War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism

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1 Journal of Strategic Security Volume 5 Article 8 Volume 5, No. 2: Summer 2012 Number 2 War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism Pat Proctor Kansas State University , [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons , National Security Law Commons , and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons pp. 47-64 Recommended Citation Proctor, Pat. "War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Journal of Strategic Security Terrorism." 5, no. 2 (2012): : 47-64. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 Available at: This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of . Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]

2 War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism Author Biography Pat Proctor is a U.S. Army field artillery lieutenant colonel with over seventeen years' active service. In 2007, he served in Iraq as a member of the Joint Strategic Assessment Team under General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, mapping the future for post-surge Iraq. Colonel Proctor is currently deployed to eastern Afghanistan as the chief of plans for the First Infantry Division. He is the author of Task Force Patriot and the End of Combat Operations in Iraq. He holds master's degrees in military arts and sciences for strategy and theater operations from the U.S. Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies, respectively. He is a doctoral candidate in history at Kansas State University. Colonel Proctor's recent publications include "Message versus Perception during the Americanization of the Vietnam War," The Historian (Spring 2011); "Fighting to Understand: A Practical Example of Design at the Battalion Level," Military Review (March–April 2011); and "The Mythical Shia Crescent," Parameters (Spring 2008) and Iran International Times, May 23, 2008. Abstract After a decade of war, the United States has failed to eradicate the threat of salafist jihadism. No matter how hard it tries, the United States cannot kill its way to victory in the war on terrorism. Sweeping changes across the Middle East—dubbed the "Arab Spring" by the media—have presented the West with a unique opportunity to pursue an alternative approach. Rather than engaging in war (politics through violence), the United States should engage in mass politics (war without violence) to compel the Arab world to reject the salafist jihadism idea. This article proposes a strategy calibrated to defeat international terrorism without unnecessarily antagonizing non-jihadist salafists and political salafists who enjoy broad-based support in the Arab world. The article goes on to identify key political figures already espousing elements of this counternarrative, and it describes the methods the United States should use to empower these and other anti–salafist jihadism activists. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/ vol5/iss2/8

3 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o Journal of Strategic Security Volume 5 Issue 2 2012, pp. 47-64 DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3 War Without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism Pat Proctor Kansas State University Abstract fter a decade of war, the United States has failed to eradicate the threat A rd it tries, the United States cannot of salafist jihadism. No matter how ha terrorism. Sweeping changes across kill its way to victory in the war on the Middle East—dubbed the "Arab Spring" by the media—have pre- sented the West with a unique oppo rtunity to pursue an alternative approach. Rather than engaging in war (politics through violence), the United States should engage in mass politics (war without violence) to compel the Arab world to reject the sa lafist jihadism idea. This article pro- poses a strategy calibrated to defe at international terrorism without unnecessarily antagonizing non-jihadist salafists and political salafists w ho enjoy broad-based support in the Arab world. The article goes on to identify key political figures already espousing elements of this counter- bes the methods the United States should use to narrative, and it descri alafist jihadism activists. empower these and other anti–s Introduction At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States faces a new kind of threat that defies the overwhelming military might that has made the United States the world's sole rema ining superpower. This threat began salafism , which typifies the yearning of a people to return to a as an idea, idea in turn inspired a holy war, a mythical "golden age" of Islam. This 1 , against the West. jihad Salafist jihadism was the foundation of a global Journal of Strategic Security 47 64 eISSN: 1944-0472 (c) 2012 ISSN: 1944-04 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

4 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security of terrorist violen ce culminating in terrorist network that launched a wave gton, DC, on September 11, 2001. the attacks in New York and Washin When the United States responded with overwhelming military force against the heart of this network in Afghanistan, salafist jihadism metas- tasized into an even more difficult problem, a global movement that con- 2 st violence across Europe tinued a wave of terrori and the Muslim world. Only days after the September 11 attack s, in a speech before a joint session 3 of Congress, President George W. Bush declared a "global war on terror," yet, after a decade of war, the United States has failed to eradicate the threat of salafist jihadism. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz 4 wrote, "War is ... an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will," yet, no matter how hard it tries, the United States cannot kill its way to victory rnment to force to capitulate. More- in this war. There is simply no gove over, the population that must be co mpelled to abandon salafist jihadism is so vast and spread over such a large area that the level of violence required is beyond both the United St ates' capacity and its will. In short, this threat defies war as a solution. The United States needs an alternative way to persuade the Muslim world to reject the salafist jihadism idea . Fortunately, commu nist revolutionary Chairman Mao Zedong has provided a useful corollary to Clausewitz: 5 "Politics is war without [violence]." The United States needs to engage in politics, mass politics, with the people of the Arab world to compel them to reject salafist jihadism as a path to overcome perceived Western domi- nation and to help them achieve individual freedom. Sweeping changes across the Middle East that had nothing to do with the West with a unique opportunity to war on terrorism have presented the pursue this alternative. For example, Arab youth, fed up with the lack of opportunity and political liberties in th eir country, poured into the streets of Tunisia in a revolution that toppled President Zine el Abidine bin Ali's twenty-three-year-old regime. Weeks la ter, in February 2011, throngs of Egyptian protestors toppled the thirty -year-old regime of President Hosni 6 Mubarak. This tectonic shift—the overthrow of the political order of the most populous country in the Arab world—generated a tsunami that washed over the Middle East. Protestors poured into the streets of Alge- ria, Libya, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Ir an, and Syria. Even countries as far away as China and Venezuela felt th e aftershocks. This wave of change, dubbed the "Arab Spring" by the me dia, has presented an appealing opportunity to reshape the Muslim world. 48 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

5 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism The Salafist Jihadism Idea In the final days of Islamic independence, before the great powers of Europe ultimately carved up and colonized the Arab world, a word began to emerge to describe the humiliation Islam was suffering at the hands of the West. Scholars debate its first use; there is disagreement as to whether it arrived with the British domination of Sudan beginning in the late nine- teenth century or in the aftermath of World War I. However, from the Maghreb (North Africa) to Mesopotamia, Arabs began using the word ista'mar to describe their predicament. Alternately translated as "to colo- nize" or "to exploit," the word beca me synonymous with the—at times— 7 brutal domination of the Arab world by the West. The struggle to defeat the ista'mar has fueled a succession of ideologies ly one in a host of ideologies that among the Arabs; as such, salafism is on as a solution to the have vied for dominance . From the Arabic ista'mar salafi generations," salafism hark- word , meaning "ancestors" or "earlier ens back to a mythical "golden age" of Islam in its purest form, as prac- 8 ticed by the Prophet and his Companions, the Sahaba . Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism, in the early eighteenth century, was the father of modern salafism. He earned the patronage of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Saud in 1740 when Saud promised to support the spread of Wahhabism in exchange for political support. This alliance persisted through the generations of conflict that finally saw the Saud family take over the entirety of the Nejd and Hejaz (the Arabian 9 Peninsula). More importantly, however, the Saudis had managed to maintain true independence from the West, one of the only states in the Arab world not under the yoke of the ista'mar . personal and community practice of These first salafists had sought purer ista'mar Islam as a religion. Yet their goal, even before the concept of the had crystallized in the Arab mind, was a return to the former glory of the Islamic Empire. The salafists held that the Islamic world could only return to this age by a return to strict adherence to the faith as it was prac- 10 Sahaba . ticed by the first generation of Muslims, especially the After the First World War, at the sa me time that Arab nationalism was taking shape in Egypt, salafism reem erged and began to evolve. This new strain of salafism that emerged from the intellectual class in Egypt in the 1920s was political salafism—the idea that, to defeat the ista'mar , the state must reject modernism and reor der Arab governme nts and societies 11 as prescribed by the Quran. 49 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

6 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security In 1928, political salafism spawned a po litical party, the Society of Muslim Brothers (more commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood). Its ideol- Ma'alim fil-Tariq Sign- ogy is detailed in Sayyid Qutb's seminal work, ( posts along the Road ). In it, he laid out both the faults of Western modernism and the principles (but no t the form) of an ideal political salafist society. In lamic world to reject Signposts , Qutb called for the Is Jahiliyyah , a modernism and its Western-style political structures as pejorative referring to the Arabs' pr e-Quranic, pagan practices. Qutb con- 12 . Jahiliyyah demned both communist and democratic government as rn to a society as dictated by the Instead, Qutb insisted, Islam should retu 13 Quran, under the power of the shari'a, Islamic law. In the 1980s, in the mujahideen training camps of the Soviet-Afghan war, political salafist ideology met Pakistan i jihadism, forged over more than a century of conflict with both British colonial rule and Indian Hindu nationalism. When these ideologies met, they metastasized into some- 14 thing new. Political salafist Usama bin Laden, educated in a Saudi uni- rsed in Pakistani jihadism during versity by Muslim Brothers and imme the Soviet-Afghan war, was a vessel for this blend of ideologies. As the jihad in Afghanistan ended, ibn Laden saw Western troops in his to deal humiliation to Arab Iraq. homeland of Saudi Arabia preparing fists—the Wahhabi clerics—supported Even more outrageous, the old sala 15 the Saudi king's decision. This completed his rejection of the Whhabists' brand of salafism (focused on individual living and practice of Islam). is, he drifted into the orbit of fel- After ibn Laden was exiled by the Saud low–former mujahideen Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was leading a political salafist insurgency in his home coun try of Egypt, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Together, they concluded that th e insurgencies of political salafism ista'mar . They could never overturn were not sufficient to overcome the the authority of apostate regimes in the Middle East until they first removed the far enemy, the Western regimes that fueled the ista'mar . The jihad, they decided, should be exported to the West and especially to the United States, the sole remaining superpower. This marked a new evolutionary step in salafist ideology: salafist jihad- ism. The defeat of the ista'mar and return to the greatness of Islam's golden age could only come about by: strict adherence to Islam as prac- Sahaba in the days of the Prophet; rejection of the Jahiliyyah ticed by the of Western modernism and its politica l structures; and a jihad prosecuted 16 by every Muslim. But salafist jihadism went on e critical step further: the jihad should be taken out of the Islamic world, directly to the West, in the form of international terrorism. This is the raison d'être of al-Qaida, the standard-bearer of the sala fist jihadism ideology. 50 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

7 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism The Promise of the Arab Spring As of 2008, nearly 65 percent of th e population of the Arab world was under the age of thirty. This "youth bulge," constituting both the labor and the intellectual aphic and economic future class, embodies the demogr 17 of the Arab world. Nonetheless, this majority is denied political power by not one but two powerful forces. On the one hand, many Arab youth ista'mar in their countries via West- believe that the manifestation of the ern-backed authoritarian regimes unju stly represses them. On the other accompanied by the threat of totali- hand, the salafist jihadist movement tarian rule continuously smothers the hope of mass political participa- tion. This instability has brought the Arab world to a tipping point. the "Arab street" on its own is over- Without a singular, unifying ideology, ista'mar , one of the chief obstacle s that has prevented them coming the from achieving individual political po wer. The challenge for the West now is to quickly turn this fervor into a movement that will also defeat the other obstacle to their individual political power, salafist jihadism. Salafist jihadism is an ideology, an idea that has mobilized a global move- ment. The United States has tried to use warfare to defeat this idea and has failed. An idea can only be defeated by another idea. The United States must first identify the elements of this counter-idea, an "anti" salafist jihadism idea that is intended to counter all of salafist jihadism sm). Such an idea must be generated (that is to say salafist-inspired jihadi d in order to be effective. After the within and propagated by the Arab worl United States has identified where this idea might gain a foothold, it must move quickly, while new political orders are still forming in the Middle East, to forge new, national anti sala fist jihadism movements in each Arab country in the region. salafist jihadism idea has existed As will be shown in a moment, the anti in the Arab world for years, as have elem ents of these national anti salafist jihadism movements. But, until re cently, the authoritarian Western- backed regimes of the prerevolution Ar ab world limited political power in the government to the oligarchy and brutally represse d activism among the people. This is where the Arab Sp ring phenomenon offers an opportu- nity that has never existed before, th e opportunity to build national anti salafist jihadist movements—with in fluence—within the government, the media, and the people of their respective countries. With these regimes now overthrown, the future of each government is an open question. The people of these countries are already mobilized and, for the first time, free to express their opinions and respon sive to activism. The U.S. govern- ment, with the help of the internatio nal community and anti salafist jiha- dist activists, must foster new nati onal movements in these countries. 51 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

8 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security tional anti salafist jihadist move- Building the government wing of a na ment in a country like Egypt, Tunisi a, or Libya, where the governments country like Syria, where the armed has already been unseated, or in a rebellion against the regime is ongoing, involves empowering those will- First, the U.S. must use diplomatic ing to embrace anti–salafist jihadism. and intelligence means to identify th ose individuals. Once they are identi- fied, a combination of money and pref erred access to U.S. representatives ed to empower them through a com- and business opportunities can be us bination of public diplomacy and cove rt means, all of which will vary in each country according to its unique conditions. In countries like Syria, rt or overt military assistance, in where an armed struggle continues, cove , or even air or drone strikes can be the form of military hardware, training used to weight the outcome in favor of leaders who embrace the anti salafist jihadist idea. This method wi ll also work to a lesser degree in countries like Bahrain, where gove rnments are currently engaged in armed suppression of anti -government demonstrations in their countries. development of activism by national The United States can also foster the ing the public diplomacy tools cur- anti salafist jihadism movements. Us rently present in U.S. embassies across the Arab world, the U.S. State Department can empower activists with Internet access to spread the anti 18 salafist jihadism idea wi thin their own countries. These same tools can be used to train national anti salafist jihadist activists in the use of new media like blogs and social media such as Facebook and Twitter to call ough partnership with U.S.-based other young Arabs to activism. Thr blicize national anti salafist jihad- media, the U.S. government can also pu ist activists and bring international atte ntion to their activities. Finally, as has been the practice since the beginning of the War on Terrorism, the plomacy and economic incentives, U.S. government should, through di countries inside and outside the continue to encourage allied Muslim Arab world to oppose salafist jihadi sm. However, with the advent of new anti salafist jihadist movements, these regimes should be encouraged to support this activism. Because it wi ll be focused on encouraging opposi- tion to salafist jihadism rather than the spread of de mocratic freedom, Arab governments (equally threatened by salafist jihadism) may be eager to support activism of this kind. They could do so by encouraging the pan- Arab networks in their countries to favorably cover these movements, giv- ing activists access to Internet an d other communication means, and pro- viding money to support their activities. While the countries that have been transformed by the Arab Spring are the most susceptible to the development of national anti salafist jihadist movements, that does not mean that national mo vements in other coun- tries are not possible. For example, near ly nine years in Iraq has given the 52 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

9 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism United States a very close relationship with figures in both the media and the government. Iraqi medi a already provides a strong anti salafist jihad- ist media wing. Sunni Arab reconcilia tionists currently serving in the Iraqi government, who have already stood up to al-Qaida in Iraq to partic- ipate in the Iraqi political process, could form the core of an Iraqi anti (Awakening move- salafist jihadist political wing. Similarly, the al Sawah power of their Sons of Iraq (Sunni ment) sheikhs, with both the military States during the Iraq "surge") and militias first sponsored by the United the social legitimacy of their status as tribal sheikhs, have risked their salafist jihadism. They could serve as lives to demonstrate that they reject st wing of an anti salafist jihadist members of either the political or activi movement. Despite the Arab Spring, some countries in the Arab world have remained Arabia and Jordan and emirates like authoritarian. Monarchies like Saudi to varying degrees, already support the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, anti salafist jihadism. They also, to varying degrees, have tightly con- trolled media that could be directed to reinforce the anti salafist jihadism idea. And, of course, these regimes could force their people out into the streets in support of any agenda, in cluding anti salafist jihadism. How- ever, in some respects, fostering movements in these countries can be counterproductive. People in these countries are savvy—a necessity of survival under brutal regimes. They will no doubt see anti salafist jihad- vement. People resentful of their ism as an artificially generated mo the West for their regime's longevity are likely regime and prone to blame as just another affront of the ista'mar . Press- to see anti salafist jihadism ountries might actually have the unin- ing anti salafist jihadism in these c tended effect of strengthening the case for salafist jihadism. The Anti Salafist Jihadism Idea So far, this article has discussed how national anti salafist jihadist move- ments could be formed. But movement s form around an idea. The heart of a mass-political approach to defeat ing salafist jihadism must be an idea. First and foremost, this idea mu st come from the Arab world, the population targeted by the salafist jiha dism idea. In fact, as will be shown in a moment, the seeds of an idea al ready exist and are being expressed by prominent figures throughout the Arab world. These advocates just need functioning anti salafist jihadist me dia wings to propagate their ideas and strong political and activist wings to exploit their success. 53 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

10 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security ea look like? Military theorist David What does an anti salafist jihadism id , Galula, in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice generalizes his observations from the French counterinsurgency in Alge- and counterinsurgency warfare. For ria to produce a theory of insurgency cause , a political idea that Galula, a key element of insurgency is the drives the movement. Galula felt that a cause (or idea) and its representa- proceed from a political problem. tive insurgency (or movement) must l problem?" He then responds: Galula asks, "What is a politica ' according to Mao Tse-tung. If "It is 'an unsolved contradiction, one accepts this definition, then a political cause is the champion- ing of one side of the contradiction. In other words, where there is no problem, there is no cause, but there are always problems in 19 any country." Galula goes on to list four different "natures" of a problem: 1. The problem may be essentially poli tical, related to the national or international situation of the country... 2. The problem may be social, as when one class is exploited by another or denied any possibility g its lot... of improvin 3. The problem may be economic, such as the low price of agricultural products in relation to industrial goods, or the low price of raw mate- rial in relation to fi nished products, or the import of foreign goods ent a national industry... rather than the developm 4. The problem may even be artificial as long as it has a chance to be 20 accepted as a fact. Finally, Galula tells the reader: "It is not absolutely necessary that the problem be acute, although the insurgent's work is facilitated if such is the case. If the prob- lem is merely latent, the first task of the insurgent is to make it 21 acute by 'raising the political consciousness of the masses.'" Thus a problem, the progenitor of a cause, is a political, social, economic, or artificial contradiction in a society that is either acute or made acute by a movement. 54 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

11 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism sm idea must be salafist jihadism The problem for the anti salafist jihadi itself—a political, social, and economic problem. Salafist jihadism is an use it empowers the movement, al- international political problem beca Qaida, to act as a destructive indepe ndent, non-state ac tor on the interna- tional stage, provoking a violent response from the West. Salafist jihadism is a social problem because it fosters a violent, nihilistic, clandestine sub- culture that threatens social order both inside and outside the Muslim world. Salafist jihadism is an economic problem, first, in that it impedes strongest, and second, in that the investment in the areas where it is mage both in the initial destruction attacks it inspires cause economic da and in the security measures and lost growth that follow. at then is the anti salafist jihadist If salafist jihadism is the problem, wh There are, Galula says, four "strate- idea that seeks to solve this problem? gic criteria for a cause [or idea]": 1. The best cause for the insurgent's pu rpose is one that, by definition, can attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents... 2. The insurgent must, of course, be ab le to identify himself totally with the cause or, more precisely, with the entire majority of the population theoretically at tracted by it... 3. To be perfectly sound, the cause must be such that the counterinsur- gent cannot espouse it too or can do so only at the risk of losing his power, which is, after all, what he is fighting for... 4. A cause, finally, must also be lasting, if not for the duration of the revo- lutionary war, at least until the insurgent movement is well on its 22 feet. For a cause (i.e. idea) to be viable as the foundation for a political move- ment, it must be broad, uniquely id entified with the movement's organi- zation, and sufficient to carry the movement to its goal. The anti salafist jihadism idea must meet David Galula's four "strategic 23 requirements" for an idea. An anti salafist jihadism idea must be uniquely identifiable with the anti salafist jihadist movement. The idea must also be shaped such that it cannot be co-opted by the salafist jihadist movement. The anti salafist jihadism idea must have sufficient longevity to carry it to its ultimate goal—destruction of the salafist jihadism idea. 55 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

12 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security that gives it broad-based appeal and, The idea must be structured in a way even more important, avoid argume nts against salafism and political the Arab world and narrow its appeal. salafism that will alienate some in This final point must be emphasized. An anti salafist jihadism idea must be precisely targeted. Salafist jihadi sm shares arguments and principles with salafism and political salafism, ideas with broad-based appeal in the Arab world. The anti salafist jihadism idea must be calibrated to attack and destroy only the unwanted behavi or of the salafist jihadist move- ment—international terro rism—without inadverten tly and unnecessarily challenging those aspects it shares with salafism or political salafism. The West frequently has diffi culty distinguishing between salafist jihadism led astray by distractions like polit- and its predecessors, and is frequently tical structure and brutality toward ical salafism's anti-democratic poli women. While these themes resonate with Western audiences, they are g to those in the Arab world who counterproductive when communicatin are already disillusioned with Wester n-style secular democracy and reject gender equality. Seeking democracy and women's rights in the Arab world, while a noble goal, is a large part of the reason that the United States is still fighting the war on terrorism after more than ten years. These issues must be se t aside until salafist jihadism is defeated. The core of any idea is a principle. Because the anti salafist jihadism idea seeks to avoid challenging salafism and political salafism, its principle than directly challenge the salafist jihadist prin- must be nuanced. Rather Sahaba (the Companions of the Prophet) hold the key to ciple that the perfect freedom (a principle salafist jihadism shares with salafism and dism's principle must political salafism), anti salafist jiha directly oppose the undesirable behavior of salafist jihadists that separates them from salafists and political salafists: inte rnational terrorism. The principle of the anti salafist jihadism idea must be that international terrorism is wrong. This directly opposes the unde sired behavior of the salafist jihad- ist movement without passing judgment on the rightness of Islam as it Sahaba . was practiced by the Surrounding the core principle of an idea are arguments. These are asser- tions or claims that support the principle. Philosophy, particularly logic and rhetoric, provides some insights into the structure of arguments. Stephen Toulmin, in 1958, proposed what has come to be known as the Toulmin Model for the construction of arguments. In his model, a claim (i.e., principle) is supported by a hi erarchy of arguments. Each order of 24 argument provides the basis for the order of arguments below it. These orders are (from highest to lowest order): 56 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

13 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism der arguments are generally unspo- 1. Meta-principles. These highest-or ken because they are accepted by everyone. These are foundational beliefs that the audience holds. are statements that should be 2. Backing-warrant arguments. Backings accepted by everyone because they are derived from meta-principles. Each supports a warrant, which is a normative (i.e. prescriptive) statement made about the claim—a principle that applies to the specific situation. 3. Ground-reason arguments. Grounds are hard data about the situation, observable facts. Each reason is an opinion statement supported by at least one ground. 4. Counterargument-rebutt al arguments. In defend ing a claim, one might uments against the claim and then rebut each raise possible counterarg counterargument. These rebuttals might take the form of backing- 25 warrant or ground-reason arguments. ould lead inexorably to the claim (or Collectively, all of these arguments sh principle) and exclude all other possible conclusions. The arguments of the anti salafist ji hadism idea should be designed to counter the arguments that support international terro rism. However, they do not need to be direct coun terarguments to salafist jihadism arguments. In fact, it is better if they are not, as that will unnecessarily bring anti salafist jihadism into co nflict with salafism and political salafism, which share many arguments with salafist jihadism. Rather, they should be backing-warrant arguments, arguments derived from 26 meta-principles that the Arab wo rld nearly universally accepts. To be most effective, the anti salafist ji hadism idea should use arguments based on the same meta-principles used by the salafist jihadism idea to arrive at contradictory conclusions. Fortunately, the United States does not have to engineer these arguments itself. They are already being made by prominent personal ities in the Arab world. For instance, Musl im scholar Sheikh Yusuf al Qaradawi, a political salafist Muslim Brother and Egyptian-born Qatari, is very well known for his talk show on al Jazeera, ash Shariah wal Hayat ("Shar'ia and Life"), and his website, IslamOnline.net. He has a great deal of influence across the Arab world, drawing an audience as large as forty million with his television show. He also has credibilit y as a Muslim Brother; in 2004 he turned down the job of leader of th e Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He also has credibility within the Arab Spring; he was a frequent speaker at 57 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

14 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security hrir Square and issued a fatwa demonstrations in Egypt's Ta live on his television program demanding that the Libyan Army kill their President, 27 Col. Muammar Qaddafi. as a stalwart opponent He also has credibility of the ista'mar . He has repeatedly defended the right of Iraqis to fight a resistance against oc cupying U.S. forces. scussion, however, al Qaradawi has made a core More germane to this di argument of the anti salafist jihadist idea. He has repeatedly argued on his television show and websit e and in his writings an d press conferences that the kidnapping and killing of civilians is forbidden by Islam. For instance, in response to the kidnapping of It d workers in Iraq, alian and French ai ch a matter of bloodshed. It forbids he said, "Islam deals strictly with su 28 o have nothing to do with wars." the killing of innocent people wh For similar reasons, he condemned the 9/11 attacks against the United States. o Austrians by al-Qaida in North In condemning the kidnapping of tw show that kidnapping civilians is Africa, he explained on his television wrong because "they have no guilt. They are innocent civilians used to punish others or apply pressure on th em. In Islam people are only respon- 29 sible for what they do individually." These related arguments all rely on the same meta-principles as the argume nts of the salafist jihadism idea, d the rightness of shar'ia and the the absolute authority of Allah an Hadith (the sayings and examples from the life of the Prophet and the Sahaba ). Another anti salafist jihadism argume nt also originates with a prominent figure in the Arab world. Imam-e-Kaaba Abdul Rahman Ibn Abdul Aziz as Sudais is the imam of the Grand Mo sque in Mecca, the holiest site in Islam. As such, he is a very well-kno wn and influential figure in the Mus- lim world. He was named the Dubai International Holy Quran Award's (DIHQA) ninth Islamic Personality of th e Year in 2005. His recitations of the Quran, free for download from th e Internet, are also extremely popu- lar. He even has a presence on Facebook "liked" by over five thousand people. As Sudais also has considerable credibility for his opposition to ista'mar ; he has repeatedly preached from the Grand Mosque against the the peace process with Israel. Unfortun ately, his rhetoric is also laced with racism; for instance, in one sermon he called Jews "the scum of the human race, the rats of the world, th e violators of pacts and agreements, 30 the murderers of the prophets, and the offspring of apes and pigs." Nev- ertheless, as the imam of the most important mosque in Islam, deep in the heart of Saudi Arabia, he is a pillar of the salafist Wahhabist clerical com- munity that underwrites the Saudi regime and wields considerable influ- ence that could be leve raged against the idea of salafist jihadism. 58 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

15 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism st jihadist movement, however, as Most notable for a future anti salafi Sudais argues against the legitimacy of al-Qaida's jihad. In 2007, as work collectively Sudais told a gathering in Pakistan that Muslims should eating divisions in Islam. He added, rather than fighting individually or cr "No individual can or has the right to declare and wage jihad." He has also condemned terrorism as a tactic, saying in a sermon from the Grand Mosque, "We remind those that still sympathize, or harbor [terrorists] that they are committing a crime against their religion, their nation and 31 their country." Like al Qardawi's arguments, these arguments are also backing-warrant arguments, based on the same Islamic meta-principles as the salafist jihadism idea. These are just two prominent figure salafist Muslim s—one a political Brother the other a salafist Wahhabi st—who make arguments that sup- ea. There are many, many more from port the anti salafist jihadism id within both communities, as well as from the secular moderate commu- nity, who make similar arguments. Their voices could serve to turn the Arab world, including those who suppo rt salafism or political salafism, away from the salafist jihadism idea. Just as the salafist jihadism idea has benefits from the telecommunica- tions age, the anti salafist jihadism idea must also leverage twenty-first century technology. Like the salafist jihadism idea, anti salafist jihadism can propagate through the mass communications of sympathetic "main- s by using figures from those move- stream" salafists and political salafist , as shown above, anti salafist ments to make its arguments. In fact jihadism is already doing this. By harnessing the energy of the leaders of the Arab Spring in those countries where it has borne fruit, the anti salafist jihadist movement can compet e with the salafist jihadists on the Internet as well. d official support that the salafist Because it will have the legitimacy an jihadist movement lacks, the anti salafi st jihadist movement will also be able to transmit its idea through a variety of other means unavailable to salafist jihadists. In fact, the idea is already being transmitted through these means. Since 2004, the United Stat es has paid Bell Pottinger, a Brit- ish advertising firm, to run anti-terrorism and anti–sectarian violence 32 vision stations across Iraq. commercials on satellite tele The highly effective campaign was a major factor in turning Sunni Arabs against al- Qaida in Iraq during the surge. In 2006, an advertisin g campaign under the banner "Terrorism Has No Religion" began broadcasting on pan-Arab satellite channels like al Arabiya acro ss the Arab world. It is unclear who sponsored the campaign, but at least the initial advertisement, showing a suicide bomber blowing himself up in a marketplace, killing women and 59 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

16 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security udio (fueling speculation that the ad children, was filmed by a California st is campaign was a U.S. government effort). The 2004 movie The Martyr films originating in the Middle East just one of a number of independent 33 that confront terrorism. Thus far, all of these efforts have been rudi- . But they do illustrate mentary, tainted by the involvement of the ista'mar dism idea to fill mainstream Arab the potential of the anti salafist jiha media spaces that the salafist jihadi st movement cannot. Similar efforts initiated and execut ed by national anti salafist jihadism movements could be exponentially more effective. Admittedly, surgically targeting the undesired behavior encouraged by the salafist jihadism idea while avoi ding challenging the widely supported salafism and political salafism idea s also creates a problematic unin- tended consequence. Seeking out and supporting prominent political hadist message will inevitably empower salafists to carry the anti salafist ji of the Muslim Brotherhood and other political salafists. The raison d'être political salafist movements is to bring down secular, Western-backed regimes. In practice, the political sala fists' alternative is Taliban-style totalitarianism. In the process of defe ating salafist jihadism, the U.S. may be condemning more countries to the same fate as post-Soviet Afghani- stan. Yet, this is—and always has been—a choice for the Arab world to make; fretting over the final political form of the Middle East is yet another reason the United States is st ill embroiled in the war on terrorism after a decade. Likewise, this anti salafist jihadism id ea is not without its inherent contra- sm idea outlined here prohibits sup- dictions. While the anti salafist jihadi silent on the subject of defensive port to international terrorism, it is jihad, fighting the infidel in Muslim lands. In other words, while the anti salafist jihadism idea does prohibit terrorism in Western lands and the killing of civilians anywhere, it does not explicitly prohibit attacks against the West inside the Muslim world. Attacks like those against the USS Cole and Khobar Towers, which targeted U. S. military personnel in Muslim lands, would still theoretically be perm itted. Moreover, the anti salafist jihadism idea is also silent on the su bject of political salafist insurgencies like the Taliban's insurgency in Afgh anistan or al-Qaida in the Maghreb's insurgency in Algeria, as long as those insurgencies target police and mili- tary forces rather than civilians. Of course, if the United States and its allies extricate themselves from the war in Afghanistan, much of the case for defensive jihad would evaporat e, at lease in that nation. 60 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

17 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism Conclusion The Arab Spring provides a unique opportunity not just to reshape the political landscape of the Arab world, but also to inoculate the region against the insidious disease of salafist jihadism that has hijacked West- de. The United States and its allies ern strategic thinking for the past deca must extricate themselves from the remaining military engagements of the war on terrorism. But, at the same time, the United States must also find and empower the voices within the Arab world that are already expressing a powerful and appealing anti salafist jihadism idea. Only then despotic regimes and toward real can the West move beyond shoring up engagement with the peop le of the Middle East. About the Author Pat Proctor is a U.S. Army field artillery lieutenant colonel with over sev- enteen years' active servic e. In 2007, he served in Iraq as a member of the Joint Strategic Assessment Team under General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, mapping th e future for post-surge Iraq. Colo- nel Proctor is currently deployed to eastern Afghanistan as the chief of plans for the First Infantry Division. He is the author of Task Force . He holds master's Patriot and the End of Combat Operations in Iraq for strategy and theater operations degrees in military arts and sciences from the U.S. Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies, respectively . He is a doctoral candidate in his- tory at Kansas State University. Co lonel Proctor's recent publications include "Message versus Perception during the Americanization of the The Historian Vietnam War," (Spring 2011); "Fighting to Understand: A Practical Example of Design at the Battalion Level," Military Review (March–April 2011); and "The Parameters Mythical Shia Crescent," (Spring 2008) and Iran International Times , May 23, 2008. References 1 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Pr ess, 2002), 219–221. 2 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University, 2006), 280– 289. 3 Tony Karon, "Bush Claims the Mantle of World Leader," Time , September 21, 2001, available at: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175885,00.html . 4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 75, 87. 61 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

18 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume 5 Mao Tse-Tung, "War and Politics," in II (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 153. to the Arab World': Tunisia Protest Icon's 6 Agence France-Presse, "'He Brought Fire Mother Shares Her Son with the World," , March 5, 2011, Sydney Morning Herald available at: http://tinyurl.com/6ehdupb (www.smh.com.au/world/he-brought- fire-to-the-arab-world-tunisia-protest- icons-mother-shares-her-son-with-the- ; Jackie Northam, "Mubarak's Fall Spurs Calls To world-20110305-1biny.html) Rethink U.S. Policy," Morning Edition on NPR , February 15, 2011, available at: http://tinyurl.com/72lzx33 (www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133763952/mubaraks- fall-spurs-calls-for-u-s-policy-rethink) . Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq 7 Ofra Bengio, (New York: Oxford Uni- versity, 1998), 128; Christian Bawa Yamba, Permanent Pilgrims: The role of Pil- grimage in the Lives of West African Muslims in Sudan (London: Edinburgh University, 1995), 212. 8 Kepel, , 219–220. Jihad 9 Peter Clarke, ed., The World's Religions: Islam (London: Routledge, 2002), 152; George Rentz, "The Saudi Monarchy," in Willard A. Beling, ed., King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia , (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 26–27. 10 Kepel, Jihad , 219–220. 11 Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1999), 56. of Modern Rationalism 12 Ibid., 54, 56. 13 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State (Boul- der, CO: Westview, 2004), 84–85. 14 Kepel, Jihad , 140–149. In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism & the bin 15 Roland Jacquard, (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2002), 25–26. Laden Brotherhood 16 Kepel, Jihad , 140–149. 17 Navtej Dhillon, "Middle East Youth Bulge: Challenge or Opportunity?" Brookings , 22 May 2008, available at: http://tinyurl.com/6pbk6zw (www.brookings.edu/ research/speeches/2008/05/22 -middle-east-youth-dhillon) . UPI , 15 April 2011, available at: 18 "U.S. Groups Nurtured Arab Uprisings," http://tinyurl.com/ckn7aew (www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/04/15/US- groups-nurtured-Arab-uprisings/UPI-48381302909782/) . 19 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Fre- drick A. Praeger, 1968), 19–25. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 62 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

19 Proctor: War without Violence: Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War o War Without Violence : Leveraging the Arab Spring to Win the War on Terrorism The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- 24 Stephen Edelston Toulmin, versity Press, 1958), 94–141. gument: An Introducti on to the Toulmin 25 Charles W. Kneupper, "Teaching Ar Model," 29:3 (October 1978): 237–241. College Composition and Communication 26 Ibid. 27 AFP, "Al-Qaradawi Turns Down Top Brotherhood Post," , Janu- al Jazeera English ary 12, 2004, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/ 2004/01/2008410145045889729.html ; al r Questions Visa Ban," , February 7, Jazeera, "Muslim Schola al Jazeera English http://tinyurl.com/c59k323 2008, available at: (www.aljazeera.com/news/mid- dleeast/2008/02/200852513532222870.html) ; "Cleric Calls for Fatwa against UPI , February 22, 2011, available at: http://tinyurl Gadhafi," .com/c3hguog 011/02/22/Cleric-calls-for-fatwa- (www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2 against-Gadhafi/UPI-50271298378296/) . IslamicBoard , Sep- s Kidnapping, Killing Civilians," 28 IslamicBoard, "Islam Forbid tember 10, 2006, available at: http://tinyurl.com/czlyseo (www.islamic- board.com/clarifications-about-islam/3 0264-islam-forbids-kidnapping-killing- civilians.html) Pak- ; Essam Talima, "Islam Forbids Kidnapping, Killing Civilians," links.com http://tinyurl.com/7q3c4s6 , October 25 2006, available at: (www.pak- links.com/gs/religion-and-scripture/23 4782-islam-forbids-kidnapping-killing- civilians-qaradawi.html) . 29 Steven Simon, "Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Islam, Democracy, and U.S.- Middle East Policy," Council on Foreign Relations , September 14, 2006, available at: http://tinyurl.com/6ttar2f (www.cfr.org/democracy-promotion/there-clash- ; Inal Ersan, civilizations-islam-democracy- us-middle-east-policy/p11425) , March 16, 2008, Reuters "Leading Muslim Cleric Urges Qaeda to Free Austrians," available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/16/idUSL16354911 . 30 "Ninth Session," DIHQA , Dubai, UAE, 2005, available at: http://tinyurl.com/7ctrmg5 (web.archive.org/web/20070711191653/http:// ; "Reciter Abdulrahman quran.gov.ae/content/view/94/49/lang,english/) MP3Quran.net , aham1.net, available at: Alsudaes," http://mp3quran.net/eng/sds_english.html ; Imam-e-Kaaba Abdul Rahman Ibn Abdul Aziz as-Sudais, "Imam-e-Kaaba Abdul Rahman Ibn Abdul Aziz as-Sudais," available at: http://tinyurl.com/7z3ya2d (www.facebook.com/pages/Imam-e- Kaaba-Abdul-Rahman-Ibn-A bdul-Aziz-as-Sudais/3893 5267436#!/pages/Imam- e-Kaaba-Abdul-Rahman-Ibn-Abdul-Azi z-as-Sudais/38935267436?sk=info) ; Interpretation Aluma Solnick, "Based on Koranic Verses, s, and Traditions, Muslim Clerics State: The Jews Are the Descendants of Apes, Pigs, And Other Animals," , November 1, 2002, available at: MEMRI http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/754.htm#_edn2 . 31 "Imam-e-Kaaba Urges Cler ics to Shun Confrontation," Gulf Times , Doha, Qatar, June 4, 2007, available at: http://tinyurl.com/86dzvax (www.gulf-times.com/ site/topics/printArticle.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=152997&ver- sion=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23) ; "Makkah Imam says 'Nip Terror Groups in the Bud,'" Fatwa-Online.com , July 24, 2004, available at: http://www.fatwa-online .com/news/0040724.htm . 63 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

20 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Journal of Strategic Security PR Week , March 32 Sarah Robertson, "Bell Pottinger in Iraq Democracy PR Drive," 11, 2004, available at: http://www.prweek.com/uk/news/204668/ . 33 "Graphic Anti-Terro rism Advert Launched in the Middle East," Daily Mail (UK), October 11, 2006, available at: http://tinyurl.com/bwfztgt 9799/Graphic-anti-terrorism-advert- (www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-40 launched-Middle-East.html) ; see also: "The Martyr (2004)," IMDb , available at: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0813132/ . 64 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/8 DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.3

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