ladin later set up an NGO in Nairobi as a cover 36 for operatives there.) Bin Ladin now had a vision of himself as head of an international jihad con- federation. In Sudan, he established an “Islamic Army Shura” that was to serve as the coordinating body for the consortium of terrorist groups with which he was forging alliances. It was composed of his own al Qaeda Shura together with leaders or representatives of terrorist organizations that were still independent. In building this Islamic army, he enlisted groups from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jor- Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and dan, Lebanon, with Eritrea.Al Qaeda also established cooperative but less formal relationships other extremist groups from these same countries; from the Afr ican states of Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda; and from the Southeast Asian states of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Bin Ladin maintained connec- 37 The groundwork for a true global ter- tions in the Bosnian conflict as well. rorist network was being laid. Bin Ladin also provided equipment and training assistance to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and also to a newly forming Philip- pine group that called itself the Abu Sayyaf Brigade, after one of the major 38 Al Qaeda helped Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a nas- Afghan jihadist commanders. cent organization headed by Indonesian Islamists with cells scattered across Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It also aided a Pakistani group engaged in insurrectionist attacks in Kashmir. In mid-1991, Bin Ladin dispatched a band of supporters to the northern Afghanistan border to assist the Tajikistan Islamists in the ethnic conflicts that had been boiling there even before the Central Asian departments of the Soviet Union became indepen- 39 dent states. This pattern of expansion through building alliances extended to the United States. A Muslim organization called al Khifa had numerous branch offices, the largest of which was in the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn. In the mid- 1980s, it had been set up as one of the first outposts of Azzam and Bin Ladin’s 40 Other cities with branches of al Khifa included Atlanta, Boston, MAK. 41 Al Khifa recruited American Muslims to Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Tucson.

76 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 59 59 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM fight in Afghanistan; some of them would participate in terrorist actions in the United States in the early 1990s and in al Qaeda operations elsewhere, includ- ing the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa. 2.4 BUILDING AN ORGANIZATION, DECLARING WAR ON THE UNITED STATES (1992–1996) Bin Ladin began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western “occupation” of Islamic lands. Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Ladin’s public fatwa in August 1996. In ensuing weeks, Bin Ladin delivered an often-repeated lec- 42 ture on the need to cut off “the head of the snake.” By this time, Bin Ladin was well-known and a senior figure among Islamist extremists, especially those in Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Still, he was just one among many diverse terrorist barons. Some of Bin Ladin’s close comrades were more peers than sub- ordinates. For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Ladin in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajik- istan. The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Ladin admired, was also in the network.Among sympathetic peers in Afghanistan were a few of the warlords still fighting for power and Abu Zubaydah, who helped operate a popular terrorist training camp near the bor- der with Pakistan.There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who—though not necessarily formal members of someone else’s organization—were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Ladin, 43 the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. In now analyzing the terrorist programs carried out by members of this net- work, it would be misleading to apply the label “al Qaeda operations” too often in these early years.Yet it would also be misleading to ignore the significance of these connections.And in this network, Bin Ladin’s agenda stood out.While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Ladin concentrated on attacking the “far enemy”—the United States. Attacks Known and Suspected After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formu- lated a fatwa demanding their eviction. In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. The perpetrators are reported to have belonged to a

77 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 60 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 60 group from southern Yemen headed by a Yemeni member of Bin Ladin’s Islamic 44 Army Shura; some in the group had trained at an al Qaeda camp in Sudan. Al Qaeda leaders set up a Nairobi cell and used it to send weapons and train- ers to the Somali warlords battling U.S. forces, an operation directly supervised 45 Scores of trainers flowed to Somalia over the by al Qaeda’s military leader. ensuing months, including most of the senior members and weapons training experts of al Qaeda’s military committee.These trainers were later heard boast- ing that their assistance led to the October 1993 shootdown of two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters by members of a Somali militia group and to the subsequent 46 withdrawal of U.S. forces in early 1994. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside a Saudi-U.S. joint facil- ity in Riyadh for training the Saudi National Guard. Five Americans and two officials from India were killed.The Saudi government arrested four perpetra- tors, who admitted being inspired by Bin Ladin.They were promptly executed. Though nothing proves that Bin Ladin or dered this attack, U.S. intelligence sub- al Qaeda leaders had decided a year earlier to attack a sequently learned that U.S. target in Saudi Arabia, and had shipped explosives to the peninsula for this 47 purpose. Some of Bin Ladin’s associates later took credit. In June 1996, an enormous truck bomb detonated in the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that housed U.S. Air Force per- sonnel. Nineteen Americans were killed, and 372 were wounded.The opera- tion was carried out principally, perhaps exclusively, by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received support from the government of Iran.While the evidence of Iranian involvement is strong, there are also signs that al Qaeda 48 played some role, as yet unknown. In this period, other prominent attacks in which Bin Ladin’s involvement is at best cloudy are the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, a plot that same year to destroy landmarks in New York, and the 1995 Manila air plot to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific. Details on these plots appear in chapter 3. Another scheme revealed that Bin Ladin sought the capability to kill on a mass scale. His business aides received word that a Sudanese military officer who had been a member of the previous government cabinet was offering to sell weapons-grade uranium.After a number of contacts were made through inter- mediaries, the officer set the price at $1.5 million, which did not deter Bin Ladin.Al Qaeda representatives asked to inspect the uranium and were shown a cylinder about 3 feet long, and one thought he could pronounce it genuine. 49 Al Qaeda apparently purchased the cylinder, then discovered it to be bogus. But while the effort failed, it shows what Bin Ladin and his associates hoped to do. One of the al Qaeda representatives explained his mission: “it’s easy to 50 kill more people with uranium.” Bin Ladin seemed willing to include in the confederation terrorists from

78 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 61 61 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM almost every corner of the Muslim world. His vision mirrored that of Sudan’s Islamist leader,Turabi, who convened a series of meetings under the label Pop- ular Arab and Islamic Conference around the time of Bin Ladin’s arrival in that country. Delegations of violent Islamist extremists came from all the groups represented in Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Shura. Representatives also came from organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and 51 Hezbollah. Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to coop- erate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out pri- marily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983.The relation- ship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist opera- tions.As will be described in chapter 7, al Qaeda contacts with Iran continued 52 in ensuing years. Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda—save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against “Crusaders” during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract 53 them into his Islamic army. To protect his own ties with Iraq,Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad’s control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin’s help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam.There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common 54 Kurdish enemy. With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded 55 As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to to this request. establish connections.

79 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 62 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 62 Sudan Becomes a Doubtful Haven Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Ladin lost his base in Sudan. Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western gov- ernments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. Other governments in the region, such as those of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and even Libya, which were targets of some of these groups, added their own pres- sure. At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change.Though Turabi had been its inspirational leader, General Omar al Bashir, president since 1989, had never been entirely under his thumb.Thus as outside pressures mounted, Bashir’s supporters began to displace those of Turabi. The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in 56 When the Sudanese refused to hand over Sudan and helped by Bin Ladin. three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Secu- rity Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanc- 57 tioned Khartoum in April 1996. A clear signal to Bin Ladin that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya’s demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. Bin Ladin had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the 58 Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. y problems. Inter Bin Ladin also began to have serious mone national pres- sure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan’s cur- rency. Some of Bin Ladin’s companies ran short of funds. As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. Saudi pressures on the Bin Ladin family also probably took some toll. In any case, Bin back his spending and to control his out- Ladin found it necessary both to cut lays more closely. He appointed a new financial manager, whom his followers saw 59 as miserly. Money problems proved costly to Bin Ladin in other ways. Jamal Ahmed al Fadl, a Sudanese-born Arab, had spent time in the United States and had been recruited for the Afghan war through the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn. He had joined al Qaeda and taken the oath of fealty to Bin Ladin, serving as one of his business agents. Then Bin Ladin discovered that Fadl had skimmed about $110,000, and he asked for restitution. Fadl resented receiving a salary of only $500 a month while some of the Egyptians in al Qaeda were given $1,200 a month. He defected and became a star informant for the United States. Also testifying about al Qaeda in a U.S. court was L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who told of breaking with Bin Ladin because of Bin Ladin’s professed inability to pro- 60 vide him with money when his wife needed a caesarian section. In February 1996, Sudanese officials began approaching officials from the

80 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 63 63 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM United States and other governments, asking what actions of theirs might ease foreign pressure. In secret meetings with Saudi officials, Sudan offered to expel Bin Ladin to Saudi Arabia and asked the Saudis to pardon him. U.S. officials became aware of these secret discussions, certainly by March. Saudi officials apparently wanted Bin Ladin expelled from Sudan.They had already revoked his citizenship, however, and would not tolerate his presence in their country. And Bin Ladin may have no longer felt safe in Sudan, where he had already escaped at least one assassination attempt that he believed to have been the work of the Egyptian or Saudi regimes, or both. In any case, on May 19, 1996, Bin Ladin left Sudan—significantly weakened, despite his ambitions and orga- 61 nizational skills. He returned to Afghanistan. 2.5 AL QAEDA’S RENEWAL IN AFGHANISTAN (1996–1998) Bin Ladin flew on a leased aircraft from Khartoum to Jalalabad, with a refuel- 62 He was accompanied by family ing stopover in the United Arab Emirates. members and bodyguards, as well as by al Qaeda members who had been close associates since his organization’s 1988 founding in Afghanistan. Dozens of 63 additional militants arrived on later flights. Though Bin Ladin’s destination was Afghanistan, Pakistan was the nation that held the key to his ability to use Afghanistan as a base from which to revive his ambitious enterprise for war against the United States. For the first quarter century of its existence as a nation, Pakistan’s identity had derived from Islam, but its politics had been decidedly secular.The army was—and remains—the country’s strongest and most respected institution, and the army had been and continues to be preoccupied with its rivalry with India, especially over the disputed territory of Kashmir. From the 1970s onward, religion had become an increasingly powerful force in Pakistani politics. After a coup in 1977, military leaders turned to Islamist groups for support, and fundamentalists became more prominent. South Asia had an indigenous form of Islamic fundamentalism, which had developed in 64 The the nineteenth century at a school in the Indian village of Deoband. influence of the Wahhabi school of Islam had also grown, nurtured by Saudi- funded institutions. Moreover, the fighting in Afghanistan made Pakistan home to an enormous—and generally unwelcome—population of Afghan refugees; and since the badly strained Pakistani education system could not accommo- date the refugees, the government increasingly let privately funded religious schools serve as a cost-free alternative. Over time, these schools produced large numbers of half-educated young men with no marketable skills but with deeply 65 held Islamic views. Pakistan’s rulers found these multitudes of ardent young Afghans a source

81 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 64 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 64 of potential trouble at home but potentially useful abroad.Those who joined the Taliban movement, espousing a ruthless version of Islamic law, perhaps could bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and make it a cooperative ally.They thus might give Pakistan greater security on one of the several borders where 66 Pakistani military officers hoped for what they called “strategic depth.” It is unlikely that Bin Ladin could have returned to Afghanistan had Pak- istan disapproved. The Pakistani military intelligence service probably had advance knowledge of his coming, and its officers may have facilitated his travel. During his entire time in Sudan, he had maintained guesthouses and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These were part of a larger network used by diverse organizations for recruiting and training fighters for Islamic insur- gencies in such places as Tajikistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya. Pakistani intelli- gence officers reportedly introduced Bin Ladin to Taliban leaders in Kandahar, their main base of power, to aid his reassertion of control over camps near

82 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 65 65 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM Khowst, out of an apparent hope that he would now expand the camps and 67 make them available for training Kashmiri militants. Yet Bin Ladin was in his weakest position since his early days in the war against the Soviet Union.The Sudan ese government had canceled the registra- tion of the main business enterprises he had set up there and then put some of them up for public sale. According to a senior al Qaeda detainee, the govern- 68 ment of Sudan seized everything Bin Ladin had possessed there. committee,Abu Ubaidah Banshiri, one al He also lost the head of his military of the most capable and popular leaders of al Qaeda.While most of the group’s key figures had accompanied Bin Ladin to Afghanistan, Banshiri had remained in Kenya to oversee the training and weapons shipments of the cell set up some four years earlier. He died in a ferryboat accident on Lake Victoria just a few days after Bin Ladin arrived in Jalalabad, leaving Bin Ladin with a need to replace him not only in the Shura but also as supervisor of the cells and 69 He had to make other adjustments as prospective operations in East Africa. well, for some al Qaeda members viewed Bin Ladin’s return to Afghanistan as occasion to go off in their own directions. Some maintained collaborative rela- 70 tionships with al Qaeda, but many disengaged entirely. For a time, it may not have been clear to Bin Ladin that the Taliban would be his best bet as an ally.When he arrived in Afghanistan, they controlled much of the country, but key centers, including Kabul, were still held by rival war- lords. Bin Ladin went initially to Jalalabad, probably because it was in an area controlled by a provincial council of Islamic leaders who were not major con- tenders for national power. He found lodgings with Younis Khalis, the head of one of the main mujahideen factions. Bin Ladin apparently kept his options open, maintaining contacts with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who, though an Islamic extremist, was also one of the Taliban’s most militant opponents. But after September 1996, when first Jalalabad and then Kabul fell to the Taliban, 71 Bin Ladin cemented his ties with them. That process did not always go smoothly. Bin Ladin, no longer constrained by the Sudanese, clearly thought that he had new freedom to publish his appeals for jihad. At about the time when the Taliban were making their final drive toward Jalalabad and Kabul, Bin Ladin issued his August 1996 fatwa, saying that “We . . . have been prevented from addressing the Muslims,” but expressing relief that “by the grace of Allah, a safe base here is now available in the high Hindu Kush mountains in Khurasan.” But the Taliban, like the Sudanese, would 72 eventually hear warnings, including from the Saudi monarchy. Though Bin Ladin had promised Taliban leaders that he would be circum- spect, he broke this promise almost immediately, giving an inflammatory inter- view to CNN in March 1997. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar promptly “invited” Bin Ladin to move to Kandahar, ostensibly in the interests of Bin Ladin’s own security but more likely to situate him where he might be easier 73 to control.

83 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 66 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 66 There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response.According to one report, Saddam Hus- sein’s efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle 74 Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin. In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the ini- tiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin’s public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelli- gence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin’s Egypt- ian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air 75 attacks in December. Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides’ hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the ear- lier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in devel- 76 oping or carrying out any attacks against the United States. Bin Ladin eventually enjoyed a strong financial position in Afghanistan, thanks to Saudi and other financiers associated with the Golden Chain. Through his relationship with Mullah Omar—and the monetary and other benefits that it brought the Taliban—Bin Ladin was able to circumvent restric- tions; Mullah Omar would stand by him even when other Taliban leaders raised objections. Bin Ladin appeared to have in Afghanistan a freedom of move- ment that he had lacked in Sudan.Al Qaeda members could travel freely within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any immigration procedures, pur- chase and import vehicles and weapons, and enjoy the use of official Afghan Ministry of Defense license plates.Al Qaeda also used the Afghan state-owned 77 Ariana Airlines to courier money into the country. The Taliban seemed to open the doors to all who wanted to come to Afghanistan to train in the camps.The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff ter- rorist schemes.While Bin Ladin maintained his own al Qaeda guesthouses and camps for vetting and training recruits, he also provided support to and bene-

84 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 67 67 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM fited from the broad infrastructure of such facilities in Afghanistan made avail- able to the global network of Islamist movements. U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in Bin Ladin–sup- 78 ported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000. In addition to training fighters and special operators, this larger network of guesthouses and camps provided a mechanism by which al Qaeda could screen and vet candidates for induction into its own organization.Thousands flowed through the camps, but no more than a few hundred seem to have become al Qaeda members. From the time of its founding, al Qaeda had employed 79 training and indoctrination to identify “worthy” candidates. Al Qaeda continued meanwhile to collaborate closely with the many Mid- dle Eastern groups—in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, and elsewhere—with which it had been linked when Bin Ladin was in Sudan. It also reinforced its London base and its other offices around Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Bin Ladin bolstered his links to extremists in South and Southeast Asia, including the Malaysian-Indonesian JI and several 80 Pakistani groups engaged in the Kashmir conflict. The February 1998 fatwa thus seems to have been a kind of public launch of a renewed and stronger al Qaeda, after a year and a half of work. Having rebuilt his fund-raising network, Bin Ladin had again become the rich man of the jihad movement. He had maintained or restored many of his links with ter- rorists elsewhere in the world. And he had strengthened the internal ties in his own organization. The inner core of al Qaeda continued to be a hierarchical top-down group with defined positions, tasks, and salaries. Most but not all in this core swore bayat fealty (or ) to Bin Ladin. Other operatives were committed to Bin Ladin or to his goals and would take assignments for him, but they did not swear bayat and maintained, or tried to maintain, some autonomy. A looser circle of money to al Qaeda or train in its camps but remained adherents might give essentially independent. Nevertheless, they constituted a potential resource for 81 al Qaeda. 82 Now effectively merged with Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al Qaeda promised to become the general headquarters for international terrorism, with- out the need for the Islamic Army Shura. Bin Ladin was prepared to pick up where he had left off in Sudan. He was ready to strike at “the head of the snake.” Al Qaeda’s role in organizing terrorist operations had also changed. Before the move to Afghanistan, it had concentrated on providing funds, training, and weapons for actions carried out by members of allied groups. The attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa in the summer of 1998 would take a differ- ent form—planned, directed, and executed by al Qaeda, under the direct super- vision of Bin Ladin and his chief aides.

85 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 68 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 68 The Embassy Bombings As early as December 1993, a team of al Qaeda operatives had begun casing targets in Nairobi for future attacks. It was led by Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian army officer who had moved to the United States in the mid-1980s, enlisted in the U.S.Army, and became an instructor at Fort Bragg. He had pro- vided guidance and training to extremists at the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, including some who were subsequently convicted in the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. The casing team also included a computer expert 83 whose write-ups were reviewed by al Qaeda leaders. The team set up a makeshift laboratory for developing their surveillance photographs in an apartment in Nairobi where the various al Qaeda opera- tives and leaders based in or traveling to the Kenya cell sometimes met. Ban- shiri, al Qaeda’s military committee chief, continued to be the operational commander of the cell; but because he was constantly on the move, Bin Ladin had dispatched another operative, Khaled al Fawwaz, to serve as the on-site manager. The technical surveillance and communications equipment employed for these casing missions included state-of-the-art video cameras obtained from China and from dealers in Germany. The casing team also 84 reconnoitered targets in Djibouti. As early as January 1994, Bin Ladin received the surveillance reports, com- plete with diagrams prepared by the team’s computer specialist. He, his top mil- itary committee members—Banshiri and his deputy, Abu Hafs al Masri (also known as Mohammed Atef)—and a number of other al Qaeda leaders reviewed the reports. Agreeing that the U.S. embassy in Nairobi was an easy target because a car bomb could be parked close by, they began to form a plan. Al Qaeda had begun developing the tactical expertise for such attacks months earlier, when some of its operatives—top military committee members and sev- eral operatives who were involved with the Kenya cell among them—were sent 85 to Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon. The cell in Kenya experienced a series of disruptions that may in part account for the relatively long delay before the attack was actually carried out. The difficulties Bin Ladin began to encounter in Sudan in 1995, his move to Afghanistan in 1996, and the months spent establishing ties with the Taliban may also have played a role, as did Banshiri’s accidental drowning. Daily Telegraph In August 1997, the Kenya cell panicked. The London reported that Madani al Tayyib, formerly head of al Qaeda’s finance committee, had turned himself over to the Saudi gove rnment.The ar ticle said (incorrectly) s information with the U.S. and British that the Saudis were sharing Tayyib’ 86 At almost the same time, cell members learned that U.S. and authorities. Kenyan agents had searched the Kenya residence of Wadi al Hage, who had become the new on-site manager in Nairobi, and that Hage’s telephone was being tapped. Hage was a U. S. citizen who had worked with Bin Ladin in Afgha-

86 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 69 69 THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM nistan in the 1980s, and in 1992 he went to Sudan to become one of al Qaeda’s major financial operatives.When Hage returned to the United States to appear before a grand jury investigating Bin Ladin, the job of cell manager was taken over by Harun Fazul, a Kenyan citizen who had been in Bin Ladin’s advance team to Sudan back in 1990. Harun faxed a report on the “security situation” ] in grave to several sites, warning that “the crew members in East Africa is [ sic danger” in part because “America knows . . . that the followers of [Bin Ladin] . . . carried out the operations to hit Americans in Somalia.” The report pro- 87 vided instructions for avoiding further exposure. On February 23, 1998, Bin Ladin issued his public fatwa.The language had been in negotiation for some time, as part of the merger under way between Bin Ladin’s organization and Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Less than a month after the publication of the fatwa, the teams that were to carry out the embassy attacks were being pulled together in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.The timing and content of their instructions indicate that the decision to launch 88 the attacks had been made by the time the fatwa was issued. The next four months were spent setting up the teams in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Members of the cells rented residences, and purchased bomb-mak- ing materials and transport vehicles. At least one additional explosives expert was brought in to assist in putting the weapons together. In Nairobi, a hotel room was rented to put up some of the operatives. The suicide trucks were 89 purchased shortly before the attack date. While this was taking place, Bin Ladin continued to push his public mes- sage. On May 7, the deputy head of al Qaeda’s military committee, Mohammed Atef, faxed to Bin Ladin’s London office a new fatwa issued by a Al Quds group of sheikhs located in Afghanistan. A week later, it appeared in , the same Arabic-language newspaper in London that had first published al Arabi Bin Ladin’s February fatwa, and it conveyed the same message—the duty of Muslims to carry out holy war against the enemies of Islam and to expel the Americans from the Gulf region.Two weeks after that, Bin Ladin gave a video- taped interview to ABC News with the same slogans, adding that “we do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are 90 fatwa all targets in this .” By August 1, members of the cells not directly involved in the attacks had mostly departed from East Africa. The remaining operatives prepared and assembled the bombs, and acquired the delivery vehicles. On August 4, they made one last casing run at the embassy in Nairobi. By the evening of August 6, all but the delivery teams and one or two persons assigned to remove the evi- dence trail had left East Africa. Back in Afghanistan, Bin Ladin and the al Qaeda leadership had left Kandahar for the countryside, expecting U.S. retaliation. Declarations taking credit for the attacks had already been faxed to the joint al Qaeda–Egyptian Islamic Jihad office in Baku, with instructions to stand by

87 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 70 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 70 for orders to “instantly” transmit them to . One proclaimed “the Al Quds al Arabi formation of the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places,” and two others—one for each embassy—announced that the attack had been carried 91 out by a “company” of a “battalion” of this “Islamic Army.” On the morning of August 7, the bomb-laden trucks drove into the . . in Nairobi and 10:39 M A embassies roughly five minutes apart—about 10:35 . M A . in Dar es Salaam. Shortly afterward, a phone call was placed from Baku 92 to London.The previously prepared messages were then faxed to London. The attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi destroyed the embassy and killed 12 Americans and 201 others, almost all Kenyans. About 5,000 people were injured.The attack on the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam killed 11 more peo- ple, none of them Americans. Interviewed later about the deaths of the Africans, Bin Ladin answered that “when it becomes apparent that it would be impos- sible to repel these Americans without assaulting them, even if this involved the killing of Muslims, this is permissible under Islam.”Asked if he had indeed masterminded these bombings, Bin Ladin said that the World Islamic Front for jihad against “Jews and Crusaders” had issued a “crystal clear” fatwa. If the insti- gation for jihad against the Jews and the Americans to liberate the holy places 93 “is considered a crime,” he said,“let history be a witness that I am a criminal.”

88 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 71 3 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES we described the growth of a new kind of terrorism, and a In chapter 2, new terrorist organization—especially from 1988 to 1998, when Usama Bin Ladin declared war and organized the bombing of two U.S. embassies. In this chapter, we trace the parallel evolution of government efforts to counter ter- rorism by Islamic extremists against the United States. We mention many personalities in this report. As in any study of the U.S. government, some of the most important characters are institutions. We will introduce various agencies, and how they adapted to a new kind of terrorism. 3.1 FROM THE OLD TERRORISM TO THE NEW: THE FIRST WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING At 18 minutes after noon on February 26, 1993, a huge bomb went off beneath the two towers of the World Trade Center.This was not a suicide attack.The terrorists parked a truck bomb with a timing device on Level B-2 of the under- ground garage, then departed.The ensuing explosion opened a hole seven sto- ries up. Six people died. More than a thousand were injured. An FBI agent at 1 the scene described the relatively low number of fatalities as a miracle. President Bill Clinton ordered his National Security Council to coordinate the response. Government agencies swung into action to find the culprits.The Counterterrorist Center located at the CIA combed its files and queried sources around the world. The National Security Agency (NSA), the huge Defense Department signals collection agency, ramped up its communications 2 The New York Field intercept network and searched its databases for clues. Office of the FBI took control of the local investigation and, in the end, set a pattern for future management of terrorist incidents. Four features of this episode have significance for the story of 9/11. 71

89 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 72 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 72 First, the bombing signaled a new terrorist challenge, one whose rage and planted the bomb, Sunni extremist who malice had no limit. Ramzi Yousef, the 3 said later that he had hoped to kill 250,000 people. Second, the FBI and the Justice Department did excellent work investigat- ing the bombing.Within days, the FBI identified a truck remnant as part of a 4 Ryder rental van reported stolen in Jersey City the day before the bombing. Mohammed Salameh, who had rented the truck and reported it stolen, kept calling the rental office to get back his $400 deposit.The FBI arrested him there on March 4, 1993. In short order, the Bureau had several plotters in custody, including Nidal Ayyad, an engineer who had acquired chemicals for the bomb, 5 and Mahmoud Abouhalima, who had helped mix the chemicals. The FBI identified another conspirator, Ahmad Ajaj, who had been arrested by immigration authorities at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Sep- tember 1992 and charged with document fraud. His traveling companion was Ramzi Yousef, who had also entered with fraudulent documents but claimed political asylum and was admitted. It quickly became clear that Yousef had been a central player in the attack. He had fled to Pakistan immediately after the 6 bombing and would remain at large for nearly two years. The arrests of Salameh, Abouhalima, and Ayyad led the FBI to the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, where a central figure was Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, an extremist Sunni Muslim cleric who had moved to the United States from Egypt in 1990. In speeches and writings, the sightless Rahman, often called the Milestones “Blind Sheikh,” preached the message of Sayyid Qutb’s , characteriz- ing the United States as the oppressor of Muslims worldwide and asserting that it was their religious duty to fight against God’s enemies. An FBI informant learned of a plan to bomb major New York landmarks, including the Holland and Lincoln tunnels. Disrupting this “landmarks plot,” the FBI in June 1993 7 arrested Rahman and various confederates. As a result of the investigations and arrests, the U.S.Attorney for the South- ern District of New York prosecuted and convicted multiple individuals, including Ajaj, Salameh, Ayyad, Abouhalima, the Blind Sheikh, and Ramzi Yousef, for crimes related to the World Trade Center bombing and other plots. An unfortunate consequence of this superb investigative and prosecutorial effort was that it created an impression that the law enforcement system was well-equipped to cope with terrorism. Neither President Clinton, his princi- pal advisers, the Congress, nor the news media felt prompted, until later, to press the question of whether the procedures that put the Blind Sheikh and Ramzi Yousef behind bars would really protect Americans against the new virus of 8 which these individuals were just the first symptoms. Third, the successful use of the legal system to address the first World Trade Center bombing had the side effect of obscuring the need to examine the char- acter and extent of the new threat facing the United States.The trials did not bring the Bin Ladin network to the attention of the public and policymakers.

90 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 73 73 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES The FBI assembled, and the U.S. Attorney’s office put forward, some evi- dence showing that the men in the dock were not the only plotters. Materials taken from Ajaj indicated that the plot or plots were hatched at or near the Khaldan camp, a terrorist training camp on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Ajaj had left Texas in April 1992 to go there to learn how to construct bombs. He had met Ramzi Yousef in Pakistan, where they discussed bombing targets in the United States and assembled a “terrorist kit” that included bomb-mak- ing manuals, operations guidance, videotapes advocating terrorist action 9 against the United States, and false identification documents. Yousef was captured in Pakistan following the discovery by police in the Philippines in January 1995 of the Manila air plot, which envisioned placing bombs on board a dozen trans-Pacific airliners and setting them off simultane- ously. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—Yousef ’s uncle, then located in Qatar—was a fellow plotter of Yousef ’s in the Manila air plot and had also wired him some money prior to the Trade Center bombing. The U.S. Attorney obtained an indictment against KSM in January 1996, but an official in the government of Qatar probably warned him about it. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed evaded cap- 10 ture (and stayed at large to play a central part in the 9/11 attacks). The law enforcement process is concerned with proving the guilt of per- sons apprehended and charged. Investigators and prosecutors could not pres- ent all the evidence of possible involvement of individuals other than those charged, although they continued to pursue such investigations, planning or hoping for later prosecutions.The process was meant, by its nature, to mark for the public the events as finished—case solved, justice done. It was not designed to ask if the events might be harbingers of worse to come. Nor did it allow for aggregating and analyzing facts to see if they could provide clues to terrorist tactics more generally—methods of entry and finance, and mode of operation inside the United States. Fourth, although the bombing heightened awareness of a new terrorist dan- ger, successful prosecutions contributed to widespread underestimation of the threat.The government’s attorneys stressed the seriousness of the crimes, and put forward evidence of Yousef ’s technical ingenuity.Yet the public image that persisted was not of clever Yousef but of stupid Salameh going back again and again to reclaim his $400 truck rental deposit. 3.2 ADAPTATION—AND NONADAPTATION—IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY Legal processes were the primary method for responding to these early mani- festations of a new type of terrorism. Our overview of U.S. capabilities for deal- ing with it thus begins with the nation’s vast complex of law enforcement agencies.

91 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 74 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 74 The Justice Department and the FBI At the federal level, much law enforcement activity is concentrated in the Department of Justice. For countering terrorism, the dominant agency under Justice is the Federal Bureau of Investigation.The FBI does not have a general grant of authority but instead works under specific statutory authorizations. Most of its work is done in local offices called field offices. There are 56 of them, each covering a specified geographic area, and each quite separate from all others. Prior to 9/11, the special agent in charge was in general free to set 11 his or her office’s priorities and assign personnel accordingly. The office’s priorities were driven by two primary concerns. First, perform- ance in the Bureau was generally measured against statistics such as numbers of arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and convictions. Counterterrorism and counterintelligence work, often involving lengthy intelligence investigations that might never have positive or quantifiable results, was not career-enhanc- ing. Most agents who reached management ranks had little counterterrorism experience. Second, priorities were driven at the local level by the field offices, whose concerns centered on traditional crimes such as white-collar offenses and those pertaining to drugs and gangs. Individual field offices made choices 12 to serve local priorities, not national priorities. The Bureau also operates under an “office of origin” system.To avoid dupli- cation and possible conflicts, the FBI designates a single office to be in charge of an entire investigation. Because the New York Field Office indicted Bin Ladin prior to the East Africa bombings, it became the office of origin for all Bin Ladin cases, including the East Africa bombings and later the attack on the Cole USS . Most of the FBI’s institutional knowledge on Bin Ladin and al Qaeda resided there.This office worked closely with the U.S.Attorney for the South- ern District of New York to identify, arrest, prosecute, and convict many of the perpetrators of the attacks and plots. Field offices other than the specified office of origin were often reluctant to spend much energy on matters over which 13 they had no control and for which they received no credit. The FBI’s domestic intelligence gathering dates from the 1930s.With World War II looming, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to investigate foreign and foreign-inspired subversion—Communist, Nazi, and Japanese. Hoover added investigation of possible espionage, sabotage, or subversion to the duties of field offices. After the war, foreign intelligence duties were assigned to the newly established Central Intelligence Agency. Hoover jealously guarded the FBI’s domestic portfolio against all rivals. Hoover felt he was accountable only to the president, and the FBI’s domestic intelligence activities kept growing. In the 1960s, the FBI was receiving signif- icant assistance within the United States from the CIA and from Army Intel- ligence.The legal basis for some of this assistance was dubious. Decades of encouragement to perform as a domestic intelligence agency abruptly ended in the 1970s.Two years after Hoover’s death in 1972, congres-

92 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 75 75 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES sional and news media investigations of the Watergate scandals of the Nixon administration expanded into general investigations of foreign and domestic 14 They disclosed domestic intelligence by the Church and Pike committees. intelligence efforts, which included a covert action program that operated from 1956 to 1971 against domestic organizations and, eventually, domestic dissi- dents.The FBI had spied on a wide range of political figures, especially indi- viduals whom Hoover wanted to discredit (notably the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.), and had authorized unlawful wiretaps and surveillance.The shock registered in public opinion polls, where the percentage of Americans declaring a “highly favorable” view of the FBI dropped from 84 percent to 37 15 percent.The FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division was dissolved. In 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi adopted domestic security guide- lines to regulate intelligence collection in the United States and to deflect calls for even stronger regulation. In 1983,Attorney General William French Smith revised the Levi guidelines to encourage closer investigation of potential ter- rorism. He also loosened the rules governing authorization for investigations and their duration. Still, his guidelines, like Levi’s, took account of the reality that suspicion of “terrorism,” like suspicion of “subversion,” could lead to mak- ing individuals targets for investigation more because of their beliefs than because of their acts. Smith’s guidelines also took account of the reality that potential terrorists were often members of extremist religious organizations and that investigation of terrorism could cross the line separating state and 16 church. In 1986, Congress authorized the FBI to investigate terrorist attacks against Americans that occur outside the United States. Three years later, it added authority for the FBI to make arrests abroad without consent from the host country. Meanwhile, a task force headed by Vice President George H.W. Bush had endorsed a concept already urged by Director of Central Intelligence William Casey—a Counterterrorist Center, where the FBI, the CIA, and other organizations could work together on international terrorism.While it was dis- tinctly a CIA entity, the FBI detailed officials to work at the Center and obtained leads that helped in the capture of persons wanted for trial in the United States. The strengths that the FBI brought to counterterrorism were nowhere more brilliantly on display than in the case of Pan American Flight 103, bound from London to New York, which blew up over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, killing 270 people. Initial evidence pointed to the government of Syria and, later, Iran.The Counterterrorist Center reserved judgment on the perpe- trators of the attack. Meanwhile, FBI technicians, working with U.K. security services, gathered and analyzed the widely scattered fragments of the airliner. In 1991, with the help of the Counterterrorist Center, they identified one small fragment as part of a timing device—to the technicians, as distinctive as DNA. It was a Libyan device. Together with other evidence, the FBI put together a

93 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 76 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 76 case pointing conclusively to the Libyan government. Eventually Libya 17 Pan Am 103 became a cautionary tale acknowledged its responsibility. against rushing to judgment in attributing responsibility for a terrorist act. It also showed again how—given a case to solve—the FBI remained capable of extraordinary investigative success. FBI Organization and Priorities In 1993, President Clinton chose Louis Freeh as the Director of the Bureau. Freeh, who would remain Director until June 2001, believed that the FBI’s work should be done primarily by the field offices.To emphasize this view he cut headquarters staff and decentralized operations.The special agents in charge 18 gained power, influence, and independence. Freeh recognized terrorism as a major threat. He increased the number of legal attaché offices abroad, focusing in particular on the Middle East. He also urged agents not to wait for terrorist acts to occur before taking action. In his first budget request to Congress after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, he stated that “merely solving this type of crime is not enough; it is equally important that the FBI thwart terrorism before such acts can be perpetrated.” Within headquarters, he created a Counterterrorism Division that would com- plement the Counterterrorist Center at the CIA and arranged for exchanges of senior FBI and CIA counterterrorism officials. He pressed for more coop- 19 eration between legal attachés and CIA stations abroad. Freeh’s efforts did not, however, translate into a significant shift of resources to counterterrorism. FBI, Justice, and Office of Management and Budget offi- cials said that FBI leadership seemed unwilling to shift resources to terrorism from other areas such as violent crime and drug enforcement; other FBI offi- cials blamed Congress and the OMB for a lack of political will and failure to understand the FBI’s counterterrorism resource needs. In addition, Freeh did not impose his views on the field offices. With a few notable exceptions, the field offices did not apply significant resources to terrorism and often repro- 20 grammed funds for other priorities. In 1998, the FBI issued a five-year strategic plan led by its deputy director, Robert “Bear” Bryant. For the first time, the FBI designated national and eco- nomic security, including counterterrorism, as its top priority. Dale Watson, who would later become the head of the new Counterterrorism Division, said that after the East Africa bombings,“the light came on” that cultural change had to occur within the FBI.The plan mandated a stronger intelligence collection effort. It called for a nationwide automated system to facilitate information collection, analysis, and dissemination. It envisioned the creation of a professional intelligence cadre of experienced and trained agents and analysts. If successfully implemented, this would have been a major step toward addressing terrorism systematically, 21 rather than as individual unrelated cases. But the plan did not succeed. First, the plan did not obtain the necessary human resources. Despite des-

94 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 77 77 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES ignating “national and economic security” as its top priority in 1998, the FBI did not shift human resources accordingly.Although the FBI’s counter- terrorism budget tripled during the mid-1990s, FBI counterterrorism spending remained fairly constant between fiscal years 1998 and 2001. In 2000, there were still twice as many agents devoted to drug enforcement as 22 to counterterrorism. Second, the new division intended to strengthen the FBI’s strategic analy- sis capability faltered. It received insufficient resources and faced resistance from senior managers in the FBI’s operational divisions.The new division was sup- posed to identify trends in terrorist activity, determine what the FBI did not know, and ultimately drive collection efforts. However, the FBI had little appre- ciation for the role of analysis.Analysts continued to be used primarily in a tac- tical fashion—providing support for existing cases. Compounding the problem was the FBI’s tradition of hiring analysts from within instead of recruiting indi- 23 viduals with the relevant educational background and expertise. Moreover, analysts had difficulty getting access to the FBI and intelligence community information they were expected to analyze.The poor state of the FBI’s information systems meant that such access depended in large part on an analyst’s personal relationships with individuals in the operational units or squads where the information resided. For all of these reasons, prior to 9/11 relatively few strategic analytic reports about counterterrorism had been com- pleted. Indeed, the FBI had never completed an assessment of the overall ter- 24 rorist threat to the U.S. homeland. Third, the FBI did not have an effective intelligence collection effort. Col- lection of intelligence from human sources was limited, and agents were inad- equately trained. Only three days of a 16-week agents’ course were devoted to counterintelligence and counterterrorism, and most subsequent training was received on the job.The FBI did not have an adequate mechanism for validat- ing source reporting, nor did it have a system for adequately tracking and shar- ing source reporting, either internally or externally.The FBI did not dedicate sufficient resources to the surveillance and translation needs of counter- terrorism agents. It lacked sufficient translators proficient in Arabic and other 25 key languages, resulting in a significant backlog of untranslated intercepts. Finally, the FBI’s information systems were woefully inadequate. The FBI lacked the ability to know what it knew: there was no effective mechanism for capturing or sharing its institutional knowledge. FBI agents did create records of interviews and other investigative efforts, but there were no reports officers to condense the information into meaningful intelligence that could be retrieved 26 and disseminated. In 1999, the FBI created separate Counterterrorism and Counterintelli- gence divisions. Dale Watson, the first head of the new Counterterrorism Divi- sion, recognized the urgent need to increase the FBI’s counterterrorism capability. His plan, called MAXCAP 05, was unveiled in 2000: it set the goal

95 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 78 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 78 of bringing the Bureau to its “maximum feasible capacity” in counterterror- ism by 2005. Field executives told Watson that they did not have the analysts, linguists, or technically trained experts to carry out the strategy. In a report pro- vided to Director Robert Mueller in September 2001, one year after Watson presented his plan to field executives, almost every FBI field office was assessed to be operating below “maximum capacity.”The report stated that “the goal to ‘prevent terrorism’ requires a dramatic shift in emphasis from a reactive capa- bility to highly functioning intelligence capability which provides not only 27 leads and operational support, but clear strategic analysis and direction.” Legal Constraints on the FBI and “the Wall” 28 For crim- The FBI had different tools for law enforcement and intelligence. inal matters, it could apply for and use traditional criminal warrants. For intel- ligence matters involving international terrorism, however, the rules were different. For many years the attorney general could authorize surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers without any court review, but in 29 This law reg- 1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. ulated intelligence collection directed at foreign powers and agents of foreign powers in the United States. In addition to requiring court review of proposed surveillance (and later, physical searches), the 1978 act was interpreted by the courts to require that a search be approved only if its “primary purpose” was to obtain foreign intelligence information. In other words, the authorities of the FISA law could not be used to circumvent traditional criminal warrant requirements.The Justice Department interpreted these rulings as saying that criminal prosecutors could be briefed on FISA information but could not 30 direct or control its collection. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Justice prosecutors had informal arrangements for obtaining information gathered in the FISA process, the understanding being that they would not improperly exploit that process for their criminal cases. Whether the FBI shared with prosecutors information pertinent to possible criminal investigations was left solely to the judgment of 31 the FBI. But the prosecution of Aldrich Ames for espionage in 1994 revived con- cerns about the prosecutors’ role in intelligence investigations.The Department of Justice’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) is responsible for reviewing and presenting all FISA applications to the FISA Court. It worried that because of the numerous prior consultations between FBI agents and pros- ecutors, the judge might rule that the FISA warrants had been misused. If that had happened,Ames might have escaped conviction. Richard Scruggs, the act- ing head of OIPR, complained to Attorney General Janet Reno about the lack of information-sharing controls. On his own, he began imposing information- sharing procedures for FISA material. The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review became the gatekeeper for the flow of FISA information to criminal 32 prosecutors.

96 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 79 79 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES In July 1995, Attorney General Reno issued formal procedures aimed at managing information sharing between Justice Department prosecutors and the FBI.They were developed in a working group led by the Justice Depart- ment’s Executive Office of National Security, overseen by Deputy Attorney 33 These procedures—while requiring the sharing of General Jamie Gorelick. intelligence information with prosecutors—regulated the manner in which such information could be shared from the intelligence side of the house to the criminal side. These procedures were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied. As a result, there was far less information sharing and coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division in practice than was allowed under the department’s procedures. Over time the procedures came to be referred to as “the wall.” The term “the wall” is misleading, however, because several factors 34 led to a series of barriers to information sharing that developed. The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review became the sole gatekeeper for passing information to the Criminal Division. Though Attorney General Reno’s procedures did not include such a provision, the Office assumed the role anyway, arguing that its position reflected the concerns of Judge Royce Lamberth, then chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.The Office threatened that if it could not regulate the flow of information to crim- inal prosecutors, it would no longer present the FBI’s warrant requests to the 35 FISA Court.The information flow withered. The 1995 procedures dealt only with sharing between agents and criminal prosecutors, not between two kinds of FBI agents, those working on intelli- gence matters and those working on criminal matters. But pressure from the Office of Intelligence Policy Review, FBI leadership, and the FISA Court built barriers between agents—even agents serving on the same squads. FBI Deputy Director Bryant reinforced the Office’s caution by informing agents that too much information sharing could be a career stopper.Agents in the field began to believe—incorrectly—that no FISA information could be shared with 36 agents working on criminal investigations. This perception evolved into the still more exaggerated belief that the FBI any could not share intelligence information with criminal investigators, even if no FISA procedures had been used. Thus, relevant information from the National Security Agency and the CIA often failed to make its way to crimi- nal investigators. Separate reviews in 1999, 2000, and 2001 concluded inde- pendently that information sharing was not occurring, and that the intent of 37 We will describe some of the the 1995 procedures was ignored routinely. unfortunate consequences of these accumulated institutional beliefs and prac- tices in chapter 8. There were other legal limitations. Both prosecutors and FBI agents argued that they were barred by court rules from sharing grand jury information, even though the prohibition applied only to that small fraction that had been pre- sented to a grand jury, and even that prohibition had exceptions. But as inter-

97 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 80 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 80 preted by FBI field offices, this prohibition could conceivably apply to much of the information unearthed in an investigation.There were also restrictions, arising from executive order, on the commingling of domestic information with foreign intelligence. Finally the NSA began putting caveats on its Bin Ladin–related reports that required prior approval before sharing their contents with criminal investigators and prosecutors. These developments further 38 blocked the arteries of information sharing. Other Law Enforcement Agencies The Justice Department is much more than the FBI. It also has a U.S. Marshals Service, almost 4,000 strong on 9/11 and especially expert in tracking fugi- tives, with much local police knowledge.The department’s Drug Enforcement 39 There were a num- Administration had, as of 2001, more than 4,500 agents. ber of occasions when DEA agents were able to introduce sources to the FBI or CIA for counterterrorism use. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), with its 9,000 Border Patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000 immigration special agents, had per- haps the greatest potential to develop an expanded role in counterterrorism. However, the INS was focused on the formidable challenges posed by illegal entry over the southwest border, criminal aliens, and a growing backlog in the applications for naturalizing immigrants.The White House, the Justice Depart- ment, and above all the Congress reinforced these concerns. In addition, when Doris Meissner became INS Commissioner in 1993, she found an agency seri- ously hampered by outdated technology and insufficient human resources. Bor- der Patrol agents were still using manual typewriters; inspectors at ports of entry were using a paper watchlist; the asylum and other benefits systems did not 40 effectively deter fraudulent applicants. Commissioner Meissner responded in 1993 to the World Trade Center bombing by providing seed money to the State Department’s Consular Affairs Bureau to automate its terrorist watchlist, used by consular officers and border inspectors. The INS assigned an individual in a new “lookout” unit to work with the State Department in watchlisting suspected terrorists and with the intelligence community and the FBI in determining how to deal with them when they appeared at ports of entry. By 1998, 97 suspected terrorists had been 41 denied admission at U.S. ports of entry because of the watchlist. How to conduct deportation cases against aliens who were suspected ter- rorists caused significant debate.The INS had immigration law expertise and authority to bring the cases, but the FBI possessed the classified information sometimes needed as evidence, and information-sharing conflicts resulted. New laws in 1996 authorized the use of classified evidence in removal hear- ings, but the INS removed only a handful of the aliens with links to terrorist 42 activity (none identified as associated with al Qaeda) using classified evidence. Midlevel INS employees proposed comprehensive counterterrorism pro-

98 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 81 81 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES posals to management in 1986, 1995, and 1997. No action was taken on them. In 1997, a National Security Unit was set up to handle alerts, track potential terrorist cases for possible immigration enforcement action, and work with the rest of the Justice Department. It focused on the FBI’s priorities of Hezbollah and Hamas, and began to examine how immigration laws could be brought to bear on terrorism. For instance, it sought unsuccessfully to require that CIA security checks be completed before naturalization applications were 43 Policy questions, such as whether resident alien status should be approved. revoked upon the person’s conviction of a terrorist crime, were not addressed. Congress, with the support of the Clinton administration, doubled the num- ber of Border Patrol agents required along the border with Mexico to one agent every quarter mile by 1999. It rejected efforts to bring additional resources to bear in the north.The border with Canada had one agent for every 13.25 miles. Despite examples of terrorists entering from Canada, awareness of terrorist activity in Canada and its more lenient immigration laws, and an inspector general’s report recommending that the Border Patrol develop a northern border strategy, the only positive step was that the number of Border 44 Patrol agents was not cut any further. Inspectors at the ports of entry were not asked to focus on terrorists. Inspec- tors told us they were not even aware that when they checked the names of incoming passengers against the automated watchlist, they were checking in part for terrorists. In general, border inspectors also did not have the informa- tion they needed to make fact-based determinations of admissibility.The INS initiated but failed to bring to completion two efforts that would have pro- vided inspectors with information relevant to counterterrorism—a proposed establish a way to track foreign student visa compliance and a system program to 45 of tracking travelers’ entry to and exit from the United States. In 1996, a new law enabled the INS to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies through which the INS provided training and the local agencies exercised immigration enforcement authority. Terrorist watchlists were not available to them. Mayors in cities with large immigrant populations sometimes imposed limits on city employee cooperation with fed- eral immigration agents. A large population lives outside the legal framework. Fraudulent documents could be easily obtained. Congress kept the number of 46 INS agents static in the face of the overwhelming problem. The chief vehicle for INS and for state and local participation in law enforcement was the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), first tried out in New spate of incidents inv York City in 1980 in response to a olving domestic ter- aged by the New York Field Office rorist organizations.This task force was man of the FBI, and its existence provided an opportunity to exchange information and, as happened after the first World Trade Center bombing, to enlist local offi- cers, as well as other agency representatives, as partners in the FBI investiga- tion. The FBI expanded the number of JTTFs throughout the 1990s, and by

99 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 82 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 82 9/11 there were 34.While useful, the JTTFs had limitations.They set priori- ties in accordance with regional and field office concerns, and most were not fully staffed. Many state and local entities believed they had little to gain from 47 having a full-time representative on a JTTF. Other federal law enforcement resources, also not seriously enlisted for counterterrorism, were to be found in the Treasury Department. Treasury housed the Secret Service, the Customs Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, and Firearms. Given the Secret Service’s mission to pro- tect the president and other high officials, its agents did become involved with those of the FBI whenever terrorist assassination plots were rumored. The Customs Service deployed agents at all points of entry into the United States. Its agents worked alongside INS agents, and the two groups sometimes cooperated. In the winter of 1999–2000, as will be detailed in chapter 6, questioning by an especially alert Customs inspector led to the arrest of an al Qaeda terrorist whose apparent mission was to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. The Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, and Firearms was used on occasion by the FBI as a resource.The ATF’s laboratories and analysis were critical to the inves- tigation of the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the April 48 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Before 9/11, with the exception of one portion of the FBI, very little of the sprawling U.S. law enforcement community was engaged in countering ter- rorism. Moreover, law enforcement could be effective only after specific indi- viduals were identified, a plot had formed, or an attack had already occurred. Responsible individuals had to be located, apprehended, and transported back to a U.S. court for prosecution. As FBI agents emphasized to us, the FBI and the Justice Department do not have cruise missiles.They declare war by indict- ing someone.They took on the lead role in addressing terrorism because they 49 were asked to do so. 3.3 . . . AND IN THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) within the Department of Trans- portation had been vested by Congress with the sometimes conflicting man- date of regulating the safety and security of U.S. civil aviation while also promoting the civil aviation industry.The FAA had a security mission to pro- tect the users of commercial air transportation against terrorism and other criminal acts. In the years before 9/11, the FAA perceived sabotage as a greater threat to aviation than hijacking. First, no domestic hijacking had occurred in a decade. Second, the commercial aviation system was perceived as more vul- nerable to explosives than to weapons such as firearms. Finally, explosives were

100 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 83 83 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES perceived as deadlier than hijacking and therefore of greater consequence. In 1996, a presidential commission on aviation safety and security chaired by Vice President Al Gore reinforced the prevailing concern about sabotage and explo- sives on aircraft.The Gore Commission also flagged, as a new danger, the pos- sibility of attack by surface-to-air missiles. Its 1997 final report did not discuss 50 the possibility of suicide hijackings. The FAA set and enforced aviation security rules, which airlines and air- ports were required to implement.The rules were supposed to produce a “lay- ered” system of defense.This meant that the failure of any one layer of security would not be fatal, because additional layers would provide backup security. But each layer relevant to hijackings—intelligence, passenger prescreening, checkpoint screening, and onboard security—was seriously flawed prior to 9/11.Taken together, they did not stop any of the 9/11 hijackers from getting 51 on board four different aircraft at three different airports. The FAA’s policy was to use intelligence to identify both specific plots and general threats to civil aviation security, so that the agency could develop and deploy appropriate countermeasures. The FAA’s 40-person intelligence unit was supposed to receive a broad range of intelligence data from the FBI, CIA, and other agencies so that it could make assessments about the threat to avia- tion. But the large volume of data contained little pertaining to the presence and activities of terrorists in the United States. For example, information on the FBI’s effort in 1998 to assess the potential use of flight training by terror- ists and the Phoenix electronic communication of 2001 warning of radical Middle Easterners attending flight school were not passed to FAA headquar- ters. Several top FAA intelligence officials called the domestic threat picture a 52 serious blind spot. Moreover, the FAA’s intelligence unit did not receive much attention from the agency’s leadership. Neither Administrator Jane Garvey nor her deputy rou- tinely reviewed daily intelligence, and what they did see was screened for them. She was unaware of a great amount of hijacking threat information from her own intelligence unit, which, in turn, was not deeply involved in the agency’s policymaking process. Historically, decisive security action took place only after 53 a disaster had occurred or a specific plot had been discovered. The next aviation security layer was passenger prescreening. The FAA directed air carriers not to fly individuals known to pose a “direct” threat to civil aviation. But as of 9/11, the FAA’s “no-fly” list contained the names of just 12 terrorist suspects (including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), even though government watchlists contained the names of many thousands of known and suspected terrorists.This astonishing mismatch existed despite the Gore Commission’s having called on the FBI and CIA four years earlier to provide terrorist watchlists to improve prescreening.The long- time chief of the FAA’s civil aviation security division testified that he was not even aware of the State Department’s TIPOFF list of known and suspected ter-

101 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 84 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 84 rorists (some 60,000 before 9/11) until he heard it mentioned during the Commission’s January 26, 2004, public hearing.The FAA had access to some 54 TIPOFF data, but apparently found it too difficult to use. The second part of prescreening called on the air carriers to implement an FAA-approved computerized algorithm (known as CAPPS, for Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) designed to identify passengers whose profile suggested they might pose more than a minimal risk to aircraft. Although the algorithm included hijacker profile data, at that time only pas- sengers checking bags were eligible to be selected by CAPPS for additional scrutiny. Selection entailed only having one’s checked baggage screened for explosives or held off the airplane until one had boarded. Primarily because of concern regarding potential discrimination and the impact on passenger throughput, “selectees” were no longer required to undergo extraordinary screening of their carry-on baggage as had been the case before the system was 55 This policy change also reflected the perception that computerized in 1997. nonsuicide sabotage was the primary threat to civil aviation. Checkpoint screening was considered the most important and obvious layer of security. Walk-through metal detectors and X-ray machines operated by trained screeners were employed to stop prohibited items. Numerous govern- ment reports indicated that checkpoints performed poorly, often failing to detect even obvious FAA test items. Many deadly and dangerous items did not set off metal detectors, or were hard to distinguish in an X-ray machine from 56 innocent everyday items. While FAA rules did not expressly prohibit knives with blades under 4 inches long, the airlines’ checkpoint operations guide (which was developed in cooperation with the FAA), explicitly permitted them.The FAA’s basis for this policy was (1) the agency did not consider such items to be menacing, (2) most local laws did not prohibit individuals from carrying such knives, and (3) such knives would have been difficult to detect unless the sensitivity of metal detec- tors had been greatly increased. A proposal to ban knives altogether in 1993 had been rejected because small cutting implements were difficult to detect and the number of innocent “alarms” would have increased significantly, exacer- 57 bating congestion problems at checkpoints. Several years prior to 9/11, an FAA requirement for screeners to conduct “continuous” and “random” hand searches of carry-on luggage at checkpoints had been replaced by explosive trace detection or had simply become ignored by the air carriers. Therefore, secondary screening of individuals and their carry-on bags to identify weapons (other than bombs) was nonexistent, except for passengers who triggered the metal detectors. Even when small knives were detected by secondary screening, they were usually returned to the traveler. Reportedly, the 9/11 hijackers were instructed to use items that would be 58 undetectable by airport checkpoints. In the pre-9/11 security system, the air carriers played a major role. As the

102 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 85 85 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES Inspector General of the Department of Transportation told us, there were great pressures from the air carriers to control security costs and to “limit the impact of security requirements on aviation operations, so that the industry could con- . . . [T]hose centrate on its primary mission of moving passengers and aircraft. counterpressures in turn manifested themselves as significant weaknesses in security.”A longtime FAA security official described the air carriers’ approach to security regulation as “decry, deny and delay” and told us that while “the air carriers had seen the enlightened hand of self-interest with respect to safety, 59 they hadn’t seen it in the security arena.” The final layer, security on board commercial aircraft, was not designed to counter suicide hijackings.The FAA-approved “Common Strategy” had been elaborated over decades of experience with scores of hijackings, beginning in the 1960s. It taught flight crews that the best way to deal with hijackers was to accommodate their demands, get the plane to land safely, and then let law enforcement or the military handle the situation. According to the FAA, the record had shown that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it was to end peacefully. The strategy operated on the fundamental assumption that hijackers issue negotiable demands (most often for asylum or the release of pris- oners) and that, as one FAA official put it,“suicide wasn’t in the game plan” of hijackers. FAA training material provided no guidance for flight crews should 60 violence occur. This prevailing Common Strategy of cooperation and nonconfrontation meant that even a hardened cockpit door would have made little difference in a hijacking.As the chairman of the Security Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association observed when proposals were made in early 2001 to install rein- forced cockpit doors in commercial aircraft, “Even if you make a vault out of the door, if they have a noose around my flight attendant’s neck, I’m going to open the door.” Prior to 9/11, FAA regulations mandated that cockpit doors permit ready access into and out of the cockpit in the event of an emergency. Even so, rules implemented in the 1960s required air crews to keep the cock- pit door closed and locked in flight.This requirement was not always observed 61 or vigorously enforced. As for law enforcement, there were only 33 armed and trained federal air marshals as of 9/11.They were not deployed on U.S. domestic flights, except when in transit to provide security on international departures. This policy reflected the FAA’s view that domestic hijacking was in check—a view held confidently as no terrorist had hijacked a U.S. commercial aircraft anywhere in 62 the world since 1986. In the absence of any recent aviation security incident and without “spe- cific and credible” evidence of a plot directed at civil aviation, the FAA’s lead- ership focused elsewhere, including on operational concerns and the ever-present issue of safety. FAA Administrator Garvey recalled that “every day in 2001 was like the day before Thanksgiving.” Heeding calls for improved air

103 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 86 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 86 service, Congress concentrated its efforts on a “passenger bill of rights,” to improve capacity, efficiency, and customer satisfaction in the aviation system. 63 There was no focus on terrorism. 3.4 . . . AND IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY The National Security Act of 1947 created the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Independent from the departments of Defense, State, Justice, and other policy departments, the DCI heads the U.S. intelligence community and provides intelligence to federal entities. The sole element of the intelligence community independent from a cab- inet agency is the CIA.As an independent agency, it collects, analyzes, and dis- seminates intelligence from all sources.The CIA’s number one customer is the president of the United States, who also has the authority to direct it to con- 64 Although covert actions represent a very small frac- duct covert operations. tion of the Agency’s entire budget, these operations have at times been controversial and over time have dominated the public’s perception of the CIA. The DCI is confirmed by the Senate but is not technically a member of the president’s cabinet.The director’s power under federal law over the loose, con- 65 He or she states the commu- federated “intelligence community” is limited. nity’s priorities and coordinates development of intelligence agency budget requests for submission to Congress. This responsibility gives many the false impression that the DCI has line authority over the heads of these agencies and has the power to shift resources within these budgets as the need arises. Neither is true. In fact, the DCI’s real authority has been directly proportional to his personal closeness to the presi- dent, which has waxed and waned over the years, and to others in government, especially the secretary of defense. Intelligence agencies under the Department of Defense account for approximately 80 percent of all U.S. spending for intelligence, including some that supports a national customer base and some that supports specific Defense 66 As they are housed in the Defense Department or military service needs. Department, these agencies are keenly attentive to the military’s strategic and tactical requirements. One of the intelligence agencies in Defense with a national customer base is the National Security Agency, which intercepts and analyzes foreign com- munications and breaks codes.The NSA also creates codes and ciphers to pro- tect government information. Another is the recently renamed National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), which provides and analyzes imagery and produces a wide array of products, including maps, navigation tools, and surveillance intelligence. A third such agency in Defense is the National Reconnaissance Office. It develops, procures, launches, and maintains in orbit

104 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 87 87 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES information-gathering satellites that serve other government agencies. The Defense Intelligence Agency supports the secretary of defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military field commanders. It does some collection through human sources as well as some technical intelligence collection. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have their own intelligence components that collect information, help them decide what weapons to acquire, and serve the tactical intelligence needs of their respective services. In addition to those from the Department of Defense, other elements in the intelligence community include the national security parts of the FBI; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department; the intelligence component of the Treasury Department; the Energy Department’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the former of which, through leverag- ing the expertise of the national laboratory system, has special competence in nuclear weapons; the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard; and, today, the Directorate of Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection in the Department of Homeland Security. The National Security Agency The National Security Agency’s intercepts of terrorist communications often set off alarms elsewhere in the government. Often, too, its intercepts are con- clusive elements in the analyst’s jigsaw puzzle. NSA engineers build technical systems to break ciphers and to make sense of today’s complex signals environ- ment. Its analysts listen to conversations between foreigners not meant for them.They also perform “traffic analysis”—studying technical communications systems and codes as well as foreign organizational structures, including those of terrorist organizations. Cold War adversaries used very hierarchical, familiar, and predictable mili- tary command and control methods.With globalization and the telecommu- nications revolution, and with loosely affiliated but networked adversaries using commercial devices and encryption, the technical impediments to signals col- lection grew at a geometric rate. At the same time, the end of the Cold War and the resultant cuts in national security funding forced intelligence agencies to cut systems and seek economies of scale. Modern adversaries are skilled users of communications technologies.The NSA’s challenges, and its opportunities, 67 increased exponentially in “volume, variety, and velocity.” The law requires the NSA to not deliberately collect data on U.S. citizens or on persons in the United States without a warrant based on foreign intelli- gence requirements. Also, the NSA was supposed to let the FBI know of any indication of crime, espionage, or “terrorist enterprise” so that the FBI could obtain the appropriate warrant. Later in this story, we will learn that while the NSA had the technical capability to report on communications with suspected terrorist facilities in the Middle East, the NSA did not seek FISA Court war- rants to collect communications between individuals in the United States and

105 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 88 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 88 foreign countries, because it believed that this was an FBI role. It also did not want to be viewed as targeting persons in the United States and possibly vio- 68 eign intelligence. lating laws that governed NSA’ s collection of for An almost obsessive protection of sources and methods by the NSA, and its focus on foreign intelligence, and its avoidance of anything domestic would, as will be seen, be important elements in the story of 9/11. Technology as an Intelligence Asset and Liability The application of newly developed scientific technology to the mission of U.S. war fighters and national security decisionmakers is one of the great success sto- ries of the twentieth century. It did not happen by accident. Recent wars have been waged and won decisively by brave men and women using advanced tech- nology that was developed, authorized, and paid for by conscientious and dili- gent executive and legislative branch leaders many years earlier. The challenge of technology, however, is a daunting one. It is expensive, sometimes fails, and often can create problems as well as solve them. Some of the advanced technologies that gave us insight into the closed-off territories of the Soviet Union during the Cold War are of limited use in identifying and tracking individual terrorists. this same rapid de velop ment of com- Terrorists, in turn, have benefited from munication technologies.They simply could b uy off the shelf and harvest the products of a $3 trillion a year telecommunications industry.They could acquire without great expense commu nication devices that were varied, global, instantaneous, complex, and encrypted. The emergence of the World Wide Web has given terrorists a much easier means of acquiring information and exercising command and control over their operations.The operational leader of the 9/11 conspiracy, Mohamed Atta, went online from Hamburg, Germany, to research U.S. flight schools. Targets of intelligence collection have become more sophisticated.These changes have made surveillance and threat warning more difficult. Despite the problems that technology creates,Americans’ love affair with it leads them to also regard it as the solution. But technology produces its best results when an organization has the doctrine, structure, and incentives to exploit it. For example, even the best information technology will not improve information sharing so long as the intelligence agencies’ personnel and secu- rity systems reward protecting information rather than disseminating it. The CIA The CIA is a descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which Pres- ident Roosevelt created early in World War II after having first thought the FBI might take that role.The father of the OSS was William J. “Wild Bill” Dono- van, a Wall Street lawyer. He recruited into the OSS others like himself—well 69 traveled, well connected, well-to-do professional men and women.

106 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 89 89 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES An innovation of Donovan’s, whose legacy remains part of U.S. intelligence today, was the establishment of a Research and Analysis Branch. There large numbers of scholars from U.S. universities pored over accounts from spies, com- munications intercepted by the armed forces, transcripts of radio broadcasts, and publications of all types, and prepared reports on economic, political, and social conditions in foreign theaters of operation. At the end of World War II, to Donovan’s disappointment, President Harry Truman dissolved the Office of Strategic Services. Four months later, the Pres- ident directed that “all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, devel- oped and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security,” under a National Intelli- gence Authority consisting of the secretaries of State,War, and the Navy, and a personal representative of the president.This body was to be assisted by a Cen- depart sons detailed from the tral Intelligence Group, made up of per ments of 70 each of the members and headed by a Director of Central Intelligence. Subsequently, President Truman agreed to the National Security Act of 1947, which, among other things, established the Central Intelligence Agency, under the Director of Central Intelligence. Lobbying by the FBI, combined 71 led to the FBI’s being assigned respon- with fears of creating a U.S. Gestapo, sibility for internal security functions and counterespionage. The CIA was specifically accorded “no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or 72 This structure built in tensions between the CIA internal security functions.” and the Defense Department’s intelligence agencies, and between the CIA and the FBI. With this history, the CIA brought to the Clandestine and Covert Action. elite organization, vie era of 9/11 many attributes of an wing itself as serving on the nation’s front lines to engage Amer ica’s enemies. Officers in its Clandestine Service, under what became the Directorate of Operations, fanned out into sta- tions abroad. Each chief of station was a very important person in the organi- zation, given the additional title of the DCI’s representative in that country. He (occasionally she) was governed by an operating directive that listed operational priorities issued by the relevant regional division of the Directorate, constrained by centrally determined allocations of resources. Because the conduct of espionage was a high-risk activity, decisions on the clandestine targeting, recruitment, handling, and termination of secret sources and the dissemination of collected information required Washington’s approval and action. But in this decentralized system, analogous in some ways to the cul- ture of the FBI field offices in the United States, everyone in the Directorate of Operations presumed that it was the job of headquarters to support the field, rather than manage field activities. In the 1960s, the CIA suffered exposure of its botched effort to land Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs.The Vietnam War brought on more criticism.A promi-

107 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 90 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 90 nent feature of the Watergate era was investigations of the CIA by committees headed by Frank Church in the Senate and Otis Pike in the House.They pub- lished evidence that the CIA had secretly planned to assassinate Fidel Castro and other foreign leaders.The President had not taken plain responsibility for these judgments. CIA officials had taken most of the blame, saying they had 73 done so in order to preserve the President’s “plausible deniability.” After the Watergate era, Congress established oversight committees to ensure that the CIA did not undertake covert action contrary to basic Amer- ican law. Case officers in the CIA’s Clandestine Service interpreted legislation, such as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring that the president approve and report to Congress any covert action, as sending a message to them that covert action often leads to trouble and can severely damage one’s career. Controver- sies surrounding Central American covert action programs in the mid-1980s led to the indictment of several senior officers of the Clandestine Service. Dur- ing the 1990s, tension sometimes arose, as it did in the effort against al Qaeda, between policymakers who wanted the CIA to undertake more aggressive covert action and wary CIA leaders who counseled prudence and making sure that the legal basis and presidential authorization for their actions were unde- niably clear. The Clandestine Service felt the impact of the post–Cold War peace divi- dend, with cuts beginning in 1992. As the number of officers declined and overseas facilities were closed, the DCI and his managers responded to devel- oping crises in the Balkans or in Africa by “surging,” or taking officers from across the service to use on the immediate problem. In many cases the surge officers had little familiarity with the new issues. Inevitably, some parts of the world and some collection targets were not fully covered, or not covered at all. This strategy also placed great emphasis on close relations with foreign liaison services, whose help was needed to gain information that the United States itself did not have the capacity to collect. The nadir for the Clandestine Service was in 1995, when only 25 trainees 74 In 1998, the DCI was able to persuade the administra- became new officers. tion and the Congress to endorse a long-range rebuilding program. It takes five to seven years of training, language study, and experience to bring a recruit up 75 to full performance. Analysis. The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence retained some of its original character of a university gone to war. Its men and women tended to judge one another by the quantity and quality of their publications (in this case, classified publications). Apart from their own peers, they looked for approval and guid- ance to policymakers. During the 1990s and today, particular value is attached to having a contribution included in one of the classified daily “newspapers”— the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief—or, better still, selected for inclusion 76 in the President’s Daily Brief.

108 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 91 91 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES The CIA had been created to wage the Cold War. Its steady focus on one or two primary adversaries, decade after decade, had at least one positive effect: it created an environment in which managers and analysts could safely invest time and resources in basic research, detailed and reflective. Payoffs might not be immediate. But when they wrote their estimates, even in brief papers, they could draw on a deep base of knowledge. When the Cold War ended, those investments could not easily be reallo- cated to new enemies. The cultural effects ran even deeper. In a more fluid international environment with uncertain, changing goals and interests, intel- ligence managers no longer felt they could afford such a patient, strategic approach to long-term accumulation of intellectual capital. A university cul- ture with its versions of books and articles was giving way to the culture of the newsroom. During the 1990s, the rise of round-the-clock news shows and the Internet reinforced pressure on analysts to pass along fresh reports to policymakers at an ever-faster pace, trying to add context or supplement what their customers were receiving from the media. Weaknesses in all-source and strategic analysis were highlighted by a panel, chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah, that critiqued the intelligence community’s failure to foresee the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, as well as by a 1999 panel, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, that discussed the community’s limited ability to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Both reports called attention to the dispersal of effort on too many priorities, the declining attention to the craft of strategic analysis, and security rules that prevented adequate sharing of information.Another Cold War craft had been an elaborate set of methods for warning against surprise attack, 77 but that too had faded in analyzing new dangers like terrorism. Another set of experiences that would affect the capacity of the CIA Security. to cope with the new terrorism traced back to the early Cold War, when the Agency developed a concern, bordering on paranoia, about penetration by the Soviet KGB. James Jesus Angleton, who headed counterintelligence in the CIA until the early 1970s, became obsessed with the belief that the Agency harbored one or more Soviet “moles.”Although the pendulum swung back after Angle- ton’s forced retirement, it did not go very far. Instances of actual Soviet pene- 78 Then, in the early 1990s, came the Aldrich tration kept apprehensions high. Ames espionage case, which intensely embarrassed the CIA.Though obviously unreliable,Ames had been protected and promoted by fello w officers while he paid his bills by selling to the Soviet Union the names of U.S. operatives and agents, a number of whom died as a result. ing. Infor- The concern about security vastly complicated information shar mation was compartmented in order to protect it against exposure to skilled and technologically sophisticated adversaries. There were therefore numerous restrictions on handling information and a deep suspicion about sending infor-

109 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 92 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 92 mation over newfangled electronic systems, like email, to other agencies of the 79 U.S. government. Security concerns also increased the difficulty of recruiting officers quali- fied for counterterrorism.Very few American colleges or universities offered programs in Middle Eastern languages or Islamic studies.The total number of undergraduate degrees granted in Arabic in all U.S. colleges and universities in 80 Many who had traveled much outside the United States could 2002 was six. expect a very long wait for initial clearance.Anyone who was foreign-born or had numerous relatives abroad was well-advised not even to apply.With budg- ets for the CIA shrinking after the end of the Cold War, it was not surprising that, with some notable exceptions, new hires in the Clandestine Service tended to have qualifications similar to those of serving officers: that is, they were suited for traditional agent recruitment or for exploiting liaison relation- ships with foreign services but were not equipped to seek or use assets inside the terrorist network. Early Counterterrorism Efforts In the 1970s and 1980s, terrorism had been tied to regional conflicts, mainly in the Middle East.The majority of terrorist groups either were sponsored by governments or, like the Palestine Liberation Organization, were militants try- ing to create governments. In the mid-1980s, on the basis of a report from a task force headed by Vice President George Bush and after terrorist attacks at airports in Rome and Athens, the DCI created a Counterterrorist Center to unify activities across the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Intelligence.The Countert- errorist Center had representation from the FBI and other agencies. In the for- mal table of organization it reported to the DCI, but in fact most of the Center’s chiefs belonged to the Clandestine Service and usually looked for guidance to 81 the head of the Directorate of Operations. The Center stimulated and coordinated collection of information by CIA stations, compiled the results, and passed selected reports to appropriate stations, parts of the intelligence commu- the Directorate of Intelligence analysts, other nity, or to policymakers.The Center protected its bureaucratic turf.The Direc- tor of Central Intelligence had once had a national intelligence officer for terrorism to coordinate analysis; that office was abolished in the late 1980s and its duties absorbed in part by the Counterterrorist Center. Though analysts assigned to the Center produced a large number of papers, the focus was sup- iticized the Cen- port to operations.A CIA inspector general’s report in 1994 cr 82 ter’s capacity to provide warning of terrorist attacks. Subsequent chapters will raise the issue of whether, despite tremendous tal- ent, energy, and dedication, the intelligence community failed to do enough in coping with the challenge from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. Confronted with such questions, managers in the intelligence community often responded that they 83 had meager resources with which to work.

110 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 93 93 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES Cuts in national security expenditures at the end of the Cold War led to budget cuts in the national foreign intelligence program from fiscal years 1990 to 1996 and essentially flat budgets from fiscal years 1996 to 2000 (except for the so-called Gingrich supplemental to the FY1999 budget and two later, smaller supplementals).These cuts compounded the difficulties of the intelli- gence agencies. Policymakers were asking them to move into the digitized future to fight against computer-to-computer communications and modern communication systems, while maintaining capability against older systems, such as high-frequency radios and ultra-high- and very-high-frequency (line of sight) systems that work like old-style television antennas. Also, demand for imagery increased dramatically following the success of the 1991 Gulf War. Both these developments, in turn, placed a premium on planning the next gen- eration of satellite systems, the cost of which put great pressure on the rest of the intelligence budget. As a result, intelligence agencies experienced staff 84 reductions, affecting both operators and analysts. Yet at least for the CIA, part of the burden in tackling terrorism arose from the background we have described: an organization capable of attracting extraordinarily motivated people but institutionally averse to risk, with its capacity for covert action atrophied, predisposed to restrict the distribution of information, having difficulty assimilating new types of personnel, and accus- tomed to presenting descriptive reportage of the latest intelligence.The CIA, to put it another way, needed significant change in order to get maximum effect in counterterrorism. President Clinton appointed George Tenet as DCI in 1997, and by all accounts terrorism was a priority for him. But Tenet’s own assessment, when questioned by the Commission, was that in 2004, the CIA’s clandestine service was still at least five years away from being fully ready to 85 And while Tenet was clearly the leader of the play its counterterrorism role. CIA, the intelligence community’s confederated structure left open the ques- tion of who really was in charge of the entire U.S. intelligence effort. 3.5 . . . AND IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT The State Department The Commission asked Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in 2004 why the State Department had so long pursued what seemed, and ultimately proved, to be a hopeless effort to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to deport Bin Ladin. Armitage replied: “We do what the State Department does, we don’t go out and fly bombers, we don’t do things like that[;] . . . we 86 part in these things.” do our Fifty years earlier, the person in Armitage’s position would not have spoken of the Department of State as having such a limited role. Until the late 1950s, the department dominated the processes of advising the pr esident and Con-

111 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 94 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 94 gress on U.S. relations with the rest of the world.The National Security Coun- cil was created in 1947 largely as a result of lobbying from the Pentagon for a forum where the military could object if they thought the State Department was setting national objectives that the United States did not have the where- withal to pursue. The State Department retained primacy until the 1960s, when the Kennedy and Johnson administrations turned instead to Robert McNamara’s Defense Department, where a mini–state department was created to analyze foreign policy issues. President Richard Nixon then concentrated policy plan- ning and policy coordination in a powerful National Security Council staff, overseen by Henry Kissinger. In later years, individual secretaries of state were important figures, but the department’s role continued to erode. State came into the 1990s overmatched by the resources of other departments and with little support for its budget either in the Congress or in the president’s Office of Management and Bud- get. Like the FBI and the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, the State Department had a tradition of emphasizing service in the field over service in Washington. Even ambassadors, however, often found host governments not only making connections with the U.S. government through their own missions in Wash- ington, but working through the CIA station or a Defense attaché. Increasingly, the embassies themselves were overshadowed by powerful regional command- 87 ers in chief reporting to the Pentagon. Counterterrorism In the 1960s and 1970s, the State Department managed counterterrorism pol- icy. It was the official channel for communication with the governments pre- sumed to be behind the terrorists. Moreover, since terrorist incidents of this period usually ended in negotiations, an ambassador or other embassy official was the logical person to represent U.S. interests. Keeping U.S. diplomatic efforts against terrorism coherent was a recurring challenge. In 1976, at the direction of Congress, the department elevated its coordinator for combating terrorism to the rank equivalent to an assistant sec- retary of state. As an “ambassador at large,” this official sought to increase the visibility of counterterrorism matters within the department and to help inte- grate U.S. policy implementation among government agencies.The prolonged crisis of 1979–1981, when 53 Americans were held hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, ended the State Department leadership in counterterrorism. Presi- dent Carter’s assertive national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, took charge, and the coordination function remained thereafter in the White House. President Reagan’s second secretary of state, George Shultz, advocated active U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, often recommending the use of military force. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposed Shultz, who made little head-

112 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 95 95 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES way against Weinberger, or even within his own department. Though Shultz elevated the status and visibility of counterterrorism coordination by appoint- ing as coordinator first L. Paul Bremer and then Robert Oakley, both senior career ambassadors of high standing in the Foreign Service, the department continued to be dominated by regional bureaus for which terrorism was not a first-order concern. Secretaries of state after Shultz took less personal interest in the problem. Only congressional opposition prevented President Clinton’s first secretary of state, Warren Christopher, from merging terrorism into a new bureau that would have also dealt with narcotics and crime.The coordinator under Secre- tary Madeleine Albright told the Commission that his job was seen as a minor 88 Although the description of his status has been one within the department. disputed, and Secretary Albright strongly supported the August 1998 strikes against Bin Ladin, the role played by the Department of State in counterter- rorism was often cautionary before 9/11. This was a reflection of the reality that counterterrorism priorities nested within broader foreign policy aims of the U.S. government. State Department consular officers around the world, it should not be for- gotten, were constantly challenged by the problem of terrorism, for they han- dled visas for travel to the United States. After it was discovered that Abdel Rahman, the Blind Sheikh, had come and gone almost at will, State initiated significant reforms to its watchlist and visa-processing policies. In 1993, Con- gress passed legislation allowing State to retain visa-processing fees for border security; those fees were then used by the department to fully automate the terrorist watchlist. By the late 1990s, State had created a worldwide, real-time electronic database of visa, law enforcement, and watchlist information, the core of the post-9/11 border screening systems. Still, as will be seen later, the sys- 89 tem had many holes. The Department of Defense The Department of Defense is the behemoth among federal agencies.With an annual budget larger than the gross domestic product of Russia, it is an empire. The Defense Department is part civilian, part military.The civilian secretary of defense has ultimate control, under the president. Among the uniformed mil- itary, the top official is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is sup- ported by a Joint Staff divided into standard military staff compartments—J-2 (intelligence), J-3 (operations), and so on. Because of the necessary and demanding focus on the differing mission of each service, and their long and proud traditions, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have often fought ferociously over roles and missions in war fighting and over budgets and posts of leadership. Two developments dimin- ished this competition. The first was the passage by Congress in 1986 of the Goldwater-Nichols

113 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 96 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 96 Act, which, among other things, mandated that promotion to high rank required some period of duty with a different service or with a joint (i.e., multiservice) command.This had strong and immediate effects, loosening the loyalties of senior officers to their separate services and causing them to think 90 However, it also more broadly about the military establishment as a whole. may have lessened the diversity of military advice and options presented to the president.The Goldwater-Nichols example is seen by some as having lessons applicable to lessening competition and increasing cooperation in other parts of the federal bureaucracy, particularly the law enforcement and intelligence communities. The second, related development was a significant transfer of planning and command responsibilities from the service chiefs and their staffs to the joint and unified commands outside of Washington, espe cially those for Strategic Forces and for four regions: Europe, the P acific, the Center, and the South. Posts in these commands became prized assignments for ambitious officers, and the voices of their five commanders in chief became as influential as those of the service chiefs. Counterterrorism The Pentagon first became concerned about terrorism as a result of hostage taking in the 1970s. In June 1976, Palestinian terrorists seized an Air France plane and landed it at Entebbe in Uganda, holding 105 Israelis and other Jews as hostages. A special Israeli commando force stormed the plane, killed all the terrorists, and rescued all but one of the hostages. In October 1977, a West Ger- man special force dealt similarly with a Lufthansa plane sitting on a tarmac in Mogadishu: every terrorist was killed, and every hostage brought back safely. The White House, members of Congress, and the news media asked the Pen- tagon whether the United States was prepared for similar action. The answer was no. The Army immediately set about creating the Delta Force, one of whose missions was hostage rescue. The first test for the new force did not go well. It came in April 1980 dur- ing the Iranian hostage crisis, when Navy helicopters with Marine pilots flew to a site known as Desert One, some 200 miles southeast of Tehran, to ren- dezvous with Air Force planes carrying Delta Force commandos and fresh fuel. Mild sandstorms disabled three of the helicopters, and the commander ordered the mission aborted. But foul-ups on the ground resulted in the loss of eight aircraft, five airmen, and three marines. Remembered as “Desert One,” this fail- ure remained vivid for members of the armed forces. It also contributed to the later Goldwater-Nichols reforms. In 1983 came Hezbollah’s massacre of the Marines in Beirut. President Rea- gan quickly withdrew U.S. forces from Lebanon—a reversal later routinely cited by jihadists as evidence of U.S. weakness. A detailed investigation pro- duced a list of new procedures that would become customary for forces

114 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 97 97 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES deployed abroad.They involved a number of defensive measures, including cau- tion not only about strange cars and trucks but also about unknown aircraft overhead. “Force protection” became a significant claim on the time and resources of the Department of Defense. A decade later, the military establishment had another experience that evoked both Desert One and the withdrawal from Beirut.The first President Bush had authorized the use of U.S. military forces to ensure humanitarian relief in war-torn Somalia.Tribal factions interfered with the supply missions. By the autumn of 1993, U.S. commanders concluded that the main source of trouble was a warlord, Mohammed Farrah Aidid. An Army special force launched a raid on Mogadishu to capture him. In the course of a long night, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, 73 Americans were wounded, 18 were killed, and the world’s television screens showed images of an Amer- ican corpse dragged through the streets by exultant Somalis. Under pressure from Congress, President Clinton soon ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces. “Black Hawk down” joined “Desert One” as a symbol among Americans in uniform, code phrases used to evoke the risks of daring exploits without max- imum preparation, overwhelming force, and a well-defined mission. In 1995–1996, the Defense Department began to invest effort in planning how to handle the possibility of a domestic terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The idea of a domestic command for homeland defense began to be discussed in 1997, and in 1999 the Joint Chiefs developed a concept for the establishment of a domestic Unified Command. Congress killed the idea. Instead, the Department established the Joint Forces Command, located at Norfolk, Virginia, making it responsible for military 91 response to domestic emergencies, both natural and man-made. Pursuant to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program, the Defense Department began in 1997 to train first responders in 120 of the nation’s largest cities.As a key part of its efforts, Defense created National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams to respond in the event of a WMD terrorist inci- dent. A total of 32 such National Guard teams were authorized by fiscal year 2001. Under the command of state governors, they provided support to civil- ian agencies to assess the nature of the attack, offer medical and technical advice, 92 and coordinate state and local responses. The Department of Defense, like the Department of State, had a coordina- tor who represented the department on the interagency committee concerned with counterterrorism. By the end of President Clinton’s first term, this offi- cial had become the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and 93 low-intensity conflict. The experience of the 1980s had suggested to the military establishment that if it were to have a role in counterterrorism, it would be a traditional mil- itary role—to act against state sponsors of terrorism.And the military had what seemed an excellent example of how to do it. In 1986, a bomb went off at a

115 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 98 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 98 disco in Berlin, killing two American soldiers. Intelligence clearly linked the bombing to Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. President Reagan ordered air strikes against Libya.The operation was not cost free: the United States lost two planes. Evidence accumulated later, including the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103, clearly showed that the operation did not curb Qadhafi’s interest in ter- rorism. However, it was seen at the time as a success.The lesson then taken from Libya was that terrorism could be stopped by the use of U.S. air power that inflicted pain on the authors or sponsors of terrorist acts. This lesson was applied, using Tomahawk missiles, early in the Clinton administration. George H.W. Bush was scheduled to visit Kuwait to be hon- ored for his rescue of that country in the Gulf War of 1991. Kuwaiti security services warned Washington that Iraqi agents were planning to assassinate the former president. President Clinton not only ordered precautions to protect Bush but asked about options for a reprisal against Iraq.The Pentagon proposed 12 targets for Tomahawk missiles. Debate in the White House and at the CIA about possible collateral damage pared the list down to three, then to one— Iraqi intelligence headquarters in central Baghdad. The attack was made at night, to minimize civilian casualties.Twenty-three missiles were fired. Other than one civilian casualty, the operation seemed completely successful: the intelligence headquarters was demolished. No further intelligence came in 94 about terrorist acts planned by Iraq. The 1986 attack in Libya and the 1993 attack on Iraq symbolized for the military establishment effective use of military power for counterterrorism— limited retaliation with air power, aimed at deterrence.What remained was the hard question of how deterrence could be effective when the adversary was a loose transnational network. 3.6 . . . AND IN THE WHITE HOUSE Because coping with terrorism was not (and is not) the sole province of any component of the U.S. government, some coordinating mechanism is neces- sary. When terrorism was not a prominent issue, the State Department could perform this role. When the Iranian hostage crisis developed, this procedure went by the board: National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski took charge of crisis management. The Reagan administration continued and formalized the practice of hav- ing presidential staff coordinate counterterrorism. After the killing of the marines in Beirut, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 138, calling for a “shift . . . from passive to active defense measures” and reprogram- ming or adding new resources to effect the shift. It directed the State Depart- ment “to intensify efforts to achieve cooperation of other governments” and the CIA to “intensify use of liaison and other intelligence capabilities and also

116 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 99 99 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES to develop plans and capability to preempt groups and individuals planning 95 strikes against U.S. interests.” Speaking to the American Bar Association in July 1985, the President char- acterized terrorism as “an act of war” and declared:“There can be no place on earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest, to train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or unilaterally, if necessary to 96 The air strikes against ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary—anywhere.” Libya were one manifestation of this strategy. Through most of President Reagan’s second term, the coordination of counterterrorism was overseen by a high-level interagency committee chaired by the deputy national security adviser. But the Reagan administration closed with a major scandal that cast a cloud over the notion that the White House should guide counterterrorism. President Reagan was concerned because Hezbollah was taking Americans hostage and periodically killing them. He was also constrained by a bill he signed into law that made it illegal to ship military aid to anticommunist Con- tra guerrillas in Nicaragua, whom he strongly supported. His national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, and McFarlane’s deputy,Admiral John Poindexter, thought the hostage problem might be solved and the U.S. position in the Mid- dle East improved if the United States quietly negotiated with Iran about exchanging hostages for modest quantities of arms. Shultz and Weinberger, united for once, opposed McFarlane and Poindexter. A staffer for McFarlane and Poindexter, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, developed a scheme to trade U.S. arms for hostages and divert the pro- ceeds to the Contras to get around U.S. law. He may have had encouragement 97 from Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. When the facts were revealed in 1986 and 1987, it appeared to be the 1970s all over again: a massive abuse of covert action. Now, instead of stories about poisoned cigars and Mafia hit men, Americans heard testimony about a secret visit to Tehran by McFarlane, using an assumed name and bearing a chocolate cake decorated with icing depicting a key. An investigation by a special coun- sel resulted in the indictment of McFarlane, Poindexter, North, and ten oth- ers, including several high-ranking officers from the CIA’s Clandestine Service. The investigations spotlighted the importance of accountability and official responsibility for faithful execution of laws. For the story of 9/11, the significance of the Iran-Contra affair was that it made parts of the bureaucracy 98 reflexively skeptical about any operating directive from the White House. As the national security advisor’s function expanded, the procedures and structure of the advisor’s staff, conventionally called the National Security Council staff, became more formal.The advisor developed recommendations for presidential directives, differently labeled by each president. For President Clinton, they were to be Presidential Decision Directives; for President George W. Bush, National Security Policy Directives.These documents and many oth-

117 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 100 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 100 ers requiring approval by the president worked their way through interagency committees usually composed of departmental representatives at the assistant secretary level or just below it.The NSC staff had senior directors who would sit on these interagency committees, often as chair, to facilitate agreement and to represent the wider interests of the national security advisor. coordinate When President Clinton took office, he decided right away to counterterrorism from the White House. On January 25, 1993, Mir Amal Kansi, an Islamic extremist from Pakistan, shot and killed two CIA employees at the main highway entrance to CIA headquarters in Virginia. (Kansi drove away and was captured abroad much later.) Only a month afterward came the World Trade Center bombing and, a few weeks after that, the Iraqi plot against former President Bush. President Clinton’s first national security advisor, Anthony Lake, had retained from the Bush administration the staffer who dealt with crime, nar- cotics, and terrorism (a portfolio often known as “drugs and thugs”), the vet- eran civil servant Richard Clarke. President Clinton and Lake turned to Clarke to do the staff work for them in coordinating counterterrorism. Before long, he would chair a midlevel interagency committee eventually titled the Coun- terterrorism Security Group (CSG).We will later tell of Clarke’s evolution as adviser on and, in time, manager of the U.S. counterterrorist effort. When explaining the missile strike against Iraq provoked by the plot to kill President Bush, President Clinton stated: “From the first days of our Revolu- tion,America’s security has depended on the clarity of the message: Don’t tread on us. A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sover- eignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civ- 99 ilized behavior among nations.” In his State of the Union message in January 1995, President Clinton prom- ised “comprehensive legislation to strengthen our hand in combating terror- ists, whether they strike at home or abroad.” In February, he sent Congress proposals to extend federal criminal jurisdiction, to make it easier to deport terrorists, and to act against terrorist fund-raising. In early May, he submitted a bundle of strong amendments.The interval had seen the news from Tokyo in March that a doomsday cult, Aum Shinrikyo, had released sarin nerve gas in a subway, killing 12 and injuring thousands.The sect had extensive properties and laboratories in Japan and offices worldwide, including one in New York. Nei- ther the FBI nor the CIA had ever heard of it. In April had come the bomb- ing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City; immediate suspicions that it had been the work of Islamists turned out to be wrong, and the bombers proved to be American antigovernment extremists named Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. President Clinton proposed to amend his earlier proposals by increasing wiretap and electronic surveillance authority for the FBI, requir- ing that explosives carry traceable taggants, and providing substantial new 100 money not only for the FBI and CIA but also for local police.

118 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 101 101 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES President Clinton issued a classified directive in June 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39, which said that the United States should “deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens.”The directive called terrorism both a matter of national security and a crime, and it assigned responsibilities to various agencies.Alarmed by the inci- dent in Tokyo, President Clinton made it the very highest priority for his own staff and for all agencies to prepare to detect and respond to terrorism that 101 involved chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. During 1995 and 1996, President Clinton devoted considerable time to seeking cooperation from other nations in denying sanctuary to terrorists. He proposed significantly larger budgets for the FBI, with much of the increase designated for counterterrorism. For the CIA, he essentially stopped cutting allocations and supported requests for supplemental funds for counterterror- 102 ism. When announcing his new national security team after being reelected in 1996, President Clinton mentioned terrorism first in a list of several challenges 103 In 1998, after Bin Ladin’s fatwa and other alarms, Pres- facing the country. ident Clinton accepted a proposal from his national security advisor, Samuel “Sandy” Berger, and gave Clarke a new position as national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism. He issued two Presi- dential Decision Directives, numbers 62 and 63, that built on the assignments to agencies that had been made in Presidential Decision Directive 39; laid out ten program areas for counterterrorism; and enhanced, at least on paper, Clarke’s authority to police these assignments. Because of concerns especially on the part of Attorney General Reno, this new authority was defined in pre- cise and limiting language. Clarke was only to “provide advice” regarding budg- ets and to “coordinate the development of interagency agreed guidelines” for 104 action. Clarke also was awarded a seat on the cabinet-level Principals Committee when it met on his issues—a highly unusual step for a White House staffer. His interagency body, the CSG, ordinarily reported to the Deputies Committee of subcabinet officials, unless Berger asked them to report directly to the princi- pals. The complementary directive, number 63, defined the elements of the nation’s critical infrastructure and considered ways to protect it. Taken together, the two directives basically left the Justice Department and the FBI in charge at home and left terrorism abroad to the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies, under Clarke’s and Berger’s coordinating hands. Explaining the new arrangement and his concerns in another commence- ment speech, this time at the Naval Academy, in May 1998, the President said: First, we will use our new integrated approach to intensify the fight against all forms of terrorism: to capture terrorists, no matter where they hide; to work with other nations to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries overseas; to respond rapidly and effectively to protect Americans from terrorism at

119 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 102 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 102 home and abroad. Second, we will launch a comprehensive plan to detect, deter, and defend against attacks on our critical infrastructures, our power systems, water supplies, police, fire, and medical services, air traffic con- trol, financial services, telephone systems, and computer networks. . . . Third, we will undertake a concerted effort to prevent the spread and use of biological weapons and to protect our people in the event these terri- ble weapons are ever unleashed by a rogue state, a terrorist group, or an international criminal organization. . . . Finally, we must do more to pro- 105 tect our civilian population from biological weapons. Clearly, the President’s concern about terrorism had steadily risen. That heightened worry would become even more obvious early in 1999, when he addressed the National Academy of Sciences and presented his most somber account yet of what could happen if the United States were hit, unprepared, by terrorists wielding either weapons of mass destruction or potent cyberweapons. 3.7 . . . AND IN THE CONGRESS Since the beginning of the Republic, few debates have been as hotly contested as the one over executive versus legislative powers.At the Constitutional Con- vention, the founders sought to create a strong executive but check its powers. They left those powers sufficiently ambiguous so that room was left for Con- gress and the president to struggle over the direction of the nation’s security and foreign policies. The most serious question has centered on whether or not the president needs congressional authorization to wage war. The current status of that debate seems to have settled into a recognition that a president can deploy mil- itary forces for small and limited operations, but needs at least congressional support if not explicit authorization for large and more open-ended military operations. This calculus becomes important in this story as both President Clinton and President Bush chose not to seek a declaration of war on Bin Ladin after he had declared and begun to wage war on us, a declaration that they did not acknowledge publicly. Not until after 9/11 was a congressional authorization sought. The most substantial change in national security oversight in Congress took place following World War II.The Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946 created the modern Armed Services committees that have become so power- ful today. One especially noteworthy innovation was the creation of the Joint House-Senate Atomic Energy Committee, which is credited by many with the development of our nuclear deterrent capability and was also criticized for wielding too much power relative to the executive branch.

120 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 103 103 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES Ironically, this committee was eliminated in the 1970s as Congress was undertaking the next most important reform of oversight in response to the Church and Pike investigations into abuses of power. In 1977, the House and Senate created select committees to exercise oversight of the executive branch’s conduct of intelligence operations. The Intelligence Committees The House and Senate select committees on intelligence share some impor- tant characteristics.They have limited authorities.They do not have exclusive authority over intelligence agencies.Appropriations are ultimately determined by the Appropriations committees. The Armed Services committees exercise jurisdiction over the intelligence agencies within the Department of Defense (and, in the case of the Senate, over the Central Intelligence Agency). One con- sequence is that the rise and fall of intelligence budgets are tied directly to trends in defense spending. The president is required by law to ensure the congressional Intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States.The committees allow the CIA to some extent to with- hold information in order to protect sources, methods, and operations.The CIA must bring presidentially authorized covert action Findings and Memoranda of Notification to the Intelligence committees, and it must detail its failures. The committees conduct their most important work in closed hearings or briefings in which security over classified material can be maintained. Members of the Intelligence committees serve for a limited time, a restric- tion imposed by each chamber. Many members believe these limits prevent committee members from developing the necessary expertise to conduct effec- tive oversight. Secrecy, while necessary, can also harm oversight.The overall budget of the intelligence community is classified, as are most of its activities.Thus, the Intel- ligence committees cannot take advantage of democracy’s best oversight mechanism: public disclosure. This makes them significantly different from other congressional oversight committees, which are often spurred into action by the work of investigative journalists and watchdog organizations. Adjusting to the Post–Cold War Era The unexpected and rapid end of the Cold War in 1991 created trauma in the foreign policy and national security community both in and out of govern- ment.While some criticized the intelligence community for failing to forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union (and used this argument to propose drastic cuts in intelligence agencies), most recognized that the good news of being relieved of the substantial burden of maintaining a security structure to meet the Soviet challenge was accompanied by the bad news of increased insecurity. In many directions, the community faced threats and intelligence challenges that it was largely unprepared to meet.

121 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 104 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 104 So did the intelligence oversight committees. New digitized technologies, and the demand for imagery and continued capability against older systems, meant the need to spend more on satellite systems at the expense of human efforts. In addition, denial and deception became more effective as targets learned from public sources what our intelligence agencies were doing. There were comprehensive reform proposals of the intelligence community, such as those offered by Senators Boren and McCurdy. That said, Congress still took 106 too little action to address institutional weaknesses. With the Cold War over, and the intelligence community roiled by the Ames spy scandal, a presidential commission chaired first by former secretary of defense Les Aspin and later by former secretary of defense Harold Brown exam- ined the intelligence community’s future. After it issued recommendations addressing the DCI’s lack of personnel and budget authority over the intelli- gence community, the Intelligence committees in 1996 introduced implement- ing legislation to remedy these problems. The Department of Defense and its congressional authorizing committees rose in opposition to the proposed changes. The President and DCI did not actively support these changes. Relatively small changes made in 1996 gave the DCI consultative authority and created a new deputy for management and analysis.These reforms occurred only after the assistant DCIs for collection and t Committee on Intelligence took the unprecedented step of Senate Selec threatening to bring down the defense authorization bill. Indeed, rather than increasing the DCI’s authorities over national intelligence, the 1990s witnessed movement in the opposite direction through, for example, the transfer of the CIA’s imaging analysis capability to the new imagery and mapping agency cre- ated within the Department of Defense. Congress Adjusts Congress as a whole, like the executive branch, adjusted slowly to the rise of ticular, the grow- security. In transnational terrorism as a threat to national par understood in Congress.As the ing threat and capabilities of Bin Ladin were not most representative branch of the federal government, Congress closely tracks trends in what public opinion and the electorate identify as key issues. In the years before September 11, terrorism seldom registered as important. To the extent that terrorism did break through and engage the attention of the Con- gress as a whole, it would briefly command attention after a specific incident, and then return to a lower rung on the public policy agenda. Several points about Congress are worth noting. First, Congress always has a strong orientation toward domestic affairs. It usually takes on foreign policy and national security issues after threats are identified and articulated by the detailed—and repeated—articulation, administration. In the absence of such a national security tends not to rise very high on the list of congressional prior- ities. Presidents are selecti ve in their use of political capital for international issues.

122 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 105 105 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES In the decade before 9/11, presidential discussion of and congressional and public attention to foreign affairs and national security were dominated by other issues—among them, Haiti, Bosnia, Russia, China, Somalia, Kosovo, NATO enlargement, the Middle East peace process, missile defense, and glob- alization.Terrorism infrequently took center stage; and when it did, the con- text was often terrorists’ tactics—a chemical, biological, nuclear, or computer 107 threat—not terrorist organizations. Second, Congress tends to follow the overall lead of the president on budget issues with respect to national security matters.There are often sharp arguments about individual programs and internal priorities, but by and large the overall funding authorized and appropriated by the Congress comes out close to the president’s request. This tendency was certainly illustrated by the downward trends in spending on defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs in the first part of the 1990s. The White House, to be sure, read the political signals coming from Capitol Hill, but the Congress largely acceded to the executive branch’s decade, Congress appropriated some funding requests. In the second half of the for intelligence programs.Apart 98 percent of what the administration r equested from the Gingrich supplemental of $1.5 billion for overall intelligence pro- grams in fiscal year 1999, the key decisions on overall allocation of resources for national security issues in the decade before 9/11—including counterter- rorism funding—were made in the president’s Office of Management and Bud- 108 get. Third, Congress did not reorganize itself after the end of the Cold War to address new threats. Recommendations by the Joint Committee on the Orga- nization of Congress were implemented, in part, in the House of Representa- tives after the 1994 elections, but there was no reorganization of national security functions.The Senate undertook no appreciable changes.Traditional issues—foreign policy, defense, intelligence—continued to be handled by committees whose structure remained largely unaltered, while issues such as transnational terrorism fell between the cracks.Terrorism came under the juris- diction of at least 14 different committees in the House alone, and budget and oversight functions in the House and Senate concerning terrorism were also splintered badly among committees. Little effort was made to consider an inte- grated policy toward terrorism, which might range from identifying the threat to addressing vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure; and the piecemeal approach in the Congress contributed to the problems of the executive branch 109 in formulating such a policy. Fourth, the oversight function of Congress has diminished over time. In recent years, traditional review of the administration of programs and the implementation of laws has been replaced by “a focus on personal investiga- tions, possible scandals, and issues designed to generate media attention.”The unglamorous but essential work of oversight has been neglected, and few mem- bers past or present believe it is performed well. DCI Tenet told us: “We ran

123 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 106 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 106 from threat to threat to threat. . . . [T]here was not a system in place to say,‘You got to go back and do this and this and this.’” Not just the DCI but the entire executive branch needed help from Congress in addressing the questions of counterterrorism strategy and policy, looking past day-to-day concerns. Mem- bers of Congress, however, also found their time spent on such everyday mat- ters, or in looking back to investigate mistakes, and often missed the big questions—as did the executive branch. Staff tended as well to focus on parochial considerations, seeking to add or cut funding for individual (often 110 small) programs, instead of emphasizing comprehensive oversight projects. Fifth, on certain issues, other priorities pointed Congress in a direction that was unhelpful in meeting the threats that were emerging in the months lead- ing up to 9/11. Committees with oversight responsibility for aviation focused overwhelmingly on airport congestion and the economic health of the airlines, not aviation security. Committees with responsibility for the INS focused on the Southwest border, not on terrorists. Justice Department officials told us that committees with responsibility for the FBI tightly restricted appropriations for improvements in information technology, in part because of concerns about the FBI’s ability to manage such projects. Committees responsible for South Asia spent the decade of the 1990s imposing sanctions on Pakistan, leaving pres- idents with little leverage to alter Pakistan’s policies before 9/11. Committees with responsibility for the Defense Department paid little heed to developing military responses to terrorism and stymied intelligence reform. All commit- tees found themselves swamped in the minutiae of the budget process, with lit- tle time for consideration of longer-term questions, or what many members 111 past and present told us was the proper conduct of oversight. Each of these trends contributed to what can only be described as Con- gress’s slowness and inadequacy in treating the issue of terrorism in the years before 9/11.The legislative branch adjusted little and did not restructure itself 112 Its attention to terrorism was episodic and splin- to address changing threats. tered across several committees. Congress gave little guidance to executive branch agencies, did not reform them in any significant way, and did not sys- tematically perform oversight to identify, address, and attempt to resolve the many problems in national security and domestic agencies that became appar- ent in the aftermath of 9/11. Although individual representatives and senators took significant steps, the overall level of attention in the Congress to the terrorist threat was low. We examined the number of hearings on terrorism from January 1998 to Septem- ber 2001.The Senate Armed Services Committee held nine—four related to Cole. the attack on the USS The House Armed Services Committee also held nine, six of them by a special oversight panel on terrorism.The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its House counterpart both held four. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in addition to its annual worldwide threat hearing, held eight; its House counterpart held perhaps two exclusively

124 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 107 107 COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES devoted to counterterrorism, plus the briefings by its terrorist working group. The Senate and House intelligence panels did not raise public and congressional Qaeda prior to the joint inquiry into the attacks attention on Bin Ladin and al of September 11, perhaps in part because of the classified nature of their work. Yet in the context of committees that each hold scores of hearings every year on issues in their jurisdiction, this list is not impressive. Terrorism was a sec- ond- or third-order priority within the committees of Congress responsible 113 for national security. In fact, Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider. Congress asked outside commissions to do the work that arguably was at the 114 Beginning in 1999, the reports of heart of its own oversight responsibilities. these commissions made scores of recommendations to address terrorism and homeland security but drew little attention from Congress. Most of their impact came after 9/11.

125 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 108 4 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 4.1 BEFORE THE BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND TANZANIA Although the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate had warned of a new type of terrorism, many officials continued to think of terrorists as agents of states (Saudi Hezbollah acting for Iran against Khobar Towers) or as domestic crim- inals (Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City). As we pointed out in chapter 3, the White House is not a natural locus for program management. Hence, gov- ernment efforts to cope with terrorism were essentially the work of individ- ual agencies. President Bill Clinton’s counterterrorism Presidential Decision Directives in 1995 (no. 39) and May 1998 (no. 62) reiterated that terrorism was a national security problem, not just a law enforcement issue.They reinforced the author- ity of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate domestic as well as foreign counterterrorism efforts, through Richard Clarke and his interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). Spotlighting new concerns about unconventional attacks, these directives assigned tasks to lead agencies but did not differentiate types of terrorist threats.Thus, while Clarke might prod or push agencies to act, what actually happened was usually decided at the State Depart- ment, the Pentagon, the CIA, or the Justice Department.The efforts of these agencies were sometimes energetic and sometimes effective.Terrorist plots were disrupted and individual terrorists were captured. But the United States did not, before 9/11, adopt as a clear strategic objective the elimination of al Qaeda. Early Efforts against Bin Ladin Until 1996, hardly anyone in the U.S. government understood that Usama Bin Ladin was an inspirer and organizer of the new terrorism. In 1993, the CIA noted that he had paid for the training of some Egyptian terrorists in Sudan. The State Department detected his money in aid to the Yemeni terrorists who 108

126 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 109 109 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS set a bomb in an attempt to kill U.S. troops in Aden in 1992. State Department sources even saw suspicious links with Omar Abdel Rahman, the “Blind Sheikh” in the New York area, commenting that Bin Ladin seemed “commit- ted to financing ‘Jihads’ against ‘anti Islamic’ regimes worldwide.” After the department designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, it put Bin Ladin on its TIPOFF watchlist, a move that might have prevented his getting a visa had he tried to enter the United States. As late as 1997, however, even the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center continued to describe him as an “extrem- 1 ist financier.” In 1996, the CIA set up a special unit of a dozen officers to analyze intelli- gence on and plan operations against Bin Ladin. David Cohen, the head of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, wanted to test the idea of having a “virtual station”—a station based at headquarters but collecting and operating against a subject much as stations in the field focus on a country.Taking his cue from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who expressed special interest in ter- rorist finance, Cohen formed his virtual station as a terrorist financial links unit. He had trouble getting any Directorate of Operations officer to run it; he finally recruited a former analyst who was then running the Islamic Extremist Branch of the Counterterrorist Center.This officer, who was especially knowledgeable about Afghanistan, had noticed a recent stream of reports about Bin Ladin and something called al Qaeda, and suggested to Cohen that the station focus on 2 this one individual. Cohen agreed.Thus was born the Bin Ladin unit. In May 1996, Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan. A few months later, as the Bin Ladin unit was gearing up, Jamal Ahmed al Fadl walked into a U.S. embassy in Africa, established his bona fides as a former senior employee of Bin Ladin, and provided a major breakthrough of intelligence on the creation, char- acter, direction, and intentions of al Qaeda. Corroborating evidence came from another walk-in source at a different U.S. embassy. More confirmation was sup- plied later that year by intelligence and other sources, including material gath- 3 ered by FBI agents and Kenyan police from an al Qaeda cell in Nairobi. By 1997, officers in the Bin Ladin unit recognized that Bin Ladin was more than just a financier.They learned that al Qaeda had a military committee that was planning operations against U.S. interests worldwide and was actively try- ing to obtain nuclear material. Analysts assigned to the station looked at the information it had gathered and “found connections everywhere,” including links to the attacks on U.S. troops in Aden and Somalia in 1992 and 1993 and 4 to the Manila air plot in the Philippines in 1994–1995. The Bin Ladin station was already working on plans for offensive opera- tions against Bin Ladin. These plans were directed at both physical assets and sources of finance. In the end, plans to identify and attack Bin Ladin’s money 5 sources did not go forward. In late 1995, when Bin Ladin was still in Sudan, the State Department and the CIA learned that Sudanese officials were discussing with the Saudi gov-

127 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 110 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 110 ernment the possibility of expelling Bin Ladin. U.S.Ambassador Timothy Car- ney encouraged the Sudanese to pursue this course.The Saudis, however, did 6 not want Bin Ladin, giving as their reason their revocation of his citizenship. Sudan’s minister of defense, Fatih Erwa, has claimed that Sudan offered to hand Bin Ladin over to the United States.The Commission has found no cred- ible evidence that this was so.Ambassador Carney had instructions only to push the Sudanese to expel Bin Ladin.Ambassador Carney had no legal basis to ask for more from the Sudanese since, at the time, there was no indictment out- 7 standing. The chief of the Bin Ladin station, whom we will call “Mike,” saw Bin Ladin’s move to Afghanistan as a stroke of luck.Though the CIA had virtually abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, case officers had reestab- lished old contacts while tracking down Mir Amal Kansi, the Pakistani gun- man who had murdered two CIA employees in January 1993.These contacts contributed to intelligence about Bin Ladin’s local movements, business activ- ities, and security and living arrangements, and helped provide evidence that he was spending large amounts of money to help the Taliban.The chief of the Counterterrorist Center, whom we will call “Jeff,” told Director George Tenet that the CIA’s intelligence assets were “near to providing real-time informa- tion about Bin Ladin’s activities and travels in Afghanistan.” One of the con- tacts was a group associated with particular tribes among Afghanistan’s ethnic 8 Pashtun community. By the fall of 1997, the Bin Ladin unit had roughed out a plan for these Afghan tribals to capture Bin Ladin and hand him over for trial either in the United States or in an Arab country. In early 1998, the cabinet-level Principals 9 Committee apparently gave the concept its blessing. On their own separate track, getting information but not direction from the CIA, the FBI’s New York Field Office and the U.S.Attorney for the Southern District of New York were preparing to ask a grand jury to indict Bin Ladin. 10 The eventual The Counterterrorist Center knew that this was happening. charge, conspiring to attack U.S. defense installations, was finally issued from the grand jury in June 1998—as a sealed indictment.The indictment was pub- licly disclosed in November of that year. When Bin Ladin moved to Afghanistan in May 1996, he became a subject of interest to the State Department’s South Asia bureau. At the time, as one diplomat told us, South Asia was seen in the department and the government generally as a low priority. In 1997, as Madeleine Albright was beginning her tenure as secretary of state, an NSC policy review concluded that the United States should pay more attention not just to India but also to Pakistan and 11 With regard to Afghanistan, another diplomat said, the United Afghanistan. 12 States at the time had “no policy.” In the State Department, concerns about India-Pakistan tensions often crowded out attention to Afghanistan or Bin Ladin. Aware of instability and

128 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 111 111 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS growing Islamic extremism in Pakistan, State Department officials worried most about an arms race and possible war between Pakistan and India.After May 1998, when both countries surprised the United States by testing nuclear weapons, 13 these dangers became daily first-order concerns of the State Department. In Afghanistan, the State Department tried to end the civil war that had con- tinued since the Soviets’ withdrawal.The South Asia bureau believed it might have a carrot for Afghanistan’s warring factions in a project by the Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) to build a pipeline across the country. While there was probably never much chance of the pipeline actually being built, the Afghan desk hoped that the prospect of shared pipeline profits might lure faction leaders to a conference table. U.S. diplomats did not favor the Tal- iban over the rival factions. Despite growing concerns, U.S. diplomats were 14 willing at the time, as one official said, to “give the Taliban a chance.” Though Secretary Albright made no secret of thinking the Taliban “despi- cable,” the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, led a del- egation to South Asia—including Afghanistan—in April 1998. No U.S. official of such rank had been to Kabul in decades.Ambassador Richardson went pri- marily to urge negotiations to end the civil war. In view of Bin Ladin’s recent public call for all Muslims to kill Americans, Richardson asked the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin. They answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In 15 any case, the Taliban said, Bin Ladin was not a threat to the United States. In sum, in late 1997 and the spring of 1998, the lead U.S. agencies each pur- sued their own efforts against Bin Ladin.The CIA’s Counterterrorist Center was developing a plan to capture and remove him from Afghanistan. Parts of the Jus- tice Department were moving toward indicting Bin Ladin, making possible a York court. Meanwhile, the State Department was focused criminal trial in a New more on lessening Indo-Pakistani nuclear tensions, ending the Afghan civil war, and ameliorating the Taliban’s human rights abuses than on driving out Bin Ladin. Another key actor, Marine General Anthony Zinni, the commander in 16 chief of the U.S. Central Command, shared the State Department’s view. The CIA Develops a Capture Plan Initially, the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center and its Bin Ladin unit considered a plan to ambush Bin Ladin when he traveled between Kandahar, the Taliban capital where he sometimes stayed the night, and his primary residence at the time,Tarnak Farms. After the Afghan tribals reported that they had tried such an ambush and failed, the Center gave up on it, despite suspicions that the trib- als’ story might be fiction.Thereafter, the capture plan focused on a nighttime 17 raid on Tarnak Farms. A compound of about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall,Tarnak Farms was located in an isolated desert area on the out- skirts of the Kandahar airport. CIA officers were able to map the entire site, identifying the houses that belonged to Bin Ladin’s wives and the one where

129 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 112 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 112 Bin Ladin himself was most likely to sleep.Working with the tribals, they drew up plans for the raid. They ran two complete rehearsals in the United States 18 during the fall of 1997. By early 1998, planners at the Counterterrorist Center were ready to come back to the White House to seek formal approval. Tenet apparently walked National Security Advisor Sandy Berger through the basic plan on February 13. One group of tribals would subdue the guards, enter Tarnak Farms stealthily, grab Bin Ladin, take him to a desert site outside Kandahar, and turn him over to a second group.This second group of tribals would take him to a desert land- ing zone already tested in the 1997 Kansi capture. From there, a CIA plane would take him to New York, an Arab capital, or wherever he was to be arraigned. Briefing papers prepared by the Counterterrorist Center acknowl- edged that hitches might develop. People might be killed, and Bin Ladin’s sup- porters might retaliate, perhaps taking U.S. citizens in Kandahar hostage. But the briefing papers also noted that there was risk in not acting. “Sooner or later,” they said, “Bin Ladin will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD [weapons 19 of mass destruction].” Clarke’s Counterterrorism Security Group reviewed the capture plan for Berger. Noting that the plan was in a “very early stage of development,” the NSC staff then told the CIA planners to go ahead and, among other things, start drafting any legal documents that might be required to authorize the covert action.The CSG apparently stressed that the raid should target Bin Ladin 20 himself, not the whole compound. The CIA planners conducted their third complete rehearsal in March, and they again briefed the CSG. Clarke wrote Berger on March 7 that he saw the doing operation as “somewhat embryonic” and the CIA as “months away from 21 anything.” “Mike” thought the capture plan was “the perfect operation.” It required minimum infrastructure. The plan had now been modified so that the tribals would keep Bin Ladin in a hiding place for up to a month before turning him over to the United States—thereby increasing the chances of keeping the U.S. hand out of sight. “Mike” trusted the information from the Afghan network; it had been corroborated by other means, he told us.The lead CIA officer in the field, Gary Schroen, also had confidence in the tribals. In a May 6 cable to CIA headquarters, he pronounced their planning “almost as professional and detailed . . . as would be done by any U.S. military special operations element.” He and the other officers who had worked through the plan with the tribals judged it “about as good as it can be.” (By that, Schroen explained, he meant that the chance of capturing or killing Bin Ladin was about 40 percent.) Although the tribals thought they could pull off the raid, if the operation were approved by headquarters and the policymakers, Schroen wrote there was going to be a point when “we step back and keep our fingers crossed that the 22 [tribals] prove as good (and as lucky) as they think they will be.”

130 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 113 113 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS Military officers reviewed the capture plan and, according to “Mike,” “found no showstoppers.”The commander of Delta Force felt “uncomfortable” with having the tribals hold Bin Ladin captive for so long, and the commander of Joint Special Operations Forces, Lieutenant General Michael Canavan, was worried about the safety of the tribals inside Tarnak Farms. General Canavan said he had actually thought the operation too complicated for the CIA—“out of their league”—and an effort to get results “on the cheap.” But a senior Joint Staff officer described the plan as “generally, not too much different than we might have come up with ourselves.” No one in the Pentagon, so far as we 23 know, advised the CIA or the White House not to proceed. In Washington, Berger expressed doubt about the dependability of the trib- als. In his meeting with Tenet, Berger focused most, however, on the question of what was to be done with Bin Ladin if he were actually captured. He wor- ried that the hard evidence against Bin Ladin was still skimpy and that there was a danger of snatching him and bringing him to the United States only to 24 see him acquitted. On May 18, CIA’s managers reviewed a draft Memorandum of Notifica- tion (MON), a legal document authorizing the capture operation.A 1986 pres- idential finding had authorized worldwide covert action against terrorism and probably provided adequate authority. But mindful of the old “rogue elephant” charge, senior CIA managers may have wanted something on paper to show that they were not acting on their own. Discussion of this memorandum brought to the surface an unease about paramilitary covert action that had become ingrained, at least among some CIA senior managers. James Pavitt, the assistant head of the Directorate of Opera- tions, expressed concern that people might get killed; it appears he thought the operation had at least a slight flavor of a plan for an assassination. Moreover, he calculated that it would cost several million dollars. He was not prepared to take that money “out of hide,” and he did not want to go to all the necessary con- gressional committees to get special money. Despite Pavitt’s misgivings, the CIA leadership cleared the draft memorandum and sent it on to the National Secu- 25 rity Council. Counterterrorist Center officers briefed Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh, telling them that the operation had about a 30 per- cent chance of success.The Center’s chief,“Jeff,” joined John O’Neill, the head of the FBI’s New York Field Office, in briefing Mary Jo White, the U.S.Attor- ney for the Southern District of New York, and her staff. Though “Jeff ” also used the 30 percent success figure, he warned that someone would surely be killed in the operation.White’s impression from the New York briefing was that 26 the chances of capturing Bin Ladin alive were nil. From May 20 to 24, the CIA ran a final, graded rehearsal of the operation, spread over three time zones, even bringing in personnel from the region.The FBI also participated. The rehearsal went well. The Counterterrorist Center

131 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 114 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 114 planned to brief cabinet-level principals and their deputies the following week, giving June 23 as the date for the raid, with Bin Ladin to be brought out of 27 Afghanistan no later than July 23. On May 20, Director Tenet discussed the high risk of the operation with Berger and his deputies, warning that people might be killed, including Bin Ladin. Success was to be defined as the exfiltration of Bin Ladin out of 28 A meeting of principals was scheduled for May 29 to decide Afghanistan. whether the operation should go ahead. The principals did not meet. On May 29, “Jeff ” informed “Mike” that he had just met with Tenet, Pavitt, and the chief of the Directorate’s Near Eastern Division.The decision was made not to go ahead with the operation.“Mike” cabled the field that he had been dir ected to “stand down on the operation for the time being.” He had been told, he wrote, that cabinet-level officials thought the risk of civilian casualties—“collateral damage”—was too high. They were concerned about the tribals’ safety, and had worried that “the purpose and nature of the operation would be subject to unavoidable misinterpretation and misrepresentation—and probably recriminations—in the event that Bin Ladin, 29 despite our best intentions and efforts, did not survive.” Impressions vary as to who actually decided not to proceed with the oper- ation. Clarke told us that the CSG saw the plan as flawed. He was said to have described it to a colleague on the NSC staff as “half-assed” and predicted that the principals would not approve it. “Jeff ” thought the decision had been made at the cabinet level. Pavitt thought that it was Berger’s doing, though perhaps on Tenet’s advice. Tenet told us that given the recommendation of his chief operations officers, he alone had decided to “turn off ” the opera- tion. He had simply informed Berger, who had not pushed back. Berger’s rec- ollection was similar. He said the plan was never presented to the White 30 House for a decision. The CIA’s senior management clearly did not think the plan would work. Tenet’s deputy director of operations wrote to Berger a few weeks later that the CIA assessed the tribals’ ability to capture Bin Ladin and deliver him to U.S. officials as low. But working-level CIA officers were disappointed. Before it was canceled, Schroen described it as the “best plan we are going to come up with 31 to capture [Bin Ladin] while he is in Afghanistan and bring him to justice.” No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation. The tribals’ reported readiness to act diminished. And Bin Ladin’s security precautions and defenses became more elaborate and formidable. the duty of Tenet away. It was At this time, 9/11 was more than three years and the CIA leadership to balance the risks of inaction against jeopardizing the lives of their operatives and agents. And they had reason to worry about fail- ure: millions of dollars down the drain; a shoot-out that could be seen as an assassination; and, if there were repercussions in Pakistan, perhaps a coup.The decisions of the U.S. government in May 1998 were made, as Berger has put

132 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 115 115 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS it, from the vantage point of the driver looking through a muddy windshield 32 moving forward, not through a clean rearview mirror. Looking for Other Options The Counterterrorist Center continued to track Bin Ladin and to contemplate covert action.The most hopeful possibility seemed now to lie in diplomacy— but not diplomacy managed by the Department of State, which focused pri- marily on India-Pakistan nuclear tensions during the summer of 1998.The CIA learned in the spring of 1998 that the Saudi government had quietly disrupted Bin Ladin cells in its country that were planning to attack U.S. forces with shoulder-fired missiles. They had arrested scores of individuals, with no pub- licity.When thanking the Saudis, Director Tenet took advantage of the open- ing to ask them to help against Bin Ladin. The response was encouraging enough that President Clinton made Tenet his informal personal representa- tive to work with the Saudis on terrorism, and Tenet visited Riyadh in May 33 and again in early June. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who had taken charge from the ailing King Fahd, promised Tenet an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin so that he could be sent to the United States or to another country for trial.The Kingdom’s emissary would be its intelligence chief, Prince Turki bin Faisal.Vice President Al Gore later added his thanks to those of Tenet, both making clear that they spoke with President Clinton’s blessing.Tenet reported that it was imperative to get an indictment against Bin Ladin.The New York grand jury issued its sealed indictment a few days later, on June 10.Tenet also recommended that no action be taken on other U.S. options, such as the covert 34 action plan. Prince Turki followed up in meetings during the summer with Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders. Apparently employing a mixture of possible incentives and threats,Turki received a commitment that Bin Ladin would be 35 expelled, but Mullah Omar did not make good on this promise. On August 5, Clarke chaired a CSG meeting on Bin Ladin. In the discus- sion of what might be done, the note taker wrote,“there was a dearth of bright ideas around the table, despite a consensus that the [government] ought to pur- 36 sue every avenue it can to address the problem.” 4.2 CRISIS: AUGUST 1998 esident Clinton On August 7, 1998, National Security Advi sor Berger woke Pr M . to tell him of the almost simultaneous bomb- . A with a phone call at 5:35 ings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,Tanzania. Sus- picion quickly focused on Bin Ladin. Unusually good intelligence, chiefly from

133 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 116 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 116 the yearlong monitoring of al Qaeda’s cell in Nairobi, soon firmly fixed respon- 37 sibility on him and his associates. Debate about what to do settled very soon on one option:Tomahawk cruise missiles. Months earlier, after cancellation of the covert capture operation, Clarke had prodded the Pentagon to explore possibilities for military action. On June 2, General Hugh Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had directed General Zinni at Central Command to develop a plan, which he had submitted during the first week of July. Zinni’s planners surely considered the two previous times the United States had used force to respond to terror- ism, the 1986 strike on Libya and the 1993 strike against Iraq.They proposed firing Tomahawks against eight terrorist camps in Afghanistan, including Bin 38 After the embassy attacks, the Pentagon Ladin’s compound at Tarnak Farms. offered this plan to the White House. The day after the embassy bombings,Tenet brought to a principals meeting intelligence that terrorist leaders were expected to gather at a camp near Khowst,Afghanistan, to plan future attacks. According to Berger,Tenet said that several hundred would attend, including Bin Ladin.The CIA described the area vilian population centers and away from ci as effectively a military cantonment, overwhelmingly populated by jihadists. Clarke remembered sitting next to Tenet in a White House meeting, asking Tenet “You thinking what I’m think- 39 The principals quickly reached a consensus on ing?” and his nodding “yes.” attacking the gathering.The strike’s purpose was to kill Bin Ladin and his chief 40 lieutenants. Berger put in place a tightly compartmented process designed to keep all planning secret. On August 11, General Zinni received orders to prepare detailed plans for strikes against the sites in Afghanistan.The Pentagon briefed President Clinton about these plans on August 12 and 14.Though the princi- pals hoped that the missiles would hit Bin Ladin, NSC staff recommended the strike whether or not there was firm evidence that the commanders were at 41 the facilities. Considerable debate went to the question of whether to strike targets out- side of Afghanistan, including two facilities in Sudan. One was a tannery believed to belong to Bin Ladin.The other was al Shifa, a Khartoum pharma- ceutical plant, which intelligence reports said was manufacturing a precursor ingredient for nerve gas with Bin Ladin’s financial support.The argument for hitting the tannery was that it could hurt Bin Ladin financially. The argument for hitting al Shifa was that it would lessen the chance of Bin Ladin’s having 42 nerve gas for a later attack. Ever since March 1995, American officials had had in the backs of their minds Aum Shinrikyo’s release of sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway. Presi- dent Clinton himself had expressed great concern about chemical and biolog- ical terrorism in the United States. Bin Ladin had reportedly been heard to speak of wanting a “Hiroshima” and at least 10,000 casualties.The CIA reported

134 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 117 117 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS that a soil sample from the vicinity of the al Shifa plant had tested positive for EMPTA, a precursor chemical for VX, a nerve gas whose lone use was for mass killing. Two days before the embassy bombings, Clarke’s staff wrote that Bin Ladin “has invested in and almost certainly has access to VX produced at a plant 43 Senior State Department officials believed that they had received in Sudan.” a similar verdict independently, though they and Clarke’s staff were probably relying on the same report. Mary McCarthy, the NSC senior director respon- sible for intelligence programs, initially cautioned Berger that the “bottom line” was that “we will need much better intelligence on this facility before we seri- ously consider any options.” She added that the link between Bin Ladin and al Shifa was “rather uncertain at this point.” Berger has told us that he thought about what might happen if the decision went against hitting al Shifa, and nerve 44 gas was used in a New York subway two weeks later. By the early hours of the morning of August 20, President Clinton and all his principal advisers had agreed to strike Bin Ladin camps in Afghanistan near Khowst, as well as hitting al Shifa.The President took the Sudanese tannery off the target list because he saw little point in killing uninvolved people without doing significant harm to Bin Ladin. The principal with the most qualms regarding al Shifa was Attorney General Reno. She expressed concern about attacking two Muslim countries at the same time. Looking back, she said that 45 she felt the “premise kept shifting.” Later on August 20, Navy vessels in the Arabian Sea fired their cruise mis- siles.Though most of them hit their intended targets, neither Bin Ladin nor any other terrorist leader was killed. Berger told us that an after-action review by Director Tenet concluded that the strikes had killed 20–30 people in the camps but probably missed Bin Ladin by a few hours. Since the missiles headed for Afghanistan had had to cross Pakistan, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was sent to meet with Pakistan’s army chief of staff to assure him the missiles were not coming from India. Officials in Washington speculated that one or another Pakistani official might have sent a warning to the Taliban or 46 Bin Ladin. The air strikes marked the climax of an intense 48-hour period in which Berger notified congressional leaders, the principals called their foreign coun- terparts, and President Clinton flew back from his vacation on Martha’s Vine- yard to address the nation from the Oval Office. The President spoke to the congressional leadership from Air Force One, and he called British Prime Min- ister Tony Blair, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and Egyptian President 47 House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Hosni Mubarak from the White House. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott initially supported the President. The next 48 month, Gingrich’s office dismissed the cruise missile attacks as “pinpricks.” At the time, President Clinton was embroiled in the Lewinsky scandal, which continued to consume public attention for the rest of that year and the first months of 1999. As it happened, a popular 1997 movie, Wag the Dog , features a

135 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 118 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 118 president who fakes a war to distract public attention from a domestic scandal. Some Republicans in Congress raised questions about the timing of the strikes. that said that Economist Berger was particularly rankled by an editorial in the only the future would tell whether the U.S. missile strikes had “created 10,000 49 new fanatics where there would have been none.” Much public commentary turned immediately to scalding criticism that the action was too aggressive. The Sudanese denied that al Shifa produced nerve gas, and they allowed journalists to visit what was left of a seemingly harmless facility. President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Berger, Tenet, and Clarke insisted to us that their judgment was right, pointing to the soil sam- ple evidence. No independent evidence has emerged to corroborate the CIA’s 50 assessment. Everyone involved in the decision had, of course, been aware of President Clinton’s problems. He told them to ignore them. Berger recalled the Presi- dent saying to him “that they were going to get crap either way, so they should 51 All his aides testified to us that they based their advice do the right thing.” solely on national security considerations. We have found no reason to ques- tion their statements. The failure of the strikes, the “wag the dog” slur, the intense partisanship of the period, and the nature of the al Shifa evidence likely had a cumulative effect on future decisions about the use of force against Bin Ladin. Berger told us that 52 he did not feel any sense of constraint. The period after the August 1998 embassy bombings was critical in shap- ing U.S. policy toward Bin Ladin. Although more Americans had been killed in the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, and many more in Beirut in 1983, the over- all loss of life rivaled the worst attacks in memory. More ominous, perhaps, was the demonstration of an operational capability to coordinate two nearly simul- taneous attacks on U.S. embassies in different countries. Despite the availability of information that al Qaeda was a global network, in 1998 policymakers knew little about the organization. The reams of new information that the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit had been developing since 1996 had not been pulled together and synthesized for the rest of the government. Indeed, analysts in the unit felt that they were viewed as alarmists even within the CIA. A National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism in 1997 had only briefly mentioned Bin Ladin, and no subsequent national estimate would authoritatively evaluate the terrorism danger until after 9/11. Policymakers knew there was a dangerous individual, Usama Bin Ladin, whom they had been trying to capture and bring to trial. Documents at the time referred to Bin ork.” They did not empha- and his “netw Ladin “and his associates” or Bin Ladin size the existence of a structured worldwide organization gearing up to train 53 thousands of potential terrorists. In the critical days and weeks after the August 1998 attacks, senior policy- makers in the Clinton administration had to reevaluate the threat posed by Bin

136 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 119 119 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS Ladin.Was this just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary ter- rorist threat America had lived with for decades, or was it radically new, pos- ing a danger beyond any yet experienced? Even after the embassy attacks, Bin Ladin had been responsible for the deaths of fewer than 50 Americans, most of them overseas. An NSC staffer working for Richard Clarke told us the threat was seen as one that could cause hun- 54 Even officials who acknowledge a vital dreds of casualties, not thousands. threat intellectually may not be ready to act on such beliefs at great cost or at high risk. Therefore, the government experts who believed that Bin Ladin and his net- work posed such a novel danger needed a way to win broad support for their views, or at least spotlight the areas of dispute.The Presidential Daily Brief and the similar, more widely circulated daily reports for high officials—consisting mainly of brief reports of intelligence “news” without much analysis or con- text—did not provide such a vehicle. The national intelligence estimate has often played this role, and is sometimes controversial for this very reason. It played no role in judging the threat posed by al Qaeda, either in 1998 or later. In the late summer and fall of 1998, the U.S. government also was worrying about the deployment of military power in two other ongoing conflicts. After years of war in the Balkans, the United States had finally committed itself to sig- nificant military interv ention in 1995–1996. Already maintaining a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia, U.S. officials were beginning to consider major combat operations against Serbia to protect Muslim civilians in Kosovo from ethnic cleansing.Air strikes were threatened in October 1998; a full-scale NATO 55 bombing campaign against Serbia was launched in March 1999. In addition, the Clinton administration was facing the possibility of major combat operations against Iraq. Since 1996, the UN inspections regime had been increasingly obstructed by Saddam Hussein.The United States was threat- ening to attack unless unfettered inspections could resume. The Clinton administration eventually launched a large-scale set of air strikes against Iraq, Operation Desert Fox, in December 1998. These military commitments became the context in which the Clinton administration had to consider open- ing another front of military engagement against a new terrorist threat based in Afghanistan. A Follow-On Campaign? Clarke hoped the August 1998 missile strikes would mark the beginning of a sustained campaign against Bin Ladin. Clarke was, as he later admitted, “obsessed” with Bin Ladin, and the embassy bombings gave him new scope for pursuing his obsession. Terrorism had moved high up among the President’s concerns, and Clarke’s position had elevated accordingly.The CSG, unlike most standing interagency committees, did not have to report through the Deputies Committee. Although such a reporting relationship had been prescribed in

137 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 120 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 120 the May 1998 presidential directive (after expressions of concern by Attor- ney General Reno, among others), that directive contained an exception that permitted the CSG to report directly to the principals if Berger so elected. In practice, the CSG often reported not even to the full Principals Commit- tee but instead to the so-called Small Group formed by Berger, consisting only of those principals cleared to know about the most sensitive issues con- nected with counterterrorism activities concerning Bin Ladin or the Kho- 56 bar Towers investigation. For this inner cabinet, Clarke drew up what he called “Political-Military delenda destroyed,” ust be , meaning that something “m Plan Delenda.”The Latin evoked the famous Roman vow to destroy its rival, Carthage.The overall goal of Clarke’s paper was to “immediately eliminate any significant threat to Amer- 57 The paper called for diplomacy to deny icans” from the “Bin Ladin network.” Bin Ladin sanctuary; covert action to disrupt terrorist activities, but above all to capture Bin Ladin and his deputies and bring them to trial; efforts to dry up Bin Ladin’s money supply; and preparation for follow-on military action.The status of the document was and remained uncertain. It was never formally adopted by the principals, and participants in the Small Group now have little or no recollection of it. It did, however, guide Clarke’s efforts. The military component of Clarke’s plan was its most fully articulated ele- ment. He envisioned an ongoing campaign of strikes against Bin Ladin’s bases in Afghanistan or elsewhere, whenever target information was ripe. Acknowl- edging that individual targets might not have much value, he cautioned Berger not to expect ever again to have an assembly of terrorist leaders in his sights. But he argued that rolling attacks might persuade the Taliban to hand over Bin Ladin and, in any case, would show that the action in August was not a “one- off ” event. It would show that the United States was committed to a relentless 58 effort to take down Bin Ladin’s network. Members of the Small Group found themselves unpersuaded of the merits of rolling attacks. Defense Secretary William Cohen told us Bin Ladin’s train- ing camps were primitive, built with “rope ladders”; General Shelton called them “jungle gym” camps. Neither thought them worthwhile targets for very Econ- expensive missiles. President Clinton and Berger also worried about the ’s point—that attacks that missed Bin Ladin could enhance his stature and omist win him new recruits. After the United States launched air attacks against Iraq at the end of 1998 and against Serbia in 1999, in each case provoking world- wide criticism, Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg added the argument that attacks in Afghanistan offered “little benefit, lots of blowback 59 against [a] bomb-happy U.S.” During the last week of August 1998, officials began considering possible follow-on strikes. According to Clarke, President Clinton was inclined to launch further strikes sooner rather than later. On August 27, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe advised Secretary Cohen that the avail-

138 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 121 121 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS able targets were not promising. The experience of the previous week, he wrote, “has only confirmed the importance of defining a clearly articulated rationale for military action” that was effective as well as justified. But Slocombe worried that simply striking some of these available targets did not add up to 60 an effective strategy. Defense officials at a lower level, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, tried to meet Slocombe’s objections.They developed a plan that, unlike Clarke’s, called not for particu- lar strikes but instead for a broad change in national strategy and in the insti- tutional approach of the Department of Defense, implying a possible need for large-scale operations across the whole spectrum of U.S. military capabilities. It urged the department to become a lead agency in driving a national coun- terterrorism strategy forward, to “champion a national effort to take up the gauntlet that international terrorists have thrown at our feet.” The authors expressed concern that “we have not fundamentally altered our philosophy or our approach” even though the terrorist threat had grown. They outlined an eight-part strategy “to be more proactive and aggressive.” The future, they warned, might bring “horrific attacks,” in which case “we will have no choice nor, unfortunately, will we have a plan.”The assistant secretary, Allen Holmes, took the paper to Slocombe’s chief deputy, Jan Lodal, but it went no further. Its lead author recalls being told by Holmes that Lodal thought it was too aggressive. Holmes cannot recall what was said, and Lodal cannot remember 61 the episode or the paper at all. 4.3 DIPLOMACY After the August missile strikes, diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options.The United States had issued a for- mal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out by the Bin Ladin network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to 62 it. For a brief moment, it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Ladin. On August 22, the reclusive Mullah Omar told a working-level State Department official that the strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue 63 Meeting in with the United States on Bin Ladin’s presence in Afghanistan. Islamabad with William Milam, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan,Taliban dele- gates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but 64 asked what would happen to Bin Ladin should he be sent to Saudi Arabia. Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mul- lah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Ladin, the

139 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 122 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 122 Taliban leader said no. Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government. Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic rela- tions with the Taliban regime. (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.) Crown Prince Abdullah told President Clinton and Vice President Gore about this when he visited Washington in late Sep- tember. His account confirmed reports that the U.S. government had received 65 independently. Other efforts with the Saudi government centered on improving intelli- gence sharing and permitting U.S. agents to interrogate prisoners in Saudi cus- 66 tody.The history of such cooperation in 1997 and 1998 had been strained. Several officials told us, in particular, that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda financial official, Madani al Tayyib, who had 67 Though U.S. officials repeat- been detained by the Saudi government in 1997. edly raised the issue, the Saudis provided limited information. In his Septem- ber 1998 meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah,Vice President Gore, while thanking the Saudi government for their responsiveness, renewed the request 68 The United States never obtained this access. for direct U.S. access to Tayyib. An NSC staff–led working group on terrorist finances asked the CIA in November 1998 to push again for access to Tayyib and to see “if it is possible to elaborate further on the ties between Usama bin Ladin and prominent indi- 69 One result viduals in Saudi Arabia, including especially the Bin Ladin family.” was two NSC-led interagency trips to Persian Gulf states in 1999 and 2000. During these trips the NSC, Treasury, and intelligence representatives spoke with Saudi officials, and later interviewed members of the Bin Ladin family, about Usama’s inheritance. The Saudis and the Bin Ladin family eventually helped in this particular effort and U.S. officials ultimately learned that Bin 70 But Clarke Ladin was not financing al Qaeda out of a personal inheritance. was frustrated about how little the Agency knew, complaining to Berger that four years after “we first asked CIA to track down [Bin Ladin]’s finances” and two years after the creation of the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit, the Agency said it could only guess at how much aid Bin Ladin gave to terrorist groups, what were the 71 main sources of his budget, or how he moved his money. The other diplomatic route to get at Bin Ladin in Afghanistan ran through Islamabad. In the summer before the embassy bombings, the State Department had been heavily focused on rising tensions between India and Pakistan and did not aggressively challenge Pakistan on Afghanistan and Bin Ladin. But State Department counterterrorism officials wanted a stronger position; the depart- ment’s acting counterterrorism coordinator advised Secretary Albright to des- ignate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, noting that despite high-level Pakistani assurances, the country’s military intelligence service continued “activities in support of international terrorism” by supporting attacks on civil- ian targets in Kashmir.This recommendation w as opposed by the State Depart- ment’s South Asia bureau, which was concerned that it would damage already

140 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 123 123 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS sensitive relations with Pakistan in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. Secretary Albright rejected the recommendation on 72 She told us that, August 5, 1998, just two days before the embassy bombings. in general, putting the Pakistanis on the terrorist list would eliminate any influ- 73 In October, an NSC counterterror- ence the United States had over them. ism official noted that Pakistan’s pro-Taliban military intelligence service had been training Kashmiri jihadists in one of the camps hit by U.S. missiles, lead- 74 ing to the death of Pakistanis. After flying to Nairobi and bringing home the coffins of the American dead, Secretary Albright increased the department’s focus on counterterrorism. According to Ambassador Milam, the bombings were a “wake-up call,” and he soon found himself spending 45 to 50 percent of his time working the Tal- 75 But Pakistan’s military intelligence service, known iban–Bin Ladin portfolio. as the ISID (Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate), was the Taliban’s primary patron, which made progress difficult. Additional pressure on the Pakistanis—beyond demands to press the Taliban on Bin Ladin—seemed unattractive to most officials of the State Department. Congressional sanctions punishing Pakistan for possessing nuclear arms pre- 76 In the words vented the administration from offering incentives to Islamabad. of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott,Washington’s Pakistan policy was “stick-heavy.”Talbott felt that the only remaining sticks were additional sanc- tions that would have bankrupted the Pakistanis, a dangerous move that could have brought “total chaos” to a nuclear-armed country with a significant num- 77 ber of Islamic radicals. The Saudi government, which had a long and close relationship with Pak- istan and provided it oil on generous terms, was already pressing Sharif with regard to the Taliban and Bin Ladin. A senior State Department official con- cluded that Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah put “a tremendous amount of heat” on the Pakistani prime minister during the prince’s October 1998 visit 78 to Pakistan. The State Department urged President Clinton to engage the Pakistanis. Accepting this advice, President Clinton invited Sharif to Washington, where they talked mostly about India but also discussed Bin Ladin. After Sharif went home, the President called him and raised the Bin Ladin subject again. This 79 effort elicited from Sharif a promise to talk with the Taliban. Mullah Omar’s position showed no sign of softening. One intelligence report passed to Berger by the NSC staff quoted Bin Ladin as saying that Mul- lah Omar had given him a completely free hand to act in any country, though asking that he not claim responsibility for attacks in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Bin Ladin was described as grabbing his beard and saying emotionally, “By Allah, by God, the Americans will still be amazed.The so-called United States 80 will suffer the same fate as the Russians.Their state will collapse, too.” Debate in the State Department intensified after December 1998, when Michael Sheehan became counterterrorism coordinator. A onetime special

141 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 124 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 124 forces officer, he had worked with Albright when she was ambassador to the United Nations and had served on the NSC staff with Clarke. He shared Clarke’s obsession with terrorism, and had little hesitation about locking horns with the regional bureaus. Through every available channel, he repeated the earlier warning to the Taliban of the possible dire consequences—including military strikes—if Bin Ladin remained their guest and conducted additional attacks.Within the department, he argued for designating the Taliban regime a state sponsor of terrorism. This was technically difficult to do, for calling it a state would be tantamount to diplomatic recognition, which the United States had thus far withheld. But Sheehan urged the use of any available weapon against the Taliban. He told us that he thought he was regarded in the depart- 81 ment as “a one-note Johnny nutcase.” In early 1999, the State Department’s counterterrorism office proposed a comprehensive diplomatic strategy for all states involved in the Afghanistan problem, including Pakistan. It specified both carrots and hard-hitting sticks— among them, certifying Pakistan as uncooperative on terrorism. Albright said the original carrots and sticks listed in a decision paper for principals may not have been used as “described on paper” but added that they were used in other ways or in varying degrees. But the paper’s author, Ambassador Sheehan, was frustrated and complained to us that the original plan “had been watered down 82 to the point that nothing was then done with it.” The cautiousness of the South Asia bureau was reinforced when, in May 1999, Pakistani troops were discovered to have infiltrated into an especially mountainous area of Kashmir. A limited war began between India and Pak- istan, euphemistically called the “Kargil crisis,” as India tried to drive the Pak- istani forces out. Patience with Pakistan was wearing thin, inside both the State Department and the NSC. Bruce Riedel, the NSC staff member responsible for Pakistan, wrote Berger that Islamabad was “behaving as a rogue state in two 83 areas—backing Taliban/UBL terror and provoking war with India.” Discussion within the Clinton administration on Afghanistan then concen- trated on two main alternatives.The first, championed by Riedel and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, was to undertake a major diplomatic effort to end the Afghan civil war and install a national unity government.The sec- ond, favored by Sheehan, Clarke, and the CIA, called for labeling the Taliban a terrorist group and ultimately funneling secret aid to its chief foe, the North- ern Alliance.This dispute would go back and forth throughout 1999 and ulti- mately become entangled with debate about enlisting the Northern Alliance 84 as an ally for covert action. Another diplomatic option may have been available: nurturing Afghan exile groups as a possible moderate governing alternative to the Taliban. In late 1999, Washington provided some support for talks among the leaders of exile Afghan groups, including the ousted Rome-based King Zahir Shah and Hamid Karzai, about bolstering anti-Taliban forces inside Afghanistan and linking the

142 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 125 125 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS Northern Alliance with Pashtun groups. One U.S. diplomat later told us that the exile groups were not ready to move forward and that coordinating frac- 85 tious groups residing in Bonn, Rome, and Cyprus proved extremely difficult. Frustrated by the Taliban’s resistance, two senior State Department officials suggested asking the Saudis to offer the Taliban $250 million for Bin Ladin. Clarke opposed having the United States facilitate a “huge grant to a regime as heinous as the Taliban” and suggested that the idea might not seem attrac- tive to either Secretary Albright or First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton—both 86 The proposal seems to have critics of the Taliban’s record on women’s rights. quietly died. Within the State Department, some officials delayed Sheehan and Clarke’s push either to designate Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a state sponsor of ter- rorism or to designate the regime as a foreign terrorist organization (thereby avoiding the issue of whether to recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s govern- ment). Sheehan and Clarke prevailed in July 1999, when President Clinton issued an executive order effectively declaring the Taliban regime a state spon- 87 In October, a UN Security Council Resolution champi- sor of terrorism. 88 oned by the United States added economic and travel sanctions. With UN sanctions set to come into effect in November, Clarke wrote 89 Mullah Omar had Berger that “the Taliban appear to be up to something.” shuffled his “cabinet” and hinted at Bin Ladin’s possible departure. Clarke’s staff thought his most likely destination would be Somalia; Chechnya seemed less appealing with Russia on the offensive. Clarke commented that Iraq and Libya had previously discussed hosting Bin Ladin, though he and his staff had their doubts that Bin Ladin would trust secular Arab dictators such as Saddam Hus- sein or Muammar Qadhafi. Clarke also raised the “remote possibility” of Yemen, which offered vast uncontrolled spaces. In November, the CSG dis- cussed whether the sanctions had rattled the Taliban, who seemed “to be look- 90 ing for a face-saving way out of the Bin Ladin issue.” In fact none of the outside pressure had any visible effect on Mullah Omar, who was unconcerned about commerce with the outside world. Omar had vir- tually no diplomatic contact with the West, since he refused to meet with non- Muslims.The United States learned that at the end of 1999, the Taliban Council eaffirmed that their regime would stick by Bin of Ministers unanimously r Bin Ladin and the Taliban leadership were sometimes Ladin. Relations between 91 Indeed, Mullah Omar had tense, but the foundation was deep and personal. 92 executed at least one subordinate who opposed his pro–Bin Ladin policy. The United States would try tougher sanctions in 2000.Working with Rus- sia (a country involved in an ongoing campaign against Chechen separatists, some of whom received support from Bin Ladin), the United States persuaded the United Nations to adopt Security Council Resolution 1333, which 93 included an embargo on arms shipments to the Taliban, in December 2000. The aim of the resolution was to hit the Taliban where it was most sensitive—

143 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 126 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 126 on the battlefield against the Northern Alliance—and criminalize giving them 94 Ye t been doing. s,” which P arms and providing military “adviser akistan had the passage of the resolution had no visible effect on Omar, nor did it halt the 95 flow of Pakistani military assistance to the Taliban. U.S. authorities had continued to try to get cooperation from Pakistan in pressing the Taliban to stop sheltering Bin Ladin. President Clinton contacted Sharif again in June 1999, partly to discuss the crisis with India but also to urge Sharif, “in the strongest way I can,” to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin 96 The President suggested that Pakistan use its control over oil supplies Ladin. to the Taliban and over Afghan imports through Karachi. Sharif suggested instead that Pakistani forces might try to capture Bin Ladin themselves. Though no one in Washington thought this was likely to happen, President 97 Clinton gave the idea his blessing. The President met with Sharif in Washington in early July. Though the meeting’s main purpose was to seal the Pakistani prime minister’s decision to withdraw from the Kargil confrontation in Kashmir, President Clinton com- plained about Pakistan’s failure to take effective action with respect to the Tal- iban and Bin Ladin. Sharif came back to his earlier proposal and won approval for U.S. assistance in training a Pakistani special forces team for an operation against Bin Ladin. Then, in October 1999, Sharif was deposed by General Per- 98 vez Musharraf, and the plan was terminated. At first, the Clinton administration hoped that Musharraf ’s coup might cre- ate an opening for action on Bin Ladin. A career military officer, Musharraf was thought to have the political strength to confront and influence the Pak- istani military intelligence service, which supported the Taliban. Berger spec- ulated that the new government might use Bin Ladin to buy concessions from 99 Washington, but neither side ever developed such an initiative. By late 1999, more than a year after the embassy bombings, diplomacy with Pakistan, like the efforts with the Taliban, had, according to Under Secretary 100 of State Thomas Pickering,“borne little fruit.” 4.4 COVERT ACTION As part of the response to the embassy bombings, President Clinton signed a Memorandum of Notification authorizing to let its tribal assets use the CIA ciates. CIA officers told the tribals that force to capture Bin Ladin and his asso the plan to capture Bin Ladin, which had been “turned off ” three months ear- lier, was back on.The memorandum also authorized the CIA to attack Bin Ladin in other ways. Also, an executive order froze financial holdings that could be 101 linked to Bin Ladin. The counterterrorism staff at CIA thought it was gaining a better under- standing of Bin Ladin and his network. In preparation for br iefing the Senate

144 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 127 127 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS Select Committee on Intelligence on September 2,Tenet was told that the intel- Ladin’s network “than about any other ligence community knew more about Bin 102 top tier terrorist organization.” The CIA was using this knowledge to disrupt a number of Bin Ladin–asso- ciated cells.Working with Albanian authorities, CIA operatives had raided an al Qaeda forgery operation and another terrorist cell in Tirana.These operations may have disrupted a planned attack on the U.S. embassy in Tirana, and did lead to the rendition of a number of al Qaeda–related terrorist operatives. After the embassy bombings, there were arrests in Azerbaijan, Italy, and Britain. Several terrorists were sent to an Arab country.The CIA described working with FBI operatives to prevent a planned attack on the U.S. embassy in Uganda, and a number of suspects were arrested. On September 16, Abu Hajer, one of Bin Ladin’s deputies in Sudan and the head of his computer operations and weapons procurement, was arrested in Germany. He was the most important Bin Ladin lieutenant captured thus far. Clarke commented to Berger with satisfaction that August and September had brought the “greatest number of terrorist arrests in 103 a short period of time that we have ever arranged/facilitated.” Given the President’s August Memorandum of Notification, the CIA had already been working on new plans for using the Afghan tribals to capture Bin Ladin. During September and October, the tribals claimed to have tried at least four times to ambush Bin Ladin. Senior CIA officials doubted whether any of these ambush attempts had actually occurred. But the tribals did seem to have 104 success in reporting where Bin Ladin was. This information was more useful than it had been in the past; since the August missile strikes, Bin Ladin had taken to moving his sleeping place fre- quently and unpredictably and had added new bodyguards. Worst of all, al Qaeda’s senior leadership had stopped using a particular means of communi- 105 This made it Washington Times cation almost immediately after a leak to the . much more difficult for the National Security Agency to intercept his conver- sations. But since the tribals seemed to know where Bin Ladin was or would be, an alternative to capturing Bin Ladin would be to mark his location and call in another round of missile strikes. On November 3, the Small Group met to discuss these problems, among other topics. Preparing Director Tenet for a Small Group meeting in mid- November, the Counterterrorist Center stressed,“At this point we cannot pre- 106 dict when or if a capture operation will be executed by our assets.” U.S. counterterrorism officials also worried about possible domestic attacks. Several intelligence reports, some of dubious sourcing, mentioned Washington as a possible target. On October 26, Clarke’s CSG took the unusual step of holding a meeting dedicated to trying “to evaluate the threat of a terrorist attack 107 The CSG members in the United States by the Usama bin Ladin network.” were “urged to be as creative as possible in their thinking” about preventing a Bin Ladin attack on U.S. territory. Participants noted that while the FBI had

145 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 128 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 128 been given additional resources for such efforts, both it and the CIA were hav- ing problems exploiting leads by tracing U.S. telephone numbers and translat- ing documents obtained in cell disruptions abroad. The Justice Department reported that the current guidelines from the Attorney General gave sufficient 108 legal authority for domestic investigation and surveillance. Though intelligence gave no clear indication of what might be afoot, some intelligence reports mentioned chemical weapons, pointing toward work at a camp in southern Afghanistan called Derunta. On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indict- ment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense instal- lations.The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah. The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had “reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specif- ically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively 109 This passage led Clarke, who for years had with the Government of Iraq.” read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khar- toum was “probably a direct result of the Iraq–Al Qida agreement.” Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the “exact formula 110 This language about al Qaeda’s “understanding” with Iraq had used by Iraq.” been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in Novem- 111 ber 1998. On Friday, December 4, 1998, the CIA included an article in the Presiden- tial Daily Brief describing intelligence, received from a friendly government, about a threatened hijacking in the United States.This article was declassified at our request. The same day, Clarke convened a meeting of his CSG to discuss both the The following is the text of an item from the Presidential Daily Brief received by President William J. Clinton on December 4, 1998. Redacted material is indicated in brackets. SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks 1. Reporting [—] suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq ‘Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG) saying that, as of late October, the IG had completed planning for

146 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 129 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 129 an operation in the US on behalf of Bin Ladin, but that the operation was on hold.A senior Bin Ladin operative from Saudi Arabia was to visit IG counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options—perhaps including an aircraft hijacking. • IG leader Islambuli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during the “next couple of weeks” to free ‘Abd al- Rahman and the other prisoners, according to what may be a different source. • The same source late last month said that Bin Ladin might implement plans to hijack US aircraft before the beginning of Ramadan on 20 December and that two members of the oper- ational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport. [—] 2. Some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack train- ing, according to various sources, but no group directly tied to Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization has ever carried out an aircraft hijacking. Bin Ladin could be weighing other types of operations against US aircraft.Accord- ing to [—] the IG in October obtained SA-7 missiles and intended to move them from Yemen into Saudi Arabia to shoot down an Egyptian plane or, if unsuccessful, a US military or civilian aircraft. • A [—] in October told us that unspecified “extremist elements” in Yemen had acquired SA-7s. [—] 3. [—] indicate the Bin Ladin organization or its allies are moving closer to implementing anti-US attacks at unspecified locations, but we do not know whether they are related to attacks on aircraft. A Bin Ladin asso- ciate in Sudan late last month told a colleague in Kandahar that he had shipped a group of containers to Afghanistan. Bin Ladin associates also talked about the movement of containers to Afghanistan before the East Africa bombings. • In other [—] Bin Ladin associates last month discussed picking up a package in Malaysia. One told his colleague in Malaysia that “they” were in the “ninth month [of pregnancy].” • An alleged Bin Ladin supporter in Yemen late last month remarked to his mother that he planned to work in “com- merce” from abroad and said his impending “marriage,” which would take place soon, would be a “surprise.”“Commerce” and “marriage” often are codewords for terrorist attacks. [—]

147 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 130 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 130 hijacking concern and the antiaircraft missile threat. To address the hijack- ing warning, the group agreed that New York airports should go to maxi- mum security starting that weekend.They agreed to boost security at other East coast airports. The CIA agreed to distribute versions of the report to the FBI and FAA to pass to the New York Police Department and the air- lines. The FAA issued a security directive on December 8, with specific requirements for more intensive air carrier screening of passengers and more 112 oversight of the screening process, at all three New York City area airports. The intelligence community could learn little about the source of the infor- mation. Later in December and again in early January 1999, more information arrived from the same source, reporting that the planned hijacking had been stalled because two of the operatives, who were sketchily described, had been arrested near Washington, D.C. or New York.After investigation, the FBI could find no information to support the hijack threat; nor could it verify any arrests like those described in the report.The FAA alert at the New York area airports 113 ended on January 31, 1999. On December 17, the day after the United States and Britain began their Desert Fox bombing campaign against Iraq, the Small Group convened to dis- cuss intelligence suggesting imminent Bin Ladin attacks on the U.S. embassies in Qatar and Ethiopia.The next day, Director Tenet sent a memo to the Pres- ident, the cabinet, and senior officials throughout the government describing reports that Bin Ladin planned to attack U.S. targets very soon, possibly over the next few days, before Ramadan celebrations began. Tenet said he was 114 “greatly concerned.” With alarms sounding, members of the Small Group considered ideas about how to respond to or prevent such attacks. Generals Shelton and Zinni came up with military options. Special Operations Forces were later told that they might be ordered to attempt very high-risk in-and-out raids either in Khar- toum, to capture a senior Bin Ladin operative known as Abu Hafs the Mauri- tanian—who appeared to be engineering some of the plots—or in Kandahar, to capture Bin Ladin himself. Shelton told us that such operations are not risk free, invoking the memory of the 1993 “Black Hawk down” fiasco in 115 Mogadishu. The CIA reported on December 18 that Bin Ladin might be traveling to Kandahar and could be targeted there with cruise missiles. Vessels with Tom- ahawk cruise missiles were on station in the Arabian Sea, and could fire within 116 a few hours of receiving target data. On December 20, intelligence indicated Bin Ladin would be spending the night at the Haji Habash house, part of the governor’s residence in Kanda- har.The chief of the Bin Ladin unit,“Mike,” told us that he promptly briefed Tenet and his deputy, John Gordon. From the field, the CIA’s Gary Schroen advised:“Hit him tonight—we may not get another chance.”An urgent tele- 117 conference of principals was arranged.

148 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 131 131 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS The principals considered a cruise missile strike to try to kill Bin Ladin. One issue they discussed was the potential collateral damage—the number of inno- cent bystanders who would be killed or wounded. General Zinni predicted a number well over 200 and was concerned about damage to a nearby mosque. The senior intelligence officer on the Joint Staff apparently made a different calculation, estimating half as much collateral damage and not predicting dam- age to the mosque. By the end of the meeting, the principals decided against recommending to the President that he order a strike.A few weeks later, in Jan- uary 1999, Clarke wrote that the principals had thought the intelligence only half reliable and had worried about killing or injuring perhaps 300 people. the reliability of the source and con- Tenet said he remembered doubts about e” remembered Tenet telling him cern about hitting the nearby mosque.“Mik that the military was concerned that a few hours had passed since the last sight- ing of Bin Ladin and that this persuaded everyone that the chance of failure 118 was too great. Some lower-level officials were angry. “Mike” reported to Schroen that he had been unable to sleep after this decision. “I’m sure we’ll regret not acting last night,” he wrote, criticizing the principals for “worrying that some stray shrapnel might hit the Habash mosque and ‘offend’ Muslims.” He commented that they had not shown comparable sensitivity when deciding to bomb Mus- lims in Iraq. The principals, he said, were “obsessed” with trying to get oth- ers—Saudis, Pakistanis,Afghan tribals—to “do what we won’t do.” Schroen was disappointed too.“We should have done it last night,” he wrote.“We may well 119 The Joint Staff ’s deputy direc- come to regret the decision not to go ahead.” tor for operations agreed, even though he told us that later intelligence appeared to show that Bin Ladin had left his quarters before the strike would have occurred. Missing Bin Ladin, he said, “would have caused us a hell of a problem, but it was a shot we should have taken, and we would have had to 120 pay the price.” The principals began considering other, more aggressive covert alternatives using the tribals. CIA officers suggested that the tribals would prefer to try a raid rather than a roadside ambush because they would have better control, it would be less dangerous, and it played more to their skills and experience. But everyone knew that if the tribals were to conduct such a raid, guns would be blazing.The current Memorandum of Notification instructed the CIA to cap- ture Bin Ladin and to use lethal force only in self-defense.Work now began on a new memorandum that would give the tribals more latitude.The intention was to say that they could use lethal force if the attempted capture seemed 121 impossible to complete successfully. Early drafts of this highly sensitive document emphasized that it authorized only a capture operation.The tribals were to be paid only if they captured Bin Ladin, not if they killed him. Officials throughout the government approved this draft. But on December 21, the day after principals decided not to launch

149 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 132 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 132 the cruise missile strike against Kandahar, the CIA’s leaders urged strengthen- be paid whether Bin Ladin was cap- ing the language to allow the tribals to or killed. Berger and Tenet then tured worked together to take this line of 122 thought even further. They finally agreed, as Berger reported to President Clinton, that an extraordinary step was necessary. The new memorandum would allow the killing of Bin Ladin if the CIA and the tribals judged that capture was not fea- sible (a judgment it already seemed clear they had reached). The Justice Department lawyer who worked on the draft told us that what was envisioned was a group of tribals assaulting a location, leading to a shoot-out. Bin Ladin and others would be captured if possible, but probably would be killed. The administration’s position was that under the law of armed conflict, killing a person who posed an imminent threat to the United States would be an act of self-defense, not an assassination. On Christmas Eve 1998, Berger sent a final draft to President Clinton, with an explanatory memo. The President 123 approved the document. Because the White House considered this operation highly sensitive, only a tiny number of people knew about this Memorandum of Notification. Berger ight, Cohen, Shelton, and inform Albr arranged for the NSC’s legal adviser to Reno. None was allowed to keep a cop y. Congressional leaders were briefed, as required by law. Attorney General Reno had sent a letter to the President expressing her concern: she warned of possible retaliation, including the tar- legal geting of U.S. officials. She did not pose any objection. A copy of the final instructions that were to be sent to document, along with the carefully cra fted 124 the tribals, was given to Tenet. A message from Tenet to CIA field agents directed them to communicate to the tribals the instructions authorized by the President: the United States preferred that Bin Ladin and his lieutenants be captured, but if a successful cap- ture operation was not feasible, the tribals were permitted to kill them. The instructions added that the tribals must avoid killing others unnecessarily and must not kill or abuse Bin Ladin or his lieutenants if they surrendered. Finally, 125 the tribals would not be paid if this set of requirements was not met. The field officer passed these instructions to the tribals word for word. But he prefaced the directions with a message:“From the American President down to the average man in the street, we want him [Bin Ladin] stopped.” If the trib- als captured Bin Ladin, the officer assured them that he would receive a fair trial under U.S. law and be treated humanely. The CIA officer reported that the tribals said they “fully understand the contents, implications and the spirit of the message” and that that their response was,“We will try our best to cap- ture Bin Ladin alive and will have no intention of killing or harming him on purpose.”The tribals explained that they wanted to prove that their standards of behavior were more civilized than those of Bin Ladin and his band of ter- rorists. In an additional note addressed to Schroen, the tribals noted that if they were to adopt Bin Ladin’s ethics,“we would have finished the job long before,”

150 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 133 133 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS but they had been limited by their abilities and “by our beliefs and laws we 126 have to respect.” Schroen and “Mike” were impressed by the tribals’ reaction. Schroen cabled that the tribals were not in it for the money but as an investment in the future of Afghanistan. “Mike” agreed that the tribals’ reluctance to kill was not a “showstopper.” “From our view,” he wrote, “that seems in character and fair 127 enough.” Policymakers in the Clinton administration, including the President and his national security advisor, told us that the President’s intent regarding covert action against Bin Ladin was clear: he wanted him dead.This intent was never well communicated or understood within the CIA. Tenet told the Commis- sion that except in one specific case (discussed later), the CIA was authorized to kill Bin Ladin only in the context of a capture operation. CIA senior man- agers, operators, and lawyers confirmed this understanding.“We always talked about how much easier it would have been to kill him,” a former chief of the 128 Bin Ladin unit said. In February 1999, another draft Memorandum of Notification went to Pres- ident Clinton. It asked him to allow the CIA to give exactly the same guidance to the Northern Alliance as had just been given to the tribals: they could kill Bin Ladin if a successful capture operation was not feasible. On this occasion, however, President Clinton crossed out key language he had approved in December and inserted more ambiguous language. No one we interviewed could shed light on why the President did this. President Clinton told the Com- 129 mission that he had no recollection of why he rewrote the language. Later in 1999, when legal authority was needed for enlisting still other col- laborators and for covering a wider set of contingencies, the lawyers returned to the language used in August 1998, which authorized force only in the con- text of a capture operation. Given the closely held character of the document approved in December 1998, and the subsequent return to the earlier language, it is possible to understand how the former White House officials and the CIA officials might disagree as to whether the CIA was ever authorized by the Pres- 130 ident to kill Bin Ladin. The dispute turned out to be somewhat academic, as the limits of available legal authority were not tested. Clarke commented to Berger that “despite ‘expanded’ authority for CIA’s sources to engage in direct action, they have shown no inclination to do so.” He added that it was his impression that the CIA thought the tribals unlikely to act against Bin Ladin and hence relying on 131 Events seemed to bear him out, since the tribals did them was “unrealistic.” not stage an attack on Bin Ladin or his associates during 1999. The tribals remained active collectors of intelligence, however, providing good but not predictive information about Bin Ladin’s whereabouts.The CIA ting on Bin Ladin by what Tenet’s also tried to improve its intelligence repor assistant director for collection, the indef atigable Charles Allen, called an “all- 132 The effort might have had an out, all-agency, seven-days-a-week” effort.

151 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 134 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 134 effect. On January 12, 1999, Clarke wrote Berger that the CIA’s confidence in was now higher than it had been on the tribals’ reporting had increased. It 133 December 20. In February 1999,Allen proposed flying a U-2 mission over Afghanistan to build a baseline of intelligence outside the areas where the tribals had cover- age. Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible. He wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin’s having met with Iraqi officials, who “may have offered him asylum.” Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein’s service, and it would be “vir- tually impossible” to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke 134 Berger suggested sending one U-2 flight, but Clarke opposed even declared. this. It would require Pakistani approval, he wrote; and “Pak[istan’s] intel[ligence service] is in bed with” Bin Ladin and would warn him that the United States was getting ready for a bombing campaign: “Armed with that 135 Though told also knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad.” by Bruce Riedel of the NSC staff that Saddam Hussein wanted Bin Ladin in Baghdad, Berger conditionally authorized a single U-2 flight.Allen meanwhile had found other ways of getting the information he wanted. So the U-2 flight 136 never occurred. 4.5 SEARCHING FOR FRESH OPTIONS “Boots on the Ground?” Starting on the day the August 1998 strikes were launched, General Shelton had issued a planning order to prepare follow-on strikes and think beyond just 137 The initial strikes had been called Operation Infinite using cruise missiles. Reach. The follow-on plans were given the code name Operation Infinite Resolve. At the time, any actual military action in Afghanistan would have been car- ried out by General Zinni’s Central Command.This command was therefore the locus for most military planning. Zinni was even less enthusiastic than Cohen and Shelton about follow-on cruise missile strikes. He knew that the Tomahawks did not always hit their targets. After the August 20 strikes, Presi- dent Clinton had had to call Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to apologize for a wayward missile that had killed several people in a Pakistani village. Sharif 138 had been understanding, while commenting on American “overkill.” Zinni feared that Bin Ladin would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pak- istani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India,

152 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 135 135 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential reper- cussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, “It was easy to 139 had to live there.” take the shot from Washington and walk away from it.We Zinni’s distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial govern- 140 ments. After the decision—in which fear of collateral damage was an important fac- tor—not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as “Spooky” can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electron- ics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projec- tiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Ladin’s head- quarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan.The Joint Staff prepared a decision 141 paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff ’s deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni’s position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option 142 feasible. The most likely explanation for the two generals’ differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia.The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft’s unre- fueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles.They needed search-and-rescue still less range.Thus an AC-130 deployment had to backup, which would have be embedded in a wider political and military concept involving Pakistan or other neighboring countries to address issues relating to basing and overflight. No one ever put such an initiative on the table. Zinni therefore cautioned about simply ordering up AC-130 deployments for a quick strike; Schoomaker planned for what he saw as a practical strike option; and the underlying issues were not fully engaged. The Joint Staff decision paper was never turned into an interagency policy paper.

153 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 136 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 136 The same was true for the option of using ground units from the Special Operations Command. Within the command, some officers—such as Schoomaker—wanted the mission of “putting boots on the ground” to get at Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. At the time, Special Operations was designated as a “supporting command,” not a “supported command”: that is, it supported a epare its own plans for dealing with al theater commander and did not pr Qaeda. Schoomaker proposed to Shelton and Cohen that Special Operations become a supported command, but the proposal was not adopted. Had it been accepted, he says, he would have taken on the al Qaeda mission instead of defer- ring to Zinni. Lieutenant General William Boykin, the current deputy under secretary of defense for intelligence and a founding member of Delta Force, told us that “opportunities were missed because of an unwillingness to take risks 143 and a lack of vision and understanding.” President Clinton relied on the advice of General Shelton, who informed him that without intelligence on Bin Ladin’s location, a commando raid’s chance of failure was high. Shelton told President Clinton he would go for- ward with “boots on the ground” if the President ordered him to do so; how- ever, he had to ensure that the President was completely aware of the large 144 logistical problems inherent in a military operation. The Special Operations plans were apparently conceived as another quick strike option—an option to insert forces after the United States received actionable intelligence. President Clinton told the Commission that “if we had had really good intelligence about . . . where [Usama Bin Ladin] was, I would have done it.” Zinni and Schoomaker did make preparations for possible very high risk in-and-out operations to capture or kill terrorists. Cohen told the Commission that the notion of putting military personnel on the ground with- out some reasonable certitude that Bin Ladin was in a particular location would 145 have resulted in the mission’s failure and the loss of life in a fruitless effort. None of these officials was aware of the ambitious plan developed months ear- lier by lower-level Defense officials. In our interviews, some military officers repeatedly invoked the analogy of 146 They were Desert One and the failed 1980 hostage rescue mission in Iran. dubious about a quick strike approach to using Special Operations Forces, which they thought complicated and risky. Such efforts would have required bases in the region, but all the options were unappealing. Pro-Taliban elements of Pakistan’s military might warn Bin Ladin or his associates of pending oper- ations.With nearby basing options limited, an alternative was to fly from ships in the Arabian Sea or from land bases in the Persian Gulf, as was done after 9/11. Such operations would then have to be supported from long distances, overflying the airspace of nations that might not have been supportive or aware 147 of U.S. efforts. However, if these hurdles were addressed, and if the military could then operate regularly in the region for a long period, perhaps clandestinely, it might

154 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 137 137 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS attempt to gather intelligence and wait for an opportunity. One Special Oper- ations commander said his view of actionable intelligence was that if you “give 148 But this course would still me the action, I will give you the intelligence.” be risky, in light both of the difficulties already mentioned and of the danger that U.S. operations might fail disastrously.We have found no evidence that such a long-term political-military approach for using Special Operations Forces in the region was proposed to or analyzed by the Small Group, even though such capability had been honed for at least a decade within the Defense Depart- ment. Therefore the debate looked to some like bold proposals from civilians meeting hypercaution from the military. Clarke saw it this way. Of the military, 149 But from another per- he said to us,“They were very, very, very reluctant.” spective, poorly informed proposals for bold action were pitted against expe- rienced professional judgment. That was how Secretary of Defense Cohen viewed it. He said to us:“I would have to place my judgment call in terms of, do I believe that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, former commander of Spe- cial Forces command, is in a better position to make a judgment on the feasi- 150 bility of this than, perhaps, Mr. Clarke?” Beyond a large-scale political-military commitment to build up a covert or clandestine capability using American personnel on the ground, either military or CIA, there was a still larger option that could have been considered—invad- ing Afghanistan itself. Every official we questioned about the possibility of an invasion of Afghanistan said that it was almost unthinkable, absent a provoca- tion such as 9/11, because of poor prospects for cooperation from Pakistan and other nations and because they believed the public would not support it. Cruise missiles were and would remain the only military option on the table. The Desert Camp, February 1999 Early in 1999, the CIA received reporting that Bin Ladin was spending much of his time at one of several camps in the Afghan desert south of Kandahar. At the beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located in the vicinity of the Sheikh Ali camp, a desert hunting camp being used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have stated that these visitors were from the United Arab 151 Emirates. Reporting from the CIA’s assets provided a detailed description of the hunt- ing camp, including its size, location, resources, and security, as well as of Bin 152 Because this was not in an urban area, mis- Ladin’s smaller, adjacent camp. siles launched against it would have less risk of causing collateral damage. On 153 The next February 8, the military began to ready itself for a possible strike. day, national technical intelligence confirmed the location and description of the larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the United Arab Emirates. But the location of Bin Ladin’s quarters could not be 154 The CIA did its best to answer a host of questions pinned down so precisely.

155 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 138 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 138 about the larger camp and its residents and about Bin Ladin’s daily schedule and routines to support military contingency planning. According to report- ing from the tribals, Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp to the larger camp where he visited the Emiratis; the tribals expected him to be at the 155 hunting camp for such a visit at least until midmorning on February 11. Clarke wrote to Berger’s deputy on February 10 that the military was then doing targeting work to hit the main camp with cruise missiles and should be 156 Speaker of the House Dennis in position to strike the following morning. 157 Hastert appears to have been briefed on the situation. No strike was launched. By February 12 Bin Ladin had apparently moved 158 According to CIA and on, and the immediate strike plans became moot. Defense officials, policymakers were concerned about the danger that a strike would kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. Clarke told us the strike was called off after consultations with Director Tenet because the intelligence was dubious, and it seemed to Clarke as if the CIA was presenting an option to attack America’s best counterterror- ism ally in the Gulf.The lead CIA official in the field, Gary Schroen, felt that the intelligence reporting in this case was very reliable; the Bin Ladin unit chief, “Mike,” agreed. Schroen believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill 159 Bin Ladin before 9/11. Even after Bin Ladin’s departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was 160 still set up.The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity. On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and Bin Ladin. Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an 161 When the former Bin Ladin interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA. unit chief found out about Clarke’s call, he questioned CIA officials, who 162 Imagery confirmed that less than a denied having given such a clearance. week after Clarke’s phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site 163 CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations was deserted. Pavitt, were irate.“Mike” thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possi- 164 ble site for targeting Bin Ladin. The United Arab Emirates was becoming both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem. From 1999 through early 2001, the United States, and President Clinton personally, pressed the UAE, one of the Taliban’s only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to 165 These efforts achieved little before 9/11. flights to and from Afghanistan. In July 1999, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid 166 The Taliban threatened to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Ladin. did not take him seriously, however. Bin Zayid later told an American diplo-

156 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 139 139 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS mat that the UAE valued its relations with the Taliban because the Afghan rad- icals offered a counterbalance to “Iranian dangers” in the region, but he also 167 noted that the UAE did not want to upset the United States. Looking for New Partners Although not all CIA officers had lost faith in the tribals’ capabilities—many judged them to be good reporters—few believed they would carry out an ambush of Bin Ladin.The chief of the Counterterrorist Center compared rely- 168 He and his associates, supported by ing on the tribals to playing the lottery. Clarke, pressed for developing a partnership with the Northern Alliance, even though doing so might bring the United States squarely behind one side in Afghanistan’s long-running civil war. The Northern Alliance was dominated by Tajiks and drew its strength mainly from the northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. In contrast,Taliban members came principally from Afghanistan’s most numerous ethnic group, the Pashtuns, who are concentrated in the southern part of the country, extending 169 into the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan. Because of the Taliban’s behavior and its association with Pakistan, the Northern Alliance had been able at various times to obtain assistance from Russia, Iran, and India.The alliance’s leader was Afghanistan’s most renowned military commander,Ahmed Shah Massoud. Reflective and charismatic, he had been one of the true heroes of the war against the Soviets. But his bands had been charged with more than one massacre, and the Northern Alliance was widely thought to finance itself in part through trade in heroin. Nor had Mas- soud shown much aptitude for governing except as a ruthless warlord. Never- theless, Tenet told us Massoud seemed the most interesting possible new ally 170 against Bin Ladin. In February 1999,Tenet sought President Clinton’s authorization to enlist Massoud and his forces as partners. In response to this request, the President signed the Memorandum of Notification whose language he personally altered. Tenet says he saw no significance in the President’s changes. So far as he was concerned, it was the language of August 1998, expressing a preference for capture but accepting the possibility that Bin Ladin could not be brought 171 out alive.“We were plowing the same ground,”Tenet said. CIA officers described Massoud’s reaction when he heard that the United States wanted him to capture and not kill Bin Ladin. One characterized Mas- soud’s body language as “a wince.” Schroen recalled Massoud’s response as “You guys are crazy—you haven’t changed a bit.” In Schroen’s opinion, the capture proviso inhibited Massoud and his forces from going after Bin Ladin but did 172 The idea, however, was a long shot. Bin Ladin’s not completely stop them. usual base of activity was near Kandahar, far from the front lines of Taliban oper- ations against the Northern Alliance.

157 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 140 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 140 Kandahar, May 1999 It was in Kandahar that perhaps the last, and most likely the best, opportunity arose for targeting Bin Ladin with cruise missiles before 9/11. In May 1999, CIA assets in Afghanistan reported on Bin Ladin’s location in and around Kan- dahar over the course of five days and nights.The reporting was very detailed and came from several sources. If this intelligence was not “actionable,” working-level officials said at the time and today, it was hard for them to imag- ine how any intelligence on Bin Ladin in Afghanistan would meet the stan- dard. Communications were good, and the cruise missiles were ready.“This was in our strike zone,” a senior military officer said. “It was a fat pitch, a home run.” He expected the missiles to fly.When the decision came back that they should stand down, not shoot, the officer said, “we all just slumped.” He told us he knew of no one at the Pentagon or the CIA who thought it was a bad 173 gamble. Bin Ladin “should have been a dead man” that night, he said. Working-level CIA officials agreed. While there was a conflicting intelli- gence report about Bin Ladin’s whereabouts, the experts discounted it. At the time, CIA working-level officials were told by their managers that the strikes were not ordered because the military doubted the intelligence and worried about collateral damage. Replying to a frustrated colleague in the field, the Bin Ladin unit chief wrote: “having a chance to get [Bin Ladin] three times in 36 ... [T]he hours and foregoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry DCI finds himself alone at the table, with the other princip[als] basically say- ing ‘we’ll go along with your decision Mr. Director,’ and implicitly saying that 174 But the mil- the Agency will hang alone if the attack doesn’t get Bin Ladin.” itary officer quoted earlier recalled that the Pentagon had been willing to act. He told us that Clarke informed him and others that Tenet assessed the chance of the intelligence being accurate as 50–50. This officer believed that Tenet’s 175 assessment was the key to the decision. Tenet told us he does not remember any details about this episode, except that the intelligence came from a single uncorroborated source and that there was a risk of collateral damage. The story is further complicated by Tenet’s absence from the critical principals meeting on this strike (he was apparently out of town); his deputy, John Gordon, was representing the CIA. Gordon recalled having presented the intelligence in a positive light, with appropriate 176 caveats, but stating that this intelligence was about as good as it could get. Berger remembered only that in all such cases, the call had been Tenet’s. Berger felt sure that Tenet was eager to get Bin Ladin. In his view,Tenet did his job responsibly.“George would call and say,‘We just don’t have it,’” Berger 177 said. The decision not to strike in May 1999 may now seem hard to understand. In fairness, we note two points: First, in December 1998, the principals’ wari- ness about ordering a strike appears to have been vindicated: Bin Ladin left his room unexpectedly, and if a strike had been ordered he would not have been

158 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 141 141 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS hit. Second, the administration, and the CIA in particular, was in the midst of intense scrutiny and criticism in May 1999 because faulty intelligence had just led the United States to mistakenly bomb the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO war against Serbia. This episode may have made officials 178 more cautious than might otherwise have been the case. From May 1999 until September 2001, policymakers did not again actively 179 The principals did give some fur- consider a missile strike against Bin Ladin. ther consideration in 1999 to more general strikes, reviving Clarke’s “Delenda” notion of hitting camps and infrastructure to disrupt al Qaeda’s organization. In the first months of 1999, the Joint Staff had developed broader target lists to undertake a “focused campaign” against the infrastructure of Bin Ladin’s net- work and to hit Taliban government sites as well. General Shelton told us that 180 the Taliban targets were “easier” to hit and more substantial. Part of the context for considering broader strikes in the summer of 1999 was renewed worry about Bin Ladin’s ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In May and June, the U.S. government received a flurry of omi- nous reports, including more information about chemical weapons training or development at the Derunta camp and possible attempts to amass nuclear mate- 181 rial at Herat. By late June, U.S. and other intelligence services had concluded that al Qaeda was in pre-attack mode, perhaps again involving Abu Hafs the Mauri- tanian. On June 25, at Clarke’s request, Berger convened the Small Group in his office to discuss the alert, Bin Ladin’s WMD programs, and his location. “Should we pre-empt by attacking UBL facilities?” Clarke urged Berger to ask 182 his colleagues. In his handwritten notes on the meeting paper, Berger jotted down the pres- ence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 60–65 casualties. Berger noted the possible “slight impact” on Bin Ladin and added, 183 The NSC staff raised the option of waiting “if he responds, we’re blamed.” until after a terrorist attack, and then retaliating, including possible strikes on the Taliban. But Clarke observed that Bin Ladin would probably empty his 184 camps after an attack. The military route seemed to have reached a dead end. In December 1999, Clarke urged Berger to ask the principals to ask themselves: “Why have there 185 There are no notes been no real options lately for direct US military action?” recording whether the question was discussed or, if it was, how it was answered. Reports of possible attacks by Bin Ladin kept coming in throughout 1999. They included a threat to blow up the FBI building in Washington, D.C. In September, the CSG reviewed a possible threat to a flight out of Los Angeles 186 These warnings came amid dozens of others that flooded in. or New York. With military and diplomatic options practically exhausted by the sum- mer of 1999, the U.S. government seemed to be back where it had been in the summer of 1998—relying on the CIA to find some other option.That

159 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 142 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 142 picture also seemed discouraging. Several disruptions and renditions aimed 187 But covert action against the broader al Qaeda network had succeeded. efforts in Afghanistan had not been fruitful. In mid-1999, new leaders arrived at the Counterterrorist Center and the Bin Ladin unit. The new director of CTC, replacing “Jeff,” was Cofer Black. The new head of the section that included the Bin Ladin unit was “Richard.” Black, “Richard,” and their colleagues began working on a new operational strategy for attacking al Qaeda; their starting point was to get better intelli- 188 gence, relying more on the CIA’s own sources and less on the tribals. In July 1999, President Clinton authorized the CIA to work with several governments to capture Bin Ladin, and extended the scope of efforts to Bin Ladin’s principal lieutenants.The President reportedly also authorized a covert action under carefully limited circumstances which, if successful, would have 189 Attorney General Reno again expressed con- resulted in Bin Ladin’s death. cerns on policy grounds. She was wo rried about the danger of retaliation.The t to work with a Pakistani team that CIA also developed the short-lived effor we discussed earlier, and an initiative to work with Uzbekistan.The Uzbeks needed basic equipment and training. No action could be expected before 190 March 2000, at the earliest. In fall 1999, DCI Tenet unveiled the CIA’s new Bin Ladin strategy. It was called, simply,“the Plan.”The Plan proposed continuing disruption and rendi- tion operations worldwide. It announced a program for hiring and training bet- ter officers with counterterrorism skills, recruiting more assets, and trying to penetrate al Qaeda’s ranks. The Plan aimed to close gaps in technical intelli- gence collection (signal and imagery) as well. In addition, the CIA would 191 increase contacts with the Northern Alliance rebels fighting the Taliban. With a new operational strategy, the CIA evaluated its capture options. None scored high marks. The CIA had no confidence in the Pakistani effort. In the event that Bin Ladin traveled to the Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan, the tribal network there was unlikely to attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin; the Counterterrorist Center rated the chance of success at less than 10 percent.To the northwest, the Uzbeks might be ready for a cross-border sortie in six 192 months; their chance of success was also rated at less than 10 percent. In the northeast were Massoud’s Northern Alliance forces—perhaps the CIA’s best option. In late October, a group of officers from the Counterter- rorist Center flew into the Panjshir Valley to meet up with Massoud, a haz- ardous journey in rickety helicopters that would be repeated several times in the future. Massoud appeared committed to helping the United States collect intelligence on Bin Ladin’s activities and whereabouts and agreed to try to cap- ture him if the opportunity arose. The Bin Ladin unit was satisfied that its reporting on Bin Ladin would now have a second source. But it also knew that Massoud would act against Bin Ladin only if his own interests and those of the

160 Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 143 143 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS United States intersected. By early December, the CIA rated this possibility at 193 less than 15 percent. Finally, the CIA considered the possibility of putting U.S. personnel on the ground in Afghanistan.The CIA had been discussing this option with Special Operations Command and found enthusiasm on the working level but reluc- tance at higher levels. CIA saw a 95 percent chance of Special Operations Command forces capturing Bin Ladin if deployed—but less than a 5 percent chance of such a deployment. Sending CIA officers into Afghanistan was to be clearly outweighs the r ”—but at this time no such isk considered “if the gain 194 gains presented themselves to warrant the risk. As mentioned earlier, such a protracted deployment of U.S. Special Opera- tions Forces into Afghanistan, perhaps as part of a team joined to a deployment of the CIA’s own officers, would have required a major policy initiative (prob- ably combined with efforts to secure the support of at least one or two neigh- boring countries) to make a long-term commitment, establish a durable presence on the ground, and be prepared to accept the associated risks and costs. Such a military plan was never developed for interagency consideration before 9/11.As 1999 came to a close, the CIA had a new strategic plan in place for capturing Bin Ladin, but no option was rated as having more than a 15 per- cent chance of achieving that objective.

161 Final Appen.4pp 7/17/04 4:21 PM Page 448

162 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 145 5 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 5.1 TERRORIST ENTREPRENEURS By early 1999, al Qaeda was already a potent adversary of the United States. Bin Ladin and his chief of operations, Abu Hafs al Masri, also known as Mohammed Atef, occupied undisputed leadership positions atop al Qaeda’s Qaeda’s worldwide terrorist organizational structure. Within this structure, al operations relied heavily on the ideas and work of enterprising and strong- willed field commanders who enjoyed considerable autonomy.To understand how the organization actually worked and to introduce the origins of the 9/11 plot, we briefly examine three of these subordinate commanders: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), Riduan Isamuddin (better known as Hambali), and Abd al Rahim al Nashiri. We will devote the most attention to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief manager of the “planes operation.” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed No one exemplifies the model of the terrorist entrepreneur more clearly than Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks. KSM 1 followed a rather tortuous path to his eventual membership in al Qaeda. Highly educated and equally comfortable in a government office or a terror- ist safehouse, KSM applied his imagination, technical aptitude, and managerial skills to hatching and planning an extraordinary array of terrorist schemes. These ideas included conventional car bombing, political assassination, aircraft bombing, hijacking, reservoir poisoning, and, ultimately, the use of aircraft as missiles guided by suicide operatives. Like his nephew Ramzi Yousef (three years KSM’s junior), KSM grew up in Kuwait but traces his ethnic lineage to the Baluchistan region straddling Iran and Pakistan. Raised in a religious family, KSM claims to have joined the Mus- lim Brotherhood at age 16 and to have become enamored of violent jihad at youth camps in the desert. In 1983, following his graduation from secondary 145

163 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 146 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 146 Detainee Interrogation Reports Chapters 5 and 7 rely heavily on information obtained from captured al Qaeda members. A number of these “detainees” have firsthand knowl- edge of the 9/11 plot. Assessing the truth of statements by these witnesses—sworn enemies of the United States—is challenging. Our access to them has been limited to the review of intelligence reports based on communications received from the locations where the actual interrogations take place. We submitted questions for use in the interrogations, but had no con- trol over whether, when, or how questions of particular interest would be asked. Nor were we allowed to talk to the interrogators so that we could better judge the credibility of the detainees and clarify ambigui- ties in the reporting.We were told that our requests might disrupt the sensitive interrogation process. We have nonetheless decided to include information from captured 9/11 conspirators and al Qaeda members in our report.We have evalu- ated their statements carefully and have attempted to corroborate them with documents and statements of others. In this report, we indicate where such statements provide the foundation for our narrative.We have been authorized to identify by name only ten detainees whose custody 2 has been confirmed officially by the U.S. government. school, KSM left Kuwait to enroll at Chowan College, a small Baptist school in Murfreesboro, North Carolina.After a semester at Chowan, KSM transferred to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro, which he attended with Yousef ’s brother, another future al Qaeda member. 3 KSM earned a degree in mechanical engineering in December 1986. Although he apparently did not attract attention for extreme Islamist beliefs or activities while in the United States, KSM plunged into the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad soon after graduating from college.Visiting Pakistan for the first time in early 1987, he traveled to Peshawar, where his brother Zahid introduced mujahid Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, head of the Hizbul- him to the famous Afghan Ittihad El-Islami (Islamic Union Party). Sayyaf became KSM’s mentor and pro- vided KSM with military training at Sayyaf ’s Sada camp. KSM claims he then fought the Soviets and remained at the front for three months before being summoned to perform administrative duties for Abdullah Azzam. KSM next took a job working for an electronics firm that catered to the communications needs of Afghan groups, where he learned about drills used to excavate caves 4 in Afghanistan. Between 1988 and 1992, KSM helped run a nongovernmental organization

164 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 147 147 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND (NGO) in Peshawar and Jalalabad; sponsored by Sayyaf, it was designed to aid young Afghan mujahideen. In 1992, KSM spent some time fighting alongside the mujahideen in Bosnia and supporting that effort with financial donations. After returning briefly to Pakistan, he moved his family to Qatar at the sug- gestion of the former minister of Islamic affairs of Qatar, Sheikh Abdallah bin Khalid bin Hamad al Thani. KSM took a position in Qatar as project engineer with the Qatari Ministry of Electricity and Water. Although he engaged in extensive international travel during his tenure at the ministry—much of it in furtherance of terrorist activity—KSM would hold his position there until early 5 1996, when he fled to Pakistan to avoid capture by U.S. authorities. KSM first came to the attention of U.S. law enforcement as a result of his cameo role in the first World Trade Center bombing. According to KSM, he learned of Ramzi Yousef ’s intention to launch an attack inside the United States in 1991 or 1992, when Yousef was receiving explosives training in Afghanistan. During the fall of 1992, while Yousef was building the bomb he would use in that attack, KSM and Yousef had numerous telephone conversations during which Yousef discussed his progress and sought additional funding. On November 3, 1992, KSM wired $660 from Qatar to the bank account of Yousef ’s co-conspirator, Mohammed Salameh. KSM does not appear to have 6 contributed any more substantially to this operation. Yousef ’s instant notoriety as the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Cen- ter bombing inspired KSM to become involved in planning attacks against the United States. By his own account, KSM’s animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experiences there as a student, but rather from his vio- lent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel. In 1994, KSM accompanied Yousef to the Philippines, and the two of them began planning what is now known as the Manila air or “Bojinka” plot—the intended bomb- ing of 12 U.S. commercial jumbo jets over the Pacific during a two-day span. This marked the first time KSM took part in the actual planning of a terrorist operation.While sharing an apartment in Manila during the summer of 1994, he and Yousef acquired chemicals and other materials necessary to construct bombs and timers.They also cased target flights to Hong Kong and Seoul that would have onward legs to the United States. During this same period, KSM and Yousef also developed plans to assassinate President Clinton during his November 1994 trip to Manila, and to bomb U.S.-bound cargo carriers by 7 smuggling jackets containing nitrocellulose on board. KSM left the Philippines in September 1994 and met up with Yousef in Karachi following their casing flights. There they enlisted Wali Khan Amin Shah, also known as Usama Asmurai, in the Manila air plot. During the fall of 1994,Yousef returned to Manila and successfully tested the digital watch timer he had invented, bombing a movie theater and a Philippine Airlines flight en route to Tokyo.The plot unraveled after the Philippine authorities discovered Yousef ’s bomb-making operation in Manila; but by that time, KSM was safely

165 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 148 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 148 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 9/11 plot, at the time of his capture in 2003 back at his government job in Qatar.Yousef attempted to follow through on the cargo carriers plan, but he was arrested in Islamabad by Pakistani authori- 8 ties on February 7, 1995, after an accomplice turned him in. KSM continued to travel among the worldwide jihadist community after Yousef ’s arrest, visiting the Sudan,Yemen, Malaysia, and Brazil in 1995. No clear evidence connects him to terrorist activities in those locations.While in Sudan, he reportedly failed in his attempt to meet with Bin Ladin. But KSM did see Atef, who gave him a contact in Brazil. In January 1996, well aware that U.S. authorities were chasing him, he left Qatar for good and fled to Afghanistan, 9 where he renewed his relationship with Rasul Sayyaf. Just as KSM was reestablishing himself in Afghanistan in mid-1996, Bin Ladin and his colleagues were also completing their migration from Sudan. Through Atef, KSM arranged a meeting with Bin Ladin in Tora Bora, a moun- tainous redoubt from the Afghan war days.At the meeting, KSM presented the al Qaeda leader with a menu of ideas for terrorist operations. According to KSM, this meeting was the first time he had seen Bin Ladin since 1989. Although they had fought together in 1987, Bin Ladin and KSM did not yet enjoy an especially close working relationship. Indeed, KSM has acknowledged

166 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 149 149 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND that Bin Ladin likely agreed to meet with him because of the renown of his 10 nephew,Yousef. At the meeting, KSM briefed Bin Ladin and Atef on the first World Trade Center bombing, the Manila air plot, the cargo carriers plan, and other activi- ties pursued by KSM and his colleagues in the Philippines. KSM also presented a proposal for an operation that would involve training pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States. This proposal eventually would 11 become the 9/11 operation. KSM knew that the successful staging of such an attack would require per- sonnel, money, and logistical support that only an extensive and well-funded organization like al Qaeda could provide. He thought the operation might 12 appeal to Bin Ladin, who had a long record of denouncing the United States. From KSM’s perspective, Bin Ladin was in the process of consolidating his new position in Afghanistan while hearing out others’ ideas, and had not yet settled on an agenda for future anti-U.S. operations.At the meeting, Bin Ladin listened to KSM’s ideas without much comment, but did ask KSM formally to 13 join al Qaeda and move his family to Afghanistan. KSM declined. He preferred to remain independent and retain the option of working with other mujahideen groups still operating in Afghanistan, including the group led by his old mentor, Sayyaf. Sayyaf was close to Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. Therefore working with him might be a problem for KSM because Bin Ladin was building ties to the rival Taliban. After meeting with Bin Ladin, KSM says he journeyed onward to India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, where he met with Jemaah Islamiah’s Hambali. Ham- bali was an Indonesian veteran of the Afghan war looking to expand the jihad into Southeast Asia. In Iran, KSM rejoined his family and arranged to move 14 them to Karachi; he claims to have relocated by January 1997. After settling his family in Karachi, KSM tried to join the mujahid leader Ibn al Khattab in Chechnya. Unable to travel through Azerbaijan, KSM returned to Karachi and then to Afghanistan to renew contacts with Bin Ladin and his col- leagues.Though KSM may not have been a member of al Qaeda at this time, he admits traveling frequently between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1997 and the first half of 1998, visiting Bin Ladin and cultivating relationships with his lieutenants, 15 Atef and Sayf al Adl, by assisting them with computer and media projects. According to KSM, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi shed in the evolution of the 9/11 plot. and Dar es Salaam marked a water KSM claims these bombings convinced him that Bin Ladin was truly com- mitted to attacking the United States. He continued to make himself useful, Qaeda members with their out- collecting news articles and helping other al dated computer equipment. Bin Ladin, apparently at Atef ’s urging, finally decided to give KSM the green light for the 9/11 operation sometime in late 16 1998 or early 1999.

167 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 150 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 150 KSM then accepted Bin Ladin’s standing invitation to move to Kandahar and work directly with al Qaeda. In addition to supervising the planning and preparations for the 9/11 operation, KSM worked with and eventually led al Qaeda’s media committee. But KSM states he refused to swear a formal oath of allegiance to Bin Ladin, thereby retaining a last vestige of his cherished 17 autonomy. At this point, late 1998 to early 1999, planning for the 9/11 operation began in earnest.Yet while the 9/11 project occupied the bulk of KSM’s attention, he continued to consider other possibilities for terrorist attacks. For example, he sent al Qaeda operative Issa al Britani to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to learn about the jihad in Southeast Asia from Hambali.Thereafter, KSM claims, at Bin Ladin’s direction in early 2001, he sent Britani to the United States to case potential economic and “Jewish” targets in New York City. Furthermore, dur- ing the summer of 2001, KSM approached Bin Ladin with the idea of recruit- ing a Saudi Arabian air force pilot to commandeer a Saudi fighter jet and attack the Israeli city of Eilat. Bin Ladin reportedly liked this proposal, but he instructed KSM to concentrate on the 9/11 operation first. Similarly, KSM’s proposals to Atef around this same time for attacks in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Maldives were never executed, although Hambali’s Jemaah 18 Islamiah operatives did some casing of possible targets. KSM appears to have been popular among the al Qaeda rank and file. He was reportedly regarded as an effective leader, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Co-workers describe him as an intelligent, efficient, and even-tempered man- ager who approached his projects with a single-minded dedication that he expected his colleagues to share. Al Qaeda associate Abu Zubaydah has expressed more qualified admiration for KSM’s innate creativity, emphasiz- ing instead his ability to incorporate the improvements suggested by others. Nashiri has been similarly measured, observing that although KSM floated many general ideas for attacks, he rarely conceived a specific operation him- 19 Perhaps these estimates reflect a touch of jealousy; in any case, KSM self. was plainly a capable coordinator, having had years to hone his skills and build relationships. Hambali Al Qaeda’s success in fostering terrorism in Southeast Asia stems largely from its close relationship with Jemaah Islamiah (JI). In that relationship, Hambali became the key coordinator. Born and educated in Indonesia, Hambali moved to Malaysia in the early 1980s to find work.There he claims to have become a follower of the Islamist extremist teachings of various clerics, including one named Abdullah Sungkar. Sungkar first inspired Hambali to share the vision of establishing a radical Islamist regime in Southeast Asia, then furthered Ham- bali’s instruction in jihad by sending him to Afghanistan in 1986. After under- going training at Rasul Sayyaf ’s Sada camp (where KSM would later train), Hambali fought against the Soviets; he eventually returned to Malaysia after 18

168 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 151 151 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND months in Afghanistan. By 1998, Hambali would assume responsibility for the Malaysia/Singapore region within Sungkar’s newly formed terrorist organiza- 20 tion, the JI. Also by 1998, Sungkar and JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir had accepted Bin Ladin’s offer to ally JI with al Qaeda in waging war against Christians and 21 Hambali met with KSM in Karachi to arrange for JI members to receive Jews. training in Afghanistan at al Qaeda’s camps. In addition to his close working relationship with KSM, Hambali soon began dealing with Atef as well. Al Qaeda began funding JI’s increasingly ambitious terrorist plans, which Atef and KSM sought to expand. Under this arrangement, JI would perform the nec- essary casing activities and locate bomb-making materials and other supplies. Al Qaeda would underwrite operations, provide bomb-making expertise, and 22 deliver suicide operatives. The al Qaeda–JI partnership yielded a number of proposals that would marry al Qaeda’s financial and technical strengths with JI’s access to materials and local operatives. Here, Hambali played the critical role of coordinator, as he distrib- uted al Qaeda funds earmarked for the joint operations. In one especially notable example,Atef turned to Hambali when al Qaeda needed a scientist to take over its biological weapons program. Hambali obliged by introducing a U.S.- educated JI member,Yazid Sufaat, to Ayman al Zawahiri in Kandahar. In 2001, Sufaat would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for al Qaeda 23 in a laboratory he helped set up near the Kandahar airport. Hambali did not originally orient JI’s operations toward attacking the United States, but his involvement with al Qaeda appears to have inspired him to pursue American targets. KSM, in his post-capture interrogations, has taken credit for this shift, claiming to have urged the JI operations chief to concen- 24 Hambali’s newfound trate on attacks designed to hurt the U.S. economy. interest in striking against the United States manifested itself in a spate of ter- rorist plans. Fortunately, none came to fruition. In addition to staging actual terrorist attacks in partnership with al Qaeda, Hambali and JI assisted al Qaeda operatives passing through Kuala Lumpur. One important occasion was in December 1999–January 2000. Ham- bali accommodated KSM’s requests to help several veterans whom KSM had just finished training in Karachi.They included Tawfiq bin Attash, also known as Khallad, who later would help bomb the USS , and future 9/11 hijack- Cole ers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. Hambali arranged lodging for them and helped them purchase airline tickets for their onward travel. Later that year, Hambali and his crew would provide accommodations and other assistance (including information on flight schools and help in acquiring ammonium nitrate) for Zacarias Moussaoui, an al Qaeda operative sent to Malaysia by Atef 25 and KSM. Hambali used Bin Ladin’s Afghan facilities as a training ground for JI recruits.Though he had a close relationship with Atef and KSM, he maintained JI’s institutional independence from al Qaeda. Hambali insists that he did not

169 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 152 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 152 discuss operations with Bin Ladin or swear allegiance to him, having already given such a pledge of loyalty to Bashir, Sungkar’s successor as JI leader.Thus, like any powerful bureaucrat defending his domain, Hambali objected when al Qaeda leadership tried to assign JI members to terrorist projects without noti- 26 fying him. Abd al Rahim al Nashiri KSM and Hambali both decided to join forces with al Qaeda because their terrorist aspirations required the money and manpower that only a robust organization like al Qaeda could supply. On the other hand, Abd al Rahim al Cole bombing and the eventual head of al Nashiri—the mastermind of the Qaeda operations in the Arabian Peninsula—appears to have originally been recruited to his career as a terrorist by Bin Ladin himself. Having already participated in the Afghan jihad, Nashiri accompanied a group of some 30 mujahideen in pursuit of jihad in Tajikistan in 1996.When serious fighting failed to materialize, the group traveled to Jalalabad and encountered Bin Ladin, who had recently returned from Sudan. Bin Ladin addressed them at length, urging the group to join him in a “jihad against the Americans.” Although all were urged to swear loyalty to Bin Ladin, many, including Nashiri, found the notion distasteful and refused. After several days of indoctrination that included a barrage of news clippings and television doc- umentaries, Nashiri left Afghanistan, first returning to his native Saudi Arabia and then visiting his home in Yemen.There, he says, the idea for his first ter- rorist operation took shape as he noticed many U.S. and other foreign ships 27 plying the waters along the southwest coast of Yemen. Nashiri returned to Afghanistan, probably in 1997, primarily to check on rel- atives fighting there and also to learn about the Taliban. He again encountered Bin Ladin, still recruiting for “the coming battle with the United States.” Nashiri pursued a more conventional military jihad, joining the Taliban forces in their fight against Ahmed Massoud’s Northern Alliance and shuttling back and forth between the front and Kandahar, where he would see Bin Ladin and meet with other mujahideen. During this period, Nashiri also led a plot to smuggle four Russian-made antitank missiles into Saudi Arabia from Yemen in early 1998 and 28 helped an embassy bombing operative obtain a Yemeni passport. At some point, Nashiri joined al Qaeda. His cousin, Jihad Mohammad Ali al Makki, also known as Azzam, was a suicide bomber for the Nairobi attack. Nashiri traveled between Yemen and Afghanistan. In late 1998, Nashiri pro- posed mounting an attack against a U.S. vessel. Bin Ladin approved. He directed Nashiri to start the planning and send operatives to Yemen, and he later pro- 29 vided money. Nashiri reported directly to Bin Ladin, the only other person who, accord- ing to Nashiri, knew all the details of the operation.When Nashiri had diffi- culty finding U.S. naval vessels to attack along the western coast of Yemen, Bin

170 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 153 153 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND Ladin reportedly instructed him to case the Port of Aden, on the southern 30 The The eventual result was an attempted attack on the USS coast, instead. Sullivans in January 2000 and the successful attack, in October 2000, on the Cole . USS Nashiri’s success brought him instant status within al Qaeda. He later was recognized as the chief of al Qaeda operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula. While Nashiri continued to consult Bin Ladin on the planning of subsequent terrorist projects, he retained discretion in selecting operatives and Cole devising attacks. In the two years between the bombing and Nashiri’s cap- ture, he would supervise several more proposed operations for al Qaeda. The Limburg in the Gulf of Aden October 6, 2002, bombing of the French tanker also was Nashiri’s handiwork. Although Bin Ladin urged Nashiri to continue plotting strikes against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, Nashiri maintains that 31 Those he actually delayed one of these projects because of security concerns. concerns, it seems, were well placed, as Nashiri’s November 2002 capture in the United Arab Emirates finally ended his career as a terrorist. 5.2 THE “PLANES OPERATION” According to KSM, he started to think about attacking the United States after Yousef returned to Pakistan following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Like Yousef, KSM reasoned he could best influence U.S. policy by targeting the country’s economy. KSM and Yousef reportedly brainstormed together about what drove the U.S. economy. New York, which KSM considered the eco- nomic capital of the United States, therefore became the primary target. For 32 similar reasons, California also became a target for KSM. KSM claims that the earlier bombing of the World Trade Center taught him that bombs and explosives could be problematic, and that he needed to grad- that he and Yousef began of attack. He maintains uate to a more novel form eapons thinking about using aircraft as w while working on the Manila air/Bojinka plot, and speculated about striking the World Trade Center and 33 CIA headquarters as early as 1995. Certainly KSM was not alone in contemplating new kinds of terrorist oper- ations.A study reportedly conducted by Atef, while he and Bin Ladin were still in Sudan, concluded that traditional terrorist hijacking operations did not fit the needs of al Qaeda, because such hijackings were used to negotiate the release of prisoners rather than to inflict mass casualties. The study is said to have considered the feasibility of hijacking planes and blowing them up in flight, paralleling the Bojinka concept. Such a study, if it actually existed, yields significant insight into the thinking of al Qaeda’s leaders: (1) they rejected hijackings aimed at gaining the release of imprisoned comrades as too com- plex, because al Qaeda had no friendly countries in which to land a plane and

171 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 154 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 154 then negotiate; (2) they considered the bombing of commercial flights in midair—as carried out against Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland— a promising means to inflict massive casualties; and (3) they did not yet con- 34 sider using hijacked aircraft as weapons against other targets. KSM has insisted to his interrogators that he always contemplated hijack- ing and crashing large commercial aircraft. Indeed, KSM describes a grandiose original plan: a total of ten aircraft to be hijacked, nine of which would crash into targets on both coasts—they included those eventually hit on September 11 plus CIA and FBI headquarters, nuclear power plants, and the tallest build- ings in California and the state of Washington. KSM himself was to land the tenth plane at a U.S. airport and, after killing all adult male passengers on board and alerting the media, deliver a speech excoriating U.S. support for Israel, the Philippines, and repressive governments in the Arab world. Beyond KSM’s rationalizations about targeting the U.S. economy, this vision gives a better glimpse of his true ambitions. This is theater, a spectacle of destruction with 35 KSM as the self-cast star—the superterrorist. KSM concedes that this proposal received a lukewarm response from al Qaeda leaders skeptical of its scale and complexity.Although Bin Ladin listened to KSM’s proposal, he was not convinced that it was practical. As mentioned earlier, Bin Ladin was receiving numerous ideas for potential operations— KSM’s proposal to attack U.S. targets with commercial airplanes was only one 36 of many. KSM presents himself as an entrepreneur seeking venture capital and peo- ple. He simply wanted al Qaeda to supply the money and operatives needed for the attack while retaining his independence. It is easy to question such a statement. Money is one thing; supplying a cadre of trained operatives willing to die is much more.Thus, although KSM contends he would have been just as likely to consider working with any comparable terrorist organization, he gives no indication of what other groups he thought could supply such excep- 37 tional commodities. KSM acknowledges formally joining al Qaeda, in late 1998 or 1999, and states that soon afterward, Bin Ladin also made the decision to support his pro- posal to attack the United States using commercial airplanes as weapons. Though KSM speculates about how Bin Ladin came to share his preoccupa- tion with attacking America, Bin Ladin in fact had long been an opponent of the United States. KSM thinks that Atef may have persuaded Bin Ladin to approve this specific proposal.Atef ’s role in the entire operation is unquestion- ably very significant but tends to fade into the background, in part because Atef himself is not available to describe it. He was killed in November 2001 by an 38 American air strike in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin summoned KSM to Kandahar in March or April 1999 to tell him that al Qaeda would support his proposal.The plot was now referred to within 39 al Qaeda as the “planes operation.”

172 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 155 155 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND The Plan Evolves Bin Ladin reportedly discussed the planes operation with KSM and Atef in a series of meetings in the spring of 1999 at the al Matar complex near Kanda- har. KSM’s original concept of using one of the hijacked planes to make a media statement was scrapped, but Bin Ladin considered the basic idea feasible. Bin Ladin, Atef, and KSM developed an initial list of targets. These included the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center. According to KSM, Bin Ladin wanted to destroy the White House and the Pen- tagon, KSM wanted to strike the World Trade Center, and all of them wanted 40 to hit the Capitol. No one else was involved in the initial selection of targets. Bin Ladin also soon selected four individuals to serve as suicide operatives: Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khallad, and Abu Bara al Yemeni. During the al Matar meetings, Bin Ladin told KSM that Mihdhar and Hazmi were so eager to participate in an operation against the United States that they had already obtained U.S. visas. KSM states that they had done so on their own after the suicide of their friend Azzam (Nashiri’s cousin) in carrying out the Nairobi bombing. KSM had not met them. His only guidance from Bin Ladin was that 41 the two should eventually go to the United States for pilot training. Hazmi and Mihdhar were Saudi nationals, born in Mecca. Like the others in this initial group of selectees, they were already experienced mujahideen. They had traveled together to fight in Bosnia in a group that journeyed to the Balkans in 1995. By the time Hazmi and Mihdhar were assigned to the planes 42 operation in early 1999, they had visited Afghanistan on several occasions. Khallad was another veteran mujahid, like much of his family. His father had been expelled from Yemen because of his extremist views. Khallad had grown ather knew Bin Ladin, Abdullah Azzam, and up in Saudi Arabia, where his f Sheikh”). Khallad departed for Afghanistan Omar Abdel Rahman (the “Blind in 1994 at the age of 15.Three years later, he lost his lower right leg in a bat- tle with the Northern Alliance, a battle in which one of his brothers died.After this experience, he pledged allegiance to Bin Ladin—whom he had first met 43 as a child in Jeddah—and volunteered to become a suicide operative. When Khallad applied for a U.S. visa, however, his application was denied. Earlier in 1999, Bin Ladin had sent Khallad to Yemen to help Nashiri obtain explosives for the planned ship-bombing and to obtain a visa to visit the United States, so that he could participate in an operation there. Khallad applied under another name, using the cover story that he would be visiting a medical clinic to obtain a new prosthesis for his leg. Another al Qaeda operative gave Khal- lad the name of a person living in the United States whom Khallad could use as a point of contact on a visa application. Khallad contacted this individual to help him get an appointment at a U.S. clinic. While Khallad was waiting for the letter from the clinic confirming the appointment, however, he was arrested by Yemeni authorities.The arrest resulted from mistaken identity: Khal- lad was driving the car of another conspirator in the ship-bombing plot who 44 was wanted by the Yemeni authorities.

173 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 156 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 156 Khallad was released sometime during the summer of 1999, after his father and Bin Ladin intervened on his behalf. Khallad learned later that the al Qaeda leader, apparently concerned that Khallad might reveal Nashiri’s operation while under interrogation, had contacted a Yemeni official to demand Khal- lad’s release, suggesting that Bin Ladin would not confront the Yemenis if they did not confront him. This account has been corroborated by others. Giving up on acquiring a U.S. visa and concerned that the United States might learn 45 of his ties to al Qaeda, Khallad returned to Afghanistan. Travel issues thus played a part in al Qaeda’s operational planning from the very start. During the spring and summer of 1999, KSM realized that Khallad and Abu Bara, both of whom were Yemenis, would not be able to obtain U.S. visas as easily as Saudi operatives like Mihdhar and Hazmi. Although Khallad had been unable to acquire a U.S. visa, KSM still wanted him and Abu Bara, as well as another Yemeni operative from Bin Ladin’s security detail, to partici- pate in the planes operation.Yet because individuals with Saudi passports could travel much more easily than Yemeni, particularly to the United States, there were fewer martyrdom opportunities for Yemenis.To overcome this problem, 46 KSM decided to split the planes operation into two components. The first part of the planes operation—crashing hijacked aircraft into U.S. targets—would remain as planned, with Mihdhar and Hazmi playing key roles. The second part, however, would now embrace the idea of using suicide oper- atives to blow up planes, a refinement of KSM’s old Manila air plot.The oper- atives would hijack U.S.-flagged commercial planes flying Pacific routes across East Asia and destroy them in midair, possibly with shoe bombs, instead of fly- ing them into targets. (An alternate scenario apparently involved flying planes into U.S. targets in Japan, Singapore, or Korea.) This part of the operation has been confirmed by Khallad, who said that they contemplated hijacking several planes, probably originating in Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, or Malaysia, and using Yemenis who would not need pilot training because they would simply down the planes.All the planes hijacked in the United States and East Asia were to be crashed or exploded at about the same time to maximize 47 the attack’s psychological impact. Training and Deployment to Kuala Lumpur In the fall of 1999, the four operatives selected by Bin Ladin for the planes oper- ation were chosen to attend an elite training course at al Qaeda’s Mes Aynak camp in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin personally selected the veteran fighters who received this training, and several of them were destined for important opera- tions. One example is Ibrahim al Thawar, or Nibras, who would participate in .According to KSM, this Cole the October 12, 2000, suicide attack on the USS training was not given specifically in preparation for the planes operation or any other particular al Qaeda venture. Although KSM claims not to have been involved with the training or to have met with the future 9/11 hijackers at Mes

174 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 157 157 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND Aynak, he says he did visit the camp while traveling from Kandahar to Kabul 48 with Bin Ladin and others. The Mes Aynak training camp was located in an abandoned Russian cop- per mine near Kabul. The camp opened in 1999, after the United States had destroyed the training camp near Khowst with cruise missiles in August 1998, Qaeda permission to open the al Faruq camp and before the Taliban granted al 1999, Mes Aynak was the only al Qaeda in Kandahar.Thus, for a brief period in camp operating in Afghanistan. It offered a full range of instruction, including an advanced commando course taught by senior al Qaeda member Sayf al Adl. Bin Ladin paid particular attention to the 1999 training session.When Salah al Din, the trainer for the session, complained about the number of trainees and said that no more than 20 could be handled at once, Bin Ladin insisted that 49 everyone he had selected receive the training. The special training session at Mes Aynak was rigorous and spared no expense.The course focused on physical fitness, firearms, close quarters com- bat, shooting from a motorcycle, and night operations. Although the subjects taught differed little from those offered at other camps, the course placed extraordinary physical and mental demands on its participants, who received 50 the best food and other amenities to enhance their strength and morale. Upon completing the advanced training at Mes Aynak, Hazmi, Khallad, and Abu Bara went to Karachi, Pakistan.There KSM instructed them on Western culture and travel. Much of his activity in mid-1999 had revolved around the collection of training and informational materials for the participants in the planes operation. For instance, he collected Western aviation magazines; tele- phone directories for American cities such as San Diego and Long Beach, Cal- ifornia; brochures for schools; and airline timetables, and he conducted Internet searches on U.S. flight schools. He also purchased flight simulator soft- ware and a few movies depicting hijackings.To house his students, KSM rented 51 a safehouse in Karachi with money provided by Bin Ladin. Hazmi In early December 1999, Khallad and Abu Bara arrived in Karachi. Hazmi spent a night joined them there a few days later. On his way to Karachi, in Quetta at a safehouse where, according to KSM, an Egyptian named Mohamed Atta simultaneously stayed on his way to Afghanistan for jihad 52 training. Mihdhar did not attend the training in Karachi with the others. KSM says that he never met with Mihdhar in 1999 but assumed that Bin Ladin and Atef had briefed Mihdhar on the planes operation and had excused him from the 53 Karachi training. The course in Karachi apparently lasted about one or two weeks. According to KSM, he taught the three operatives basic English words and phrases. He showed them how to read phone books, interpret airline timetables, use the Inter- net, use code words in communications, make travel reservations, and rent an apartment. Khallad adds that the training involved using flight simulator com-

175 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 158 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 158 puter games, viewing movies that featured hijackings, and reading flight sched- ules to determine which flights would be in the air at the same time in different parts of the world.They used the game software to increase their familiarity with aircraft models and functions, and to highlight gaps in cabin security. While in Karachi, they also discussed how to case flights in Southeast Asia. KSM told them to watch the cabin doors at takeoff and landing, to observe whether the captain went to the lavatory during the flight, and to note whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit. KSM, Khallad, and Hazmi also visited travel agen- 54 cies to learn the visa requirements for Asian countries. The four trainees traveled to Kuala Lumpur: Khallad,Abu Bara, and Hazmi came from Karachi; Mihdhar traveled from Yemen. As discussed in chapter 6, U.S. intelligence would analyze communications associated with Mihdhar, whom they identified during this travel, and Hazmi, whom they could have 55 identified but did not. According to KSM, the four operatives were aware that they had volun- teered for a suicide operation, either in the United States or in Asia.With dif- ferent roles, they had different tasks. Hazmi and Mihdhar were sent to Kuala Lumpur before proceeding to their final destination—the United States. According to KSM, they were to use Yemeni documents to fly to Malaysia, then proceed to the United States using their Saudi passports to conceal their prior travels to and from Pakistan. KSM had doctored Hazmi’s Saudi passport so it would appear as if Hazmi had traveled to Kuala Lumpur from Saudi Arabia via Dubai. Khallad and Abu Bara went to Kuala Lumpur to study airport security and conduct casing flights. According to Kha llad, he and Ab u Bara departed for Malaysia in mid-December 1999. Hazmi joined them about ten days later after 56 briefly returning to Afghanistan to attend to some passport issues. Khallad had originally scheduled his trip in order to receive a new prosthe- sis at a Kuala Lumpur clinic called Endolite, and Bin Ladin suggested that he use the opportunity to case flights as well. According to Khallad, Malaysia was an ideal destination because its government did not require citizens of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states to have a visa. Malaysian security was reputed to be lax when it came to Islamist jihadists.Also, other mujahideen wounded in com- bat had reportedly received treatment at the Endolite clinic and successfully for the concealed the origins of their injuries. money Khallad said he got the 57 prosthesis from his father, Bin Ladin, and another al Qaeda colleague. According to Khallad, when he and Abu Bara arrived in Kuala Lumpur they contacted Hambali to let him know where they were staying, since he was to be kept informed of al Qaeda activities in Southeast Asia. Hambali picked up Khallad and Abu Bara and brought them to his home, enlisting the help of a 58 colleague who spoke better Arabic. Hambali then took them to the clinic. On December 31, Khallad flew from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok; the next day, he flew to Hong Kong aboard a U.S. airliner. He flew in first class, which he realized was a mistake because this seating assignment on that flight did not afford him a view of the cockpit. He claims to have done what he could to case

176 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 159 159 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND the flight, testing security by carrying a box cutter in his toiletries kit onto the flight to Hong Kong. Khallad returned to Bangkok the following day. At the airport, the security officials searched his carry-on bag and even opened the toi- letries kit, but just glanced at the contents and let him pass. On this flight, Khal- lad waited until most of the first-class passengers were dozing, then got up and 59 notice. flight attendants took removed the kit from his car ry-on. None of the After completing his casing mission, Khallad returned to Kuala Lumpur. Hazmi arrived in Kuala Lumpur soon thereafter and may even have stayed briefly with Khallad and Abu Bara at Endolite. Mihdhar arrived on January 5, probably one day after Hazmi. All four operatives stayed at the apartment of Yazid Sufaat, the Malaysian JI member who made his home available at Ham- bali’s request. According to Khallad, he and Hazmi spoke about the possibility of hijacking planes and crashing them or holding passengers as hostages, but only speculatively. Khallad admits being aware at the time that Hazmi and Mihdhar were involved in an operation involving planes in the United States 60 but denies knowing details of the plan. While in Kuala Lumpur, Khallad wanted to go to Singapore to meet Nibras and Fahd al Quso, two of the operatives in Nashiri’s ship-bombing operation. An attempt to execute that plan by attacking the USS The Sullivans had failed just a few days earlier. Nibras and Quso were bringing Khallad money from Yemen, but were stopped in Bangkok because they lacked visas to continue on to Singapore. Also unable to enter Singapore, Khallad moved the meeting to Bangkok. Hazmi and Mihdhar decided to go there as well, reportedly because they thought it would enhance their cover as tourists to have passport stamps from a popular tourist destination such as Thailand. With Hambali’s help, the three obtained tickets for a flight to Bangkok and left Kuala Lumpur together. Abu Bara did not have a visa permitting him to return to Pakistan, so he trav- 61 eled to Yemen instead. In Bangkok, Khallad took Hazmi and Mihdhar to one hotel, then went to another hotel for his meeting on the maritime attack plan. Hazmi and Mihd- har soon moved to that same hotel, but Khallad insists that the two sets of oper- atives never met with each other or anyone else. After conferring with the ship-bombing operatives, Khallad returned to Karachi and then to Kandahar, 62 where he reported on his casing mission to Bin Ladin. Bin Ladin canceled the East Asia part of the planes operation in the spring of 2000. He evidently decided it would be too difficult to coordinate this attack with the operation in the United States. As for Hazmi and Mihdhar, they had left Bangkok a few days before Khallad and arrived in Los Angeles on January 63 15, 2000. Meanwhile, the next group of al Qaeda operatives destined for the planes operation had just surfaced in Afghanistan. As Hazmi and Mihdhar were deploying from Asia to the United States, al Qaeda’s leadership was recruiting and training four Western-educated men who had recently arrived in Kanda- har.Though they hailed from four different countries—Egypt, the United Arab

177 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 160 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 160 Emirates, Lebanon, and Yemen—they had formed a close-knit group as stu- dents in Hamburg, Germany.The new recruits had come to Afghanistan aspir- ing to wage jihad in Chechnya. But al Qaeda quickly recognized their potential and enlisted them in its anti-U.S. jihad. 5.3 THE HAMBURG CONTINGENT Although Bin Ladin,Atef, and KSM initially contemplated using established al Qaeda members to execute the planes operation, the late 1999 arrival in Kan- dahar of four aspiring jihadists from Germany suddenly presented a more attractive alternative. The Hamburg group shared the anti-U.S. fervor of the other candidates for the operation, but added the enormous advantages of flu- ency in English and familiarity with life in the West, based on years that each member of the group had spent living in Germany. Not surprisingly, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah would all become key players in the 9/11 conspiracy. Mohamed Atta Mohamed Atta was born on September 1, 1968, in Kafr el Sheikh, Egypt, to a middle-class family headed by his father, an attorney. After graduating from Cairo University with a degree in architectural engineering in 1990, Atta worked as an urban planner in Cairo for a couple of years. In the fall of 1991, he asked a German family he had met in Cairo to help him continue his edu- cation in Germany. They suggested he come to Hamburg and invited him to live with them there, at least initially.After completing a course in German,Atta traveled to Germany for the first time in July 1992. He resided briefly in Stuttgart and then, in the fall of 1992, moved to Hamburg to live with his host family. After enrolling at the University of Hamburg, he promptly transferred into the city engineering and planning course at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg, where he would remain registered as a student until the fall of 1999. He appears to have applied himself fairly seriously to his studies (at least in comparison to his jihadist friends) and actually received his degree shortly before traveling to Afghanistan. In school, Atta came across as very intelligent 64 and reasonably pleasant, with an excellent command of the German language. When Atta arrived in Germany, he appeared religious, but not fanatically so. This would change, especially as his tendency to assert leadership became increasingly pronounced.According to Binalshibh, as early as 1995 Atta sought to organize a Muslim student association in Hamburg. In the fall of 1997, he joined a working group at the Quds mosque in Hamburg, a group designed to bridge the gap between Muslims and Christians.Atta proved a poor bridge, however, because of his abrasive and increasingly dogmatic personality. But

178 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 161 161 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND among those who shared his beliefs, Atta stood out as a decisionmaker. Atta’s friends during this period remember him as charismatic, intelligent, and per- 65 suasive, albeit intolerant of dissent. In his interactions with other students, Atta voiced virulently anti-Semitic and anti-American opinions, ranging from condemnations of what he described as a global Jewish movement centered in New York City that sup- posedly controlled the financial world and the media, to polemics against gov- ernments of the Arab world.To him, Saddam Hussein was an American stooge set up to give Washington an excuse to intervene in the Middle East. Within his circle,Atta advocated violent jihad. He reportedly asked one individual close to the group if he was “ready to fight for [his] belief ” and dismissed him as too weak for jihad when the person declined. On a visit home to Egypt in 1998, Atta met one of his college friends. According to this friend, Atta had changed a great deal, had grown a beard, and had “obviously adopted fun- 66 damentalism” by that time. Ramzi Binalshibh Ramzi Binalshibh was born on May 1, 1972, in Ghayl Bawazir,Yemen.There does not seem to be anything remarkable about his family or early background.A friend who knew Binalshibh in Yemen remembers him as “religious, but not too reli- gious.” From 1987 to 1995, Binalshibh worked as a clerk for the International Bank of Yemen. He first attempted to leave Yemen in 1995, when he applied for a U.S. visa. After his application was rejected, he went to Germany and applied for asylum under the name Ramzi Omar, claiming to be a Sudanese citizen seek- ing asylum.While his asylum petition was pending, Binalshibh lived in Hamburg and associated with individuals from several mosques there. In 1997, after his asylum application was denied, Binalshibh went home to Yemen but returned to Germany shortly thereafter under his true name, this time registering as a student in Hamburg. Binalshibh continually had academic problems, failing tests and cut- 67 ting classes; he was expelled from one school in September 1998. According to Binalshibh, he and Atta first met at a mosque in Hamburg in 1995. The two men became close friends and became identified with their shared extremist outlook. Like Atta, by the late 1990s Binalshibh was decrying what he perceived to be a “Jewish world conspiracy.” He proclaimed that the highest duty of every Muslim was to pursue jihad, and that the highest honor was to die during the jihad. Despite his rhetoric, however, Binalshibh presented a more amiable figure than the austere Atta, and was known within the com- 68 munity as being sociable, extroverted, polite, and adventuresome. the Harb urg sec- In 1998, Binalshibh and Atta began sharing an apartment in tion of Hamburg, together with a young student from the United Arab Emi- 69 rates named Marwan al Shehhi.

179 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 162 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 162 Marwan al Shehhi Marwan al Shehhi was born on May 9, 1978, in Ras al Khaimah, the United Arab Emirates. His father, who died in 1997, was a prayer leader at the local mosque. After graduating from high school in 1995, Shehhi joined the Emi- rati military and received half a year of basic training before gaining admis- sion to a military scholarship program that would fund his continued study in 70 Germany. Shehhi first entered Germany in April 1996. After sharing an apartment in Bonn for two months with three other scholarship students, Shehhi moved in with a German family, with whom he resided for several months before mov- ing into his own apartment. During this period, he came across as very reli- gious, praying five times a day. Friends also remember him as convivial and “a regular guy,” wearing Western clothes and occasionally renting cars for trips to 71 Berlin, France, and the Netherlands. As a student, Shehhi was less than a success. Upon completing a course in German, he enrolled at the University of Bonn in a program for technical, mathematical, and scientific studies. In June 1997, he requested a leave from his studies, citing the need to attend to unspecified “problems” in his home coun- try.Although the university denied his request, Shehhi left anyway, and conse- quently was compelled to repeat the first semester of his studies. In addition to having academic difficulties at this time, Shehhi appeared to become more extreme in the practice of his faith; for example, he specifically avoided restau- rants that cooked with or served alcohol. In late 1997, he applied for permis- sion to complete his course work in Hamburg, a request apparently motivated by his desire to join Atta and Binalshibh. Just how and when the three of them first met remains unclear, although they seemed to know each other already when Shehhi relocated to Hamburg in early 1998.Atta and Binalshibh moved 72 into his apartment in April. The transfer to Hamburg did not help Shehhi’s academic progress; he was directed by the scholarship program administrators at the Emirati embassy to repeat his second semester starting in August 1998, but back in Bonn. Shehhi initially flouted this directive, however, and did not reenroll at the University of Bonn until the following January, barely passing his course there. By the end of July 1999, he had returned to Hamburg, applying to study shipbuilding at the Technical University and, more significantly, residing once again with Atta 73 and Binalshibh, in an apartment at 54 Marienstrasse. After Shehhi moved in with Atta and Binalshibh, his evolution toward Islamic fundamentalism became more pronounced. A fellow Emirati student who came to Hamburg to visit Shehhi noticed he no longer lived as comfort- ably as before. Shehhi now occupied an old apartment with a roommate, had no television, and wore inexpensive clothes.When asked why he was living so 74 frugally, Shehhi responded that he was living the way the Prophet had lived. Similarly, when someone asked why he and Atta never laughed, Shehhi 75 retorted,“How can you laugh when people are dying in Palestine?”

180 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 163 163 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND Ziad Jarrah Born on May 11, 1975, in Mazraa, Lebanon, Ziad Jarrah came from an afflu- ent family and attended private, Christian schools. Like Atta, Binalshibh, and Shehhi, Jarrah aspired to pursue higher education in Germany. In April 1996, he and a cousin enrolled at a junior college in Greifswald, in northeastern Ger- many.There Jarrah met and became intimate with Aysel Senguen, the daugh- 76 ter of Turkish immigrants, who was preparing to study dentistry. Even with the benefit of hindsight, Jarrah hardly seems a likely candidate for becoming an Islamic extremist. Far from displaying radical beliefs when he first moved to Germany, he arrived with a reputation for knowing where to find the best discos and beaches in Beirut, and in Greifswald was known to enjoy student parties and drinking beer. Although he continued to share an apartment in Greifswald with his cousin, Jarrah was mostly at Senguen’s apart- ment.Witnesses interviewed by German authorities after 9/11, however, recall that Jarrah started showing signs of radicalization as early as the end of 1996. After returning from a trip home to Lebanon, Jarrah started living more strictly according to the Koran. He read brochures in Arabic about jihad, held forth to friends on the subject of holy war, and professed disaffection with his previous 77 life and a desire not to leave the world “in a natural way.” In September 1997, Jarrah abruptly switched his intended course of study from dentistry to aircraft engineering—at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg. His motivation for this decision remains unclear. The rationale he expressed to Senguen—that he had been interested in aviation since playing with toy airplanes as a child—rings somewhat hollow. In any event, Jarrah appears already to have had Hamburg contacts by this time, some 78 of whom may have played a role in steering him toward Islamic extremism. Following his move to Hamburg that fall, he began visiting Senguen in Greifswald on weekends, until she moved to the German city of Bochum one year later to enroll in dental school. Around the same time, he began speaking increasingly about religion, and his visits to Senguen became less and less fre- quent. He began criticizing her for not being religious enough and for dress- ing too provocatively. He grew a full beard and started praying regularly. He refused to introduce her to his Hamburg friends because, he told her, they were religious Muslims and her refusal to become more observant embarrassed him. At some point in 1999, Jarrah told Senguen that he was planning to wage a jihad because there was no greater honor than to die for Allah. Although Jar- rah’s transformation generated numerous quarrels, their breakups invariably 79 were followed by reconciliation. Forming a Cell In Hamburg, Jarrah had a succession of living accommodations, but he appar- ently never resided with his future co-conspirators. It is not clear how and when he became part of Atta’s circle. He became particularly friendly with Binalshibh after meeting him at the Quds mosque in Hamburg, which Jarrah

181 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 164 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 164 began attending regularly in late 1997.The worshippers at this mosque featured an outspoken, flamboyant Islamist named Mohammed Haydar Zammar. A well-known figure in the Muslim community (and to German and U.S. intel- ligence agencies by the late 1990s), Zammar had fought in Afghanistan and rel- ished any opportunity to extol the virtues of violent jihad. Indeed, a witness has reported hearing Zammar press Binalshibh to fulfill his duty to wage jihad. Moreover, after 9/11, Zammar reportedly took credit for influencing not just Binalshibh but the rest of the Hamburg group. In 1998, Zammar encouraged them to participate in jihad and even convinced them to go to 80 Afghanistan. Owing to Zammar’s persuasion or some other source of inspiration, Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah eventually prepared themselves to translate their extremist beliefs into action. By late 1999, they were ready to abandon their student lives in Germany in favor of violent jihad.This final stage in their evo- lution toward embracing Islamist extremism did not entirely escape the notice of the people around them. The foursome became core members of a group of radical Muslims, often hosting sessions at their Marienstrasse apartment that involved extremely anti-American discussions. Meeting three to four times a week, the group became something of a “sect” whose members, according to 81 Atta’s one participant in the meetings, tended to deal only with each other. rent checks for the apartment provide evidence of the importance that the apartment assumed as a center for the group, as he would write on them the 82 notation “Dar el Ansar,” or “house of the followers.” In addition to Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah, the group included other extremists, some of whom also would attend al Qaeda training camps and, in some instances, would help the 9/11 hijackers as they executed the plot: • Said Bahaji, son of a Moroccan immigrant, was the only German cit- izen in the group. Educated in Morocco, Bahaji returned to Germany to study electrical engineering at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg. He spent five months in the German army before obtaining a medical discharge, and lived with Atta and Binal- shibh at 54 Marienstrasse for eight months between November 1998 and July 1999. Described as an insecure follower with no personality and with limited knowledge of Islam, Bahaji nonetheless pr ofessed his readiness to engage in violence.Atta and Binalshibh used Bahaji’s com- puter for Internet research, as evidenced by documents and diskettes 83 seized by German authorities after 9/11. • Zakariya Essabar, a Moroccan citizen, moved to Germany in Febru- ary 1997 and to Hamburg in 1998, where he studied medical tech- nology. Soon after moving to Hamburg, Essabar met Binalshibh and the others through a Turkish mosque . Essabar turned extremist fairly suddenly, probably in 1999, and r eportedly pressured one acquain- tance with physical force to become more religious, grow a beard, and

182 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 165 165 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND compel his wife to convert to Islam. Essabar’s parents were said to have made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to sway him from this lifestyle. Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, he would travel to Afghanistan to 84 communicate the date for the attacks to the al Qaeda leadership. • Mounir el Motassadeq, another Moroccan, came to Germany in 1993, moving to Hamburg two years later to study electrical engineering at the Technical University.A witness has recalled Motassadeq saying that he would kill his entire family if his religious beliefs demanded it. One of Motassadeq’s roommates recalls him referring to Hitler as a “good man” and organizing film sessions that included speeches by Bin Ladin. Motassadeq would help conceal the Hamburg group’s trip to 85 Afghanistan in late 1999. • Abdelghani Mzoudi, also a Moroccan, arrived in Germany in the summer of 1993, after completing university courses in physics and chemistry. Mzoudi studied in Dortmund, Bochum, and Muenster before moving to Hamburg in 1995. Mzoudi described himself as a weak Muslim when he was home in Morocco, but much more devout when he was back in Hamburg. In April 1996, Mzoudi and Motas- 86 sadeq witnessed the execution of Atta’s will. During the course of 1999, Atta and his group became ever more extreme and secretive, speaking only in Arabic to conceal the content of their conver- 87 When the four core members of the Hamburg cell left Germany to sations. journey to Afghanistan late that year, it seems unlikely that they already knew about the planes operation; no evidence connects them to al Qaeda before that time. Witnesses have attested, however, that their pronouncements reflected 88 In ample predisposition toward taking some action against the United States. short, they fit the bill for Bin Ladin, Atef, and KSM. Going to Afghanistan The available evidence indicates that in 1999,Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jar- rah decided to fight in Chechnya against the Russians. According to Binal- y caused the gr oup to travel to shibh, a chance meeting on a train in German al Masri Afghanistan instead. An individual named Khalid approached Binal- shibh and Shehhi (because they were Arabs with beards, Binalshibh thinks) and struck up a conversation about jihad in Chechnya.When they later called Masri and expressed interest in going to Chechnya, he told them to contact Abu Musab in Duisburg, Germany. Abu Musab turned out to be Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a significant al Qaeda operative who, even then, was well known to U.S. and German intelligence, though neither government apparently knew he was operating in Germany in late 1999. When telephoned by Binalshibh and Shehhi, Slahi reportedly invited these promising recruits to come see him 89 in Duisburg. Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah made the trip. When they arrived, Slahi

183 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 166 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 166 explained that it was difficult to get to Chechnya at that time because many travelers were being detained in Georgia. He recommended they go to Afghanistan instead, where they could train for jihad before traveling onward to Chechnya. Slahi instructed them to obtain Pakistani visas and then return to him for further directions on how to reach Afghanistan. Although Atta did not attend the meeting, he joined in the plan with the other three.After obtain- ing the necessary visas, they received Slahi’s final instructions on how to travel to Karachi and then Quetta, where they were to contact someone named Umar 90 al Masri at the Taliban office. Following Slahi’s advice,Atta and Jarrah left Hamburg during the last week of November 1999, bound for Karachi. Shehhi left for Afghanistan around the same time; Binalshibh, about two weeks later. Binalshibh remembers that when he arrived at the Taliban office in Quetta, there was no one named Umar al Masri.The name, apparently, was simply a code; a group of Afghans from the office promptly escorted him to Kandahar.There Binalshibh rejoined Atta and Jarrah, who said they already had pledged loyalty to Bin Ladin and urged him to do the same.They also informed him that Shehhi had pledged as well and had already left for the United Arab Emirates to prepare for the mission. Binal- shibh soon met privately with Bin Ladin, accepted the al Qaeda leader’s invi- tation to work under him, and added his own pledge to those of his Hamburg colleagues. By this time, Binalshibh claims, he assumed he was volunteering for 91 a martyrdom operation. Atta, Jarrah, and Binalshibh then met with Atef, who told them they were about to undertake a highly secret mission. As Binalshibh tells it, Atef instructed the three to return to Germany and enroll in flight training. Atta— whom Bin Ladin chose to lead the group—met with Bin Ladin several times to receive additional instructions, including a preliminary list of approved tar- 92 The new gets: the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Capitol. recruits also learned that an individual named Rabia al Makki (Nawaf al 93 Hazmi) would be part of the operation. In retrospect, the speed with which Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh became core members of the 9/11 plot—with Atta designated its operational leader—is remarkable.They had not yet met with KSM when all this occurred. It is clear, then, that Bin Ladin and Atef were very much in charge of the oper- ation.That these candidates were selected so quickly—before comprehensive testing in the training camps or in operations—demonstrates that Bin Ladin and Atef probably already understood the deficiencies of their initial team, Hazmi and Mihdhar.The new recruits from Germany possessed an ideal com- bination of technical skill and knowledge that the original 9/11 operatives, vet- eran fighters though they were, lacked. Bin Ladin and Atef wasted no time in assigning the Hamburg group to the most ambitious operation yet planned by al Qaeda. Bin Ladin and Atef also plainly judged that Atta was best suited to be the

184 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 167 167 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND tactical commander of the operation. Such a quick and critical judgment invites speculation about whether they had already taken Atta’s measure at some ear- lier meeting. To be sure, some gaps do appear in the record of Atta’s known whereabouts during the preceding years. One such gap is February–March 1998, a period for which there is no evidence of his presence in Germany and 94 Yet to date, neither when he conceivably could have been in Afghanistan. KSM, Binalshibh, nor any other al Qaeda figure interrogated about the 9/11 plot has claimed that Atta or any other member of the Hamburg group trav- eled to Afghanistan before the trip in late 1999. While the four core Hamburg cell members were in Afghanistan, their asso- ciates back in Hamburg handled their affairs so that their trip could be kept secret. Motassadeq appears to have done the most. He terminated Shehhi’s apartment lease, telling the landlord that Shehhi had returned to the UAE for family reasons, and used a power of attorney to pay bills from Shehhi’s bank 95 Motassadeq also assisted Jarrah, offering to look after Aysel Senguen account. in Jarrah’s absence. Said Bahaji attended to similar routine matters for Atta and Binalshibh, thereby helping them remain abroad without drawing attention to 96 their absence. Preparing for the Operation In early 2000,Atta, Jarrah, and Binalshibh returned to Hamburg. Jarrah arrived 97 According to Binalshibh, he and Atta left Kanda- first, on January 31, 2000. har together and proceeded first to Karachi, where they met KSM and were instructed by him on security and on living in the United States. Shehhi appar- ently had already met with KSM before returning to the UAE. Atta returned to Hamburg in late February, and Binalshibh arrived shortly thereafter. She- hhi’s travels took him to the UAE (where he acquired a new passport and a U.S. visa), Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and one or more other destinations. Shehhi 98 also returned to Germany, possibly sometime in March. After leaving Afghanistan, the hijackers made clear efforts to avoid appear- ing radical. Once back in Hamburg, they distanced themselves from conspic- uous extremists like Zammar, whom they knew attracted unwanted attention 99 They also changed their appearance and behavior. Atta from the authorities. wore Western clothing, shaved his beard, and no longer attended extremist no longer wore a full beard and, according to Senguen, mosques. Jarrah also acted much more the way he had when she first met him. And when Shehhi, while still in the UAE in January 2000, held a belated wedding celebration (he actually had been married in 1999), a friend of his was surprised to see that he 100 had shaved off his beard and was acting like his old self again. But Jarrah’s apparent efforts to appear less radical did not completely con- ceal his transformation from his Lebanese family, which grew increasingly con- cerned about his fanaticism. Soon after Jarrah returned to Germany, his father asked Jarrah’s cousin—a close companion from boyhood—to intercede. The

185 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 168 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 168 cousin’s ensuing effort to persuade Jarrah to depart from “the path he was tak- 101 Yet Jarrah clearly differed from the other hijackers ing” proved unavailing. in that he maintained much closer contact with his family and continued his intimate relationship with Senguen. These ties may well have caused him to harbor some doubts about going through with the plot, even as late as the sum- mer of 2001, as discussed in chapter 7. After leaving Afghanistan, the four began researching flight schools and avi- ation training. In early January 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali—a nephew of KSM living in the UAE who would become an important facilitator in the plot— used Shehhi’s credit card to order a Boeing 747-400 flight simulator program and a Boeing 767 flight deck video, together with attendant literature;Ali had all these items shipped to his employer’s address. Jarrah soon decided that the schools in Germany were not acceptable and that he would have to learn to fly in the United States. Binalshibh also researched flight schools in Europe, and in the Netherlands he met a flight school director who recommended flight schools in the United States because they were less expensive and 102 required shorter training periods. In March 2000, Atta emailed 31 different U.S. flight schools on behalf of a small group of men from various Arab countries studying in Germany who, while lacking prior training, were interested in learning to fly in the United States. Atta requested information about the cost of the training, potential 103 financing, and accommodations. Before seeking visas to enter the United States, Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah obtained new passports, each claiming that his old passport had been lost. Pre- sumably they were concerned that the Pakistani visas in their old passports would raise suspicions about possible travel to Afghanistan. Shehhi obtained his 104 Binal- visa on January 18, 2000; Atta, on May 18; and Jarrah, on May 25. shibh’s visa request was rejected, however, as were his three subsequent appli- 105 Binalshibh proved unable to obtain a visa, a victim of the cations. generalized suspicion that visa applicants from Yemen—especially young men applying in another country (Binalshibh first applied in Berlin)—might join the ranks of undocumented aliens seeking work in the United States. Before 9/11, security concerns were not a major factor in visa issuance unless the applicant already was on a terrorist watchlist, and none of these four men was. Concerns that Binalshibh intended to immigrate to the United States doomed his chances to participate firsthand in the 9/11 attacks. Although Binalshibh had to remain behind, he would provide critical assistance from abroad to his co-conspirators. Once again, the need for travel documents dictated al Qaeda’s plans. Tr ave l It should by now be apparent how significant travel was in the planning under- taken by a terrorist organization as far-flung as al Qaeda.The story of the plot includes references to dozens of international trips. Operations required travel,

186 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 169 169 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND as did basic communications and the movement of money. Where electronic communications were regarded as insecure, al Qaeda relied even more heavily on couriers. KSM and Abu Zubaydah each played key roles in facilitating travel for al Qaeda operatives. In addition, al Qaeda had an office of passports and host country issues under its security committee. The office was located at the Kandahar airport and was managed by Atef. The committee altered papers, 106 including passports, visas, and identification cards. Moreover, certain al Qaeda members were charged with organizing pass- port collection schemes to keep the pipeline of fraudulent documents flow- ing. To this end, al Qaeda required jihadists to turn in their passports before going to the front lines in Afghanistan. If they were killed, their passports were 107 The operational mission training course taught operatives recycled for use. how to forge documents. Certain passport alteration methods, which included substituting photos and erasing and adding travel cachets, were also taught. Manuals demonstrating the technique for “cleaning” visas were reportedly cir- culated among operatives. Mohamed Atta and Zakariya Essabar were reported 108 to have been trained in passport alteration. The purpose of all this training was twofold: to develop an institutional capacity for document forgery and to enable operatives to make necessary adjustments in the field. It was well-known, for example, that if a Saudi trav- eled to Afghanistan via Pakistan, then on his return to Saudi Arabia his pass- port, bearing a Pakistani stamp, would be confiscated. So operatives either erased the Pakistani visas from their passports or traveled through Iran, which 109 did not stamp visas directly into passports. 5.4 A MONEY TRAIL? Bin Ladin and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America. The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters’ tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough.They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, 110 The origin easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time. of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11. General Financing As we explained in chapter 2, Bin Ladin did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan. Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA

187 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 170 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 170 now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through 111 donations. For many years, the United States thought Bin Ladin financed al Qaeda’s expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Ladin purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government from 1970 through discovered a different reality: roughly 1994, Bin Ladin received about $1 million per year—a significant sum, to be sure, but not a 112 Then, as part of a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad. Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Ladin family was forced to find a buyer for Usama’s share of the family company in 1994.The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale.This action had the effect of divesting Bin Ladin of what otherwise might indeed have been a 113 large fortune. Nor were Bin Ladin’s assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda.When Bin Ladin lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets. These could not have provided significant income, as most were small or not economically viable.When Bin Ladin left in 1996, it appears that the Sudanese government expropriated all his assets: he left Sudan with practically nothing. When Bin Ladin arrived in Afghanistan, he relied on the Taliban until he was able to reinvigorate his fund-raising efforts by drawing on ties to wealthy Saudi individuals that he had established during the Afghan war 114 in the 1980s. Al Qaeda appears to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised money from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers, primarily 115 Some individual in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia. donors surely knew, and others did not, the ultimate destination of their dona- tions. Al Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam’s strong calls for char- zakat .These financial facilitators also appeared to rely heavily on itable giving, certain imams at mosques who were willing to divert zakat donations to al 116 Qaeda’s cause. 117 Al Qaeda also collected money from employees of corrupt charities. It took two approaches to using charities for fund-raising. One was to rely on al Qaeda sympathizers in specific foreign branch offices of large, international sight and ineffective inter- charities—particularly those with lax external over 118 Haramain Islamic Foundation. nal controls, such as the Saudi-based al Smaller charities in various parts of the globe were funded by these large Gulf 119 charities and had employees who would siphon the money to al Qaeda. In addition, entire charities, such as the al Wafa organization, may have wit- tingly participated in funneling money to al Qaeda. In those cases, al Qaeda operatives controlled the entire organization, including access to bank

188 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 171 171 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 120 Charities were a source of money and also provided significant accounts. cover, which enabled operatives to travel undetected under the guise of work- ing for a humanitarian organization. It does not appear that any government other than the Taliban financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11, although some govern ments may have con- e to al Qaeda’s fund- blind ey tained al Qaeda sympathizers who turned a 121 considered the primary source Saudi Arabia has long been raising activities. of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi govern- ment as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organ- ization. (This conclusion does not exclude the likelihood that charities with 122 significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaeda.) Still, al Qaeda found fertile fund-raising ground in Saudi Arabia, where extreme religious views are common and charitable giving was both essential 123 Al Qaeda also sought to the culture and subject to very limited oversight. states. other Gulf donors in money from wealthy Al Qaeda frequently moved the money it raised by hawala , an informal and 124 In some ways, al Qaeda had ancient trust-based system for transferring funds. no choice after its move to Afghanistan in 1996: first, the banking system there was antiquated and undependable; and second, formal banking was risky due to the scrutiny that al Qaeda received after the August 1998 East Africa embassy 125 Bin Ladin bombings, including UN resolutions against it and the Taliban. relied on the established hawala networks operating in Pakistan, in Dubai, and throughout the Middle East to transfer funds efficiently. Hawaladars associated with al Qaeda may have used banks to move and store money, as did various al Qaeda fund-raisers and operatives outside of Afghanistan, but there is little evidence that Bin Ladin or core al Qaeda members used banks while in 126 Afghanistan. Before 9/11, al Qaeda spent funds as quickly as it received them.Actual ter- rorist operations represented a relatively small part of al Qaeda’s estimated $30 million annual operating budget. Al Qaeda funded salaries for jihadists, train- ing camps, airfields, vehicles, arms, and the development of training manuals. Bin Ladin provided approximately $10–$20 million per year to the Taliban in return for safe haven. Bin Ladin also may have used money to create alliances with other terrorist organizations, although it is unlikely that al Qaeda was funding an overall jihad program. Rather, Bin Ladin selectively provided start- 127 up funds to new groups or money for specific terrorist operations. Al Qaeda has been alleged to have used a variety of illegitimate means, par- ticularly drug trafficking and conflict diamonds, to finance itself.While the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda, and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in 128 Similarly, we have seen no per- or made his money through drug trafficking. suasive evidence that al Qaeda funded itself by trading in African conflict dia- 129 There also have been claims that al Qaeda financed itself through monds.

189 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 172 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 172 manipulation of the stock market based on its advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Exhaustive investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, FBI, and other agencies have uncovered no evidence that anyone with advance 130 knowledge of the attacks profited through securities transactions. To date, the U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately the question is of little prac- tical significance. Al Qaeda had many avenues of funding. If a particular fund- ing source had dried up, al Qaeda could have easily tapped a different source or diverted funds from another project to fund an operation that cost $400,000–$500,000 over nearly two years. The Funding of the 9/11 Plot As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in for- eign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers sub- stantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign 131 government—or foreign government official—supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facili- tator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much 132 as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giv- ing them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Ger- many from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Finan- cial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda’s leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included • leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direc- tion of the operation; • communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them;

190 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 173 173 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND • a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctri- nate them, and give them necessary training; • an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assess- ments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; • the ability to move people; and • the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

191 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 174 6 FROM THREAT TO THREAT we described how the U.S. government adjusted its In chapters 3 and 4 existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Ladin and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting Bin Ladin expelled from Afghanistan or possibly cap- turing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of Bin Ladin’s organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Ladin. He and his national security advisor, Samuel “Sandy” Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Ladin’s 1 In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the reported location. threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Ladin and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was delib- erate—intended to avoid enhancing Bin Ladin’s stature by giving him unnec- essary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors 2 and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns—the Y2K scare. Some gov- ernment officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such 3 breakdowns. 6.1 THE MILLENNIUM CRISIS “Bodies Will Pile Up in Sacks” On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Ladin, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, “The time for training is over.” Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist 174

192 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 175 FROM THREAT TO THREAT 175 operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed 4 Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah’s Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and Ameri- 5 can targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters.After Abu Hoshar’s release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited in Turkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah’s assistance, 6 Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training. In late 1998, Hijazi and Abu Hoshar had settled on a plan.They would first attack four targets: the SAS Radisson Hotel in downtown Amman, the border crossings from Jordan into Israel, and two Christian holy sites, at a time when all these locations were likely to be thronged with American and other tourists. Next, they would target a local airport and other religious and cultural sites. Hijazi and Abu Hoshar cased the intended targets and sent reports to Abu Zubaydah, who approved their plan. Finally, back in Amman from Boston, Hijazi gradually accumulated bomb-making materials, including sulfuric acid and 5,200 pounds of nitric acid, which were then stored in an enormous subbasement dug by the 7 plotters over a period of two months underneath a rented house. In early 1999, Hijazi and Abu Hoshar contacted Khalil Deek, an American citizen and an associate of Abu Zubaydah who lived in Peshawar, Pakistan, and who, with Afghanistan-based extremists, had created an electronic version of a . They obtained a CD-ROM of this terrorist manual, the Encyclopedia of Jihad 8 In June, with help from Deek,Abu Hoshar arranged encyclopedia from Deek. with Abu Zubaydah for Hijazi and three others to go to Afghanistan for added training in handling explosives. In late November 1999, Hijazi reportedly swore before Abu Zubaydah the bayat to Bin Ladin, committing himself to do any- thing Bin Ladin ordered. He then departed for Jordan and was at a waypoint in Syria when Abu Zubaydah sent Abu Hoshar the message that prompted Jor- 9 danian authorities to roll up the whole cell. After the arrests of Abu Hoshar and 15 others, the Jordanians tracked Deek to Peshawar, persuaded Pakistan to extradite him, and added him to their catch. Searches in Amman found the rented house and, among other things, 71 drums of acids, several forged Saudi passports, detonators, and Deek’s . Six Encyclopedia of the accomplices were sentenced to death. In custody, Hijazi’s younger brother said that the group’s motto had been “The season is coming, and bod- 10 ies will pile up in sacks.”

193 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 176 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 176 Diplomacy and Disruption On December 4, as news came in about the discoveries in Jordan, National Security Council (NSC) Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke wrote Berger,“If George’s [Tenet’s] story about a planned series of UBL attacks at the Millennium is true, we will need to make some decisions NOW.” He told us he held several conversations with President Clinton during the crisis. He suggested threatening reprisals against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the event of any attacks on U.S. interests, anywhere, by Bin Ladin. He further proposed to Berger that a strike be made during the last week of 1999 against 11 al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan—a proposal not adopted. Warned by the CIA that the disrupted Jordanian plot was probably part of possibly involving a larger series of attacks intended for the millennium, some the night of Decem- chemical weapons, the Principals Committee met on ber 8 and decided to task Clarke’s Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) to 12 develop plans to deter and disrupt al Qaeda plots. Michael Sheehan, the State Department member of the CSG, communi- cated warnings to the Taliban that they would be held responsible for future al Qaeda attacks. “Mike was not diplomatic,” Clarke reported to Berger.With virtually no evidence of a Taliban response, a new approach was made to Pak- 13 General Anthony Zinni, the commander of Central Command istan. (CENTCOM), was designated as the President’s special envoy and sent to ask General Musharraf to “take whatever action you deem necessary to resolve the Bin Laden problem at the earliest possible time.” But Zinni came back empty- handed. As Ambassador William Milam reported from Islamabad, Musharraf 14 was “unwilling to take the political heat at home.” The CIA worked hard with foreign security services to detain or at least keep an eye on suspected Bin Ladin associates.Tenet spoke to 20 of his foreign counterparts. Disruption and arrest operations were mounted against terrorists 15 In mid-December, President Clinton signed a Memoran- in eight countries. dum of Notification (MON) giving the CIA broader authority to use foreign proxies to detain Bin Ladin lieutenants, without having to transfer them to U.S. custody. The authority was to capture, not kill, though lethal force might be 16 Tenet would later send a message to all CIA personnel over- used if necessary. . . . Do whatever is necessary seas, saying, “The threat could not be more real. to disrupt UBL’s plans. . . .The American people are counting on you and me to take every appropriate step to protect them during this period.” The State 17 Department issued a worldwide threat advisory to its posts overseas. Then, on December 14, an Algerian jihadist was caught bringing a load of explosives into the United States. Ressam’s Arrest Ahmed Ressam, 23, had illegally immigrated to Canada in 1994. Using a fal- sified passport and a bogus story about persecution in Algeria, Ressam entered

194 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 177 177 FROM THREAT TO THREAT Montreal and claimed political asylum. For the next few years he supported himself with petty crime. Recruited by an alumnus of Abu Zubaydah’s Khal- dan camp, Ressam trained in Afghanistan in 1998, learning, among other things, how to place cyanide near the air intake of a building to achieve maximum lethality at minimum personal risk. Having joined other Algerians in planning a possible attack on a U.S. airport or consulate, Ressam left Afghanistan in early 1999 carrying precursor chemicals for explosives disguised in toiletry bottles, a notebook containing bomb assembly instructions, and $12,000. Back in 18 Canada, he went about procuring weapons, chemicals, and false papers. In early summer 1999, having learned that not all of his colleagues could get the travel documents to enter Canada, Ressam decided to carry out the plan alone. By the end of the summer he had chosen three Los Angeles–area airports as potential targets, ultimately fixing on Los Angeles International (LAX) as the largest and easiest to operate in surreptitiously. He bought or stole chemicals and equipment for his bomb, obtaining advice from three Algerian friends, all of whom were wanted by authorities in France for their roles in past terrorist attacks there. Ressam also acquired new confederates. He promised to help a New York–based partner, Abdelghani Meskini, get training in Afghanistan if Meskini 19 would help him maneuver in the United States. In December 1999, Ressam began his final preparations. He called an Afghanistan-based facilitator to inquire into whether Bin Ladin wanted to take credit for the attack, but he did not get a reply. He spent a week in Vancouver preparing the explosive components with a close friend. The chemicals were so caustic that the men kept their windows open, despite the freezing temper- 20 atures outside, and sucked on cough drops to soothe their irritated throats. While in Vancouver, Ressam also rented a Chrysler sedan for his travel into the 21 United States, and packed the explosives in the trunk’s spare tire well. On December 14, 1999, Ressam drove his rental car onto the ferry from Victoria, Canada, to Port Angeles, Washington. Ressam planned to drive to Seattle and meet Meskini, with whom he would travel to Los Angeles and case A Case Study in Terrorist Travel Following a familiar terrorist pattern, Ressam and his associates used fraudulent passports and immigration fraud to travel. In Ressam’s case, this involved flying from France to Montreal using a photo-substituted French passport under a false name. Under questioning, Ressam admit- ted the passport was fraudulent and claimed political asylum. He was released pending a hearing, which he failed to attend. His political asy- lum claim was denied. He was arrested again, released again, and given another hearing date.Again, he did not show. He was arrested four times

195 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 178 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 178 for thievery, usually from tourists, but was neither jailed nor deported. He also supported himself by selling stolen documents to a friend who was 22 a document broker for Islamist terrorists. Ressam eventually obtained a genuine Canadian passport through a document vendor who stole a blank baptismal certificate from a Catholic church.With this document he was able to obtain a Canadian passport under the name of Benni Antoine Noris.This enabled him to travel to Pakistan, and from there to Afghanistan for his training, and then return to Canada. Impressed, Abu Zubaydah asked Ressam to get more genuine Canadian passports and to send them to him for other 23 terrorists to use. Another conspirator, Abdelghani Meskini, used a stolen identity to travel to Seattle on December 11, 1999, at the request of Mokhtar Haouari, another conspirator. Haouari provided fraudulent passports and ited away from the Un visas to assist Ressam and Meskini’s planned get 24 One of Meskini’s associ- States to Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. ates,Abdel Hakim Tizegha, also filed a claim for political asylum. He was released pending a hearing, which was adjourned and rescheduled five times. His claim was finally denied two years after his initial filing. His attorney appealed the decision, and Tizegha was allowed to remain in the country pending the appeal. Nine months later, his attorney notified the court that he could not locate his client. A warrant of deportation was 25 issued. LAX. They planned to detonate the bomb on or around January 1, 2000. At the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) preinspection station in Vic- toria, Ressam presented officials with his genuine but fraudulently obtained Canadian passport, from which he had torn the Afghanistan entry and exit stamps.The INS agent on duty ran the passport through a variety of databases but, since it was not in Ressam’s name, he did not pick up the pending Cana- dian arrest warrants. After a cursory examination of Ressam’s car, the INS 26 agents allowed Ressam to board the ferry. Late in the afternoon of December 14, Ressam arrived in Port Angeles. He waited for all the other cars to depart the ferry, assuming (incorrectly) that the last car off would draw less scrutiny. Customs officers assigned to the port, noticing Ressam’s nervousness, referred him to secondary inspection. When asked for additional identification, Ressam handed the Customs agent a Price Costco membership card in the same false name as his passport. As that agent 27 away. began an initial pat-down, Ressam panicked and tried to run

196 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 179 179 FROM THREAT TO THREAT Inspectors examining Ressam’s rental car found the explosives concealed in the spare tire well, but at first they assumed the white powder and viscous liq- uid were drug-related—until an inspector pried apart and identified one of the lack boxes. Ressam was placed under four timing devices concealed within b arrest. Investigators guessed his target was in Seattle.They did not learn about the Los Angeles airport planning until they reexamined evidence seized in Montreal in 2000; they obtained further details when Ressam began cooper- 28 ating in May 2001. Emergency Cooperation After the disruption of the plot in Amman, it had not escaped notice in Wash- ington that Hijazi had lived in California and driven a cab in Boston and that Deek was a naturalized U.S. citizen who, as Berger reminded President Clin- 29 ton, had been in touch with extremists in the United States as well as abroad. Before Ressam’s arrest, Berger saw no need to raise a public alarm at home— 30 although the FBI put all field offices on alert. Now, following Ressam’s arrest, the FBI asked for an unprecedented num- ber of special wiretaps. Both Berger and Tenet told us that their impression was that more Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap requests were 31 processed during the millennium alert than ever before. The next day, writing about Ressam’s arrest and links to a cell in Mon- treal, Berger informed the President that the FBI would advise police in the United States to step up activities but would still try to avoid undue public alarm by stressing that the government had no specific information about 32 planned attacks. At a December 22 meeting of the Small Group of principals, FBI Director Louis Freeh briefed officials from the NSC staff, CIA, and Justice on wiretaps and investigations inside the United States, including a Brooklyn entity tied to the Ressam arrest, a seemingly unreliable foreign report of possible attacks on seven U.S. cities, two Algerians detained on the Canadian border, and searches in Montreal related to a jihadist cell.The Justice Department released a state- 33 ment on the alert the same day. Clarke’s staff warned,“ Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks 34 Clarke asked Berger to try to make sure that the domes- in the US are likely .” tic agencies remained alert.“Is there a threat to civilian aircraft?” he wrote. Clarke also asked the principals in late December to discuss a foreign security service 35 report about a Bin Ladin plan to put bombs on transatlantic flights. 36 Later, The CSG met daily. Berger said that the principals met constantly. when asked what made her decide to ask Ressam to step out of his vehicle, Diana Dean, a Customs inspector who referred Ressam to secondary inspec- 37 It appears that the tion, testified that it was her “training and experience.” heightened sense of alert at the national level played no role in Ressam’s detention.

197 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 180 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 180 There was a mounting sense of public alarm.The earlier Jordanian arrests had been covered in the press, and Ressam’s arrest was featured on network 38 evening news broadcasts throughout the Christmas season. The FBI was more communicative during the millennium crisis than it had ever been.The senior FBI official for counterterrorism, Dale Watson, was a regu- lar member of the CSG, and Clarke had good relations both with him and with some of the FBI agents handling al Qaeda–related investigations, including John York.As a rule, however, neither Watson nor these agents brought O’Neill in New much information to the group. The FBI simply did not produce the kind of intelligence reports that other agencies routinely wrote and disseminated.As law enforcement officers, Bureau agents tended to write up only witness interviews. Written case analysis usually occurred only in memoranda to supervisors 39 requesting authority to initiate or expand an investigation. But during the millennium alert, with its direct links into the United States from Hijazi, Deek, and Ressam, FBI officials were briefing in person about ongoing investigations, not relying on the dissemination of written reports. Berger told us that it was hard for FBI officials to hold back information in front of a cabinet-rank group. After the alert, according to Berger and mem- bers of the NSC staff, the FBI returned to its normal practice of withholding written reports and saying little about investigations or witness interviews, tak- ing the position that any information related to pending investigations might be presented to a grand jury and hence could not be disclosed under then- 40 prevailing federal law. The terrorist plots that were broken up at the end of 1999 display the vari- ety of operations that might be attributed, however indirectly, to al Qaeda.The Jordanian cell was a loose affiliate; we now know that it sought approval and training from Afghanistan, and at least one key member swore loyalty to Bin Ladin. But the cell’s plans and preparations were autonomous. Ressam’s ties to al Qaeda were even looser. Though he had been recruited, trained, and pre- pared in a network affiliated with the organization and its allies, Ressam’s own plans were, nonetheless, essentially independent. Al Qaeda, and Bin Ladin himself, did have at least one operation of their very own in mind for the millennium period. In chapter 5 we introduced an al Qaeda operative named Nashiri.Working with Bin Ladin, he was develop- ing a plan to attack a ship near Yemen. On January 3, an attempt was made to attack a U.S. warship in Aden, the USS The Sullivans .The attempt failed when the small boat, overloaded with explosives, sank.The operatives salvaged their equipment without the attempt becoming known, and they put off their plans for another day. Al Qaeda’s “planes operation” was also coming along. In January 2000, the United States caught a glimpse of its preparations.

198 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 181 181 FROM THREAT TO THREAT A Lost Trail in Southeast Asia In late 1999, the National Security Agency (NSA) analyzed communications associated with a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East, indicating that several members of “an operational cadre” were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur in early January 2000. Initially, only the first names of three were known—“Nawaf,”“Salem,” and “Khalid.” NSA analysts surmised correctly that Salem was Nawaf ’s younger brother. Seeing links not only with al Qaeda but specifically with the 1998 embassy bombings, a CIA desk officer guessed that 41 “something more nefarious [was] afoot.” In chapter 5, we discussed the dispatch of two operatives to the United States for their part in the planes operation—Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihd- har.Two more, Khallad and Abu Bara, went to Southeast Asia to case flights for 42 All made their the part of the operation that was supposed to unfold there. way to Southeast Asia from Afghanistan and Pakistan, except for Mihdhar, who 43 traveled from Yemen. Though Nawaf ’s trail was temporarily lost, the CIA soon identified “Khalid” 44 He was located leaving Yemen and tracked until he as Khalid al Mihdhar. 45 Other Arabs, unidentified at the arrived in Kuala Lumpur on January 5, 2000. 46 time, were watched as they gathered with him in the Malaysian capital. On January 8, the surveillance teams reported that three of the Arabs had 47 They identified suddenly left Kuala Lumpur on a short flight to Bangkok. one as Mihdhar. They later learned that one of his companions was named Alhazmi, although it was not yet known that he was “Nawaf.”The only iden- 48 In tifier available for the third person was part of a name—Salahsae. Bangkok, CIA officers received the information too late to track the three men 49 as they came in, and the travelers disappeared into the streets of Bangkok. The Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had briefed the CIA leadership on the gathering in Kuala Lumpur, and the information had been passed on to Berger and the NSC staff and to Director Freeh and others at the FBI (though the FBI noted that the CIA had the lead and would let the FBI know if a domes- tic angle arose).The head of the Bin Ladin unit kept providing updates, unaware at first even that the Arabs had left Kuala Lumpur, let alone that their trail had 50 When this bad news arrived, the names were put on a been lost in Bangkok. Thai watchlist so that Thai authorities could inform the United States if any 51 of them departed from Thailand. Several weeks later, CIA officers in Kuala Lumpur pr odded colleagues in 52 In early ding the three Bangkok for additional information regar travelers. March 2000, Bangkok reported that Nawaf al Hazmi, now identified for the on January 15 on a United Airlines first time with his full name, had departed flight to Los Angeles. As for Khalid al Mihdhar, there was no report of his departure even though he had accompanied Hazmi on the United flight to Los 53 No one outside of the Counterterrorist Center was told any of this. Angeles. The CIA did not try to register Mihdhar or Hazmi with the State Department’s

199 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 182 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 182 TIPOFF watchlist—either in January, when word arrived of Mihdhar’s visa, or in March, when word came that Hazmi, too, had had a U.S. visa and a ticket 54 to Los Angeles. None of this information—about Mihdhar’s U.S. visa or Hazmi’s travel to the United States—went to the FBI, and nothing more was done to track any of the three until January 2001, when the investigation of another bombing, that of the USS Cole , reignited interest in Khallad.We will return to that story in chapter 8. 6.2 POST-CRISIS REFLECTION: AGENDA FOR 2000 After the millennium alert, elements of the U.S. government reviewed their performance.The CIA’s leadership was told that while a number of plots had been disrupted, the millennium might be only the “kick-off ” for a period of 55 Clarke wrote Berger on January 11, 2000, that the CIA, the extended attacks. FBI, Justice, and the NSC staff had come to two main conclusions. First, U.S. disruption efforts thus far had “not put too much of a dent” in Bin Ladin’s net- work. If the United States wanted to “roll back” the threat, disruption would have to proceed at “a markedly different tempo.” Second,“sleeper cells” and “a 56 As one of Clarke’s staff variety of terrorist groups” had turned up at home. noted, only a “chance discovery” by U.S. Customs had prevented a possible 57 Berger gave his approval for the NSC staff to commence an “after- attack. action review,” anticipating new budget requests. He also asked DCI Tenet to review the CIA’s counterterrorism strategy and come up with a plan for “where 58 we go from here.” The NSC staff advised Berger that the United States had only been “nib- bling at the edges” of Bin Ladin’s network and that more terror attacks were a 59 The Principals Com- question not of “if ” but rather of “when” and “where.” mittee met on March 10, 2000, to review possible new moves.The principals ended up agreeing that the government should take three major steps. First, more money should go to the CIA to accelerate its efforts to “seriously attrit” al Qaeda. Second, there should be a crackdown on foreign terrorist organiza- tions in the United States. Third, immigration law enforcement should be strengthened, and the INS should tighten controls on the Canadian border (including stepping up U.S.-Canada cooperation).The principals endorsed the proposed programs; some, like expanding the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, moved forward, and others, like creating a centralized translation unit 60 for domestic intelligence intercepts in Arabic and other languages, did not. Pressing Pakistan While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pres- sure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it,

200 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 183 183 FROM THREAT TO THREAT “Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism 61 In early 2000, the United States began as it is a state sponsored by terrorists.” a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with Gen- eral Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government’s legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Ladin.They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do any- 62 thing,“given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan.” President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.The Secret Ser- vice and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President’s life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pak- istan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton 63 His insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Ladin. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Ladin.“I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if 64 he’d help us get Bin Ladin and deal with another issue or two.” The U.S. effort continued. Early in May, President Clinton urged Mushar- raf to carry through on his promise to visit Afghanistan and press Mullah Omar 65 At the end of the month, Under Secretary of State to expel Bin Ladin. 66 In June, DCI Tenet Thomas Pickering followed up with a trip to the region. 67 By September, the United traveled to Pakistan with the same general message. States was becoming openly critical of Pakistan for supporting a Taliban mili- 68 tary offensive aimed at completing the conquest of Afghanistan. In December, taking a step proposed by the State Department some months earlier, the United States led a campaign for new UN sanctions, which resulted in UN Security Council Resolution 1333, again calling for Bin Ladin’s expul- sion and forbidding any country to provide the Taliban with arms or military 69 This, too, had little if any effect. The Taliban did not expel Bin assistance. Ladin. Pakistani arms continued to flow across the border. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told us, “We did not have a strong hand to play with the Pakistanis. Because of the sanctions required by U.S. law, 70 Congress had blocked most economic and mil- we had few carrots to offer.” itary aid to Pakistan because of that country’s nuclear arms program and Musharraf ’s coup. Sheehan was critical of Musharraf, telling us that the Pak- 71 istani leader “blew a chance to remake Pakistan.”

201 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 184 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 184 Building New Capabilities: The CIA The after-action review had treated the CIA as the lead agency for any offen- sive against al Qaeda, and the principals, at their March 10 meeting, had endorsed strengthening the CIA’s capability for that role. To the CTC, that meant proceeding with “the Plan,” which it had put forward half a year earlier—hiring and training more case officers and building up the capabilities of foreign security services that provided intelligence via liaison. On occasion, as in Jordan in December 1999, these liaison services took direct action against 72 al Qaeda cells. In the CTC and higher up, the CIA’s managers believed that they desper- ately needed funds just to continue their current counterterrorism effort, for they reckoned that the millennium alert had already used up all of the Cen- ter’s funds for the current fiscal year; the Bin Ladin unit had spent 140 percent of its allocation.Tenet told us he met with Berger to discuss funding for coun- 73 terterrorism just two days after the principals’ meeting. While Clarke strongly favored giving the CIA more money for counter- terrorism, he differed sharply with the CIA’s managers about where it should come from.They insisted that the CIA had been shortchanged ever since the end of the Cold War. Their ability to perform any mission, counterterrorism included, they argued, depended on preserving what they had, restoring what they had lost since the beginning of the 1990s, and building from there—with across-the-board recruitment and training of new case officers, and the reopening of closed stations.To finance the counterterrorism effort,Tenet had gone to congressional leaders after the 1998 embassy bombings and persuaded them to give the CIA a special supplemental appropriation. Now, in the after- math of the millennium alert,Tenet wanted a boost in overall funds for the CIA 74 another supplemental appropriation specifically for counterterrorism. and To Clarke, this seemed evidence that the CIA’s leadership did not give suffi- cient priority to the battle against Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. He told us that James Pavitt, the head of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, “said if there’s going ...My to be money spent on going after Bin Ladin, it should be given to him. view was that he had had a lot of money to do it and a long time to do it, and I 75 The CIA had a very different didn’t want to put more good money after bad.” attitude: Pavitt told us that while the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit did “extraordinary and commendable work,” his chief of station in London “was just as much part of 76 the al Qaeda struggle as an officer sitting in [the Bin Ladin unit].” The dispute had large managerial implications, for Clarke had found allies in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).They had supplied him with the figures he used to argue that CIA spending on counterterrorism from its 77 baseline budget had shown almost no increase. Berger met twice with Tenet in April to try to resolve the dispute. The Deputies Committee met later in the month to review fiscal year 2000 and 2001 budget priorities and offsets for the CIA and other agencies. In the end,

202 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 185 185 FROM THREAT TO THREAT Tenet obtained a modest supplemental appropriation, which funded counter- terrorism without requiring much reprogramming of baseline funds. But the 78 CIA still believed that it remained underfunded for counterterrorism. Terrorist Financing The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. attention on al Qaeda’s The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency com- mittee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had des- ignated Bin Ladin and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.This gave the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Ladin or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC 79 had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Ladin. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and 80 After Octo- ve Bank of New York, were also frozen. held by the Federal Reser ber 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a “foreign terrorist organization,” it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transac- 81 Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much tions and seize its funds. additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries’ financial sys- 82 tems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than find- ing and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experi- ence in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intel- ligence.This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists’ plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA 83 placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. al Qaeda Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how raised money. It knew relatively early, for example, about the loose affiliation of financial institutions, businesses, and wealthy individuals who supported 84 Much of the early reporting on al Qaeda’s finan- extremist Islamic activities. cial situation and its structure came from Jamal Ahmed al Fadl, whom we have 85 After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. mentioned earlier in the report. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin’s finances. A U.S.

203 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 186 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 186 interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money else- where, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced 86 it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda’s somewhat more intelligence, financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international finan- 87 cial system.The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda’s money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelli- gence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Trea- 88 sury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations oper- ating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the infor- mation to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent 89 of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launder- ers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the 90 Before 9/11,Treasury did not Department of the Treasury and of Congress. consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strat- 91 egy for money laundering. Border Security The third point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need for attention to America’s porous borders and the weak enforcement of immi- gration laws. Drawing on ideas from government officials, Clarke’s working group developed a menu of proposals to bolster border security. Some 92 They included reworked or reiterated previous presidential directives. • creating an interagency center to target illegal entry and human traffickers;

204 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 187 187 FROM THREAT TO THREAT 93 • imposing tighter controls on student visas; • taking legal action to prevent terrorists from coming into the United States and to remove those already here, detaining them while await- 94 ing removal proceedings; • further increasing the number of immigration agents to FBI Joint Ter- rorism Task Forces to help investigate immigration charges against 95 individuals suspected of terrorism; • activating a special court to enable the use of classified evidence in 96 and immigration-related national security cases; • both implementing new security measures for U.S. passports and working with the United Nations and foreign governments to raise 97 global security standards for travel documents. Clarke’s working group compiled new proposals as well, such as • undertaking a Joint Perimeter Defense program with Canada to estab- lish cooperative intelligence and law enforcement programs, leading to joint operations based on shared visa and immigration data and joint border patrols; • staffing land border crossings 24/7 and equipping them with video cameras, physical barriers, and means to detect weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and • addressing the problem of migrants—possibly including terrorists— who destroy their travel documents so they cannot be returned to 98 their countries of origin. These proposals were praiseworthy in principle. In practice, however, they required action by weak, chronically underfunded executive agencies and pow- erful congressional committees, which were more responsive to well-organ- ized interest groups than to executive branch interagency committees. The changes sought by the principals in March 2000 were only beginning to occur before 9/11. “Afghan Eyes” In early March 2000, when President Clinton received an update on U.S. covert action efforts against Bin Ladin, he wrote in the memo’s margin that the United States could surely do better. Military officers in the Joint Staff told us that they shared this sense of frustration. Clarke used the President’s comment to push 99 the CSG to brainstorm new ideas, including aid to the Northern Alliance. Back in December 1999, Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud had offered to stage a rocket attack against Bin Ladin’s Derunta training com- plex. Officers at the CIA had worried that giving him a green light might cross the line into violation of the assassination ban. Hence, Massoud was told not

205 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 188 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 188 100 In the spring of to take any such action without explicit U.S. authorization. 2000, after the CIA had sent out officers to explore possible closer relation- ships with both the Uzbeks and the Northern Alliance, discussions took place 101 in Washington between U.S. officials and delegates sent by Massoud. The Americans agreed that Massoud should get some modest technical help so he could work on U.S. priorities—collecting intelligence on and possibly acting against al Qaeda. But Massoud wanted the United States both to become his ally in trying to overthrow the Taliban and to recognize that they were fight- ing common enemies. Clarke and Cofer Black, the head of the Counterter- rorist Center, wanted to take this next step. Proposals to help the Northern Alliance had been debated in the U.S. government since 1999 and, as we men- tioned in chapter 4, the U.S. government as a whole had been wary of endors- ing them, largely because of the Northern Alliance’s checkered history, its 102 limited base of popular support in Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s objections. CIA officials also began pressing proposals to use their ties with the Northern Alliance to get American agents on the ground in Afghanistan for an extended period, setting up their own base for covert intelligence col- lection and activity in the Panjshir Valley and lessening reliance on foreign 103 But proxies. “There’s no substitute for face-to-face,” one officer told us. the CIA’s institutional capacity for such direct action was weak, especially if it was not working jointly with the U.S. military. The idea was turned down 104 as too risky. In the meantime, the CIA continued to work with its tribal assets in south- ern Afghanistan. In early August, the tribals reported an attempt to ambush Bin Ladin’s convoy as he traveled on the road between Kabul and Kandahar city— their first such reported interdiction attempt in more than a year and a half. But it was not a success. According to the tribals’ own account, when they approached one of the vehicles, they quickly determined that women and chil- dren were inside and called off the ambush. Conveying this information to the NSC staff, the CIA noted that they had no independent corroboration for this incident, but that the tribals had acted within the terms of the CIA’s authori- 105 ties in Afghanistan. In 2000, plans continued to be developed for potential military operations in Afghanistan. Navy vessels that could launch missiles into Afghanistan were 106 In the summer, the military refined its still on call in the north Arabian Sea. list of strikes and Special Operations possibilities to a set of 13 options within 107 Yet planning efforts continued to be the Operation Infinite Resolve plan. limited by the same operational and policy concerns encountered in 1998 and 1999. Although the intelligence community sometimes knew where Bin Ladin was, it had been unable to provide intelligence considered sufficiently reliable to launch a strike. Above all, the United States did not have American eyes on the target. As one military officer put it, we had our hand on the door, but we 108 couldn’t open the door and walk in.

206 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 189 189 FROM THREAT TO THREAT At some point during this period, President Clinton expressed his frustra- tion with the lack of military options to take out Bin Ladin and the al Qaeda leadership, remarking to General Hugh Shelton,“You know, it would scare the shit out of al-Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of heli- 109 Although Shelton told the Commis- copters into the middle of their camp.” sion he did not remember the statement, President Clinton recalled this remark as “one of the many things I said.” The President added, however, that he real- ized nothing would be accomplished if he lashed out in anger. Secretary of Defense William Cohen thought that the President might have been making a hypothetical statement. Regardless, he said, the question remained how to get 110 As discussed in chap- the “ninjas” into and out of the theater of operations. ter 4, plans of this kind were never carried out before 9/11. In late 1999 or early 2000, the Joint Staff ’s director of operations,Vice Admi- ral Scott Fry, directed his chief information operations officer, Brigadier Gen- eral Scott Gration, to develop innovative ways to get better intelligence on Bin Ladin’s whereabouts. Gration and his team worked on a number of different ideas aimed at getting reliable American eyes on Bin Ladin in a way that would 111 reduce the lag time between sighting and striking. One option was to use a small, unmanned U.S. Air Force drone called the Predator, which could survey the territory below and send back video footage. Another option—eventually dismissed as impractical—was to place a power- ful long-range telescope on a mountain within range of one of Bin Ladin’s training camps. Both proposals were discussed with General Shelton, the chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then briefed to Clarke’s office at the White House as the CSG was searching for new ideas. In the spring of 2000, Clarke brought in the CIA’s assistant director for collection, Charles Allen, to work together with Fry on a joint CIA-Pentagon effort that Clarke dubbed “Afghan 112 After much argument between the CIA and the Defense Department Eyes.” about who should pay for the program, the White House eventually imposed a cost-sharing agreement.The CIA agreed to pay for Predator operations as a 113 60-day “proof of concept” trial run. The Small Group backed Afghan Eyes at the end of June 2000. By mid-July, testing was completed and the equipment was ready, but legal issues were still 114 By August 11, the principals had agreed to deploy the being ironed out. 115 The NSC staff considered how to use the information the drones Predator. would be relaying from Afghanistan. Clarke’s deputy, Roger Cressey, wrote to Berger that emergency CSG and Principals Committee meetings might be needed to act on video coming in from the Predator if it proved able to lock in Bin Ladin’s location. In the memo’s margin, Berger wrote that before con- than verified location: we will need, at least, e sidering action,“I will want mor n of movements to provide some assurance he will remain in data on patter 116 place.” President Clinton was kept up to date. On September 7, the Predator flew for the first time over Afghanistan.When

207 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 190 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 190 Clarke saw video taken during the trial flight, he described the imagery to Berger as “truly astonishing,” and he argued immediately for more flights seek- ing to find Bin Ladin and target him for cruise missile or air attack. Even if Bin Ladin were not found, Clarke said, Predator missions might identify additional worthwhile targets, such as other al Qaeda leaders or stocks of chemical or bio- 117 logical weapons. Clarke was not alone in his enthusiasm. He had backing from Cofer Black and Charles Allen at the CIA.Ten out of 15 trial missions of the Predator over Afghanistan were rated successful. On the first flight, a Predator saw a security detail around a tall man in a white robe at Bin Ladin’s Tarnak Farms compound outside Kandahar. After a second sighting of the “man in white” at the com- pound on September 28, intelligence community analysts determined that he 118 was probably Bin Ladin. During at least one trial mission, the Taliban spotted the Predator and scram- bled MiG fighters to try, without success, to intercept it. Berger worried that a Predator might be shot down, and warned Clarke that a shootdown would be a 119 “bonanza” for Bin Ladin and the Taliban. Still, Clarke was optimistic about Predator—as well as progress with dis- ruptions of al Qaeda cells elsewhere. Berger was more cautious, praising the NSC staff ’s performance but observing that this was no time for compla- cency. “Unfortunately,” he wrote, “the light at the end of the tunnel is 120 another tunnel.” COLE 6.3 THE ATTACK ON THE USS med, two Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Moham aeda: Khallad and other men who became operational coordinators for al Q Nashiri. As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in prepar- ing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Ladin urged them to look for a U.S. warship instead. In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. More than nine months later, on October 12, 2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy Cole , killing destroyer, the USS Cole .The blast ripped a hole in the side of the 121 17 members of the ship’s crew and wounding at least 40. The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Ladin. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken

208 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 191 191 FROM THREAT TO THREAT identity and freed with Bin Ladin’s help, as we also mentioned earlier. Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.The two suicide opera- tives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras. Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khal- 122 lad’s January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. In September 2000, Bin Ladin reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Ladin that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S. warship 123 that entered the port of Aden. While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS , made friendly Cole gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. Quso did not arrive at the 124 apartment in time to film the attack. Back in Afghanistan, Bin Ladin anticipated U.S. military retaliation. He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda’s Kandahar airport compound and fled— first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventu- ally back to Kandahar. In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al 125 Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. There was no American strike. In February 2001, a source reported that an individual whom he identified as the big instructor (probably a reference to Bin Ladin) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked. According to the source, Bin Ladin wanted the United States to attack, and if 126 it did not he would launch something bigger. Cole galvanized al Qaeda’s recruitment efforts. Fol- The attack on the USS lowing the attack, Bin Ladin instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kash- mir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. Al Qaeda’s image was very important to Bin Ladin, and the video was widely disseminated. Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. It was also disseminated among y extremists to Yemen, and caused man many young men in Saudi Arabia and travel to Afghanistan for training and jihad.Al Qaeda members considered the video an effective tool in their struggle for preeminence among other Islamist 127 and jihadist movements.

209 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 192 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 192 Investigating the Attack Teams from the FBI, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the CIA were immediately sent to Yemen to investigate the attack.With difficulty, Bar- bara Bodine, the U.S. ambassador to Yemen, tried to persuade the Yemeni gov- ernment to accept these visitors and allow them to carry arms, though the Yemenis balked at letting Americans openly carry long guns (rifles, shotguns, automatic weapons). Meanwhile, Bodine and the leader of the FBI team, John O’Neill, clashed repeatedly—to the point that after O’Neill had been rotated out of Yemen but wanted to return, Bodine refused the request. Despite the initial tension, the Yemeni and American investigations proceeded.Within a few 128 weeks, the outline of the story began to emerge. On the day of the attack, a list of suspects was assembled that included Cole al Qaeda’s affiliate Egyptian Islamic Jihad. U.S. counterterrorism officials told us they immediately assumed that al Qaeda was responsible. But as Deputy DCI John McLaughlin explained to us, it was not enough for the attack to smell, look, and taste like an al Qaeda operation.To make a case, the CIA needed not 129 just a guess but a link to someone known to be an al Qaeda operative. Within the first weeks after the attack, the Yemenis found and arrested both Badawi and Quso, but did not let the FBI team participate in the interroga- tions. The CIA described initial Yemeni support after the Cole as “slow and inadequate.” President Clinton, Secretary Albright, and DCI Tenet all inter- vened to help. Because the information was secondhand, the U.S. team could 130 not make its own assessment of its reliability. On November 11, the Yemenis provided the FBI with new information from the interrogations of Badawi and Quso, including descriptions of indi- viduals from whom the detainees had received operational direction. One of them was Khallad, who was described as having lost his leg. The detainees operation from Afghanistan or Pak- said that Khallad helped direct the Cole istan.The Yemenis (correctly) judged that the man described as Khallad was 131 Tawfiq bin Attash. An FBI special agent recognized the name Khallad and connected this news with information from an important al Qaeda source who had been meeting regularly with CIA and FBI officers.The source had called Khallad Bin Ladin’s “run boy,” and described him as having lost one leg in an explosives accident at a training camp a few years earlier. To confirm the identification, the FBI agent asked the Yemenis for their photo of Khallad.The Yemenis provided the photo on November 22, reaffirming their view that Khallad had been an inter- mediary between the plotters and Bin Ladin. (In a meeting with U.S. officials a few weeks later, on December 16, the source identified Khallad from the 132 Yemeni photograph.) U.S. intelligence agencies had already connected Khallad to al Qaeda terror- ist operations, including the 1998 embassy bombings. By this time the Yeme-

210 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 193 193 FROM THREAT TO THREAT nis also had identified Nashiri, whose links aeda and the 1998 embassy to al Q 133 bombings were even more well-known. Cole In other words, the Yemenis provided strong evidence connecting the identifying individ- attack to al Qaeda during the second half of November, ual operatives whom the United States knew were part of al Qaeda. During December the United States was able to corroborate this evidence. But the United States did not have evidence about Bin Ladin’s personal involvement in the attacks until Nashiri and Khallad were captured in 2002 and 2003. Considering a Response The Cole attack prompted renewed consideration of what could be done about al Qaeda. According to Clarke, Berger upbraided DCI Tenet so sharply after the Cole attack—repeatedly demanding to know why the United States had to put 134 up with such attacks—that Tenet walked out of a meeting of the principals. The CIA got some additional covert action authorities, adding several other individuals to the coverage of the July 1999 Memorandum of Notification that allowed the United States to develop capture operations against al Qaeda lead- ers in a variety of places and circumstances. Tenet developed additional options, such as strengthening relationships with the Northern Alliance and the 135 Uzbeks and slowing recent al Qaeda–related activities in Lebanon. On the diplomatic track, Berger agreed on October 30, 2000, to let the State Department make another approach to Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Jalil about expelling Bin Ladin. The national security advisor ordered that the U.S. message “be stern and foreboding.” This warning was similar to those issued in 1998 and 1999. Meanwhile, the administration was working with Russia on 136 new UN sanctions against Mullah Omar’s regime. President Clinton told us that before he could launch further attacks on al Qaeda in Afghanistan, or deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban threatening strikes if they did not immediately expel Bin Ladin, the CIA or the FBI had to be sure enough that they would “be willing to stand up in public and say, we believe that he [Bin Ladin] did this.” He said he was very frustrated that he could not 137 Sim- get a definitive enough answer to do something about the attack. Cole ilarly, Berger recalled that to go to war, a president needs to be able to say that his senior intelligence and law enforcement officers have concluded who is responsible. He recalled that the intelligence agencies had strong suspicions, but 138 had reached “no conclusion by the time we left office that it was al Qaeda.” Our only sources for what intelligence officials thought at the time are what they said in informal briefings. Soon after the Cole attack and for the remainder of the Clinton administration, analysts stopped distributing writ- ten reports about who was responsible.The topic was obviously sensitive, and both Ambassador Bodine in Yemen and CIA analysts in Washington presumed that the government did not want reports circulating around the agencies that

211 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 194 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 194 might become public, impeding law enforcement actions or backing the Pres- 139 ident into a corner. Instead the White House and other principals relied on informal updates as more evidence came in.Though Clarke worried that the CIA might be equiv- ocating in assigning responsibility to al Qaeda, he wrote Berger on November 7 that the analysts had described their case by saying that “it has web feet, flies, and quacks.” On November 10, CIA analysts briefed the Small Group of prin- cipals on their preliminary findings that the attack was carried out by a cell of Yemeni residents with some ties to the transnational mujahideen network. According to the briefing, these residents likely had some support from al Qaeda. But the information on outside sponsorship, support, and direction of the operation was inconclusive.The next day, Berger and Clarke told President Clinton that while the investigation was continuing, it was becoming increas- 140 ingly clear that al Qaeda had planned and directed the bombing. In mid-November, as the evidence of al Qaeda involvement mounted, Berger asked General Shelton to reevaluate military plans to act quickly against Bin Ladin. General Shelton tasked General Tommy Franks, the new com- mander of CENTCOM, to look again at the options. Shelton wanted to demonstrate that the military was imaginative and knowledgeable enough to move on an array of options, and to show the complexity of the operations. He briefed Berger on the “Infinite Resolve” strike options developed since 1998, which the Joint Staff and CENTCOM had refined during the summer into a list of 13 possibilities or combinations. CENTCOM added a new “phased campaign” concept for wider-ranging strikes, including attacks against the Taliban. For the first time, these strikes envisioned an air campaign against Afghanistan of indefinite duration. Military planners did not include contin- gency planning for an invasion of Afghanistan. The concept was briefed to Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick on December 20, and to 141 other officials. On November 25, Berger and Clarke wrote President Clinton that although the FBI and CIA investigations had not reached a formal conclu- sion, they believed the investigations would soon conclude that the attack had been carried out by a large cell whose senior members belonged to al Qaeda. Most of those involved had trained in Bin Ladin–operated camps in Afghanistan, Berger continued. So far, Bin Ladin had not been tied person- ally to the attack and nobody had heard him directly order it, but two intel- ligence reports suggested that he was involved. When discussing possible responses, though, Berger referred to the premise—al Qaeda responsibility— 142 as an “unproven assumption.” In the same November 25 memo, Berger informed President Clinton about a closely held idea: a last-chance ultimatum for the Taliban. Clarke was devel- oping the idea with specific demands: immediate extradition of Bin Ladin and his lieutenants to a legitimate government for trial, observable closure of all ter-

212 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 195 195 FROM THREAT TO THREAT rorist facilities in Afghanistan, and expulsion of all terrorists from Afghanistan within 90 days. Noncompliance would mean U.S. “force directed at the Tal- iban itself ” and U.S. efforts to ensure that the Taliban would never defeat the 143 Northern Alliance. No such ultimatum was issued. Nearly a month later, on December 21, the CIA made another presentation to the Small Group of principals on the investigative team’s findings.The CIA’s briefing slides said that their “preliminary judgment” was that Bin Ladin’s al , based on strong circumstan- Cole Qaeda group “supported the attack” on the tial evidence tying key perpetrators of the attack to al Qaeda.The CIA listed the key suspects, including Nashiri. In addition, the CIA detailed the timeline of the operation, from the mid-1999 preparations, to the failed attack on the The Sullivans USS on January 3, 2000, through a meeting held by the opera- 144 tives the day before the attack. The slides said that so far the CIA had “no definitive answer on [the] cru- cial question of outside direction of the attack—how and by whom.”The CIA noted that the Yemenis claimed that Khallad helped direct the operation from Afghanistan or Pakistan, possibly as Bin Ladin’s intermediary, but that it had not seen the Yemeni evidence. However, the CIA knew from both human sources and signals intelligence that Khallad was tied to al Qaeda.The prepared briefing concluded that while some reporting about al Qaeda’s role might have merit, those reports offered few specifics. Intelligence gave some ambiguous 145 indicators of al Qaeda direction of the attack. This, President Clinton and Berger told us, was not the conclusion they needed in order to go to war or deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban threaten- ing war.The election and change of power was not the issue, President Clin- ton added.There was enough time. If the agencies had given him a definitive answer, he said, he would have sought a UN Security Council ultimatum and given the Taliban one, two, or three days before taking further action against both al Qaeda and the Taliban. But he did not think it would be responsible for a president to launch an invasion of another country just based on a “pre- 146 liminary judgment.” Other advisers have echoed this concern. Some of Secretary Albright’s advisers warned her at the time to be sure the evidence conclusively linked Bin Ladin to the before considering any response, especially a military one, Cole because such action might inflame the Islamic world and increase support for the Taliban. Defense Secretary Cohen told us it would not have been prudent to risk killing civilians based only on an assumption that al Qaeda was respon- sible. General Shelton added that there was an outstanding question as to who 147 was responsible and what the targets were. Clarke recalled that while the Pentagon and the State Department had reser- vations about retaliation, the issue never came to a head because the FBI and the CIA never reached a firm conclusion. He thought they were “holding back.” He said he did not know why, but his impression was that Tenet and

213 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 196 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 196 Reno possibly thought the White House “didn’t really want to know,” since the principals’ discussions by November suggested that there was not much White House interest in conducting further military operations against Afghanistan in the administration’s last weeks. He thought that, instead, Presi- dent Clinton, Berger, and Secretary Albright were concentrating on a last- 148 minute push for a peace agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Some of Clarke’s fellow counterterrorism officials, such as the State Depart- ment’s Sheehan and the FBI’s Watson, shared his disappointment that no mil- itary response occurred at the time. Clarke recently recalled that an angry Sheehan asked rhetorically of Defense officials:“Does al Qaeda have to attack 149 the Pentagon to get their attention?” On the question of evidence,Tenet told us he was surprised to hear that the Cole White House was awaiting a conclusion from him on responsibility for the attack before taking action against al Qaeda. He did not recall Berger or anyone else telling him that they were waiting for the magic words from the CIA and the FBI. Nor did he remember having any discussions with Berger or the President about retaliation. Tenet told us he believed that it was up to him to present the case.Then it was up to the principals to decide if the case was good enough to justify using force. He believed he laid out what was knowable relatively early in 150 the investigation, and that this evidence never really changed until after 9/11. A CIA official told us that the CIA’s analysts chose the term “preliminary judgment” because of their notion of how an intelligence standard of proof differed from a legal standard. Because the attack was the subject of a crim- inal investigation, they told us, the term preliminary was used to avoid lock- ing the government in with statements that might later be obtained by defense lawyers in a future court case. At the time, Clarke was aware of the problem of distinguishing between an intelligence case and a law enforce- ment case. Asking U.S. law enforcement officials to concur with an intelligence-based case before their investigation had been concluded “could give rise to charges that the administration had acted before final culpability 151 had been determined.” There was no interagency consideration of just what military action might have looked like in practice—either the Pentagon’s new “phased campaign” concept or a prolonged air campaign in Afghanistan. Defense officials, such as Under Secretary Walter Slocombe and Vice Admiral Fry, told us the military response options were still limited. Bin Ladin continued to be elusive.They felt, udimen- just as they had for the past two years, that hitting inexpensive and r tary training camps with costly missiles would not do much good and might 152 even help al Qaeda if the strikes failed to kill Bin Ladin. In late 2000, the CIA and the NSC staff began thinking about the coun- terterrorism policy agenda they would present to the new administration.The Counterterrorist Center put down its best ideas for the future, assuming it was free of any prior policy or financial constraints.The paper was therefore infor-

214 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 197 197 FROM THREAT TO THREAT mally referred to as the “Blue Sky” memo; it was sent to Clarke on December 29.The memo proposed • A major effort to support the Northern Alliance through intelligence sharing and increased funding so that it could stave off the Taliban army and tie down al Qaeda fighters.This effort was not intended to remove the Taliban from power, a goal that was judged impractical and too expensive for the CIA alone to attain. • Increased support to the Uzbeks to strengthen their ability to fight terrorism and assist the United States in doing so. • Assistance to anti-Taliban groups and proxies who might be encour- aged to passively resist the Taliban. The CIA memo noted that there was “no single ‘silver bullet’ available to deal with the growing problems in Afghanistan.”A multifaceted strategy would 153 be needed to produce change. No action was taken on these ideas in the few remaining weeks of the Clin- ton administration. Berger did not recall seeing or being briefed on the Blue Sky memo. Nor was the memo discussed during the transition with incoming top Bush administration officials.Tenet and his deputy told us they pressed these 154 ideas as options after the new team took office. As the Clinton administration drew to a close, Clarke and his staff devel- oped a policy paper of their own, the first such comprehensive effort since the Delenda plan of 1998.The r esulting paper, entitled “Strategy for Eliminating of al the Threat from the Jihadist Networks Qida: Status and Prospects,” reviewed the threat and the record to date, incorporated the CIA’s new ideas from the Blue Sky memo, and posed several near-term policy options. Clarke and his staff proposed a goal to “roll back” al Qaeda over a period of three to five years. Over time, the policy should try to weaken and elimi- nate the network’s infrastructure in order to reduce it to a “rump group” like other formerly feared but now largely defunct terrorist organizations of the 1980s. “Continued anti-al Qida operations at the current level will prevent some attacks,” Clarke’s office wrote, “but will not seriously attrit their ability to plan and conduct attacks.” The paper backed covert aid to the Northern Alliance, covert aid to Uzbekistan, and renewed Predator flights in March 2001. A sentence called for military action to destroy al Qaeda command-and- Taliban military control targets and infrastructure and and command assets.The ves in the esence of al Qaeda operati paper also expressed concern about the pr 155 United States.

215 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 198 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 198 6.4 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY On November 7, 2000,American voters went to the polls in what turned out to be one of the closest presidential contests in U.S. history—an election cam- paign during which there was a notable absence of serious discussion of the al Qaeda threat or terrorism. Election night became a 36-day legal fight. Until the Supreme Court’s 5–4 ruling on December 12 and Vice President Al Gore’s concession, no one knew whether Gore or his Republican opponent, Texas Governor George W. Bush, would become president in 2001. The dispute over the election and the 36-day delay cut in half the normal transition period. Given that a presidential election in the United States brings wholesale change in personnel, this loss of time hampered the new adminis- tration in identifying, recruiting, clearing, and obtaining Senate confirmation of key appointees. From the Old to the New The principal figures on Bush’s White House staff would be National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who had been a member of the NSC staff in the administration of George H.W. Bush; Rice’s deputy, Stephen Hadley, who had been an assistant secretary of defense under the first Bush; and Chief of Staff Andrew Card, who had served that same administration as deputy chief of staff, then secretary of transportation. For secretary of state, Bush chose General Colin Powell, who had been national security advisor for President Ronald Reagan and then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For secretary of defense he selected Donald Rumsfeld, a former member of Congress, White House chief of staff, and, under President Gerald Ford, already once secretary of defense. Bush decided fairly soon to keep Tenet as Director of Central Intelli- gence. Louis Freeh, who had statutory ten-year tenure, would remain director of the FBI until his voluntary retirement in the summer of 2001. Bush and his principal advisers had all received briefings on terrorism, including Bin Ladin. In early September 2000, Acting Deputy Director of Cen- tral Intelligence John McLaughlin led a team to Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, and gave him a wide-ranging, four-hour review of sensitive informa- tion. Ben Bonk, deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, used one of the four hours to deal with terrorism.To highlight the danger of terrorists obtaining chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, Bonk brought along a mock-up suitcase to evoke the way the Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult had spread deadly sarin nerve agent on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Bonk told Bush that Americans would die from terrorism during the next four 156 During the long contest after election day, the CIA set up an office in years. 157 Tenet, Crawford to pass intelligence to Bush and some of his key advisers. accompanied by his deputy director for operations, James Pavitt, briefed President-elect Bush at Blair House during the transition. President Bush told

216 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 199 199 FROM THREAT TO THREAT us he asked Tenet whether the CIA could kill Bin Ladin, and Tenet replied that killing Bin Ladin would have an effect but would not end the threat. President 158 Bush told us Tenet said to him that the CIA had all the authority it needed. In December, Bush met with Clinton for a two-hour, one-on-one discus- sion of national security and foreign policy challenges. Clinton recalled saying to Bush,“I think you will find that by far your biggest threat is Bin Ladin and the al Qaeda.” Clinton told us that he also said,“One of the great regrets of my 159 presidency is that I didn’t get him [Bin Ladin] for you, because I tried to.” Bush told the Commission that he felt sure President Clinton had mentioned terrorism, but did not remember much being said about al Qaeda. Bush recalled that Clinton had emphasized other issues such as North Korea and the Israeli- 160 Palestinian peace process. In early January, Clarke briefed Rice on terrorism. He gave similar presen- tations—describing al Qaeda as both an adaptable global network of jihadist organizations and a lethal core terrorist organization—to Vice President–elect Cheney, Hadley, and Secretary of State–designate Powell. One line in the brief- ing slides said that al Qaeda had sleeper cells in more than 40 countries, includ- 161 Berger told us that he made a point of dropping in ing the United States. on Clarke’s briefing of Rice to emphasize the importance of the issue. Later the same day, Berger met with Rice. He says that he told her the Bush admin- istration would spend more time on terrorism in general and al Qaeda in par- ticular than on anything else. Rice’s recollection was that Berger told her she would be surprised at how much more time she was going to spend on ter- rorism than she expected, but that the bulk of their conversation dealt with the faltering Middle East peace process and North Korea. Clarke said that the new team, having been out of government for eight years, had a steep learning curve 162 to understand al Qaeda and the new transnational terrorist threat. Organizing a New Administration During the short transition, Rice and Hadley concentrated on staffing and 163 Their policy priorities differed from those of the Clin- organizing the NSC. ton administration. Those priorities included China, missile defense, the col- 164 Generally aware lapse of the Middle East peace process, and the Persian Gulf. that terrorism had changed since the first Bush administration, they paid par- ticular attention to the question of how counterterrorism policy should be coordinated. Rice had asked University of Virginia history professor Philip 165 Hadley and Zelikow asked Clarke Zelikow to advise her on the transition. and his deputy, Roger Cressey, for a special briefing on the terrorist threat and how Clarke’s Transnational Threats Directorate and Counterterrorism Security 166 Group functioned. In the NSC during the first Bush administration, many tough issues were addressed at the level of the Deputies Committee. Issues did not go to the prin- cipals unless the deputies had been unable to resolve them. Presidential Deci-

217 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 200 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 200 sion Directive 62 of the tion had said specifically that Clinton administra Group should report through the Deputies Clarke’s Counterterrorism Security Committee or, at Berger’s discretion, directly to the principals. Berger had in practice allowed Clarke’s group to function as a parallel deputies committee, reporting directly to those members of the Principals Committee who sat on the special Small Group.There, Clarke himself sat as a de facto principal. Rice decided to change the special structure that had been built to coordi- nate counterterrorism policy. It was important to sound policymaking, she felt, that Clarke’s interagency committee—like all others—report to the principals 167 through the deputies. Rice made an initial decision to hold over both Clarke and his entire coun- terterrorism staff, a decision that she called rare for a new administration. She decided also that Clarke should retain the title of national counterterrorism coordinator, although he would no longer be a de facto member of the Prin- cipals Committee on his issues.The decision to keep Clarke, Rice said, was “not uncontroversial,” since he was known as someone who “broke china,” but she and Hadley wanted an experienced crisis manager. No one else from Berger’s 168 staff had Clarke’s detailed knowledge of the levers of government. Clarke was disappointed at what he perceived as a demotion. He also wor- ried that reporting through the Deputies Committee would slow decisionmak- 169 ing on counterterrorism. The result, amid all the changes accompanying the transition, was signifi- cant continuity in counterterrorism policy. Clarke and his Counterterrorism Security Group would continue to manage coordination. Tenet remained Director of Central Intelligence and kept the same chief subordinates, includ- ing Black and his staff at the Counterterrorist Center. Shelton remained chair- man of the Joint Chiefs, with the Joint Staff largely the same. At the FBI, Director Freeh and Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Dale Watson remained.Working-level counterterrorism officials at the State Department and the Pentagon stayed on, as is typically the case.The changes were at the cabi- net and subcabinet level and in the CSG’s reporting arrangements.At the sub- cabinet level, there were significant delays in the confirmation of key officials, particularly at the Defense Department. The procedures of the Bush administration were to be at once more formal and less formal than its predecessor’s. President Clinton, a voracious reader, received his daily intelligence briefings in writing. He often scrawled questions and comments in the margins, eliciting written responses.The new president, by contrast, reinstated the practice of face-to-face briefings from the DCI. Pres- A ., with Vice President . M ident Bush and Tenet met in the Oval Office at 8:00 Cheney, Rice, and Card usually also present.The President and the DCI both told us that these daily sessions provided a useful opportunity for exchanges on 170 intelligence issues. The President talked with Rice every day, and she in turn talked by phone at least daily with Powell and Rumsfeld.As a result, the President often felt less

218 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 201 201 FROM THREAT TO THREAT need for formal meetings. If, however, he decided that an event or an issue called for action, Rice would typically call on Hadley to have the Deputies Commit- tee develop and review options.The President said that this process often tried 171 his patience but that he understood the necessity for coordination. Early Decisions Within the first few days after Bush’s inauguration, Clarke approached Rice in an effort to get her—and the new President—to give terrorism very high pri- ority and to act on the agenda that he had pushed during the last few months of the previous administration. After Rice requested that all senior staff iden- tify desirable major policy reviews or initiatives, Clarke submitted an elaborate memorandum on January 25, 2001. He attached to it his 1998 Delenda Plan need . . . a Principals level y urgentl and the December 2000 strategy paper.“We 172 review on the network,” Clarke wrote. al Qida He wanted the Principals Committee to decide whether al Qaeda was “a first order threat” or a more modest worry being overblown by “chicken lit- tle” alarmists. Alluding to the transition briefing that he had prepared for Rice, Clarke wrote that al Qaeda “is not some narrow, little terrorist issue that needs to be included in broader regional policy.” Two key decisions that had been deferred, he noted, concerned covert aid to keep the Northern Alliance alive when fighting began again in Afghanistan in the spring, and covert aid to the Uzbeks. Clarke also suggested that decisions should be made soon on messages to the Taliban and Pakistan over the al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan, on pos- sible new money for CIA operations, and on “when and how . . . to respond 173 to the attack on the USS Cole.” The national security advisor did not respond directly to Clarke’s memo- randum. No Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda was held until Sep- tember 4, 2001 (although the Principals Committee met frequently on other subjects, such as the Middle East peace process, Russia, and the Persian 174 But Rice and Hadley began to address the issues Clarke had listed. Gulf ). had been an obvious question since inaugu- What to do or say about the Cole ration day. When the attack occurred, 25 days before the election, candidate Bush had said to CNN,“I hope that we can gather enough intelligence to fig- ure out who did the act and take the necessary action.There must be a conse- 175 Since the Clinton administration had not responded militarily, quence.” what was the Bush administration to do? On January 25,Tenet briefed the President on the Cole investigation.The writ- ten briefing repeated for top officials of the new administration what the CIA had told the Clinton White House in November.This included the “preliminary judgment” that al Qaeda was responsible, with the caveat that no evidence had yet been found that Bin Ladin himself ordered the attack.Tenet told us he had 176 no recollection of a conversation with the President about this briefing. In his January 25 memo, Clarke had advised Rice that the government should respond to the Cole attack, but “should take advantage of the policy that

219 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 202 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 202 ‘we will respond at a time, place and manner of our own choosing’ and not be 177 Before Vice President Cheney visited the forced into knee-jerk responses.” CIA in mid-February, Clarke sent him a memo—outside the usual White House document-management system—suggesting that he ask CIA officials “what additional information is needed before CIA can definitively conclude 178 In March 2001, the CIA’s brief- . Cole that al-Qida was responsible” for the ing slides for Rice were still describing the CIA’s “preliminary judgment” that a “strong circumstantial case” could be made against al Qaeda but noting that the CIA continued to lack “conclusive information on external command and 179 Clarke and his aides continued to provide Rice and control” of the attack. 180 Hadley with evidence reinforcing the case against al Qaeda and urging action. The President explained to us that he had been concerned lest an ineffec- tual air strike just serve to give Bin Ladin a propaganda advantage. He said he had not been told about Clinton administration warnings to the Taliban.The President told us that he had concluded that the United States must use ground 181 forces for a job like this. Rice told us that there was never a formal, recorded decision not to retali- attack. Exchanges with the President, between the ate specifically for the Cole President and Tenet, and between herself and Powell and Rumsfeld had pro- duced a consensus that “tit-for-tat” responses were likely to be counterproduc- tive. This had been the case, she thought, with the cruise missile strikes of August 1998.The new team at the Pentagon did not push for action. On the contrary, Rumsfeld thought that too much time had passed and his deputy, Paul Cole Wolfowitz, thought that the attack was “stale.” Hadley said that in the end, would be a new, more aggressive the administration’s real response to the Cole 182 strategy against al Qaeda. The administration decided to propose to Congress a substantial increase in counterterrorism funding for national security agencies, including the CIA and the FBI.This included a 27 percent increase in counterterrorism funding for 183 the CIA. Starting a Review In early March, the administration postponed action on proposals for increas- ing aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice noted at the time that a more wide-ranging examination of policy toward Afghanistan was needed 184 first. She wanted the review very soon. Rice and others recalled the President saying, “I’m tired of swatting at 185 The President reportedly also said,“I’m tired of playing defense. I want flies.” 186 President Bush to play offense. I want to take the fight to the terrorists.” explained to us that he had become impatient. He apparently had heard propos- als for rolling back al Qaeda but felt that catching terrorists one by one or even cell by cell was not an approach likely to succeed in the long run. At the same time, he said, he understood that policy had to be developed slowly so that diplo- 187 macy and financial and military measures could mesh with one another.

220 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 203 203 FROM THREAT TO THREAT Hadley convened an informal Deputies Committee meeting on March 7, when some of the deputies had not yet been confirmed. For the first time, Clarke’s various proposals—for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks and for Predator missions—went before the group that, in the Bush NSC, would do most of the policy work.Though they made no decisions on these specific proposals, Hadley apparently concluded that there should be a presi- 188 dential national security policy directive (NSPD) on terrorism. Clarke would later express irritation about the deputies’ insistence that a strategy for coping with al Qaeda be framed within the context of a regional policy. He doubted that the benefits would compensate for the time lost.The administration had in fact proceeded with Principals Committee meetings on topics including Iraq and Sudan without prior contextual review, and Clarke 189 But favored moving ahead similarly with a narrow counterterrorism agenda. the President’s senior advisers saw the al Qaeda problem as part of a puzzle that could not be assembled without filling in the pieces for Afghanistan and Pak- istan. Rice deferred a Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda until the deputies had developed a new policy for their consideration. The full Deputies Committee discussed al Qaeda on April 30. CIA brief- ing slides described al Qaeda as the “most dangerous group we face,” citing its “leadership, experience, resources, safe haven in Afghanistan, [and] focus on 190 attacking U.S.”The slides warned,“There will be more attacks.” At the meeting, the deputies endorsed covert aid to Uzbekistan. Regard- ing the Northern Alliance, they “agreed to make no major commitment at this time.” Washington would first consider options for aiding other anti- 191 Meanwhile, the administration would “initiate a compre- Taliban groups. hensive review of U.S. policy on Pakistan” and explore policy options on 192 Afghanistan, “including the option of supporting regime change.” Working-level officials were also to consider new steps on terrorist financing and America’s perennially troubled public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world, where NSC staff warned that “we have by and large ceded the court of public opinion” to al Qaeda. While Clarke remained concerned about the pace of the policy review, he now saw a greater possibility of persuading the deputies to recognize the 193 The process of fleshing out that strategy was changed nature of terrorism. under way. 6.5 THE NEW ADMINISTRATION’S APPROACH The Bush administration in its first months faced many problems other than terrorism.They included the collapse of the Middle East peace process and, in April, a crisis over a U.S. “spy plane” brought down in Chinese territory. The new administration also focused heavily on Russia, a new nuclear strategy that allowed missile defenses, Europe, Mexico, and the Persian Gulf.

221 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 204 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 204 In the spring, reporting on terrorism surged dramatically. In chapter 8, we will explore this reporting and the ways agencies responded.These increasingly alarming reports, briefed to the President and top officials, became part of the context in which the new administration weighed its options for policy on al Qaeda. Except for a few reports that the CSG considered and apparently judged to be unreliable, none of these pointed specifically to possible al Qaeda action inside the United States—although the CSG continued to be con- cerned about the domestic threat. The mosaic of threat intelligence came from the Counterterrorist Center, which collected only abroad. Its reports were not supplemented by reports from the FBI. Clarke had expressed con- cern about an al Qaeda presence in the United States, and he worried about an attack on the White House by “Hizbollah, Hamas, al Qida and other ter- 194 rorist organizations.” In May, President Bush announced that Vice President Cheney would him- self lead an effort looking at preparations for managing a possible attack by weapons of mass destruction and at more general problems of national pre- paredness.The next few months were mainly spent organizing the effort and bringing an admiral from the Sixth Fleet back to Washington to manage it. The Vice President’s task force was just getting under way when the 9/11 attack 195 occurred. On May 29, at Tenet’s request, Rice and Tenet converted their usual weekly meeting into a broader discussion on al Qaeda; participants included Clarke, CTC chief Cofer Black, and “Richard,” a group chief with authority over the Bin Ladin unit. Rice asked about “taking the offensive” and whether any approach could be made to influence Bin Ladin or the Taliban. Clarke and Black replied that the CIA’s ongoing disruption activities were “taking the offensive” and that Bin Ladin could not be deterred. A wide-ranging discus- 196 sion then ensued about “breaking the back” of Bin Ladin’s organization. Tenet emphasized the ambitious plans for covert action that the CIA had developed in December 2000. In discussing the draft authorities for this pro- gram in March, CIA officials had pointed out that the spending level envisioned for these plans was larger than the CIA’s entire current budget for counterter- rorism covert action. It would be a multiyear program, requiring such levels of 197 spending for about five years. The CIA official, “Richard,” told us that Rice “got it.” He said she agreed with his conclusions about what needed to be done, although he complained 198 Clarke to us that the policy process did not follow through quickly enough. options for attacking Bin Ladin’s and Black were asked to develop a range of 199 organization, from the least to most ambitious. Rice and Hadley asked Clarke and his staff to draw up the new presiden- tial directive. On June 7, Hadley describing it as “an circulated the first draft, 200 The draft Qaeda. confronting al admittedly ambitious” program for NSPD’s goal was to “eliminate the al Qida network of terrorist groups as a

222 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 205 205 FROM THREAT TO THREAT threat to the United States and to friendly governments.” It called for a multi- year effort involving diplomacy, covert action, economic measures, law enforcement, public diplomacy, and if necessary military efforts. The State Department was to work with other governments to end all al Qaeda sanctu- aries, and also to work with the Treasury Department to disrupt terrorist financing.The CIA was to develop an expanded covert action program includ- ing significant additional funding and aid to anti-Taliban groups.The draft also tasked OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds to support this program were 201 found in U.S. budgets from fiscal years 2002 to 2006. Rice viewed this draft directive as the embodiment of a comprehensive new strategy employing all instruments of national power to eliminate the al Qaeda threat. Clarke, however, regarded the new draft as essentially similar to the pro- posal he had developed in December 2000 and put forward to the new admin- 202 In May or June, Clarke asked to be moved from istration in January 2001. his counterterrorism portfolio to a new set of responsibilities for cybersecu- rity. He told us that he was frustrated with his role and with an administration 203 If Clarke was frustrated, he that he considered not “serious about al Qaeda.” 204 never expressed it to her, Rice told us. Diplomacy in Blind Alleys Afghanistan. The new administration had already begun exploring possible diplomatic options, retracing many of the paths traveled by its predecessors. U.S. envoys again pressed the Taliban to turn Bin Ladin “over to a country where he could face justice” and repeated, yet again, the warning that the Taliban 205 The would be held responsible for any al Qaeda attacks on U.S. interests. Taliban’s representatives repeated their old arguments. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told us that while U.S. diplomats were becoming more active on Afghanistan through the spring and summer of 2001, “it would be wrong for anyone to characterize this as a dramatic shift from the previous 206 administration.” enet was tasked In deputies meetings at the end of June,T the prospects to assess for Taliban cooperation with the United States on al Qaeda.The NSC staff was tasked to flesh out options for dealing with the Taliban. Revisiting these issues tried the patience of some of the officials who felt they had already been down these roads and who found the NSC’s procedures slow.“We weren’t going fast enough,” Armitage told us. Clarke kept arguing that moves against the Taliban and al Qaeda should not have to wait months for a larger review of U.S. pol- icy in South Asia.“For the government,” Hadley said to us,“we moved it along 207 as fast as we could move it along.” As all hope in moving the Taliban faded, debate revived about giving covert assistance to the regime’s opponents. Clarke and the CIA’s Cofer Black renewed the push to aid the Northern Alliance. Clarke suggested starting with modest aid, just enough to keep the Northern Alliance in the fight and tie 208 down al Qaeda terrorists, without aiming to overthrow the Taliban.

223 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 206 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 206 Rice, Hadley, and the NSC staff member for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, told us they opposed giving aid to the Northern Alliance alone.They argued that the program needed to have a big part for Pashtun opponents of the Taliban.They also thought the program should be conducted on a larger scale than had been suggested. Clarke concurred with the idea of a larger program, but he warned that 209 delay risked the Northern Alliance’s final defeat at the hands of the Taliban. During the spring, the CIA, at the NSC’s request, had developed draft legal authorities—a presidential finding—to undertake a large-scale program of covert assistance to the Taliban’s foes.The draft authorities expressly stated that not the goal of the assistance was to overthrow the Taliban. But even this pro- gram would be very costly. This was the context for earlier conversations, when in March Tenet stressed the need to consider the impact of such a large pro- gram on the political situation in the region and in May Tenet talked to Rice 210 about the need for a multiyear financial commitment. By July, the deputies were moving toward agreement that some last effort should be made to convince the Taliban to shift position and then, if that failed, the administration would move on the significantly enlarged covert action pro- gram.As the draft presidential directive was circulated in July, the State Depart- ment sent the deputies a lengthy historical review of U.S. efforts to engage the Taliban about Bin Ladin from 1996 on. “These talks have been fruitless,” the 211 State Department concluded. Arguments in the summer brought to the surface the more fundamental issue of whether the U.S. covert action program should seek to overthrow the regime, intervening decisively in the civil war in or der to change Afghanistan’s government. By the end of a deputies meeting on September 10, officials for- ould give the Taliban a mally agreed on a three-phase strategy. First an envoy w last chance. If this failed, continuing diplomatic pressure would be combined with the planned covert action program encouraging anti-Taliban Afghans of all major ethnic groups to stalemate the Taliban in the civil war and attack al Qaeda bases, while the United States developed an international coalition to undermine the regime. In phase three, if the Taliban’s policy still did not change, the deputies agreed that the United States would try covert action to topple 212 the Taliban’s leadership from within. The deputies agreed to revise the al Qaeda presidential directive, then being finalized for presidential approval, in order to add this strategy to it. Armitage explained to us that after months of continuing the previous administration’s policy, he and Powell were bringing the State Department to a policy of over- throwing the Taliban. From his point of view, once the United States made the commitment to arm the Northern Alliance, even covertly, it was taking action to initiate regime change, and it should give those opponents the strength to 213 achieve complete victory. Pakistan. The Bush administration immediately encountered the dilemmas that arose from the varied objectives the United States was trying to accom-

224 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 207 207 FROM THREAT TO THREAT plish in its relationship with Pakistan. In February 2001, President Bush wrote General Musharraf on a number of matters. He emphasized that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda were “a direct threat to the United States and its interests that must Musharraf to use his influence with the Taliban on be addressed.” He urged 214 Powell and Armitage reviewed the possibility of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. acquiring more carrots to dangle in front of Pakistan. Given the generally neg- ative view of Pakistan on Capitol Hill, the idea of lifting sanctions may have seemed far-fetched, but perhaps no more so than the idea of persuading 215 Musharraf to antagonize the Islamists in his own government and nation. On June 18, Rice met with the visiting Pakistani foreign minister, Abdul 216 Other evi- Sattar. She “really let him have it” about al Qaeda, she told us. dence corroborates her account. But, as she was upbraiding Sattar, Rice recalled thinking that the Pakistani diplomat seemed to have heard it all before. Sattar urged senior U.S. policymakers to engage the Taliban, arguing that such a course would take time but would produce results. In late June, the deputies agreed to review U.S. objectives. Clarke urged Hadley to split off all other issues in U.S.-Pakistani relations and just focus on demanding that Pakistan move vig- orously against terrorism—to push the Pakistanis to do before an al Qaeda attack what Washington would demand that they do after. He had made similar requests in the Clinton administration; he had no more success with Rice than 217 he had with Berger. On August 4, President Bush wrote President Musharraf to request his sup- port in dealing with terrorism and to urge Pakistan to engage actively against al Qaeda.The new administration was again registering its concerns, just as its predecessor had, but it was still searching for new incentives to open up diplo- matic possibilities. For its part, Pakistan had done little. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca described the administration’s plan to break this logjam as a move from “half engagement” to “enhanced engagement.” The adminis- tration was not ready to confront Islamabad and threaten to rupture relations. Deputy Secretary Armitage told us that before 9/11, the envisioned new 218 approach to Pakistan had not yet been attempted. Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration did not develop new diplomatic ini- tiatives on al Qaeda with the Saudi government before 9/11.Vice President Cheney called Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5, 2001, to seek Saudi help in preventing threatened attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom. Secre- tary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11.They dis- al Qaeda. U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001 cussed topics like Iraq, not were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli- 219 Palestinian violence, not about Bin Ladin. Military Plans The confirmation of the Pentagon’s new leadership was a lengthy process. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was confirmed in March 2001 and Under Secre-

225 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 208 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 208 tary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in July. Though the new officials were briefed about terrorism and some of the earlier planning, including that for Operation Infinite Resolve, they were focused, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us, 220 on creating a twenty-first-century military. At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton did not recall much interest by the new administration in military options against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary. Brian Sheridan—the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in the Pentagon—never briefed Rumsfeld. He departed on January 20; he had not 221 been replaced by 9/11. Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism, which came up often in his regular meetings with Tenet. He thought that the Defense Department, before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats like terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place and working on the foundation documents of a new defense policy, the quad- rennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and the existing contin- gency plans. He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Preda- 222 tor unmanned aircraft system. The commander of Central Command, General Franks, told us that he did not regard the existing plans as serious.To him a real military plan to address al Qaeda would need to go all the way, following through the details of a full campaign (including the political-military issues of where operations would be 223 based) and securing the rights to fly over neighboring countries. The draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 began its discussion of the military by reiterating the Defense Department’s lead role in protecting its forces abroad.The draft included a section directing Secretary Rumsfeld to “develop contingency plans” to attack both al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan.The new section did not specifically order planning for the use of ground troops, or clarify how this guidance differed from the existing Infinite 224 Resolve plans. Hadley told us that by circulating this section, a draft Annex B to the direc- tive, the White House was putting the Pentagon on notice that it would need 225 “The military to produce new military plans to address this problem. 226 didn’t particularly want this mission,” Rice told us. With this directive still awaiting President Bush’s signature, Secretary Rumsfeld did not order his subordinates to begin preparing any new military plans against either al Qaeda or the Taliban before 9/11. 9/11, he had not President Bush told us that before seen good options for itable bases in neighboring special military operations against Bin Ladin. Su countries were not available and, even if the U.S. for ces were sent in, it was 227 not clear where they would go to find Bin Ladin.

226 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 209 209 FROM THREAT TO THREAT President Bush told us that before 9/11 there was an appetite in the gov- ernment for killing Bin Ladin, not for war. Looking back in 2004, he equated the presidential directive with a readiness to invade Afghanistan.The problem, he said, would have been how to do that if there had not been another attack on America. To many people, he said, it would have seemed like an ultimate 228 act of unilateralism. But he said that he was prepared to take that on. Domestic Change and Continuity During the transition, Bush had chosen John Ashcroft, a former senator from Missouri, as his attorney general. On his arrival at the Justice Department, Ashcroft told us, he faced a number of problems spotlighting the need for 229 reform at the FBI. In February, Clarke briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on his directorate’s issues. He reported that at the time, the attorney general acknowledged a Cole investiga- “steep learning curve,” and asked about the progress of the 230 Neither Ashcroft nor his predecessors received the President’s Daily tion. Brief. His office did receive the daily intelligence report for senior officials that, during the spring and summer of 2001, was carrying much of the same threat information. The FBI was struggling to build up its institutional capabilities to do more against terrorism, relying on a strategy called MAXCAP 05 that had been unveiled in the summer of 2000.The FBI’s assistant director for counterterror- ism, Dale Watson, told us that he felt the new Justice Department leadership was not supportive of the strategy.Watson had the sense that the Justice Depart- ment wanted the FBI to get back to the investigative basics: guns, drugs, and civil rights. The new administration did seek an 8 percent increase in overall FBI funding in its initial budget proposal for fiscal year 2002, including the largest proposed percentage increase in the FBI’s counterterrorism program since fiscal year 1997. The additional funds included the FBI’s support of the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah (a onetime increase), enhanced security at FBI facilities, and improvements to the FBI’s WMD incident 231 response capability. In May, the Justice Department began shaping plans for building a budget for fiscal year 2003, the process that would usually culminate in an administra- tion proposal at the beginning of 2002. On May 9, the attorney general testi- fied at a congressional hearing concerning federal efforts to combat terrorism. He said that “one of the nation’s most fundamental responsibilities is to pro- tect its citizens . . . from terrorist attacks.” The budget guidance issued the next day, however, highlighted gun crimes, narcotics trafficking, and civil rights as priorities.Watson told us that he almost fell out of his chair when he saw this memo, because it did not mention counterterrorism. Longtime FBI Director Louis Freeh left in June 2001, after announcing the indictment in the Khobar Towers case that he had worked so long to obtain.Thomas Pickard was the act-

227 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 210 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 210 ing director during the summer. Freeh’s successor, Robert Mueller, took office 232 just before 9/11. The Justice Department prepared a draft fiscal year 2003 budget that main- tained but did not increase the funding level for counterterrorism in its pend- ing fiscal year 2002 proposal. Pickard appealed for more counterterrorism 233 enhancements, an appeal the attorney general denied on September 10. Ashcroft had also inherited an ongoing debate on whether and how to modify the 1995 procedures governing intelligence sharing between the FBI and the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. But in August 2001,Ashcroft’s deputy, Larry Thompson, issued a memorandum reaffirming the 1995 proce- dures with the clarification that evidence of “any federal felony” was to be immediately reported by the FBI to the Criminal Division.The 1995 proce- 234 dures remained in effect until after 9/11. Covert Action and the Predator In March 2001, Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan. Rice’s recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice described the draft document as providing for “consolidation plus,” superseding the various Clinton administration documents. In fact, the CIA drafted two documents. One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime; the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification, which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations. Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28. The CIA’s notes for Tenet advised him that “in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options, each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law.” At the meeting,Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it. Hadley accepted this argument, and the 235 draft MON was put on hold. As the policy review moved forward, the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive, as part of an 236 “Annex A” on intelligence activities to “eliminate the al Qaeda threat.” The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on Bin Ladin—an armed version of the Preda- tor drone. In the first months of the new administration, questions concerning the Predator became more and more a central focus of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hop- ing that they still might provide the elusive “actionable intelligence” to target Bin Ladin with cruise missiles. Learning that the Air Force was thinking of

228 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 211 211 FROM THREAT TO THREAT equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic 237 about redeployment. The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes. He recalled that the Taliban had spotted a Predator in the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters. Black wanted to wait until the armed version was ready. “I do not believe the possible recon value out- weighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN,” he wrote. Military 238 There is some dispute as to officers in the Joint Staff shared this concern. whether or not the Deputies Committee endorsed resuming reconnaissance flights at its April 30, 2001, meeting. In any event, Rice and Hadley ultimately went along with the CIA and the Pentagon, holding off on reconnaissance 239 flights until the armed Predator was ready. The CIA’s senior management saw problems with the armed Predator as well, problems that Clarke and even Black and Allen were inclined to mini- mize. One (which also applied to reconnaissance flights) was money. A Preda- tor cost about $3 million. If the CIA flew Predators for its own reconnaissance or covert action purposes, it might be able to borrow them from the Air Force, but it was not clear that the Air Force would bear the cost if a vehicle went down. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz took the position that the CIA 240 should have to pay for it; the CIA disagreed. Second, Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator.“This was new ground,” he told us.Tenet ticked off key questions:What is the chain of command? Who takes the shot? Are America’s leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control? Charlie Allen told us that when these questions were discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency’s execu- tive director, A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, had said that either one of them would be happy to pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had 241 no authority to do it, nor did he. Third, the Hellfire warhead carried by the Predator needed work. It had been built to hit tanks, not people. It needed to be designed to explode in a different way, and even then had to be targeted with extreme precision. In the configuration planned by the Air Force through mid-2001, the Predator’s mis- 242 sile would not be able to hit a moving vehicle. White House officials had seen the Predator video of the “man in white.” On July 11, Hadley tried to hurry along preparation of the armed system. He directed McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Richard Myers to deploy Predators capable of being armed no later than September 1. He also directed that they have cost-sharing arrangements in place by August 1. Rice told us that this attempt by Hadley to dictate a solution had failed and 243 that she eventually had to intervene herself. On August 1, the Deputies Committee met again to discuss the armed

229 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 212 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 212 Predator.They concluded that it was legal for the CIA to kill Bin Ladin or one of his deputies with the Predator. Such strikes would be acts of self-defense that would not violate the ban on assassinations in Executive Order 12333.The big issues—who would pay for what, who would authorize strikes, and who would pull the trigger—were left for the principals to settle.The Defense Department 244 representatives did not take positions on these issues. The CIA’s McLaughlin had also been reticent. When Hadley circulated a memorandum attempting to prod the deputies to reach agreement, McLaugh- lin sent it back with a handwritten comment on the cost-sharing: “we ques- e the decision is tion whether it is advisable to make such an investment befor taken on flying an armed Predator.” For Clarke, this came close to being a final straw. He angrily asked Rice to call Tenet.“Either al Qida is a threat worth act- ing against or it is not,” Clarke wrote. “CIA leadership has to decide which it 245 is and cease these bi-polar mood swings.” These debates, though, had little impact in advancing or delaying efforts to make the Predator ready for combat.Those were in the hands of military offi- cers and engineers. General John Jumper had commanded U.S. air forces in Europe and seen Predators used for reconnaissance in the Balkans. He started the program to develop an armed version and, after returning in 2000 to head the Air Combat Command, took direct charge of it. There were numerous technical problems, especially with the Hellfire mis- siles. The Air Force tests conducted during the spring were inadequate, so missile testing needed to continue and modifications needed to be made during the summer. Even then, Jumper told us, problems with the equipment persisted. Nevertheless, the Air Force was moving at an extraordinary pace.“In the modern era, since the 1980s,” Jumper said to us,“I would be shocked if you 246 found anything that went faster than this.” September 2001 The Principals Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4. On the day of the meeting, Clarke sent Rice an impassioned personal note. He criticized U.S. counterterrorism efforts past and present. The “real question” before the principals, he wrote, was “are we serious about dealing with the Decision makers should imagine them- al Qida threat? . . . Is al Qida a big deal? . . . selves on a future day when the CSG has not succeeded in stopping al Qida attacks and Clarke wrote. hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the US,” “What would those decision makers wish that they had done earlier? That 247 future day could happen at any time.” Clarke then turned to the Cole .“ The fact that the USS Cole was attacked dur- ,” he wrote. ing the last Administration does not absolve us of responding for the attack “Many in al Qida and the Taliban may have drawn the wrong lesson from the Cole: that they can kill Americans without there being a US response, with- out there being a price ... One might have thought that with a $250m hole

230 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 213 213 FROM THREAT TO THREAT in a destroyer and 17 dead sailors, the Pentagon might have wanted to respond. Instead, they have often talked about the fact that there is ‘nothing worth hit- ting in Afghanistan’ and said ‘the cruise missiles cost more than the jungle gyms why we con- and mud huts’ at terrorist camps.” Clarke could not understand “ tinue to allow the existence of large scale al Qida bases where we know people are being 248 .” trained to kill Americans Turning to the CIA, Clarke warned that its bureaucracy, which was “mas- terful at passive aggressive behavior,” would resist funding the new national security presidential directive, leaving it a “hollow shell of words without deeds.”The CIA would insist its other priorities were more important. Invok- You are left with a modest effort ing President Bush’s own language, Clarke wrote,“ to swat flies , to try to prevent specific al Qida attacks by using [intelligence] to detect them and friendly governments’ police and intelligence officers to stop You are left waiting for the big attack , with lots of casualties, after which some them. 249 major US retaliation will be in order[.]” Rice told us she took Clarke’s memo as a warning not to get dragged down 250 While his arguments have force, we also take by bureaucratic inertia. Clarke’s jeremiad as something more. After nine years on the NSC staff and more than three years as the president’s national coordinator, he had often failed to persuade these agencies to adopt his views, or to persuade his superiors to set an agenda of the sort he wanted or that the whole government could sup- port. Meanwhile, another counterterrorism veteran, Cofer Black, was preparing his boss for the principals meeting. He advised Tenet that the draft presidential directive envisioned an ambitious covert action program, but that the author- ities for it had not yet been approved and the funding still had not been found. If the CIA was reluctant to use the Predator, Black did not mention it. He wanted “a timely decision from the Principals,” adding that the window for missions within 2001 was a short one. The principals would have to decide 251 enet, Rumsfeld, or someone else would give the order to fire. whether Rice,T At the September 4 meeting, the principals approved the draft presidential 252 Rice told us that she had, at some point, told directive with little discussion. President Bush that she and his other advisers thought it would take three years 253 They then discussed the armed or so for their al Qaeda strategy to work. Predator. Hadley portrayed the Predator as a useful tool, although perhaps not for immediate use. Rice, who had been advised by her staff that the armed Preda- tor was not ready for deployment, commented about the potential for using 254 the armed Predator in the spring of 2002. The State Department supported the armed Predator, although Secretary Powell was not convinced that Bin Ladin was as easy to target as had been sug- gested. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill was skittish, cautioning about the impli- 255 cations of trying to kill an individual.

231 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 214 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 214 The Defense Department favored strong action. Deputy Secretary Wol- fowitz questioned the United States’ ability to deliver Bin Ladin and bring him to justice. He favored going after Bin Ladin as part of a larger air strike, simi- lar to what had been done in the 1986 U.S. strike against Libya. General Myers emphasized the Predator’s value for surveillance, perhaps enabling broader air strikes that would go beyond Bin Ladin to attack al Qaeda’s training infrastruc- 256 ture. The principals also discussed which agency—CIA or Defense—should have 257 the authority to fire a missile from the armed Predator. At the end, Rice summarized the meeting’s conclusions.The armed Preda- tor capability was needed but not ready. The Predator would be available for the military to consider along with its other options.The CIA should consider flying reconnaissance-only missions.The principals—including the previously reluctant Tenet—thought that such reconnaissance flights were a good idea, combined with other efforts to get actionable intelligence. Tenet deferred an answer on the additional reconnaissance flights, conferred with his staff after 258 the meeting, and then directed the CIA to press ahead with them. A few days later, a final version of the draft presidential directive was circu- 259 lated, incorporating two minor changes made by the principals. On September 9, dramatic news arrived from Afghanistan.The leader of the Northern Alliance,Ahmed Shah Massoud, had granted an interview in his bun- galow near the Tajikistan border with two men whom the Northern Alliance leader had been told were Arab journalists.The supposed reporter and camera- man—actually al Qaeda assassins—then set off a bomb, riddling Massoud’s chest with shrapnel. He died minutes later. On September 10, Hadley gathered the deputies to finalize their three- phase, multiyear plan to pressure and perhaps ultimately topple the Taliban lead- 260 ership. That same day, Hadley instructed DCI Tenet to have the CIA prepare new draft legal authorities for the “broad covert action program” envisioned by the draft presidential directive. Hadley also directed Tenet to prepare a separate sec- tion “authorizing a broad range of other covert activities, including authority to capture or to use lethal force” against al Qaeda command-and-control ele- ments. This section would supersede the Clinton-era documents. Hadley wanted the authorities to be flexible and broad enough “to cover any additional 261 UBL-related covert actions contemplated.” Funding still needed to be located. The military component remained unclear. Pakistan remained uncooperative. The domestic policy institutions were largely uninvolved. But the pieces were coming together for an integrated policy dealing with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Pakistan.

232 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 215 7 THE ATTACK LOOMS 7.1 FIRST ARRIVALS IN CALIFORNIA In chapter 5 we described the Southeast Asia travels of Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar, and others in January 2000 on the first part of the “planes opera- tion.” In that chapter we also described how Mihdhar was spotted in Kuala Lumpur early in January 2000, along with associates who were not identified, and then was lost to sight when the group passed through Bangkok. On Jan- uary 15, Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in Los Angeles. They spent about two 1 weeks there before moving on to San Diego. Two Weeks in Los Angeles Why Hazmi and Mihdhar came to California, we do not know for certain. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the organizer of the planes operation, explains that California was a convenient point of entry from Asia and had the 2 added benefit of being far away from the intended target area. Hazmi and Mihdhar were ill-prepared for a mission in the United States. Their only qualifications for this plot were their devotion to Usama Bin Ladin, their veteran service, and their ability to get valid U.S. visas. Neither had spent 3 any substantial time in the West, and neither spoke much, if any, English. It would therefore be plausible that they or KSM would have tried to iden- tify, in advance, a friendly contact for them in the United States. In detention, KSM denies that al Qaeda had any agents in Southern California.We do not 4 We believe it is unlikely that Hazmi and Mihdhar—neither credit this denial. of whom, in contrast to the Hamburg group, had any prior exposure to life in the West—would have come to the United States without arranging to receive 5 assistance from one or more individuals informed in advance of their arrival. KSM says that though he told others involved in the conspiracy to stay away from mosques and to avoid establishing personal contacts, he made an excep- tion in this case and instructed Hazmi and Mihdhar to pose as newly arrived 215

233 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 216 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 216 Saudi students and seek assistance at local mosques. He counted on their break- 6 Our inabil- ing off any such relationships once they moved to the East Coast. ity to ascertain the activities of Hazmi and Mihdhar during their first two weeks in the United States may reflect al Qaeda tradecraft designed to protect the identity of anyone who may have assisted them during that period. Hazmi and Mihdhar were directed to enroll in English-language classes upon arriving in Southern California, so that they could begin pilot training as soon as possible. KSM claims to have steered the two to San Diego on the basis of his own research, which supposedly included thumbing through a San Diego phone book acquired at a Karachi flea market. Contradicting himself, he also says that, 7 as instructed, they attempted to enroll in three language schools in Los Angeles. After the pair cleared Immigration and Customs at Los Angeles International 8 They appear to have obtained assis- Airport, we do not know where they went. tance from the Muslim community, specifically the community surrounding the King Fahd mosque in Culver City, one of the most prominent mosques in Southern California. It is fairly certain that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque and made some acquaintances there. One witness interviewed by the FBI after the September 11 attacks has said he first met the hijackers at the mosque in early 2000. Furthermore, one of the people who would befriend them—a man named Mohdar Abdullah—recalled a trip with Hazmi and Mihdhar to Los Angeles in June when, on their arrival, the three went to the King Fahd mosque. There Hazmi and Mihdhar greeted various individuals whom they appeared to have met previously, including a man named “Khal- lam.” In Abdullah’s telling, when Khallam visited the al Qaeda operatives at their motel that evening,Abdullah was asked to leave the room so that Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Khallam could meet in private.The identity of Khallam and his 9 purpose in meeting with Hazmi and Mihdhar remain unknown. To understand what Hazmi and Mihdhar did in their first weeks in the United States, evidently staying in Los Angeles, we have investigated whether anyone associated with the King Fahd mosque assisted them.This subject has received substantial attention in the media. Some have speculated that Fahad al Thumairy—an imam at the mosque and an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Arabian consulate from 1996 until 2003—may have played a role in helping the hijackers establish themselves on their arrival in Los Angeles.This specula- tion is based, at least in part, on Thumairy’s reported leadership of an extrem- 10 ist faction at the mosque. A well-known figure at the King Fahd mosque and within the Los Ange- les Muslim community,Thumairy was reputed to be an Islamic fundamental- ist and a strict adherent to orthodox Wahhabi doctrine. Some Muslims concerned about his preaching have said he “injected non-Islamic themes into his guidance/prayers at the [King Fahd] Mosque” and had followers “support- 11 Thumairy appears to have associ- ive of the events of September 11, 2001.”

234 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 217 217 THE ATTACK LOOMS ated with a particularly radical faction within the community of local worship- pers, and had a network of contacts in other cities in the United States. After 9/11,Thumairy’s conduct was a subject of internal debate among some Saudi officials. He apparently lost his position at the King Fahd mosque, possibly because of his immoderate reputation. On May 6, 2003,Thumairy attempted to reenter the United States from Saudi Arabia but was refused entry, based on a determination by the State Department that he might be connected with ter- 12 rorist activity. When interviewed by both the FBI and the Commission staff, Thumairy has denied preaching anti-Western sermons, much less promoting violent jihad. More to the point, he claimed not to recognize either Hazmi or Mihdhar. Both denials are somewhat suspect. (He likewise denied knowing Omar al Bay- oumi—a man from San Diego we will discuss shortly—even though witnesses and telephone records establish that the two men had contact with each other. Similarly,Thumairy’s claim not to know Mohdar Abdullah is belied by Abdul- lah’s contrary assertion.) On the other hand,Thumairy undoubtedly met with and provided religious counseling to countless individuals during his tenure at the King Fahd mosque, so he might not remember two transients like Hazmi 13 and Mihdhar several years later. The circumstantial evidence makes Thumairy a logical person to consider as a possible contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar.Yet, after exploring the available leads, we have not found evidence that Thumairy provided assistance to the 14 two operatives. We do not pick up their trail until February 1, 2000, when they encoun- tered Omar al Bayoumi and Caysan Bin Don at a halal food restaurant on away from Venice Boulevard in Culver City, a few blocks the King Fahd mosque. Bayoumi and Bin Don have both told us that they had driven up from San Diego earlier that day so that Bayoumi could address a visa issue and col- lect some papers from the Saudi consulate. Bayoumi heard Hazmi and Mih- dhar speaking in what he recognized to be Gulf Arabic and struck up a conversation. Since Bin Don knew only a little Arabic, he had to rely heavily 15 on Bayoumi to translate for him. Mihdhar and Hazmi said they were students from Saudi Arabia who had just arrived in the United States to study English. They said they were living in an apartment near the restaurant but did not spec ify the address.They did not like Los Angeles and were having a hard time, especially because they did not know anyone. Bayoumi told them how pleasant San Diego was and offered to help them settle there.The two pairs then left the restaurant and went their 16 separate ways. Bayoumi and Bin Don have been interviewed many times about the Feb- ruary 1, 2000, lunch. For the most part, their respective accounts corroborate each other. However, Bayoumi has said that he and Bin Don attempted to visit the King Fahd mosque after lunch but could not find it. Bin Don, on the other

235 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 218 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 218 hand, recalls visiting the mosque twice that day for prayers, both before and after the meal. Bin Don’s recollection is spotty and inconsistent. Bayoumi’s ver- sion can be challenged as well, since the mosque is close to the restaurant and Bayoumi had visited it, and the surrounding area, on multiple occasions, includ- ing twice within six weeks of February 1.We do not know whether the lunch encounter occurred by chance or design.We know about it because Bayoumi 17 told law enforcement that it happened. Bayoumi, then 42 years old, was in the United States as a business student, supported by a private contractor for the Saudi Civil Aviation Authority, where 18 The object of considerable media Bayoumi had worked for over 20 years. speculation following 9/11, he lives now in Saudi Arabia, well aware of his notoriety. Both we and the FBI have interviewed him and investigated evi- dence about him. Bayoumi is a devout Muslim, obliging and gregarious. He spent much of his spare time involved in religious study and helping run a mosque in El Cajon, about 15 miles from San Diego. It is certainly possible that he has dis- sembled about some aspects of his story, perhaps to counter suspicion. On the other hand, we have seen no credible evidence that he believed in violent 19 Our investigators who have extremism or knowingly aided extremist groups. dealt directly with him and studied his background find him to be an unlikely candidate for clandestine involvement with Islamist extremists. The Move to San Diego By February 4, Hazmi and Mihdhar had come to San Diego from Los Ange- les, possibly driven by Mohdar Abdullah. Abdullah, a Yemeni university student in his early 20s, is fluent in both Arabic and English, and was perfectly suited to 20 assist the hijackers in pursuing their mission. After 9/11,Abdullah was interviewed many times by the FBI. He admitted knowing of Hazmi and Mihdhar’s extremist leanings and Mihdhar’s involve- ment with the Islamic Army of Aden (a group with ties to al Qaeda) back in Yemen. Abdullah clearly was sympathetic to those extremist views. During a post-9/11 search of his possessions, the FBI found a notebook (belonging to someone else) with references to planes falling from the sky, mass killing, and hijacking. Further, when detained as a material witness following the 9/11 attacks, Abdullah expressed hatred for the U.S. gover nment and “stated that the 21 U.S. brought ‘this’ on themselves.” When interviewed by the FBI after 9/11, Abdullah denied having advance knowledge of attacks. In May 2004, however, we learned of reports about Abdullah bragging to fellow inmates at a California prison in September– October 2003 that he had known Hazmi and Mihdhar were planning a ter- rorist attack.The stories attributed to Abdullah are not entirely consistent with each other. Specifically, according to one inmate, Abdullah claimed an unnamed individual had notified him that Hazmi and Mihdhar would be arriv-

236 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 219 219 THE ATTACK LOOMS ing in Los Angeles with plans to carry out an attack. Abdullah allegedly told the same inmate that he had driven the two al Qaeda operatives from Los Ange- les to San Diego, but did not say when this occurred.We have been unable to 22 corroborate this account. Another inmate has recalled Abdullah claiming he first heard about the hijackers’ terrorist plans after they arrived in San Diego, when they told him they planned to fly an airplane into a building and invited him to join them on the plane. According to this inmate, Abdullah also claimed to have found out about the 9/11 attacks three weeks in advance, a claim that appears to dove- tail with evidence that Abdullah may have received a phone call from Hazmi around that time, that he stopped making calls from his telephone after August 23 25, 2001, and that, according to his friends, he started acting strangely. Although boasts among prison inmates often tend to be unreliable, this evi- dence is obviously important.To date, neither we nor the FBI have been able to verify Abdullah’s alleged jailhouse statements, despite investigative efforts. We thus do not know when or how Hazmi and Mihdhar first came to San Diego. We do know that on February 4, they went to the Islamic Center of San Diego to find Omar al Bayoumi and take him up on his offer of help. Bay- oumi obliged by not only locating an apartment but also helping them fill out the lease application, co-signing the lease and, when the real estate agent refused to take cash for a deposit, helping them open a bank account (which they did with a $9,900 deposit); he then provided a certified check from his own account for which the al Qaeda operatives reimbursed him on the spot for the deposit. Neither then nor later did Bayoumi give money to either Hazmi or 24 Mihdhar, who had received money from KSM. Hazmi and Mihdhar moved in with no furniture and practically no posses- sions. Soon after the move, Bayoumi used their apartment for a party attended by some 20 male members of the Muslim community. At Bayoumi’s request, Bin Don videotaped the gathering with Bayoumi’s video camera. Hazmi and Mihdhar did not mingle with the other guests and reportedly spent most of 25 the party by themselves off camera, in a back room. Hazmi and Mihdhar immediately started looking for a different place to stay. Based on their comment to Bayoumi about the first apartment being expen- sive, one might infer that they wanted to save money.They may also have been reconsidering the wisdom of living so close to the video camera–wielding Bay- oumi, who Hazmi seemed to think was some sort of Saudi spy. Just over a week after moving in, Hazmi and Mihdhar filed a 30-day notice of intention to vacate. Bayoumi apparently loaned them his cell phone to help them check out 26 possibilities for new accommodations. Their initial effort to move turned out poorly. An acquaintance arranged with his landlord to have Mihdhar take over his apartment. Mihdhar put down a $650 deposit and signed a lease for the apartment effective March 1. Several weeks later, Mihdhar sought a refund of his deposit, claiming he no longer

237 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 220 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 220 intended to move in because the apartment was too messy.When the landlord refused to refund the deposit, Mihdhar became belligerent. The landlord 27 remembers him “ranting and raving” as if he were “psychotic.” Hazmi and Mihdhar finally found a room to rent in the home of an indi- vidual they had met at a mosque in San Diego.According to the homeowner, the future hijackers moved in on May 10, 2000. Mihdhar moved out after only about a month. On June 9, he left San Diego to return to Yemen. Hazmi, on the other hand, stayed at this house for the rest of his time in California, until mid-December; he would then leave for Arizona with a newly arrived 9/11 28 hijacker-pilot, Hani Hanjour. While in San Diego, Hazmi and Mihdhar played the part of recently arrived foreign students.They continued to reach out to members of the Muslim com- munity for help.At least initially, they found well-meaning new acquaintances at the Islamic Center of San Diego, which was only a stone’s throw from the apartment where they first lived. For example, when they purchased a used car (with cash), they bought it from a man who lived across the street from the Islamic Center and who let them use his address in registering the vehicle, an accommodation “to help a fellow Muslim brother.” Similarly, in April, when their cash supply may have been dwindling, Hazmi persuaded the administra- tor of the Islamic Center to let him use the administrator’s bank account to receive a $5,000 wire transfer from someone in Dubai, in the United Arab Emi- 29 rates (this was KSM’s nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali). Hazmi and Mihdhar visited other mosques as well, mixing comfortably as devout worshippers. During the operatives’ critical first weeks in San Diego, Mohdar Abdullah helped them. Translating between English and Arabic, he assisted them in obtaining California driver’s licenses and with applying to lan- guage and flight schools.Abdullah also introduced them to his circle of friends; he shared an apartment with some of those friends near the Rabat mosque in 30 La Mesa, a few miles from the hijackers’ residence. Abdullah has emerged as a key associate of Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego. Detained after 9/11 (first as a material witness, then on immigration charges), he was deported to Yemen on May 21, 2004, after the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California declined to prosecute him on charges arising out of his alleged jailhouse admissions concerning the 9/11 operatives. The Department of Justice declined to delay his removal pending further inves- 31 tigation of this new information. Other friends of Abdullah also translated for Hazmi and Mihdhar and helped them adjust to life in San Diego. Some held extremist beliefs or were well acquainted with known extremists. For example, immediately after 9/11, Osama Awadallah, a Yemeni whose telephone number was found in Hazmi’s Toyota at Washington Dulles International Airport, was found to possess pho- tos, videos, and articles relating to Bin Ladin.Awadallah also had lived in a house where copies of Bin Ladin’s fatwas and other similar materials were distributed

238 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 221 221 THE ATTACK LOOMS to the residents. Omar Bakarbashat, a Saudi, also met Hazmi and Mihdhar at the Rabat mosque. He admitted helping Hazmi to learn English and taking over the operatives’ first apartment in San Diego after they moved out. Bakar- bashat apparently had downloaded stridently anti-American Web pages to his 32 computer’s hard drive. Another potentially significant San Diego contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar was Anwar Aulaqi, an imam at the Rabat mosque. Born in New Mexico and thus a U.S. citizen, Aulaqi grew up in Yemen and studied in the United States on a Yemeni government scholarship. We do not know how or when Hazmi and Mihdhar first met Aulaqi. The operatives may even have met or at least talked to him the same day they first moved to San Diego. Hazmi and Mih- dhar reportedly respected Aulaqi as a religious figure and developed a close rela- 33 tionship with him. When interviewed after 9/11, Aulaqi said he did not recognize Hazmi’s name but did identify his picture. Although Aulaqi admitted meeting with Hazmi several times, he claimed not to remember any specifics of what they discussed. He described Hazmi as a soft-spoken Saudi student who used to appear at the mosque with a companion but who did not have a large circle 34 of friends. Aulaqi left San Diego in mid-2000, and by early 2001 had relocated to Vir- ginia.As we will discuss later, Hazmi eventually showed up at Aulaqi’s mosque in Virginia, an appearance that may not have been coincidental.We have been unable to learn enough about Aulaqi’s relationship with Hazmi and Mihdhar 35 to reach a conclusion. In sum, although the evidence is thin as to specific motivations, our overall impression is that soon after arriving in California, Hazmi and Mihdhar sought out and found a group of young and ideologically like-minded Muslims with roots in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, individuals mainly associated with Mohdar Abdullah and the Rabat mosque.The al Qaeda operatives lived openly in San Diego under their true names, listing Hazmi in the telephone directory.They managed to avoid attracting much attention. Flight Training Fails; Mihdhar Bails Out Hazmi and Mihdhar came to the United States to learn English, take flying lessons, and become pilots as quickly as possible.They turned out, however, to have no aptitude for English. Even with help and tutoring from Mohdar Abdul- lah and other bilingual friends, Hazmi and Mihdhar’s efforts to learn proved futile.This lack of language skills in turn became an insurmountable barrier to 36 learning how to fly. A pilot they consulted at one school, the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego, spoke Arabic. He explained to them that their flight instruction would begin with small planes. Hazmi and Mihdhar emphasized their interest in learning to fly jets, Boeing aircraft in particular, and asked where they might enroll to train

239 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 222 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 222 on jets right vinced that the two were either joking or dreaming, the away. Con pilot responded that no such school existed. Other instructors who worked with Hazmi and Mihdhar remember them as poor students who focused on learning to control the aircraft in flight but took no interest in takeoffs or land- ings. By the end of May 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar had given up on learning 37 how to fly. Mihdhar’s mind seems to have been with his family back in Yemen, as evi- denced by calls he made from the apartment telephone.When news of the birth of his first child arrived, he could stand life in California no longer. In late May and early June of 2000, he closed his bank account, transferred the car regis- tration to Hazmi, and arranged his return to Yemen.According to KSM, Mih- dhar was bored in San Diego and foresaw no problem in coming back to the United States since he had not overstayed his visa. Hazmi and Mohdar Abdul- lah accompanied him to Los Angeles on June 9. After visiting the King Fahd mosque one last time with his friends, Mihdhar left the country the follow- 38 ing day. KSM kept in fairly close touch with his operatives, using a variety of meth- ods. When Bin Ladin called KSM back from Pakistan to Afghanistan in the spring of 2000, KSM asked Khallad (whom we introduced in chapter 5) to maintain email contact with Hazmi in the United States. Mihdhar’s decision to strand Hazmi in San Diego enraged KSM, who had not authorized the departure and feared it would compromise the plan. KSM attempted to drop Mihdhar from the planes operation and would have done so, he says, had he 39 not been overruled by Bin Ladin. Following Mihdhar’s departure, Hazmi grew lonely and worried that he would have trouble managing by himself. He prayed with his housemate each . M . and attended services at the Islamic Center. He borrowed A morning at 5:00 his housemate’s computer for Internet access, following news coverage of fight- ing in Chechnya and Bosnia.With his housemate’s help, Hazmi also used the Internet to search for a wife (after obtaining KSM’s approval to marry). This search did not succeed. Although he developed a close relationship with his housemate, Hazmi preferred not to use the house telephone, continuing the 40 practice he and Mihdhar had adopted of going outside to make phone calls. After Mihdhar left, other students moved into the house. One of these, Yazeed al Salmi, stands out. In July 2000, Salmi purchased $4,000 in traveler’s checks at a bank in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On September 5, Hazmi deposited $1,900 of the traveler’s checks into his bank account, after withdrawing the same amount in cash. It is possible that Hazmi was simply cashing the traveler’s checks for a friend.We do not know; Salmi claims not to remember the trans- action.After 9/11, Salmi reportedly confided to Mohdar Abdullah that he had previously known terrorist pilot Hani Hanjour.After living in the same house with Hazmi for about a month, Salmi moved to the La Mesa apartment shared 41 by Abdullah and others.

240 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 223 223 THE ATTACK LOOMS By the fall of 2000, Hazmi no longer even pretended to study English or take flying lessons. Aware that his co-conspirators in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be sending him a new colleague shortly, he bided his time and worked for a few weeks at a gas station in La Mesa where some of his friends, includ- ing Abdullah, were employed. On one occasion, Hazmi told a fellow employee that he was planning to find a better job, and let slip a prediction that he would 42 become famous. On December 8, 2000, Hani Hanjour arrived in San Diego, having traveled from Dubai via Paris and Cincinnati. Hazmi likely picked up Hanjour at the airport.We do not know where Hanjour stayed; a few days later, both men left San Diego. Before departing, they visited the gas station in La Mesa, where jour as a “long time friend from Saudi Ara- Hazmi reportedly introduced Han bia.” Hazmi told his housemate that he and his friend “Hani” were headed for San Jose to take flying lessons and told his friends that he would stay in touch. 43 Hazmi promised to return to San Diego soon, and he and Hanjour drove off. Hazmi did not sever all contact with his friends in San Diego.According to Abdullah, after Hazmi left San Diego in December 2000, he telephoned Abdul- lah twice: in December 2000 or January 2001, Hazmi said he was in San Fran- cisco and would be attending flight school there; about two weeks later, he said he was attending flight school in Arizona. Some evidence, which we will dis- cuss later, indicates that Hazmi contacted Abdullah again, in August 2001. In addition, during the month following Hazmi’s departure from San Diego, he emailed his housemate three times, including a January 2001 email that Hazmi signed “Smer,” an apparent attempt to conceal his identity that struck the housemate as strange at the time. Hazmi also telephoned his housemate that he and his friend had decided to take flight lessons in Arizona, and that Mih- dhar was now back in Yemen.That was their last contact.When the housemate emailed Hazmi in February and March of 2001 to find out how he was far- 44 ing, Hazmi did not reply. The housemate who rented the room to Hazmi and Mihdhar during 2000 is an apparently law-abiding citizen with long-standing, friendly contacts among local police and FBI personnel. He did not see anything unusual enough in the behavior of Hazmi or Mihdhar to prompt him to report to his law enforcement contacts. Nor did those contacts ask him for information about his tenants/housemates. 7.2 THE 9/11 PILOTS IN THE UNITED STATES The Hamburg Pilots Arrive in the United States In the early summer of 2000, the Hamburg group arrived in the United States to begin flight training. Marwan al Shehhi came on May 29, arriving in Newark on a flight from Brussels. He went to New York City and waited there for

241 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 224 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 224 Mohamed Atta to join him. On June 2, Atta traveled to the Czech Republic by bus from Germany and then flew from Prague to Newark the next day. According to Ramzi Binalshibh, Atta did not meet with anyone in Prague; he simply believed it would contribute to operational security to fly out of Prague rather than Hamburg, the departure point for much of his previous interna- 45 tional travel. Atta and Shehhi had not settled on where they would obtain their flight training. In contrast, Ziad Jarrah had already arranged to attend the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC) in Venice, Florida. Jarrah arrived in Newark on June 27 and then flew to Venice. He immediately began the private pilot pro- gram at FFTC, intending to get a multi-engine license. Jarrah moved in with 46 some of the flight instructors affiliated with his school and bought a car. While Jarrah quickly settled into training in Florida, Atta and Shehhi kept searching for a flight school. After visiting the Airman Flight School in Nor- man, Oklahoma (where Zacarias Moussaoui would enroll several months later and where another al Qaeda operative, Ihab Ali, had taken lessons in the mid- 1990s), Atta started flight instruction at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida, and both Atta and Shehhi subsequently enrolled in the Accelerated Pilot Pro- gram at that school. By the end of July, both of them took solo flights, and by mid-August they passed the private pilot airman test.They trained through the 47 summer at Huffman, while Jarrah continued his training at FFTC. The Hamburg operatives paid for their flight training primarily with funds wired from Dubai by KSM’s nephew,Ali Abdul Aziz Ali. Between June 29 and September 17, 2000,Ali sent Shehhi and Atta a total of $114,500 in five trans- fers ranging from $5,000 to $70,000.Ali relied on the unremarkable nature of his transactions, which were essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars 48 Ali was not required to provide identification flowing daily across the globe. 49 in sending this money and the aliases he used were not questioned. In mid-September,Atta and Shehhi applied to change their immigration sta- tus from tourist to student, stating their intention to study at Huffman until September 1, 2001. In late September, they decided to enroll at Jones Aviation in Sarasota, Florida, about 20 miles north of Venice. According to the instruc- tor at Jones, the two were aggressive, rude, and sometimes even fought with him to take over the controls during their training flights. In early October, they took the Stage I exam for instruments rating at Jones Aviation and failed. Very upset, they said they were in a hurry because jobs awaited them at home. 50 Atta and Shehhi then returned to Huffman. In the meantime, Jarrah obtained a single-engine private pilot certificate in early August. Having reached that milestone, he departed on the first of five foreign trips he would take after first entering the United States. In October, he flew back to Germany to visit his girlfriend, Aysel Senguen.The two trav- eled to Paris before Jarrah returned to Florida on October 29. His relationship with her remained close throughout his time in the United States. In addition

242 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 225 225 THE ATTACK LOOMS to his trips, Jarrah made hundreds of phone calls to her and communicated fre- 51 quently by email. Jarrah was supposed to be joined at FFTC by Ramzi Binalshibh, who even sent the school a deposit. But Binalshibh could not obtain a U.S. visa. His first applications in May and June 2000 were denied because he lacked established ties in Germany ensuring his return from a trip to the United States. In Sep- tember, he went home to Yemen to apply for a visa from there, but was denied on grounds that he also lacked sufficient ties to Yemen. In October, he tried one last time, in Berlin, applying for a student visa to attend “aviation language school,” but the prior denials were noted and this application was denied as 52 well, as incomplete. Unable to participate directly in the operation, Binalshibh instead took on the role of coordinating between KSM and the operatives in the United States. Apart from sending a total of about $10,000 in wire transfers to Atta and Sheh- hi during the summer of 2000, one of Binalshibh’s first tasks in his new role as 53 plot coordinator was to assist another possible pilot, Zacarias Moussaoui. In the fall of 2000, KSM had sent Moussaoui to Malaysia for flight training, but Moussaoui did not find a school he liked. He worked instead on other ter- rorist schemes, such as buying four tons of ammonium nitrate for bombs to be planted on cargo planes flying to the United States.When KSM found out, he recalled Moussaoui back to Pakistan and directed him to go to the United States for flight training. In early October, Moussaoui went to London.When Binalshibh visited London in December, he stayed at the same 16-room dor- mitory where Moussaoui was still residing. From London, Moussaoui sent 54 inquiries to the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. Confronting training or travel problems with Hazmi, Mihdhar, Binalshibh, and Moussaoui, al Qaeda was looking for another possible pilot candidate. A new recruit with just the right background conveniently presented himself in Afghanistan. The Fourth Pilot: Hani Hanjour Hani Hanjour, from Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, first came to the United States in 1991 to study at the Center for English as a Second Language at the University of Arizona. He seems to have been a rigorously observant Muslim. According to his older brother, Hani Hanjour went to Afghanistan for the first time in the late 1980s, as a teenager, to participate in the jihad and, because the Soviets had 55 already withdrawn, worked for a relief agency there. In 1996, Hanjour returned to the United States to pursue flight training, after being rejected by a Saudi flight school. He checked out flight schools in Florida, California, and Arizona; and he briefly started at a couple of them before returning to Saudi Arabia. In 1997, he returned to Florida and then, along with two friends, went back to Arizona and began his flight training there in earnest. After about three months, Hanjour was able to obtain his private

243 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 226 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 226 pilot’s license. Several more months of training yielded him a commercial pilot certificate, issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in April 1999. 56 He then returned to Saudi Arabia. Hanjour reportedly applied to the civil aviation school in Jeddah after returning home, but was rejected. He stayed home for a while and then told his family he was going to the United Arab Emirates to work for an airline. Where Hanjour actually traveled during this time period is unknown. It is pos- 57 sible he went to the training camps in Afghanistan. The fact that Hanjour spent so much time in Arizona may be significant.A number of important al Qaeda figures attended the University of Arizona in 58 Some of Hanjour’s Tucson or lived in Tucson in the 1980s and early 1990s. known Arizona associates from the time of his flight training in the late 1990s 59 FBI investigators have speculated that al Qaeda may have also raised suspicion. have directed other extremist Muslims in the Phoenix area to enroll in avia- tion training. It is clear that when Hanjour lived in Arizona in the 1990s, he associated with several individuals holding extremist beliefs who have been the subject of counterterrorism investigations. Some of them trained with Han- jour to be pilots. Others had apparent connections to al Qaeda, including train- 60 ing in Afghanistan. By the spring of 2000, Hanjour was back in Afghanistan.According to KSM, Hanjour was sent to him in Karachi for inclusion in the plot after Hanjour was identified in al Qaeda’s al Faruq camp as a trained pilot, on the basis of back- ground information he had provided. Hanjour had been at a camp in Afghanistan for a few weeks when Bin Ladin or Atef apparently realized that he was a trained pilot; he was told to report to KSM, who then trained Han- 61 jour for a few days in the use of code words. On June 20, Hanjour returned home to Saudi Arabia. He obtained a U.S. student visa on September 25 and told his family he was returning to his job in the UAE. Hanjour did go to the UAE, but to meet facilitator Ali Abdul 62 Aziz Ali. Ali opened a bank account in Dubai for Hanjour and providing the initial funds for his trip. On December 8, Hanjour traveled to San Diego. His supposed destination was an English as a second language program in Oakland, Califor- nia, which he had scheduled before leaving Saudi Arabia but never attended. 63 Instead, as mentioned earlier, he joined Nawaf al Hazmi in San Diego. Hazmi and Hanjour left San Diego almost immediately and drove to Ari- zona. Settling in Mesa, Hanjour began refresher training at his old school,Ari- zona Aviation. He wanted to train on multi-engine planes, but had difficulties because his English was not good enough.The instructor advised him to dis- continue but Hanjour said he could not go home without completing the training. In early 2001, he started training on a Boeing 737 simulator at Pan Am International Flight Academy in Mesa.An instructor there found his work well below standard and discouraged him from continuing.Again, Hanjour per-

244 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 227 227 THE ATTACK LOOMS severed; he completed the initial training by the end of March 2001. At that point, Hanjour and Hazmi vacated their apartment and started driving east, anticipating the arrival of the “muscle hijackers”—the operatives who would storm the cockpits and control the passengers. By as early as April 4, Hanjour 64 and Hazmi had arrived in Falls Church,Virginia. The three pilots in Florida continued with their training. Atta and Shehhi finished up at Huffman and earned their instrument certificates from the FAA in November. In mid-December 2000, they passed their commercial pilot tests and received their licenses.They then began training to fly large jets on a flight simulator. At about the same time, Jarrah began simulator training, also in Florida but at a different center. By the end of 2000, less than six months after their arrival, the three pilots on the East Coast were simulating flights on large 65 jets. Travels in Early 2001 Jarrah, Atta, and Shehhi, having progressed in their training, all took foreign trips during the holiday period of 2000–2001. Jarrah flew through Germany to get home to Beirut.A few weeks later, he returned to Florida via Germany, with Aysel Senguen. She stayed with him in Florida for ten days, even accom- panying him to a flight training session. We do not know whether Atta or al Qaeda leaders knew about Jarrah’s trips and Senguen’s visit.The other opera- tives had broken off regular contact with their families. At the end of January 2001, Jarrah again flew to Beirut, to visit his sick father. After staying there for several weeks, Jarrah visited Senguen in Germany for a few days before return- 66 ing to the United States at the end of February. While Jarrah took his personal trips,Atta traveled to Germany in early Jan- uary 2001 for a progress meeting with Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh says Atta told him to report to the al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan that the three Hamburg pilots had completed their flight training and were awaiting orders. Atta also disclosed that a fourth pilot, Hanjour, had joined Hazmi. Upon returning to Florida,Atta wired Binalshibh travel money. Binalshibh proceeded to Afghanistan, made his report, and spent the next several months there and 67 in Pakistan. When Atta returned to Florida, Shehhi left for Morocco, traveling to Casablanca in mid-January. Shehhi’s family, concerned about not having heard from him, reported him missing to the UAE government.The UAE embassy in turn contacted the Hamburg police and a UAE representative tried to find him in Germany, visiting mosques and Shehhi’s last address in Hamburg.After learning that his family was looking for him, Shehhi telephoned them on Jan- uary 20 and said he was still living and studying in Hamburg.The UAE gov- 68 ernment then told the Hamburg police they could call off the search. Atta and Shehhi both encountered some difficulty reentering the United States, on January 10 and January 18, respectively. Because neither presented a

245 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 228 228 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Atta’s Alleged Trip to Prague Mohamed Atta is known to have been in Prague on two occasions: in December 1994, when he stayed one night at a transit hotel, and in June 2000, when he was en route to the United States. On the latter occa- sion, he arrived by bus from Germany, on June 2, and departed for 69 Newark the following day. The allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001 originates from the reporting of a single source of the Czech intelligence service. Shortly after 9/11, the source reported having seen Atta meet with Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, an Iraqi . M . A diplomat, at the Iraqi Embassy in Prague on April 9, 2001, at 11:00 This information was passed to CIA headquarters. The U.S. legal attaché (“Legat”) in Prague, the representative of the FBI, met with the Czech service’s source. After the meeting, the assess- ment of the Legat and the Czech officers present was that they were 70 percent sure that the source was sincere and believed his own story of the meeting. Subsequently, the Czech intelligence service publicly stated that there was a 70 percent probability that the meeting between Atta and Ani had taken place.The Czech Interior Minister also made several statements to the press about his belief that the meeting had occurred, and the story was widely reported. The FBI has gathered evidence indicating that Atta was in Virginia Beach on April 4 (as evidenced by a bank surveillance camera photo), and in Coral Springs, Florida on April 11, where he and Shehhi leased an apartment. On April 6, 9, 10, and 11,Atta’s cellular telephone was used numerous times to call various lodging establishments in Florida from cell sites within Florida.We cannot confirm that he placed those calls. But there are no U.S. records indicating that Atta departed the country during this period. Czech officials have reviewed their flight and bor- der records as well for any indication that Atta was in the Czech Repub- lic in April 2001, including records of anyone crossing the border who even looked Arab.They have also reviewed pictures from the area near the Iraqi embassy and have not discovered photos of anyone who looked like Atta. No evidence has been found that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001. According to the Czech government,Ani, the Iraqi officer alleged to have met with Atta, was about 70 miles Prague on April 8–9 away from and did not return until the afternoon of the ninth, while the source was . M . When questioned about A firm that the sighting occurred at 11:00 the reported April 2001 meeting,Ani—now in custody—has denied ever

246 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 229 THE ATTACK LOOMS 229 meeting or having any contact with Atta.Ani says that shortly after 9/11, he became concerned that press stories about the alleged meeting might hurt his career. Hoping to clear his name, Ani asked his superiors to approach the Czech government about refuting the allegation. He also denies knowing of any other Iraqi official having contact with Atta. These findings cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Atta was in Prague on April 9, 2001. He could have used an alias to travel and a passport under that alias, but this would be an exception to his practice of using his true name while traveling (as he did in January and would in July when he took his next overseas trip). The FBI and CIA have uncovered no evidence that Atta held any fraudulent passports. KSM and Binalshibh both deny that an Atta-Ani meeting occurred. There was no reason for such a meeting, especially considering the risk it would pose to the operation. By April 2001, all four pilots had com- pleted most of their training, and the muscle hijackers were about to begin entering the United States. The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of 70 an Atta-Ani meeting. student visa, both of them had to persuade INS inspectors that they should be admitted so that they could continue their flight training. Neither operative 71 had any problem clearing Customs. After returning to Florida from their trips,Atta and Shehhi visited Georgia, staying briefly in Norcross and Decatur, and renting a single-engine plane to fly with an instructor in Lawrenceville. By February 19,Atta and Shehhi were in Virginia.They rented a mailbox in Virginia Beach, cashed a check, and then promptly returned to Georgia, staying in Stone Mountain.We have found no explanation for these travels. In mid-March, Jarrah was in Georgia as well, stay- ing in Decatur.There is no evidence that the three pilots met, although Jarrah and Atta apparently spoke on the phone. At the end of the month, Jarrah left the United States again and visited Senguen in Germany for two weeks. In early April, Atta and Shehhi returned to Virginia Beach and closed the mail- 72 box they had opened in February. By the time Atta and Shehhi returned to Virginia Beach from their travels in Georgia, Hazmi and Hanjour had also arrived in Virginia, in Falls Church. They made their way to a large mosque there, the Dar al Hijra mosque, some- 73 time in early April. As we mentioned earlier, one of the imams at this mosque was the same Anwar Aulaqi with whom Hazmi had spent time at the Rabat mosque in San Diego. Aulaqi had moved to Virginia in January 2001. He remembers Hazmi

247 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 230 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 230 from San Diego but has denied having any contact with Hazmi or Hanjour in 74 Virginia. At the Dar al Hijra mosque, Hazmi and Hanjour met a Jordanian named Eyad al Rababah. Rababah says he had gone to the mosque to speak to the vices, which nor- imam, Aulaqi, about finding work. At the conclusion of ser mally had 400 to 500 att endees, Rababah says he happened to meet Hazmi and Hanjour.They were looking for an apartment; Rababah referred them to a friend who had one to rent. Hazmi and Hanjour moved into the apartment, 75 which was in Alexandria. Some FBI investigators doubt Rababah’s story. Some agents suspect that Aulaqi may have tasked Rababah to help Hazmi and Hanjour. We share that suspicion, given the remarkable coincidence of Aulaqi’s prior relationship with Hazmi. As noted above, the Commission was unable to locate and interview Aulaqi. Rababah has been deported to Jordan, having been convicted after 9/11 76 in a fraudulent driver’s license scheme. Rababah, who had lived in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, told investigators that he had recommended Paterson, New Jersey, as a place with an Arabic-speaking community where Hazmi and Hanjour might want to set- tle.They asked for his help in getting them an apartment in Paterson. Rababah tried without success. He says he then suggested that Hazmi and Hanjour travel 77 with him to Connecticut where they could look for a place to live. On May 8, Rababah went to Hazmi and Hanjour’s apartment to pick them up for the trip to Connecticut.There he says he found them with new room- mates—Ahmed al Ghamdi and Majed Moqed.These two men had been sent to America to serve as muscle hijackers and had arrived at Dulles Airport on May 2. Rababah drove Hanjour to Fairfield, Connecticut, followed by Hazmi, who had Moqed and Ghamdi in his car. After a short stay in Connecticut, where they apparently called area flight schools and real estate agents, Rababah drove the four to Paterson to have dinner and show them around. He says that they returned with him to Fairfield that night, and that he never 78 saw them again. Within a few weeks, Hanjour, Hazmi, and several other operatives moved to Paterson and rented a one-room apartment. When their landlord later paid a visit, he found six men living there—Nawaf al Hazmi, now joined by his younger brother Salem, Hanjour, Moqed, probably Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Abdul Aziz al Omari; Hazmi’s old friend Khalid al Mihdhar would soon 79 join them. Atta and Shehhi had already returned to Florida. On April 11, they moved into an apartment in Coral Springs. Atta stayed in Florida, awaiting the arrival 80 of the first muscle hijackers. Shehhi, on the other hand, bought a ticket to Cairo and flew there from Miami on April 18. We do not know much more about Shehhi’s reason for traveling to Egypt in April than we know about his January trip to Morocco.

248 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 231 231 THE ATTACK LOOMS Shehhi did meet with Atta’s father, who stated in a post-9/11 interview that Shehhi just wanted to pick up Atta’s international driver’s license and some money.This story is not credible.Atta already had the license with him and pre- sented it during a traffic stop on April 26 while Shehhi was still abroad. Sheh- hi spent about two weeks in Egypt, obviously more time than would have been needed just to meet with Atta’s father. Shehhi could have traveled elsewhere during this time, but no records indicating additional travel have been discov- 81 ered. Shehhi returned to Miami on May 2. That day, Atta and Jarrah were together, about 30 miles to the north, visiting a Department of Motor Vehicles office in Lauderdale Lakes, Florida, to get Florida driver’s licenses. Back in Vir- ginia, Hazmi and Hanjour were about to leave for Connecticut and New Jer- sey.As the summer approached, the lead operatives were settled in Florida and 82 New Jersey, waiting for the rest of their contingent to join them. 7.3 ASSEMBLING THE TEAMS During the summer and early autumn of 2000, Bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan started selecting the muscle hijackers—the operatives who would storm the cockpits and control the passengers. Despite the phrase widely used to describe them, the so-called muscle hijackers were not at all 83 physically imposing; most were between 5' 5" and 5' 7" in height. Recruitment and Selection for 9/11 Twelve of the 13 muscle hijackers (excluding Nawaf al Hazmi and Mihdhar) came from Saudi Arabia: Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, Abdul Aziz al Omari, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, Majed Moqed, Salem al Hazmi, Saeed al Ghamdi,Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ahmed al Nami. The remaining recruit, Fayez Banihammad, came from the UAE. He appears to have played a unique role among the muscle hijack- ers because of his work with one of the plot’s financial facilitators, Mustafa al 84 Hawsawi. Saudi authorities interviewed the relatives of these men and have briefed us on what they found.The muscle hijackers came from a variety of educational and societal backgrounds. All were between 20 and 28 years old; most were 85 unemployed with no more than a high school education and were unmarried. Four of them—Ahmed al Ghamdi, Saeed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Ahmad al Haznawi—came from a cluster of three towns in the al Bahah region, an isolated and underdeveloped area of Saudi Arabia, and shared the same tribal affiliation. None had a university degree.Their travel patterns and information from family members suggest that the four may have been in con- 86 tact with each other as early as the fall of 1999.

249 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 232 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 232 Five more—Wail al Shehri,Waleed al Shehri,Abdul Aziz al Omari, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami—came from Asir Province, a poor region in southwestern Saudi Arabia that borders Yemen; this weakly policed area is sometimes called “the wild frontier.”Wail and Waleed al Shehri were brothers. All five in this group had begun university studies. Omari had graduated with honors from high school, had attained a degree from the Imam Muhammad 87 Ibn Saud Islamic University, was married, and had a daughter. The three remaining muscle hijackers from Saudi Arabia were Satam al Suqami, Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi. Suqami came from Riyadh. Moqed hailed from a small town called Annakhil, west of Medina. Suqami had very little education, and Moqed had dropped out of university. Neither Suqami nor Moqed appears to have had ties to the other, or to any of the other 88 operatives, before getting involved with extremists, probably by 1999. Salem al Hazmi, a younger brother of Nawaf, was born in Mecca. Salem’s family recalled him as a quarrelsome teenager. His brother Nawaf probably rec- ommended him for recruitment into al Qaeda. One al Qaeda member who knew them says that Nawaf pleaded with Bin Ladin to allow Salem to partic- 89 ipate in the 9/11 operation. Detainees have offered varying reasons for the use of so many Saudi oper- atives. Binalshibh argues that al Qaeda wanted to send a message to the gov- ernment of Saudi Arabia about its relationship with the United States. Several other al Qaeda figures, however, have stated that ethnicity generally was not a factor in the selection of operatives unless it was important for security or oper- 90 ational reasons. KSM, for instance, denies that Saudis were chosen for the 9/11 plot to drive a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and stresses practical rea- sons for considering ethnic background when selecting operatives. He says that so many were Saudi because Saudis comprised the largest portion of the pool of recruits in the al Qaeda training camps. KSM estimates that in any given camp, 70 percent of the mujahideen were Saudi, 20 percent were Yemeni, and 10 percent were from elsewhere. Although Saudi and Yemeni trainees were most often willing to volunteer for suicide operations, prior to 9/11 it was eas- 91 ier for Saudi operatives to get into the United States. Most of the Saudi muscle hijackers developed their ties to extremists two or three years before the attacks. Their families often did not consider these young men religious zealots. Some were perceived as devout, others as lacking in faith. For instance, although Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Saeed al Ghamdi attended prayer services regularly and Omari often served as an imam at his mosque in Saudi Arabia, Suqami and Salem al Hazmi appeared unconcerned with religion and, contrary to Islamic law, were known to drink 92 alcohol. Like many other al Qaeda operatives, the Saudis who eventually became the muscle hijackers were targeted for recruitment outside Afghanistan— probably in Saudi Arabia itself. Al Qaeda recruiters, certain clerics, and—in a

250 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 233 233 THE ATTACK LOOMS few cases—family members probably all played a role in spotting potential candidates. Several of the muscle hijackers seem to have been recruited 93 through contacts at local universities and mosques. According to the head of one of the training camps in Afghanistan, some were chosen by unnamed Saudi sheikhs who had contacts with al Qaeda. Omari, for example, is believed to have been a student of a radical Saudi cleric named Sulayman al Alwan. His mosque, which is located in al Qassim Province, is known among more moderate clerics as a “terrorist factory.”The province is at the very heart of the strict Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. Saeed al Ghamdi and Mohand al Shehri also spent time in al Qassim, both breaking with their families. According to his father, Mohand al Shehri’s fre- quent visits to this area resulted in his failing exams at his university in Riyadh. Saeed al Ghamdi transferred to a university in al Qassim, but he soon stopped 94 talking to his family and dropped out of school without informing them. The majority of these Saudi recruits began to break with their families in late 1999 and early 2000. According to relatives, some recruits began to make arrangements for extended absences. Others exhibited marked changes in behavior before disappearing. Salem al Hazmi’s father recounted that Salem— who had had problems with alcohol and petty theft—stopped drinking and 95 started attending mosque regularly three months before he disappeared. Several family members remembered that their relatives had expressed a desire to participate in jihad, particularly in Chechnya. None had mentioned going to Afghanistan.These statements might be true or cover stories.The four recruits from the al Ghamdi tribe, for example, all told their families that they were going to Chechnya. Only two—Ahmed al Ghamdi and Saeed al 96 Ghamdi—had documentation suggesting travel to a Russian republic. Some aspiring Saudi mujahideen, intending to go to Chechnya, encoun- tered difficulties along the way and diverted to Afghanistan. In 1999, Ibn al Khattab—the primary commander of Arab nationals in Chechnya—reportedly most foreign mujahideen because of their inexperi- had started turning away ence and inability to adjust to the local conditions. KSM states that several of the 9/11 muscle hijackers faced problems traveling to Chechnya and so went 97 to Afghanistan, where they were drawn into al Qaeda. Khallad has offered a more detailed story of how such diversions occurred. According to him, a number of Saudi mujahideen who tried to go to Chech- nya in 1999 to fight the Russians were stopped at the Turkish-Georgian bor- der. Upon arriving in Turkey, they received phone calls at guesthouses in places such as Istanbul and Ankara, informing them that the route to Chechnya via Georgia had been closed.These Saudis then decided to travel to Afghanistan, where they could train and wait to make another attempt to enter Chechnya during the summer of 2000.While training at al Qaeda camps, a dozen of them heard Bin Ladin’s speeches, volunteered to become suicide operatives, and eventually were selected as muscle hijackers for the planes operation. Khallad says he met a number of them at the Kandahar airport, where they were help-

251 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 234 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 234 ing to provide extra security. He encouraged Bin Ladin to use them. Khallad claims to have been closest with Saeed al Ghamdi, whom he convinced to become a martyr and whom he asked to recruit a friend, Ahmed al Ghamdi, to the same cause. Although Khallad claims not to recall everyone from this group who was later chosen for the 9/11 operation, he says they also included Suqami,Waleed and Wail al Shehri, Omari, Nami, Hamza al Ghamdi, Salem al 98 Hazmi, and Moqed. According to KSM, operatives volunteered for suicide operations and, for the most part, were not pressured to martyr themselves. Upon arriving in Afghanistan, a recruit would fill out an application with standard questions, such as,What brought you to Afghanistan? How did you travel here? How did you hear about us? What attracted you to the cause? What is your educational back- ground? Where have you worked before? Applications were valuable for deter- mining the potential of new arrivals, for filtering out potential spies from among them, and for identifying recruits with special skills. For instance, as pointed out earlier, Hani Hanjour noted his pilot training. Prospective opera- tives also were asked whether they were prepared to serve as suicide operatives; those who answered in the affirmative were interviewed by senior al Qaeda 99 lieutenant Muhammad Atef. KSM claims that the most important quality for any al Qaeda operative was willingness to martyr himself. Khallad agrees, and claims that this criterion had preeminence in selecting the planes operation participants. The second most important criterion was demonstrable patience, Khallad says, because the 100 planning for such attacks could take years. Khallad claims it did not matter whether the hijackers had fought in jihad previously, since he believes that U.S. authorities were not looking for such operatives before 9/11. But KSM asserts that young mujahideen with clean records were chosen to avoid raising alerts during travel. The al Qaeda train- ing camp head mentioned above adds that operatives with no prior involve- ment in activities likely to be known to international security agencies were 101 purposefully selected for the 9/11 attacks. Most of the muscle hijackers first underwent basic training similar to that given other al Qaeda recruits. This included training in firearms, heavy weapons, explosives, and topography. Recruits learned discipline and military life.They were subjected to artificial stresses to measure their psychological fit- ness and commitment to jihad.At least seven of the Saudi muscle hijackers took this basic training regime at the al Faruq camp near Kandahar.This particular camp appears to have been the preferred location for vetting and training the potential muscle hijackers because of its proximity to Bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda leadership.Two others—Suqami and Moqed—trained at Khal- dan, another large basic training facility located near Kabul, where Mihdhar had 102 trained in the mid-1990s. By the time operatives for the planes operation were picked in mid-2000, some of them had been training in Afghanistan for months, others were just

252 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 235 235 THE ATTACK LOOMS arriving for the first time, and still others may have been returning after prior visits to the camps. According to KSM, Bin Ladin would travel to the camps to deliver lectures and meet the trainees personally. If Bin Ladin believed a trainee held promise for a special operation, that trainee would be invited to 103 the al Qaeda leader’s compound at Tarnak Farms for further meetings. KSM claims that Bin Ladin could assess new trainees very quickly, in about ten minutes, and that many of the 9/11 hijackers were selected in this manner. Bin Ladin, assisted by Atef, personally chose all the future muscle hijackers for the planes operation, primarily between the summer of 2000 and April 2001. Upon choosing a trainee, Bin Ladin would ask him to swear loyalty for a sui- cide operation. After the selection and oath-swearing, the operative would be sent to KSM for training and the filming of a martyrdom video, a function 104 KSM supervised as head of al Qaeda’s media committee. KSM sent the muscle hijacker recruits on to Saudi Arabia to obtain U.S. visas. He gave them money (about $2,000 each) and instructed them to return to Afghanistan for more training after obtaining the visas. At this early stage, the operatives were not told details about the operation.The majority of the Saudi muscle hijackers obtained U.S. visas in Jeddah or Riyadh between Sep- 105 tember and November of 2000. KSM told potential hijackers to acquire new “clean” passpor ts in their home raising suspicion countries before applying for a U.S. visa.This was to avoid about previous travel to countries where al Qaeda operated. Fourteen of the 19 hijackers, including nine Saudi muscle hijackers, obtained new passports. Some of these passports were then likely doctored by the al Qaeda passport division in Kandahar, which would add or erase entry and exit stamps to cre- 106 ate “false trails” in the passports. In addition to the operatives who eventually participated in the 9/11 attacks as muscle hijackers, Bin Ladin apparently selected at least nine other Saudis who, for various reasons, did not end up taking part in the operation: Mohamed Mani Ahmad al Kahtani, Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani, Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi, Saeed al Baluchi, Qutaybah al Najdi, Zuhair al Thubaiti, Saeed Abdullah Saeed al Ghamdi, Saud al Rashid, and Mushabib al Hamlan. A tenth individual, a Tunisian with Canadian citizenship named Abderraouf Jdey, may have been a candidate to participate in 9/11, or he may have been a candidate for a later attack.These candidate hijackers either backed out, had trouble obtaining needed travel documents, or were removed from the operation by the al Qaeda leadership. Khallad believes KSM wanted between four and six operatives per plane. KSM states that al Qaeda had originally 107 planned to use 25 or 26 hijackers but ended up with only the 19. Final Training and Deployment to the United States Having acquired U.S. visas in Saudi Arabia, the muscle hijackers returned to Afghanistan for special training in late 2000 to early 2001.The training report- edly was conducted at the al Matar complex by Abu Turab al Jordani, one of

253 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 236 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 236 only a handful of al Qaeda operatives who, according to KSM, was aware of the full details of the planned planes operation. Abu Turab taught the opera- tives how to conduct hijackings, disarm air marshals, and handle explosives. He also trained them in bodybuilding and provided them with a few basic Eng- 108 lish words and phrases. According to KSM,Abu Turab even had the trainees butcher a sheep and a camel with a knife to prepare to use knives during the hijackings.The recruits learned to focus on storming the cockpit at the earliest opportunity when the doors first opened, and to worry about seizing control over the rest of the plane later. The operatives were taught about other kinds of attack as well, such as truck bombing, so that they would not be able to disclose the exact nature of their operation if they were caught. According to KSM, the muscle did not learn the full details—including the plan to hijack planes and fly them into 109 buildings—before reaching the United States. After training in Afghanistan, the operatives went to a safehouse maintained by KSM in Karachi and stayed there temporarily before being deployed to the United States via the UAE.The safehouse was run by al Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim Ghulum Rabbani, also known as Abu Rahmah, a close associate of KSM who assisted him for three years by finding apartments and lending logis- tical support to operatives KSM would send. According to an al Qaeda facilitator, operatives were brought to the safe- house by a trusted Pakistani al Qaeda courier named Abdullah Sindhi, who also worked for KSM. The future hijackers usually arrived in groups of two or three, staying at the safe house for as long as two weeks.The facilitator has identified each operative whom he assisted at KSM’s direction in the spring of 2001. Before the operatives left Pakistan, each of them received $10,000 110 from KSM for future expenses. From Pakistan, the operatives transited through the UAE en route to the United States. In the Emirates they were assisted primarily by al Qaeda oper- atives Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa al Hawsawi. Ali apparently assisted nine future hijackers between April and June 2001 as they came through Dubai. He helped them with plane tickets, traveler’s checks, and hotel reservations; he also taught them about everyday aspects of life in the West, such as purchasing clothes and ordering food. Dubai, a modern city with easy access to a major airport, travel agencies, hotels, and Western commercial establishments, was an 111 ideal transit point. Ali reportedly assumed the operatives he was helping were involved in a big 112 When he asked operation in the United States, he did not know the details. KSM to send him an assistant, KSM dispatched Hawsawi, who had worked on al Qaeda’s media committee in Kandahar. Hawsawi helped send the last four operatives (other than Mihdhar) to the United States from the UAE. Hawsawi would consult with Atta about the hijackers’ travel schedules to the United States and later check with Atta to confirm that each had arrived. Hawsawi told

254 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 237 237 THE ATTACK LOOMS the muscle hijackers that they would be met by Atta at the airport. Hawsawi 113 also facilitated some of the operation’s financing. The muscle hijackers began arriving in the United States in late April 2001. In most cases, they traveled in pairs on tourist visas and entered the United States in Orlando or Miami, Florida; Washington, D.C.; or New York. Those arriving in Florida were assisted by Atta and Shehhi, while Hazmi and Han- jour took care of the rest. By the end of June, 14 of the 15 muscle hijackers 114 had crossed the Atlantic. The muscle hijackers supplied an infusion of funds, which they carried as a mixture of cash and traveler’s checks purchased in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Seven muscle hijackers are known to have purchased a total of nearly $50,000 in traveler’s checks that were used in the United States. Moreover, substantial deposits into operatives’ U.S. bank accounts immediately followed the entry of other muscle hijackers, indicating that those newcomers brought money with them as well. In addition, muscle hijacker Banihammad came to the United States after opening bank accounts in the UAE into which were deposited the equivalent of approximately $30,000 on June 25, 2001.After his June 27 arrival in the United States, Banihammad made Visa and ATM withdrawals from his 115 UAE accounts. The hijackers made extensive use of banks in the United States, choosing both branches of major international banks and smaller regional banks. All of the hijackers opened accounts in their own name, and used passports and other identification documents that appeared valid on their face. Contrary to numer- ous published reports, there is no evidence the hijackers ever used false Social Security numbers to open any bank accounts. While the hijackers were not experts on the use of the U.S. financial system, nothing they did would have led the banks to suspect criminal behavior, let alone a terrorist plot to commit 116 mass murder. The last muscle hijacker to arrive was Khalid al Mihdhar.As mentioned ear- lier, he had abandoned Hazmi in San Diego in June 2000 and returned to his family in Yemen. Mihdhar reportedly stayed in Yemen for about a month before Khallad persuaded him to return to Afghanistan. Mihdhar complained about life in the United States. He met with KSM, who remained annoyed at his deci- sion to go AWOL. But KSM’s desire to drop him from the operation yielded 117 to Bin Ladin’s insistence to keep him. By late 2000, Mihdhar was in Mecca, staying with a cousin until February 2001, when he went home to visit his family before returning to Afghanistan. In June 2001, Mihdhar returned once more to Mecca to stay with his cousin for another month. Mihdhar said that Bin Ladin was planning five attacks on the United States. Before leaving, Mihdhar asked his cousin to watch over his 118 home and family because of a job he had to do. On July 4, 2001, Mihdhar left Saudi Arabia to return to the United States, arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Mihdhar gave

255 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 238 238 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT American Airlines Flight 11 Left to right, Mohamed Atta, pilot ; Waleed al Shehri, Wail al Shehri, Satam al Suqami, Abdulaziz al Omari, hijackers United Airlines Flight 175 Left to right, Marwan al Shehhi, pilot ; Fayez Baniham- mad, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, hijackers

256 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 239 AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 239 American Airlines Flight 77 Left to right, Hani Hanjour, pilot ; Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Salem hijackers al Hazmi, United Airlines Flight 93 Left to right, Ziad Jarrah pilot ; Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmad al Haznawi, Ahmed al Nami, hijackers

257 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 240 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 240 his intended address as the Marriott Hotel, New York City, but instead spent one night at another New York hotel. He then joined the group of hijackers in Paterson, reuniting with Nawaf al Hazmi after more than a year.With two months remaining, all 19 hijackers were in the United States and ready to take 119 the final steps toward carrying out the attacks. Assistance from Hezbollah and Iran to al Qaeda As we mentioned in chapter 2, while in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda maintained contacts with Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide terrorist organization Hezbollah, which is based mainly in southern Lebanon and Beirut. Al Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezbollah. Intelligence indicates the persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin Ladin’s return to Afghanistan. Khallad has said that Iran made a concerted effort to strengthen relations with Cole al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS , but was rebuffed because Bin Ladin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia. Khal- lad and other detainees have described the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to and from Afghanistan. For example, Iranian border inspectors would be told not to place telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. Such arrangements were par- 120 ticularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda. Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda operatives selected for the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we now have evi- dence suggesting that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi “muscle” operatives traveled into 121 or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001. In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in Saudi Ara- bia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah commander and 122 Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved. Also in October 2000, two future muscle hijackers, Mohand al Shehri and Hamza al Ghamdi, flew from Iran to Kuwait. In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi apparently flew to Beirut, traveling—perhaps by coincidence—on the same flight as a senior Hezbollah operative.Also in November, Salem al Hazmi appar- 123 ently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut. In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers,Wail al Shehri,Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, all of whom had obtained their U.S. visas in late October, traveled in a group from Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to Iran. An associate of a senior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took the future hijackers to Iran. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting the arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of this group was important enough to merit the attention of sen- 124 ior figures in Hezbollah. Later in November, two future muscle hijackers, Satam al Suqami and Majed

258 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 241 241 THE ATTACK LOOMS Moqed, flew into Iran from Bahrain. In February 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar may have taken a flight from Syria to Iran, and then traveled further within Iran to 125 a point near the Afghan border. KSM and Binalshibh have confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at least eight, according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, taking advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports.They deny any other reason for the hijackers’ travel to Iran.They also 126 deny any relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah. In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers.There also is circumstantial evidence that senior Hezbol- lah operatives were closely tracking the travel of some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November 2000. However, we cannot rule out the pos- sibility of a remarkable coincidence—that is, that Hezbollah was actually focus- ing on some other group of individuals traveling from Saudi Arabia during this 127 same time frame, rather than the future hijackers. We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the plan- ning for what later became the 9/11 attack.At the time of their travel through Iran, the al Qaeda operatives themselves were probably not aware of the spe- cific details of their future operation. After 9/11, Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al Qaeda. A senior Hezbol- 128 lah official disclaimed any Hezbollah involvement in 9/11. We believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S. government. 7.4 FINAL STRATEGIES AND TACTICS Final Preparations in the United States During the early summer of 2001, Atta, assisted by Shehhi, was busy coordi- nating the arrival of most of the muscle hijackers in southern Florida—pick- ing them up at the airport, finding them places to stay, and helping them settle 129 in the United States. The majority settled in Florida. Some opened bank accounts, acquired mail- boxes, and rented cars. Several also joined local gyms, presumably to stay fit for the operation. Upon first arriving, most stayed in hotels and motels; but by mid- June, they settled in shared apartments relatively close to one another and 130 Though these muscle hijackers did not travel much after arriving in Atta. the United States, two of them, Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami, took unusual trips. On May 19, Shehri and Suqami flew from Fort Lauderdale to Freeport, the Bahamas, where they had reservations at the Bahamas Princess Resort.The two were turned away by Bahamian officials on arrival, however, because they

259 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 242 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 242 lacked visas; they returned to Florida that same day. They likely took this trip to renew Suqami’s immigration status, as Suqami’s legal stay in the United States 131 ended May 21. On July 30, Shehri traveled alone from Fort Lauderdale to Boston. He flew before returning via to San Francisco the next day, where he sta yed one night Las Vegas.While this travel may have been a casing flight—Shehri traveled in first class on the same type of aircraft he would help hijack on September 11 (a Boeing 767) and the trip included a layover in Las Vegas—Shehri was nei- ther a pilot nor a plot leader, as were the other hijackers who took surveillance 132 flights. The three Hamburg pilots—Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah—took the first of their cross-country surveillance flights early in the summer. Shehhi flew from New York to Las Vegas via San Francisco in late May. Jarrah flew from Baltimore to Las Vegas via Los Angeles in early June. Atta flew from Boston to Las Vegas via San Francisco at the end of June. Each traveled in first class, on United Airlines. For the east-west transcontinental leg, each operative flew on the same type of aircraft he would pilot on September 11 (Atta and Shehhi, a Boeing 767; Jar- 133 Hanjour and Hazmi, as noted below, took similar cross- rah, a Boeing 757). country surveillance flights in August. Jarrah and Hanjour also received additional training and practice flights in the early summer.A few days before departing on his cross-country test flight, Jarrah flew from Fort Lauderdale to Philadelphia, where he trained at Hort- man Aviation and asked to fly the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude “hallway” along the Hudson River that passes New York landmarks like the World Trade Center. Heavy traffic in the area can make the corridor a dangerous route for an inexperienced pilot. Because Hortman deemed Jarrah unfit to fly solo, he 134 could fly this route only with an instructor. this Corridor about same time, Hanjour, too, requested to fly the Hudson at Air Fleet Training Systems in Teterboro, New Jersey, where he started receiv- ing ground instruction soon after settling in the area with Hazmi. Hanjour flew the Hudson Corridor, but his instructor declined a second request because of what he considered Hanjour’s poor piloting skills. Shortly thereafter, Hanjour switched to Caldwell Flight Academy in Fairfield, New Jersey, where he rented small aircraft on several occasions during June and July. In one such instance on July 20, Hanjour—likely accompanied by Hazmi—rented a plane from Caldwell and took a practice flight from Fairfield to Gaithersburg, Maryland, a route that would have allowed them to fly near Washington, D.C. Other evi- dence suggests that Hanjour may even have returned to Arizona for flight sim- 135 ulator training earlier in June. There is no indication that Atta or Shehhi received any additional flight training in June. Both were likely too busy organizing the newly arrived mus- cle hijackers and taking their cross-country surveillance flights.Atta, moreover, 136 needed to coordinate with his second-in-command, Nawaf al Hazmi.

260 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 243 243 THE ATTACK LOOMS Although Atta and Hazmi appear to have been in Virginia at about the same time in early April, they probably did not meet then.Analysis of late April com- munications associated with KSM indicates that they had wanted to get 137 Atta and Hazmi together in April but could not coordinate the meeting. probably first met in the United States only when Hazmi traveled round-trip from Newark to Miami between June 19 and June 25. After he returned to New Jersey, Hazmi’s behavior began to closely paral- lel that of the other hijackers. He and Hanjour, for instance, soon established new bank accounts, acquired a mailbox, rented cars, and started visiting a gym. So did the four other hijackers who evidently were staying with them in New Jersey. Several also obtained new photo identification, first in New Jersey and then at the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, where Hazmi and Hanjour had obtained such documents months earlier, likely with help from their Jor- 138 danian friend, Rababah. Atta probably met again with Hazmi in early July. Returning from his ini- tial cross-country surveillance flight, Atta flew into New York. Rather than return immediately to Florida, he checked into a New Jersey hotel. He picked up tickets to travel to Spain at a travel agency in Paterson on July 4 before departing for Fort Lauderdale. Now that the muscle hijackers had arrived, he 139 was ready to meet with Ramzi Binalshibh for the last time. The Meeting in Spain After meeting with Atta in Berlin in January 2001, Binalshibh had spent much of the spring of 2001 in Afghanistan and Pakistan, helping move the muscle hijackers as they passed through Karachi. During the Berlin meeting, the two had agreed to meet later in the year in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the operation in person again. In late May, Binalshibh reported directly to Bin Ladin at an 140 al Qaeda facility known as “Compound Six” near Kandahar. Bin Ladin told Binalshibh to instruct Atta and the others to focus on their security and that of the operation, and to advise Atta to proceed as planned with the targets discussed before Atta left Afghanistan in early 2000—the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the White House, and the Capitol. According to Binalshibh, Bin Ladin said he preferred the White House over the Capitol, asking Binalshibh to confirm that Atta understood this preference. Binalshibh says Bin Ladin had given the same message to Waleed al Shehri for conveyance to Atta earlier that spring. Binalshibh also received permission to meet Atta in Malaysia.Atef provided money for the trip, which KSM would help Binalshibh 141 arrange in Karachi. In early June, Binalshibh traveled by taxi from Kandahar to Quetta, Pakistan, where al Qaeda courier Abu Rahmah took him to KSM.According to Binal- shibh, KSM provided a plane ticket to Malaysia and a fraudulent Saudi pass- port to use for the trip. KSM told him to ask Atta to select a date for the attacks. Binalshibh was to return to Germany and then inform KSM of the date. KSM

261 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 244 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 244 also gave Binalshibh the email address of Zacarias Moussaoui for future con- 142 tact. Binalshibh then left for Kuala Lumpur. Binalshibh contacted Atta upon arriving in Malaysia and found a change in plan. Atta could not travel because he was too busy helping the new arrivals settle in the United States.After remaining in Malaysia for approximately three weeks, Binalshibh went to Bangkok for a few days before returning to Ger- 143 many. He and Atta agreed to meet later at a location to be determined. In early July, Atta called Binalshibh to suggest meeting in Madrid, for rea- sons Binalshibh claims not to know. He says he preferred Berlin, but that he and Atta knew too many people in Germany and feared being spotted together. Unable to buy a ticket to Madrid at the height of the tourist season, Binalshibh booked a seat on a flight to Reus, near Barcelona, the next day.Atta was already en route to Madrid, so Binalshibh phoned Shehhi in the United 144 States to inform him of the change in itinerary. Atta arrived in Madrid on July 8. He spent the night in a hotel and made three calls from his room, most likely to coordinate with Binalshibh.The next day, Atta rented a car and drove to Reus to pick up Binalshibh; the two then drove to the nearby town of Cambrils. Hotel records show Atta renting rooms in the same area until July 19, when he returned his rental car in Madrid and flew back to Fort Lauderdale. On July 16, Binalshibh returned to Hamburg, using a ticket Atta had purchased for him earlier that day. According to Binal- 145 shibh, they did not meet with anyone else while in Spain. Binalshibh says he told Atta that Bin Ladin wanted the attacks carried out as soon as possible. Bin Ladin, Binalshibh conveyed, was worried about hav- ing so many operatives in the United States.Atta replied that he could not yet provide a date because he was too busy organizing the arriving hijackers and still needed to coordinate the timing of the flights so that the crashes would occur simultaneously. Atta said he required about five to six weeks before he could provide an attack date. Binalshibh advised Atta that Bin Ladin had directed that the other operatives not be informed of the date until the last minute.Atta was to provide Binalshibh with advance notice of at least a week or two so that Binalshibh could travel to Afghanistan and report the date per- 146 sonally to Bin Ladin. As to targets, Atta understood Bin Ladin’s interest in striking the White House.Atta said he thought this target too difficult, but had tasked Hazmi and Hanjour to evaluate its feasibility and was awaiting their answer. Atta said that those two operatives had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights near the Pentagon.Atta explained that Hanjour was assigned to attack the Pen- tagon, Jarrah the Capitol, and that both Atta and Shehhi would hit the World Trade Center. If any pilot could not reach his intended target, he was to crash the plane. If Atta could not strike the World Trade Center, he planned to crash his aircraft directly into the streets of New York.Atta told Binalshibh that each pilot had volunteered for his assigned target, and that the assignments were sub- 147 ject to change.

262 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 245 245 THE ATTACK LOOMS During the Spain meeting,Atta also mentioned that he had considered tar- geting a nuclear facility he had seen during familiarization flights near New York—a target they referred to as “electrical engineering.”According to Binal- shibh, the other pilots did not like the idea.They thought a nuclear target would be difficult because the airspace around it was restricted, making reconnaissance flights impossible and increasing the likelihood that any plane would be shot down before impact. Moreover, unlike the approved targets, this alternative had not been discussed with senior al Qaeda leaders and therefore did not have the requisite blessing. Nor would a nuclear facility have particular symbolic value. Atta did not ask Binalshibh to pass this idea on to Bin Ladin, Atef, or KSM, 148 and Binalshibh says he did not mention it to them until after September 11. Binalshibh claims that during their time in Spain, he and Atta also discussed how the hijackings would be executed. Atta said he, Shehhi, and Jarrah had encountered no problems carrying box cutters on cross-country surveillance flights.The best time to storm the cockpit would be about 10–15 minutes after takeoff, when the cockpit doors typically were opened for the first time. Atta did not believe they would need any other weapons. He had no firm contin- gency plan in case the cockpit door was locked.While he mentioned general ideas such as using a hostage or claiming to have a bomb, he was confident the cockpit doors would be opened and did not consider breaking them down a viable idea. Atta told Binalshibh he wanted to select planes departing on long flights because they would be full of fuel, and that he wanted to hijack Boeing aircraft because he believed them easier to fly than Airbus aircraft, which he understood had an autopilot feature that did not allow them to be crashed into 149 the ground. Finally, Atta confirmed that the muscle hijackers had arrived in the United States without incident. They would be divided into teams according to their English-speaking ability.That way they could assist each other before the oper- ation and each team would be able to command the passengers in English. According to Binalshibh,Atta complained that some of the hijackers wanted to contact their families to say goodbye, something he had forbidden. Atta, more- over, was nervous about his future communications with Binalshibh, whom he instructed to obtain new telephones upon returning to Germany. Before Binal- shibh left Spain, he gave Atta eight necklaces and eight bracelets that Atta had asked him to buy when he was recently in Bangkok, believing that if the hijack- ers were clean shaven and well dressed, others would think them wealthy Saudis 150 and give them less notice. As directed, upon returning from Spain, Binalshibh obtained two new phones, one to communicate with Atta and another to communicate with KSM and others, such as Zacarias Moussaoui. Binalshibh soon contacted KSM and, using code words, reported the results of his meeting with Atta. This 151 important exchange occurred in mid-July. ics. For example, Jarrah was to send The conversation covered various top Binalshibh certain personal materials fr om the hijackers, including copies of their

263 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 246 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 246 passports, which Binalshibh in turn would pass along to KSM, probably for sub- 152 sequent use in al Qaeda propaganda. The most significant part of the mid-July conversation concerned Jarrah’s troubled relationship with Atta. KSM and Binalshibh both acknowledge that Jarrah chafed under Atta’s authority over him. Binalshibh believes the disagree- ment arose in part from Jarrah’s family visits. Moreover, Jarrah had been on his own for most of his time in the United States because Binalshibh’s visa diffi- culty had prevented the two of them from training together. Jarrah thus felt excluded from the decisionmaking. Binalshibh had to act as a broker between 153 Jarrah and Atta. Concerned that Jarrah might withdraw from the operation at this late stage, KSM emphasized the importance of Atta and Jarrah’s resolving their differ- ences. Binalshibh claims that such concern was unwarranted, and in their mid- July discussion reassured KSM that Atta and Jarrah would reconcile and be ready to move forward in about a month, after Jarrah visited his family. Not- ing his concern and the potential for delay, KSM at one point instructed Binal- shibh to send “the skirts” to “Sally”—a coded instruction to Binalshibh to send funds to Zacarias Moussaoui.While Binalshibh admits KSM did direct him to send Moussaoui money during the mid-July conversation, he denies knowing exactly why he received this instruction—though he thought the money was 154 being provided “within the framework” of the 9/11 operation. KSM may have instructed Binalshibh to send money to Moussaoui in order to help prepare Moussaoui as a potential substitute pilot for Jarrah. On July 20, 2001, Aysel Senguen, Jarrah’s girlfriend, purchased a one-way ticket for Jarrah from Miami to Dusseldorf. On Jarrah’s previous four trips from the United States to see Senguen and his family in Lebanon, he had always traveled with a round-trip ticket. When Jarrah departed Miami on July 25, Atta appears to 155 have driven him to the airport, another unique circumstance. Binalshibh picked up Jarrah at the airport in Dusseldorf on July 25. Jarrah wanted to see Senguen as soon as possible, so he and Binalshibh arranged to meet a few days later.When they did, they had an emotional conversation dur- 156 ing which Binalshibh encouraged Jarrah to see the plan through. While Jarrah was in Germany, Binalshibh and Moussaoui were in contact to arrange for the transfer of funds. Binalshibh received two wire transfers from Hawsawi in the UAE totaling $15,000 and, within days, relayed almost all of 157 this money to Moussaoui in two installments. Moussaoui had been taking flight lessons at the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, since February but stopped in late May.Although at that point he had only about 50 hours of flight time and no solo flights to his credit, Moussaoui began making inquiries about flight materials and simulator train- ing for Boeing 747s. On July 10, he put down a $1,500 deposit for flight sim- ulator training at Pan Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, and by the end of the month, he had received a simulator schedule to train from

264 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 247 247 THE ATTACK LOOMS August 13 through August 20. Moussaoui also purchased two knives and inquired of two manufacturers of GPS equipment whether their products could be converted for aeronautical use—activities that closely resembled those 158 of the 9/11 hijackers during their final preparations for the attacks. On August 10, shortly after getting the money from Binalshibh, Moussaoui left Oklahoma with a friend and drove to Minnesota.Three days later, Mous- flight simulator training at Pan Am saoui paid the $6,800 balance owed for his in cash and began his training. His conduct, however, raised the suspicions of his flight instructor. It was unusual for a student with so little training to be large jets without any intention of obtaining a pilot’s license learning to fly or other goal. On August 16, once the instructor reported his suspicion to the 159 on immig authorities, Moussaoui was arrested by the INS ration charges. KSM denies ever considering Moussaoui for the planes operation. Instead he claims that Moussaoui was slated to participate in a “second wave” of attacks. KSM also states that Moussaoui had no contact with Atta, and we are unaware 160 of evidence contradicting this assertion. Yet KSM has also stated that by the summer of 2001, he was too busy with the planes operation to continue planning for any second-wave attacks. More- over, he admits that only three potential pilots were ever recruited for the alleged second wave, Moussaoui plus two others who, by midsummer of 2001, 161 We therefore believe that the effort to push had backed out of the plot. Moussaoui forward in August 2001 lends credence to the suspicion that he was being primed as a possible pilot in the immediate planes operation. Binalshibh says he assumed Moussaoui was to take his place as another pilot in the 9/11 operation. Recounting a post-9/11 discussion with KSM in Kan- dahar, Binalshibh claims KSM mentioned Moussaoui as being part of the 9/11 operation. Although KSM never referred to Moussaoui by name, Binalshibh understood he was speaking of the operative to whom Binalshibh had wired money. Binalshibh says KSM did not approve of Moussaoui but believes KSM did not remove him from the operation only because Moussaoui had been 162 selected and assigned by Bin Ladin himself. KSM did not hear about Moussaoui’s arrest until after September 11. According to Binalshibh, had Bin Ladin and KSM learned prior to 9/11 that Moussaoui had been detained, they might have canceled the operation.When Binalshibh discussed Moussaoui’s arrest with KSM after September 11, KSM congratulated himself on not having Moussaoui contact the other operatives, which would have compromised the operation. Moussaoui had been in con- 163 tact with Binalshibh, of course, but this was not discovered until after 9/11. As it turned out, Moussaoui was not needed to replace Jarrah. By the time Moussaoui was arrested in mid-August, Jarrah had returned to the United States from his final trip to Germany, his disagreement with Atta apparently 164 resolved.The operatives began their final preparations for the attacks.

265 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 248 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 248 Readying the Attacks A week after he returned from meeting Binalshibh in Spain, Atta traveled to Newark, probably to coordinate with Hazmi and give him additional funds. Atta spent a few days in the area before returning to Florida on July 30. The month of August was busy, as revealed by a set of contemporaneous Atta- 165 Binalshibh communications that were recovered after September 11. On August 3, for example, Atta and Binalshibh discussed several matters, such as the best way for the operatives to purchase plane tickets and the assign- ment of muscle hijackers to individual teams. Atta and Binalshibh also revis- ited the question of whether to target the White House.They discussed targets in coded language, pretending to be students discussing various fields of study: “architecture” referred to the World Trade Center, “arts” the Pentagon, “law” 166 the Capitol, and “politics” the White House. Binalshibh reminded Atta that Bin Ladin wanted to target the White House. Atta again cautioned that this would be difficult. When Binalshibh persisted, Atta agreed to include the White House but suggested they keep the Capitol as an alternate target in case the White House proved too difficult. Atta also suggested that the attacks would not happen until after the first week in Sep- 167 tember, when Congress reconvened. Atta and Binalshibh also discussed “the friend who is coming as a tourist”— a cryptic reference to candidate hijacker Mohamed al Kahtani (mentioned above), whom Hawsawi was sending the next day as “the last one” to “com- plete the group.” On August 4,Atta drove to the Orlando airport to meet Kah- tani. Upon arrival, however, Kahtani was denied entry by immigration officials because he had a one-way ticket and little money, could not speak English, and could not adequately explain what he intended to do in the United States. He was sent back to Dubai. Hawsawi contacted KSM, who told him to help Kah- 168 tani return to Pakistan. On August 7,Atta flew from Fort Lauderdale to Newark, probably to coor- dinate with Hazmi.Two days later,Ahmed al Ghamdi and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who had been living in New Jersey with Hazmi and Hanjour, flew to Miami—probably signifying that the four hijacking teams had finally been assigned.While Atta was in New Jersey, he, Hazmi, and Hanjour all purchased tickets for another set of surveillance flights. Like Shehhi, Jarrah, Atta, and Waleed al Shehri before them, Hazmi and Hanjour each flew in first class on the same type of aircraft they would hijack on 9/11 (a Boeing 757), and on transcontinental flights that connected to Las Vegas. This time, however, Atta himself also flew directly to Las Vegas, where all three stayed on August 13–14. Beyond Las Vegas’s reputation for welcoming tourists, we have seen no credi- ble evidence explaining why, on this occasion and others, the operatives flew 169 to or met in Las Vegas. Through August, the hijackers kept busy with their gym training and the pilots took frequent practice flights on small rented aircraft.The operatives also

266 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 249 249 THE ATTACK LOOMS began to make purchases suggesting that the planning was coming to an end. In mid-August, for example, they bought small knives that may actually have been used in the attacks. On August 22, moreover, Jarrah attempted to pur- chase four GPS units from a pilot shop in Miami. He was able to buy only one unit, which he picked up a few days later when he also purchased three aero- 170 nautical charts. Perhaps most significant, however, was the purchase of plane tickets for Sep- tember 11. On August 23, Atta again flew to Newark, probably to meet with Hazmi and select flights. All 19 tickets were booked and purchased between 171 August 25 and September 5. It therefore appears that the attack date was selected by the third week of August. This timing is confirmed by Binalshibh, who claims Atta called him with the date in mid-August. According to Binalshibh, Atta used a riddle to convey the date in code—a message of two branches, a slash, and a lollipop (to non-Americans, 11/9 would be interpreted as September 11). Binalshibh says 172 he called Atta back to confirm the date before passing it to KSM. KSM apparently received the date from Binalshibh in a message sent through Binalshibh’s old Hamburg associate, Zakariya Essabar. Both Binalshibh and KSM claim that Essabar was not privy to the meaning of the message and had no foreknowledge of the attacks.According to Binalshibh, shortly after the date was chosen, he advised Essabar and another Hamburg associate, Said Bahaji, that if they wanted to go to Afghanistan, now was the time because it made reservations on August 22 would soon become more difficult. Essabar and departed Hamburg for Karachi on August 30; Bahaji purchased his tickets 173 on August 20 and departed Hamburg for Karachi on September 3. Binalshibh also made arrangements to leave for Pakistan during early Sep- tember, before the attacks, as did Ali and Hawsawi, the plot facilitators in the UAE. During these final days, Binalshibh and Atta kept in contact by phone, email, and instant messaging.Although Atta had forbidden the hijackers to con- tact their families, he apparently placed one last call to his own father on Sep- tember 9. Atta also asked Binalshibh to contact the family of one hijacker, pass along goodbyes from others, and give regards to KSM. Jarrah alone appears to 174 have left a written farewell—a sentimental letter to Aysel Senguen. Hazmi, however, may not have been so discreet. He may have telephoned his former San Diego companion, Mohdar Abdullah, in late August. Several bits of evidence indicate that others in Abdullah’s circle may have received word that something big would soon happen. As noted earlier, Abdullah’s behavior reportedly changed noticeably. Prior to September 11, both he and Yazeed al Salmi suddenly became intent on proceeding with their planned marriages. One witness quotes Salmi as commenting after the 9/11 attacks,“I knew they were going to do something, that is why I got married.” Moreover, as of August 2001, Iyad Kreiwesh and other employees at the Texaco station where Hazmi had worked suddenly were anticipating attention from law enforcement

267 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 250 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 250 authorities in the near future. Finally, according to an uncorroborated witness account, early on the morning of September 10, Abdullah, Osama Awadallah, Omar Bakarbashat, and others behaved suspiciously at the gas station.Accord- ing to the witness, after the group met, Awadallah said “it is finally going to 175 happen” as the others celebrated by giving each other high fives. Dissent within the al Qaeda Leadership While tactical preparations for the attack were nearing completion, the entire operation was being questioned at the top, as al Qaeda and the Taliban argued over strategy for 2001. Our focus has naturally been on the specifics of the planes operation. But from the perspective of Bin Ladin and Atef, this opera- tion was only one, admittedly key, element of their unfolding plans for the year. Living in Afghanistan, interacting constantly with the Taliban, the al Qaeda leaders would never lose sight of the situation in that country. Bin Ladin’s consistent priority was to launch a major attack directly against the United States. He wanted the planes operation to proceed as soon as pos- sible. Mihdhar reportedly told his cousin during the summer of 2001 that Bin Ladin was reputed to have remarked,“I will make it happen even if I do it by 176 myself.” According to KSM, Bin Ladin had been urging him to advance the date of the attacks. In 2000, for instance, KSM remembers Bin Ladin pushing him to launch the attacks amid the controversy after then-Israeli opposition party leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. KSM claims Bin Ladin told him it would be enough for the hijackers simply to down planes 177 rather than crash them into specific targets. KSM says he resisted the pressure. KSM claims to have faced similar pressure twice more in 2001. According to him, Bin Ladin wanted the operation carried out on May 12, 2001, seven bombing. KSM adds that the 9/11 attacks had months to the day after the Cole originally been envisioned for May 2001. The second time he was urged to launch the attacks early was in June or July 2001, supposedly after Bin Ladin learned from the media that Sharon would be visiting the White House. On both occasions KSM resisted, asserting that the hijacking teams were not ready. Bin Ladin pressed particularly strongly for the latter date in two letters stress- ing the need to attack early.The second letter reportedly was delivered by Bin 178 Ladin’s son-in-law, Aws al Madani. Other evidence corroborates KSM’s account. For instance, Mihdhar told his cousin that the attacks were to happen in May, but were postponed twice, first to July, then to September. Moreover, one candidate hijacker remembers a general warning being issued in the al Qaeda camps in July or early August, bombing and ten days just like the warnings issued two weeks before the Cole before the eventual 9/11 attacks. During the midsummer alert, al Qaeda members dispersed with their families, security was increased, and Bin Ladin 179 disappeared for about 30 days, until the alert was canceled. While the details of the operation were strictly compartmented, by the time

268 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 251 251 THE ATTACK LOOMS of the alert, word had begun to spread that an attack against the United States was coming. KSM notes that it was generally well known by the summer of 2001 that he was planning some kind of operation against the United States. Many were even aware that he had been preparing operatives to go to the United States, leading some to conclude that al Qaeda was planning a near- term attack on U.S. soil. Moreover, Bin Ladin had made several remarks that summer hinting at an upcoming attack and generating rumors throughout the worldwide jihadist community. Bin Ladin routinely told important visitors to expect significant attacks against U.S. interests soon and, during a speech at the al Faruq camp, exhorted trainees to pray for the success of an attack involving 20 martyrs. Others have confirmed hearing indications of an impending attack and have verified that such news, albeit without specific details, had spread 180 across al Qaeda. Although Bin Ladin’s top priority apparently was to attack the United States, others had a different view.The Taliban leaders put their main empha- sis on the year’s military offensive against the Northern Alliance, an offensive that ordinarily would begin in the late spring or summer.They certainly hoped that this year’s offensive would finally finish off their old enemies, driving them from Afghanistan. From the Taliban’s perspective, an attack against the United States might be counterproductive. It might draw the Americans into the war 181 against them, just when final victory seemed within their grasp. There is evidence that Mullah Omar initially opposed a major al Qaeda operation directly against the United States in 2001. Furthermore, by July, with word spreading of a coming attack, a schism emerged among the senior lead- ership of al Qaeda. Several senior members reportedly agreed with Mullah Omar. Those who reportedly sided with Bin Ladin included Atef, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, and KSM. But those said to have opposed him were weighty fig- ures in the organization—including Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, Sheikh Saeed al Masri, and Sayf al Adl. One senior al Qaeda operative claims to recall Bin Ladin arguing that attacks against the United States needed to be carried out immediately to support insurgency in the Israeli-occupied territories and protest the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Beyond these rhetorical appeals, Bin Ladin also reportedly thought an attack against the United States would benefit al Qaeda by attracting more suicide operatives, eliciting greater donations, and increasing the number of sympathizers willing to provide logis- 182 tical assistance. Mullah Omar is reported to have opposed this course of action for ideo- logical reasons rather than out of fear of U.S. retaliation. He is said to have pre- ferred for al Qaeda to attack Jews, not necessarily the United States. KSM contends that Omar faced pressure from the Pakistani government to keep al Qaeda from engaging in operations outside Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s chief financial manager, Sheikh Saeed, argued that al Qaeda should defer to the Tali- ban’s wishes. Another source says that Sheikh Saeed opposed the operation, both out of deference to Omar and because he feared the U.S. response to an

269 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 252 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 252 attack. Abu Hafs the Mauritanian reportedly even wrote Bin Ladin a message 183 basing opposition to the attacks on the Qur’an. According to KSM, in late August, when the operation was fully planned, Bin Ladin formally notified the al Qaeda Shura Council that a major attack against the United States would take place in the coming weeks.When some council members objected, Bin Ladin countered that Mullah Omar lacked authority to prevent al Qaeda from conducting jihad outside Afghanistan. Though most of the Shura Council reportedly disagreed, Bin Ladin persisted. 184 The attacks went forward. The story of dissension within al Qaeda regarding the 9/11 attacks is prob- ably incomplete.The information on which the account is based comes from sources who were not privy to the full scope of al Qaeda and Taliban planning. Bin Ladin and Atef, however, probably would have known, at least, that • The general Taliban offensive against the Northern Alliance would rely on al Qaeda military support. • Another significant al Qaeda operation was making progress during the summer—a plot to assassinate the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud. The operatives, disguised as journalists, were in Massoud’s camp and prepared to kill him sometime in August.Their 185 appointment to see him was delayed. But on September 9, the Massoud assassination took place.The delayed Tal- iban offensive against the Northern Alliance was apparently coordinated to 186 begin as soon as he was killed, and it got under way on September 10. As they deliberated earlier in the year, Bin Ladin and Atef would likely have remembered that Mullah Omar was dependent on them for the Massoud assas- sination and for vital support in the Taliban military operations. KSM remem- bers Atef telling him that al Qaeda had an agreement with the Taliban to eliminate Massoud, after which the Taliban would begin an offensive to take over Afghanistan. Atef hoped Massoud’s death would also appease the Taliban when the 9/11 attacks happened. There are also some scant indications that Omar may have been reconciled to the 9/11 attacks by the time they 187 occurred. Moving to Departure Positions In the days just before 9/11, the hijackers returned leftover funds to al Qaeda and assembled in their departure cities.They sent the excess funds by wire trans- 188 fer to Hawsawi in the UAE, about $26,000 altogether. The hijackers targeting American Airlines Flight 77, to depart from Dulles, migrated from New Jersey to Laurel, Maryland, about 20 miles from Washing- ton, D.C.They stayed in a motel during the first week in September and spent

270 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 253 253 THE ATTACK LOOMS time working out at a gym. On the final night before the attacks, they lodged 189 at a hotel in Herndon,Virginia, close to the airport. Further north, the hijackers targeting United Airlines Flight 93, to depart from Newark, gathered in that city from their base in Florida on September 7. Just after midnight on September 8–9, Jarrah received a speeding ticket in Mary- 190 land as he headed north on I-95. He joined the rest of his team at their hotel. Atta was still busy coordinating the teams. On September 7, he flew from Fort Lauderdale to Baltimore, presumably to meet with the Flight 77 team in Laurel. On September 9, he flew from Baltimore to Boston. By then, Shehhi had arrived there, and Atta was seen with him at his hotel.The next day, Atta picked up Omari at another hotel, and the two drove to Portland, Maine, for reasons that remain unknown. In the early morning hours of September 11, they boarded a commuter flight to Boston to connect to American Airlines Flight 11. The two spent their last night pursuing ordinary activities: making ATM withdrawals, eating pizza, and shopping at a convenience store. Their three fellow hijackers for Flight 11 stayed together in a hotel in Newton, Mass- 191 achusetts, just outside of Boston. Shehhi and his team targeting United Airlines Flight 175 from Logan Air- 192 The plan that started with port spent their last hours at two Boston hotels. a proposal by KSM in 1996 had evolved to overcome numerous obstacles. Now 19 men waited in nondescript hotel rooms to board four flights the next morning.

271 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 254 8 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 8.1 THE SUMMER OF THREAT As 2001 began, counterterrorism officials were receiving frequent but fragmen- tary reports about threats. Indeed, there appeared to be possible threats almost everywhere the United States had interests—including at home. To understand how the escalation in threat reporting was handled in the summer of 2001, it is useful to understand how threat information in general is collected and conveyed. Information is collected through several methods, including signals intelligence and interviews of human sources, and gathered into intelligence reports. Depending on the source and nature of the report- ing, these reports may be highly classified—and therefore tightly held—or less sensitive and widely disseminated to state and local law enforcement agencies. Threat reporting must be disseminated, either through individual reports or through threat advisories. Such advisories, intended to alert their recipients, may address a specific threat or be a general warning. Because the amount of reporting is so voluminous, only a select fraction can be chosen for briefing the president and senior officials. During 2001, Direc- tor of Central Intelligence George Tenet was briefed regularly regarding threats 1 He in turn and other operational information relating to Usama Bin Ladin. met daily with President Bush, who was briefed by the CIA through what is known as the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). Each PDB consists of a series of six to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering a broad array of topics; CIA staff decides which subjects are the most important on any given day. There were more than 40 intelligence articles in the PDBs from January 20 to September 10, 2001, that related to Bin Ladin. The PDB is considered 2 highly sensitive and is distributed to only a handful of high-level officials. The Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), distributed to a broader group of officials, has a similar format and generally covers the same subjects as the PDB. It usually contains less information so as to protect sources and 254

272 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 255 255 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” methods. Like their predecessors, the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and Richard Clarke, the National Security Council (NSC) counterterrorism coor- 3 Clarke and his staff had extensive dinator, all received the SEIB, not the PDB. access to terrorism reporting, but they did not have access to internal, nondis- seminated information at the National Security Agency (NSA), CIA, or FBI. The Drumbeat Begins In the spring of 2001, the level of reporting on terrorist threats and planned attacks increased dramatically to its highest level since the millennium alert.At the end of March, the intelligence community disseminated a terrorist threat advisory, indicating a heightened threat of Sunni extremist terrorist attacks 4 against U.S. facilities, personnel, and other interests. On March 23, in connection with discussions about possibly reopening Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, Clarke warned National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that domestic or foreign terrorists might use a truck bomb—their “weapon of choice”—on Pennsylvania Avenue.That would result, he said, in the destruction of the West Wing and parts of the res- 5 He also told her that he thought there were terrorist cells within the idence. United States, including al Qaeda. The next week, Rice was briefed on the activities of Abu Zubaydah and on CIA efforts to locate him.As pointed out in chapter 6,Abu Zubaydah had been a major figure in the millennium plots. Over the next few weeks, the CIA repeat- edly issued warnings—including calls from DCI Tenet to Clarke—that Abu Zubaydah was planning an operation in the near future. One report cited a source indicating that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack in a country that CIA ana- lysts thought might be Israel, or perhaps Saudi Arabia or India. Clarke relayed 6 these reports to Rice. offices on sent a message to all In response to these threats, the FBI its field to task all offices April 13, summarizing reporting to date . It asked the resources, including human sources and electronic databases, for any informa- tion pertaining to “current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism.” 7 It did not suggest that there was a domestic threat. The interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that Clarke chaired discussed the Abu Zubaydah reports on April 19.The next day, a brief- ing to top officials reported “Bin Ladin planning multiple operations.” When the deputies discussed al Qaeda policy on April 30, they began with a briefing 8 on the threat. In May 2001, the drumbeat of reporting grew louder with reports to top officials that “Bin Ladin public profile may presage attack” and “Bin Ladin net- work’s plans advancing.” In early May, a walk-in to the FBI claimed there was a plan to launch attacks on London, Boston, and New York. Attorney General John Ashcroft was briefed by the CIA on May 15 regarding al Qaeda gener- ally and the current threat reporting specifically. The next day brought a report

273 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 256 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 256 that a phone call to a U.S. embassy had warned that Bin Ladin supporters were planning an attack in the United States using “high explosives.” On May 17, based on the previous day’s report, the first item on the CSG’s agenda was 9 The anonymous caller’s tip could not be “UBL: Operation Planned in U.S.” corroborated. Late May brought reports of a possible hostage plot against Americans abroad to force the release of prisoners, including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the “Blind Sheikh,” who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 plot to blow up sites in New York City. The reporting noted that operatives might opt to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. This report led to a Federal Avia- tion Administration (FAA) information circular to airlines noting the potential for “an airline hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the United States.” Other reporting mentioned that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack, possi- bly against Israel, and expected to carry out several more if things went well. On May 24 alone, counterterrorism officials grappled with reports alleging plots in Yemen and Italy, as well as a report about a cell in Canada that an anonymous 10 caller had claimed might be planning an attack against the United States. Reports similar to many of these were made available to President Bush in morning intelligence briefings with DCI Tenet, usually attended by Vice Pres- ident Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice.While these briefings discussed general threats to attack America and American interests, the specific threats mentioned in these briefings were all overseas. On May 29, Clarke suggested that Rice ask DCI Tenet what more the United States could do to stop Abu Zubaydah from launching “a series of major terrorist attacks,” probably on Israeli targets, but possibly on U.S. facilities. Clarke wrote to Rice and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, “When these attacks occur, as they likely will, we will wonder what more we could have done to stop them.” In May, CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) Chief Cofer Black told Rice that the current threat level was a 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, as com- 11 pared to an 8 during the millennium. High Probability of Near-Term “Spectacular” Attacks Threat reports surged in June and July, reaching an even higher peak of urgency. The summer threats seemed to be focused on Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and possibly Rome, but the danger could be anywhere— including a possible attack on the G-8 summit in Genoa.A June 12 CIA report passing along biographical background information on several terrorists men- tioned, in commenting on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that he was recruiting people to travel to the United States to meet with colleagues already there so that they might conduct terrorist attacks on Bin Ladin’s behalf. On June 22, ligence suggesting a possible the CIA notified all its station chiefs about intel al Qaeda suicide attack on a U.S. target over the next few days. DCI Tenet asked 12 that all U.S. ambassadors be briefed.

274 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 257 257 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” That same day, the State Department notified all embassies of the terrorist threat and updated its worldwide public warning. In June, the State Depart- ment initiated the Visa Express program in Saudi Arabia as a security measure, away from in order to keep long lines of foreigners vulnerable embassy spaces. The program permitted visa applications to be made through travel agencies, 13 instead of directly at the embassy or consulate. A terrorist threat advisory distributed in late June indicated a high proba- bility of near-term “spectacular” terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casu- alties. Other reports’ titles warned,“Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent” and “Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats.” The latter reported multiple attacks planned over the coming days, including a “severe blow” 14 against U.S. and Israeli “interests” during the next two weeks. On June 21, near the height of the threat reporting, U.S. Central Command raised the force protection condition level for U.S. troops in six countries to the highest possible level, Delta.The U.S. Fifth Fleet moved out of its port in Bahrain, and a U.S. Marine Corps exercise in Jordan was halted. U.S. embassies in the Persian Gulf conducted an emergency security review, and the embassy in Yemen was closed.The CSG had foreign emergency response teams, known as FESTs, ready to move on four hours’ notice and kept up the terrorism alert 15 posture on a “rolling 24 hour basis.” On June 25, Clarke warned Rice and Hadley that six separate intelligence reports showed al Qaeda personnel warning of a pending attack.An Arabic tel- evision station reported Bin Ladin’s pleasure with al Qaeda leaders who were saying that the next weeks “will witness important surprises” and that U.S. and Israeli interests will be targeted. Al Qaeda also released a new recruitment and fund-raising tape. Clarke wrote that this was all too sophisticated to be merely a psychological operation to keep the United States on edge, and the CIA agreed.The intelligence reporting consistently described the upcoming attacks as occurring on a calamitous level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil and that they would consist of possible multiple—but not nec- 16 essarily simultaneous—attacks. On June 28, Clarke wrote Rice that the pattern of al Qaeda activity indi- cating attack planning over the past six weeks “had reached a crescendo.” “A series of new reports continue to convince me and analysts at State, CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and NSA that a major terrorist attack or series of attacks is likely in July,” he noted. One al Qaeda intelligence report warned that something “very, very, very, very” big was about to happen, and most of Bin Ladin’s network was reportedly anticipating the attack. In late June, the with their CIA ordered all its station chiefs to shar e information on al Qaeda 17 cells. uptions of push for immediate disr host governments and to The headline of a June 30 briefing to top officials was stark:“Bin Ladin Plan- ning High-Profile Attacks.” The report stated that Bin Ladin operatives expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic pro-

275 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 258 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 258 portions.That same day, Saudi Arabia declared its highest level of terror alert. Despite evidence of delays possibly caused by heightened U.S. security, the 18 planning for attacks was continuing. On July 2, the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies summarizing informa- tion regarding threats from Bin Ladin. It warned that there was an increased volume of threat reporting, indicating a potential for attacks against U.S. tar- gets abroad from groups “aligned with or sympathetic to Usama Bin Ladin.” Despite the general warnings, the message further stated, “The FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States.” However, it went on to emphasize that the possibility of attack in the United States could not be discounted. It also noted that the July 4 holiday might heighten the threats.The report asked recipients to “exercise extreme vigilance” and “report suspicious activities” to the FBI. It did not suggest specific actions 19 that they should take to prevent attacks. Disruption operations against al Qaeda–affiliated cells were launched involving 20 countries. Several terrorist operatives were detained by foreign governments, possibly disrupting operations in the Gulf and Italy and perhaps averting attacks against two or three U.S. embassies. Clarke and others told us of a particular concern about possible attacks on the Fourth of July. After it 20 passed uneventfully, the CSG decided to maintain the alert. To enlist more international help,Vice President Cheney contacted Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5. Hadley apparently called European coun- terparts, while Clarke worked with senior officials in the Gulf. In late July, because of threats, Italy closed the airspace over Genoa and mounted antiair- craft batteries at the Genoa airport during the G-8 summit, which President 21 Bush attended. At home, the CSG arranged for the CIA to brief intelligence and security officials from several domestic agencies. On July 5, representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the FAA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs, the CIA, and the FBI met with Clarke to discuss the current threat. Attendees report that they were told not to disseminate the threat information they received at the meeting. They interpreted this direc- tion to mean that although they could brief their superiors, they could not send out advisories to the field.An NSC official recalls a somewhat different empha- sis, saying that attendees were asked to take the information back to their home agencies and “do what you can” with it, subject to classification and distribu- tion restrictions. A representative from the INS asked for a summary of the 22 information that she could share with field offices. She never received one. That same day, the CIA briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on the al Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent. Ashcroft was told that preparations for multiple attacks were in late stages or already com-

276 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 259 259 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” plete and that little additional war be expected. The briefing ning could 23 addressed only threats outside the United States. The next day, the CIA representative told the CSG that al Qaeda members believed the upcoming attack would be “spectacular,” qualitatively different 24 from anything they had done to date. Apparently as a result of the July 5 meeting with Clarke, the interagency committee on federal building security was tasked to examine security meas- ures. This committee met on July 9, when 37 officials from 27 agencies and organizations were briefed on the “current threat level” in the United States. They were told that not only the threat reports from abroad but also the recent convictions in the East Africa bombings trial, the conviction of Ahmed Ressam, and the just-returned Khobar Towers indictments reinforced the need to “exercise extreme vigilance.” Attendees were expected to determine 25 whether their respective agencies needed enhanced security measures. On July 18, 2001, the State Department provided a warning to the public 26 regarding possible terrorist attacks in the Arabian Peninsula. Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard told us he had one of his periodic con- ference calls with all special agents in charge on July 19. He said one of the items he mentioned was the need, in light of increased threat reporting, to have evidence response teams ready to move at a moment’s notice, in case of an 27 He did not task field offices to try to determine whether any plots attack. were being considered within the United States or to take any action to dis- rupt any such plots. In mid-July, reporting started to indicate that Bin Ladin’s plans had been delayed, maybe for as long as two months, but not abandoned. On July 23, the lead item for CSG discussion was still the al Qaeda threat, and it included men- 28 tion of suspected terrorist travel to the United States. On July 31, an FAA circular appeared alerting the aviation community to “reports of possible near-term terrorist operations . . . particularly on the Ara- bian Peninsula and/or Israel.” It stated that the FAA had no credible evidence of specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation, though it noted that some of the “currently active” terrorist groups were known to “plan and train for hijack- ings” and were able to build and conceal sophisticated explosive devices in lug- 29 gage and consumer products. Tenet told us that in his world “the system was blinking red.” By late July, 30 Not everyone was convinced. Some Tenet said, it could not “get any worse.” asked whether all these threats might just be deception. On June 30, the SEIB contained an article titled “Bin Ladin Threats Are Real.” Yet Hadley told Tenet in July that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz questioned the report- ing. Perhaps Bin Ladin was trying to study U.S. reactions.Tenet replied that he had already addressed the Defense Department’s questions on this point; the reporting was convincing.To give a sense of his anxiety at the time, one senior

277 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 260 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 260 official in the Counterterrorist Center told us that he and a colleague were con- 31 sidering resigning in order to go public with their concerns. The Calm Before the Storm On July 27, Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the spike in intelligence about a near-term al Qaeda attack had stopped. He urged keeping readiness high during the August vacation period, warning that another report suggested 32 an attack had just been postponed for a few months “but will still happen.” On August 1, the FBI issued an advisory that in light of the increased vol- ume of threat reporting and the upcoming anniversary of the East Africa embassy bombings, increased attention should be paid to security planning. It noted that although most of the reporting indicated a potential for attacks on U.S. interests abroad, the possibility of an attack in the United States could not 33 be discounted. On August 3, the intelligence community issued an advisory concluding that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefi- nitely. Citing threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, the advisory suggested that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in 34 security before moving forward with the planned attacks. During the spring and summer of 2001, President Bush had on several occa- sions asked his briefers whether any of the threats pointed to the United States. Reflecting on these questions, the CIA decided to write a briefing article sum- marizing its understanding of this danger. Two CIA analysts involved in prepar- ing this briefing article believed it represented an opportunity to communicate their view that the threat of a Bin Ladin attack in the United States remained 35 The result was an article in the August 6 Presiden- both current and serious. tial Daily Brief titled “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US.” It was the 36th PDB item briefed so far that year that related to Bin Ladin or al Qaeda, and the first devoted to the possibility of an attack in the United States. The President told us the August 6 report was historical in nature. President Bush said the article told him that al Qaeda was dangerous, which he said he had known since he had become President. The President said Bin Ladin had long been talking about his desire to attack America. He recalled some oper- ational data on the FBI, and remembered thinking it was heartening that 70 investigations were under way.As best he could recollect, Rice had mentioned that the Yemenis’ surveillance of a federal building in New York had been looked into in May and June, but there was no actionable intelligence. He did not recall discussing the August 6 report with the Attorney General or whether Rice had done so. He said that if his advisers had told him there was a cell in the United States, they would have moved to take care of it. That 36 never happened. Although the following day’s SEIB repeated the title of this PDB, it did not contain the reference to hijackings, the alert in New York, the alleged casing

278 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 261 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 261 The following is the text of an item from the Presidential Daily Brief received by 37 Redacted material is indicated President George W. Bush on August 6, 2001. by brackets. Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the fighting to America.” After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, accord- ] service. ing to a [— ] service An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [— at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the oper- ative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike. The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin’s first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was plan- ning his own US attack. Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation. Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997. Al-Qa’ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qua’ da members found

279 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 262 262 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s. A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks. We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat ] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin reporting, such as that from a [— wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Shaykh” ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists. Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York. The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US plan- ning attacks with explosives. of buildings in New York, the threat phoned in to the embassy, or the fact that 38 No the FBI had approximately 70 ongoing bin Ladin–related investigations. CSG or other NSC meeting was held to discuss the possible threat of a strike in the United States as a result of this report. Late in the month, a foreign service reported that Abu Zubaydah was con- sidering mounting terrorist attacks in the United States, after postponing pos- sible operations in Europe. No targets, timing, or method of attack were 39 provided. We have found no indication of any further discussion before September 11 among the President and his top advisers of the possibility of a threat of an al Qaeda attack in the United States. DCI Tenet visited President Bush in Crawford,Texas, on August 17 and participated in PDB briefings of the Pres- ident between August 31 (after the President had returned to Washington) and September 10. But Tenet does not recall any discussions with the President of 40 the domestic threat during this period. Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something terrible was planned, and they were desper- ate to stop it. Despite their large number, the threats received contained few

280 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 263 263 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” specifics regarding time, place, method, or target. Most suggested that attacks were planned against targets overseas; others indicated threats against unspeci- fied “U.S. interests.” We cannot say for certain whether these reports, as dra- matic as they were, related to the 9/11 attacks. Government Response to the Threats National Security Advisor Rice told us that the CSG was the “nerve center” for running the crisis, although other senior officials were involved over the course of the summer. In addition to his daily meetings with President Bush, and weekly meetings to go over other issues with Rice,Tenet was speaking reg- ularly with Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The foreign policy principals routinely talked on the telephone 41 every day on a variety of topics. Hadley told us that before 9/11, he and Rice did not feel they had the job of coordinating domestic agencies. They felt that Clarke and the CSG (part of 42 the NSC) were the NSC’s bridge between foreign and domestic threats. There was a clear disparity in the levels of response to foreign versus domes- tic threats. Numerous actions were taken overseas to disrupt possible attacks— enlisting foreign partners to upset terrorist plans, closing embassies, moving military assets out of the way of possible harm. Far less was done domestically— in part, surely, because to the extent that specifics did exist, they pertained to threats overseas.As noted earlier, a threat against the embassy in Yemen quickly resulted in its closing. Possible domestic threats were more vague.When reports did not specify where the attacks were to take place, officials presumed that they would again be overseas, though they did not rule out a target in the United 43 States. Each of the FBI threat advisories made this point. that al Clarke mentioned to National Security Advisor Rice at least twice Qaeda sleeper cells were likely in the United States. In January 2001, Clarke forwarded a strategy paper to Rice warning that al Qaeda had a presence in the United States. He noted that two key al Qaeda members in the Jordanian cell involved in the millennium plot were naturalized U.S. citizens and that one jihadist suspected in the East Africa bombings had “informed the FBI that an extensive network of al Qida ‘sleeper agents’ currently exists in the US.” He added that Ressam’s abortive December 1999 attack revealed al Qaeda sup- 44 His analysis, however, was based not on new porters in the United States. threat reporting but on past experience. The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the foreign and domes- tic threats. The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to U.S. interests there.The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets. The threat that was coming was not from sleeper cells. It was foreign—but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the United States.

281 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 264 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 264 A second cause of this disparity in response is that domestic agencies did not know what to do, and no one gave them direction. Cressey told us that the CSG did not tell the agencies how to respond to the threats. He noted that the agencies that were operating overseas did not need direction on how to respond; they had experience with such threats and had a “playbook.” In con- trast, the domestic agencies did not have a game plan. Neither the NSC (includ- 45 ing the CSG) nor anyone else instructed them to create one. This lack of direction was evident in the July 5 meeting with representa- tives from the domestic agencies.The briefing focused on overseas threats.The bout how they planned to address the domestic agencies were not questioned a as expected of them. Indeed, as noted earlier, threat and were not told what w they were specifically told they could not issue advisories based on the brief- 46 The domestic agencies’ limited response indicates that they did not per- ing. ceive a call to action. Clarke reflected a different perspective in an email to Rice on September 15, 2001. He summarized the steps taken by the CSG to alert domestic agen- cies to the possibility of an attack in the United States. Clarke concluded that domestic agencies, including the FAA, knew that the CSG believed a major al Qaeda attack was coming and could be in the United States. Although the FAA had authority to issue security directives mandating new security procedures, none of the few that were released during the summer of 2001 increased security at checkpoints or on board aircraft. The information circulars mostly urged air carriers to “exercise prudence” and be alert. Prior to 9/11, the FAA did present a CD-ROM to air carriers and airport authorities describing the increased threat to civil aviation. The presentation mentioned the possibility of suicide hijackings but said that “fortunately, we have no indi- 47 The FAA con- cation that any group is currently thinking in that direction.” ducted 27 special security briefings for specific air carriers between May 1, 2001, and September 11, 2001.Two of these briefings discussed the hijacking threat overseas. None discussed the possibility of suicide hijackings or the use 48 of aircraft as weapons. No new security measures were instituted. Rice told us she understood that the FBI had tasked its 56 U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of suspected terrorists and to reach out to informants who might have information about terrorist plots. An NSC staff document at the time describes such a tasking as having occurred in late June but does not indicate whether it was generated by the NSC or the FBI. Other than the pre- viously described April 13 communication sent to all FBI field offices, how- ever, the FBI could not find any record of having received such a directive.The April 13 document asking field offices to gather information on Sunni extremism did not mention any possible threat within the United States and did not order surveillance of suspected operatives. The NSC did not specify what the FBI’s directives should contain and did not review what had been 49 issued earlier.

282 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 265 265 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” Acting FBI Director Pickard told us that in addition to his July 19 confer- ence call, he mentioned the heightened terrorist threat in individual calls with the special agents in charge of field offices during their annual performance review discussions. In speaking with agents around the country, we found lit- tle evidence that any such concerns had reached FBI personnel beyond the 50 New York Field Office. The head of counterterrorism at the FBI, Dale Watson, said he had many discussions about possible attacks with Cofer Black at the CIA. They had expected an attack on July 4. Watson said he felt deeply that something was going to happen. But he told us the threat information was “nebulous.” He wished he had known more. He wished he had had “500 analysts looking at 51 Usama Bin Ladin threat information instead of two.” Attorney General Ashcroft was briefed by the CIA in May and by Pickard in early July about the danger. Pickard said he met with Ashcroft once a week in late June, through July, and twice in August. There is a dispute regarding Ashcroft’s interest in Pickard’s briefings about the terrorist threat situation. Pickard told us that after two such briefings Ashcroft told him that he did not want to hear about the threats anymore. Ashcroft denies Pickard’s charge. Pickard says he continued to present terrorism information during further briefings that summer, but nothing further on the “chatter” the U.S. govern- 52 ment was receiving. The Attorney General told us he asked Pickard whether there was intelli- gence about attacks in the United States and that Pickard said no. Pickard said he replied that he could not assure Ashcroft that there would be no attacks in the United States, although the reports of threats were related to overseas tar- gets. Ashcroft said he therefore assumed the FBI was doing what it needed to do. He acknowledged that in retrospect, this was a dangerous assumption. He did not ask the FBI what it was doing in response to the threats and did not task it to take any specific action. He also did not direct the INS, then still part 53 of the Department of Justice, to take any specific action. In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute.The borders were not hardened.Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic sur- 54 State and local law veillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI’s efforts.The public was not warned. The terrorists exploited deep institutional failings within our government. The question is whether extra vigilance might have turned up an opportu- nity to disrupt the plot. As seen in chapter 7, al Qaeda’s operatives made mis- takes. At least two such mistakes created opportunities during 2001, especially in late August.

283 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 266 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 266 8.2 LATE LEADS—MIHDHAR, MOUSSAOUI, AND KSM In chapter 6 we discussed how intelligence agencies successfully detected some of the early travel in the planes operation, picking up the movements of Khalid al Mihdhar and identifying him, and seeing his travel converge with someone they perhaps could have identified but did not—Nawaf al Hazmi—as well as with less easily identifiable people such as Khallad and Abu Bara.These observations occurred in December 1999 and January 2000.The trail had been lost in Janu- ary 2000 without a clear realization that it had been lost, and without much effort to pick it up again. Nor had the CIA placed Mihdhar on the State Department’s watchlist for suspected terrorists, so that either an embassy or a port of entry might take note if Mihdhar showed up again. On four occasions in 2001, the CIA, the FBI, or both had apparent oppor- tunities to refocus on the significance of Hazmi and Mihdhar and reinvigorate the search for them. After reviewing those episodes we will turn to the han- dling of the Moussaoui case and some late leads regarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. January 2001: Identification of Khallad Almost one year after the original trail had been lost in Bangkok, the FBI and the CIA were working on the investigation of the Cole bombing.They learned of the link between a captured conspirator and a person called “Khallad.”They also learned that Khallad was a senior security official for Bin Ladin who had helped direct the bombing (we introduced Khallad in chapter 5, and returned 55 to his role in the Cole bombing in chapter 6). One of the members of the FBI’s investigative team in Yemen realized that he had heard of Khallad before, from a joint FBI/CIA source four months ear- lier.The FBI agent obtained from a foreign government a photo of the person Cole believed to have directed the bombing. It was shown to the source, and he confirmed that the man in that photograph was the same Khallad he had 56 described. In December 2000, on the basis of some links associated with Khalid al Mihdhar, the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit speculated that Khallad and Khalid al Mihd- 57 har might be one and the same. The CIA asked that a Kuala Lumpur surveillance photo of Mihdhar be shown to the joint source who had identified Khallad. In early January 2001, two photographs from the Kuala Lumpur meeting were shown to the source. One was a known photograph of Mihdhar, the other a photograph of a then unknown subject.The source did not recognize Mihdhar. But he indicated he 58 was 90 percent certain that the other individual was Khallad. This meant that Khallad and Mihdhar were two different people. It also meant that there was a link between Khallad and Mihdhar, making Mihdhar 59 Yet we found no effort by the CIA to renew the seem even more suspicious. long-abandoned search for Mihdhar or his travel companions.

284 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 267 267 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” In addition, we found that the CIA did not notify the FBI of this identifi- cation. DCI Tenet and Cofer Black testified before Congress’s Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to this identification from the beginning. But drawing on an extensive record, including documents that were not available to the CIA personnel who drafted that testimony, we conclude this was not investigators had no knowledge that Khallad the case.The FBI’s primary Cole had been in Kuala Lumpur with Mihdhar and others until after the Septem- ber 11 attacks. Because the FBI had not been informed in January 2000 about Mihdhar’s possession of a U.S. visa, it had not then started looking for him in the United States. Because it did not know of the links between Khallad and 60 Mihdhar, it did not start looking for him in January 2001. This incident is an example of how day-to-day gaps in information sharing can emerge even when there is mutual goodwill.The information was from a joint FBI/CIA source who spoke essentially no English and whose languages were not understood by the FBI agent on the scene overseas. Issues of travel and security necessarily kept short the amount of time spent with the source. As a result, the CIA officer usually did not translate either questions or answers 61 for his FBI colleague and friend. For interviews without simultaneous translation, the FBI agent on the scene received copies of the reports that the CIA disseminated to other agencies regarding the interviews. But he was not given access to the CIA’s internal operational reports, which contained more detail. It was there—in reporting to which FBI investigators did not have access—that information regarding the January 2001 identification of Khallad appeared.The CIA officer does not recall this particular identification and thus cannot say why it was not shared with his FBI colleague. He might not have understood the possible significance of 62 the new identification. In June 2000, Mihdhar left California and returned to Yemen. It is possible that if, in January 2001, the CIA had resumed its search for him, placed him on the State Department’s TIPOFF watchlist, or provided the FBI with the information, he might have been found—either before or at the time he applied for a new visa in June 2001, or when he returned to the United States on July 4. Spring 2001: Looking Again at Kuala Lumpur By mid-May 2001, as the threat reports were surging, a CIA official detailed to the International Terrorism Operations Section at the FBI wondered where the attacks might occur.We will call him “John.” Recalling the episode about the Kuala Lumpur travel of Mihdhar and his associates, “John” searched the CIA’s databases for information regarding the travel. On May 15, he and an official at the CIA reexamined many of the old cables from early 2000, includ- ing the information that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa, and that Hazmi had come 63 to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. The CIA official who reviewed the cables took no action regarding them.

285 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 268 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 268 “John,” however, began a lengthy exchange with a CIA analyst, whom we will call “Dave,” to figure out what these cables meant. “John” was aware of how dangerous Khallad was—at one point calling him a “major league killer.” He concluded that “something bad was definitely up.” Despite the U.S. links evi- dent in this traffic, “John” made no effort to determine whether any of these individuals was in the United States. He did not raise that possibility with his 64 FBI counterpart. He was focused on Malaysia. “John” described the CIA as an agency that tended to play a “zone defense.” He was worrying solely about Southeast Asia, not the United States. In con- 65 trast, he told us, the FBI tends to play “man-to-man.” Desk officers at the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit did not have “cases” in the same sense as an FBI agent who works an investigation from beginning to end.Thus, when the trail went cold after the Kuala Lumpur meeting in January 2000, the desk officer moved on to different things. By the time the March 2000 cable arrived with information that one of the travelers had flown to Los Angeles, the case officer was no longer responsible for follow-up.While several individ- uals at the Bin Ladin unit opened the cable when it arrived in March 2000, no 66 action was taken. The CIA’s zone defense concentrated on “where,” not “who.” Had its infor- mation been shared with the FBI, a combination of the CIA’s zone defense and the FBI’s man-to-man approach might have been productive. June 2001: The Meeting in New York “John’s” review of the Kuala Lumpur meeting did set off some more shar- ing of information, getting the attention of an FBI analyst whom we will call “Jane.” “Jane” was assigned to the FBI’s Cole investigation. She knew that another terrorist involved in that operation, Fahd al Quso, had traveled to 67 Bangkok in January 2000 to give money to Khallad. “Jane” and the CIA analyst, “Dave,” had been working together on - Cole related issues. Chasing Quso’s trail, “Dave” suggested showing some photo- case and had Cole graphs to FBI agents in New York who were working on the 68 interviewed Quso. “John” gave three Kuala Lumpur surveillance pictures to “Jane” to show to the New York agents. She was told that one of the individuals in the photo- graphs was someone named Khalid al Mihdhar. She did not know why the photographs had been taken or why the Kuala Lumpur travel might be signif- icant, and she was not told that someone had identified Khallad in the photo- graphs. When “Jane” did some research in a database for intelligence reports, Intelink, she found the original NSA reports on the planning for the meeting. Because the CIA had not disseminated reports on its tracking of Mihdhar, “Jane” did not pull up any information about Mihdhar’s U.S. visa or about travel 69 to the United States by Hazmi or Mihdhar. “Jane,”“Dave,” and an FBI analyst who was on detail to the CIA’s Bin Ladin

286 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 269 269 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” unit went to New York on June 11 to meet with the agents about the case. Cole “Jane” brought the surveillance pictures. At some point in the meeting she showed the photographs to the agents and asked whether they recognized Quso in any of them. The agents asked questions about the photographs— Why were they taken? Why were these people being followed? Where are the 70 rest of the photographs? The only information “Jane” had about the meeting—other than the pho- tographs—were the NSA reports that she had found on Intelink. These reports, however, contained caveats that their contents could not be shared with crim- inal investigators without the permission of the Justice Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR).Therefore “Jane” concluded that she could not pass on information from those reports to the agents.This decision was potentially significant, because the signals intelligence she did not share linked Mihdhar to a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East.The agents would have established a link to the suspected facility from their work on the embassy bombings case. This link would have made them very interested in 71 The sad irony is that the agents who found learning more about Mihdhar. the source were being kept from obtaining the fruits of their own work. “Dave,” the CIA analyst, knew more about the Kuala Lumpur meeting. He knew that Mihdhar possessed a U.S. visa, that his visa application indicated that he intended to travel to New York, that Hazmi had traveled to Los Angeles, and that a source had put Mihdhar in the company of Khallad. No one at the meeting asked him what he knew; he did not volunteer anything. He told investigators that as a CIA analyst, he was not authorized to answer FBI ques- tions regarding CIA information.“Jane” said she assumed that if “Dave” knew the answers to questions, he would have volunteered them. The New York agents left the meeting without obtaining information that might have started 72 them looking for Mihdhar. Mihdhar had been a weak link in al Qaeda’s operational planning. He had left the United States in June 2000, a mistake KSM realized could endanger the entire plan—for to continue with the operation, Mihdhar would have to travel to the United States again.And unlike other operatives, Mihdhar was not “clean”: he had jihadist connections. It was just such connections that had brought him to the attention of U.S. officials. Nevertheless, in this case KSM’s fears were not realized. Mihdhar received a new U.S. visa two days after the CIA-FBI meeting in New York. He flew to New York City on July 4. No one was looking for him. August 2001: The Search for Mihdhar and Hazmi Begins and Fails During the summer of 2001 “John,” following a good instinct but not as part of any formal assignment, asked “Mary,” an FBI analyst detailed to the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit, to review all the Kuala Lumpur materials one more time. She had been at the New York meeting with “Jane” and “Dave” but had not

287 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 270 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 270 looked into the issues yet herself.“John” asked her to do the research in her 73 free time. “Mary” began her work on July 24.That day, she found the cable reporting that Mihdhar had a visa to the United States.A week later, she found the cable reporting that Mihdhar’s visa application—what w as later discovered to be his destination. On August 21, she his first application—listed New York as “noted with interest” that Hazmi had flown located the March 2000 cable that 2000. She immediately grasped the significance of to Los Angeles in January 74 mation. this infor “Mary” and “Jane” promptly met with an INS representative at FBI head- quarters. On August 22, the INS told them that Mihdhar had entered the United States on January 15, 2000, and again on July 4, 2001. “Jane” and “Mary” also learned that there was no record that Hazmi had left the coun- try since January 2000, and they assumed he had left with Mihdhar in June 2000. They decided that if Mihdhar was in the United States, he should be 75 found. They divided up the work.“Mary” asked the Bin Ladin unit to draft a cable requesting that Mihdhar and Hazmi be put on the TIPOFF watchlist. Both 76 Hazmi and Mihdhar were added to this watchlist on August 24. “Jane” took responsibility for the search effort inside the United States. As the information indicated that Mihdhar had last arrived in New York, she began drafting what is known as a lead for the FBI’s New York Field Office. A lead relays information from one part of the FBI to another and requests that a par- ticular action be taken. She called an agent in New York to give him a “heads- up” on the matter, but her draft lead was not sent until August 28. Her email told the New York agent that she wanted him to get started as soon as possi- ble, but she labeled the lead as “Routine”—a designation that informs the 77 receiving office that it has 30 days to respond. The agent who received the lead forwarded it to his squad supervisor.That same day, the supervisor forwarded the lead to an intelligence agent to open an intelligence case—an agent who thus was behind “the wall” keeping FBI intelligence information from being shared with criminal prosecutors. He also Cole case agents and an agent who had spent significant time in sent it to the 78 Malaysia searching for another Khalid: Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. The suggested goal of the investigation was to locate Mihdhar, determine his contacts and reasons for being in the United States, and possibly conduct an interview. Before sending the lead, “Jane” had discussed it with “John,” the CIA official on detail to the FBI. She had also checked with the acting head of the FBI’s Bin Ladin unit. The discussion seems to have been limited to whether the search should be classified as an intelligence investigation or as a criminal one. It appears that no one informed higher levels of management in 79 There is no evidence that the lead, or either the FBI or CIA about the case. the search for these terrorist suspects, was substantively discussed at any level

288 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 271 271 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” above deputy chief of a section within the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters. case agents read the lead with interest, and contacted “Jane” One of the Cole to obtain more information.“Jane” argued, however, that because the agent was designated a “criminal” FBI agent, not an intelligence FBI agent, the wall kept him from participating in any search for Mihdhar. In fact, she felt he had to destroy his copy of the lead because it contained NSA information from reports that included caveats ordering that the information not be shared without OIPR’s permission. The agent asked “Jane” to get an opinion from the FBI’s National Security Law Unit (NSLU) on whether he could open a criminal 80 case on Mihdhar. Cole “Jane” sent an email to the case agent explaining that according to the NSLU, the case could be opened only as an intelligence matter, and that if Mihdhar was found, only designated intelligence agents could conduct or even be present at any interview. She appears to have misunderstood the complex 81 rules that could apply to this situation. The FBI agent angrily responded: Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain “problems.” Let’s hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL, is get- ting the most “protection.” “Jane” replied that she was not making up the rules; she claimed that they were in the relevant manual and “ordered by the [FISA] Court and every office 82 of the FBI is required to follow them including FBI NY.” It is now clear that everyone involved was confused about the rules govern- ing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels. Because Mihdhar was being sought for his possible connection to or knowl- Cole edge of the bombing, he could be investigated or tracked under the exist- Cole criminal case. No new criminal case was needed for the criminal agent ing to begin searching for Mihdhar. And as NSA had approved the passage of its information to the criminal agent, he could have conducted a search using all available information. As a result of this confusion, the criminal agents who were knowledgeable about al Qaeda and experienced with criminal investiga- tive techniques, including finding suspects and possible criminal charges, were 83 thus excluded from the search. The search was assigned to one FBI agent, and it was his very first coun- terterrorism lead. Because the lead was “routine,” he was given 30 days to open an intelligence case and make some unspecified efforts to locate Mihdhar. He started the process a few days later. He checked local New York databases for

289 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 272 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 272 criminal record and driver’s license information and checked the hotel listed on Mihdhar’s U.S. entry form. Finally, on September 11, the agent sent a lead to Los Angeles, because Mihdhar had initially arrived in Los Angeles in Janu- 84 ary 2000. We believe that if more resources had been applied and a significantly dif- ferent approach taken, Mihdhar and Hazmi might have been found.They had used their true names in the United States. Still, the investigators would have needed luck as well as skill to find them prior to September 11 even if such 85 searches had begun as early as August 23, when the lead was first drafted. Many FBI witnesses have suggested that even if Mihdhar had been found, there was nothing the agents could have done except follow him onto the planes.We believe this is incorrect. Both Hazmi and Mihdhar could have been bombing Cole held for immigration violations or as material witnesses in the case. Investigation or interrogation of them, and investigation of their travel and financial activities, could have yielded evidence of connections to other par- ticipants in the 9/11 plot.The simple fact of their detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the opportunity did not arise. Phoenix Memo The Phoenix memo was investigated thoroughly by the Joint Inquiry and the 86 We will recap it briefly here. In July Department of Justice Inspector General. 2001, an FBI agent in the Phoenix field office sent a memo to FBI headquar- ters and to two agents on international terrorism squads in the New York Field Office, advising of the “possibility of a coordinated effort by Usama Bin Ladin” to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation schools.The agent based his theory on the “inordinate number of individuals of investigative inter- 87 est” attending such schools in Arizona. The agent made four recommendations to FBI headquarters: to compile a list of civil aviation schools, establish liaison with those schools, discuss his the- ories about Bin Ladin with the intelligence community, and seek authority to obtain visa information on persons applying to flight schools. His recommen- dations were not acted on. His memo was forwarded to one field office. Man- agers of the Usama Bin Ladin unit and the Radical Fundamentalist unit at FBI headquarters were addressees, but they did not even see the memo until after September 11. No managers at headquarters saw the memo before September 88 11, and the New York Field Office took no action. As its author told investigators, the Phoenix memo was not an alert about suicide pilots. His worry was more about a Pan Am Flight 103 scenario in which explosives were placed on an air craft.The memo’s refer ences to aviation 89 If the memo had been training were broad, including aeronautical engineering. distributed in a timely fashion and its recommendations acted on promptly, we do not believe it would have uncovered the plot. It might well, however, have sensitized the FBI so that it might have taken the Moussaoui matter more seri- ously the next month.

290 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 273 273 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” Zacarias Moussaoui On August 15, 2001, the Minneapolis FBI Field Office initiated an intelligence investigation on Zacarias Moussaoui.As mentioned in chapter 7, he had entered the United States in February 2001, and had begun flight lessons at Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. He resumed his training at the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, starting on August 13. He had none of the usual qualifications for flight training on Pan Am’s Boeing 747 flight simulators. He said he did not intend to become a commercial pilot but wanted the training as an “ego boosting thing.” Moussaoui stood out because, with little knowledge of flying, he wanted to learn how to “take off and land” 90 a Boeing 747. The agent in Minneapolis quickly learned that Moussaoui possessed jihadist beliefs. Moreover, Moussaoui had $32,000 in a bank account but did not pro- vide a plausible explanation for this sum of money. He had traveled to Pakistan but became agitated when asked if he had traveled to nearby countries while in Pakistan (Pakistan was the customary route to the training camps in Afghanistan). He planned to receive martial arts training, and intended to pur- chase a global positioning receiver. The agent also noted that Moussaoui became extremely agitated whenever he was questioned regarding his religious beliefs.The agent concluded that Moussaoui was “an Islamic extremist prepar- ing for some future act in furtherance of radical fundamentalist goals.” He also 91 believed Moussaoui’s plan was related to his flight training. Moussaoui can be seen as an al Qaeda mistake and a missed opportunity. An apparently unreliable operative, he had fallen into the hands of the FBI. As discussed in chapter 7, Moussaoui had been in contact with and received money from Ramzi Binalshibh. If Moussaoui had been connected to al Qaeda, questions should instantly have arisen about a possible al Qaeda plot that involved piloting airliners, a possibility that had never been seriously ana- lyzed by the intelligence community. The FBI agent who handled the case in conjunction with the INS repre- sentative on the Minneapolis Joint Terrorism Task Force suspected that Mous- saoui might be planning to hijack a plane. Minneapolis and FBI headquarters debated whether Moussaoui should be arrested immediately or surveilled to obtain additional information. Because it was not clear whether Moussaoui could be imprisoned, the FBI case agent decided the most important thing was to prevent Moussaoui from obtaining any further training that he could use to 92 carry out a potential attack. As a French national who had overstayed his visa, Moussaoui could be detained immediately. The INS arrested Moussaoui on the immigration viola- 93 tion. A deportation order was signed on August 17, 2001. The agents in Minnesota were concerned that the U.S.Attorney’s Office in Minneapolis would find insufficient probable cause of a crime to obtain a crim- 94 Agents at FBI headquar- inal warrant to search Moussaoui’s laptop computer. ters believed there was insufficient probable cause. Minneapolis therefore

291 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 274 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 274 sought a special warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the search (we introduced FISA in chapter 3). To do so, however, the FBI needed to demonstrate probable cause that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power, a demonstration that was not required to obtain a criminal warrant but was a statutory requirement for a 95 The case agent did not have sufficient information to connect FISA warrant. Moussaoui to a “foreign power,” so he reached out for help, in the United States and overseas. The FBI agent’s August 18 message requested assistance from the FBI legal attaché in Paris. Moussaoui had lived in London, so the Minneapolis agent sought assistance from the legal attaché there as well. By August 24, the Min- neapolis agent had also contacted an FBI detailee and a CIA desk officer at the 96 Counterterrorist Center about the case. The FBI legal attaché’s office in Paris first contacted the French government on August 16 or 17, shortly after speaking to the Minneapolis case agent on the telephone. On August 22 and 27, the French provided information that made a connection between Moussaoui and a rebel leader in Chechnya, Ibn al Khattab. This set off a spirited debate between the Minneapolis Field Office, FBI headquarters, and the CIA as to whether the Chechen rebels and Khattab were sufficiently associated with a terrorist organization to constitute a “for- eign power” for purposes of the FISA statute. FBI headquarters did not believe this was good enough, and its National Security Law Unit declined to submit 97 a FISA application. After receiving the written request for assistance, the legal attaché in Lon- don had promptly forwarded it to his counterparts in the British government, hand-delivering the request on August 21. On August 24, the CIA also sent a cable to London and Paris regarding “subjects involved in suspicious 747 flight training” that described Moussaoui as a possible “suicide hijacker.” On August 28, the CIA sent a request for information to a different service of the British government; this communication warned that Moussaoui might be expelled to Britain by the end of August. The FBI office in London raised the matter briefly with British officials as an aside, after a meeting about a more urgent matter on September 3, and sent the British service a written update on Sep- tember 5. The case was not handled by the British as a priority amid a large 98 number of other terrorist-related inquiries. On September 4, the FBI sent a teletype to the CIA, the FAA, the Customs Service, the State Department, the INS, and the Secret Service summarizing the known facts regarding Moussaoui. It did not report the case agent’s per- sonal assessment that Moussaoui planned to hijack an airplane. It did contain the FAA’s comment that it was not unusual for Middle Easterners to attend 99 flight training schools in the United States. Although the Minneapolis agents wanted to tell the FAA from the begin- ning about Moussaoui, FBI headquarters instructed Minneapolis that it could

292 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 275 275 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” not share the more complete report the case agent had prepared for the FAA. The Minneapolis supervisor sent the case agent in person to the local FAA 100 office to fill in what he thought were gaps in the FBI headquarters teletype. No FAA actions seem to have been taken in response. There was substantial disagreement between Minneapolis agents and FBI headquarters as to what Moussaoui was planning to do. In one conversation between a Minneapolis supervisor and a headquarters agent, the latter com- plained that Minneapolis’s FISA request was couched in a manner intended to get people “spun up.”The supervisor replied that was precisely his intent. He said he was “trying to keep someone from taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center.” The headquarters agent replied that this was not going 101 to happen and that they did not know if Moussaoui was a terrorist. There is no evidence that either FBI Acting Director Pickard or Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Dale Watson was briefed on the Moussaoui case prior to 9/11. Michael Rolince, the FBI assistant director heading the Bureau’s International Terrorism Operations Sec tion (ITOS), recalled being told about Moussaoui in two passing hallway conver sations but only in the context that he might be receiving telephone calls from Minneapolis complaining about how headquarters was handling the matter. He never received such a call. Although the acting special agent in charge of Minneapolis called the ITOS supervisors to discuss the Moussaoui case on August 27, he declined to go up 102 the chain of command at FBI headquarters and call Rolince. On August 23, DCI Tenet was briefed about the Moussaoui case in a brief- 103 Tenet was also told that Mous- ing titled “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.” saoui wanted to learn to fly a 747, paid for his training in cash, was interested to learn the doors do not open in flight, and wanted to fly a simulated flight from London to New York. He was told that the FBI had arrested Moussaoui because of a visa overstay and that the CIA was working the case with the FBI. Tenet told us that no connection to al Qaeda was apparent to him at the time. Seeing it as an FBI case, he did not discuss the matter with anyone at the White House or the FBI. No connection was made between Moussaoui’s presence in 104 the United States and the threat reporting during the summer of 2001. On September 11, after the attacks, the FBI office in London renewed their appeal for information about Moussaoui. In response to U.S. requests, the British government supplied some basic biographical information about Moussaoui.The British government informed us that it also immediately tasked intelligence collection facilities for information about Moussaoui. On Septem- ber 13, the British government received new, sensitive intelligence that Mous- saoui had attended an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. It passed this intelligence to the United States on the same day. Had this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost certainly have 105 received intense, high-level attention. The FBI also learned after 9/11 that the millennium terrorist Ressam, who

293 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 276 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 276 by 2001 was cooperating with investigators, recognized Moussaoui as some- 106 As mentioned above, before 9/11 one who had been in the Afghan camps. the FBI agents in Minneapolis had failed to persuade supervisors at headquar- ters that there was enough evidence to seek a FISA warrant to search Mous- saoui’s computer hard drive and belongings. Either the British information or the Ressam identification would have broken the logjam. A maximum U.S. effort to investigate Moussaoui conceivably could have unearthed his connections to Binalshibh. Those connections might have brought investigators to the core of the 9/11 plot.The Binalshibh connection was recognized shortly after 9/11, though it was not an easy trail to find. Dis- covering it would have required quick and very substantial cooperation from the German government, which might well have been difficult to obtain. However, publicity about Moussaoui’s arrest and a possible hijacking threat 107 With time, the search for Mihdhar and Hazmi might have derailed the plot. and the investigation of Moussaoui might also have led to a breakthrough that would have disrupted the plot. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Another late opportunity was presented by a confluence of information regarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed received by the intelligence community in the summer of 2001.The possible links between KSM, Moussaoui, and an individual only later identified as Ramzi Binalshibh would remain undiscov- ered, however. Although we readily equate KSM with al Qaeda today, this was not the case before 9/11. KSM, who had been indicted in January 1996 for his role in the Manila air plot, was seen primarily as another freelance terrorist, associated with Ramzi Yousef. Because the links between KSM and Bin Ladin or al Qaeda were not recognized at the time, responsibility for KSM remained in the small Islamic Extremist Branch of the Counterterrorist Center, not in the Bin Ladin unit. Moreover, because KSM had already been indicted, he became targeted for arrest. In 1997, the Counterterrorist Center added a Renditions Branch to help find wanted fugitives. Responsibility for KSM was transferred to this branch, which gave the CIA a “man-to-man” focus but was not an analyti- cal unit.When subsequent information came, more critical for analysis than for tracking, no unit had the job of following up on what the information 108 might mean. For example, in September 2000, a source had reported that an individual named Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was a key lieutenant in al Qaeda. Al- Ballushi means “from Baluchistan,” and KSM is from Baluchistan. Recogniz- ing the possible significance of this information, the Bin Ladin unit sought more information.When no information was forthcoming, the Bin Ladin unit

294 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 277 277 “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 109 When additional pieces of the puzzle arrived in the dropped the matter. spring and summer of 2001, they were not put together. The first piece of the puzzle concerned some intriguing information asso- ciated with a person known as “Mukhtar” that the CIA had begun analyzing in April 2001. The CIA did not know who Mukhtar was at the time—only that he associated with al Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaydah and that, based on the nature of the information, he was evidently involved in planning possible 110 terrorist activities. The second piece of the puzzle was some alarming information regarding KSM. On June 12, 2001, a CIA report said that “Khaled” was actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan, including to the United States where col- leagues were reportedly already in the country to meet them, to carry out terrorist-related activities for Bin Ladin. CIA headquarters presumed from the details of the reporting that this person was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In July, the same source was shown a series of photographs and identified a photograph 111 of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the Khaled he had previously discussed. The final piece of the puzzle arrived at the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit on August 28 in a cable reporting that KSM’s nickname was Mukhtar. No one made the connection to the reports about Mukhtar that had been circulated in the spring. This connection might also have underscored concern about the June reporting that KSM was recruiting terrorists to travel, including to the United States. Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that Muhktar/KSM had com- municated with a phone that was used by Binalshibh, and that Binalshibh had used the same phone to communicate with Moussaoui, as discussed in chap- ter 7.As in the Moussaoui situation already described, the links to Binalshibh might not have been an easy trail to find and would have required substantial cooperation from the German government. But time was short, and running 112 out. Time Runs Out As Tenet told us, “the system was blinking red” during the summer of 2001. Officials were alerted across the world. Many were doing everything they pos- sibly could to respond to the threats. Yet no one working on these late leads in the summer of 2001 connected the case in his or her in-box to the threat reports agitating senior officials and being briefed to the President. Thus, these individual cases did not become national priorities.As the CIA supervisor “John” told us, no one looked at the bigger picture; no analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the 113 thundercloud to the ground. We see little evidence that the progress of the plot was disturbed by any gov- ernment action. The U.S. government was unable to capitalize on mistakes made by al Qaeda.Time ran out.

295 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 278 9 HEROISM AND HORROR 9.1 PREPAREDNESS AS OF SEPTEMBER 11 Emergency response is a product of preparedness. On the morning of Septem- ber 11, 2001, the last best hope for the community of people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public servants, especially the first responders: fire, police, emergency medical service, and building safety professionals. Building Preparedness The World Trade Center (WTC) complex was The World Trade Center. built for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Construction began in 1966, and tenants began to occupy its space in 1970.The Twin Towers came to occupy a unique and symbolic place in the culture of New York City and America. The WTC actually consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel, spread across 16 acres of land.The buildings were connected by an underground mall (the concourse).The Twin Towers (1 WTC, or the North Tower, and 2 WTC, or the South Tower) were the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of office space. Both towers had 110 stories, were about 1,350 feet high, and were square; each wall measured 208 feet in length. On any given workday, up to 50,000 office workers occupied the towers, and 40,000 people 1 passed through the complex. Each tower contained three central stairwells, which ran essentially from top to bottom, and 99 elevators. Generally, elevators originating in the lobby ran to “sky lobbies” on higher floors, where additional elevators carried passengers 2 to the tops of the buildings. Stairwells A and C ran from the 110th floor to the raised mezzanine level of the lobby. Stairwell B ran from the 107th floor to level B6, six floors below ground, and was accessible from the West Street lobby level, which was one 278

296 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 279 279 HEROISM AND HORROR The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11 Rendering by Marco Crupi floor below the mezzanine. All three stairwells ran essentially straight up and down, except for two deviations in stairwells A and C where the staircase jut- ted out toward the perimeter of the building. On the upper and lower bound- aries of these deviations were transfer hallways contained within the stairwell proper. Each hallway contained smoke doors to prevent smoke from rising from lower to upper portions of the building; they were kept closed but not locked. Doors leading from tenant space into the stairwells were never kept locked; 3 reentry from the stairwells was generally possible on at least every fourth floor. Doors leading to the roof were locked. There was no rooftop evacuation plan. The roofs of both the North Tower and the South Tower were sloped and cluttered surfaces with radiation hazards, making them impractical for hel- icopter landings and as staging areas for civilians. Although the South Tower roof had a helipad, it did not meet 1994 Federal Aviation Administration 4 guidelines. The 1993 Terrorist Bombing of the WTC and the Port Authority’s Unlike most of America, New York City and specifically the World Response.

297 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 280 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 280 M . Trade Center had been the target of terrorist attacks before 9/11.At 12:18 . P on February 26, 1993, a 1,500-pound bomb stashed in a rental van was deto- nated on a parking garage ramp beneath the Twin Towers.The explosion killed six people, injured about 1,000 more, and exposed vulnerabilities in the World 5 Trade Center’s and the city’s emergency preparedness. The towers lost power and communications capability. Generators had to be shut down to ensure safety, and elevators stopped. The public-address sys- tem and emergency lighting systems failed. The unlit stairwells filled with smoke and were so dark as to be impassable. Rescue efforts by the Fire Depart- ment of New York (FDNY) were hampered by the inability of its radios to function in buildings as large as the Twin Towers.The 911 emergency call sys- tem was overwhelmed.The general evacuation of the towers’ occupants via the 6 stairwells took more than four hours. Several small groups of people who were physically unable to descend the stairs were evacuated from the roof of the South Tower by New York Police Department (NYPD) helicopters. At least one person was lifted from the North Tower roof by the NYPD in a dangerous helicopter rappel operation— 15 hours after the bombing. General knowledge that these air rescues had occurred appears to have left a number of civilians who worked in the Twin Towers with the false impression that helicopter rescues were part of the WTC evacuation plan and that rescue from the roof was a viable, if not favored, option for those who worked on upper floors. Although they were considered after 1993, helicopter evacuations in fact were not incorporated into the WTC fire 7 safety plan. To address the problems encountered during the response to the 1993 bombing, the Port Authority spent an initial $100 million to make physical, structural, and technological improvements to the WTC, as well as to enhance 8 its fire safety plan and reorganize and bolster its fire safety and security staffs. Substantial enhancements were made to power sources and exits. Fluores- cent signs and markings were added in and near stairwells.The Port Authority also installed a sophisticated computerized fire alarm system with redundant electronics and control panels, and state-of-the-art fire command stations were 9 placed in the lobby of each tower. To manage fire emergency preparedness and operations, the Port Authority created the dedicated position of fire safety director.The director supervised a team of deputy fire safety directors, one of whom was on duty at the fire com- mand station in the lobby of each tower at all times. He or she would be respon- 10 sible for communicating with building occupants during an emergency. The Port Authority also sought to prepare civilians better for future emer- gencies. Deputy fire safety directors conducted fire drills at least twice a year, with advance notice to tenants.“Fire safety teams” were selected from among civilian employees on each floor and consisted of a fire warden, deputy fire war- dens, and searchers.The standard procedure for fire drills was for fire wardens

298 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 281 281 HEROISM AND HORROR to lead co-workers in their respective areas to the center of the floor, where they would use the emergency intercom phone to obtain specific information on how to proceed. Some civilians have told us that their evacuation on Sep- tember 11 was greatly aided by changes and training implemented by the Port 11 Authority in response to the 1993 bombing. But during these drills, civilians were not directed into the stairwells, or pro- vided with information about their configuration and about the existence of transfer hallways and smoke doors. Neither full nor partial evacuation drills were held. Moreover, participation in drills that were held varied greatly from tenant to tenant. In general, civilians were never told not to evacuate up.The standard fire drill announcement advised participants that in the event of an actual emergency, they would be directed to descend to at least three floors below the fire. Most civilians recall simply being taught to await the instruc- tions that would be provided at the time of an emergency. Civilians were not informed that rooftop evacuations were not part of the evacuation plan, or that doors to the roof were kept locked.The Port Authority acknowledges that it 12 had no protocol for rescuing people trapped above a fire in the towers. Six weeks before the September 11 attacks, control of the WTC was trans- ferred by net lease to a private developer, Silverstein Properties. Select Port Authority employees were designated to assist with the transition. Others remained on-site but were no longer part of the official chain of command. However, on September 11, most Port Authority World Trade Department employees—including those not on the designated “transition team”— reported to their regular stations to provide assistance throughout the morn- ing. Although Silverstein Properties was in charge of the WTC on September 13 11, the WTC fire safety plan remained essentially the same. Preparedness of First Responders On 9/11, the principal first responders were from the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM). Port Authority Police Department. On September 11, 2001, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department consisted of 1,331 officers, many of whom were trained in fire suppression methods as well as in law enforcement. The PAPD was led by a superintendent. There was a sepa- rate PAPD command for each of the Port Authority’s nine facilities, including 14 the World Trade Center. Most Port Authority police commands used ultra-high-frequency radios. Although all the radios were capable of using more than one channel, most PAPD officers used one local channel. The local channels were low-wattage and worked only in the immediate vicinity of that command.The PAPD also 15 had an agencywide channel, but not all commands could access it.

299 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 282 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 282 As of September 11, the Port Authority lacked any standard operating pro- cedures to govern how officers from multiple commands would respond to and then be staged and utilized at a major incident at the WTC. In particular, there were no standard operating procedures covering how different commands should communicate via radio during such an incident. The New York Police Department. The 40,000-officer NYPD was headed by a police commissioner, whose duties were not primarily operational but who retained operational authority. Much of the NYPD’s operational activities were run by the chief of department. In the event of a major emer- gency, a leading role would be played by the Special Operations Division.This division included the Aviation Unit, which provided helicopters for surveys and rescues, and the Emergency Service Unit (ESU), which carried out specialized rescue missions.The NYPD had specific and detailed standard operating pro- cedures for the dispatch of officers to an incident, depending on the incident’s 16 magnitude. The NYPD precincts were divided into 35 different radio zones, with a cen- tral radio dispatcher assigned to each. In addition, there were several radio chan- nels for citywide operations. Officers had portable radios with 20 or more available channels, so that the user could respond outside his or her precinct. ESU teams also had these channels but at an operation would use a separate 17 point-to-point channel (which was not monitored by a dispatcher). The NYPD also supervised the city’s 911 emergency call system. Its approximately 1,200 operators, radio dispatchers, and supervisors were civil- ian employees of the NYPD. They were trained in the rudiments of emer- gency response.When a 911 call concerned a fire, it was transferred to FDNY 18 dispatch. The 11,000-member FDNY was The Fire Department of New York. headed by a fire commissioner who, unlike the police commissioner, lacked operational authority. Operations were headed by the chief of department— 19 the sole five-star chief. The FDNY was organized in nine separate geographic divisions. Each divi- sion was further divided into between four to seven battalions. Each battalion contained typically between three and four engine companies and two to four ladder companies. In total, the FDNY had 205 engine companies and 133 lad- der companies. On-duty ladder companies consisted of a captain or lieutenant and five firefighters; on-duty engine companies consisted of a captain or lieu- tenant and normally four firefighters. Ladder companies’ primary function was 20 to conduct rescues; engine companies focused on extinguishing fires. The FDNY’s Specialized Operations Command (SOC) contained a lim- ited number of units that were of particular importance in responding to a terrorist attack or other major incident.The department’s five rescue compa- nies and seven squad companies performed specialized and highly risky res- 21 cue operations.

300 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 283 283 HEROISM AND HORROR The logistics of fire operations were directed by Fire Dispatch Operations Division, which had a center in each of the five boroughs. All 911 calls concern- 22 ing fire emergencies were transferred to FDNY dispatch. As of September 11, FDNY companies and chiefs responding to a fire used analog, point-to-point radios that had six normal operating channels.Typically, the companies would operate on the same tactical channel, which chiefs on the scene would monitor and use to communicate with the firefighters. Chiefs at a fire operation also would use a separate command channel. Because these point-to-point radios had weak signal strength, communications on them could be heard only by other FDNY personnel in the immediate vicinity. In addition, the FDNY had a dispatch frequency for each of the five boroughs; these were not point-to-point channels and could be monitored from around 23 the city. The FDNY’s radios performed poorly during the 1993 WTC bombing for two reasons. First, the radios signals often did not succeed in penetrating the numerous steel and concrete floors that separated companies attempting to communicate; and second, so many different companies were attempting to use 24 the same point-to-point channel that communications became unintelligible. The Port Authority installed, at its own expense, a repeater system in 1994 to greatly enhance FDNY radio communications in the difficult high-rise environment of the Twin Towers. The Port Authority recommended leaving the repeater system on at all times. The FDNY requested, however, that the repeater be turned on only when it was actually needed because the channel could cause interference with other FDNY operations in Lower Manhattan. The repeater system was installed at the Port Authority police desk in 5 WTC, to be activated by members of the Port Authority police when the FDNY units responding to the WTC complex so requested. However, in the spring of 2000 the FDNY asked that an activation console for the repeater system be placed instead in the lobby fire safety desk of each of the towers, making FDNY per- 25 sonnel entirely responsible for its activation.The Port Authority complied. Between 1998 and 2000, fewer people died from fires in New York City since accurate measurements began in 1946. Fire- than in any three-year period fighter deaths—a total of 22 during the 1990s—compared favorably with the 26 most tranquil periods in the department’s history. In Office of Emergency Management and Interagency Preparedness. 1996, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani created the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Man- agement, which had three basic functions. First, OEM’s Watch Command was to monitor the city’s key communications channels—including radio frequen- cies of FDNY dispatch and the NYPD—and other data. A second purpose of the OEM was to improve New York City’s response to major incidents, includ- ing terrorist attacks, by planning and conducting exercises and drills that would involve multiple city agencies, particularly the NYPD and FDNY. Third, the OEM would play a crucial role in managing the city’s overall response to an

301 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 284 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 284 The World Trade Center Radio Repeater System Rendering by Marco Crupi incident.After OEM’s Emergency Operations Center was activated, designated liaisons from relevant agencies, as well as the mayor and his or her senior staff, would respond there. In addition, an OEM field responder would be sent to 27 the scene to ensure that the response was coordinated. The OEM’s headquarters was located at 7 WTC. Some questioned locating it both so close to a previous terrorist target and on the 23rd floor of a build- ing (difficult to access should elevators become inoperable). There was no 28 backup site. In July 2001, Mayor Giuliani updated a directive titled “Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New York.” Its purpose was to elim- inate “potential conflict among responding agencies which may have areas

302 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 285 285 HEROISM AND HORROR of overlapping expertise and responsibility.”The directive sought to accom- plish this objective by designating, for different types of emergencies, an appropriate agency as “Incident Commander.” This Incident Commander would be “responsible for the management of the City’s response to the emergency,” while the OEM was “designated the ‘On Scene Interagency 29 Coordinator.’” Nevertheless, the FDNY and NYPD each considered itself operationally autonomous.As of September 11, they were not prepared to comprehensively coordinate their efforts in responding to a major incident.The OEM had not overcome this problem. 9.2 SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 As we turn to the events of September 11, we are mindful of the unfair per- spective afforded by hindsight. Nevertheless, we will try to describe what hap- pened in the following 102 minutes: • the 17 minutes from the crash of the hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 into 1 World Trade Center (the North Tower) at 8:46 until the South Tower was hit • the 56 minutes from the crash of the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 into 2 World Trade Center (the South Tower) at 9:03 until the collapse of the South Tower • the 29 minutes from the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 until the collapse of the North Tower at 10:28 M A . . From 8:46 until 9:03 At 8:46:40, the hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the upper por- tion of the North Tower, cutting through floors 93 to 99. Evidence suggests that all three of the building’s stairwells became impassable from the 92nd floor instantly by the impact. Hundreds more up. Hundreds of civilians were killed 30 remained alive but trapped. Civilians, Fire Safety Personnel, and 911 Calls North Tower. A jet fuel fireball erupted upon impact and shot down at least one bank of elevators.The fireball exploded onto numerous lower floors, includ- ing the 77th and 22nd; the West Street lobby level; and the B4 level, four stories below ground.The burning jet fuel immediately created thick, black smoke that enveloped the upper floors and roof of the North Tower.The roof of the South Tower was also engulfed in smoke because of prevailing light winds from the 31 northwest. Within minutes, New York City’s 911 system was flooded with eyewit-

303 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 286 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 286 ness accounts of the event. Most callers correctly identified the target of the 32 attack. Some identified the plane as a commercial airliner. The first response came from private firms and individuals—the people and companies in the building. Everything that would happen to them during the next few minutes would turn on their circumstances and their preparedness, assisted by building personnel on-site. Hundreds of civilians trapped on or above the 92nd floor gathered in large and small groups, primarily between the 103rd and 106th floors.A large group was reported on the 92nd floor, technically below the impact but unable to descend. Civilians were also trapped in elevators. Other civilians below the impact zone—mostly on floors in the 70s and 80s, but also on at least the 47th 33 and 22nd floors—were either trapped or waiting for assistance. It is unclear when the first full building evacuation order was attempted over the public-address system. The deputy fire safety director in the lobby, while immediately aware that a major incident had occurred, did not know for approximately ten minutes that a commercial jet had directly hit the building. Following protocol, he initially gave announcements to those floors that had generated computerized alarms, advising those tenants to descend to points of safety—at least two floors below the smoke or fire—and to wait there for fur- ther instructions. The deputy fire safety director has told us that he began instructing a full evacuation within about ten minutes of the explosion. But the first FDNY chiefs to arrive in the lobby were advised by the Port Author- ity fire safety director—who had reported to the lobby although he was no longer the designated fire safety director—that the full building evacuation 34 announcement had been made within one minute of the building being hit. Because of damage to building systems caused by the impact of the plane, public-address announcements were not heard in many locations. For the same reason, many civilians may have been unable to use the emergency intercom 35 phones, as they had been advised to do in fire drills. Many called 911. The 911 system was not equipped to handle the enormous volume of calls it received. Some callers were unable to connect with 911 operators, receiving an “all circuits busy” message. Standard operating procedure was for calls relat- ing to fire emergencies to be transferred from 911 operators to FDNY dispatch operators in the appropriate borough (in this case, Manhattan).Transfers were often plagued by delays and were in some cases unsuccessful. Many calls were 36 also prematurely disconnected. The 911 operators and FDNY dispatchers had no information about either the location or the magnitude of the impact zone and were therefore unable to provide information as fundamental as whether callers were above or below the fire. Because the operators were not informed of NYPD Aviation’s deter- mination of the impossibility of rooftop rescues from the Twin Towers on that day, they could not knowledgeably answer when callers asked whether to go up or down. In most instances, therefore, the operators and the FDNY dis- patchers relied on standard operating procedures for high-rise fires—that civil-

304 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 287 287 HEROISM AND HORROR ians should stay low, remain where they are, and wait for emergency person- nel to reach them.This advice was given to callers from the North Tower for locations both above and below the impact zone. Fire chiefs told us that the evacuation of tens of thousands of people from skyscrapers can create many new problems, especially for individuals who are disabled or in poor health. 37 Many of the injuries after the 1993 bombing occurred during the evacuation. Although the guidance to stay in place may seem understandable in cases of conventional high-rise fires, FDNY chiefs in the North Tower lobby deter- mined at once that all building occupants should attempt to evacuate imme- diately. By 8:57, FDNY chiefs had instructed the PAPD and building personnel to evacuate the South Tower as well, because of the magnitude of 38 the damage caused by the first plane’s impact. These critical decisions were not conveyed to 911 operators or to FDNY dispatchers. Departing from protocol, a number of operators told callers that they could break windows, and several operators advised callers to evacuate if 39 Civilians who called the Port Authority police desk located at 5 they could. 40 WTC were advised to leave if they could. Most civilians who were not obstructed from proceeding began evacuating without waiting for instructions over the intercom system. Some remained to wait for help, as advised by 911 operators. Others simply continued to work or delayed to collect personal items, but in many cases were urged to leave by oth- ers. Some Port Authority civilian employees remained on various upper floors 41 to help civilians who were trapped and to assist in the evacuation. While evacuating, some civilians had trouble reaching the exits because of damage caused by the impact. Some were confused by deviations in the increas- ingly crowded stairwells, and impeded by doors that appeared to be locked but actually were jammed by debris or shifting that resulted from the impact of the 42 plane. Despite these obstacles, the evacuation was relatively calm and orderly. Within ten minutes of impact, smoke was beginning to rise to the upper floors in debilitating volumes and isolated fires were reported, although there were some pockets of refuge. Faced with insufferable heat, smoke, and fire, and 43 with no prospect for relief, some jumped or fell from the building. South Tower. Many civilians in the South Tower were initially unaware of what had happened in the other tower. Some believed an incident had occurred in their building; others were aware that a major explosion had occurred on the upper floors of the North Tower. Many people decided to leave, and some were advised to do so by fire wardens. In addition, Morgan Stanley, which occupied more than 20 floors of the South Tower, evacuated its 44 employees by the decision of company security officials. Consistent with protocol, at 8:49 the deputy fire safety director in the South Tower told his counterpart in the North Tower that he would wait to hear from “the boss from the Fire Department or somebody” before ordering an evacua- 45 At about this time, an announcement over the public-address system in tion.

305 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 288 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 288 The World Trade Center North Tower Stairwell with Deviation Rendering by Marco Crupi the South Tower stated that the incident had occurred in the other building and advised tenants, generally, that their building was safe and that they should remain on or return to their offices or floors. A statement from the deputy fire safety director informing tenants that the incident had occurred in the other building was consistent with protocol; the expanded advice did not correspond to any existing written protocol, and did not reflect any instruction known to have been given to the deputy fire safety director that day.We do not know the reason for the announcement, as both the deputy fire safety director believed to have made it and the director of fire safety for the WTC complex perished in the South Tower’s collapse. Clearly, however, the prospect of another plane hitting the sec- ond building was beyond the contemplation of anyone giving advice.According

306 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 289 289 HEROISM AND HORROR to one of the first fire chiefs to arrive, such a scenario was unimaginable,“beyond our consciousness.”As a result of the announcement, many civilians remained on 46 their floors. Others reversed their evacuation and went back up. Similar advice was given in person by security officials in both the ground- floor lobby—where a group of 20 that had descended by the elevators was per- sonally instructed to go back upstairs—and in the upper sky lobby, where many waited for express elevators to take them down. Security officials who gave this 47 advice were not part of the fire safety staff. Several South Tower occupants called the Port Authority police desk in 5 WTC. Some were advised to stand by for further instructions; others were 48 strongly advised to leave. It is not known whether the order by the FDNY to evacuate the South Tower was received by the deputy fire safety director making announcements there. However, at approximately 9:02—less than a minute before the building was hit—an instruction over the South Tower’s public-address system advised civilians, generally, that they could begin an orderly evacuation if conditions warranted. Like the earlier advice to remain in place, it did not correspond to 49 any prewritten emergency instruction. FDNY Initial Response Mobilization. The FDNY response began within five seconds of the crash. By 9:00, many senior FDNY leaders, including 7 of the 11 most highly ranked chiefs in the department, as well as the Commissioner and many of his deputies and assistants, had begun responding from headquarters in Brooklyn.While en route over the Brooklyn Bridge, the Chief of Department and the Chief of Operations had a clear view of the situation on the upper floors of the North Tower.They determined that because of the fire’s magnitude and location near the top of the building, their mission would be primarily one of rescue.They called for a fifth alarm, which would bring additional engine and ladder com- panies, as well as for two more elite rescue units. The Chief of Department arrived at about 9:00; general FDNY Incident Command was transferred to his location on the West Side Highway. In all, 22 of the 32 senior chiefs and 50 commissioners arrived at the WTC before 10:00. As of 9:00, the units that were dispatched (including senior chiefs respond- ing to headquarters) included approximately 235 firefighters.These units con- sisted of 21 engine companies, nine ladder companies, four of the department’s elite rescue teams, the department’s single Hazmat team, two of the city’s elite squad companies, and support staff. In addition, at 8:53 nine Brooklyn units were staged on the Brooklyn side of the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel to await pos- 51 sible dispatch orders. Operations. A battalion chief and two ladder and two engine companies arrived at the North Tower at approximately 8:52. As they entered the lobby, they encountered badly burned civilians who had been caught in the path of

307 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 290 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 290 the fireball. Floor-to-ceiling windows in the northwest corner of the West Street level of the lobby had been blown out; some large marble tiles had been dislodged from the walls; one entire elevator bank was destroyed by the fire- 52 ball. Lights were functioning, however, and the air was clear of smoke. As the highest-ranking officer on the scene, the battalion chief initially was the FDNY incident commander. Minutes later, the on-duty division chief for Lower Manhattan arrived and took over. Both chiefs immediately began speak- ing with the former fire safety director and other building personnel to learn whether building systems were working.They were advised that all 99 eleva- tors in the North Tower appeared to be out, and there were no assurances that sprinklers or standpipes were working on upper floors. Chiefs also spoke with 53 Port Authority police personnel and an OEM representative. After conferring with the chiefs in the lobby, one engine and one ladder company began climbing stairwell C at about 8:57, with the goal of approach- ing the impact zone as scouting units and reporting back to the chiefs in the lobby.The radio channel they used was tactical 1. Following FDNY high-rise fire protocols, other units did not begin climbing immediately, as the chiefs worked to formulate a plan before sending them up. Units began mobilizing 54 in the lobby, lining up and awaiting their marching orders. Also by approximately 8:57, FDNY chiefs had asked both building person- nel and a Port Authority police officer to evacuate the South Tower, because in their judgment the impact of the plane into the North Tower made the entire 55 complex unsafe—not because of concerns about a possible second plane. The FDNY chiefs in the increasingly crowded North Tower lobby were had ordered units confronting critical choices with little to no information.They up the stairs to report back on conditions, but did not know what the impact floors were; they did not know if any stairwells into the impact zone were clear; and they did not know whether water for firefighting would be available on the upper floors.They also did not know what the fire and impact zone looked 56 like from the outside. They did know that the explosion had been large enough to send down a fireball that blew out elevators and windows in the lobby and that conditions were so dire that some civilians on upper floors were jumping or falling from the building.They also knew from building personnel that some civilians were trapped in elevators and on specific floors. According to Division Chief for Lower Manhattan Peter Hayden, “We had a very strong sense we would lose firefighters and that we were in deep trouble, but we had estimates of 25,000 57 to 50,000 civilians, and we had to try to rescue them.” The chiefs concluded that this would be a rescue operation, not a firefight- ing operation. One of the chiefs present explained: We realized that, because of the impact of the plane, that there was some structural damage to the building, and most likely that the fire suppres-

308 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 291 291 HEROISM AND HORROR sion systems within the building were probably damaged and possibly that at the height of the day there were as many ...We knew inoperable as 50,000 people in this building.We had a large volume of fire on the upper floors. Each floor was approximately an acre in size. Several floors of fire would have been beyond the fire-extinguishing capability of the forces that we had on hand. So we determined, very early on, that this was going to be strictly a rescue mission. We were going to vacate the 58 building, get everybody out, and then we were going to get out. The specifics of the mission were harder to determine, as they had almost no information about the situation 80 or more stories above them.They also received advice from senior FDNY chiefs that while the building might even- tually suffer a partial collapse on upper floors, such structural failure was not 59 imminent. No one anticipated the possibility of a total collapse. Emergency medical services (EMS) personnel were directed to one of four triage areas being set up around the perimeter of the WTC. Some entered the lobby to respond to specific casualty reports. In addition, many ambulance para- 60 medics from private hospitals were rushing to the WTC complex. NYPD Initial Response Numerous NYPD officers saw the plane strike the North Tower and immedi- 61 ately reported it to NYPD communications dispatchers. At 8:58, while en route, the NYPD Chief of Department raised the NYPD’s mobilization to level 4, thereby sending to the WTC approximately 22 lieutenants, 100 sergeants, and 800 police officers from all over the city. The 62 Chief of Department arrived at Church and Vesey at 9:00. At 9:01, the NYPD patrol mobilization point was moved to West and Vesey in order to handle the greater number of patrol officers dispatched in the higher-level mobilization. These officers would be stationed around the perimeter of the complex to direct the evacuation of civilians. Many were diverted on the way to the scene by intervening emergencies related to the 63 attack. At 8:50, the Aviation Unit of the NYPD dispatched two helicopters to the WTC to report on conditions and assess the feasibility of a rooftop landing or of special rescue operations. En route, the two helicopters communicated with air traffic controllers at the area’s three major airports and informed them of the commercial airplane crash at the World Trade Center.The air traffic con- 64 trollers had been unaware of the incident. At 8:56, an NYPD ESU team asked to be picked up at the Wall Street hel- iport to initiate rooftop rescues. At 8:58, however, after assessing the North Tower roof, a helicopter pilot advised the ESU team that they could not land 65 on the roof, because “it is too engulfed in flames and heavy smoke condition.” By 9:00, a third NYPD helicopter was responding to the WTC complex.

309 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 292 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 292 NYPD helicopters and ESU officers remained on the scene throughout the morning, prepared to commence rescue operations on the roof if conditions improved. Both FDNY and NYPD protocols called for FDNY personnel to be placed in NYPD helicopters in the event of an attempted rooftop rescue at a high-rise fire. No FDNY personnel were placed in NYPD helicopters on 66 September 11. The 911 operators and FDNY dispatchers were not advised that rooftop rescues were not being undertaken.They thus were not able to communicate 67 this fact to callers, some of whom spoke of attempting to climb to the roof. Two on-duty NYPD officers were on the 20th floor of the North Tower at 8:46.They climbed to the 29th floor, urging civilians to evacuate, but did not 68 locate a group of civilians trapped on the 22nd floor. Just before 9:00, an ESU team began to walk from Church and Vesey to the North Tower lobby, with the goal of climbing toward and setting up a triage center on the upper floors for the severely injured.A second ESU team would 69 follow them to assist in removing those individuals. Numerous officers responded in order to help injured civilians and to urge those who could walk to vacate the area immediately. Putting themselves in danger of falling debris, several officers entered the plaza and successfully res- cued at least one injured, nonambulatory civilian, and attempted to rescue 70 others. Also by about 9:00, transit officers began shutting down subway stations in the vicinity of the World Trade Center and evacuating civilians from those 71 stations. Around the city, the NYPD cleared major thoroughfares for emergency vehicles to access the WTC.The NYPD and PAPD coordinated the closing of 72 bridges and tunnels into Manhattan. PAPD Initial Response The Port Authority’s on-site commanding police officer was standing in the concourse when a fireball erupted out of elevator shafts and exploded onto the mall concourse, causing him to dive for cover. The on-duty sergeant initially instructed the officers in the WTC Command to meet at the police desk in 5 WTC. Soon thereafter, he instructed officers arriving from outside commands to meet him at the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. A few of these 73 officers from outside commands were given WTC Command radios. One Port Authority police officer at the WTC immediately began climb- 74 Other officers began performing res- ing stairwell C in the North Tower. cue and evacuation operations on the ground floors and in the PATH (Port Authority Trans-Hudson) station below the WTC complex. Within minutes of impact, Port Authority police officers from the PATH, bridges, tunnels, and airport commands began responding to the WTC. The PAPD lacked written standard operating procedures for personnel responding from outside commands to the WTC during a major incident. In addition, offi-

310 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 293 293 HEROISM AND HORROR cers from some PAPD commands lacked interoperable radio frequencies. As a 75 result, there was no comprehensive coordination of PAPD’s overall response. At 9:00, the PAPD commanding officer of the WTC ordered an evacuation of all civilians in the World Trade Center complex, because of the magnitude of the calamity in the North Tower. This order was given over WTC police radio channel W, which could not be heard by the deputy fire safety director 76 in the South Tower. Also at 9:00, the PAPD Superintendent and Chief of Department arrived 77 separately and made their way to the North Tower. OEM Initial Response By 8:48, officials in OEM headquarters on the 23rd floor of 7 WTC—just to the north of the North Tower—began to activate the Emergency Operations Center by calling such agencies as the FDNY, NYPD, Department of Health, and the Greater Hospital Association and instructing them to send their des- ignated representatives to the OEM. In addition, the Federal Emergency Man- agement Agency (FEMA) was called and asked to send at least five federal Urban Search and Rescue Teams (such teams are located throughout the United States). At approximately 8:50, a senior representative from the OEM arrived in the lobby of the North Tower and began to act as the OEM field responder to the incident. He soon was joined by several other OEM officials, 78 including the OEM Director. Summary M A . . on September 11, New In the 17-minute period between 8:46 and 9:03 York City and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had mobilized the largest rescue operation in the city’s history. Well over a thousand first responders had been deployed, an evacuation had begun, and the critical deci- sion that the fire could not be fought had been made. Then the second plane hit. M . A . From 9:03 until 9:59 At 9:03:11, the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 hit 2 WTC (the South Tower) from the south, crashing through the 77th to 85th floors.What had been the largest and most complicated rescue operation in city history instantly dou- bled in magnitude.The plane banked as it hit the building, leaving portions of the building undamaged on impact floors. As a consequence—and in contrast to the situation in the North Tower—one of the stairwells (A) initially remained 79 passable from at least the 91st floor down, and likely from top to bottom. Civilians, Fire Safety Personnel, and 911 Calls South Tower. At the lower end of the impact, the 78th-floor sky lobby, hun- dreds had been waiting to evacuate when the plane hit. Many had attempted but failed to squeeze into packed express elevators. Upon impact, many were

311 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 294 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 294 killed or severely injured; others were relatively unharmed.We know of at least one civilian who seized the initiative and shouted that anyone who could walk should walk to the stairs, and anyone who could help should help others in need of assistance. As a result, at least two small groups of civilians descended from that floor. Others remained on the floor to help the injured and move 80 victims who were unable to walk to the stairwell to aid their rescue. Still others remained alive in the impact zone above the 78th floor. Dam- age was extensive, and conditions were highly precarious. The only survivor known to have escaped from the heart of the impact zone described the 81st floor—where the wing of the plane had sliced through his office—as a “dem- olition” site in which everything was “broken up” and the smell of jet fuel was so strong that it was almost impossible to breathe.This person escaped by means of an unlikely rescue, aided by a civilian fire warden descending from a higher 81 floor, who, critically, had been provided with a flashlight. At least four people were able to descend stairwell A from the 81st floor or above. One left the 84th floor immediately after the building was hit. Even at that point, the stairway was dark, smoky, and difficult to navigate; glow strips on the stairs and handrails were a significant help. Several flights down, how- ever, the evacuee became confused when he reached a smoke door that caused him to believe the stairway had ended. He was able to exit that stairwell and 82 switch to another. Many civilians in and above the impact zone ascended the stairs. One small group reversed its descent down stairwell A after being advised by another civil- ian that they were approaching a floor “in flames.” The only known survivor has told us that their intention was to exit the stairwell in search of clearer air. At the 91st floor, joined by others from intervening floors, they perceived themselves to be trapped in the stairwell and began descending again. By this time, the stairwell was “pretty black,” intensifying smoke caused many to pass 83 out, and fire had ignited in the 82nd-floor transfer hallway. Others ascended to attempt to reach the roof but were thwarted by locked doors. At approximately 9:30 a “lock release” order—which would unlock all areas in the complex controlled by the buildings’ computerized security sys- tem, including doors leading to the roofs—was transmitted to the Security Command Center located on the 22nd floor of the North Tower. Damage to the software controlling the system, resulting from the impact of the plane, pre- 84 vented this order from being executed. Others, attempting to descend, were frustrated by jammed or locked doors in stairwells or confused by the structure of the stairwell deviations. By the lower 70s, however, stairwells A and B were well-lit, and conditions were gen- 85 erally normal. Some civilians remained on affected floors, and at least one ascended from a lower point into the impact zone, to help evacuate colleagues or assist the 86 injured. Within 15 minutes after the impact, debilitating smoke had reached at least

312 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 295 295 HEROISM AND HORROR one location on the 100th floor, and severe smoke conditions were reported throughout floors in the 90s and 100s over the course of the following half hour. By 9:30, a number of civilians who had failed to reach the roof remained on the 105th floor, likely unable to descend because of intensifying smoke in the stairwell.There were reports of tremendous smoke on that floor, but at least one area remained less affected until shortly before the building collapsed. There were several areas between the impact zone and the uppermost floors where conditions were better.At least a hundred people remained alive on the 87 88th and 89th floors, in some cases calling 911 for direction. The 911 system remained plagued by the operators’ lack of awareness of what was occurring. Just as in the North Tower, callers from below and above the impact zone were advised to remain where they were and wait for help. The operators were not given any information about the inability to conduct rooftop rescues and therefore could not advise callers that they had essentially been ruled out.This lack of information, combined with the general advice to remain where they were, may have caused civilians above the impact not to 88 attempt to descend, although stairwell A may have been passable. In addition, the 911 system struggled with the volume of calls and rigid stan- dard operating procedures according to which calls conveying crucial informa- 89 According tion had to wait to be transferred to either EMS or FDNY dispatch. to one civilian who was evacuating down stairwell A from the heart of the impact zone and who stopped on the 31st floor in order to call 911, I told them when they answered the phone, where I was, that I had passed somebody on the 44th floor, injured—they need to get a medic and a stretcher to this floor, and described the situation in brief, and the per- son then asked for my phone number, or something, and they said—they put me on hold. “You gotta talk to one of my supervisors”—and sud- denly I was on hold. And so I waited a considerable amount of time. Somebody else came back on the phone, I repeated the story. And then it happened again. I was on hold a second time, and needed to repeat the story for a third time. But I told the third person that I am only telling you once. I am getting out of the building, here are the details, write it 90 down, and do what you should do. Very few 911 calls were received from floors below the impact, but at least one person was advised to remain on the 73rd floor despite the caller’s protests that oxygen was running out.The last known 911 call from this location came 91 at 9:52. Evidence suggests that the public-address system did not continue to func- tion after the building was hit. A group of people trapped on the 97th floor, however, made repeated references in calls to 911 to having heard “announce- ments” to go down the stairs. Evacuation tones were heard in locations both 92 above and below the impact zone.

313 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 296 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 296 By 9:35, the West Street lobby level of the South Tower was becoming over- whelmed by injured people who had descended to the lobby but were having difficulty going on.Those who could continue were directed to exit north or 93 east through the concourse and then out of the WTC complex. By 9:59, at least one person had descended from as high as the 91st floor of that tower, and stairwell A was reported to have been almost empty. Stairwell B was also reported to have contained only a handful of descending civilians at an earlier point in the morning. But just before the tower collapsed, a team of NYPD ESU officers encountered a stream of civilians descending an unidentified stairwell in the 20s.These civilians may have been descending from 94 at or above the impact zone. In the North Tower, civilians continued their evacuation. On North Tower. the 91st floor, the highest floor with stairway access, all civilians but one were uninjured and able to descend.While some complained of smoke, heat, fumes, and crowding in the stairwells, conditions were otherwise fairly normal on floors below the impact.At least one stairwell was reported to have been “clear 95 and bright” from the upper 80s down. Those who called 911 from floors below the impact were generally advised to remain in place. One group trapped on the 83rd floor pleaded repeatedly to know whether the fire was above or below them, specifically asking if 911 oper- ators had any information from the outside or from the news.The callers were transferred back and forth several times and advised to stay put. Evidence sug- 96 gests that these callers died. At 8:59, the Port Authority police desk at Newark Airport told a third party that a group of Port Authority civilian employees on the 64th floor should evacuate. (The third party was not at the WTC, but had been in phone con- tact with the group on the 64th floor.) At 9:10, in response to an inquiry from the employees themselves, the Port Authority police desk in Jersey City con- firmed that employees on the 64th floor should “be careful, stay near the stair- wells, and wait for the police to come up.” When the third party inquired again at 9:31, the police desk at Newark Airport advised that they “absolutely” evac- uate.The third party informed the police desk that the employees had previ- ously received contrary advice from the FDNY, which could only have come via 911. These workers were not trapped, yet unlike most occupants on the upper floors, they had chosen not to descend immediately after impact.They eventually began to descend the stairs, but most of them died in the collapse 97 of the North Tower. All civilians who reached the lobby were directed by NYPD and PAPD offi- cers into the concourse, where other police officers guided them to exit the concourse and complex to the north and east so that they might avoid falling 98 debris and victims. By 9:55, only a few civilians were descending above the 25th floor in stair-

314 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 297 297 HEROISM AND HORROR well B; these primarily were injured, handicapped, elderly, or severely over- 99 weight civilians, in some cases being assisted by other civilians. By 9:59, tenants from the 91st floor had already descended the stairs and exited the concourse. However, a number of civilians remained in at least stair- well C, approaching lower floors. Other evacuees were killed earlier by debris 100 falling on the street. FDNY Response Increased Mobilization. Immediately after the second plane hit, the FDNY 101 Chief of Department called a second fifth alarm. By 9:15, the number of FDNY personnel en route to or present at the scene was far greater than the commanding chiefs at the scene had requested. Five factors account for this disparity. First, while the second fifth alarm had called for 20 engine and 8 ladder companies, in fact 23 engine and 13 ladder com- panies were dispatched. Second, several other units self-dispatched. Third, because the attacks came so close to the 9:00 shift change, many firefighters just going off duty were given permission by company officers to “ride heavy” and became part of those on-duty teams, under the leadership of that unit’s officer. Fourth, many off-duty firefighters responded from firehouses separately from the on-duty unit (in some cases when expressly told not to) or from home.The arrival of personnel in excess of that dispatched was particularly pro- nounced in the department’s elite units. Fifth, numerous additional FDNY per- sonnel—such as fire marshals and firefighters in administrative positions—who 102 lacked a predetermined operating role also reported to the WTC. Almost immediately after the South Tower was hit, The Repeater System. senior FDNY chiefs in the North Tower lobby huddled to discuss strategy for the operations in the two towers. Of particular concern to the chiefs—in light the 1993 bombing—was communica- of FDNY difficulties in responding to tions capability. One of t he chiefs recommended testing the repeater channel 103 to see if it would work. Earlier, an FDNY chief had asked building personnel to activate the repeater channel, which would enable greatly-enhanced FDNY portable radio communications in the high-rises. One button on the repeater system activa- tion console in the North Tower was pressed at 8:54, though it is unclear by whom.As a result of this activation, communication became possible between FDNY portable radios on the repeater channel. In addition, the repeater’s mas- safety desk could hear communications made by FDNY ter handset at the fire on the portable radios on the repeater channel. The activation of transmission master handset required, however, that a second button be pressed. That sec- 104 ond button was never activated on the morning of September 11. At 9:05, FDNY chiefs tested the WTC complex’s repeater system. Because the second button had not been activated, the chief on the master handset could

315 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 298 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 298 not transmit. He was also apparently unable to hear another chief who was attempting to communicate with him from a portable radio, either because of a technical problem or because the volume was turned down on the console (the normal setting when the system was not in use). Because the repeater channel seemed inoperable—the master handset appeared unable to transmit or receive communications—the chiefs in the North Tower lobby decided not to use it.The repeater system was working at least partially, however, on portable FDNY radios, and firefighters subsequently used repeater channel 7 in the 105 South Tower. Command and control decisions were FDNY North Tower Operations. affected by the lack of knowledge of what was happening 30, 60, 90, and 100 floors above. According to one of the chiefs in the lobby, “One of the most critical things in a major operation like this is to have information.We didn’t have a lot of information coming in.We didn’t receive any reports of what was seen from the [NYPD] helicopters. It was impossible to know how much dam- 106 age was done on the upper floors, whether the stairwells were intact or not.” According to another chief present, “People watching on TV certainly had more knowledge of what was happening a hundred floors above us than we [W]ithout critical information coming in . . . it’s very dif- ... did in the lobby 107 ficult to make informed, critical decisions[.]” As a result, chiefs in the lobby disagreed over whether anyone at or above the impact zone possibly could be rescued, or whether there should be even 108 limited firefighting for the purpose of cutting exit routes through fire zones. Many units were simply instructed to ascend toward the impact zone and report back to the lobby via radio. Some units were directed to assist specific groups of individuals trapped in elevators or in offices well below the impact zone. One FDNY company successfully rescued some civilians who were 109 trapped on the 22nd floor as a result of damage caused by the initial fireball. An attempt was made to track responding units’ assignments on a magnetic board, but the number of units and individual firefighters arriving in the lobby made this an overwhelming task.As the fire companies were not advised to the contrary, they followed protocol and kept their radios on tactical channel 1, which would be monitored by the chiefs in the lobby. Those battalion chiefs who would climb would operate on a separate command channel, which also 110 would be monitored by the chiefs in the lobby. Fire companies began to ascend stairwell B at approximately 9:07, laden with about 100 pounds of heavy protective clothing, self-contained breathing apparatuses, and other equipment (including hoses for engine companies and 111 heavy tools for ladder companies). Firefighters found the stairways they entered intact, lit, and clear of smoke. Unbeknownst to the lobby command post, one battalion chief in the North Tower found a working elevator, which he took to the 16th floor before begin- 112 ning to climb.

316 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 299 299 HEROISM AND HORROR In ascending stairwell B, firefighters were passing a steady and heavy stream of descending civilians. Firemen were impressed with the composure and total lack of panic shown by almost all civilians. Many civilians were in awe of the 113 firefighters and found their mere presence to be calming. Firefighters periodically stopped on particular floors and searched to ensure that no civilians were still on it. In a few instances healthy civilians were found on floors, either because they still were collecting personal items or for no apparent reason; they were told to evacuate immediately. Firefighters deputized 114 healthy civilians to be in charge of others who were struggling or injured. Climbing up the stairs with heavy protective clothing and equipment was hard work even for physically fit firefighters.As firefighters began to suffer vary- 115 ing levels of fatigue, some became separated from others in their unit. At 9:32, a senior chief radioed all units in the North Tower to return to the lobby, either because of a false report of a third plane approaching or because of his judgment about the deteriorating condition of the building. Once the rumor of the third plane was debunked, other chiefs continued operations, and there is no evidence that any units actually returned to the lobby. At the same time, a chief in the lobby was asked to consider the possibility of a rooftop res- cue but was unable to reach FDNY dispatch by radio or phone. Out on West Street, however, the FDNY Chief of Department had already dismissed any 116 rooftop rescue as impossible. As units climbed higher, their ability to communicate with chiefs on tacti- cal 1 became more limited and sporadic, both because of the limited effective- ness of FDNY radios in high-rises and because so many units on tactical 1 were trying to communicate at once. When attempting to reach a particular unit, 117 chiefs in the lobby often heard nothing in response. Just prior to 10:00, in the North Tower one engine company had climbed to the 54th floor, at least two other companies of firefighters had reached the sky lobby on the 44th floor, and numerous units were located between the 5th 118 and 37th floors. Immediately after FDNY South Tower and Marriott Hotel Operations. the repeater test, a senior chief and a battalion chief commenced operations in the South Tower lobby. Almost at once they were joined by an OEM field sizable number of away by a responder.They were not, however, joined right fire companies, as units that had been in or en route to the North Tower lobby 119 at 9:03 were not reallocated to the South Tower. A battalion chief and a ladder company found a working elevator to the 40th floor and from there proceeded to climb stairwell B. Another ladder company arrived soon thereafter, and began to rescue civilians trapped in an elevator between the first and second floors. The senior chief in the lobby expressed frustration about the lack of units he initially had at his disposal for South Tower 120 operations. Unlike the commanders in the North Tower, the senior chief in the lobby

317 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 300 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 300 and the ascending battalion chief kept their radios on repeater channel 7. For the first 15 minutes of the operations, communications among them and the ladder company climbing with the battalion chief worked well. Upon learn- ing from a company security official that the impact zone began at the 78th floor, a ladder company transmitted this information, and the battalion chief directed an engine company staged on the 40th floor to attempt to find an ele- 121 vator to reach that upper level. To our knowledge, no FDNY chiefs outside the South Tower realized that the repeater channel was functioning and being used by units in that tower. The senior chief in the South Tower lobby was initially unable to communi- cate his requests for more units to chiefs either in the North Tower lobby or 122 at the outdoor command post. From approximately 9:21 on, the ascending battalion chief was unable to reach the South Tower lobby command post because the senior chief in the lobby had ceased to communicate on repeater channel 7. The vast majority of units that entered the South Tower did not communicate on the repeater chan- 123 nel. The first FDNY fatality of the day occurred at approximately 9:30, when a civilian landed on and killed a fireman near the intersection of West and Lib- 124 erty streets. By 9:30, chiefs in charge of the South Tower still were in need of additional companies. Several factors account for the lag in response. First, only two units that had been dispatched to the North Tower prior to 9:03 reported immedi- ately to the South Tower. Second, units were not actually sent until approxi- mately five minutes after the FDNY Chief of Department ordered their dispatch. Third, those units that had been ordered at 8:53 to stage at the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel—and thus very close to the WTC complex—were not dispatched after the plane hit the South Tower. Fourth, units parked fur- ther north on West Street, then proceeded south on foot and stopped at the overall FDNY command post on West Street, where in some cases they were told to wait. Fifth, some units responded directly to the North Tower. (Indeed, radio communications indicated that in certain cases some firemen believed that the South Tower was 1 WTC when in fact it was 2 WTC.) Sixth, some units couldn’t find the staging area (at West Street south of Liberty) for the South Tower. Finally, the jumpers and debris that confronted units attempting to enter the South Tower from its main entrance on Liberty Street caused some units to search for indirect ways to enter that tower, most often through the 125 Marriott Hotel, or simply to remain on West Street. A chief at the overall outdoor command post was under the impression that he was to assist in lobby operations of the South Tower, and in fact his aide already was in that lobby. But because of his lack of familiarity with the WTC complex and confusion over how to get to there, he instead ended up in the Marriott at about 9:35. Here he came across about 14 units, many of which had been trying to find safe access to the South Tower. He directed them to

318 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 301 301 HEROISM AND HORROR secure the elevators and conduct search-and-rescue operations on the upper these companies searched the spa on the hotel’s floors of the Marriott. Four of 126 top floor—the 22nd floor—for civilians, and found none. Feeling satisfied with the scope of the operation in the Marriott, the chief in the lobby there directed some units to proceed to what he thought was the South Tower. In fact, he pointed them to the North Tower. Three of the FDNY companies who had entered the North Tower from the Marriott found a work- ing elevator in a bank at the south end of the lobby, which they took to the 127 23rd floor. In response to the shortage of units in the South Tower, at 9:37 an addi- tional second alarm was requested by the chief at the West and Liberty streets staging area. At this time, the units that earlier had been staged on the Brook- lyn side of the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel were dispatched to the South Tower; some had gone through the tunnel already and had responded to the Marriott, 128 not the South Tower. Between 9:45 and 9:58, the ascending battalion chief continued to lead FDNY operations on the upper floors of the South Tower.At 9:50, an FDNY ladder company encountered numerous seriously injured civilians on the 70th floor.With the assistance of a security guard, at 9:53 a group of civilians trapped in an elevator on the 78th-floor sky lobby were found by an FDNY company. They were freed from the elevator at 9:58. By that time the battalion chief had reached the 78th floor on stairwell A; he reported that it looked open to the 79th floor, well into the impact zone. He also reported numerous civilian fatal- 129 ities in the area. The overall com- FDNY Command and Control Outside the Towers. mand post consisted of senior chiefs, commissioners, the field communications van (Field Comm), numerous units that began to arrive after the South Tower 130 was hit, and EMS chiefs and personnel. Field Comm’s two main functions were to relay information between the overall operations command post and FDNY dispatch and to track all units operating at the scene on a large magnetic board. Both of these missions were severely compromised by the magnitude of the disaster on September 11. First, the means of transmitting information were unreliable. For example, while FDNY dispatch advised Field Comm that 100 people were reported via 911 to be trapped on the 105th floor of the North Tower, and Field Comm then attempted to convey that report to chiefs at the outdoor com- mand post, this information did not reach the North Tower lobby. Second, Field Comm’s ability to keep track of which units were operating where was limited, because many units reported directly to the North Tower, the South Tower, or the Marriott.Third, efforts to track units by listening to tactical 1 were severely hampered by the number of units using that channel; as many people tried to speak at once, their transmissions overlapped and often became indecipherable. In the opinion of one of the members of the Field

319 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 302 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 302 Comm group, tactical 1 simply was not designed to handle the number of 131 units operating on it that morning. The primary Field Comm van had access to the NYPD’s Special Opera- tions channel (used by NYPD Aviation), but it was in the garage for repairs on 132 September 11.The backup van lacked that capability. The Chief of Department, along with civilian commissioners and senior EMS chiefs, organized ambulances on West Street to expedite the transport of 133 injured civilians to hospitals. To our knowledge, none of the chiefs present believed that a total collapse of either tower was possible. One senior chief did articulate his concern that upper floors could begin to collapse in a few hours, and that firefighters thus should not ascend above floors in the 60s.That opinion was not conveyed to chiefs in the North Tower lobby, and there is no evidence that it was conveyed 134 to chiefs in the South Tower lobby either. Although the Chief of Department had general authority over operations, tactical decisions remained the province of the lobby commanders. The highest-ranking officer in the North Tower was responsible for communicat- ing with the Chief of Department. They had two brief conversations. In the first, the senior lobby chief gave the Chief of Department a status report and confirmed that this was a rescue, not firefighting, operation. In the second con- versation, at about 9:45, the Chief of Department suggested that given how the North Tower appeared to him, the senior lobby chief might want to consider 135 evacuating FDNY personnel. At 9:46, the Chief of Department called an additional fifth alarm, and at 9:54 an additional 20 engine and 6 ladder companies were sent to the WTC. As a result, more than one-third of all FDNY companies now had been dispatched to the WTC.At about 9:57, an EMS paramedic approached the FDNY Chief of Department and advised that an engineer in front of 7 WTC had just remarked 136 that the Twin Towers in fact were in imminent danger of a total collapse. NYPD Response Immediately after the second plane hit, the Chief of Department of the NYPD ordered a second Level 4 mobilization, bringing the total number of NYPD 137 officers responding to close to 2,000. The NYPD Chief of Department called for Operation Omega, which required the protection of sensitive locations around the city. NYPD headquar- 138 ters were secured and all other government buildings were evacuated. The ESU command post at Church and Vesey streets coordinated all NYPD ESU rescue teams.After the South Tower was hit, the ESU officer running this command post decided to send one ESU team (each with approximately six police officers) up each of the Twin Towers’ stairwells.While he continued to monitor the citywide SOD channel, which NYPD helicopters were using, he also monitored the point-to-point tactical channel that the ESU teams climb- 139 ing in the towers would use.

320 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 303 303 HEROISM AND HORROR The first NYPD ESU team entered the West Street–level lobby of the North M . They attempted to . A Tower and prepared to begin climbing at about 9:15 check in with the FDNY chiefs present, but were rebuffed. OEM personnel did not intervene.The ESU team began to climb the stairs. Shortly thereafter, ed the South Tower.The OEM field respon- a second NYPD ESU team enter der present ensured that they check in with the FDNY chief in charge of the lobby, and it was agreed that the ESU team would ascend and support FDNY 140 personnel. A third ESU team subsequently entered the North Tower at its elevated mezzanine lobby level and made no effort to check in with the FDNY com- mand post. A fourth ESU team entered the South Tower. By 9:59, a fifth ESU 141 team was next to 6 WTC and preparing to enter the North Tower. By approximately 9:50, the lead ESU team had reached the 31st floor, observing that there appeared to be no more civilians still descending. This ESU team encountered a large group of firefighters and administered oxygen 142 to some of them who were exhausted. At about 9:56, the officer running the ESU command post on Church and Vesey streets had a final radio communication with one of the ESU teams in the South Tower. The team then stated that it was ascending via stairs, was somewhere in the 20s, and was making slow progress because of the numer- 143 ous descending civilians crowding the stairwell. Three plainclothes NYPD officers without radios or protective gear had begun ascending either stairwell A or C of the North Tower.They began check- ing every other floor above the 12th for civilians. Only occasionally did they find any, and in those few cases they ordered the civilians to evacuate imme- diately.While checking floors, they used office phones to call their superiors. In one phone call an NYPD chief instructed them to leave the North Tower, but they refused to do so.As they climbed higher, they encountered increasing 144 smoke and heat. Shortly before 10:00 they arrived on the 54th floor. Throughout this period (9:03 to 9:59), a group of NYPD and Port Author- ity police officers, as well as two Secret Service agents, continued to assist civil- ians leaving the North Tower. They were positioned around the mezzanine lobby level of the North Tower, directing civilians leaving stairwells A and C to evacuate down an escalator to the concourse.The officers instructed those civilians who seemed composed to evacuate the complex calmly but rapidly. s who were either injured or exhausted collapsed Other civilians exiting the stair 145 at the foot of these stairs; officers then assisted them out of the building. When civilians reached the concourse, another NYPD officer stationed at the bottom of the escalator directed them to exit through the concourse to the north and east and then out of the WTC complex.This exit route ensured that civilians would not be endangered by falling debris and people on West Street, 146 on the plaza between the towers, and on Liberty Street. Some officers positioned themselves at the top of a flight of stairs by 5 WTC that led down into the concourse, going into the concourse when necessary

321 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 304 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 304 to evacuate injured or disoriented civilians. Numerous other NYPD officers were stationed throughout the concourse, assisting burned, injured, and disori- ented civilians, as well as directing all civilians to exit to the north and east. NYPD officers were also in the South Tower lobby to assist in civilian evacu- ation. NYPD officers stationed on Vesey Street between West Street and Church Street urged civilians not to remain in the area and instead to keep 147 walking north. At 9:06, the NYPD Chief of Department instructed that no units were to land on the roof of either tower. At about 9:30, one of the helicopters present advised that a rooftop evacuation still would not be possible. One NYPD hel- icopter pilot believed one portion of the North Tower roof to be free enough of smoke that a hoist could be lowered in order to rescue people, but there was no one on the roof. This pilot’s helicopter never attempted to hover directly over the tower. Another helicopter did attempt to do so, and its pilot stated that the severity of the heat from the jet fuel–laden fire in the North Tower would have made it impossible to hover low enough for a rescue, because the 148 high temperature would have destabilized the helicopter. At 9:51, an aviation unit warned units of large pieces of debris hanging from the building. Prior to 9:59, no NYPD helicopter pilot predicted that either 149 tower would collapse. Interaction of 911 Calls and NYPD Operations. At 9:37, a civilian on the 106th floor of the South Tower reported to a 911 operator that a lower floor—the “90-something floor”—was collapsing. This information was conveyed inaccurately by the 911 operator to an NYPD dispatcher.The dis- patcher further confused the substance of the 911 call by telling NYPD offi- cers at the WTC complex that “the 106th floor is crumbling” at 9:52, 15 minutes after the 911 call was placed. The NYPD dispatcher conveyed this message on the radio frequency used in precincts in the vicinity of the WTC and subsequently on the Special Operations Division channel, but not on 150 City Wide channel 1. PAPD Response Initial responders from outside PAPD commands proceeded to the police desk in 5 WTC or to the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. Some officers were then assigned to assist in stairwell evacuations; others were assigned to expedite evacuation in the plaza, concourse, and PATH station.As information was received of civilians trapped above ground-level floors of the North Tower, other PAPD officers were instructed to climb to those floors for rescue efforts. 151 Still others began climbing toward the impact zone. At 9:11, the PAPD Superintendent and an inspector began walking up stair- well B of the North Tower to assess damage near and in the impact zone.The PAPD Chief and several other PAPD officers began ascending a stairwell in

322 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 305 305 HEROISM AND HORROR order to reach the Windows on the World restaurant on the 106th floor, from which calls had been made to the PAPD police desk reporting at least 100 peo- 152 ple trapped. Many PAPD officers from different commands responded on their own ini- tiative. By 9:30, the PAPD central police desk requested that responding offi- cers meet at West and Vesey and await further instructions. In the absence of a predetermined command structure to deal with an incident of this magnitude, a number of PAPD inspectors, captains, and lieutenants stepped forward at around 9:30 to formulate an on-site response plan. They were hampered by not knowing how many officers were responding to the site and where those officers were operating. Many of the officers who responded to this command 153 post lacked suitable protective equipment to enter the complex. By 9:58, one PAPD officer had reached the 44th-floor sky lobby of the North Tower.Also in the North Tower, one team of PAPD officers was in the mid-20s and another was in the lower 20s. Numerous PAPD officers were also climbing in the South Tower, including the PAPD ESU team. Many PAPD officers were on the ground floors of the complex—some assisting in evacuation, others man- 154 ning the PAPD desk in 5 WTC or assisting at lobby command posts. OEM Response After the South Tower was hit, OEM senior leadership decided to remain in its “bunker” and continue conducting operations, even though all civilians had been evacuated from 7 WTC. At approximately 9:30, a senior OEM official ordered the evacuation of the facility, after a Secret Service agent in 7 WTC advised him that additional commercial planes were not accounted for. Prior to its evacuation, no outside agency liaisons had reached OEM. OEM field responders were stationed in each tower’s lobby, at the FDNY overall com- mand post, and, at least for some period of time, at the NYPD command post 155 at Church and Vesey. Summary The emergency response effort escalated with the crash of United 175 into the South Tower. With that escalation, communications as well as command and control became increasingly critical and increasingly difficult. First responders assisted thousands of civilians in evacuating the towers, even as incident com- manders from responding agencies lacked knowledge of what other agencies and, in some cases, their own responders were doing. A . . M From 9:59 until 10:28 At 9:58:59, the South Tower collapsed in ten seconds, killing all civilians and emergency personnel inside, as well a number of individuals—both first responders and civilians—in the concourse, in the Marriott, and on neighbor- ing streets.The building collapsed into itself, causing a ferocious windstorm and

323 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 306 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 306 creating a massive debris cloud. The Marriott hotel suffered significant dam- 156 age as a result of the collapse of the South Tower. Civilian Response in the North Tower The 911 calls placed from most locations in the North Tower grew increas- ingly desperate as time went on.As late as 10:28, people remained alive in some locations, including on the 92nd and 79th floors. Below the impact zone, it is likely that most civilians who were physically and emotionally capable of descending had exited the tower.The civilians who were nearing the bottom of stairwell C were assisted out of the building by NYPD, FDNY, and PAPD personnel. Others, who experienced difficulty evacuating, were being helped 157 by first responders on lower floors. FDNY Response The FDNY Immediate Impact of the Collapse of the South Tower. overall command post and posts in the North Tower lobby, the Marriott lobby, and the staging area on West Street south of Liberty all ceased to operate upon the collapse of the South Tower, as did EMS staging areas, because of their prox- 158 imity to the building. Those who had been in the North Tower lobby had no way of knowing that the South Tower had suffered a complete collapse. Chiefs who had fled from the overall command post on the west side of West Street took shelter in the underground parking garage at 2 World Financial Center and were not 159 available to influence FDNY operations for the next ten minutes or so. When the South Tower collapsed, firefighters on upper floors of the North Tower heard a violent roar, and many were knocked off their feet; they saw debris coming up the stairs and observed that the power was lost and emer- gency lights activated. Nevertheless, those firefighters not standing near win- dows facing south had no way of knowing that the South Tower had collapsed; many surmised that a bomb had exploded, or that the North Tower had suf- 160 fered a partial collapse on its upper floors. We do not know whether the repeater channel continued to function 161 after 9:59. Initial Evacuation Instructions and Communications. The South Tower’s total collapse was immediately communicated on the Manhattan dis- patch channel by an FDNY boat on the Hudson River; but to our knowledge, no one at the site received this information, because every FDNY command post had been abandoned—including the overall command post, which included the Field Comm van. Despite his lack of knowledge of what had hap- pened to the South Tower, a chief in the process of evacuating the North Tower lobby sent out an order within a minute of the collapse:“Command to all units in Tower 1, evacuate the building.”Another chief from the North Tower lobby 162 soon followed with an additional evacuation order issued on tactical 1.

324 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 307 307 HEROISM AND HORROR Evacuation orders did not follow the protocol for giving instructions when a building’s collapse may be imminent—a protocol that includes constantly repeating “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday”—during the 29 minutes between the fall of the South Tower and that of the North Tower. In addition, most of the evac- uation instructions did not mention that the South Tower had collapsed. How- ever, at least three firefighters heard evacuation instructions which stated that 163 the North Tower was in danger of “imminent collapse.” Within FDNY Personnel above the Ground Floors of the North Tower. minutes, some firefighters began to hear evacuation orders over tactical 1. At least one chief also gave the evacuation instruction on the command channel 164 used only by chiefs in the North Tower, which was much less crowded. At least two battalion chiefs on upper floors of the North Tower—one on the 23rd floor and one on the 35th floor—heard the evacuation instruction on the command channel and repeated it to everyone they came across.The chief on the 23rd floor apparently aggressively took charge to ensure that all fire- fighters on the floors in the immediate area were evacuating. The chief on the 35th floor also heard a separate radio communication stating that the South Tower had collapsed (which the chief on the 23rd floor may have heard as well). He subsequently acted with a sense of urgency, and some firefighters heard the evacuation order for the first time when he repeated it on tactical 1.This chief also had a bullhorn and traveled to each of the stairwells and shouted the evac- uation order:“All FDNY, get the fuck out!”As a result of his efforts, many fire- 165 fighters who had not been in the process of evacuating began to do so. Other firefighters did not receive the evacuation transmissions, for one of four reasons: First, some FDNY radios did not pick up the transmission because of the difficulties of radio communications in high-rises. Second, the numbers trying to use tactical 1 after the South Tower collapsed may have drowned out some evacuation instructions. According to one FDNY lieutenant who was on the 31st floor of the North Tower at the time, “[Tactical] channel 1 just might have been so bogged down that it may have been impossible to get that 166 Third, some firefighters in the North Tower were off-duty order through.” and did not have radios. Fourth, some firefighters in the North Tower had been dispatched to the South Tower and likely were on the different tactical chan- 167 nel assigned to that tower. FDNY personnel in the North Tower who received the evacuation orders did not respond uniformly. Some units—including one whose officer knew that the South Tower had collapsed—either delayed or stopped their evacua- tion in order to assist nonambulatory civilians. Some units whose members had become separated during the climb attempted to regroup so they could descend together. Some units began to evacuate but, according to eyewitnesses, did not hurry. At least several firefighters who survived believed that they and others would have evacuated more urgently had they known of the South Tower’s complete collapse. Other firefighters continued to sit and rest on floors

325 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 308 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 308 while other companies descended past them and reminded them that they were supposed to evacuate. Some firefighters were determined not to leave the build- ing while other FDNY personnel remained inside and, in one case, convinced others to remain with them. In another case, firefighters had successfully descended to the lobby, where another firefighter then persuaded them to reas- 168 cend in order to look for specific FDNY personnel. Other FDNY personnel did not hear the evacuation order on their radio but were advised orally to leave the building by other firefighters and police 169 who were themselves evacuating. By 10:24, approximately five FDNY companies reached the bottom of stair- well B and entered the North Tower lobby.They stood in the lobby for more than a minute, not certain what to do, as no chiefs were present. Finally, one firefighter—who had earlier seen from a window that the South Tower had col- lapsed—urged that they all leave, as this tower could fall as well.The units then proceeded to exit onto West Street.While they were doing so, the North Tower 170 began its pancake collapse, killing some of these men. The Marriott Hotel suffered significant damage in Other FDNY Personnel. the collapse of the South Tower.Those in the lobby were knocked down and enveloped in the darkness of a debris cloud. Some were hurt but could walk. Others were more severely injured, and some were trapped. Several firefight- ers came across a group of about 50 civilians who had been taking shelter in the restaurant and assisted them in evacuating. Up above, at the time of the South Tower’s collapse four companies were descending the stairs single file in 171 a line of approximately 20 men. Four survived. At the time of the South Tower’s collapse, two FDNY companies were either at the eastern side of the North Tower lobby, near the mall concourse, or actu- ally in the mall concourse, trying to reach the South Tower. Many of these men were thrown off their feet by the collapse of the South Tower; they then attempted to regroup in the darkness of the debris cloud and evacuate civil- ians and themselves, not knowing that the South Tower had collapsed. Several of these firefighters subsequently searched the PATH station below the con- 172 course—unaware that the PAPD had cleared the area of all civilians by 9:19. At about 10:15, the FDNY Chief of Department and the Chief of Safety, who had returned to West Street from the parking garage, confirmed that the South Tower had collapsed.The Chief of Department issued a radio order for all units to evacuate the North Tower, repeating it about five times. He then directed that the FDNY command post be moved further north on West Street and told FDNY units in the area to proceed north on West Street toward Chambers Street. At approximately 10:25, he radioed for two ladder compa- nies to respond to the Marriott, where he was aware that both FDNY person- 173 nel and civilians were trapped. Many chiefs, including several of those who had been in the North Tower lobby, did not learn that the South Tower had collapsed until 30 minutes or

326 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 309 309 HEROISM AND HORROR more after the event. According to two eyewitnesses, however, one senior FDNY chief who knew that the South Tower had collapsed strongly expressed the opinion that the North Tower would not collapse, because unlike the South 174 Tower, it had not been hit on a corner. After the South Tower collapsed, some firefighters on the streets neighbor- ing the North Tower remained where they were or came closer to the North Tower. Some of these firefighters did not know that the South Tower had col- lapsed, but many chose despite that knowledge to remain in an attempt to save additional lives. According to one such firefighter, a chief who was preparing to mount a search-and-rescue mission in the Marriott, “I would never think of myself as a leader of men if I had headed north on West Street after [the] South Tower collapsed.” Just outside the North Tower on West Street one fire- fighter was directing others exiting the building, telling them when no jumpers were coming down and it was safe to run out. A senior chief had grabbed an NYPD bullhorn and was urging firefighters exiting onto West away from the WTC. Three of the most Street to continue running north, well senior and respected members of the FDNY were involved in attempting to 175 rescue civilians and firefighters from the Marriott. NYPD Response A member of the NYPD Aviation Unit radioed that the South Tower had col- lapsed immediately after it happened, and further advised that all people in the WTC complex and nearby areas should be evacuated. At 10:04, NYPD avia- tion reported that the top 15 stories of the North Tower “were glowing red” and that they might collapse. At 10:08, a helicopter pilot warned that he did 176 not believe the North Tower would last much longer. Immediately after the South Tower collapsed, many NYPD radio frequen- cies became overwhelmed with transmissions relating to injured, trapped, or missing officers. As a result, NYPD radio communications became strained on most channels. Nevertheless, they remained effective enough for the two clos- 177 est NYPD mobilization points to be moved further from the WTC at 10:06. Just like most firefighters, the ESU rescue teams in the North Tower had no idea that the South Tower had collapsed. However, by 10:00 the ESU officer running the command post at Church and Vesey ordered the evacuation of all ESU units from the WTC complex.This officer, who had observed the South Tower collapse, reported it to ESU units in the North Tower in his evacuation 178 instruction. This instruction was clearly heard by the two ESU units already in the North Tower and the other ESU unit preparing to enter the tower.The ESU team on the 31st floor found the full collapse of the South Tower so unfath- omable that they radioed back to the ESU officer at the command post and 179 asked him to repeat his communication. He reiterated his urgent message. The ESU team on the 31st floor conferred with the FDNY personnel there to ensure that they, too, knew that they had to evacuate, then proceeded down

327 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 310 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 310 stairwell B. During the descent, they reported seeing many firefighters who were resting and did not seem to be in the process of evacuating.They further reported advising these firefighters to evacuate, but said that at times they were not acknowledged. In the opinion of one of the ESU officers, some of these firefighters essentially refused to take orders from cops. At least one firefighter who was in the North Tower has supported that assessment, stating that he was not going to take an evacuation instruction from a cop that morning. How- ever, another firefighter reports that ESU officers ran past him without advis- 180 ing him to evacuate. The ESU team on the 11th floor began descending stairwell C after receiv- ing the evacuation order. Once near the mezzanine level—where stairwell C ended—this team spread out in chain formation, stretching from several floors down to the mezzanine itself.They used their flashlights to provide a path of beacons through the darkness and debris for civilians climbing down the stairs. Eventually, when no one else appeared to be descending, the ESU team exited the North Tower and ran one at a time to 6 WTC, dodging those who still were jumping from the upper floors of the North Tower by acting as spotters for each other.They remained in the area, conducting additional searches for 181 civilians; all but two of them died. After surviving the South Tower’s collapse, the ESU team that had been prepar- ing to enter the North Tower spread into chain formation and created a path for civilians (who had exited from the North Tower mezzanine) to evacuate the WTC complex by descending the stairs on the north side of 5 and 6 WTC, which led down to Vesey Street.They remained at this post until the North Tower collapsed, 182 yet all survived. The three plainclothes NYPD officers who had made it up to the 54th floor of the North Tower felt the building shake violently at 9:59 as the South Tower collapsed (though they did not know the cause). Immediately thereafter, they were joined by three firefighters from an FDNY engine company. One of the firefighters apparently heard an evacuation order on his radio, but responded in a return radio communication,“We’re not fucking coming out!” However, the firefighters urged the police officers to descend because they lacked the protective gear and equipment needed to handle the increasing smoke and heat.The police officers reluctantly began descending, checking that the lower floors were clear of civilians.They pro ceeded down st airwell B, poking their 183 vilians. for ci heads into every floor and briefly looking Other NYPD officers helping evacuees on the mezzanine level of the North Tower were enveloped in the debris cloud that resulted from the South Tower’s collapse.They struggled to regroup in the darkness and to evacuate both them- selves and civilians they encountered.At least one of them died in the collapse of the North Tower. At least one NYPD officer from this area managed to evac- uate out toward 5 WTC, where he teamed up with a Port Authority police officer and acted as a spotter in advising the civilians who were still exiting

328 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 311 311 HEROISM AND HORROR when they could safely run from 1 WTC to 5 WTC and avoid being struck 184 by people and debris falling from the upper floors. At the time of the collapse of the South Tower, there were numerous NYPD officers in the concourse, some of whom are believed to have died there. Those who survived struggled to evacuate themselves in darkness, 185 assisting civilians as they exited the concourse in all directions. Port Authority Response The collapse of the South Tower forced the evacuation of the PAPD com- mand post on West and Vesey, compelling PAPD officers to move north. There is no evidence that PAPD officers without WTC Command radios received an evacuation order by radio. Some of these officers in the North Tower decided to evacuate, either on their own or in consultation with other first responders they came across. Some greatly slowed their own descent in 186 order to assist nonambulatory civilians. . A . After 10:28 M M ., killing all civilians alive on upper . A The North Tower collapsed at 10:28:25 floors, an undetermined number below, and scores of first responders. The FDNY Chief of Department, the Port Authority Police Department Superin- tendent, and many of their senior staff were killed. Incredibly, twelve firefight- ers, one PAPD officer, and three civilians who were descending stairwell B of 187 the North Tower survived its collapse. On September 11, the nation suffered the largest loss of life—2,973—on its soil as a result of hostile attack in its history. The FDNY suffered 343 fatalities— the largest loss of life of any emergency response agency in history. The PAPD suffered 37 fatalities—the largest loss of life of any police force in history.The NYPD suffered 23 fatalities—the second largest loss of life of any police force 188 in history, exceeded only by the number of PAPD officers lost the same day. Mayor Giuliani, along with the Police and Fire commissioners and the OEM director, moved quickly north and established an emergency operations command post at the Police Academy. Over the coming hours, weeks, and months, thousands of civilians and city, state, and federal employees devoted 189 themselves around the clock to putting New York City back on its feet. 9.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT THE PENTAGON If it had happened on any other day, the disaster at the Pentagon would be remembered as a singular challenge and an extraordinary national story.Yet the calamity at the World Trade Center that same morning included catastrophic damage 1,000 feet above the ground that instantly imperiled tens of thousands of people.The two experiences are not comparable. Nonetheless, broader les-

329 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 312 312 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT New York Post © Tamara Beckwith, The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175

330 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 313 HEROISM AND HORROR 313 © Reuters 2004 The Pentagon, after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77 © Reuters 2004 United Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

331 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 314 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 314 sons in integrating multiagency response efforts are apparent when we analyze the response at the Pentagon. The emergency response at the Pentagon represented a mix of local, state, and federal jurisdictions and was generally effective. It overcame the inherent complications of a response across jurisdictions because the Incident Command System, a formalized management structure for emergency response, was in 190 place in the National Capital Region on 9/11. Because of the nature of the event—a plane crash, fire, and partial building collapse—the Arlington County Fire Department served as incident com- mander. Different agencies had different roles. The incident required a major rescue, fire, and medical response from Arlington County at the U.S. military’s headquarters—a facility under the control of the secretary of defense. Since it was a terrorist attack, the Department of Justice was the lead federal agency in charge (with authority delegated to the FBI for operational response). Addi- tionally, the terrorist attack affected the daily operations and emergency management requirements of Arlington County and all bordering and sur- 191 rounding jurisdictions. At 9:37, the west wall of the Pentagon was hit by hijacked American Air- lines Flight 77, a Boeing 757. The crash caused immediate and catastrophic damage. All 64 people aboard the airliner were killed, as were 125 people inside the Pentagon (70 civilians and 55 military service members). One hundred six 192 people were seriously injured and transported to area hospitals. While no emergency response is flawless, the response to the 9/11 terror- ist attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons: first, the strong professional relationships and trust established among emergency responders; second, the adoption of the Incident Command System; and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to response. Many fire and police agencies that responded had extensive prior experience working together on regional events and training exercises. Indeed, at the time preparations were under way at many of these agencies to ensure public safety at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank scheduled to be held later 193 that month in Washington, D.C. Local, regional, state, and federal agencies immediately responded to the Pentagon attack. In addition to county fire, police, and sheriff ’s departments, the response was assisted by the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Fire Department, Fort Myer Fire Department, the Virginia State Police, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management, the FBI, FEMA, a National Medical Response Team, the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, and Firearms, and numerous military personnel within the 194 Military District of Washington. Command was established at 9:41.At the same time, the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center contacted the fire departments of Fair- fax County, Alexandria, and the District of Columbia to request mutual aid.

332 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 315 315 HEROISM AND HORROR The incident command post provided a clear view of and access to the crash 195 site, allowing the incident commander to assess the situation at all times. At 9:55, the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the Pentagon impact area because a partial collapse was imminent; it occurred at 9:57, and 196 no first responder was injured. At 10:15, the incident commander ordered a full evacuation of the com- mand post because of the warning of an approaching hijacked aircraft passed along by the FBI. This was the first of three evacuations caused by reports of incoming aircraft, and the evacuation order was well communicated and well 197 coordinated. Several factors facilitated the response to this incident, and distinguish it from the far more difficult task in New York.There was a single incident, and it was not 1,000 feet above ground. The incident site was relatively easy to secure and contain, and there were no other buildings in the immediate area. 198 There was no collateral damage beyond the Pentagon. Yet the Pentagon response encountered difficulties that echo those expe- rienced in New York. As the “Arlington County: After-Action Report” notes, there were significant problems with both self-dispatching and communica- tions: “Organizations, response units, and individuals proceeding on their own initiative directly to an incident site, without the knowledge and permission of the host jurisdiction and the Incident Commander, complicate the exer- cise of command, increase the risks faced by bonafide responders, and exac- erbate the challenge of accountability.”With respect to communications, the report concludes: “Almost all aspects of communications continue to be prob- lematic, from initial notification to tactical operations. Cellular telephones ... were of little value Radio channels were initially oversaturated. . . . Pagers seemed to be the most reliable means of notification when available and used, 199 but most firefighters are not issued pagers.” It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City and Northern Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and communica- tions that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar scale. The task looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a coordinated manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situation. 9.4 ANALYSIS Like the national defense effort described in chapter 1, the emergency response to the attacks on 9/11 was necessarily improvised. In New York, the FDNY, NYPD, the Port Authority, WTC employees, and the building occu- pants themselves did their best to cope with the effects of an unimaginable catastrophe—unfolding furiously over a mere 102 minutes—for which they were unprepared in terms of both training and mindset. As a result of the

333 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 316 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 316 efforts of first responders, assistance from each other, and their own good instincts and goodwill, the vast majority of civilians below the impact zone were able to evacuate the towers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology has provided a prelim- inary estimation that between 16,400 and 18,800 civilians were in the WTC . on September 11. At most 2,152 individuals died at M . A complex as of 8:46 the WTC complex who were not (1) fire or police first responders, (2) secu- rity or fire safety personnel of the WTC or individual companies, (3) volun- teer civilians who ran to the WTC after the planes’ impact to help others, or (4) on the two planes that crashed into the Twin Towers. Out of this total num- ber of fatalities, we can account for the workplace location of 2,052 individu- als, or 95.35 percent. Of this number, 1,942 or 94.64 percent either worked or were supposed to attend a meeting at or above the respective impact zones of the Twin Towers; only 110, or 5.36 percent of those who died, worked below the impact zone.While a given person’s office location at the WTC does not definitively indicate where that individual died that morning or whether he or she could have evacuated, these data strongly suggest that the evacuation was 200 a success for civilians below the impact zone. Several factors influenced the evacuation on September 11. It was aided greatly by changes made by the Port Authority in response to the 1993 bomb- ing and by the training of both Port Authority personnel and civilians after that time. Stairwells remained lit near unaffected floors; some tenants relied on procedures learned in fire drills to help them to safety; others were guided down the stairs by fire safety officials based in the lobby. Because of damage caused by the impact of the planes, the capability of the sophisticated building systems may have been impaired. Rudimentary improvements, however, such as the addition of glow strips to the handrails and stairs, were credited by some as the reason for their survival. The general evacuation time for the towers dropped from more than four hours in 1993 to under one hour on Septem- ber 11 for most civilians who were not trapped or physically incapable of enduring a long descent. First responders also played a significant role in the success of the evacua- tion. Some specific rescues are quantifiable, such as an FDNY company’s res- cue of civilians trapped on the 22d floor of the North Tower, or the success of FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD personnel in carrying nonambulatory civilians out of both the North and South Towers. In other instances, intangibles combined to reduce what could have been a much higher death total. It is impossible to measure how many more civilians who descended to the ground floors would have died but for the NYPD and PAPD personnel directing them—via safe exit routes that avoided jumpers and debris—to leave the complex urgently but calmly. It is impossible to measure how many more civilians would have died but for the determination of many members of the FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD to continue assisting civilians after the South Tower collapsed. It is

334 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 317 317 HEROISM AND HORROR impossible to measure the calming influence that ascending firefighters had on descending civilians or whether but for the firefighters’ presence the poor behavior of a very few civilians could have caused a dangerous and panicked mob flight. But the positive impact of the first responders on the evacuation 201 came at a tremendous cost of first responder lives lost. Civilian and Private-Sector Challenges The “first” first responders on 9/11, as in most catastrophes, were private- sector civilians. Because 85 percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure is controlled not by government but by the private sector, private-sector civil- ians are likely to be the first responders in any future catastrophes. For that reason, we have assessed the state of private sector and civilian preparedness in order to formulate recommendations to address this critical need. Our rec- ommendations grow out of the experience of the civilians at the World Trade Center on 9/11. Lack of Protocol for Rooftop Rescues. Civilians at or above the impact zone in the North Tower had the smallest hope of survival. Once the plane struck, they were prevented from descending because of damage to or impass- able conditions in the building’s three stairwells. The only hope for those on the upper floors of the North Tower would have been a swift and extensive air rescue. Several factors made this impossible. Doors leading to the roof were kept locked for security reasons, and damage to software in the security command station prevented a lock release order from taking effect. Even if the doors had not been locked, structural and radiation hazards made the rooftops unsuitable staging areas for a large number of civilians; and even if conditions permitted general helicopter evacuations—which was not the case—only several people could be lifted at a time. The WTC lacked any plan for evacuation of civilians on upper floors of the WTC in the event that all stairwells were impassable below. Lack of Comprehensive Evacuation of South Tower Immediately after the North Tower Impact. No decision has been criticized more than the decision of building personnel not to evacuate the South Tower immediately after the North Tower was hit.A firm and prompt evacuation order would likely have led many to safety. Even a strictly “advisory” announcement would not have dissuaded those who decided for themselves to evacuate. The advice to stay in place was understandable, however, when considered in its context. At that moment, no one appears to have thought a second plane could hit the South Tower. The evacuation of thousands of people was seen as inherently dangerous. Additionally, conditions were hazardous in some areas outside the 202 towers. Less understandable, in our view, is the instruction given to some civilians

335 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 318 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 318 who had reached the lobby to return to their offices. They could have been held in the lobby or perhaps directed through the underground concourse. Despite the initial advice given over its public-address system, the South Tower was ordered to be evacuated by the FDNY and PAPD within 12 min- utes of the North Tower’s being hit. If not for a second, unanticipated attack, the evacuation presumably would have proceeded. Once the Impact of Fire Safety Plan and Fire Drills on Evacuation. South Tower was hit, civilians on upper floors wasted time ascending the stairs instead of searching for a clear path down, when stairwell A was at least ini- tially passable. Although rooftop rescues had not been conclusively ruled out, civilians were not informed in fire drills that roof doors were locked, that rooftop areas were hazardous, and that no helicopter evacuation plan existed. In both towers, civilians who were able to reach the stairs and descend were also stymied by the deviations in the stairways and by smoke doors.This con- fusion delayed the evacuation of some and may have obstructed that of others. The Port Authority has acknowledged that in the future, tenants should be made aware of what conditions they will encounter during descent. The NYPD’s 911 operators and Impact of 911 Calls on Evacuation. FDNY dispatch were not adequately integrated into the emergency response. In several ways, the 911 system was not ready to cope with a major disaster. These operators and dispatchers were one of the only sources of information for individuals at and above the impact zone of the towers.The FDNY ordered both towers fully evacuated by 8:57, but this guidance was not conveyed to 911 operators and FDNY dispatchers, who for the next hour often continued to advise civilians not to self-evacuate, regardless of whether they were above or below the impact zones. Nor were 911 operators or FDNY dispatchers advised that rooftop rescues had been ruled out.This failure may have been harmful to civilians on the upper floors of the South Tower who called 911 and were not told that their only evacuation hope was to attempt to descend, not to ascend. In planning for future disasters, it is important to integrate those taking 911 calls into the emergency response team and to involve them in providing up- to-date information and assistance to the public. Preparedness of Individual Civilians. One clear lesson of September 11 is that individual civilians need to take responsibility for maximizing the prob- ability that they will survive, should disaster strike. Clearly, many building occu- pants in the World Trade Center did not take preparedness seriously. Individuals should know the exact location of every stairwell in their work- place. In addition, they should have access at all times to flashlights, which were deemed invaluable by some civilians who managed to evacuate the WTC on September 11.

336 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 319 319 HEROISM AND HORROR Challenges Experienced by First Responders As noted above, in July 2001, The Challenge of Incident Command. Mayor Giuliani updated a directive titled “Direction and Control of Emergen- cies in the City of New York.”The directive designated, for different types of emergencies, an appropriate agency as “Incident Commander”; it would be “responsible for the management of the City’s response to the emergency.” The e incidents are “so multifaceted that no one directive also provided that wher agency immediately stands out as the Incident Commander, OEM will assign 203 the role of Incident Commander to an agency as the situation demands.” To some degree, the Mayor’s directive for incident command was followed on 9/11. It was clear that the lead response agency was the FDNY, and that the other responding local, federal, bistate, and state agencies acted in a supporting role. There was a tacit understanding that FDNY personnel would have pri- mary responsibility for evacuating civilians who were above the ground floors of the Twin Towers, while NYPD and PAPD personnel would be in charge of evacuating civilians from the WTC complex once they reached ground level. The NYPD also greatly assisted responding FDNY units by clearing emer- 204 gency lanes to the WTC. In addition, coordination occurred at high levels of command. For exam- ple, the Mayor and Police Commissioner consulted with the Chief of the Department of the FDNY at approximately 9:20.There were other instances of coordination at operational levels, and information was shared on an ad hoc basis. For example, an NYPD ESU team passed the news of their evacuation 205 order to firefighters in the North Tower. It is also clear, however, that the response operations lacked the kind of integrated communications and unified command contemplated in the directive. These problems existed both within and among individual responding agencies. For a uni- Command and Control within First Responder Agencies. fied incident management system to succeed, each participant must have com- mand and control of its own units and adequate internal communications.This was not always the case at the WTC on 9/11. Understandably lacking experience in responding to events of the magni- tude of the World Trade Center attacks, the FDNY as an institution proved incapable of coordinating the numbers of units dispatched to different points within the 16-acre complex. As a result, numerous units were congregating in the undamaged Marriott Hotel and at the overall command post on West Street Tower still were in desperate need by 9:30, while chiefs in charge of the South of units.With better under standing of the resources already available, additional units might not have been dispatched to the South Tower at 9:37. The task of accounting for and coordinating the units was rendered diffi- cult, if not impossible, by internal communications breakdowns resulting from

337 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 320 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 320 the limited capabilities of radios in the high-rise environment of the WTC and from confusion over which personnel were assigned to which frequency. Fur- thermore, when the South Tower collapsed the overall FDNY command post ceased to operate, which compromised the FDNY’s ability to understand the situation; an FDNY marine unit’s immediate radio communication to FDNY dispatch that the South Tower had fully collapsed was not conveyed to chiefs at the scene.The FDNY’s inability to coordinate and account for the different radio channels that would be used in an emergency of this scale contributed to the early lack of units in the South Tower, whose lobby chief initially could 206 not communicate with anyone outside that tower. Though almost no one at 9:50 on September 11 was contemplating an imminent total collapse of the Twin Towers, many first responders and civilians were contemplating the possibility of imminent additional terrorist attacks throughout New York City. Had any such attacks occurred, the FDNY’s response would have been severely compromised by the concentration of so many of its off-duty personnel, particularly its elite personnel, at the WTC. The Port Authority’s response was hampered by the lack of both standard oper- ating procedures and radios capable of enabling multiple commands to respond in unified fashion to an incident at the WTC. Many officers reporting from the tunnel and airport commands could not hear instructions being issued over the WTC Command frequency. In addition, command and control was complicated by senior Port Authority Police officials becoming directly involved in frontline rescue operations. The NYPD experienced comparatively fewer internal command and con- trol and communications issues. Because the department has a history of mobi- lizing thousands of officers for major events requiring crowd control, its technical radio capability and major incident protocols were more easily adapted to an incident of the magnitude of 9/11. In addition, its mission that day lay largely outside the towers themselves. Although there were ESU teams and a few individual police officers climbing in the towers, the vast majority of NYPD personnel were staged outside, assisting with crowd control and evacu- ation and securing other sites in the city. The NYPD ESU division had firm command and control over its units, in part because there were so few of them (in comparison to the number of FDNY companies) and all reported to the same ESU command post. It is unclear, however, whether non-ESU NYPD officers operating on the ground floors, and in a few cases on upper floors, of the WTC were as well coordinated. Significant shortcomings within the FDNY’s command and control capa- bilities were painfully exposed on September 11. To its great credit, the department has made a substantial effort in the past three years to address these.While significant problems in the command and control of the PAPD also were exposed on September 11, it is less clear that the Port Authority has adopted new training exercises or major incident protocols to address 207 these shortcomings.

338 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 321 321 HEROISM AND HORROR Lack of Coordination among First Responder Agencies. Any attempt to establish a unified command on 9/11 would have been further frustrated by the lack of communication and coordination among responding agencies. Cer- tainly, the FDNY was not “responsible for the management of the City’s response to the emergency,” as the Mayor’s directive would have required.The command posts were in different locations, and OEM headquarters, which could have served as a focal point for information sharing, did not play an inte- grating role in ensuring that information was shared among agencies on 9/11, even prior to its evacuation.There was a lack of comprehensive coordination between FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD personnel climbing above the ground floors in the Twin Towers. Information that was critical to informed decisionmaking was not shared among agencies. FDNY chiefs in leadership roles that morning have told us that their decision making capability was hampered by a lack of information ., a helicopter pilot cautioned that “large A . M from NYPD aviation. At 9:51 pieces” of the South Tower appeared to be about to fall and could pose a dan- ger to those below. Immediately after the tower’s collapse, a helicopter pilot radioed that news.This transmission was followed by communications at 10:08, 10:15, and 10:22 that called into question the condition of the North Tower. The FDNY chiefs would have benefited greatly had they been able to com- municate with personnel in a helicopter. The consequence of the lack of real-time intelligence from NYPD aviation should not be overstated. Contrary to a widely held misperception, no NYPD helicopter predicted the fall of either tower before the South Tower collapsed, and no NYPD personnel began to evacuate the WTC complex prior to that time. Furthermore, the FDNY, as an institution, was in possession of the knowl- edge that the South Tower had collapsed as early as the NYPD, as its fall had been immediately reported by an FDNY boat on a dispatch channel. Because of internal breakdowns within the department, however, this information was not disseminated to FDNY personnel on the scene. The FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD did not coordinate their units that were searching the WTC complex for civilians. In many cases, redundant searches of specific floors and areas were conducted. It is unclear whether fewer first responders in the aggregate would have been in the Twin Towers if there had been an integrated response, or what impact, if any, redundant searches had on the total number of first responder fatalities. Whether the lack of coordination between the FDNY and NYPD on Sep- tember 11 had a catastrophic effect has been the subject of controversy. We believe that there are too many variables for us to responsibly quantify those consequences. It is clear that the lack of coordination did not affect adversely the evacuation of civilians. It is equally clear, however, that the Incident Com- mand System did not function to integrate awareness among agencies or to 208 facilitate interagency response. If New York and other major cities are to be prepared for future terrorist

339 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 322 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 322 attacks, different first responder agencies within each city must be fully coordi- nated, just as different branches of the U.S. military are. Coordination entails a unified command that comprehensively deploys all dispatched police, fire, and other first responder resources. In May 2004, New York City adopted an emergency response plan that expressly contemplates two or more agencies jointly being lead agency when responding to a terrorist attack but does not mandate a comprehensive and uni- fied incident command that can deploy and monitor all first responder resources from one overall command post. In our judgment, this falls short of an optimal response plan, which requires clear command and control, common training, and the trust that such training creates. The experience of the mili- tary suggests that integrated into such a coordinated response should be a uni- fied field intelligence unit, which should receive and combine information from all first responders—including 911 operators. Such a field intelligence unit could be valuable in large and complex incidents. Radio Communication Challenges:The Effectiveness and Urgency of Evacuation Instructions. As discussed above, the location of the NYPD ESU command post was crucial in making possible an urgent evacuation order explaining the South Tower’s full collapse. Firefighters most certainly would have benefited from that information. A separate matter is the varied success at conveying evacuation instructions to personnel in the North Tower after the South Tower’s collapse.The success of NYPD ESU instruction is attributable to a combination of (1) the strength of the radios, (2) the relatively small numbers of individuals using them, and (3) use of the correct channel by all. The same three factors worked against successful communication among FDNY personnel. First, the radios’ effectiveness was drastically reduced in the high-rise environment. Second, tactical channel 1 was simply overwhelmed by the number of units attempting to communicate on it at 10:00. Third, some firefighters were on the wrong channel or simply lacked radios altogether. It is impossible to know what difference it made that units in the North Tower were not using the repeater channel after 10:00. While the repeater channel was at least partially operational before the South Tower collapsed, we do not know whether it continued to be operational after 9:59. at most 32 companies Even without the repeater channel, at least 24 of the who were dispatched to and actually in the North Tower received the evacu- ation instruction—either via radio or directly from other first responders. Nev- ertheless, many of these firefighters died, either because they delayed their evacuation to assist civilians, attempted to regroup their units, lacked urgency, or some combination of these factors. In addition, many other firefighters not dispatched to the North Tower also died in its collapse. Some had their radios on the wrong channel. Others were off-duty and lacked radios. In view of these

340 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 323 323 HEROISM AND HORROR considerations, we conclude that the technical failure of FDNY radios, while a contributing factor, was not the primary cause of the many firefighter fatal- 209 ities in the North Tower. The FDNY has worked hard in the past several years to address its radio deficiencies.To improve radio capability in high-rises, the FDNY has internally developed a “post radio” that is small enough for a battalion chief to carry to 210 the upper floors and that greatly repeats and enhances radio signal strength. The story with respect to Port Authority police officers in the North Tower is less complicated; most of them lacked access to the radio channel on which the Port Authority police evacuation order was given. Since September 11, the Port Authority has worked hard to integrate the radio systems of their differ- ent commands. ... The lesson of 9/11 for civilians and first responders can be stated simply: in the new age of terror, they—we—are the primary targets.The losses Amer- ica suffered that day demonstrated both the gravity of the terrorist threat and the commensurate need to prepare ourselves to meet it. The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can be prevented, civilians and first responders will again find themselves on the front lines.We must plan for that eventuality. A rededication to preparedness is per- haps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that day.

341 Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 324

342 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 325 10 WARTIME After the attacks had occurred, while crisis managers were still sorting out a number of unnerving false alarms, Air Force One flew to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. One of these alarms was of a reported threat against Air Force One itself, a threat eventually run down to a misunderstood com- 1 munication in the hectic White House Situation Room that morning. While the plan at the elementary school had been to return to Washington, A . M . the Secret Service, the by the time Air Force One was airborne at 9:55 President’s advisers, and Vice President Cheney were strongly advising against it. President Bush reluctantly acceded to this advice and, at about 10:10, Air Force One changed course and began heading due west.The immediate objec- tive was to find a safe location—not too far away—where the President could land and speak to the American people.The Secret Service was also interested in refueling the aircraft and paring down the size of the traveling party. The President’s military aide, an Air Force officer, quickly researched the options and, sometime around 10:20, identified Barksdale Air Force Base as an appro- 2 priate interim destination. When Air Force One landed at Barksdale at about 11:45, personnel from the local Secret Service office were still en route to the airfield.The motorcade consisted of a military police lead vehicle and a van; the proposed briefing the- ater had no phones or electrical outlets. Staff scrambled to prepare another room for the President’s remarks, while the lead Secret Service agent reviewed the security situation with superiors in Washington.The President completed his statement, which for security reasons was taped and not broadcast live, and the traveling party returned to Air Force One. The next destination was dis- cussed: once again the Secret Service recommended against returning to Wash- ington, and the Vice President agreed. Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska was chosen because of its elaborate command and control facilities, and because it could accommodate overnight lodging for 50 persons. The Secret Service 3 wanted a place where the President could spend several days, if necessary. 325

343 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 326 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 326 M . At about 3:15, President Bush Air Force One arrived at Offutt at 2:50 . P 4 Rice met with his principal advisers through a secure video teleconference. 5 and said President Bush began the meeting with the words, “We’re at war,” that Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said the agency was still 6 That assessing who was responsible, but the early signs all pointed to al Qaeda. evening the Deputies Committee returned to the pending presidential direc- 7 tive they had labored over during the summer. The secretary of defense directed the nation’s armed forces to Defense Con- 8 For the first time in history, dition 3, an increased state of military readiness. all nonemergency civilian aircraft in the United States were grounded, strand- ing tens of thousands of passengers across the country. Contingency plans for the continuity of government and the evacuation of leaders had been imple- 9 The Pentagon had been struck; the White House or the Capitol had mented. narrowly escaped direct attack. Extraordinary security precautions were put in place at the nation’s borders and ports. In the late afternoon, the President overruled his aides’ continuing reluc- tance to have him return to Washington and ordered Air Force One back to Andrews Air Force Base. He was flown by helicopter back to the White House, passing over the still-smoldering Pentagon.At 8:30 that evening, President Bush addressed the nation from the White House. After emphasizing that the first priority was to help the injured and protect against any further attacks, he said: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” He quoted Psalm 23—“though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death . . .” No American, he said, “will ever forget 10 this day.” Following his speech, President Bush met again with his National Security Council (NSC), expanded to include Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta and Joseph Allbaugh, the director of the Federal Emergency Manage- ment Agency. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had returned from Peru after 11 hearing of the attacks, joined the discussion.They reviewed the day’s events. 10.1 IMMEDIATE RESPONSES AT HOME As the urgent domestic issues accumulated,White House Deputy Chief of Staff 12 The Joshua Bolten chaired a temporary “domestic consequences” group. agenda in those first days is worth noting, partly as a checklist for future crisis planners. It began with problems of how to help victims and stanch the flow- ing losses to the American economy, such as • Organizing federal emergency assistance. One question was what kind of public health advice to give about the air quality in Lower Manhat- 13 tan in the vicinity of the fallen buildings.

344 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 327 327 WARTIME • Compensating victims.They evaluated legislative options, eventually setting up a federal compensation fund and defining the powers of a special master to run it. • Determining federal assistance. On September 13, President Bush promised to provide $20 billion for New York City, in addition to the $20 billion his budget director had already guessed might be needed 14 for the country as a whole. • Restoring civil aviation. On the morning of September 13, the national airspace reopened for use by airports that met newly impro- vised security standards. • Reopening the financial markets. After extraordinary emergency efforts involving the White House, the Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, aided by unprecedented cooperation among the usually competitive firms of the financial 15 industry, the markets reopened on Monday, September 17. • Deciding when and how to return border and port security to more normal operations. • Evaluating legislative proposals to bail out the airline industry and cap its liability. The very process of reviewing these issues underscored the absence of an effective government organization dedicated to assessing vulnerabilities and handling problems of protection and preparedness.Though a number of agen- cies had some part of the task, none had security as its primary mission. By September 14,Vice President Cheney had decided to recommend, at least as a first step, a new White House entity to coordinate all the relevant agen- cies rather than tackle the challenge of combining them in a new department. This new White House entity would be a homeland security adviser and Homeland Security Council—paralleling the National Security Council sys- tem.Vice President Cheney reviewed the proposal with President Bush and other advisers. President Bush announced the new post and its first occupant— Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge—in his address to a joint session of Con- 16 gress on September 20. Beginning on September 11, Immigration and Naturalization Service agents working in cooperation with the FBI began arresting individuals for immigration violations whom they encountered while following up leads in the FBI’s investigation of the 9/11 attacks. Eventually, 768 aliens were arrested as “special interest” detainees. Some (such as Zacarias Moussaoui) were actu- ally in INS custody before 9/11; most were arrested after. Attorney General John Ashcroft told us that he saw his job in directing this effort as “risk mini- mization,” both to find out who had committed the attacks and to prevent a subsequent attack. Ashcroft ordered all special interest immigration hearings closed to the public, family members, and press; directed government attorneys

345 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 328 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 328 to seek denial of bond until such time as they were “cleared” of terrorist con- nections by the FBI and other agencies; and ordered the identity of the detainees kept secret. INS attorneys charged with prosecuting the immigration violations had trouble getting information about the detainees and any terror- ist connections; in the chaos after the attacks, it was very difficult to reach law enforcement officials, who were following up on other leads. The clearance process approved by the Justice Department was time-consuming, lasting an 17 average of about 80 days. We have assessed this effort to detain aliens of “special interest.” The detainees were lawfully held on immigration charges. Records indicate that 531 were deported, 162 were released on bond, 24 received some kind of immi- gration benefits, 12 had their proceedings terminated, and 8—one of whom was Moussaoui—were remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service. The inspector general of the Justice Department found significant problems in 18 In response to a request about the the way the 9/11 detainees were treated. counterterrorism benefits of the 9/11 detainee program, the Justice Depart- ment cited six individuals on the special interest detainee list, noting that two (including Moussaoui) were linked directly to a terrorist organization and that it had obtained new leads helpful to the investigation of the 9/11 terrorist 19 A senior al Qaeda detainee has stated that U.S. government efforts attacks. after the 9/11 attacks to monitor the American homeland, including review of Muslims’ immigration files and deportation of nonpermanent residents, forced 20 al Qaeda to operate less freely in the United States. The government’s ability to collect intelligence inside the United States, and the sharing of such information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities, was not a priority before 9/11. Guidelines on this subject issued in August 2001 by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson essentially reca- pitulated prior guidance. However, the attacks of 9/11 changed everything. Less than one week after September 11, an early version of what was to become the 21 A cen- Patriot Act (officially, the USA PATRIOT Act) began to take shape. tral provision of the proposal was the removal of “the wall” on information sharing between the intelligence and law enforcement communities (discussed in chapter 3). Ashcroft told us he was determined to take every conceivable action, within the limits of the Constitution, to identify potential terrorists and 22 The administration developed a proposal that even- deter additional attacks. tually passed both houses of Congress by large majorities and was signed into 23 law on October 26.

346 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 329 WARTIME 329 Flights of Saudi Nationals Leaving the United States Three questions have arisen with respect to the departure of Saudi nationals from the United States in the immediate aftermath of 9/11: (1) Did any flights of Saudi nationals take place before national airspace reopened on September 13, 2001? (2) Was there any political interven- tion to facilitate the departure of Saudi nationals? (3) Did the FBI screen Saudi nationals thoroughly before their departure? First, we found no evidence that any flights of Saudi nationals, domestic or international, took place before the reopening of national 24 To the contrary, airspace on the morning of September 13, 2001. every flight we have identified occurred after national airspace 25 reopened. Second, we found no evidence of political intervention.We found no evidence that anyone at the White House above the level of Richard Clarke participated in a decision on the departure of Saudi nationals. The issue came up in one of the many video teleconferences of the interagency group Clarke chaired, and Clarke said he approved of how the FBI was dealing with the matter when it came up for interagency discussion at his level. Clarke told us,“I asked the FBI, Dale Watson . . . to handle that, to check to see if that was all right with them, to see if they wanted access to any of these people, and to get back to me. And if they had no objections, it would be fine with me.” Clarke added,“I have no recollection of clearing it with anybody at the White 26 House.” Although White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card remembered someone telling him about the Saudi request shortly after 9/11, he said he had not talked to the Saudis and did not ask anyone to do anything about it.The President and Vice President told us they were not aware of the issue at all until it surfaced much later in the media. None of the officials we interviewed recalled any intervention or direction on this 27 matter from any political appointee. Third, we believe that the FBI conducted a satisfactory screening of 28 The Saudi nationals who left the United States on charter flights. Saudi government was advised of and agreed to the FBI’s requirements that passengers be identified and checked against various databases 29 The Federal Aviation Administration rep- before the flights departed. resentative working in the FBI operations center made sure that the

347 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 330 330 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT FBI was aware of the flights of Saudi nationals and was able to screen 30 the passengers before they were allowed to depart. The FBI interviewed all persons of interest on these flights prior to their departures.They concluded that none of the passengers was con- nected to the 9/11 attacks and have since found no evidence to change that conclusion. Our own independent review of the Saudi nationals involved confirms that no one with known links to terrorism departed 31 on these flights. 10.2 PLANNING FOR WAR By late in the evening of September 11, the President had addressed the nation on the terrible events of the day.Vice President Cheney described the Presi- 32 The long day was not yet over.When the larger meet- dent’s mood as somber. ing that included his domestic department heads broke up, President Bush chaired a smaller meeting of top advisers, a group he would later call his “war 33 usually included This group Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State council.” Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Hugh Shelton, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (later to become chairman) General Myers, DCI Tenet, Attorney General Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. From the White House staff, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Chief of Staff Card were part of the core group, often joined by their deputies, Stephen Hadley and Joshua Bolten. In this restricted National Security Council meeting, the President said it was a time for self-defense.The United States would punish not just the per- petrators of the attacks, but also those who harbored them. Secretary Powell said the United States had to make it clear to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arab states that the time to act was now. He said we would need to build a coalition.The President noted that the attacks provided a great opportunity to engage Russia and China. Secretary Rumsfeld urged the President and the principals to think broadly about who might have harbored the attackers, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. He wondered aloud how much evidence the United States would need in order to deal with these coun- 34 tries, pointing out that major strikes could take up to 60 days to assemble. President Bush chaired two more meetings of the NSC on September 12. In the first meeting, he stressed that the United States was at war with a new and different kind of enemy.The President tasked principals to go beyond their pre-9/11 work and develop a strategy to eliminate terrorists and punish those who support them.As they worked on defining the goals and objectives of the upcoming campaign, they considered a paper that went beyond al Qaeda to

348 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 331 331 WARTIME propose the “elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life,” an aim that would include pursuing other international terrorist organizations in the Mid- 35 dle East. Rice chaired a Principals Committee meeting on September 13 in the Sit- uation Room to refine how the fight against al Qaeda would be conducted. The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone support- ing al Qaeda would risk harm. The United States would need to integrate diplomacy, financial measures, intelligence, and military actions into an over- arching strategy.The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against al Qaeda.They concluded that if Pakistan decided 36 not to help the United States, it too would be at risk. The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistan’s military intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed.Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps: • to stop al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Ladin; • to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations; • to provide territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda; • to provide the United States with intelligence information; • to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts; • to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and, • if the evidence implicated bin Ladin and al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban 37 government. Pakistan made its decision swiftly.That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terror- ism.The next day, the U.S. embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. “Pakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us,” the embassy noted. “Musharraf said the GOP [government of Pakistan] was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His stand- ing in Pakistan was certain to suffer.To counterbalance that he needed to show 38 that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions.” At the September 13 NSC meeting, when Secretary Powell described Pak- istan’s reply, President Bush led a discussion of an appropriate ultimatum to the Taliban. He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan against

349 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 332 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 332 the Taliban.The President wanted the United States to strike the Taliban, step back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if they did not. He made clear that the military should focus on targets that would influence the 39 Taliban’s behavior. President Bush also tasked the State Department, which on the following day delivered to the White House a paper titled “Game Plan for a Political- Military Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.” The paper took it as a given that Bin Ladin would continue to act against the United States even while under Taliban control. It therefore detailed specific U.S. demands for the Tal- iban: surrender Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants, including Ayman al Zawahiri; tell the United States what the Taliban knew about al Qaeda and its operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply 40 with all UN Security Council resolutions. The State Department proposed delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban: produce Bin Ladin and his deputies and shut down al Qaeda camps within 24 to 48 hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to destroy the terrorist infrastructure. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to comply. Therefore, State and Defense would plan to build an international coalition to go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO and other allies and request intelligence, basing, and other support from coun- tries, according to their capabilities and resources. Finally, the plan detailed a public U.S. stance: America would use all its resources to eliminate terrorism as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any peo- 41 ple, religion, or culture. President Bush recalled that he quickly realized that the administration 42 But the early brief- would have to invade Afghanistan with ground troops. ings to the President and Secretary Rumsfeld on military options were disap- 43 Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command pointing. (CENTCOM), told us that the President was dissatisfied. The U.S. military, Franks said, did not have an off-the-shelf plan to eliminate the al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view, 44 amount to such a plan. All these diplomatic and military plans were reviewed over the weekend of September 15–16, as President Bush convened his war council at Camp 45 Present were Vice President Cheney, Rice, Hadley, Powell, Armitage, David. Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Mueller, Tenet, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wol- fowitz, and Cofer Black, chief of the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center. Tenet described a plan for collecting intelligence and mounting covert oper- ations. He proposed inserting CIA teams into Afghanistan to work with Afghan 46 These CIA teams would warlords who would join the fight against al Qaeda. act jointly with the military’s Special Operations units. President Bush later 47 praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking.

350 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 333 333 WARTIME General Shelton briefed the principals on the preliminary plan for Afghanistan that the military had put together. It drew on the Infinite Resolve “phased campaign” plan the Pentagon had begun developing in November 2000 as an addition to the strike options it had been refining since 1998. But Shelton added a new element—the possible significant use of ground forces— 48 and that is where President Bush reportedly focused his attention. After hearing from his senior advisers, President Bush discussed with Rice the contents of the directives he would issue to set all the plans into motion. Rice prepared a paper that President Bush then considered with principals on Monday morning, September 17. “The purpose of this meeting,” he recalled saying,“is to assign tasks for the first wave of the war against terror- 49 ism. It starts today.” In a written set of instructions slightly refined during the morning meet- ing, President Bush charged Ashcroft, Mueller, and Tenet to de velop a plan for homeland defense. President Bush directed Secretary of State Powell to along the lines that his department had deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban originally proposed. The State Department was also tasked to develop a plan to stabilize Pakistan and to be prepared to notify Russia and countries near 50 Afghanistan when hostilities were imminent. In addition, Bush and his advisers discussed new legal authorities for covert action in Afghanistan, including the administration’s first Memorandum of Notification on Bin Ladin. Shortly thereafter, President Bush authorized broad 51 new authorities for the CIA. President Bush instructed Rumsfeld and Shelton to develop further the Camp David military plan to attack the Taliban and al Qaeda if the Taliban rejected the ultimatum. The President also tasked Rumsfeld to ensure that robust measures to protect American military forces against terrorist attack were implemented worldwide. Finally, he directed Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill 52 NSC staff mem- to craft a plan to target al Qaeda’s funding and seize its assets. 53 bers had begun leading meetings on terrorist fund-raising by September 18. Also by September 18, Powell had contacted 58 of his foreign counterparts and received offers of general aid, search-and-rescue equipment and person- 54 On the same day, Deputy Secretary of State nel, and medical assistance teams. Armitage was called by Mahmud Ahmed regarding a two-day visit to Afghanistan during which the Pakistani intelligence chief had met with Mul- lah Omar and conveyed the U.S. demands. Omar’s response was “not negative 55 But the administration knew that the Taliban was unlikely on all these points.” 56 to turn over Bin Ladin. The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on al Qaeda evolved into a new directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States.” The directive would now extend to a global war on terrorism, not just on al Qaeda. It also incorporated the Presi- dent’s determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who har- bor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary to end

351 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 334 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 334 al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. The new directive—formally signed on October 25, after the fighting in Afghanistan had already begun—included new material followed by annexes discussing each targeted terrorist group.The old 57 The United draft directive on al Qaeda became, in effect, the first annex. States would strive to eliminate all terrorist networks, dry up their financial sup- port, and prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.The goal 58 was the “elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life.” 10.3 “PHASE TWO” AND THE QUESTION OF IRAQ President Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein’s regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had been an enemy of the United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the United States was engaged in ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot, the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and some of the piloting, especially Hanjour’s high-speed dive into the Pentagon. He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide terrorists as well. Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President 59 told us he also thought about Iran. Clarke has written that on the evening of September 12, President Bush told him and some of his staff to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11. “See if Sad- dam did this,” Clarke r ecalls the Pr esident telling them. “See if he’s linked in any 60 While he believed the details of Clarke’s account to be incorrect, Presi- way.” dent Bush acknowledged that he might well have spoken to Clarke at some 61 point, asking him about Iraq. Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.” Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evi- dence linked Iraq to al Qaeda.The memo found no “compelling case” that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconven- 62 tional weapons. On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as

352 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 335 335 WARTIME possible.The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply inter- ested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.S. response should con- sider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not only Bin Ladin. Secretary Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one 63 of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party. According to Rice, the issue of what, if anything, to do about Iraq was really engaged at Camp David. Briefing papers on Iraq, along with many others, were in briefing materials for the participants. Rice told us the administration was concerned that Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that in the first Camp David session chaired by the President, Rumsfeld asked what the administration should do about Iraq. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the 64 case for striking Iraq during “this round” of the war on terrorism. A Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq’s long-standing involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass 65 destruction. Secretary Powell recalled that Wolfowitz—not Rumsfeld—argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore be 66 Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq attacked. was behind 9/11. “Paul was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with,” Powell told us.“And he saw this as one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem.” Powell said that President Bush 67 Though continuing to did not give Wolfowitz’s argument “much weight.” worry about Iraq in the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw 68 Afghanistan as the priority. President Bush told Bob Woodward that the decision not to invade Iraq was made at the morning session on September 15. Iraq was not even on the table during the September 15 afternoon session, which dealt solely with 69 Rice said that when President Bush called her on Sunday, Sep- Afghanistan. tember 16, he said the focus would be on Afghanistan, although he still wanted plans for Iraq should the country take some action or the administration even- 70 tually determine that it had been involved in the 9/11 attacks. At the September 17 NSC meeting, there was some further discussion of 71 President Bush ordered the Defense “phase two” of the war on terrorism. Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against U.S. inter- 72 ests, with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields. Within the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to press the case for dealing with Iraq.Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo headlined “Preventing More Events,” he argued that if there was even a 10 per- cent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum pri-

353 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 336 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 336 ority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that the odds were “far more” than 1 in 10, citing Saddam’s praise for the attack, his long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Cen- 73 The next day, Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld ter. about the interest of Yousef ’s co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about informa- tion from a foreign government regarding Iraqis’ involvement in the attempted hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so lit- tle thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a “failure 74 of imagination” and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities. On September 19, Rumsfeld offered several thoughts for his commanders as they worked on their contingency plans.Though he emphasized the world- wide nature of the conflict, the references to specific enemies or regions named 75 Shelton told us the administra- only the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Afghanistan. tion reviewed all the Pentagon’s war plans and challenged certain assumptions 76 underlying them, as any prudent organization or leader should do. General Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command, recalled receiving Rumsfeld’s guidance that each regional commander should assess what these plans meant for his area of responsibility. He knew he would soon be striking the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. But, he told us, he now wondered how that action was connected to what might need to be done 77 in Somalia,Yemen, or Iraq. On September 20, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the two leaders discussed the global conflict ahead.When Blair asked about Iraq, the President replied that Iraq was not the immediate problem. Some members of his administration, he commented, had expressed a differ- 78 ent view, but he was the one responsible for making the decisions. Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust plan- ning on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11—a request President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right. (CENTCOM also began dusting off plans for a full invasion of Iraq during this period, Franks said.) The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed his appeal for further military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after 9/11, both because he personally felt that Iraq and al Qaeda might be engaged in some form of collusion and because he worried that Saddam might take advantage of the attacks to move against his internal enemies in the northern or southern parts of Iraq, where the United States was flying regular missions to enforce Iraqi 79 no-fly zones. Franks said that President Bush again turned down the request. ... Having issued directives to guide his administration’s preparations for war, on Thursday, September 20, President Bush addressed the nation before a joint session of Congress. “Tonight,” he said, “we are a country awakened to

354 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 337 337 WARTIME 80 The President blamed al Qaeda for 9/11 and the 1998 embassy danger.” bombings and, for the first time, declared that al Qaeda was “responsible for 81 He reiterated the ultimatum that had already been .” Cole bombing the USS conveyed privately.“The Taliban must act, and act immediately,” he said.“They 82 The President will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.” added that America’s quarrel was not with Islam: “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.” Other regimes faced hard choices, he pointed out: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the 83 terrorists.” President Bush argued that the new war went beyond Bin Ladin.“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there,” he said.“It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” The President had a message for the Pentagon: “The hour is com- ing when America will act, and you will make us proud.” He also had a mes- sage for those outside the United States. “This is civilization’s fight,” he said. 84 “We ask every nation to join us.” President Bush approved military plans to attack Afghanistan in meetings with Central Command’s General Franks and other advisers on September 21 and October 2. Originally titled “Infinite Justice,” the operation’s code word was changed—to avoid the sensibilities of Muslims who associate the power of infinite justice with God alone—to the operational name still used for opera- 85 tions in Afghanistan:“Enduring Freedom.” The plan had four phases. the United States and its allies would move forces into Phase One, • In the region and arrange to operate from or over neighboring coun- tries such as Uzbekistan and Pakistan.This occurred in the weeks fol- lowing 9/11, aided by overwhelming international sympathy for the United States. Phase Two , air strikes and Special Operations attacks would hit key • In al Qaeda and Taliban targets. In an innovative joint effort, CIA and Special Operations forces would be deployed to work together with each major Afghan faction opposed to the Taliban. The Phase Two strikes and raids began on October 7.The basing arrangements con- templated for Phase One were substantially secured—after arduous effort—by the end of that month. Phase Three , the United States would carry out “decisive operations” • In using all elements of national power, including ground troops, to top- ple the Taliban regime and eliminate al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. Mazar-e-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan, fell to a coali- tion assault by Afghan and U.S. forces on November 9. Four days later the Taliban had fled from Kabul. By early December, all major cities

355 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 338 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 338 had fallen to the coalition. On December 22, Hamid Karzai, a Pash- tun leader from Kandahar, was installed as the chairman of Afghanistan’s interim administration. Afghanistan had been liberated from the rule of the Taliban. In December 2001, Afghan forces, with limited U.S. support, engaged al Qaeda elements in a cave complex called Tora Bora. In March 2002, the largest engagement of the war was fought, in the mountainous Shah-i-Kot area south of Gardez, against a large force of al Qaeda jihadists.The three-week battle was substantially successful, and almost all remaining al Qaeda forces took refuge in Pakistan’s equally mountainous and lightly governed frontier provinces. As of July 2004, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are still believed to be at large. Phase Four , civilian and military operations turned to the indefinite • In task of what the armed forces call “security and stability operations.” Within about two months of the start of combat operations, several hun- dred CIA operatives and Special Forces soldiers, backed by the striking power of U.S. aircraft and a much larger infrastructure of intelligence and support efforts, had combined with Afghan militias and a small number of other coali- tion soldiers to destroy the Taliban regime and disrupt al Qaeda.They had killed or captured about a quarter of the enemy’s known leaders. Mohammed Atef, al Qaeda’s military commander and a principal figure in the 9/11 plot, had been killed by a U.S. air strike.According to a senior CIA officer who helped devise the overall strategy, the CIA provided intelligence, experience, cash, covert action capabilities, and entrée to tribal allies. In turn, the U.S. military offered 86 With these ini- combat expertise, firepower, logistics, and communications. tial victories won by the middle of 2002, the global conflict against Islamist ter- rorism became a different kind of struggle.

356 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 339 11 FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT In composing this narrative, we have tried to remember that we write with the benefit and the handicap of hindsight. Hindsight can sometimes see the past clearly—with 20/20 vision. But the path of what happened is so brightly lit that it places everything else more deeply into shadow. Comment- ing on Pearl Harbor, Roberta Wohlstetter found it “much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals.After the event, of course, a sig- nal is always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with 1 conflicting meanings.” As time passes, more documents become available, and the bare facts of what those things happened how happened become still clearer.Yet the picture of becomes harder to reimagine, as that past world, with its preoccupations and uncertainty, recedes and the remaining memories of it become colored by what happened and what was written about it later.With that caution in mind, we asked ourselves, before we judged others, whether the insights that seem appar- ent now would really have been meaningful at the time, given the limits of what people then could reasonably have known or done. We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. 11.1 IMAGINATION Historical Perspective The 9/11 attack was an event of surpassing disproportion. America had suf- fered surprise attacks before—Pearl Harbor is one well-known case, the 1950 Chinese attack in Korea another. But these were attacks by major powers. While by no means as threatening as Japan’s act of war, the 9/11 attack was in some ways more devastating. It was carried out by a tiny group of people, 339

357 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 340 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 340 not enough to man a full platoon. Measured on a governmental scale, the resources behind it were trivial.The group itself was dispatched by an organi- zation based in one of the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized coun- tries on earth. This organization recruited a mixture of young fanatics and highly educated zealots who could not find suitable places in their home soci- eties or were driven from them. To understand these events, we attempted to reconstruct some of the con- text of the 1990s. Americans celebrated the end of the Cold War with a mix- ture of relief and satisfaction.The people of the United States hoped to enjoy a peace dividend, as U.S. spending on national security was cut following the end of the Soviet military threat. The United States emerged into the post–Cold War world as the globe’s pre- eminent military power. But the vacuum created by the sudden demise of the Soviet Union created fresh sources of instability and new challenges for the United States. President George H.W. Bush dealt with the first of these in 1990 and 1991 when he led an international coalition to reverse Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Other examples of U.S. leaders’ handling new threats included the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction program to help contain new nuclear dangers; and international involvement in the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. America stood out as an object for admiration, envy, and blame. This cre- ated a kind of cultural asymmetry.To us, Afghanistan seemed very far away.To members of al Qaeda, America seemed very close. In a sense, they were more globalized than we were. Understanding the Danger If the government’s leaders understood the gravity of the threat they faced and understood at the same time that their policies to eliminate it were not likely to succeed any time soon, then history’s judgment will be harsh. Did they understand the gravity of the threat? The U.S. government responded vigorously when the attack was on our soil. Both Ramzi Yousef, who organized the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Mir Amal Kansi, who in 1993 killed two CIA employees as they waited to go to work in Langley,Virginia, were the objects of relentless, uncom- promising, and successful efforts to bring them back to the United States to stand trial for their crimes. Before 9/11, al Qaeda and its affiliates had killed fewer than 50 Americans, including the East Africa embassy bombings and the Cole attack.The U.S. gov- ernment took the threat seriously, but not in the sense of mustering anything like the kind of effort that would be gathered to confront an enemy of the first, second, or even third rank.The modest national effort exerted to contain Ser- bia and its depredations in the Balkans between 1995 and 1999, for example, was orders of magnitude larger than that devoted to al Qaeda.

358 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 341 341 FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT As best we can determine, neither in 2000 nor in the first eight months of 2001 did any polling organization in the United States think the subject of ter- rorism sufficiently on the minds of the public to warrant asking a question about it in a major national survey. Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, or even terrorism was not an important topic in the 2000 presidential campaign. Congress and the media called little attention to it. If a president wanted to rally the American people to a warlike effort, he would need to publicize an assessment of the growing al Qaeda danger. Our government could spark a full public discussion of who Usama Bin Ladin was, what kind of organization he led, what Bin Ladin or al Qaeda intended, what past attacks they had sponsored or encouraged, and what capabilities they were bringing together for future assaults. We believe American and international public opinion might have been different––and so might the range of options for a president––had they been informed of these details. Recent examples of such debates include calls to arms against such threats as Serbian ethnic cleans- ing, biological attacks, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, global climate change, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. While we now know that al Qaeda was formed in 1988, at the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the intelligence community did not describe this organization, at least in documents we have seen, until 1999. A National Intelligence Estimate distributed in July 1995 predicted future terrorist attacks in the United States. It warned that this dan- against the United States—and ger would increase over the next several years. It specified as particular points of vulnerability the White House, the Capitol, symbols of capitalism such as Wall Street, critical infrastructure such as power grids, areas where people con- gregate such as sports arenas, and civil aviation generally. It warned that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing had been intended to kill a lot of people, not to achieve any more traditional political goal. This 1995 estimate described the greatest danger as “transient groupings of individuals” that lacked “strong organization but rather are loose affiliations.” They operate “outside traditional circles but have access to a worldwide net- 2 This was an excellent summary of work of training facilities and safehavens.” the emerging danger, based on what was then known. In 1996–1997, the intelligence community received new information mak- ing clear that Bin Ladin headed his own terrorist group, with its own target- ing agenda and operational commanders. Also revealed was the previously unknown involvement of Bin Ladin’s organization in the 1992 attack on a Yemeni hotel quartering U.S. military personnel, the 1993 shootdown of U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in Somalia, and quite possibly the 1995 Riyadh bombing of the American training mission to the Saudi National Guard. The 1997 update of the 1995 estimate did not discuss the new intelligence. It did state that the terrorist danger depicted in 1995 would persist. In the update’s summary of key points, the only reference to Bin Ladin was this sen-

359 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 342 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 342 tence:“Iran and its surrogates, as well as terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin and his followers, have stepped up their threats and surveillance of US facilities abroad in what also may be a portent of possible additional attacks in the United 3 Bin Ladin was mentioned in only two other sentences in the six-page States.” report.The al Qaeda organization was not mentioned.The 1997 update was the 4 last national estimate on the terrorism danger completed before 9/11. From 1998 to 2001, a number of very good analytical papers were distrib- uted on specific topics. These included Bin Ladin’s political philosophy, his command of a global network, analysis of information from terrorists captured in Jordan in December 1999, al Qaeda’s operational style, and the evolving goals of the Islamist extremist movement. Many classified articles for morning brief- ings were prepared for the highest officials in the government with titles such as “Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft [with antiaircraft missiles]” (June 1998),“Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin” (January 1999), “Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus” (June 1999), “Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays” (December 1999),“Bin Ladin Evad- ing Sanctions” (March 2000),“Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological, Radiological Weapons” (February 2001), “Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin for Now” (March 2001),“Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot” (May 5 2001), and “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US” (August 2001). Despite such reports and a 1999 paper on Bin Ladin’s command structure for al Qaeda, there were no complete portraits of his strategy or of the extent of his organization’s involvement in past terrorist attacks. Nor had the intelli- gence community provided an authoritative depiction of his organization’s relationships with other governments, or the scale of the threat his organiza- tion posed to the United States. Though Deputy DCI John McLaughlin said to us that the cumulative out- put of the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) “dramatically eclipsed” any analy- sis that could have appeared in a fresh National Intelligence Estimate, he conceded that most of the work of the Center’s 30- to 40-person analytic 6 In late 2000, DCI George Tenet recognized group dealt with collection issues. the deficiency of strategic analysis against al Qaeda. To tackle the problem within the CTC he appointed a senior manager, who briefed him in March 2001 on “creating a strategic assessment capability.”The CTC established a new strategic assessments branch during July 2001. The decision to add about ten analysts to this effort was seen as a major bureaucratic victory, but the CTC labored to find them.The new chief of this branch reported for duty on Sep- 7 tember 10, 2001. Whatever the weaknesses in the CIA’s portraiture, both Presidents Bill Clin- ton and George Bush and their top advisers told us they got the picture—they understood Bin Ladin was a danger. But given the character and pace of their policy efforts, we do not believe they fully understood just how many people

360 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 343 343 FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT al Qaeda might kill, and how soon it might do it. At some level that is hard to define, we believe the threat had not yet become compelling. It is hard now to recapture the conventional wisdom before 9/11. For exam- New York Times ple, a article in April 1999 sought to debunk claims that Bin Ladin was a terrorist leader, with the headline “U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof 8 The head of analysis at the CTC until 1999 dis- Bin Laden Directed Attacks.” counted the alarms about a catastrophic threat as relating only to the danger of chemical, biological, or nuclear attack—and he downplayed even that, writing several months before 9/11:“It would be a mistake to redefine counterterror- ism as a task of dealing with ‘catastrophic,’‘grand,’ or ‘super’ terrorism, when in fact these labels do not represent most of the terrorism that the United States 9 is likely to face or most of the costs that terrorism imposes on U.S. interests.” Beneath the acknowledgment that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda presented seri- ous dangers, there was uncertainty among senior officials about whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat America had lived with for decades, or was radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet experienced. Such differences affect calculations about whether or how to go to war. Therefore, those government experts who saw Bin Ladin as an unprece- dented new danger needed a way to win broad support for their views, or at least spotlight the areas of dispute, and perhaps prompt action across the gov- ernment.The national estimate has often played this role, and is sometimes con- 10 Such assessments, which provoke widespread troversial for this very reason. thought and debate, have a major impact on their recipients, often in a wider circle of decisionmakers.The National Intelligence Estimate is noticed in the Congress, for example. But, as we have said, none was produced on terrorism between 1997 and 9/11. By 2001 the government still needed a decision at the highest level as to whether al Qaeda was or was not “a first order threat,” Richard Clarke wrote in his first memo to Condoleezza Rice on January 25, 2001. In his blistering protest about foot-dragging in the Pentagon and at the CIA, sent to Rice just a week before 9/11, he repeated that the “real question” for the principals was “are we serious about dealing with the al Qida threat? . . . Is al Qida a big deal?” One school of thought, Clarke wrote in this September 4 note, implicitly argued that the terrorist network was a nuisance that killed a score of Ameri- cans every 18–24 months. If that view was credited, then current policies might be proportionate. Another school saw al Qaeda as the “point of the spear of radical Islam.” But no one forced the argument into the open by calling for a national estimate or a broader discussion of the threat. The issue was never joined as a collective debate by the U.S. government, including the Congress, before 9/11. We return to the issue of proportion—and imagination. Even Clarke’s note

361 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 344 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 344 challenging Rice to imagine the day after an attack posits a strike that kills “hundreds” of Americans. He did not write “thousands.” Institutionalizing Imagination: The Case of Aircraft as Weapons Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies. For example, before Pearl Harbor the U.S. government had excellent intelligence that a Japanese attack was coming, especially after peace talks stalemated at the end of November 1941. These were days, one historian notes, of “excruciating uncertainty.” The most likely targets were judged to be in Southeast Asia. An attack was coming,“but officials were at a loss to know where the blow would 11 In retrospect, available inter- fall or what more might be done to prevent it.” cepts pointed to Japanese examination of Hawaii as a possible target. But, another historian observes,“in the face of a clear warning, alert measures bowed 12 to routine.” It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination. Doing so requires more than finding an expert who can imagine that aircraft could be used as weapons. Indeed, since al Qaeda and other groups had already used suicide vehicles, namely truck bombs, the leap to the use Cole attack) or planes is not far-fetched. of other vehicles such as boats (the Yet these scenarios were slow to work their way into the thinking of avia- tion security experts. In 1996, as a result of the TWA Flight 800 crash, Presi- dent Clinton created a commission under Vice President Al Gore to report on shortcomings in aviation security in the United States.The Gore Commission’s report, having thoroughly canvassed available expertise in and outside of gov- ernment, did not mention suicide hijackings or the use of aircraft as weapons. It focused mainly on the danger of placing bombs onto aircraft—the approach of the Manila air plot. The Gore Commission did call attention, however, to lax screening of passengers and what they carried onto planes. In late 1998, reports came in of a possible al Qaeda plan to hijack a plane. One, a December 4 Presidential Daily Briefing for President Clinton (reprinted in chapter 4), brought the focus back to more traditional hostage taking; it reported Bin Ladin’s involvement in planning a hijack operation to free prison- ers such as the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel Rahman. Had the contents of this PDB been brought to the attention of a wider group, including key members of Congress, it might have brought much more attention to the need for per- 13 manent changes in domestic airport and airline security procedures. Threat reports also mentioned the possibility of using an aircraft filled with explosives. The most prominent of these mentioned a possible plot to fly an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. city. This report, circulated in September 1998, originated from a source who had walked into an American consulate in East Asia. In August of the same year, the intelligence community had received information that a group of Libyans hoped to crash a plane into the

362 Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04 4:12 PM Page 345 345 FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT World Trade Center. In neither case could the information be corroborated. In addition, an Algerian group hijacked an airliner in 1994, most likely intend- 14 ing to blow it up over Paris, but possibly to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. In 1994, a private airplane had crashed onto the south lawn of the White House. In early 1995,Abdul Hakim Murad—Ramzi Yousef ’s accomplice in the Manila airlines bombing plot—told Philippine authorities that he and Yousef 15 had discussed flying a plane into CIA headquarters. Clarke had been concerned about the danger posed by aircraft since at least the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. There he had tried to create an air defense plan using assets from the Treasury Department, after the Defense Department declined to contribute resources.The Secret Service continued to work on the problem of airborne threats to the Washington region. In 1998, Clarke chaired an exercise designed to highlight the inadequacy of the solution. This paper exercise involved a scenario in which a group of terrorists commandeered a Learjet on the ground in Atlanta, loaded it with explosives, and flew it toward a target in Washington, D.C. Clarke asked officials from the Pentagon, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Secret Service what they could do about the situation. Officials from the Pentagon said they could scramble aircraft from Langley Air Force Base, but they would need to go to the President for rules of engagement, and there was no mechanism to do so.There was no clear res- 16 olution of the problem at the exercise.