s 2017 81

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1 S /2017/81 United Nations Security Council Distr.: General 31 January 2017 Original: English Letter dated 27 January 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 6 of . resolution 2266 (2016) The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established 2140 (2014) pursuant to resolution on 11 January 2017 and considered by the Committee on 27 January 2017. We would appreciate it if the present letter and th e report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. ( Signed ) Ahmed Himmiche Coordinator Panel of Experts on Yemen ) Dakshinie Ruwanthika ( Signed Gunaratne Expert ) Gregory ( Signed John sen Expert ) Adrian Signed ( Wilkinson Expert 17 - 00300 (E) 170217 *1700300*

2 S/2017/81 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Summary The Panel of Experts on Yemen considers that, after nearly two years of longer a realistic conflict in Yemen, an outright military victory by any one side is no possibility in the near term. The country has fractured into competing power centres, Saleh alliance controlling much of the northern highlands and the - with the Houthi legitimate Government, backed by forces from Saudi Arabia and the Uni ted Arab Emirates, seeking to build capacity to administer parts of the south and the east. To date, the parties have not demonstrated sustained interest in or commitment to a political settlement or peace talks. The Panel assesses that the Houthi and Saleh forces continue to operate as part of a military alliance, while maintaining separate lines of command and control at the operational level. The Panel has identified the increased use by the Houthis of battle - - wi - tank guided mi ssiles that were not in the pre nning weapons, such as anti conflict Yemeni stockpile. These missiles are covertly shipped to the Houthi - Saleh alliance over land, along a new main supply route from the border with Oman. The Houthis - flight rockets continued to use short free range ballistic missiles and have also - against Saudi Arabian towns within 300 km of the border, to some political and propaganda effect. The air campaign waged by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, while devastating to Y emeni infrastructure and civilians, has failed to dent the political will of the Houthi - Saleh alliance to continue the conflict. Maritime attacks in the Red Sea in - late 2016 have increased the risk of the conflict spreading regionally. The Houthi Saleh all iance has demonstrated that it has an effective anti - ship capability, with one successful attack against a United Arab Emirates naval ship, and other attacks eliciting a cruise missile response by the United States N avy against Houthi land radar stations. There has also been a failed improvised explosive device attack by an as yet unidentified party against a large liquid nitrogen gas tanker heading north - Mandab strait. through the Bab al - Although the military front lines have remained largely the same, the near constant clashes and casualties notwithstanding, the political landscape has shifted. The Panel has identified a tightening of the Houthi - Saleh political alliance, culminating based supreme political council. On 28 - November, in th e establishment of a Sana’a this body announced a new 42 - person government. The Panel believes this to be an attempt by the alliance to create “facts on the ground” by establishing a functioning, de facto go vernment that will be difficult to uproot. It is, in effect, a new “bureaucratic” front to the conflict. Throughout 2016, the alliance has constantly undertaken acts that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government. the Central Bank to Aden by the Government has effectively The transfer of opened an “economic” front to the conflict, aimed at denying the Houthi - Saleh alliance the resources necessary to support continued hostilities or to administer the territory under its control. It has also significantly reduced the provision of material and services that are indispensable to the survival of civilians. The move may result in accelerating the impending humanitarian catastrophe in areas under the control of the alliance. 17 - 00300 2 / 242

3 S/2017/81 Terrorist Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the - groups such as Al Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) affiliate in Yemen are now actively exploiting the changing political environment and governance vacuums to recruit new members and stage new attack s and are laying the foundation for terrorist - networks that may last for years. The Panel assesses that AQAP is pursuing a two track strategy of seeking to control and administer territory in Yemen to serve as a nd execute attacks against the West. ISIL base, while simultaneously looking to plot a experienced a leadership restructuring early in 2016 and is looking to attract new recruits after a wave of defections in the first half of the year. The improvised also increased significantly, with explosive device threat from terrorist groups has the introduction of new technology and tactics into Yemen in 2016. It cannot be assumed that the use of this technology is now the preserve of a single group in the of technical knowledge light of the movement of fighters and thus the exchange between AQAP, ISIL, Houthi or Saleh forces and “resistance” forces affiliated to the President. Improvised explosive devices are also acting as a force multiplier for armed groups operating outside the control of the Government, red ucing their current and future dependence on conventional weapons. This has all significantly increased the overall risk to civilians from explosive remnants of war. The conflict has seen widespread violations of international humanitarian law by all pa rties to the conflict. The Panel has undertaken detailed investigations into some of these incidents and has sufficient grounds to believe that the coalition led by Saudi Arabia did not comply with international humanitarian law in at least 10 air that targeted houses, markets, factories and a hospital. It is also highly likely strikes that the Houthi and Saleh forces did not comply with international humanitarian law in at least three incidents when they fired explosive ordnance at a market, a house and a hospital. There have also been widespread and systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and human rights norms by officials and security forces affiliated to the Government and to the Houthis. The investigated cases of forced displacement of civilians and concludes that Panel has - there are indications of a governorate level policy, with clear violations by the Government in Aden and Lahij. The Panel has concluded that the Houthis, as well as Hadrami Elite For ces aligned with the Government and the United Arab Emirates, have violated international humanitarian law and human rights law and norms on at least 12 and 6 occasions, respectively, by forcibly disappearing individuals. The Houthi security forces in part icular routinely use torture and commit international humanitarian law violations and human rights abuses relating to deprivation of liberty. The Panel also documented many cases of violations against hospitals, medical staff, children and religious minori ties. It concludes that the violations by Saleh alliance are sufficiently routine, widespread and systematic to the Houthi - implicate its top leadership. All parties to the conflict have obstructed the distribution of humanitarian . The methods of obstruction vary, including the denial of assistance within Yemen movement, threats to humanitarian staff and the placing of conditions that seek to influence where and how aid is distributed. 17 - 00300 3 / 242

4 S/2017/81 of designated The Panel continued its investigations into the financial networks individuals and has identified that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh has a significant role in the management of financial assets on behalf of listed individuals Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005). The Panel has iden tified suspicious transfers of significant funds during the period 2014 - 2016, involving six companies and five banks in five countries, that certainly fall well outside the normal - wealth individuals. The Panel has also ide ntified fund management practices of high a company named Raydan Investments and accounts used by Khaled Ali Abdullah week period in December 2014. - Saleh to launder $83,953,782 within a three The financial activities, in terms of regional black market arms trafficking, of Fares Mohammed Mana’a (SOi.008) have also come to the attention of the Panel, in based - particular since he was appointed as minister of state in the new Sana’a 8 November and has known connections to both Ali Abdullah Saleh government of 2 and the Houthis. He is freely travelling on a Yemeni diplomatic passport, (YEi.003) including within the Schengen area. This case is just one illustration of how nd criminal entities are benefiting from the conflict opportunistic businesspeople a using governmental privileges and immunities. It is in their vested interest to use their influence to undermine any prospect for peaceful settlement. on of the targeted sanctions Only the continuation and effective implementati regime will deter such individuals and their supporters from participating in acts that threaten the peace and security of Yemen. If well implemented, delisting within the re willing to engage sanctions regime could offer incentives for those who a constructively for a better Yemen. 17 - 00300 4 / 242

5 S/2017/81 Contents Page Introduction and background ... ... 7 I. ... ... Mandate and appointment 7 A. Methodology ... ... B. 7 C. Programme of work ... ... 8 ... D. 8 Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations ... peace, security and stability ... II. 10 Acts that threaten A. Challenges to the authority of the legitimate Government ... 10 B. 12 Impediments to the cessation of hostilities and to the resumption of the political process 13 ... ... C. Security and regional dynamics ... III. units ... Armed groups and military 17 A. Yemeni military ... ... 17 B. Saleh network ... ... 18 C. Houthi network ... ... 21 ... D. Al - Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula ... 22 ... ... Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 23 E. F. ... ... 24 Active “fronts” ... 25 IV. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo 25 weapons and ammunition A. ... Supply chains for ... B. Probability of large - scale supply of weapons from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Yemen ... ... . 26 C. Maritime trafficking routes ... ... 26 D. Small - scale “ant trafficking” ... ... 32 34 E. Seizure, theft or diversion from the Yemeni national stockpile ... F. ... ... 35 Small arms ammunition on the black market ... - Saleh “missile campaign” ... G. 35 Houthi Improvised explosive devices ... ... 37 H. I. Explosive remnants of war, mines and unexploded ordnance ... 39 V. Economic context and overview of finance ... ... 39 A. Impact of the conflict on public finances ... ... 39 B. Houthi - Saleh financial networks: war profiteering and looting ... 40 ... ... Funding available to the Houthis 40 C. 17 - 00300 5 / 242

6 S/2017/81 ... - Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula finances ... Al 41 D. Asset freeze ... ... ... 41 VI. A. Ali Abdullah Saleh ... ... 41 Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh ... ... 42 B. C. Shaher Abdulhak ... ... 44 D. ... ... 45 Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh E. Houthi designated individuals ... ... 45 VII. Travel ban ... ... ... 45 A. Ali Abdullah Saleh ... ... 45 Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh ... ... 46 B. Other designated individuals 46 ... ... C. VIII. ... 47 Acts that violate international humanitarian law and human rights law Incidents attributed to the coalition led by Saudi Arabia ... 47 A. B. Incidents attributed to Houthi and Saleh forces: violations associated with deprivation of liberty ... ... . 54 C. Use of explosive ordnance in populated areas ... ... 55 D. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict ... 58 58 E. Intolerance and discrimination against religious minorities ... F. Incidents attributed to the Government ... ... 59 IX. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance ... ... 60 A. Obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance ... 60 B. Obstructions to the distribution of humanitarian assistance ... 61 Recommendations ... ... 61 X. * Annexes __________________ The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing. * 17 - 00300 6 / 242

7 S/2017/81 I. Introduction and background A. Mandate and appointment 1 . By its resolution 2266 (2016) , the Security Council renewed the sanctions measures in relation to Yemen and extended the mandate of the Panel on Experts on 1 Yemen until 27 March 2017. The Panel has the following mandate: To assist the Security Council Committee established pursuant to (a) resolution 2140 (2014) in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolutions 2140 2216 (2015) and , including b (2014) y providing it at any time with information relevant to the potential designation at a later stage of individuals and entities who may be engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen, as defined in paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015) ; (b) To gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regiona l organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the sanctions measures and targeted arms embargo, in particular incidents of undermining the political transition; 27 July To provide a midterm update to the Committee no later than (c) 2016, and a final report no later than 27 January 2017 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee; (d) To assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals subject to sanctions measures, including through the provision of identifying information and additional information for the publicly available narrative summary of rea sons for listing; To cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the (e) Security Council, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. 2 . On 5 August, the Panel presented a midterm update to the Committee, in accor dance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2266 (2016) . An additional update, containing a preliminary analysis of the attack against the Salah al - Kubra Committee on community hall in Sana’a on 8 October, was provided to the October. 17 . The present report covers 2016. The Panel has also continued to investigate 3 outstanding issues covered in its previous final report ( S/2016/73 ). B. Methodology . 4 In its inves tigations, the Panel complied with paragraph 11 of resolution 2266 , which pertains to the best practices and methods recommended by the (2016) es of Sanctions Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issu (see S/2006/997 ), and has maintained the highest achievable standard of proof, even __________________ 1 2016 The finance expert, Farhan Hyder Sahito, resigned on 7 December to pursue an alternative professional opportunity; his work is included herein. 17 - 00300 7 / 242

8 S/2017/81 though it was unable to travel to Yemen. Emphasis has been placed on adherence to ncy and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration standards regarding transpare 2 The Panel of independent verifiable sources and providing the opportunity to reply. has maintained transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence in its investigations and based its findings o n a balance of verifiable evidence. The Panel used satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations . 5 from private providers to support investigations. It also used commercial databases ds. Public statements recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone recor by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or ot hers to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in the present report and instead placed the relevant evidence in United Nations archives. 6 as . The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof. f the The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity o 7 . source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present report. Programme of work C. 8 . During its investigations, Panel members travelled to Bahrain, Colombia, Djibouti, France, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Saud i Arabia facilitated visits along the border with Yemen at Khamis Mushayt, at Khubah in Jazan and at Najran, allowing the Panel to inspect remnants of munitions fired by the Houthis to assist in identifying potential violations of the arms embargo. The Pan el requested official visits to Oman and areas of Yemen under the control of the legitimate Government, in Ma’rib, and of the Houthis, in Sana’a, but the requests have not yet been approved. For more than 70 per cent of the time at least one expert was tra velling for investigative purposes. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations D. United Nations system 1 . 9 . The Panel highlights the excellent level of cooperation with the Office of the General for Yemen and the United Nations resident - Special Envoy of the Secretary coordinators/humanitarian coordinators in Yemen and neighbouring States visited by the Panel. Th e United Nations country team and United Nations agencies with a regional mandate remain supportive of the Panel’s work. The Panel has consistently __________________ 2 See annex 1 for details of the opportunity to reply methodology and annex 2 for details of the inte rnational humanitarian law investigative methodology. 17 - 00300 8 / 242

9 S/2017/81 had direct access to country team officials in Sana’a and the wider region to tise. exchange information and exper 10 . The Panel has maintained close cooperation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team and the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. 2 . Communications with Member States and organizations 11 to Member States and entities requesting The Panel has sent 166 letters . information on specific issues relevant to its mandate. Such requests do not necessarily imply that these Governments, or individuals or entities in those States, have been violating the sanctions regime. The Panel notes, however, that only 57 per cent of requests to Member States for information have thus far resulted in a response. At the time of submission of the present report, replies were awaited from Australia, the Bahamas, Bahrain, the Democratic People’s Rep ublic of Korea, Djibouti, France, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yemen. The 3 and Sana’a - based ministry of foreign affairs under the control of the Houthis several other entities also have yet to reply. A summary of correspondence is provided in annex 4. Government of Yemen . 3 12 The Panel met the President of Yemen, Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour, the . President, Ali Muhsin al - Ahmar, and other officials of the legitimate Vice - Government in Riyadh in October. Although they expressed their full support for the Panel, the information that they provided regarding arms and finance in relation to the Houthis did not meet the required evidentiary standards nor contain sufficient detail to allow the Panel to verify the information using other means and sources. 4 . Houthi - Saleh alliance 13 . The Panel regrets to report that, its four requests dat ed 1 March, 3 June, 19 September and 12 October notwithstanding, the Houthis, who have effective control of the airport in Sana’a, have continued to deny entry to the Panel. The Panel has maintained telephone contact with Ansar Allah and General People’s C ongress (GPC) political leaders and met some of them during visits to countries neighbouring Yemen. __________________ 3 To avoid confusion between the legitimate Government and Houthi - Saleh alliance authorities and appointments and to easily distinguish between the two, in the present report, for ministries and ials of the legitimate Government the Panel will use capitalization. For example, Minister of offic Defence and Ministry of Defence. The Houthi duplicate administration would then be referred to as the “Sana’a istry of defence”. based min - based minister of defence” and the “Sana’a - 17 - 00300 9 / 242

10 S/2017/81 II. Acts that threaten peace, security and stability A. Challenges to the authority of the legitimate Government In paragraph 18 (a) of its resolution , the Security Council 2140 (2014) 14 . determined that obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition, as outlined in the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative and implementation mechanism agreement, posed a threat to the peace, security or stability of Yemen and that those undertaking such acts might fall within the designation criterion. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 2216 (2015) , the Council demanded that all Yemeni parties, in particular the Houthis, fully implement resolution 2201 (2015) ould and refrain from further unilateral actions that c undermine the political transition and also demanded that the Houthis immediately and unconditionally cease all actions that were exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government. The initial control exerted by the Houthis over the S tate apparatus was further 15 . consolidated in 2016, in particular with the formalization of the Houthi Saleh - political alliance in August. Together, they continue to undertake acts that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government. he Houthis have continued to control the capital and municipality of Sana’a T . 16 and 13 of the 21 governorates. This represents 27 per cent of the surface area of Yemen and comprised more than 80 per cent of the total population before the conflict. The Houthis control all or most of the governorates of Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Hudaydah, Ibb, Mahwit, Raymah and Sa‘dah, in addition to the municipality of Sana’a. In addition, they control significant portions of Bayda’ and Jawf and remain active in Ta‘izz. 1 . Con trol of the State by the Houthis (January - August) Until August, the Houthis exercised de facto control over central government 17 . institutions in Sana’a and local government in other areas under their control through the supreme revolutionary committee, headed by Muhammad Ali al Houthi, - a relative of Abdulmalik al - Houthi (YEi.004). During that period, the Houthis maintained the administrative structure of a . 18 functioning authority with public offices and services. This was supervised under ontrol of Houthi delegates, and their committees, within an executive the close c member government council headed by the structure, comprising an acting 33 - acting prime minister, Talal Aqlan (see annex 5). The Houthis also controlled the when the President appointed a new governor and Central Bank until September, ordered the transfer of the Bank to Aden. 19 The Houthis also maintained a solid grip over the intelligence and security . agencies, effectively preventing any attempts to challenge their authority through a supreme security committee (see annex 6). The Panel has identified that Abdulrabb Saleh Ahmed Jarfan, also known as Abu Taha (see figure I), has emerged as the highest Houthi authority in charge of the intelligence services. Since early 2015, he as the head of the national security bureau and has significant influence has acted over all other Yemeni intelligence and investigation services under the control of the 17 - 00300 10 / 242

11 S/2017/81 Houthis involved in allegations of violations of international humanitarian law (see 4 annex 7). Figure I Abdulrabb Saleh Ahmed Jarfan, head of Houthi intelligence services Source : Euronews, 20 August 2016. Samad. Note : left to right: Abdulrabb Saleh Ahmed Jarfan, Talal Aqlan and Saleh Ali Muhammad al - 2 . Control of the State by the Houthi - Saleh political alliance (August - December) . 20 On 28 July, Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) agreed to a power - sharing agreement with Abdulmalik al - Houthi (YEi.004). A Sana’a - based 10 - member 5 five members each nominated by Saleh and the with supreme political council, Houthis, was established on the same day (see annex 8), and issued its first “governmental” decree. It has since acted as a de facto government, appointing 6 - al Headed by Saleh Ali Muhammad Samad, it replaced the governors and officials. 7 Supreme Revolutionary Council, which has yet to be disbanded. __________________ 4 The Yemeni intelligence and security services also include the Political Security Organization and the Central Security Forces (also known as the Special Security Force). See www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/yemen/index.html . All hyperlinks in the present report were checked on 1 January 2017, unless otherwise stated. 5 (YEi.003) The agreement was signed by Sa diq Amin Abu Ras on behalf of Ali Abdullah Saleh Houthi (YEi.004) . and by Saleh Ali Muhammad al - Samad on behalf of Abdulmalik al - 6 Parliament, which is now seven years past its next scheduled elections, later ratified the supreme political coun cil. Of the 301 - seat Parliament, 26 members have since died, leaving 275 members, of whom 142 attended the session and ratified the council. For membership of the financial ee, see advisory committee, the media advisory committee and the political advisory committ annex 6. 7 The Supreme Revolutionary Council still exists, although it is unclear what power it continues to hold and many of its members have taken on other positions, either in the Sana’a - based supreme based government of 28 November. Its head, - political council and/or as members of the Sana’a Houthi, continues to keep his title and to remain active in official activities. See Mohamed Ali al - www.almasirah.net/ the statement attributed to the Council on 5 December, available from . details.php?es_id=833&cat_id=3 17 - 00300 11 / 242

12 S/2017/81 . 21 On 28 November, the supreme political council announced a 42 - person 8 - Aziz bin Habtour, an active GPC member affiliated to Ali government under Abdel Abdullah Sale h (YEi.003) (see annex 9). The Panel considers this to be an attempt by the Houthi - Saleh alliance to create “facts on the ground”, establishing a de facto government that will be difficult to uproot in order to resume a peaceful political transition. The P anel noted that the Sana’a - based cabinet does not include the most influential members of the Houthis and GPC and believes that the alliance is likely to use this cabinet to ensure a stronger bargaining position in any future peace negotiations. raction by the Houthi Inte . 3 Saleh alliance with the international community - 22 . With regard to international relations, the Houthis have established or continued diplomatic contact with those Member States that have maintained their diplomatic representations in Sana’a, including Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic. In the absence of other 9 both the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) diplomatic representations, to interact with representatives have used the presence of their delegations in Oman of other countries. Mohamed Abdusalam Salah Fletah, as the lead negotiator, has gradually become the public face of the Houthis within the international 10 to Nevertheless, the Panel assesses that an individual close community. 11 makes Abdulmalik al - Houthi (YEi.004), Mahdi Mohammed Hussein al - Mashaat, the decisions during the negotiations (see annex 10). Most Yemeni diplomatic representations abroad remain affiliated with the 23 . 12 and the Islamic Republic of Iran legitimate Government, apart from those in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the latter, the Houthis made their first diplomatic 13 appointment on 7 March, naming Naif Ahmed Hamid al - Qanes as ambassador. B. Impediments to the cessation of hostilities and to the resumptio n of the political process 24 . No real progress towards a peaceful settlement was made during the reporting period. __________________ 8 He had previously served as Governor of Aden, appointed by the current President. 9 Most international representations closed between January 2015, when the Houthis took control of Sana’a, and 26 March 2015, when Operation Decisive Storm began. 10 He is assisted in this by Hamza al Houthi - - Houthi, who has some links to Abdulmalik al . (YEi.004) 11 the Houthi negotiating team for According to confidential well - informed sources, he has headed (YEi.004) more than two years. He has direct access to Abdulmalik al - Houthi , who operates behind the scenes. He has been described by many confidential sources as an impulsive hardliner. 12 el that in September 2015 the legitimate Government recalled Yemeni diplomats informed the Pan its ambassador. Thereafter, other diplomats in the embassy aligned themselves with the Houthis. 13 Supreme Revolutionary Council decree No. 89. See “SRC appoints ambassador to Syria”, Yemen News . A Yemeni Agency, 7 March 2016, available from http://sabanews.net/en/news421619.htm conformity with his credentials process, which - diplomat informed the Panel that, because of non l authority, the Syrian Arab Republic had accepted the nominee only as required presidentia chargé d’affaires. 17 - 00300 12 / 242

13 S/2017/81 25 . The peace talks in Kuwait that opened on 21 April offered an initial hostilities, which would have opportunity to reach arrangements for the cessation of created an environment more conducive to a potential political transition. Throughout the talks, which ended on 6 August, there were regular breaches of the cessation of hostilities agreed to among the Yemeni parties and betwe en the Houthis and Saudi Arabia bilaterally. They included four Houthi launches of free - flight rockets against Saudi Arabian territory; continued military operations by Houthi and Saleh forces and forces affiliated with the Government in Ta‘izz and on the front line in Nihm; and air strikes by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Occasionally, the breaches were used as a pretext by one of the parties to suspend its participation in, 14 or threaten to withdraw from, the talks. . 26 roving coordination mechanisms for the There was some progress in imp - escalation and cessation of hostilities through an agreement to establish a de Janub, Saudi Arabia, comprising officers from the coordination cell in Dhahran al - Government and the Houthi - Saleh alliance. As the talks s talled, however, the lack of 15 trust prevented progress. The support of the United Nations and the international community notwithstanding, the cell could not operate owing to the Houthis’ refusal 16 to deploy their officers. The Houthis subsequently shelled t he cell’s location. Security and regional dynamics C. 1 Areas under the control of forces allied to the legitimate Government . 27 The legitimate Government continues to face significant challenges in . ensuring the delivery of public developing a safe and secure environment and services in the areas that it controls. The President spent much of the reporting 17 period in Riyadh, returning to Aden on 26 November. The Vice - President, Ali Mohsen, limited his travel inside Yemen to Ma’rib. The Prime Min ister, Ahmed - Dagher, was deployed earlier to Aden on 6 June and then made Obaid Mubarek Bin short visits to Ma’rib, Mukalla and Socotra. The presence of officials of northern origin in Aden and the movement of all members of the Government in Aden remain r estricted for security reasons. 28 . The Panel has investigated some of these local officials and military commanders for their potential involvement in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen. These acts range from attempts to jeopard ize the country’s __________________ 14 On 1 May, the delegation of the legitimate Government suspended its participation in the direct h Mechanized Infantry Brigade talks, claiming that Houthi and Saleh forces had plundered the 29 t in Harf Sufyan, Amran. Similarly, the head of the Houthi delegation to the talks complained that . https://twit ter.com/abdusalamsalah the air strikes by the coalition were jeopardizing the talks. See 15 On 26 May, the Panel visited Khuba h , near Jazan, Saudi Arabia, less than 5 km from the Yemeni firing could border, and observed the fragility of the cessation of hostilities, given that sporadic be heard. The village has been ev acuated owing to previous fighting. 16 The Houthis committed themselves to reactivating the cell and to deploying members to Dhahran al - Janub after meeting the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, in Oman on November. The cessation of hostilit https://twitter.com/ ies has not yet materialized. See 17 . OSESGY/status/800051770022051840?lang=en 17 He left Aden for Riyadh on 13 February. He returned to Ma’rib for a one visit on 19 July. He day - next visited Aden on 26 August. He returned to Aden on 26 November where he has since remained, except for a visit to the United Arab Emirates on 3 and 4 December. 17 - 00300 13 / 242

14 S/2017/81 unity and territorial integrity, through violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, to allegations of support for terrorist organizations. Involvement of the coalition forces 2 . change to the political composition of the coalition led by Saudi 29 . There was no 18 Arabia in 2016. The military composition, however, did change. In a letter dated July, Morocco informed the Committee and the Panel that, as from 22 January, it 13 assets in support of the Government. In a letter dated had ceased operating air 18 July, Egypt informed the Panel that it was contributing naval forces to secure navigation through the Bab al Mandab strait. On 22 August, the President of Egypt, - Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, confirmed, dur ing a press conference, the presence of air force elements in Saudi Arabia but denied the presence of ground troops in that region 19 other than for peacekeeping missions. 30 . At the operational level, the Panel considers that coalition military activities are conducted under the control of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (see map in annex 11), as follows: Air operations in Yemen are under the operational control of a joint (a) headquarters led by Saudi Arabia and based in Riyadh, with a targetin g and control cell for the targeting and tasking processes. Officers are present from the coalition 20 member States, less Morocco and Senegal; (b) Ground operations in Ma’rib are under the operational control of Saudi Arabia; Ground operations in Ad en and in the vicinity of Mukalla are under the (c) operational control of the United Arab Emirates; (d) Ground operations in the Ta‘izz area are under a loose operational control of the Yemeni military; (e) Naval operations are under national command. . 31 The coalition significantly reduced the rate of its air operations in Yemen 21 during the period of cessation of hostilities from 10 March to 6 August. 32 . After the collapse of the talks in Kuwait on 6 August, the coalition increased the scope and tempo of its air operations, which also resulted in the air strike on a funeral hall in Sana’a on 8 October (see para. 121). The coalition has imposed additional r estrictions on commercial flights to Sana’a, with the cancellation in August of Yemenia Airways flights, which used to land at the international airport after inspection in Bishah, Saudi Arabia. The coalition refused to allow Omani __________________ 18 The Panel assesses that Saudi Arabia is leading the coalition compr ising four States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) and four States members of the League of Arab States (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and the Sudan). 19 - علينا - يملى See http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/192000/25/News/192000/25/547049 /الأولى/القرار - المصرى - « مستقل » - ولا - أحد - . غير - ما - نر. aspx 20 United States officers are present to support logis tical and intelligence activities. The Chief of Joint Operations of Operation Restoring Hope, led by Saudi Arabia, told the Panel that officers from France, Malaysia and the United Kingdom were also present at the joint headquarters. 21 order hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia began on 10 March. The cessation of b The United Nations sponsored cessation of hostilities began on 10 April. - 17 - 00300 14 / 242

15 S/2017/81 State - owned aircraft to transport political delegations between Oman and Sana’a. Consequently, the Houthi delegation participating in the talks in Kuwait was stranded in Oman for more than two months. It returned on 15 October on an Omani llowed in order to transport victims of the aircraft whose access was exceptionally a air strike on the funeral hall. Map 1 Conflict areas as at 31 December 2016 Maritime attacks in the Bab al . 3 Mandab strait and the Red Sea - ship missiles by Houthi or Saleh forces 33 . The launch of anti - , against the SWIFT - 1 a vessel flying the flag of the United Arab Emirates, on 1 October and the USS Mason on 9 and 12 October, reported radar locks from the Yemeni coast against 22 coalition vessels, the destruction by the United States Navy of three Yemeni coastal radar sites in Houthi - controlled territory by cruise missiles on 13 October __________________ 22 Maritime Asset Security and Training, Intelligence Report, No. 49, 2 November 2016. Available . security.com - www.mast from 17 - 00300 15 / 242

16 S/2017/81 and a maritime attack by unidentified forces against the Spanish - flagged MV Galicia Spirit on 25 October marked a significant escalation in the conflict at sea (see map 2) . The Panel considers attacks using anti ship missiles to be a threat to the peace - 34 . - Mandab strait and the and security of Yemen, given that such attacks in the Bab al Red Sea area may affect the security of maritime navigation and commercial shipping, thereby jeopardizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen by . More than 8 per cent of sea, in violation of paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015) 23 all global maritime trade uses this route to th e Suez Canal. Map 2 Maritime attacks 1 - Attack on the SWIFT was operating in direct support of military operations by the . The SWIFT - 1 35 United Arab Emirates in Yemen, making regular deliveries of supplies, troops and 24 equipment from Assab, Eritrea, to Aden. It was not engaged in the routine delivery of humanitarian aid. The ves sel was a legitimate military objective under __________________ 23 “Q&A: Suez Canal”, www.theguardian.com/ , 1 February 2011. Available from Guardian q - b/01/suez - canal - egypy - business/2011/fe and - a . 24 , S/2016/920 For details of United Arab Emirates military operations based in Assab, see 31 paras. 35. - 17 - 00300 16 / 242

17 S/2017/81 international humanitarian law. Fires caused by the burning propellant from the rocket motor of an anti - ship missile seriously damaged the vessel. The warhead failed to detonate on impact and passed through the vessel. Further information is provided in annex 13. . 36 Neutral civilian vessels remain at risk of attack in the event of targeting errors stemming from system failures or misidentification during the hours of darkness. The Houthi Saleh alliance has dem onstrated a technological capability to attack a - large vessel in the Red Sea. That will, however, last only as long as the alliance has access to old Yemeni naval stocks of missiles supplied before the arms embargo, tive in ensuring that there is no resupply of and as long as the arms embargo is effec ship missiles to the alliance. anti - Improvised explosive device attack against the MV Galicia Spirit Galicia Spirit 37 . The maritime attack against the liquid natural gas tanker, MV , on 25 October demonstrates the vulnerability of commercial shipping to small vessel attacks while close to the coast of Yemen. A determined attempt was made to board - 70 kg of high the vessel using an improvised explosive device of approximately 20 failed only because of the premature and accidental initiation explosive. The attempt of the device. That the assaulting group possessed a device of significant size and was determined to close with and board the vessel demonstrates a new tactic. The location of the attack . 38 , the tactics and equipment and the type of improvised explosive device all provide indicators as to the perpetrators. The Panel continues to investigate and has also passed all relevant information to the or its information. The Panel Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team f considers that the attack was designed more for an “international spectacular” than as part of the Yemeni conflict. The Panel also considers that this attack was not specifically targeted against the MV and that the vessel was simply a Galicia Spirit target of opportunity; any similar vessel in the area heading north at that time would have been just as likely to have been attacked. Further information is provided in annex 14. III. Armed groups and military units 39 Pur and as reiterated in 2140 (2014) suant to paragraph 17 of resolution . resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2266 ( 2016) , the Panel continues to investigate individuals and entities associated with armed groups who may be engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen. A. Yemeni military remains deeply divided. Allegiance to the central State, . 40 The Yemeni military historically weak, has virtually disappeared. Allegiance is now to various groups, many of which purport to be either the State or an alternative governing authority. n danger of fracturing beyond the point of no The Panel assesses Yemen to be i return. Since the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm, led by Saudi Arabia, on 26 March 2015, several military units have defected to either the Houthis or to join 17 - 00300 17 / 242

18 S/2017/81 i.003). Those units that remain loyal to the former President, Ali Abdullah Saleh (YE the current President are often operating at less than full strength. No entity in Yemen has a monopoly on power or the use of force. This has resulted in a messy talions in which no one side and chaotic conflict between broken brigades and bat has been able to impose its will on the other. In practice, this means that, just as on the political front in which both sides . 41 make appointments to the same position, there are “duplicate” military units operating in Yeme n: legitimate units loyal to the current President and “shadow” units loyal to the Houthis or the former President. For example, in Ta‘izz there are two 35th Armoured Brigades, one loyal to the legitimate Government and one he former President. Both claim to be the “true” unit operating under the control of t 25 and both continue to use the name; such duplicate units are common throughout 26 There has also been the creation of new military bodies, such as the Yemen. 27 which are active throughout southern Yemen, Security Belt Forces early in 2016, the Hadrami Elite Forces based in Hadramawt and various militia groups, which, while affiliated with the legitimate Government, operate largely outside its control. Instead of one large war, in which various mil itary units work towards a common, overarching goal, the conflict in Yemen comprises several smaller wars with local commanders pursing their own agendas. B. Saleh network 42 . The former President, Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003), continues to exert ef fective command and control over an extensive network of allies that he built up - 2012). There are three during more than three decades as Head of State (1978 distinct components to this network: tribal, political and military. The tribal element 28 The political aspect revolves around GPC, of which on his Sanhan tribe. is centred he remains the head. Militarily, he retains the personal loyalty and allegiance of - several high ranking officers whom he appointed during his presidency. It is this last component th at is the most important for his continued influence and power, and where he has placed his most trusted deputies. For example, one of his tribespeople, Brigadier General Abdullah Daba’an, is the Ta‘izz axis commander. . The Saleh (YEi.003) network functions along highly personal lines of loyalty 43 and is best envisaged as three concentric circles radiating out from family to clan to 29 tribe. He has also used the politics of marriage, by marrying sons and daughters 30 y means of creating durable alliances. into prominent families, as a secondar __________________ 25 challenging, but also This not only makes the establishment of an accurate order of battle complicates the determining of responsibility for acts and violations. 26 This is also true, for example, of the th Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Ta‘izz. 17 27 First identified by the Panel in May. Nevertheless, the Panel believes that the body was established as early as March/April. 28 See annex 15 for background on the families, clans and tribes of Bayt al - Ahmar. 29 The Saleh inner circle is the immediate family, in particular the sons (see annex 16) and the nephews (see annex 17). Members of his Afaash clan fall into the second circle, while fellow members of his Sanhan tribe largely comprise the outer circle. See also Sarah Phillips, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis (Abingdon, United Kingdom, Routledge, 2011). 30 Se law. - in - e annex 18 for a list of Saleh’s wives and annex 19 for a list of his daughters and sons 17 - 00300 18 / 242

19 S/2017/81 Although this network has suffered defections, most notably during the popular 31 uprisings of 2011 and 2012, it has survived largely intact. 44 . Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) came to power in 1978 on the heels of two brutal assassinations of both his immediate predecessors. Concerned for his own 32 personal safety, he drastically revamped and restructured the Yemeni military 33 This allowed him to command structure until it resembled a Sanhan tribal tree. surround himself with people whom he trusted and also ensured that many within 34 the senior officer corps owed him their position and their loyalty. 45 . Post - 2012 efforts by the current President to restructure the Yemeni military were often met with resistance by many of these officers who were more loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) than to the State itself. In the wake of the Houthi takeover of Sana’a in late 2014, and the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm on rrent President and 26 March 2015, many of these officers broke with the cu continued to operate on behalf of Saleh. Although Saleh has periodically claimed that he no longer controls or directs military units in Yemen, the Panel assesses this rom further to be a fig leaf designed to afford him deniability and shield him f international repercussions and responsibility for violations of international 35 humanitarian law committed by forces under his command and control. . In late July, the Panel documented, for the first time, military units loyal to Ali 46 Abdulla h Saleh (YEi.003) fighting alongside Houthi units on the border with Saudi 36 Arabia. The first known casualty of a Saleh loyalist soldier, a member of the 37 republican guards, Sharif Ahmed Ali Ghashim Maqawlah, on the border occurred 38 on 31 July. Several othe r casualties followed over the following few weeks, __________________ 31 One notable example is that of the current Vice - President, Ali Muhsin al - Ahmar, who for years - rom the same village (Bayt al Ahmar) was a Saleh loyalist, only to break with him in 2011. He is f and tribe (Sanhan) as Saleh, but from a different clan. 32 Throughout his career has survived assassination attempts, many Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) of which came early in his rule, during the 1970s and 1980s. He mo st recently survived an attempt in June 2011. 33 Sanhan has not traditionally been a strong tribe in Yemen. It was only with Saleh’s rise to the presidency that it became powerful, largely by supplying officers to the military. 34 were removed from Many of these Sanhan of ficers fear that if Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) Yemen they would also be purged. 35 See Saleh’s speeches in October 2015 (see S/2016/73 for more detail) and, more recently, on 25 June, available from www.almotamar.net/pda/130743.htm . 36 epublican under the control of the Houthis uards g , These units appeared to be largely from the r hich was technically disbanded by the current President yet remains operational under Saleh’s w instructions. 37 The Ja‘ifi, r epublican g uards under the control of the Houthis were then headed by Ali bin Ali al - who was injured in the coalition strike on a hall in Sana’a on 8 October and died of c ommunity General Murad al - Awbali, who had his wounds on 10 October. He was replaced by Major formerly commanded the 62 nd Mechanized Brigade within the r epublican g uards, which is rigade were active in fighting Awbali and the b stationed at the Farijah military bas e in Amran. Al - in Nihm in 2016. 38 For a list of soldiers loyal to the Saleh network killed on the border with Saudi Arabia in July - August, see annex 20. 17 - 00300 19 / 242

20 S/2017/81 Mulusi, who died on including Brigadier General Hasan Abdullah Muhammad al - 39 September (see figure II). 22 Figure II - Mulusi in Houthi “martyrdom” poster (left) Hasan Abdullah Muhammad al and in th e company of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) (right) . 47 Although the Houthi - Saleh alliance has tightened politically, military units loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) and those operating under the umbrella of the 40 The Panel assesses that the Houthi leadership continue to r emain largely distinct. Houthi (YEi.004) is an alliance of relationship between Saleh and Abdulmalik al - convenience, which is unlikely to survive the end of the current conflict. Saleh has historically ruled by playing groups o ff against one another, a process that he likes to call “dancing on the heads of snakes”. His alliance with the Houthis, after fighting six wars against the group from 2004 to 2010, is the latest version of this uthis are currently allied by a common strategy. While the Saleh network and the Ho - enemy, several long term issues continue to divide the two, in particular the shape and ideology of any future State. Nevertheless, for the time being, Houthi and Saleh 41 in military strikes. commanders continue to coordinate and cooperate . 48 The Panel has found that the Houthi and Saleh forces operate in three distinct ways. In population centres, such as Ta‘izz, they operate along traditional military lines with a military district commander, axis commanders and bri gade __________________ 39 it within the Yemeni Terrorism Un He was the former head of the Counter - S pecial F orces, which was headed by Saleh’s eldest son, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) . Following Ali Abdullah Saleh’s (YEi.003) resignation in 2012 and the subsequent military reshuffling, he acted as the (YEi.005) h Saleh’s close protection team in the United Arab head of Ahmed Ali Abdulla Emirates. 40 One exception to this, which is notable because it is the only exception that the Panel has observed, is the case of Brigadier General Hasan Abdullah Muhammad al - Mulusi, who, althou gh close to the Saleh family and a member of the Sanhan tribe, led a unit of Houthi fighters. Sources - interviewed by the Panel ascribe this to the fact that al Mulusi “became a Houthi”, joining the movement to avenge the death of one of his sons who was al legedly killed in a coalition air strike in Sana’a. 41 The Panel has drawn a distinction between the Houthi - Saleh political alliance and the alliance of Houthi and Saleh military forces. In the former, the Panel views the establishment of the joint sharing agreement between the two - e political council as the formalization of a power suprem groups. Nevertheless, while the Panel finds that the Houthi and Saleh forces are part of a military Saleh - ses the terms “Houthi alliance it has not found significant unit integration. It therefore u political alliance” and “Houthi and Saleh forces” to describe the situation on the ground. 17 - 00300 20 / 242

21 S/2017/81 42 commanders. On the border with Saudi Arabia, there are smaller special operations units, including elements of the republican guards, and mobile missile groups. The missile force was previously part of the republican guards under the command of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005), but now appears to be operating under the 43 Lastly, along the Red Sea coast, Houthi forces have control of the Houthi forces. adopted a territorial defensive strategy, which includes the use of land mines to support the defenc e of key points. C. Houthi network 44 . The Houthis, led by Abdulmalik al - Houthi (YEi.004), 49 have both a political and a military wing. Although they have established a supreme military council, in alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003), key deci sions for the movement 45 Houthi (YEi.004), who is believed to be in continue to be made by Abdulmalik al - 46 Sa‘dah. 50 . Militarily, the Houthis rely on a two - tiered approach: a network of militias, 47 which rotate frequently through areas under Houthi control, and ex - Yemeni military regular units under the command of officers who have broken with the 48 current President and have “joined”, or are now aligned to, the Houthi movement. Many, although certainly not all of these officers, are Zaydis from families. sayyid One such figure is Major General Zakaria Yahya Mohammed al - Shami, who was 49 named deputy chief of staff by the Houthis. Just as with the Saleh network, __________________ 42 See annex 21 for an outline of the command and control structure in the military districts in active. which Houthi and Saleh forces are 43 The missile force has its headquarters in Faj Attan in Sana’a and brigades in the Sabra camp, south A’tifi, an officer from the Hadr - west of Sana’a. Major General Mohamed Nasser Ahmed al - subtribe of Khawlan, was appointed as its commander by th e current President in 2013. - Houthi (YEi.004) has praised the force for its creativity and Major General Abdulmalik al - A’tifi was appointed as the Sana’a al based minister of defence in th e Sana’a - based government - of 28 November. 44 See annex 22 for backg round to the Houthi movement and annex 23 for the Houthi family tree. 45 Houthi’s Abdulmalik al - (YEi.004) leadership has caused some rifts with early members of the Houthi network. This is most notably the case with Abdullah al - Razzami, a former Houthi’s key deputies in the initial - - Haqq, who was one of Husayn al parliamen tarian for Hizb al Razzami, who continues to reside in - Houthi war in 2004. The Panel does not believe that al of his tribe, the Sa’dah, is still a member of the Houthi movement. Early in September, members Razzam, clashed with Houthi fighters in Sa’dah, leaving seven dead. 46 He rarely appears in public and most frequently communicates with the public via video messages. 47 These militias, as is the case with many irregular forces, do not wear uniforms and are not , such as stationed at bases. Their commanders often use a nom de guerre or, in Arabic, a kunya Abu Ali (literally: “the father of Ali”), which makes positive identification difficult. See, for example, this article on a Houthi co Abu mmander in Ibb, who is known only by the kunya www.almasdaronline.com/article/83398 . See also annex 24 for a list of Hout hi fighters Hamza: released in Ma’rib in September, which illustrates the degree to which Houthi fighters from different regions are moved around the country to participate in active battlefronts. 48 It is often unclear which senior officers have joined the Hout hi movement out of ideological agreement and which have joined because the Houthis are the strongest group in an area. 49 based government announced on 28 November, he was named the minister of - In the Sana’a Houthis. The Panel has yet to confirm that he will transportation in territories controlled by the retain his role as the effective head of the former Yemeni military now affiliated to the Houthi armed groups. 17 - 00300 21 / 242

22 S/2017/81 50 although not definitive, role. The Houthis have appointed identity plays a key, 51 In addition, anders to five of the seven military districts of Yemen. military comm 52 which the Houthis control an intelligence apparatus, the national security bureau, 53 is headed by Abdullrabb Saleh Ahmed Jarfan. D. Al - Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula 51 Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula - Following the forced withdrawal of Al . (AQAP) from Mukalla in late April, the group has been unable to seize, hold or 54 Nevertheless, it remains active in carrying administer similar portions of territory. which generally fall into three main categories: suicide out attacks in Yemen, attacks (see annex 28), mortar attacks and roadside bombs. Throughout 2016, AQAP 55 has claimed some 200 attacks, most of which have been conducted using roadside bombs (see para. 86). evoted most of its efforts in Yemen to fighting the Houthis, 52 . AQAP has d 57 56 attacking Security Belt Forces in Abyan and Aden and especially in Bayda’, 58 striking forces loyal to the President in Hadramawt. The Panel also assesses that AQAP is actively working towards pr eparing terrorist attacks to be launched against 59 The group has continued to actively recruit from the West using Yemen as a base. Yemeni tribes, especially in southern Yemen and Hadramawt, and has emphasized __________________ 50 an. For For Saleh’s network, the identity that mattered was tribal, in particular being from Sanh the Houthis, the identity that matters is religious, being a descendant of the Prophet. 51 See annex 25 for information on Houthi military district commanders. Annex 26 shows Houthi appointments in one district as an example. 52 n ational s ecurity b ureau is the most powerful intelligence service in Yemen under the The www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/yemen/index.html . It was Houthis. For background, see originally formed in 2002, at least partly in response to outside fears that jihadi sympathizers had infiltrated the main intelligence body, the Political Security Organization. Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) swiftly co - opted the new organization by m aking his nephew, Ammar Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, principal deputy in the b ureau, a position that he held until the current President removed him in 2012. 53 s In addition to his post at the n ational ecurity b ureau under the control of the Houthis , Abdulrab b Jarfan was also appointed to the supreme security council for the Houthis in February 2015. See s46910.html www.almashhad - alyemeni.com/new . On 20 August, he was similarly appointed to . For the full east/582499.html www.gulfeyes.net/middle the military and security committee. See - list of members, see annex 6. 54 Infor mation on prominent AQAP officials of interest to the Panel is provided in annex 27. 55 This number is not exact because AQAP lists its attacks per month according to the Islamic calendar, which is based on a lunar cycle, making determining a precise star ting point impossible. 56 The Panel has documented several clashes between AQAP and militias linked to the Houthis in Bayda’, in particular during September and October. 57 A recent example of this was a roadside bomb used to assassinate a former Securit y Belt Commander and current “resistance” leader, Khadr Mualim, in Abyan on 28 November. See www.almasdaronline.com/article/86749 . 58 For example, on 13 July there was a dual suicide attack claimed by AQAP, which targeted a military base in Hadramawt. 59 This has been the stated position of the AQAP leader, Qasim al - Raymi (QDi.282), and the Panel AQAP has changed its focus. has seen no evidence to suggest that 17 - 00300 22 / 242

23 S/2017/81 that the West remains its primary target. AQAP members have also taken part in the 60 fight in Ta‘izz on the side of the “resistance” against Houthi and Saleh forces. . Throughout 2016, AQAP has also been under pressure from bilateral United 53 out more than 30 such States air and drone strikes. The United States has carried 61 strikes, killing at least 139 individuals. Separate from the coalition led by Saudi small numbers “ Arabia, the United States has deployed ” of military personnel to 62 assist in operations targeting AQAP. It has also listed six Yemenis, including two 63 “ specially designated global terrorists ” . members of the Government, as 64 54 quality video productions, - AQAP continues to release high which appear to . 65 be produced locally, and issues of its English - language magazine, Inspire . There owever, been a marked decrease in the number of official statements, and has, h 66 those that are released tend to be aimed at either setting the record straight or 67 clarifying an AQAP position. The Panel believes that AQAP continues to have two primary goals in Ye men: the control and administration of territory and the use of the country as a launching pad for attacks against the West. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant E. 68 55 . Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also remains active in Yemen, altho ugh it had fewer members and carried out fewer attacks than AQAP during the __________________ 60 As a terrorist group, AQAP is opposed to nearly every other side in the conflict: the Houthis, Saleh’s forces, the legitimate Government and the coalition. This typically means that AQAP opposes whichever group has the most control in a region, while at times making common cause with the enemy of that group. This explains why in some areas AQAP is targeting forces loyal to the current President, while in others it is fighting alongside groups broadly affiliated with the imate Government. legit 61 These numbers are collated from the United States Central Command and may still increase. For the full table of confirmed United States air and drone strikes, see annex 29. 62 Report on the Legal and Poli United States, White House, cy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations , December 2016. Available from www.justsecurity.org/wp - content/uploads/2016/12/framework.Report_Final.pdf . 63 On 19 May, the United States listed the Governor of Bayda’, Nayif Salim Saleh al - Qaysi, and on 7 December a member of the Consultative Council and the leader of a pro - government militia in an Ali Ali Abkar. Both individuals have denied the charges. In addition, another listed Jawf, Has - Omgy, has publicly denied the charges. The Panel individual, Muhammad Salih Abd - Rabbuh al has been able to confirm only that one of the listed individuals, Ghalib Abdul - Zaidi, is a lah al member of AQAP. 64 Examples of this include videos such as the fifth instalment in the series “ Harvest of Spies ” and the sixth instalment in the series “ Repelling the Aggressors ”. 65 in the organization, including Qasim al The latest issue is No. 16. Prominent figures with - Raymi, Khaled Ba Tarfi and Ibrahim al Quso, a former detainee at Guantanamo Bay, have all appeared in - propaganda videos. See annex 27 for a list of prominent AQAP figures of interest to the Panel. 66 For example, e arly in September it released a statement to deny that it had played a role in killing 20 Yemeni soldiers in Hadramawt. It has also denied destroying a Sufi shrine in Ta‘izz. ISIL similarly distanced itself from destroying the shrine. 67 issued a statement on its attempts to interact and work with tribes in Shabwah. In October, AQAP 68 For a list of ISIL affiliated figures of interest to the Panel, see annex 30. - 17 - 00300 23 / 242

24 S/2017/81 69 reporting period. The group appears to be weaker than at this point in 2015. Nevertheless, it remains capable of inflicting significant damage. Most ISIL attacks 70 in Yemen fall int o two categories: suicide bombings quarter assassination - and close 71 of security officials, which are increasingly filmed as they happen. Early gains in the recruiting battle against AQAP in 2015 notwithstanding, ISIL is now struggling 72 to maintain this early momentum. By the middle of 2016, it had suffered a wave of 73 defections and losses. AQAP and ISIL have publicly sparred over which gro up is 74 doing the most to combat the Houthis. 56 . The group, which is much more clandestine about its inner workings than 75 AQAP, appears to have undergone a leadership change early in 2016. Nevertheless, while it benefits from the continuing fighting in Ye men, it continues to struggle to supplant AQAP as the organization of choice for radicalized individuals. F. Active “ fronts ” 57 . Although the Houthi and Saleh forces initially reached as far south as Aden in 76 to the northern highlands. Throughout 2015, they have since been pushed back in __________________ 69 The Panel has received information that in mid - 2015 ISIL established a training camp in Hadramawt near the border with Saudi Arabia. The Panel has, however, been unable to confirm whether the camp remains operational. 70 29 One of the deadliest such attacks took place on August in Aden when an ISIL attacker and 28 - old Koranic teacher later identified as Ahmed Sayf (Abu Sufayn al - Adani) killed at least year - http://golden.news/articles/361/ . 54 soldiers, wounding 67 more. See 71 Two recent attacks, the assassination on 30 September of an offi cer in the Political Security Organization, Ali Muqbil, in Aden and the assassination on 22 November of a security official at Aden airport, Abd al - Rahman al - Dhala‘i, were both publicized with graphic, video - game - style first - person shooter photographs, sho wing the moment of the assassination from the perspective of the killer. 72 Early in September, three young men announced via a crude video an ISIL province in Mahrah, on the eastern border with Oman. Nevertheless, there has been no official acknowledgem ent by - quality, do ISIL. Given the low - yourself feel to the video, the Panel believes that this claim is - it more aspirational than actual. The Panel has also received information from a confidential source that in 2015 several Saudi Arabian nationals trave lled across the border to join ISIL in Yemen. The Panel has identified nationals of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arabic Republic, Tunisia and Yemen among ISIL members in Yemen. 73 - For example, on 8 July, an ISIL defector, Ghassan al ted in Abyan. Sadi, was assassina 74 Although there is evidence to suggest that AQAP has fought Houthi forces, especially in Bayda’, the Panel has found no credible evidence to suggest that ISIL is carrying out similar attacks against the Houthis. 75 The Panel is aware of a report that two ISIL members from outside Yemen led a contingent of fighters who allegedly took part in the fighting in Ta‘izz on the side of the Salafist resistance. rmation, it continues to While the Panel has been unable to independently verify this info investigate the incident and the links between ISIL in Yemen and in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. 76 The Houthis, as Zaydis, had very little local support in south Yemen, which remains largely may have not actually intended to take Aden, but only to force the Shafi‘i, or Sunni. The Houthis current President and troops loyal to him to defend it. 17 - 00300 24 / 242

25 S/2017/81 77 much of 2016, the high numbers of casualties notwithstanding, the battle lines have gradually hardened. Although there has been increased fighting along the terms of territory taken or border with Saudi Arabia, little has changed militarily, in lost by any side, during the period covered herein. . 58 At the time of writing, after 22 months of war the military map looked much the same as it did after 10 months. The Houthis control or are active in much of the 78 highlands, including Ibb, Dhamar, Sana’a and Sa‘dah. Ta‘izz is still northern contested, as are other parts of the country. The Government controls large sections of the south, including Aden, although the city is beset by violence and insecurity. 79 AQAP and ISIL co ntinue to recruit and carry out attacks. IV. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo . 59 , the Panel continues 2216 (2015) Pursuant to paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution to focus on a range of monitoring and investigative activities in order to identify whether there have been violations of the targeted arms embargo, which was put in place to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of, individuals and entities listed by the Committee and the Security Council. Supply chains for weapons and ammunition A. The Panel has established that the options for supply chains of weapons and . 60 ttee and the Security ammunition to the individuals and entities listed by the Commi Council and those acting on their behalf or at their direction are currently limited to those set out in table 1. Table 1 Supply chains for weapons to Houthi or Saleh forces Supply chain Remarks Classified by the Panel as more than 1,000 large - scale supply Illicit external weapons or tens of tonnes of ammunition “ ” ) Less than a few hundred weapons Small - scale supply ( ant trafficking Owing to military - scale seizures from the Yemeni national Large operations, theft or diversion stockpile __________________ 77 These include both foot soldiers and key commanders. Two of those commanders, Mubarak t, Ma’rib) and Muhammad al - Mishn al - Zayadi (third military distric al - Hawari (sixth military district, Amran), were killed in the strike on the funeral hall in Sana’a on 8 October. For a full list of the Houthi military commanders, see annex 25. Their government equivalents are listed in annex 31. 78 There are, however, still clashes in these cities and governorates. 79 See annex 32 for a timeline of key security events and annex 33 for an outline of the major battlefronts. 17 - 00300 25 / 242

26 S/2017/81 Supply chain Remarks Small - scale capture after battles Battlefield capture from individual combatants or units (see annex 34) Internal black market B. Probability of large - scale supply of weapons from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Yemen . 61 In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 14 September ( S/2016/786 ), Saudi Arabia alleged violations of resolution 2216 (2015 ) by the Islamic Republic of Iran and demanded that the Council take the appropriate and the necessary measures against those who had violated the relevant resolutions. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected ” the allegations a s “ pure fabrications and unsubstantiated in a response dated 27 September ( S/2016/817 ). A further response was made by the United Arab Emirates, also on behalf of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Yemen, in a note verbale dated 27 October addressed to the Secretary - General ( A/71/581 ), requesting that the annex thereto, containing alleged violations by the Islamic Republic of Iran, be circulated to the General in a “ Assembly. The allegations were again firmly rejected as being ” baseless esentative of the Islamic response dated 16 November by the Permanent Repr Republic of Iran ( ). A/71/617 62 . The Panel has not seen sufficient evidence to confirm any direct large - scale supply of arms from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, although there are indicators that anti - tank guided weapons being supplied to the Houthi or Saleh forces are of Iranian manufacture. The air supremacy of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia over Yemen and the effectiveness of the maritime inspection system means tha t there are now only three credible direct supply routes from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Yemen for small scale trafficking. - C. Maritime trafficking routes Saleh controlled ports on the west coast of Yemen 1 . Coastal dhows to Houthi - - 63 Coastal dhows, if en route to Houthi - Saleh - . controlled ports on the west coast of Yemen, even if routed via a transit point in Djibouti or Somalia, must pass from the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea through the busy Bab al - Mandab strait, which is 80 This is well patrolled by the Combined Maritime Forces, the United 28 km wide. avy. If sent in very small States Navy Fifth Fleet and the Royal Saudi N consignments on coastal dhows, it is probable that some shipments would arrive, but many would inevitably be interdi cted by naval patrols. The Panel has seen no evidence of any maritime seizures to date on this route, which strongly suggests that it is not being actively exploited. __________________ 80 See . inedmaritimeforces.com https://comb 17 - 00300 26 / 242

27 S/2017/81 2 . Coastal dhows to Omani transit ports 81 64 . There are only two small Omani ports the west of Salalah, Dhofar to governorate, with road access to the border with Yemen that would be suitable for the offloading of arms. Ship - to - shore transfers across Omani beaches in Dhofar are also possible. The subsequent requirement for vehicles to then transit through the 82 carries a higher risk of most likely border crossing point at Sarfayt/Hawf interdiction by border guards than if ship to - shore transfers were made directly - across a Yemeni beach. Recent land seizures indicate that this route may be in use for small - scale shipments (see para. 75). 3 . Coastal dhows to south - eastern ports or beaches in Yemen 65 . The only suitable port for the direct offloading of weapons in south - eastern 83 but this is under the control of govern ment forces, Yemen would be Nishtun, meaning that its use would imply a level of corruption on the part of officials. The alternative to offloading weapons at Yemeni ports is, however, to operate a covert ship - shore transfer from coastal dhows or small boats across the known - to 87 84 , 86 85 Haswayn mugglers’ beaches at Ghaydah, s Recent land seizures and Qishn. indicate that this route is also probably in use for small scale shipments (see - para. 75). 4 . Maritime seizures in 2015 and 2016 66 . There were only four confirmed seizures of weapons in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden by the Combined Maritime Forces or the United States Fifth Navy 88 Fleet during 2015 and 2016, together with an alleged seizure by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia in 2016 (see table 2). Table 2 Regional maritime weapon seizures, 2015 - 2016 Weapon type and quantity 9M113 Konkurs 47 AK - PKM - 12.7 medium mm DShK Kornet RPG 7 variant or 9M133 assault - variant anti variant heavy tank machine - rifle rocket Hoshdar - M Fishing 60 - mm a b Date vessel gun machine gun Seized by launcher sniper rifle mortar Toophan guided weapon variant HMAS Melbourne 56 19 Nasir 24 September 2015 Samer HMAS Darwin 1 989 49 100 20 27 February 2016 c Unknown 64 20 March 2016 9 FS Provence 1 998 6 __________________ 81 Raysut, 16°55'30.06"N, 54°00'38.74"E, and Dalqut, 16°42'16.85"N, 53°15'14.37"E. 82 16°40'15.73"N, 53°05'57.32"E 83 15°49'15.64"N, 52°11'49.01"E. 84 16°10'18.29"N, 52°13'28.69"E. 85 " E. 15°35'04.14 " N, 52°06'19.69 86 N, 51°38'35.64 15°23'17.67 " E. " 87 Confidential sources. 88 relating to Somalia. See 2244 (2015) Seized under the mandate in resolutions 2182 (2014) and , annex 8.4. S/2016/919 also 00300 - 17 / 242 27

28 S/2017/81 Weapon type and quantity 9M113 Konkurs AK PKM 47 - - 12.7 RPG - 7 variant or 9M133 Kornet assault medium mm DShK rocket tank - machine rifle variant anti variant heavy Hoshdar - M Fishing 60 - mm a b Seized by vessel gun machine gun Date launcher sniper rifle mortar Toophan variant guided weapon Adris USS Sirocco 1 500 March 2016 21 200 28 d Unknown 16 November 2016 56 20 300 28 Total 4 487 55 64 21 a - 79 sniper rifle. Confirmed by Armament Research Services. Iranian copy of the Chinese type b Tube - launched, optically tracked, wire - - tank guided missile. guided anti c Democratic People’s Republic of Korea type - 73 variant. d Media reports claimed that two small dhows had been captured by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia off the coast of Salif, wit h conflicting reports stating that they had been destroyed by air strikes. Saudi Arabia has not responded to the Panel’s requests for more details on the reported incident or incidents. 89 . Tracing requests were sent to the Member States 67 that manufactured the eight weapon types tha t the Panel could positively identify from imagery (see annex 35). The age of the weapons seized was problematic in terms of the effectiveness of the requests. The Member States that responded have a national legal requirement to keep export control record s only for 5 or 10 years. Manufacturing records are available, which can be used to confirm the State of manufacture, but they do not have details of the initial end user. Given that some weapon types were also 90 further tracing exported to many countries, requests were unlikely to elicit any useful information as to the supply chain owing to the time elapsed and the wide distribution of the weapon systems. The Panel could not therefore positively determine the origin of the weapons, given that the supply ch ains remain opaque. . Tracing requests by the Panel to identify the supply chains have been further 68 constrained by some of those Member States that seized the vessels not providing sufficient detail in their notifications to the Committee and their resp onses to subsequent requests by the Panel and not allowing the Panel to physically inspect 91 The Panel requires detailed imagery of the weapons to the weapons seized. identify the exact type and model, as well as the serial numbers to then enable detailed s upply chain investigations. 69 referenced maritime seizures, the Panel has identified . In investigating above - 2,064 weapons that could be directly linked to Iranian manufacture or origin (see the imagery supplied table 3). The Panel identified the country of manufacture from by the Member State seizing the weapons. The remaining weapons could not be positively attributed to a specific country of manufacture. __________________ 89 Bulgaria and the Russian Federation confirmed manufacture, but noted that that manufacture had been more than 10 years ago, rendering it impossible to trace the end - user certifi cate. China confirmed that a weapon type was not of Chinese manufacture. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Romania have yet to respond. 90 For example, the 9M113 Konkurs anti - tank guided weapon system was exported to 26 countries, ). https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/Home.aspx ( according to Jane’s 91 Provence Apart from the FS seizure, which the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea was permitted to inspect in Brest, France, in December 2015. 17 - 00300 28 / 242

29 S/2017/81 Table 3 - 2016 traceable to Iranian manufacture or supply Maritime seizures in 2015 Vessel Weapon type Remarks Nasir Samer Unknown Adris a - 47 assault rifle variant 1 998 AK One was positively confirmed as being of Iranian manufacture. All were reported to be of the same type. 64 Iran manufactures this weapon type. Only the Islamic Republic of Hoshdar - M sniper rifle 2 7 variant rocket - Two were positively confirmed as being of Iranian manufacture. RPG launcher All 100 were reported to be of the same type. ” Note : Data also taken from Conflict Armament Research, “ Analysis of maritime weapon seizures Maritime interdictions of , in “ weapon supplies to Somalia and Yemen: deciphering a link to Iran (London, November 2016). ” a turer. Four sets of sequential serial numbers were noted, making it certain that all were from the same manufac Track analysis 5 . 70 Track analysis of the vessels’ declared and probable courses (see map 3), . compared against the seizure positions, challenges assertions made that Yemen was 92 A small dhow captain would the destination for the four vessels listed in table 2. probably be conscious of fuel costs and wish to take the most direct route to port. Deviations would probably be made only owing to bad weather or to avoid detection sel would deviate from if carrying illicit cargo. It is, however, unlikely that a ves by ” safety in numbers “ track to avoid detection, instead relying on a policy of transiting in the company of other dhows. The track analysis strongly suggests the following: The Nasir , which departed from Chabahar in the Isl amic Republic of (a) FV 93 Iran, was seized at a position on the most direct and economical track to Hurdiyo, Somalia. This was the destination plotted recovered as evidence by HMAS Melbourne . Mobile and satellite phones were also inspected during the seizure opera tion and subsequent traffic analysis from data provided by a Member State provided further evidence that the originator was based in the Islamic Republic of 94 Iran and that Somalia was the destination for the shipment. In the period from 27 August to 23 Sep tember 2015, during which the smuggling operation occurred, 60 per cent of outgoing calls from and 72 per cent of incoming calls to the vessel 95 was The master of the FV Nasir were from a single Iranian subscriber number. also in contact with known arms dea lers with links to a former pirate, Isse __________________ 92 For example, see “French navy seizes weapons cache heading from Iran to Yemen”, Al Arabiya, 30 March 2016, available from http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle - east/ 2016/03/30 / seizes and Sam LaGrone, “U.S. ; ml Yemen.ht - French - navy - - - weapons to cache - heading - from - Iran - navy seizes suspected Iranian arms supply to Yemen”, USNI News, 4 April 2016, available from - 016/04/04/u - s - navy - seizes - suspected https://news.usni.org/2 iranian - arms - shipment - bound - for - yemen . 93 10°33'41.00 " N, 51°08'04.13 " E. 94 Details have been omitted because the investigation is continuing. 95 the Islamic Republic of Iran. No The Panel has requested details as to the subscriber from response has been received to date. 17 - 00300 29 / 242

30 S/2017/81 96 “ and the leader of the ISIL faction in Somalia, ” ), Mohamoud Yusuf ( Yullux Abdulqadir Mumin; (b) The was seized at a position 130 nautical miles south FV east of Samer - the most direct and economical track from Chabahar, Islamic Republic of Iran, to 97 this being the destination port assessed as likely by HMAS Boosaaso, Somalia, 98 . y from the Yemeni coast than the most direct This position is further awa Darwin and economical track and suggests that a more likely direct destination was the eastern smuggling ports of Somalia than Boosaaso; at a point on Provence (c) The unknown fishing vessel was seized by the FS most direct and economical track from Chabahar, Islamic Republic of Iran, to its the 99 Somalia; declared destination of Qandala, (d) has not been communicated to the Adris FV The seizure location of the Panel, notwithstanding requests sent on 10 May and 3 Nov ember to the Member 100 State responsible. The declared destination of the vessel was Caluula, Somalia, and the vessel originated in Sirik, Islamic Republic of Iran. Although the media 101 has seen that Yemen had been the destination for the shipment, the Panel reported no evidence to confirm this. __________________ 96 See S/2013/413 S/2014/726 , annex 4.7, para. 204, for further information on his , annex 3.1, and operati ons and network in Somalia. 97 11°17'29.42 " N, 49°10'46.40 " E. 98 Letter to the Panel from Australia dated 22 June 2016. 99 " 11°28'29.46 N, 49°52'19.40 " E. 100 11°57 ' 58.07 " " E. N, 50°45'17.94 101 Sam LaGrone, “US navy seizes suspected Iranian arms shipment bound for Yemen”, USNI News, - 4 April 2016, available from 16/04/04/u - s - navy https://news.usni.org/20 seizes - suspected - iranian - . yemen - for - bound - shipment arms - 17 - 00300 30 / 242

31 S/2017/81 Map 3 Probable tracks and seizure positions . The evidence that the vessels originated from the Islamic Republic of Iran is 71 irrefutable, but that seen by the Panel for the onward shipment of their cargo of weapons to Yemen from Somalia, or transfer at sea en route to divert from a Somali destination to a Yemeni destination is much less firm. None of the interdicted maritime shipments contained munitions other than 72 . - . Ammunition supplies are much bulkier tank guided weapons (see para. 76) anti than weapon supplies, by at least a factor of 10, because of their rate of use during combat they require constant replenishment. This suggests that: naval interdiction — nts have been missed, which is has been unlucky and illicit ammunition shipme considered unlikely by the Panel in the context of three seizures of weapons in such a brief time; ammunition is being shipped by air, which is unlikely with the air blockade in place; ammunition is being shipped by road (see para. 75); and/or that there are sufficient stocks already available in Yemen, which, based on black market prices, is the most likely scenario (see para. 79). 17 - 00300 31 / 242

32 S/2017/81 The Panel cannot, however, entirely discount the possibility that it was 73 . shipments would be cross loaded to even smaller vessels in planned that the - Somalia, or off the Somali coast, for onward transit to Yemen. The seizure of three vessels within a month may have disrupted this as a plan, effectively forcing arms ptions (see para. 75). traffickers to explore other o scale D. Small - “ ant trafficking ” 77), the Panel analysed the In its previous final report ( . 74 - , paras. 75 S/2016/73 potential use of weapon smuggling networks established before the imposition of . The current proliferation and 2216 (2015) the arms embargo under resolution ad distribution of weapons within Yemen means that such networks could widespre - profile weapons such as man - profit only by either attempting to smuggle high - portable anti ; tank guided weapons into Yemen or smuggling small arms and light weapons from Yemen to neighb ouring States, for which there is no evidence. The land routes from the border crossing points with Dhofar, Oman, to the 75 . - - controlled territory, or from south nearest Houthi eastern Yemeni ports, pass through more than 600 km of government - controlled te rritory (see map 4). The - scale shipments being able to successively use this route probability of large without detection is low, but it is possible. The route is being exploited, as indicated 102 by recent seizures by the Government. e trucks and either These were all from larg hidden under other cargo, for example chicken boxes, or were in false compartments of the trailer units (see summary and imagery in annex 36). __________________ 102 The Panel has requested detailed information on seizures from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Only the United Arab Emirates has responded to date. 17 - 00300 32 / 242

33 S/2017/81 Map 4 Land smuggling routes from Oman and Yemen beaches and ports tank guided weapons on the land - identified that seizures of anti The Panel has . 76 route from Oman to Ma’rib began to be reported in mid - 2016. Given that the interdiction risks are high on this route, this is an indicator that the route opened for such trafficking around th is time. Table 4 provides a summary of the operational use and seizure of anti tank guided weapons from mid 2015 to 2016, with imagery - - 103 provided in annex 37. __________________ 103 er Iranian weapons observed in individual Houthi use, see annex 38. For oth 17 - 00300 33 / 242

34 S/2017/81 Table 4 - tank guided weapons, 2015 - 2016 Operational use and seizures of anti Type Iranian 9M113 9M115 Iranian 9M113 Iranian Date Konkurs Location Tosan Metis Toophan Remarks Kornet Dehlaviyeh 1 24 September 2015 FV Nasir 19 56 Konkurs of 1992 manufacture 2 Ta‘izz 1 29 November 2015 1 Kornet lot No. 2 of 2008, same serial number batch as at item 3 Dehlaviyeh lot No. 7 of 2015 (only four months before seizure) 3 20 March 2016 9 Unknown Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of 2008, either fishing Kornet or Dehlaviyeh vessel 15 Dehlaviyeh Either Kornet or 4 28 September 2016 Ma’rib 5 Lot No. 4 of 2002 1 Unknown date in Safir, Ma’rib September 2016 18 October 2016 6 Shehn, 18 anti - tank guided weapons, type not yet confirmed Ma’rib 20 56 26+ analysis Source : Wide range of open and confidential sources, including Armament Research Services Hoplite reports and Jane’s ). ( https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/Home.aspx 77 . Although anti - tank guided weapons are now being smuggled on the land routes, the Panel assesses it as unlikely that the network using these routes could covertly transfer any significant quantities of larger - calibre weapon systems, such as tank guided short range ball istic missiles, into Yemen at the current time. An anti - - weapon is less than 1 m in length and easily hidden in a large truck, while a short - range ballistic missile of 7 m in length is much more difficult to conceal. Seizure, theft or div E. ersion from the Yemeni national stockpile 104 . By analysing the order of battle 78 of the Yemeni A rmy (see annex 39), the Panel identified those units that either aligned themselves with or supported Houthi or Saleh forces in an effort to assess what part of the national stockpile had ended up outside the control of the army. The data indicate that the legitimate Government has potentially lost control of more than 68 per cent of the national stockpile during the conflict. The Panel has been unable to deter mine the size of the national stockpile before the current hostilities, and thus it is not yet possible to realistically estimate for how long the weapons and ammunition will sustain Houthi or Saleh forces in combat until they need major external resupply. __________________ 104 See Charles Catis, “Yemen order of battle”, American Enterprise Institute Critical Threats, . eats.org www.criticalthr February 2015. Available from 17 - 00300 34 / 242

35 S/2017/81 Small arms ammunition on the black market F. A significant indicator as to the availability of small arms ammunition within a . 79 community is the price on the black market. The Panel has begun to collect and , in Aden, for a typical 7.62 x 39 mm round, analyse data. Initial findings are that after a rapid fall in prices immediately following the beginning of the current conflict (to $0.23 per round), the black market price s are now at 65 per cent per round) of pre ($0.84 war prices ($1.30 per round) and are remaining stable at - that level (see annex 40). There may be a range of local factors to account for this, which have yet to be identified, but it is certain that small arms ammunition is more readily available than it was before the conflict. This is due to the illicit proliferation of the government stockpile. . The Panel has identified a case of an attempted post - delivery diversion of 80 - Taurus - use certification. The manufactured pistols and revolvers using dubious end ore for personal protection and not of a type typically weapon types are designed m used on the modern battlefield. The weapons were very likely destined for the black market in Somalia and the wider region, but were seized by a Member State in eal, Adeeb Mana’a, is a son of a designated transit. The individual brokering the d 105 individual and known arms trafficker, Fares Mohammed Mana’a (SOi.008), who 106 (YEi.003) is both a past close associate of Ali Abdullah Saleh and closely linked 107 to the Houthis. His involvement and his known relati onship to the Houthis make it possible that the financial aspects of the transfer may have been to the benefit of listed individuals, and the Panel will continue to investigate this aspect of the case. The Panel assesses that the modus operandi of the tran sfer was designed to circumvent normal customs and security controls. The case remains under investigation and the progress to date is described in annex 41. missile campaign “ Saleh - Houthi ” G. 81 . The Houthi - Saleh alliance has been engaged in a strategic “ land missile against Saudi Arabia since the first recorded launch of a Scud campaign ” - variant short range ballistic missile on 16 June 2015 (see figure III). While the Panel has - established that su ch missiles and improvised Qaher - 1 free - flight rockets have been launched against Saudi Arabia by Houthi or Saleh forces, the latter have also initiated a propaganda campaign claiming the use of locally manufactured, as - range ex 42 contains details of all short opposed to improvised, missiles. Ann flight rockets used to date, with technical analysis - ballistic missiles and free showing why the Panel considers that the alliance’s claims to have manufactured new missile types locally are highly unlikely. __________________ 105 Listed under the authority of resolution 1844 (2008) , para. 8, on 12 April 2010 by the Security 1907 (2009) Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and concerning Somalia and Eritrea. 106 He was the head of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Presidential Committee until late January 2010, when the Yemeni authorities arrested him. 107 Saleh supreme political council appointed him based Houthi - - On 28 November, the San a’a minister of state. 17 - 00300 35 / 242

36 S/2017/81 Figure III Timeline of Houthi Saleh missile campaign - 82 border missile attacks is low in terms of - Although the impact of the cross . casualties and infrastructure damage on the Saudi Arabian side, the attacks have a significant economic and politica l impact. From an economic perspective, launching cost option for the Houthi - the missiles, or even threatening to do so, is a very low - Saleh alliance because it seized the missile stocks at virtually no cost, whereas the financial cost to Saudi Arabia is h igh in terms of the expenditure of high - technology 3, which reportedly cost some - interceptor missiles such as the Patriot PAC 108 $900,000. . 83 source information indicates that the Saudi Arabian - Extensively reported open military is having mixed success in 1 and - intercepting and destroying the Qaher Scud variants in flight. For example, of the 60 reported launches of missiles and rockets against Saudi Arabian territory since 16 June 2015 (see annex 42), the 28 in flight (47 per cent). coalition claims to have intercepted and destroyed 84 . In terms of political impact, missile attacks on Saudi Arabian cities serve to maintain strategic pressure on Saudi Arabia, given that each impact illustrates the vulnerability of civilians to such attacks and demonstrates a weakness in defensive capabilities. The Panel assesses that it is likely that such attacks will continue until - the Houthi or Saleh forces expend all their missile and free flight rocket stocks or until the stocks are interdicted by the coalition. __________________ 108 Clay Dillow, “U.S. green lights sale of 600 Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia”, Fortune , 1 August - missiles . - arabia/ - saudi 2015. Available from http://fortune.com/2015/08/01/u - s - patriot 17 - 00300 36 / 242

37 S/2017/81 flight rockets - ven that the final impact locations of the missiles and free Gi 85 . cannot be accurately predicted owing to the inherent inaccuracy of these weapon 109 systems, it is not possible for the users to adequately distinguish between civilians and military objectives, making them indiscriminate by nature, which is a violation 110 In this connection, the Panel considers the use of international humanitarian law. - - Saleh alliance of these weapon systems in attacks on civilian by the Houthi 111 populated areas to be a v iolation of international humanitarian law. Figures IV and V Houthi fighters training on OTR - 21 Tochka missile, 23 May 2015 Source : Confidential. Note : The white container is used to deceive aerial reconnaissance. devices H. Improvised explosive . 86 There have been significant developments in the technology of improvised explosive devices and associated tactics. The introduction of the suicide improvised explosive device tactic by ISIL, especially in Aden and Mukalla, has resulted in a constant threat to government officials and military bases. There have been at least 23 person - borne improvised explosive device or suicide vehicle improvised explosive device attacks against government targets or individuals claimed by or attributed to IS IL to date. This suicide tactic has also been adopted by AQAP, which has claimed six improvised explosive device attacks to date (see annex 28). The Panel has also identified major technological developments in the type of 87 . initiation systems since the previous analysis of improvised explosive device 112 types and new container designs to enhance target effects and/or avoid detection. l information provided in These are summarized in table 5, with more technica 43. annex __________________ 109 Figures IV and V illustrate the Houthi use of missiles. 110 Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald - Jean - , Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law vol. I, Rules (Cambridge, United Kingdom, International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge University Press, 2005), rule 71 (hereinafter “customary international humanitarian law”). 111 Ibid., rules 1, 7, 11 and 14. 112 United Nations Development Programme, “IED threat assessment: Abyan”, 1 February 2013 (limited United Nations distribution). 17 - 00300 37 / 242

38 S/2017/81 Table 5 Finds of significant imp rovised explosive device types, 2016 a Type Likely attributable to Date Location b Explosively formed projectile 29 February Houthis Ma’rib Ta‘izz Disguised rock/minimal metal pressure pad AQAP or Houthis 16 March 16 May Mukalla Explosively formed projectile radio - controlled device AQAP c Directional - focused fragmentation charge 16 May Mukalla radio - AQAP controlled device 18 June Abyan Directional - focused fragmentation charge radio - AQAP controlled device 27 June Mukalla - borne suicide vest AQAP Person AQAP vehicle device - Under Aden 7 August - Unknown date in Ibb Radio - controlled device with directional focused Houthis fragmentation charge August 30 October Saleh, Ma’rib Passive infrared disguised rock Houthis a Based on the geographical location of forces. b Also known as an explosively formed penetrator or self - forging fragment. In improvised explosive device use, an explosively formed projectile has a, normally, steel liner in the shape of a dish, which defor ms upon the detonation of the explosive into a slug of metal. This accelerates to the target and then penetrates as a result of its kinetic energy. This differs from the hydrodynamic penetration effect of a shaped charge. c focused - formed small pieces of fragmentation A directional - fragmentation charge usually consists of ball bearings, or other pre bound together with resin in a designed shape. Upon detonation, the fragmentation is projected in a narrow pattern and lt of kinetic energy. The pattern is dependent on the design shape used. penetrates the target as a resu 88 . It cannot be assumed that the use of this technology is the preserve of a single group owing to the movement of fighters, and thus the exchange of technical knowledge, between AQAP, ISIL, Houthi or Saleh forces and “ resistance ” forces loyal to the current President. 89 The Panel assesses that the introduction of this new technology into Yemen . presents a major threat to peace, stability and security, even after any prospective peace process agreement. It is also effectively acting as a force multiplier for armed groups operating outside the control of the Government, reducing their current and future dependence on conventional weapons. The Panel considers that the improvised exp losive device will remain the weapon of choice for any residual opposition to any future peace process. It is a weapon that can be used strategically to create a perception of insecurity and influence national will. 90 . The deployment of improvised explos ive devices in civilian areas violates international humanitarian law because such devices affect civilians and military 113 objectives indiscriminately. __________________ 113 Customary international humanitarian law, rules 1, 7, 11 and 22. 17 - 00300 38 / 242

39 S/2017/81 I. Explosive remnants of war, mines and unexploded ordnance 91 . The Panel continues to receive evide nce of the use of mines by Houthi or Saleh forces and the use of integrated mine and improvised explosive device barrier belts (see annex 44). V. Economic context and overview of finance In accordance with its mandate, the Panel has researched t . he economic context 92 in which individuals designated pursuant to resolutions and 2216 2140 (2014) (2015) and their networks have continued to operate in vi olation of sanctions measures. In particular, the Panel has examined the flow of money, the transfer of wealth and the establishment of new proxies to finance military operations that ict has threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen. The continuing confl enabled new profiteers of war to emerge. A. Impact of the conflict on public finances . The continuing conflict has provided opportunities for the Houthi and Saleh 93 forces, AQAP and ISIL to explore new income streams in support of their war efforts and to secure tribal alliances. This includes access to State finances, oil and distribution systems and illegal taxation. Several prominent fuel supply and businesspeople have fled the country, providing an opportunity for the Houthis to take control of some significant private venture financial assets. nd has an impact on any direct financial The overall financial situation is dire a . 94 responses to the developing humanitarian crisis. This is illustrated by the following: (a) In April or May, Yemen defaulted on its international loan repayment obligations to private banking institutions; On (b) 30 July, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 114 were requested by the President to freeze all overseas assets of the Central Bank; (c) The Central Bank reserves fell from a pre - war level of $4.05 billion in December 2014 to $1.56 bill ion in December 2015 to $0.7 billion in September 2016, and were predicted to be zero by 31 December; (d) The Central Bank requires $372 million per year just to service its total overseas debt (including IMF and regional banks); (e) All Central Bank i ncome from oil and gas revenue and foreign 115 investment ceased at the end of 2014; (f) In July, a liquidity crisis forced the Central Bank to initially suspend all public sector expenditure and the payment of public salaries; __________________ 114 Letter leaked to the media. The Panel confirmed its authenticity after meeting a Ye meni ambassador and staff of IMF and the World Bank in August and September. 115 In 2014, Yemeni revenue, according to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, was $16.7 billion (38 per cent from oil and gas, 19.8 per cent from remittances, 12.8 per cent from foreign financial assistance and 11.4 per cent from direct investment in oil). 17 - 00300 39 / 242

40 S/2017/81 (g) Money supply into the e conomy from the Central Bank is not possible because the cash in individuals’ possession has increased eightfold, from an 116 equivalent of $103 million in 2014 to $884 million in January June 2016. This - has entirely depleted the money supply in the banking s ystem. B. Houthi - Saleh financial networks: war profiteering and looting 95 . The Panel found that the Houthi - Saleh alliance had greatly relied on the Saleh financial partnership - shadow economy to support its war efforts. The Houthi can be broadly summarized as follows: (a) Houthi forces have been given complete control over northern Yemen, with the exclusion of the capital. This includes, but is not restricted to, control over 117 land, crops, local taxation, fuel redistribution, humanitarian aid and taxation; (b) Saleh forces have reassumed control of the State finances, albeit under the guise of the Houthi banner, and reopened the black market channels for - trafficking in drugs, weapons and persons. C. Funding available to the Houthis he Panel found that the Houthis and their affiliates had taken advantage of T 96 . the conflict to develop a wide range of income streams, including: aligned armed forces and security - Central Bank funding of Houthi (a) agency salaries. A percentage of the salar ies and funds intended to sustain units that are no longer functioning is diverted to individual Houthi commanders; (b) Central Bank funding for the administrative support of Houthi - aligned on the national armed forces and security agencies. This funding is still based 118 budget for 2014; (c) Tariffs from smugglers and profiteers operating in the black market; business tax The imposition of a “ (d) ” of 20 per cent on the turnover of all commercial enterprises and all civil service salaries. This includes the khat trade, which accounts for 10 per cent of the gross domestic product. The national dependence on khat means that any movement of khat is eff ectively a cash transfer; 119 The diversion of local authority taxation to a central Houthi authority; (e) __________________ 116 According to data from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Yemen Socio - Economic Update , issue No. 17, August 2016. Available from www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/mpic/ الإصدارات /tabid/2574/Default.aspx . 117 For a taxation example, see annex 45. 118 e from the Central Bank the budget The Sana’a - based ministry of defence continued to receiv appropriation approved for fiscal year 2014 because no budget has since been approved. Several units have been disbanded because of the conflict, but their commanders, loyal to the Houthis, continued to receive funds for fuel and food for troops. Confidential military sources. 119 http://almashahid.net/news For background, see . - See www.almotamar.net/pda/133407.htm 937.html . 17 - 00300 40 / 242

41 S/2017/81 (f) Taxation of 4 rials per litre on all petroleum products, which generates an 120 estimated 59.3 billion rials ($237 million) per year; (g) The ex ploitation of cell phone technology to raise funds, using 121 biweekly messaging appeals. 97 . The Panel also identified the rise of a new and different network of proxies and affiliates around the Houthis. Since early 2012, new individuals have emerged, 122 e old partnerships have been dissolved (see confidential annex 46). whil D. Al - Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula finances windfall revenue of $100 million while in control of Mukalla a AQAP gained 98 . 123 from April 2015 to April 2016. This was obtained by lo oting the local branch of the Central Bank and through taxes levied on local oil smuggling networks. The Panel believes that AQAP continues to use that money to recruit new fighters and to finance new attacks. VI. Asset freeze , as extended in 2140 (2014) . 99 aphs 11 and 21 (b) of resolution Pursuant to paragr paragraph 5 of resolution 2266 (2016) , the Panel has continued to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation by Member States of asset - freeze measures. The Panel has continued to focus on the five listed individuals and on identifying and investigating other individuals and entities that may be acting on t their direction and entities owned or controlled by them. their behalf or a 124 A. Ali Abdullah Saleh . 100 The Panel has continued to gather information on any assets owned or controlled by Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) further to those disclosed in its previous final report. . The Panel has identified two companies, Wildhorse Investments and the 101 Wildhorse Corporation, that, although allegedly dissolved in June 2011, continued 2011, when two transfers, of a total of to make financial transfers until October (YEi.003) son, $58,148,155, were made to an account held by Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Panel continues to track the assets. __________________ 120 Asa Fitch and Mohammed al - Kibsi, “Yemen’s Houthi rebels face financial crisis”, Wall Street - Journal www.wsj.com/articles/yemens - houthi - rebels - face , 4 August 2015. Available from financial - crisis - 1438714980 . 121 See Khayat and Yasser Reyes, - (29 September 2016) and Mohammed al www.alhagigah.com and economic distress”, Media Line, 9 June 2016, available “Yemen’s Houthis rule with iron fist - from www.themedialine.org/featured/yemens - houthis - rule - with - iron - fist - and - economic stress/ di . 122 Confidential sources. 123 Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made Al - Qaeda stronger and richer”, Reuters, 8 April 2016. Available from aqap/ www.reuters.com/investigates/special - report/yemen - . 124 For other Saleh affiliates, see confidential annex 47. 17 - 00300 41 / 242

42 S/2017/81 B. Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh operates as a financier 102 . The Panel has identified acting on behalf and/or at the direction of his father, Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) . Since the latter was listed on 7 November 2014, Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh has measure and allow his father access to the freeze acted to circumvent the asset - funds necessary to maintain his capability to threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen. 103 . In its previous final report, the Panel presented documentary evidence that, on 23 October 2014, all the shar es in Albula Limited and Weisen Limited belonging to were transferred to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) Panel has now further investigated the transfers and identified additional evidence of ownership took place on a date after the that indicates that the actual transfer on 7 November 2014 (see annex 48). designation of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) Although the two companies are registered in different countries, they are both 125 ter of members and The regis managed by NWT Management S.A. in Geneva. share ledgers for both companies shows that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh acquired his shares in them from Ali Abdullah Saleh on 23 October 2014. The Panel (YEi.003) s in two considers it more than a coincidence that these recorded transfers of share companies, registered in two separate countries, took place on exactly the same day, in particular when the certificates of incumbency were signed on different dates, those dates being after the designation of Ali Abdullah Saleh d., (see ibi (YEi.003) also transferred a fifth company, (YEi.003) appendix A). Ali Abdullah Saleh Foxford Management Limited, to his son during the same period. The Panel has 126 and €734,786 evidence that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh received $33,471,993 anies, Albula Limited, Foxford Management Limited and from three of these comp Weisen Limited, between 24 and 29 October 2014 (see ibid., appendix B). 104 . The Panel also has evidence that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh is the sole director of the company Trice Bloom Limited and the s ole shareholder of the two companies that own it, all registered in the British Virgin Islands: Precision Diamond Limited and Unmatchable Limited (see ibid.). Trice Bloom Limited, or Khaled Ali Abdullah t Member States of $1,538,897 Saleh, made two transfers to accounts in two differen and $181,610, respectively, on 27 November 2014. This was after the listing of Ali 127 (YEi.003) on 7 November 2014. Abdullah Saleh Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh also appointed Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) as an authorized sign atory to the accounts maintained by Trice Bloom Limited (see ibid., appendix C). Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh is also the sole shareholder of a fourth company registered in the British Virgin Islands, Towkay Limited (see ibid., appendix D). 105 Khaled Ali A bdullah Saleh has transferred funds from Trice Bloom Limited . and Towkay Limited to his accounts in Singapore and the United Arab Emirates __________________ 125 Identified by tracing signatories on the documents shown in annex 48. The address is NWT Management S.A., 16 Rue de la Pelisserie, Geneva 1211, Switzerland. The registered postal address is 8 - 10 Rue Muzy, PO Box 3501, Geneva 1211, Switzerland. The website is www.newworldtrust.ch/ . 126 The exchange rates used are included in All sums have been rounded to nearest whole number. annex 48. 127 Confidential document in the Panel’s archive. 17 - 00300 42 / 242

43 S/2017/81 . He has also used a dormant (YEi.003) after the listing of Ali Abdullah Saleh - ates to launder $83,953,782 within a three personal account in the United Arab Emir week period from 8 December 2014. The funds were deposited into the account and then withdrawn over the same period (see ibid., appendix E). He also transferred funds to another company, Raydan Investments L imited 106 . (see ibid., appendix F). The Panel has evidence that he is likely to have established Emirates as a vehicle for money laundering - that company in the United Arab activities for the benefit of designated individuals. The company ownership is split per cent between a national of the United Arab Emirates, Zayed Ahmed Ali 49 51/ Abdull Daiban, and Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh (see ibid., appendix G). The documents in the possession of the Panel indicate that Zayed Ahmed Ali Abdull partne r, given that company law in the United Arab Emirates sponsor ” “ Daiban is a does not allow full ownership of companies by foreign nationals. Only Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh and his brother, Salah Ali Abdullah Saleh, hold power of attorney for the company. Figure VI illustrates t he financial links of Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh to designated individuals. Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh transited through Oman early in 2016 and was . 107 128 observed making financial transactions. The Panel has sent letters to Oman dated 17 May, 16 September and 19 October to request information 22 February, 26 April, on his assets and transactions. Responses are awaited. __________________ 128 Confidential sources. 17 - 00300 43 / 242

44 S/2017/81 Figure VI Links of Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh and his assets with listed individuals Shaher Abdulhak C. Ansan Wikfs Limited, a company owned by Shaher Abdulhak, has made . 108 several transfers of funds equivalent to $3,024,494 to Raydan Investments Limited, of which $1,631,067 has been transferred since the listing of Ali Abdullah Saleh - J). The latest transfer of which the Panel is (YEi.003) ppendices H (see annex 48, a aware was on 24 April. The Panel has not identified business activities that can account for these transfers. 17 - 00300 44 / 242

45 S/2017/81 Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh D. . The Panel has to date identified assets to the v alue of $953,262 that belonged 109 , which are being traced. The Panel has also (YEi.005) to Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh identified assets of his that have been frozen (see table 6). Table 6 Frozen assets of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) Equivalent in Remarks States dollars United Country Asset Malaysia 1 bank account 780 658 Reported on 2 August as frozen on 22 March United Arab Emirates 10 bank accounts 166 405 Reported on 11 February as frozen on 10 June 947 Total 063 has received information from two Member States that have The Panel . 110 identified and frozen further assets and bank accounts belonging to Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh , totalling just in excess of $1 million. The Panel is also (YEi.005) aware of a Member State that has fro zen assets owned by an individual whom the Panel has grounds to believe was acting on his behalf. E. Houthi designated individuals . The Panel has found no evidence that the three Houthis under asset 111 - freeze measures, Abd al Khaliq al - Houthi (YEi. 001), Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim (YEi.002) - and Abdulmalik al - Houthi (YEi.004), hold any bank accounts or assets outside Yemen. VII. Travel ban 112 . Pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) , the Panel continues to focus on a range of monitoring and investigation activities in order to identify whether the individuals designated by the Committee have violated the travel ban. Ali Abdullah Saleh A. 113 . Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) has mad e regular appearances in the media around Sana’a and has recently met the Special Envoy of the Secretary General and - other diplomats in Yemen. His most recent television interview was on 8 December, when he stated that, although he had not planned to atten d the funeral ceremony at the Salah al - Kubra community hall, he had been passing close by at the time of the 129 air strike. He had delegated his son, Khaled, and his nephew, Tariq Muhammad __________________ 129 See . www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nrwBm6PU54 17 - 00300 45 / 242

46 S/2017/81 Abdullah Saleh, to attend in his stead. Media affiliated to him repor ted that, on 27 October, he requested permission and a United Nations aircraft from the Security 130 Council to travel to Cuba to attend the funeral of Fidel Castro. The Committee did not receive a request. B. Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh 114 . The Panel has found no evidence that Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) has left the United Arab Emirates. The Panel met a close confidante in the United Arab Emirates and learned that he was willing to meet the Panel but would require 131 ational security services to do so. The Panel offered him an clearance from the n opportunity to convey any messages directly to the Committee. According to the close confidante and the media, he was held under house arrest in the United Arab for about three months in late 2015. Emirates by the security services Other designated individuals C. 115 . The Panel has no evidence of any travel outside Yemen by Abd Al - Khaliq - or Abdulmalik al (YEi.002) , Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim (YEi.001) Houthi al - Houthi (YEi.004) . The last ment ioned individual was most recently seen on 11 December, - 132 when he gave a television address for the Prophet’s birthday celebration. Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim (YEi.002) was reported by local media to have visited Parliament in Sana’a on 5 December after rumour s circulated that he had been a victim of an air strike in Ibb a week earlier. 116 The Panel has seen video footage from official media sources affiliated with . the Houthis showing Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim (YEi.002) in Ta‘izz on 24 November 2016. 117 . While investigating a potential violation of the arms embargo, the Panel identified that a designated individual, Fares Mohammed Mana’a , travelled (SOi.008) to Brazil, the Czech Republic, Egypt and France in January 2015 using a diplomatic passport (see fi gure VII). The Panel has received information that he travelled to two African countries in October and November 2016. All the relevant evidence has been shared with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea for its further investigation. __________________ 130 See www.almotamar.net/pda/133659.htm. 131 The Panel visited the United Arab Emirates from 15 to 23 October and met officials. 132 See . xm0Z5fq9Q - www.youtube.com/watch?v=q 17 - 00300 46 / 242

47 S/2017/81 I Figure VI Diplomatic passport used by Fares Mohammed Mana’a VIII. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and human rights law 2140 (2014) , the Security Council called upon 118 . In paragraph 9 of its resolution all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law. Paragraphs 17, 18 , together with paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 and 21 of resolution 2140 (2014) , further clarify the Panel’s responsibilities with regard to investigations of (2015) d international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law an human rights abuses, and investigations into obstructions to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. A. Incidents attributed to the coalition led by Saudi Arabia 119 . The Panel investigated potential violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and other acts that may amount to threats to peace and security attributed to some States members of the coalition led by Saudi ails of which are Arabia, both through air strikes and ground operations, det provided below. The Panel has maintained the requisite high level of evidentiary standards in respect of each incident investigated and reported, even though it did not have physical access to Yemen. 1 . Air strikes 120 investigated 10 air strikes that led to at least 292 civilian fatalities, . The Panel 133 including at least 100 women and children. The strikes also destroyed three __________________ 133 The Panel verified the data for seven incidents. Numbers 1, 6 and 10 are from United Nations and/or Médecins sans frontières data. 17 - 00300 47 / 242

48 S/2017/81 residential buildings, three civilian industrial factory complexes, a hospital and a marketplace (see tab le 7). Detailed case studies, which include assessments of compliance with international humanitarian law, are provided in appendices A to D to annex 49. Other case studies are with the Secretariat. Table 7 Air strikes, 2016 Type of explosive Civilian casualties/ Appendix to a ordnance annex 49 consequences Date Location Target A 1 15 March Hajjah Civilian market Mk 83 B omb/ 106 dead, injured Paveway 41 2 Ta‘izz Civilian 25 March Not confirmed 10 dead residence 3 25 May Lahij Civilian Mk 82 B omb/ 6 dead, B Paveway injured 3 residence 4 25 May Lahij Water bottling Mk 82 B omb/ No fatalities Paveway plant Food production Repeat strike; High explosive 5 9 August Sana’a 10 dead, facility aircraft bomb injured 13 12 6 15 August Hajjah Hospital GBU - C 19 dead, 24 injured Paveway II 7 13 September Sana’a Mk 82 B Water pump omb/ No casualties factory Paveway IV 8 22 September Sana’a Repeat strike GBU - 24/ Water pump Paveway IV factory 9 dead, more omb/ 9 24 September Ibb Residential Mk 82 B Paveway complex than 7 injured - 12 8 October Sana’a Civilian funeral D GBU 10 132 dead, Paveway II 695 injured hall a All air strikes resulted in the complete or partial destruction of the objects. 134 . Case summary: Sana’a community 2 hall air strike 121 . On 8 October, at around 3.20 p.m., two air - dropped bombs detonated on, or in, the Salah al - Kubra community hall in a residential area of south - western Sana’a, where more than 1,000 mourners were attending the funeral of the father of the - based acting minister of the interior. A significant number of Houthi Saleh - Sana’a - affiliated military and political leaders were expected to attend. __________________ 134 Included to demonstrate the technical and international humanitarian law methodology in all case studies. 17 - 00300 48 / 242

49 S/2017/81 Figure VIII Location of attack Source study are given in annex 49, appendix D. : The sources for all imagery pertaining to the case Technical analysis of physical evidence - blast original imagery of the available The Panel obtained and analysed post 122 . physical evidence and found that fragments had the shape profile, and fell within the 12 Paveway II dimensional parameters, of a fragment of fins and wings from a GBU - guidance unit fitted to a Mark 82 high explosive aircraft bomb (see figures IX and X). Figure IX GBU - 12 Paveway II guidance unit fin fragment in situ 17 - 00300 49 / 242

50 S/2017/81 Figure X GBU - 12 Paveway II guidance unit wing fragment showing manufacturer’s 135 Commercial and Government Entity code 3FU05 123 . The only party to the conflict known to have the capability to deliver a Mark II guidance unit is the 12 Paveway - explosive aircraft bomb with a GBU - 82 high coalition led by Saudi Arabia. 124 . The coalition did not respond to the Panel’s request for information. The Joint Incident Assessment Team established by the coalition to “assess reported incidents of civilian casualties, investi gation procedures and mechanisms of precision 136 targeting” (see S/2016/100 ) attributed responsibility to the coalition. 125 . The Panel, having carried out technical and international humanitarian law assessments, finds that: (a) The coalition conducted the air strike on the community hall in Sana’a fatalities the injured of that resulted in at least 827 civilian and injuries. At least 24 were children. The strike also resulted in the total destruction of the hall; (b) Given the nature of the event and those in attendance, the attack resulted in a very high number of civilian casualties, which should have been anticipated 137 re the attack. The Panel is unconvinced that the relevant international befo 138 humanitarian law requirements relating to proportionality were met; (c) The cumulative factors in (a) and (b) above also indicate that, if precautionary measures had been taken, th ey were largely inadequate and 139 ineffective. The Joint Incident Assessment Team also concluded that the relevant rules of engagement and procedures had not been followed and that those __________________ 135 See (United States). The code 3FU05 is assigned to the company Karlee Incorporated www.karlee.com. 136 Joint Incident Assessment Team press release. 137 See the case study for information that should have formed the basis of any proportionality assessment. 138 An attack that may b e expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited under internationa l humanitarian law (customary international humanitarian law, rule 14). 139 International humanitarian law requires that all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians a nd damage to civilian objects. This obligation is particularly incumbent on those who plan and decide on the air strikes (customary international humanitarian law, rules 15 22). - 17 - 00300 50 / 242

51 S/2017/81 targeted responsible in the coalition “did not take in account the nature of the 140 area”; (d) The second air strike, which occurred three to eight minutes after the first, resulted in more casualties to the already wounded civilians and to the first - rs de responders. The coalition violated its obligations in respect of persons ho 141 in what was effectively a “double - combat and the wounded, tap” attack probably caused by the tactics adopted by the pilots to guarantee the destruction of the 142 target; Even if an individual officer within the coalition acted negligently in (e) ca rrying out the strike, coalition forces are still responsible for international 143 humanitarian law violations. An official acting against instructions may not be an adequate justification under broader international law for the relevant States 144 e coalition to evade State responsibility for those wrongful acts; members of th 145 (f) Those government officers who reportedly passed the information, or were otherwise involved in the intelligence - gathering and targeting processes in relation to this incident, may also be responsible for any international humanitarian law violations to the extent of their contribution. 3 . Panel assessment relating to air strikes None of the member States the coalition that operated air assets 126 . comprising provided the Panel with access to information on the events listed in table 7, its 146 - This is in non compliance with paragraph 8 of requests notwithstanding. resolution 2266 (2016) . . In 8 of the 10 investigations, the Panel found no evidence that the air strikes 127 147 had targeted legitimate military objectives. For all 10 investigations, the Panel considers it almost certain that the coalition did not meet internationa l humanitarian __________________ 140 Joint Incident Assessment Team press release. 141 Including common artic les 1 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 142 tap” attack is an event in which “multiple strikes take place in a short period of time”. A “double - See Andrew Clapham, Paolo Gaeta and Marco Sassòli, eds., The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commen (Oxford University Press, 2016). tary 143 Customary international humanitarian law, rules 14 - 22. 144 See article 7 of the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, which states that “the conduct of ... a person or entity e mpowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the ... person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions”. See also customary i nternational humanitarian law, rule 139, which calls upon each party to the conflict to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law “by its armed forces and n or control”. other persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its directio 145 Joint Incident Assessment Team press release. 146 Letters dated 1 July and 21 November 2016. 147 guided weapons in The exceptions being air strikes Nos. 1 and 10 in table 7. The use of precision - e intended target was hit. 8 of the 10 incidents indicated that th 17 - 00300 51 / 242

52 S/2017/81 law requirements of proportionality and precautions in attack. The Panel considers 148 that some of the attacks may amount to war crimes. . 128 In the investigation relating to Abs hospital (table 7, air strike No. 6) the Panel finds that the c oalition violated principles relating to the protection of and respect 149 150 for hospitals and medical personnel; the protection of the wounded and sick; 151 and the protection of persons hors de combat in its strike on the hospital. . engage in or otherwise participate in military All States whose forces 129 operations on behalf of the coalition are responsible for “all acts committed by 152 persons forming part of its armed forces”. These States “may not evade their 153 isposal of an ad hoc coalition”. obligations by placing their contingents at the d 154 All coalition member States and their allies also have an obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure respect for international humanitarian law by the 155 vernment of This obligation is especially incumbent upon the Go coalition. Yemen, upon whose request and with those consent the air strikes are being ). conducted (see S/2015/217 Those individuals responsible for planning, deciding on and/or executing air . 130 156 that disproportionately affect civilians and civilian infrastructure may fall strikes __________________ 148 Serious violations of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes (customary international humanitarian law, rule 156). See also William Boothby and Michael N. Schmitt, (Oxford University Press, 2012), on some legal aspects relating to The Law of Targeting bombardments. 149 See customary international humanitarian law, rules 25 and 28. See also Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, arts. 9 and 11. 150 See common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and article 7 of the Additional Protocols thereto of 8 June 1977. 151 Ibid. 152 See updated commentary to common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 at https://ihl - databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId =722 39588AFA66200C1257F7D00367DBD#_Toc452378931 . See also article 3 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907. 153 See updated commentary to common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 154 f the updated commentary to common article 1, “allies” may include those States On the basis o that engage in “financing, equipping, arming or training” of the coalition armed forces for their engagement in Yemen and/or those States that plan, carry out and debrief opera tions jointly with the coalition. For the specific States that are involved, see para. 30. 155 This obligation to respect and ensure respect under common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions ctively participated in this air of 12 August 1949 is not limited to those coalition States that a strike as stated in the updated commentary. “The duty to ensure respect ... is particularly strong in the case of a partner in a joint operation, even more so as this case is closely related to the negative duty neither to en courage nor to aid or assist in violations of the Conventions. The fact, for example, that a High Contracting Party participates in the financing, equipping, arming or briefs training of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, or even plans, carries out and de operations jointly with such forces, places it in a unique position to influence the behaviour of those forces, and thus to ensure respect for the Conventions.” 156 In reference to those executing attacks, it is possible that the pilot of the aircr aft may fire his or her weapons in reliance of the accuracy of the information that may have been previously provided to him or her. In these cases, the Panel finds that it is those commanders who plan and decide upon the air strikes, who have at their dis posal the relevant information from a variety of sources, who have the responsibility to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. (Oxford University The Law of Targeting See also William Boothby and Michael N. Schmitt, Press, 2012). 17 - 00300 52 / 242

53 S/2017/81 under the designation criteria contained in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) as those who threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen. Their acts may also fall under paragraph 18 of the resolution. The Panel finds that violations associated with the conduct of the air campaign 131 . are sufficiently widespread to reflect ei ther an ineffective targeting process or a 157 broader policy of attrition against civilian infrastructure. Ground operations . 4 . 132 The Panel investigated international humanitarian law violations relating to nd/or actual AQAP affiliates/members enforced disappearances of both suspected a carried out by the Hadrami Elite Forces in Mukalla. The Forces were created to established control of the city in - counter the AQAP threat after the Government re timate Government, they late April. While nominally under the command of the legi are effectively under the operational control of the United Arab Emirates, which 158 oversees ground operations in Mukalla. The Panel investigated five incidents relating to six individuals who were 133 . ng arrested by the Hadrami Elite Forces between May forcibly disappeared after bei 159 airport and has subsequently been Riyan and November. One was detained at the 160 released. Another was a professional tradesperson who undertook some technical rity in the area. The other five have work for AQAP while it was the de facto autho no known links to AQAP. The Panel finds that, even if these individuals were associated with AQAP, the . 134 Government is obliged under international humanitarian law and international human rights law to ensure that the Hadrami Elite Forces, or any other forces operating on the ground under the authority and/or control and/or with the consent of the Government, comply with relevant legal requirements and procedural 161 safeguards regarding deprivation of liberty. cludes taking active steps to This in prevent disappearances, including through the regularization of the procedure relating to the registration of detainees and notification of whereabouts to family 162 Given that the United Arab Emirates also has ground fo members. rces operating in Mukalla, its Government has similar obligations. The United Arab Emirates has informed the Panel that the coalition has provided “military, financial and training assistance” and “intelligence, logistic information and aerial intervention ” to the Hadrami Elite Forces, which are under the control of the legitimate Yemeni Armed Forces. __________________ 157 The United Nations, for example, recorded 987 incidents of air strikes on residential buildings, 31 on civilian factories, 27 on educational institutions and 16 on medical units in 2016. Information provided to the Panel on 19 December. 158 Confidential sourc es. 159 Ibid. 160 Situation as at 2 December. 161 See customary international humanitarian law, rules 98, 99, 117 and 123. See also Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, arts. 4 and 5, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9, 10, 17 and 26. 162 Ibid., and customary international humanitarian law, rule 99. 17 - 00300 53 / 242

54 S/2017/81 Incidents attributed to Houthi and Saleh forces: violations B. 163 associa ted with deprivation of liberty . 135 to deprivation of liberty by Houthi The Panel investigated 12 incidents relating security agencies. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 164 were widespread and are summarized in table 8. norms Table 8 Houthi violations associated with deprivation of liberty Death No as a opportunity Past or result of Denial of Denial to most Restricted No recent Exposure of arrest access to external challenge to air formal place of captivity Detention Ill - detention Torture charges treatment detention Custody reasons period strikes communications medicines Remarks 1 Ibb 8 days X X X X X X X X Mechanic X 2 2 years X X X X X Amran X X Injured by air strike in detention — university student 3 Central, — 4 months X X X X X X Escaped child Sana’a 4 Central, Social media 8 months X X X X X X X Sana’a activist University X X 5 Habrah, X 9 months X X X Sana’a student 11 days X X X X 6 Housewife Saref, Sana’a Saref, 7 3 weeks X X X X X Community leader Sana’a Saref, More 8 Community X X X X X leader Sana’a than 3 months X Community More X X 9 X Saref, X than Sana’a leader months 3 X Community 10 Saref, X 4 months X X X leader Sana’a 11 Saref, Community 2 months X X X X X Sana’a leader X Trial X X 12 Central, X More X X X than Sana’a continuing 3 years __________________ 163 Table 8 details violations, including those under rules 22, 87, 90, 98 99, 117, 118 and 123. Details of some of these ca ses are provided in confidential annex 50. 164 like - State actors, especially if they exercise government - It is increasingly accepted that non functions and have de facto control over a territory, should respect human rights standards when their conduct af fects the human rights of the individuals under their control. See A/HRC/33/38 , A/HRC/29/51 para. 10; A/HRC , para. 30; /10/22 , para. 22; S/PRST/2014/20; A/HRC/21/50 , 134 and annex II, para. 10; , para. 46 (c). A/HRC/14/24 and A/HRC/22/33; para. - 00300 17 242 / 54

55 S/2017/81 136 . The violations listed in table 8 occurred in 11 detention centres. The Panel also documented more than 50 verified cases of international humanitarian law 165 violations associated with deprivation of liberty in eight governorates. The Panel finds that these violations are both recurrent and widespread in detention centres under Houthi control. Although there is ample evidence in the public domain of these violations (see annex 50), the Panel is unaware of a single criminal prosecut ion or disciplinary action brought against any Houthi agent who caused or contributed to these violations. The Panel has also identified a trend of individuals, including migrants and . 137 children, being preventively detained for fear that they may engag e in combat in the 166 future, also in violation of their due process rights. . 138 The Panel finds that these violations associated with deprivation of liberty are sufficiently widespread as to reflect a wider policy. Consequently, individuals r committing these serious violations, as well as their leaders, fall responsible fo as within the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) those who threaten peace and security of Yemen. Th eir acts may also fall under 167 paragraph 18 of the resolution. Some of these violations are war crimes. An overview of the detention facilities and those responsible is provided in annex 21. C. Use of explosive ordnance in populated areas . Panel documented four incidents of the use of explosive ordnance (see The 139 168 table 9) and continues to investigate two other incidents that involved explosions in densely populated areas in Ta‘izz (see anne x 51), which together caused 169 27 civilian deaths and dam age to a residential building, a school, a hospital and three marketplaces. __________________ 165 Information provided by victims, families, local and international non - governmental Nations documented at least organizations, human rights activists and lawyers. The United “arrests” by the Houthi forces in 2016 (as at 19 December). arbitrary 174 166 Confidential sources. 167 For example, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are war crimes. The eva Conventions of commission of torture is a grave breach. See common article 3 of the Gen 12 August 1949 and customary international humanitarian law, rule 156. 168 The two other incidents pertained to the explosion at Bab al Kabir, on 3 June, which killed at - least 12 individuals and wounded some 100 others, and the explosio n at a school in Shami neighbourhood, on 7 June, which killed five people, including four women and children. 169 Of these, the Panel verified the numbers for four incidents. For one, involving mass casualty Médecins sans frontières data. figures, the Panel relies on United Nations and 17 - 00300 55 / 242

56 S/2017/81 Table 9 Explosive ordnance use in densely populated areas, 2016 Explosive Appx to ordnance Annex 51 Date Location Comments/consequences Impact 1 3 June Jamal Street Market Free - flight A More than 2 injured rocket 2 18 September Revolution Damage to essential Mortar Hospital bomb Hospital infrastructure Market Bi’r Bashah 3 October 10 dead, more than Mortar 3 17 injured bomb 15 November Shamsin Residential Mortar 4 1 injured neighbourhood bomb building 140 . The Panel used technical analysis to identify that attacks Nos. 1, 2 and 4 in table 9 were launched from eastern Ta‘izz, which is under the con trol of Houthi or Saleh forces. 170 : attack on Revolution Hospital study summary 1 . Case 141 On 28 September at 9.15 p.m., explosive ordnance detonated on the roof of the . staff residential building at the Revolution Hospital, damaging the solar panels and water storage tanks. The Panel finds that the mortar bombs were fired from an area under the control of the Houthi or Saleh forces. Figure XI Impact point __________________ 170 Included to demonstrate the technical and international humanitarian law methodology in all case studies. 17 - 00300 56 / 242

57 S/2017/81 Figure XII High explosive mortar bomb tail fin Figure XIII firing point Mortar analysis 142 The Panel . finds that: It is almost certain that the Houthi or Saleh forces were responsible for (a) the attack; The hospital and its medical personnel are protected from attack under (b) 171 There is no demonstrable evidence to indicate that international humanitarian law. 172 at the time of the attack they had lost that protected status. The hospital staff deny receiving any communication that would have constituted the warning required 173 under international humanitarian law; It is certain that the Houthi - (c) Saleh fighters knew the location of the hospital and therefore that any mortar bombs fired into the vicinity would have a high likelihood of damaging the hospital and posing a risk to its staff, the wounded and sick and civilians; __________________ 171 Customary international humanitarian law, rules 25 and 28. 172 Ibid. 173 ian law, rule 28. Customary international humanitar 17 - 00300 57 / 242

58 S/2017/81 (d) On the basis of the foregoing, it is highly likely that principles relating to international humanitarian law on distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack were not met. Panel assessment relating to ground operations 2 . . The Houthi and Saleh forces have not provided the Panel with access to 3 14 information on the four events listed in table 9. In all the investigations, the Panel finds it highly unlikely that the Houthi or Saleh forces met international uirements of proportionality and precautions in attack. Some of humanitarian law req 174 these attacks may also amount to war crimes. 144 . The proliferation of explosive remnants of war continues to pose a major risk to civilians (see annex 44), and the Panel finds that this als o heavily constrains the safe return of the displaced to their homes. 145 . The Panel finds that individual commanders whose forces continue to engage in the above acts fall within the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of 2140 (2014) as those who threaten peace and security in Yemen. Their resolution acts may also fall under paragraph 18 of the resolution. For more information on those with command responsibility for the Houthi and Saleh forces i n Ta‘izz, see paragraph 42 and annexes 21 and 25. D. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict 146 Houthi and Saleh forces, AQAP and armed groups associated with the . 175 legitimate Government all continue to recruit and use children in armed co nflict. The coalition led by Saudi Arabia provided the Panel with a list of 52 children in its custody and access to alleged child soldiers recruited by the Houthis. Saudi Arabia informed the Panel that 52 children had subsequently been handed over to the legitimate Government and transported to Ma’rib. 147 . The Panel investigated a case of a 16 - year - old child who was captured by the Houthi forces and severely tortured and disfigured on suspicion of being a fighter (see confidential annex 50). ted findings of child recruitment and use by Houthi and Saleh forces by 148 . Repea S/2016/360 - and Add.1) indicate that the Houthi the United Nations (see A/70/836 - Saleh leaders are aware of these violations and have failed t o implement effective measures to prevent them. E. Intolerance and discriminati on against religious minorities The Panel documented cases relating to persons of the Baha’i faith who were . 149 deprived of their liberty or arrested in a manner that did not respect due process. The information relating to these cases is included in confidential annex 50. The deprivation of liberty of a group of individuals on account of their faith - based __________________ 174 Serious violations of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes (customary international humanitarian law, rule 156). 175 Multiple sources. 17 - 00300 58 / 242

59 S/2017/81 176 The Panel has identified an activities violates several human rights norms. individual responsible for the incidents. F. Inciden ts attributed to the Government Forced deportation of civilians 1 . 150 On 8 May, security personnel began to forcibly displace individuals working . 177 or residing in Aden who were from the north. Local authorities supported this move as a security initiative to curb continuing assassinations and v iolence in the area. 151 . On or about 9 May, the President issued a statement in which he condemned the deportations and instructed the Governors of Aden, Lahij and Dali‘ to urgently 178 act to halt regional incitement and forced evictions. inds that, although the expulsions were implemented at the local The Panel f . 152 level, they were almost certainly indicative of a wider governorate - level policy within Aden. The Panel has identified those responsible for the implementation of this policy. The Panel . subsequently investigated another incident relating to the forced 153 deportation of three workers from a factory in Lahij to Ta‘izz on or about 12 May. The Yemeni military forcefully removed them from their workplace and transported men. One worker was given time to go to Aden, before them to the “north” of Ye being deported, to enable him to relocate his family to the north. This incident violates several provisions of international humanitarian law and international ating to occupation, prohibition of forced human rights law, including the rights rel 179 The Panel has identified the commander in displacement and discrimination. Lahij responsible for these deportations. 154 The Panel finds that actual or perceived discrimination against “northerners” . continues i n Aden. This discrimination and incidents of deportation risk undermining the legitimacy of the local authorities and may obstruct national and international efforts to establish the local security and governance needed for a and entities engaging in serious practices of this nature durable solution. Individuals 2140 (2014) as fall within the designation criteria in paragraph 17 of resolution those who threaten peace and security in Yemen. Their acts may al so fall under (a) and (c) of the resolution. paragraphs 18 __________________ 176 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 2, 7, 18, 19 and 20. 177 Multiple individuals who were deported. 178 Rua’a Alameri, “Yemen leader slams civilian evictions in south”, Al Arabiya, 9 May 2016, - leader - - - east/2016/05/09/Yemen slams available from http://englih.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle - icials backtrack on controversial deportation - expulsions - from civilian Aden - .html ; and “Aden off www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news / 2016/ campaign”, The New Arab, 11 May 2016, available from backtrack - campaign 5/11/aden - officials - . - on - controversial - deportation 179 See Additional Protocol II of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, o (1), and customary international humanitarian law, rules 87, 88 and 129. See als 17 art. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 17, 25 and 26. 17 - 00300 59 / 242

60 S/2017/81 Obstructions to provision of medical services 2 . 155 The Panel documented 18 attacks against hospitals in Yemen in 2016 (see . annex 52). International humanitarian law requires parties to take measures to ensure that medical units, transport and personnel are respected and protected el recorded three incidents in Ta‘izz in which armed men during a conflict. The Pan threatened staff and disrupted life - saving treatment with the aim of compelling staff wounded (see confidential to accord priority to the medical treatment of their 53). The hospitals were in a reas under the control of the “resistance”. The annex Panel notes that compelling a person engaged in medical activities to perform acts 180 contrary to medical ethics is prohibited under international humanitarian law. e Obstruction of humanitarian assistanc IX. 2216 (2015) 156 . Pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution , the Panel continues to investigate the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or access to, or distribution of, humani tarian assistance in Yemen. Obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance A. 157 . The Panel finds that insecurity arising from recent attacks on commercial vessels (see paras. 33 and 37), higher war risk insurance costs, issues relating to 181 and the seizure, detention and diversion of some commercial rrency exchange cu 182 have an adverse impact on the distribution of commercial food supplies. vessels Some of these vessels also carry humanitarian assistance. This places a heavy burden 183 on humanitari an actors to bring additional aid into Yemen to meet needs. Before the conflict, Yemen relied on other countries for 90 per cent of its food supplies. 158 . The other factor placing a similar burden on humanitarian actors is the provision of medical suppl ies. The humanitarian country team assesses that the restrictions on access to the international airport in Sana’a affecting commercial flights initiated by the coalition in August left more than 6,500 people unable to 184 access medical care. Yemenia Airways estimates that at least one third of passengers were travelling abroad to seek medical care, often for chronic diseases __________________ 180 Customary international humanitarian law, rule 26. 181 Notification by wheat importer that it will stop importing wheat to Yemen. Document in the possession of the Panel. 182 Ahmad Ghaddar, Ron Bousso and Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Tankers seized in Yemen port, risking - /article/us www.reuters.com deeper import crisis”, Reuters, 15 September 2016. Available from - yemen - oil exclusive - idUSKCN11K2BQ . 183 The prices of wheat flour and sugar were about 25 per cent higher in November on average across Yemen than before the conflict. The volume of fuel imported in November was only 40 per cent of the country’ s monthly requirements. See Jonathan Saul and Maha El Dahan, “Yemen traders halt new wheat imports as famine approaches”, Reuters, 16 December 2016. - idUSKBN1450H6 . exclusive Available from www.reu ters.com/article/us - yemen - food - 184 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2017 Humanitarian needs overview: www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/ Yemen”, November 2016. Available from . documents/files/yemen_2017_hno_final_1.pdf 17 - 00300 60 / 242

61 S/2017/81 existent, in part owing to - for which treatment in Yemen had become almost non 185 import difficulties. distribution of humanitarian assistance Obstructions to the B. 159 The Panel finds that all parties to the conflict obstructed the distribution of . humanitarian assistance. At the request of its sources, and with due consideration for the sensitivities relating to humanitaria n the ground, information on n access o 29 incidents is provided in confidential annex 54. X. Recommendations The Panel has no further recommendations in addition to those already made 160 . in its final report for 2015 ( ) and its midterm update to the Committee. S/2016/73 __________________ 185 Ibid. 17 - 00300 61 / 242

62 S/2017/81 Annex 1: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it 1. should be recognized that the mere naming of 1 an individual or entity in a Panel’s report, could impact adversely on the fundamental human rights and reputation of the person. As such, the Panel decided to allow individuals concerned with an opportunity t o provide an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific information/material to support the narrative. Through this interaction, the ting criteria. This individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their conduct does not fall within the relevant lis is called the ‘opportunity to reply’. on the opportunity to reply is as follows: 2. The Panel’s methodology Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm; (a) An individual may be denied an opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes based on credible evidence (b) that there is a fear that doing so would: Result in the individual moving assets if they get advance warning of a possible (i) tion; recommendation for designa Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources; (ii) (iii) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members; (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances. 3. Unless any of 2 (b) (i) to (v) above applies, members of the Panel should be in a position to provide an individual an opportunity to reply. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel. s in exceptional circumstances. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unles 4. 5. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel. 6. f the level and nature of interaction with the The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination o Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel. at the Panel, at the conclusion of its investigations, is able to directly communicate with the 7. The key point is th individual to afford the ‘opportunity to reply’ to allegations against him/her. Some possible differences between a right of reply (after designation) and the o pportunity to reply (before designation) are as shown in table 1.1. __________________ 1 Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both. 17 - 00300 62 / 242

63 S/2017/81 Table 1.1 Right of Reply versus Opportunity to Reply 2 Right of Reply Opportunity to Reply Question The Panel Who is the responsible entity? A duly appointed focal person/ ombudsperson with the ability to provide an effective remedy. When should the right of reply/ After the individual is designated. If possible before an individual is named in the report as having violated the opportunity to reply be given? sanctions regime and definitely before a confidential recommendation is made to the Sanctions Committee recommending designation. To allow the Panel to complete its To afford the individual the What are the objectives sought to be achieved? investigation and to ensure that the ability to contest the have an alternative listing/designation. It is up to the individual does not relevant c narrative that requires investigation prior ompetent body to decide the extent of information to a recommendation for designation. shared with the individual, but it should be sufficiently detailed to enable him to prepare an informed response. Nature of allegations that form Sufficient information on the activities What information should be the basis of the summary of being investigated. shared with the evidence and other information individual/entity? deemed necessary by the Outline of allegations against individuals competent authority. to provide an informed to enable them response to these allegations. Sufficient information on possible violations. __________________ 2 This table is aimed to illustrate the differences between the opportunity to reply when compared to the right of reply and is not an authoritative statement on the nature and scope of the right to reply, which is within the competence of other bodies/enti ties, such as the Council in the event of a designation. 17 - 00300 63 / 242

64 S/2017/81 Annex 2: Violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses investigative methodology The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible 1. evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting Yemen. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Gr oup on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, S/2006/997 , on best practices and methods, . including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as requested by paragraph 11 of resolution 2266 (2016) 2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below: (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports. least three or In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at (b) more of the following sources of information: - witnesses or victims ; (i) At least two eye At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also (ii) ; independently investigated the incident (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel obtains copies of . In incidents relating to death certificates and medical certificates mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations; (iv) Technical evidence , which includes imagery of explosive events such as the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion; Panel often identifies the responsible party through a. In relation to air strikes, the crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation ; and b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artill ery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other source information. on of open source or purchased (v) The utilisati satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident; (vi) A ccess to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident; t Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals tha (vii) may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced; 17 - 00300 64 / 242

65 S/2017/81 (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other ied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground. (For are rel sources, local sources example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area); incident; and/or responsible for the (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict to identify other collaborative or contradictory information Open source information (x) regarding the Panel’s findings. In carrying out its investigations on depravation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on (c) following sources of information: the The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and (i) security conditions are conducive to such an interview; s while in custody. This is The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victim (ii) particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody; (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has ; independently investigated the incident also death certificates; and, where applicable, dical documentation Me (iv) (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities; Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible; (vi) from local and international organizations that have Investigation and other d ocumentation (vii) independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim; Where relevant, the Panel to collect specific and verifiable information ) (viii uses local sources from the ground, for example, medical certificates ; Statements issued by the party to the conflict (ix) responsible for the incident ; and/or Open source i nformation to identify other collaborative or contradictory information (xx) regarding the Panel’s findings. (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement and threats against ormation that includes: medical workers, the Panel relies on inf (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview; ation (either local or international) that has Interviews with at least one individual or organiz (ii) independently investigated the incident ; also Documentation relevant to verify information obtained; (iii) 17 - 00300 65 / 242

66 S/2017/81 (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident ; and/or Open to identify other collaborative or contradictory information source information (v) regarding the Panel’s findings. The standard of proof is met when the Panel has (e) reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”. (f) onsible with an Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those resp opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel’s standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information on incidents locations. However, - nity to respond, including geo detailed information in any opportu when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel sources, for example, in violations related to are not provided depravation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children. (g) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, then the Panel will consider 2266 (2016) ance with paragraph 8 of resolution , and - compli whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non thus consideration for reporting to the Committee. 3. The Panel will not include information in its reports any information that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel may include more source information in confidential annexes. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other 4. anel is, particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the P based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the the Panel’s anonymity of its sources. 17 - 00300 66 / 242

67 S/2017/81 Annex 3: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map (place name identification) 17 00300 - 242 / 67

68 S/2017/81 correspondence (2016) Annex 4: Summary of Panel Table 4.1 Correspondence with Member States Number of Number of unanswered letters sent by letters by Member State Member State the Panel 3 Australia 3 1 The Bahamas 2 2 Bahrain 1 1 1 Belgium Brazil 4 Bulgaria 2 Canada 1 China 3 Czech Republic 1 Djibouti 2 1 Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1 1 Egypt 2 1 France 2 1 1 Hungary Islamic Republic of Iran 7 7 Isle of Man 1 Italy 2 4 Jordan 2 Kuwait 1 1 Liechtenstein 1 Malaysia 2 Morocco 3 Netherlands 2 5 5 Oman Qatar 1 1 Romania 1 1 5 Russian Federation 21 12 Saudi Arabia Singapore 2 Spain 1 2 The Sudan 2 Switzerland 4 __________________ 3 Holding reply only received to date. 17 - 00300 68 / 242

69 S/2017/81 Number of Number of unanswered letters sent by Member State letters by Member State the Panel United Arab Emirates 18 3 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 2 2 Ireland United States of America 5 3 1 13 Yemen Total 129 48 Table 4.2 Correspondence with the ministry of foreign affairs in Yemen Number of letters sent by Number of unanswered the Panel letters by entity Entity MFA Yemen in Sana’a 5 5 5 Total 5 Table 4.3 Correspondence with commercial companies Number of letters sent by Number of unanswered the Panel letters by company Commercial company Al Rams Trading (UAE) 1 Al Thuraya Tower Trading (UAE) 1 Amir Mizraei(UAE) 1 Arab Bank (UAE) 1 Arsenal Joint Stock Company (Bulgaria) 1 1 Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and 1 Madagascar (ASCECNA) (Regional, Senegal) Caracal (UAE) 1 Citibank (UAE) 1 CITIGROUP (USA) 1 1 1 Commercial Bank of Dubai (UAE) Cygnus Telecom (UAE) 2 Deutsche Bank 1 Dubai Islamic Bank (UAE) 1 1 EDO MBM (UK) Emirates National Dubai Bank (UAE) 1 17 - 00300 69 / 242

70 S/2017/81 Number of Number of unanswered letters sent by Commercial company the Panel letters by company First Gulf Bank (UAE) 1 Instlaza (Spain) 1 1 International Commercial Bank (UAE) Jetworks (UK) 1 Lockheed Martin (USA) 1 1 1 1 Mobile Yemen (Yemen) 1 Shipping Company Mediterranean (Switzerland) National Bank of Abu Dhabi (UAE) 1 Noor Bank (UAE) 1 1 PGW Defence (Canada) Raytheon (UK) 1 1 SAMCO (Netherlands) 1 Taurus (Brazil) 1 1 Thuraya (UAE) Zastava (Serbia) 1 Total 5 32 17 - 00300 70 / 242

71 S/2017/81 under the control of the Houthis (to 28 November 2016) government Annex 5: Acting 1 . Until 28 November 2016, the Houthis managed to keep the ministries in Sana’a operational under the authority of previous members of the cabinet who chose to cooperate with them. One exam ple being Major General Jalal al Rowayshan who kept his post of minister of interior after President Hadi left Sana’a. Those - who chose to cooperate kept their titles as minster or deputy ministers. The Houthis also appointed additional chargé d'affaires’. The acting cabinet comprised of 33 members chaired by Talal le of ‘ members with the tit Aqlan. Figure 5.1 Image of the official webpage of the prime ministry with Talal Aqlan as the acting prime minister الحكومةالحالية , This page was saved by the /tabid/984/Default.aspx http://www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/gov/ Source: moved and replaced by the current “cabinet of national salvation”, see below. Panel before it was re 17 - 00300 71 / 242

72 S/2017/81 Table 5.2 List of the acting council of government up to 28 November 2016 (English) Cabinet rank Ser Position of responsibility Name Talal Abdelkarim Aqlan head head of government 1 Major General Jalal Al Rowayshan minister interior 2 Ghaleb Abdullah Motlaq implementation of NDC outcomes minister of state 3 Hassan Mohamed Zaid minister of state member of council of ministers 4 Ahmed Mohamed Ashami civil minister service and insurance 5 Abdurrahman al Mokhtar 6 legal affairs minister / chargé d'affaires Mohsein Ali Annaqib industry and commerce 7 deputy minister Abdullah Abdu al Hamdi deputy minister education 8 Mathar al Abbassi deputy minister planning 9 and international cooperation Hadi Ablan culture deputy minister 10 Ahmed al Aqida 11 deputy minister justice Mosleh Mohsein al A’zir 12 communications and information technology deputy minister Khaled al Houali deputy minister technical learning professional and 13 Hassan Zaid ben Yahya youth and sport 14 deputy minister Abdussalam Ahmed Addal’I local administration 15 minister / 4 chargé d'affaires Mohamed Ali Siwar secretary - general / 16 council of ministers chargé d'affaires Mohamed Abdullah Hajar 17 minister / foreign affairs chargé d'affaires Mohamed Nasser al Janad 18 minister / finance chargé d'affaires Yahya al A’jam 19 minister / oil and minerals chargé d'affaires Abdulmalik al Jawlahi 20 general labour and roads minister / chargé d'affaires Abdullah Basunbul 21 fisheries minister / chargé d'affaires Ahmed Nasser al Hammati 22 minister / education chargé d'affaires Ali Saleh Taissir 23 minister / human rights chargé d'affaires Abdu Mohamed al Hukaimi minister / 24 social affairs and justice chargé d'affaires Abdulkarim Arrawdi minister / higher education and social research 25 chargé d'affaires __________________ 4 chargé d'affaires these individuals also had ministerial responsibility. Although titled 17 - 00300 72 / 242

73 S/2017/81 Ser Cabinet rank Position of responsibility Name public health and housing 26 Ghazi Ismail minister / chargé d'affaires Abdurrahman al Qallam 27 minister / endowment and religious guidance chargé d'affaires Abdullah Ali al A’nsi 28 minister / transport chargé d'affaires Ibrahim al Hamdi diaspora minister / 29 chargé d'affaires Issam Assanini tourism 30 minister / chargé d'affaires Dhamran Adil energy and electricity minister / 31 chargé d'affaires 32 Mohamed Shamsan minister / water and forestry chargé d'affaires minister / chargé agriculture and irrigation 33 Ali Abdullah al Fadil d'affaires 17 - 00300 73 / 242

74 S/2017/81 Annex 6: Supreme security committee and security and military committee . 1 The Houthis established a supreme security committee on 7 February 2016, which initially comprised 17 members. A number of members left the country with some joining President Hadi. Major General Abderaqib Thabit Asso ubaihi, the then Minster of Defence under President Hadi who initially chaired the supreme security committee, escaped Sana’a and the legitimate Government in Aden. He was then subsequently arrested by the 2017. Houthis and remained incommunicado as at 2 January . 2 On 20 August 2016, the supreme political council (SPC) appointed a security and military committee to replace the supreme security committee. Only Major General Jalal Al Rowayshan the acting minister of interior, he acting minster of defence, Major General Zakaria Yahya Mohammed Al Major General Hussain Khairan, t - Shami the acting Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces in areas controlled by the Houthis and Major General Abdurrab Saleh Ahmed Jarfan continued on to also become members of the sec urity and military committee. Table 6.1 List of the SSC and SMC (English) Supreme security committee Serial Security and military committee Appointed on 7 February 2016 Appointed on 20 August 2016 1 Major General Jalal Al Rowayshan Major General Hussain Khairan 2 Major General Zakaria Yahya Mohammed Al - Shami 3 4 Major General Abdurrab Saleh Ahmed Jarfan Appointment Terminated Yussef Hassan Ismail Al Madani 5 6 Abdullah Yahya Abdullah Al Hakim Taha Hassan Al Madani 7 8 Abderrazak Al Marouni 9 Awad Ben Farid 10 Abderaqib Thabit Assoubaihi 11 Ali Ben Ali Al Jaifi 12 Abdullah Mohnif 13 Ahmed Mohsin Al Yafai 14 Mohamed Daifallah Saleh Sabhan 15 Mohammed Abdulkarim Al Ghumari ** 16 Hamoud Khaled Al Soufi Ali Hassan Al Ahmadi ** 17 ** Discontinued their membership and New appointments left Yemen 18 Abdulkarim Amir Eddine Al Houthi - Abdulkader Kassem Al Shami 19 Abdullah Al Qawssi 20 21 Ahmed Naji Mane’a 22 Abdulhakim Hashem Al Khiwani 23 Brigadier General Said Mohammed Al Hariri Brigadier General Ahmed Adhufaif 24 Asa’ad Hadi Asa’ad 25 Hassan Salah Al Marrani 26 17 - 00300 74 / 242

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76 S/2017/81 5 Annex 8: Supreme political council Table 8.1 Supreme political council Name Position Affiliation Ser 6 Salih Ali Muhammad al president Samad Houthi - 1 7 Qasim Muhammad Ghalib Labuzah vice president 2 Saleh 8 Sadiq Amin Abu Ras member Saleh 3 9 4 Yusif Husayn Abdullah al - Fayshi member Houthi 10 Dayani 5 member - Saleh Khali Said Muhammad al 11 Muhammad Saleh Mabkhut al - Nuaymi 6 member Houthi 12 Jabir Abdullah Ghalib al - Wahabani 7 member Saleh 8 Sultan Ahmed Abd al - Rabb Mujahid al - Houthi member 13 Samai 14 Saleh member Nasiri - Nasir Nasir Abdullah al 9 15 Saleh Mubarak Salih al - Mashin al - Zayadi 10 member (Deceased) __________________ 5 Established 15 August 2016. 6 Salih Ali Muhammad al - Samad is the he ad of Ansar Allah’s Political Bureau. 7 Qasim Muhammad Ghalib Labuzah is the head of the GPC in Lahj. He holds a Ph.D and participated in the National Dialogue. 8 Sadiq Amin Abu Ras is a tribal shaykh from Dhu Husayn of the Bakil tribal confederation. He is the Deputy Head of the GPC and was next to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) on 3 June 2011 when the mosque inside the presidential palace was bombed in an attempted assassination. 9 - Yusif Abdullah Husayn al - Fayshi is a former member of the Houthi’s now disbanded Revolutionary Committee. al Fayshi stood behind al Saleh Political Council on - Samad when the latter signed the agreement establishing the Houthi - . 28 July 2016 10 Khalid Said Muhammad al Dayani is a member of the GPC and a former Governor of Hadramawt. - 11 - Nuaymi is the pro - Houthi head of the Political Bureau for the Union of Popular Muhammad Saleh Mabkhut al Yemeni Forces. 12 Jabir Abdullah Ghalib al - Wahabani is a member of Yemen’s parliament and heads the pro - Saleh GPC in Ta’izz. 13 Sultan Ahmad Abd al - Rabb Muijahid al - Samai is from Ta’izz. 14 Nasir Nasir Abdullah al - Nasiri is from Dhamar. 15 Mubarak Salih al - Mashin al - Zayadi was a military commander from the al - Zaya di tribe in Ma’rib. The Houthis rd appointed him to command the 3 military district, centred in Ma’rib and he was active in the fighting in Sirwah. He Sala al n Sana’a. The - Kubra Funeral Hall i - - led coalition strike on the al was killed on 8 October 2016 in a Saudi Arabia Panel is unaware of his replacement. 17 - 00300 76 / 242

77 S/2017/81 Annex 9: Government of national salvation since 28 November 2016 1. salvation” under decree 56(2016), On 28 November 2016, the SPC appointed the “government of national which consists of a cabinet of 42 members headed by Abulaziz Sale bin Habtour, a GPC member. The cabinet contains thirteen members affiliated to GPC. The Panel notes that only five members of the outgoing acting government were renamed in the new cabinet. Two Major Generals with an active role in Houthi military operations were named Shami, the chief of staff of the armed forces affiliated to the - ministers: 1) Major General Zakaria Yahya Mohammed Al Houthis, also a member o f the military and security committee, was appointed as minister of transportation and 2) Major 16 was appointed minister of defence. General Mohamed Nasser al A’tifi Fares Mohamed Mana’a (SOi.008), who was designated on 12 April 2010 by the Security Cou 2. ncil Committee concerning Somalia and Eritrea, who was previously governor of pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Sa’dah under the Houthis b etween 2012 and 2014, was appointed as minister of state. Figure 9.1 Members of the government of national salvation appointed in 28 November 2016 __________________ 16 He commanded the group of ballistic missile brigades since at least 2012. He is a well known professional officer - from the Khawlan tribe who has recently been praised several times by Abdulmalik al Houth i (YEi.004) for the ingenuity of the ballistic missile units. 17 - 00300 77 / 242

78 S/2017/81 Figure 9.2 Prime Minister Abulaziz Sale bin Habtour Figure 9.3 Extract from official webpage of the prime ministry الحكومةالحالية /tabid/984/Default.aspx http://www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/gov/ Source: , Translation: 2016 Decree of the supreme political council 56 of ../.. Article (1): the government of the national salvation comprises as follow: 1. Abdulaziz Saleh bin Habtour, prime minister; ../.. 17 - 00300 78 / 242

79 S/2017/81 Table 9.1 List of the acting council of government up to 28 November 2016 (English) Name Cabinet rank Position of responsibility Ser GPC Abdulaziz Saleh bin Habtour head prime minister 1 Hussein Abdullah Maqboli 2 economic affairs deputy prime minister Akram Abdullah A’tia internal affairs 3 deputy prime minister Major General Jalal Ali Al Rowayshan security affairs 4 deputy prime minister GPC 17 Major General Mohamed Nasser al A’tifi defence minister 5 GPC Ali ben Ali Alqissi 6 minister local administration Ahmed Abdullah A’qabat 7 justice minister Saleh Ahmed Sha’ban finance minister 8 Talal Abdelkarim A’qlan 9 minister civil service and insurance GPC Major General Mohamed Abdullah al Qawsi interior 10 minister Alia’a Faissal Abdullatid Asha’bi human rights minister 11 GPC planning and international minister 12 Yasser Ahmed al A’wadi 18 cooperation 19 - Shami Major General Zakaria Yahya Al minister transport 13 20 Ahmed Mohamed Hamed minister social affairs and labour 14 Yahya Badreddine al Houthi 15 information minister GPC 21 Husein Ali Hazeb education 16 minister GPC Mohsen Ali Annaqib minister tertiary education and 17 research Abdurrahman Ahmed al Mokhtar technical education and 18 minister professional training 22 Hassan Mohamed Zaid 19 minister legal affairs Mohamed Mohamed al Zubairi minister of state member of the council of 20 23 ministers GPC Hisham Sharaf Abdullah minister 21 fisheries Nabil Abdullah al Wazir 22 minister foreign affairs Dhiab Mohsen ben Ma’ili 23 minister water and environment Lotf Ali al Jarmouzi oil and mineral resources 24 minister GPC Sharaf Ali al Qallissi minister electricity and energy 25 Abdu Mohamed Bashar minister endowments and religious 26 guidance __________________ 17 Commander, ballistic missile brigades since 2012. 18 Member of GPC negotiation team for the talks. 19 De facto chief of staff armed forces, member of the military and security committee. 20 Member of GPC negotiation team for the talks. 21 Half brother of Abdulmalik Al Houthi (YEi.004) and was living in Germany until mid 2016. 22 Was chargé d'affaires in the same ministry under the SRC. 23 Ibid. 17 - 00300 79 / 242

80 S/2017/81 Cabinet rank Position of responsibility Ser Name GPC Jlidan Mohamed Jlidan minister trade and industry 27 Ghazi Ahmed Mohsen minister communications and 28 technology information Nasser Mafoudh Baqazquz 29 agriculture and irrigation minister Mohamed Salim ben Hafidh 30 minister tourism Ahmed Saleh al Qana’a 31 minister public health and population GPC Abdullah Ahmed al Kebsi 32 minister implementation of the NDC outcomes 33 Ghaleb Abdullah Motlaq minister reconciliation 34 Mohamed Said al Mashjari minister culture 24 Ali Abdullah Abu Haliqa 35 general and roads minister minister of state diaspora Fares Mohamed Hassan Mana’a 36 Nabih Mohsen Abu Nashtan 37 house of representatives and minister of state 25 al shoura affairs 38 Radiah Mohamed Abdullah minister of state 39 Obeid Saleh ben Dobai’a minister of state minister of state 40 Hamed Awadh al Mazjaji GPC Abdulaziz Ahmed al Bakir 41 minister of state 42 Ahmed Abdullah A’qabat minister of state GPC ( Member of GPC) __________________ 24 M inister of state for the implementation of NDC o utcomes under the SRC. 25 since 12 April 2010 by the Security Council Committee (SOi.008) He is under asset freeze and travel ban measures 1907 (2009) pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and ia and Eritrea. concerning Somal 17 - 00300 80 / 242

81 S/2017/81 Annex 10: Houthi negotiation team visits to Baghdad, Iraq and Beijing, China Figure 10.1 Houthi negotiation team (7) Yahya al Abadi, Prime Minister of Iraq, - (6) Haider Al (5) Mohamed Abdusalam Salah Fletah, (Left to Right): - , during visit to Baghdad (28 to 31 August Mashaat, (9) Hamza al Houthi (8) Mahdi Mohammed Hussein al Houthi, 2016). Figure 10.2 Houthi team China visit (20 November 2016) Mashaat during a (Left to Right): Hamza al Houthi, Mohamed Abdusalam Salah Fletah, Mahdi Mohammed Hussein al - visit to Beijing on 30 November 2016. 17 - 00300 81 / 242

82 S/2017/81 Annex 11: Conflict map 00300 - 17 82 242 /

83 S/2017/81 Annex 12: Activity along the border between Oman and Yemen . icial sources within the coalition indications of Omani support to The Panel received from confidential off 1 Saleh alliance designed to sustain their fighting capability. The Panel learned that battle the Houthi - winning - - weapons such as anti re transited through Oman tank guided weapons (ATGW) and other military equipment a before finishing in the hands of smuggling networks associated with Ali Abdullah Saleh in al Mahrah. The weapons are then shipped across the land smuggling route to the Houthis. 2 Eastern Yemen and Ma’rib, the Panel analysed Following a number of arms seizures between . commercially available satellite imagery of the area in order to examine the border crossing point (BCP) between al Mazyunah in Oman and Ashehn in Yemen. On the date when imagery was available (21 September 201 6) the BCP was very active with several hundreds of trucks parked awaiting crossing. . The Panel received information that the Government of Yemen does not fully control this BCP and that it 3 th antry Brigade is responsible for security in that Inf was the main smuggling point in the area. Although the 137 area, its Commander and other senior security officials in the Mahrah Governorate administration are supporters of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003). 4 . The Panel sent a letter to the Government of Oman reques ting a visit to al Mazyunah. Oman subsequently verbally informed the Panel that a visit to al Mazyunah could not be arranged. 17 - 00300 83 / 242

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87 S/2017/81 Annex 13: Maritime attack against the SWIFT - 1 High Speed Vessel (HSV) 1 on 1 October 2016 was investigated by the 1. The attack on the United Arab Emirates’ flagged vessel SWIFT - - shipping missiles in the Strait of Bab al - Panel as a potential threat to the peace and security of Yemen. The use of anti Mandab and the Red Sea has th e potential to affect the security of maritime navigation and commercial shipping and thus jeopardize the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen by sea, in violation of paragraph 19 of resolution 221 6 . Also, any attack on a civilian ship carrying humanitarian assistance is likely to be a violation of international (2015) humanitarian law (IHL). Introduction A. 27 26 IHS Maritime data 2. shows that the SWIFT - 1 stopped transmitting its automatic identification signal (AIS) a few seconds past midnight on the night of 30 September / 1 October 2016. Immediately prior to this the vessel was at a 0 0 0 position 13 ed of 10.4 knots (see figure 13.1). Although the 05’03”N, 43 06’51”E travelling on a course of 335 at a spe vessel was only 10.5 nautical miles from the Yemeni coast, and thus within Yemen’s territorial waters, it was exercising 28 ping lane. The vessel was in transit its ‘right of transit passage’ Mandab international ship - through the Strait of Bab al from Aden, Yemen to Assab, Eritrea at the time of the attack. Figure 13.1 29 1 Last reported AIS position for SWIFT - B. SWIFT - 1 background, operations and IHL 30 original manufacturer, Incat of Australia, by the 3. The SWIFT - 1 was taken on long - term lease hire, from the National Marine Dredging Company of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in July 2015. 4. A statement by the UAE on 5 October 2016 stated that the vessel was unarmed, had no military protection, and was carryi ng humanitarian assistance, wounded Yemenis and passengers. “In more than a year of operating routine journeys to Aden, the civilian ship has carried thousands of tonnes of humanitarian assistance and more than 1,000 wounded people, along with their compan ions, in addition to large equipment for the electricity, water and healthcare __________________ 26 http://maritime.ihs.com/ 27 Identification data. IMO 9283928 / MMSI 470149000. 28 In accordance with Articles 38 and 39 of Part III of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CONLAS). 29 eloped by Panel. Location from www.maritime.ihs.com database. Image dev 30 http://www.incat.com.au/ 17 - 00300 87 / 242

88 S/2017/81 sectors which had significantly eased the suffering of the residents of Aden through the restoration of the infrastructure 31 in these vital sectors”. 5. unable to corroborate this statement by the UAE, and is unconvinced of its veracity The Panel has so far been for the following reasons: 32 shows that the SWIFT - 1 was in Port Rashid, Data on one of the leading maritime traffic databases (a) ed movement, according to the vessel’s UAE on 29 November 2015. Its next record satellite based Automatic Identification System (AIS) was to Abu Dhabi, via Jebel Ali, on 25 May 2016. The first AIS recorded voyage to Aden was on 15 June 2016. Since 15 June 2016 the AIS shows that, with exception of four voyages to Al Mukalla, the vessel made 36 regular and routine direct voyages from Assab, Eritrea to Aden and return. This voyage pattern does not support he Somalia and Eritrea a claim that it had been engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid for “more than a year”. T Committee Monitoring Group (SEMG) recently reported that “regular movement of particular naval vessels, including 33 the SWIFT The 1” was an indicator that the UAE were transporting military personnel from Assab, Eritrea to Aden. - 34 has identified from satellite imagery the presence of a UAE Navy Baynunah Class corvette in Assab Port, Panel 35 unidentified military transport aircraft and helicopters at Assab airport and the development of a military port at Assab 36 airport. Whilst the Panel has established a UAE military presence in Assab, there is no public record of any humanitarian organization based in, or operating from, Assab providing large quantities of bilateral aid to Yemen; previously delivered any UN coordinated (b) The Panel was also informed th at the SWIFT - 1 had not 37 This particular voyage was very unlikely to contain any humanitarian aid to Yemen as the humanitarian aid to Aden. vessel was en route to Assab from Aden. The Panel wrote to the UAE on 4 Octob er 2016 requesting details of the role of the vessel and the nature of the cargo and passengers relevant to humanitarian assistance to Yemen and is awaiting their ; response only persons on board at Interviews with the crew of the vessel and open source media confirm that the (c) 38 the time of attack were the crew, who evacuated from the vessel with minimal injuries; The vessel is not shown as having ever operated as part of the National Marine Dredging Company (d) 39 support fleet on their company website. SWIFT - 1 is classified as a Logistics Naval Vessel on the ‘MarineTraffic’ 40 database, and as a Military Vessel, now “retired from service” on the manufacturer’s website; piercing, aluminum (e) Although the vessel, a wave - - hulled, catamaran was originally designed and built to commercial standards, these included many military enhancements. For example, a helicopter flight deck, helicopter night landing capability, vehicle deck, small boat and unmanned vehicle launch and recovery capability, and a communications suite. The vessel also has four inbuilt gun mounts for 0.50” Heavy Machine Guns, although there is no evidence that any weapons were mounted at the time of the attack. It would be unusual to purchase, or lease, a vessel with these cap abilities, for purely civilian purposes; __________________ 31 S tatement of 5 October 2016. 32 www.maritime.ihs.com. 33 ”, Sky News Arabia, 17 October 2015. Available Paragraphs 31 - 35, S/2016/290 . See “ عدن إلى السودانية القوات وصول www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Cs8eRuQfgw . at 34 Google Earth image dated 3 April 2016. 35 Google Earth image dated 16 August 2016. 36 Ibid. 37 - Two senior well placed UN sources in Yemen. 38 Confidential sources in contact with the crew. 39 http://www.nmdc.com/site/fleet. 40 . http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:442881/mmsi:470149000/vessel:SWIFT 17 - 00300 88 / 242

89 S/2017/81 (f) The vessel is painted Naval Grey, which is an unusual choice of colour for a civilian vessel. The manufacturer could have been painted the vessel in a more appropriate colour prior to delivery to the UAE in July 2015 41 if it was intended that the vessel be for purely civilian use; and 42 (g) The vessel is insured as taking part in naval support operations. principles of 6. A ship that conducts military support operations may be considered as a military objective under 43 At the time of attack and based on the above evidence, the Panel considers that the ship was operating directly to IHL. even with a civilian crew, the Panel finds tha t, support the military efforts of one party of the conflict (the UAE). Thus, 44 1 based on the available evidence, the SWIFT - qualified as a military objective under IHL at the time of the attack. C. Weapon system used for the attack 7. terms of The performance and capability of the weapon system used for the attack is important to know in determining what threat there is to the security of maritime navigation and commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Strait of Bab al - Mandab. This performance and capability depends on the type of weapon system used, hence the Panels’ interest in t he type available to the Houthi - Saleh alliance. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen by sea could be jeopardized unless the above threat is fully 8. evels dependent on the view understood and negated. Similarly the costs of shipping insurance could rise to prohibitive l of the threat taken by the major maritime insurance brokers, such as the London based International Group of Protection 45 and Indemnity clubs going shipping. - that insure approximately 90% of the worlds ocean Ship Missile (ASM) threat - Analysis of the Anti - There have been numerous media reports of the Houthis claim that a C - 802 anti 9. ship missile (ASM) was used s for the attack. The Panel is unable as yet to verify this claim for the missile type, as no available information confirm that the Yemeni Navy ever possessed that particular ASM system. 10. The Panel has identified that the Yemeni Navy had an ASM capability prior to the current conflict. In November 1990 and January 1991 a Member State supplied the Yemeni Navy with two Tar antul (Molnya) Class - surface missile launchers. The requirement to use - to corvettes each armed with four P - 21 ‘Termit’ (Styx - 2) surface ards liquid propellant for the sustain rocket motor in the Styx - 2 missile, the age of the system, and all of the inherent haz and complexities involved in preparing a missile for launch, means that this attack option is assessed by the Panel as being unrealistic. __________________ 41 http://www.incat.com.au/domino/incat/incatweb.nsf/0/76457AADD2C1A987CA2571AF0019EC66?OpenDocument . 42 Confidential source. 43 Saleh alliance, reflects - Customary IHL, which binds all parties to the conflict, including the UAE and the Houthi I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in stating that: “In so far as objects are Article 5 2 (2) of the Additional Protocol concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an litary action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the effective contribution to mi circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”. (Rule 8 of Customary IHL Study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)). 44 tary objectives are legitimate targets under IHL (see Rule 7 of the ICRC study). Given that there was a civilian Mili crew the Houthis were under an obligation to ensure that IHL principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack are adhered t o when carrying out the attack. The Panel does not have sufficient information to assess whether the Houthis conducted this military operation in accordance with IHL. 45 . http://www.igpandi.org 17 - 00300 89 / 242

90 S/2017/81 11. In June 1995, another Member State supplied the Yemeni Navy with three ‘Huangfen’ (Type 021) (Osa I Type) surface missile launchers. Open source four HY 2 (C - 201) surface - - - fast attack craft (missile). Each was armed with to - 8 (C - 801) type missile launchers to the Yemeni information also states that this Member State subsequently supplied YJ 46 Navy on an unknown d ate, possibly in June 2007. 12. It is not known how many of these naval platforms were operational at the commencement of current hostilities - led coalition air strikes i n in March 2015, nor how much they may have been subsequently degraded by Saudi Arabia support of the legitimate Government of Yemen. 13. Although the Panel is still investigating the type of ASM system that could have been used in this attack, it is highly probable that , based on known past procurement patterns, the ASM options most like ly available to Houthi - Saleh forces are shown in table 13.1. Table 13.1 to surface ASM options and operational data - - Surface Range (km) Explosive Speed content Min Max 47 (kg) (m/s) Ser ASM Type Remarks 94.5 1 HY - 2 (C - 201) 320 513+ Initially supplied in June 1995. . 2007 2006/ Reported as being supplied in 165 306 2 YJ - 8 (C - 801) 4.5 42.6 3 - 802 120 306 C 165 Compatible with the C - 801 launch system. 4 C - 802A 180 306 165 5 ‘Noor’ 120 306 150 Compatible with the C - 801 launch system. Member State copies of the C - 802. 165 6 ‘Ghadar’ 200 48 The Panel was informed that the ASM was a ‘Noor’, but has not provided any corroboratory evidence to 14. support their claim. The source also claimed that the ‘Noor’ missile was an Iranian copy of the Chinese C - 802, when in fact it is a copy of the Chinese C - 801 system. The same source also claimed that all the old stocks of Yemeni Navy missiles had been destroyed, but this claim was also made for the land ballistic missile stocks; a claim events subsequently proved was optimistic. This all brings into question the credibility of the source, or their access to detailed technical information. Until the Panel can identify the type of missile and its original source of supply then a potential violation of the arms embargo cannot be ruled out. 15. The largest weapons system seen to d ate during an illicit maritime transfer by “stateless” dhows are anti - tank guided weapons (ATGW), which are significantly smaller than the above ASM types which are approximately 7.4m long. __________________ 46 Member State June 2007 Report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms showed the supply of two missile systems. 47 This does not imply that any of these Member States have acted in violation of the targeted arms embargo on Yemen in regards to this incident. imposed by resolution 2216 (2015) 48 led coalition. - Confidential source from a member State of the Saudi Arabia 17 - 00300 90 / 242

91 S/2017/81 49 16. His technical assessment is that the engineer. The Panel has consulted an independent naval weapons experience and skills necessary to adapt a ship based missile of the types at table 1 into a land deployable system would not be much beyond those necessary to maintain, service and operate it on the vessel. In which case, an ASM could have - Saleh personnel who been taken from a naval vessel, or out of storage, and paired with the firing system by Houthi gained experience with the system during their time in the Yemeni Navy. Houthi (YEi.004) praised the creativity and 17. It should be noted that in a 2 O ctober 2016 speech, Abdulmalik Al - 50 dedication of the missile force command, which was able to hit in the heart of the “invaders”. 18. If the Houthi and Saleh forces have access to ASM then this represents a signi ficant increase in their technological and operational capability. The damage to the vessel seen in the imagery at figures 13.2 to 13.5 are highly indicative of that caused by fire 19. and not by an explosion. The damage to the starboard bow of the vesse l was certainly caused by the impact of a missile, whilst that on the port amidships side of the vessel is highly indicative of the exit of a missile. The angle between the impact and entry point matches the known information relating to the vessels course and the most likely firing point (see figure 13.6 and later 13.7). Figure 13.2 Figure 13.3 Impact point of ASM on Starboard Bow Impact point of ASM on Starboard Bow Figure 13.5 Figure 13.4 Exit point of ASM Port Midships Fire damage to aluminium superstructure on Port Bow __________________ 49 Lieutenant Commander (Retired) Colin Nicklas, BEng (Hons) MSc CEng MIET FCMI, Independent Engineering and ent Consultant. Managem 50 . https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6qFnJsvoskE See 17 - 00300 91 / 242

92 S/2017/81 Figure 13.6 Triangulation of missile impact point, missile exit point, course of vessel and likely firing point area 1. The - SWIFT There is no evidence of any warhead detonation of damage caused by high explosives on the 20. detonation of a typical ASM warhead of 165kg would have been devastating for this type of vessel. The vessel was hit after the missile had travelled approximately 20km; the range of a typical ASM being over 100km. This means that probably only 20% of the propellant of the rocket motor had been expended. On impact with the vessel, and penetration into the hull, the thin case of the rocket motor would have broken up distributing the remaining burning propellant widely throughout the deck level of impact. Such propellant burns fiercely, at a very high temperature, and would have been impossible to extinguish using the ships limited damage control system. It would not have helped that the vessel, being constructed of aluminium, was not designed to m itigate against this sort of thermal event. In effect an uncontrollable fire was initiated which could only be effectively fought with external assistance. 21. ph), The warhead component of the missile could well have been travelling at over 200m/s (445mph/720k (66% of missile maximum velocity), after initial penetration of the hull as the resistance provided by the aluminium hull would not significantly have impeded its progress. It may have been slightly deflected off course, but it is unlikely it collide d with any significant obstacle within the vessel as such a collision would have meant the unexploded warhead remaining within the ship, and there would be no port exit hole. This explains why the incoming missile track arc at figure 13.6 is not centralize d on the likely firing point. Analysis of Houthi released video imagery 51 1 - that they claim shows the ASM missile launch, and the SWIFT 22. The Houthis have released video imagery then burning. The imagery certainly shows a burning vessel at sea being film ed from a moving small boat. The imagery quality is poor, but the Panel assesses that much of this imagery is credible based on: crosshair cursor been - (a) The imagery of the radar screen at the commencement of the video shows the red 0 (figure 13.7). This would equate to the flight vector of a moved over a radar im age at a vector of approximately 230 missile been fired from the area of Al Mukha against a target in the area of the last known position of the SWIFT __________________ 51 Masirah TV. - Al 17 - 00300 92 / 242

93 S/2017/81 (see figure 13.6). This level of detail is unlikely to have been included in the unsophisticated Houthi propaganda videos seen by the Panel to date; Figure 13.7 0 vector Radar showing 220 Red Cursor 0 Approx 230 Vector (b) The flight profile of the missile on launch, and immediately after, shows the initial climb and then reduction range ballistic missiles in altitude for sustained flight. This is an indicator of an ASM. Free flight rockets (FFR) or short - (SRBM) in the Houthi - Saleh forces arsenal do not have this distinctive flight profile. Thus it is unlikely to be stock Houthi footage of previous missile launches; (c) The imagery of the missile launch shows what is almost certainly the launch booster motor been jettisoned and falling away from a missile. All of the ASM options at table 13 .1 use a jettisoned launch booster motor. No other system known to have been in the possession of the Yemeni Armed Forces in March 2015 uses a jettisoned launch booster system; and splay very similar characteristics A later segment shows a row of windows on the burning vessel that di (d) - 1, (figures 13.8 and 13.9). to those of the SWIFT Figure 13.8 Figure 13.9 - 1 windows and claimed Houthi image SWIFT Houthi image showing window of burning vessel 00300 - 17 242 / 93

94 S/2017/81 Probable sequence of events for the ASM attack 23. The probable sequence of events based on the evidence available to date is: (a) Houthi and Saleh forces received advanced warning when the SWIFT - 1 departed Aden. As the Aden - h intelligence could have worked out the Assab transit is a routine voyage for the vessel, for which Houthi and Sale transit time, then an arrival time in the target area could easily have been predicted; (b) The vessel has limited courses that it can take, so an early warning vessel (dhow or rigid inflatable boat) could have be - deployed along the SWIFT - 1’s route; en pre (c) The early warning vessel sent a radio message to the launch platform when the vessel was in the target area; (d) The ASM search radar could easily identify the vessel based on the information from an early - warning system; 0 (e) The ASM launcher was aligned on the correct azimuth (approximately 220 for a land launch), and a data algorithm then fed to the ASM from the launch platform as to the target vessel characteristics and approximate position; (f) The ASM was launched. It climbed to approximately 50m altitude before separation of the booster rocket motor and then descended to a cruise altitude of approximately 20m to 30m above sea level. As it was probably programmed with a pre loaded target algori thm the ASM the terminal guidance seeker head in the ASM automatically searched for the target vessel; (g) Once the terminal guidance seeker head acquired the target, the ASM descended to a height of between 5m to 7m above sea level for the terminal atta ck phase; then (h) The ASM impacted on the target. D. Relevant subsequent events 24. The SWIFT - 1 attack triggered an immediate response from the US 5th Fleet, which deployed the ‘Arleigh Burke’ Class destroyers USS Mason (DDG - 87) and USS Nitze (DDG - 94) and the ‘Austin Class’ amphibious transport dock USS Ponce (AFSB 2015) to the area. These warships are able to monitor threats, protect shipping, and respond to any ASM attacks. As all these warships have an effective anti - ASM capability their deployment s hould improve the commercial maritime community’s confidence in maritime security in the area. 52 in a location relatively close to 87) was targeted by ASM 25. On Sunday 9 October 2016 the USS Mason (DDG - 1 attack just north of the Strait of Bab al - the SWIFT Mandab. The Pentagon spokesperson initially stated that the USS - 53 Mason did not open fire to interdict the two inbound detected missiles and that the missiles crashed into the sea, but 54 The USS Mason again detected an subsequent reports suggest that defensive anti missile systems may have been used. 55 ASM launch on Wednesday 12 October 2016, and a further launch may have taken place on Saturday 18 October 2016. The first two missile launches towards the USS Mason elicited a military response from the US Gov ernment, and three Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from USS Nitze against radar stations on the Yemeni coast near Al Hudaydah, __________________ 52 Widely reported. 53 http:// edition.cnn.com/2016/10/10/politics/yemen - us - navy - targeted/ . 54 defend https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss - mason - fired - 3 - missiles - to - m - fro - yemen - cruise - missiles - attack . 55 http://www.defense.gov/News/News - Releases/News - Release - View/Articl 1) - by - pentagon - press - e/971834/statement - - peter - cook - on - uss - mason ; and 2) http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/971904/uss - m ason - responds secretary off - . coast - threat yemens - to - missile - 17 - 00300 94 / 242

95 S/2017/81 56 Al Khawkah and Al Mukha on Thursday 13 October 2016. The Panel has been unable to determine the post strike damage inflic ted by these attacks. 26. The Panel has requested more specific technical information from the US Government on these ASM attacks 1 attack, and thus the assessment of the threat to commercial and launches as it will help in the analysis of the SWIFT - ng. shippi E. Conclusions 27. The Houthi and Saleh forces have demonstrated they had the technological capability to make a single attack on a large vessel in the area of Al Mukha and the Strait of al - Mandab. That technological capability will only last as long as: The Houthi and Saleh forces still have access to the old Yemeni naval stocks of missiles, supplied prior (a) to the arms embargo. The dual missile attack against the USS Mason suggests they may; and (b) The arms embargo is effective in ensuring the re is no resupply of ASM to the Houthi and Saleh forces. Saleh military alliance has potentially significantly increased the maritime threat to vessels - The Houthi 28. to Yemen. - Mandab, or those delivering humanitarian aid transiting the Red Sea and Strait of Bab al __________________ 56 - in ; and 2) yemen - - 1) http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/972322/strikes - target - radar sites - - sites on - yemens http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/972852/us - responds - to - missile - attacks - targets - 3 - radar - . coast 17 - 00300 95 / 242

96 S/2017/81 Annex 14: Maritime attack against the MV Galicia Spirit (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 242 96 /

97 S/2017/81 Annex 15: The Families, Clans, and Tribe of Bayt al - Ahmar 57 Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) is from the village of Bayt al - Ahmar 1. and the family of Afaash, which is part of 58 the Afaash clan of the Sanhan tribe. The Sanhan tribe is part of the Hashid tribal confederation. e Although Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) is not the ‘Shaykh’ or head of the tribe, he is the most powerful figur 2. within the tribe given the fact that he was Head of State. This allowed him to dispense favours within the tribe and provide jobs, particularly within the military to fellow tribesmen. This both helped the tribe and helped Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003), a s it allowed him to place trusted individuals in positions of power. Table 15.1 - Bayt al Ahmar families, clans and tribe Group Name Remarks Tribal Confederation Hashid Tribe Sanhan Bayt al - Ahmar Village Afaash Families Afaash Saleh family al - Akwa Najar al Qadhi - - Qadhi al al Dhanayn - Jaabr __________________ 57 15°07'35.7"N, 44°21'59.8"E. 58 Ahmar, also from the Sanhan tribe. - When Saleh’s father, Abdullah, died, his mother, Nasiyyah, remarried Salih al 17 - 00300 97 / 242

98 S/2017/81 Annex 16: Sons of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 / 242 98

99 S/2017/81 Annex 17: Nephews of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) - 00300 17 242 / 99

100 S/2017/81 Annex 18: Wives of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 / 242 100

101 S/2017/81 Annex 19: Daughters of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 17 00300 - 242 / 101

102 S/2017/81 Annex 20: Soldiers loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) been killed fighting on the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen during The following soldiers are known to have 59 August 2016. Table 20.1 Deceased soldiers loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) Name Ser Tribe Village Sharif Ahmad Sanhan 1 Muhammad Ahmad ‘Alwan 2 Dhabwa Sanhan 3 Abd al - Wali Muhammad ‘Amār Al Sawad Sanhan 4 Salam al - Araj Abd al Bilad al - Rus Sanhan - Rahman Dalhus - Fuad Abd al Sanhan 5 Haduri - Salih Muhammad al - Bilad al Al Sawad 6 7 Hamir Salih Hazim Sanhan 8 Sanhan Ahmad Muhammad Jabir Dar Salim Sanhan 9 10 Sami Ahmad Najad Al Sawad Sanhan Sanhan Rus 11 - Amran Hassan Sarfah Bilad al __________________ 59 s list does not Due to the difficulties in collecting the names and tribal affiliations of fighters killed in conflict, thi claim to be comprehensive. However, all the soldiers listed here are either members of the republican guards or the uards, both of which were under the control of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003). special g 17 - 00300 102 / 242

103 S/2017/81 Saleh alliance military structure - Annex 21: Houthi Figure 21.1 Saleh alliance military structure - Houthi - 00300 17 103 / 242

104 S/2017/81 Annex 22: Background on the Houthi movement 60 62 61 revivalist group . The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, 1 are a Zaydi that formed in the 1980s as a 63 of response to perceived state - sponsored attempts at cultural and religious eradication. The Zaydi imamate sayyids e than a millennium of rule by local north Yemen was overthrown in 1962, ending mor , descendants of 64 In the aftermath of the 1962 civil war and the successive the Prophet Muhammad, who formed the ruling class. nt that many within the Republican regimes that followed, Zaydi sayyid s were discriminated against to the poi community felt they were on the verge of extinction. These tensions boiled over in 2004 in the first of what would come to be known as the “Houthi Wars,” in which the central Government in Sana’a, headed by Ali 65 Five more rounds of conflict would follow 03), fought the Houthis and their local allies. Abdullah Saleh (YEi.0 66 over the next six years. 2 In the aftermath of the Arab spring and President Saleh’s negotiated resignation in early 2012, the Houthis . in and around the Governorate of Sa’dah, where they were based. In late 2014, moved to consolidate control while President Hadi was juggling multiple challenges to his rule, the Houthis pushed into Sana’a and by January 2015 they had placed President Hadi under house arrest. Two mont hs later, following President Hadi’s - led coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm on 26 escape to Saudi Arabia via Aden, the Saudi Arabia March 2015, with the stated goal of returning President Hadi to power. __________________ 60 , the Partisans of God. Literally 61 Zaydis are a Shi‘ite sect of Islam that is doctrinally distinct from the type of Shi‘ism practiced in countries such as Iraq or Iran, which is often referred to as twelver Shi‘ism. Zaydi Shi‘ism, as it has historically been practiced in Yemen, is often ref erred to as “fiver Shi‘ism.” Some scholars of Yemen also refer to Zaydism as the “fifth school of Sunni Islam,” highlighting the traditional middle ground it has occupied between Sunnis and Twelver Shi‘a. 62 Houthi Zaydi revivalists denote those who adhere to the traditional practice of Zaydism. For example Abdulmalik al - (YEi.004) is a Zaydi by heritage and adheres to traditional teachings of Zaydism. He is a Zaydi revivalist. On the other hand, Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) is a Zaydi by heritage but no t in practice, and therefore is not a revivalist. 63 In Zaydism the imamate is a religious and political office that headed the theocratic state, which ruled northern 1962. Yemen, with varying degrees of success, from 893 - 64 The Houthis are a sayyid family . 65 - The original leader of the Houthi armed group was Husayn Badr al - Din al Houthi, a former member of parliament - from the Hizb al Haqq party and the older half - brother of Abdulmalik al - Houthi (YEi.004). Husayn Badr al - Din al - Houthi was killed in Septembe r 2004. 66 Houthi, the father of both Husayn and Abdulmalik. Badr - Din al The second leader of Houthi movement was Badr al - Houthi was killed in 2010 by an AQAP suicide bomber. - Din al - al 17 - 00300 104 / 242

105 S/2017/81 Annex 23: Houthi family tree (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 242 / 105

106 S/2017/81 67 Annex 24: Houthi prisoners released in Ma’rib (September 2016) Table 24.1 Houthi prisoners released in Ma’rib Name District Governorate Ser 1 Bilal Saleh Ali al - Rabahi al - Rajim al - Mawhit 2 - Asfari Malhan al - Mawhit Ali Hasan Ali Saleh al Muhammad Ali Ali Saleh al - 3 Mitam Ibb Dharasi Hafash 4 Muhammad Ali Fatah Allah al - Mawhit - al Hamati - al Rajim - al - Mawhit 5 Mansur Muhammad Hasan al Muamari Abdullah Ali Shatir Shatir al 6 Madina Amran - 7 Ali Abdullah Salim al - Raymi Raymah Bani al 8 Muhammad Ali Ahmed Sad al - Din - Harith Sana’a 9 Muhammad Saleh Sana’a Bani Hashish - Az al - Din Abdullah Ahmed al 10 Sana’a Bani Balhul Shalali Ta’izz Ta’izz 11 Anwar Ahmed Haydar Dhawran Anis Dhamar Najad Muhsin Abdullah Muqna’a 12 __________________ 67 the different governorates from which these The release took place on 1 September 2016. The Panel believes that fighters came illustrates how the Houthis move militia fighters throughout the territory under their control. 17 - 00300 106 / 242

107 S/2017/81 Annex 25: Houthi appointed military district commanders Table 25.1 Houthi appointed military district commanders militar y district Location Name 1 Sayyun No known Houthi Commander 2 Mukalla No known Houthi Commander 68 Ma’rib Unknown 3 - Yahya al Abdullah (YEi.002) Hakim 4 Aden/Ta‘izz Hudaydah Muhammad Said al - Hariri 5 69 Amran / Unknown 6 Sa’dah Dhamar / 7 Ali Al Arjah Hamid Mujahid Al Khurashi Sana’a __________________ 68 - led coalition strike on the Zayadi, was killed in the Saudi Arabia Previous Houthi commander, Mubarak al - Mishn al - Funeral Hall in Sana’a on 8 October 2016. 69 - Hawari, was killed in the Saudi Arabia - Previous Houthi commander, Muhammad al led coalition strike on the Funeral Hall in Sana’a on 8 October 2016 17 - 00300 107 / 242

108 S/2017/81 70 Annex 26: Houthi appointees in Dhamar Table 26.1 Houthi appointees Dhamar Position Name Ser Village 1 Muhammad Muhsin Muhammad Jalan assistant director for security Abdu Saleh Muhammad Amar assistant director of security, police affairs 2 Ibrahim Ali Ahmed al - Kibsi 3 director, administration affairs - Aziz Muhammad Ali Khayran deputy director, criminal Investigations 4 Abd al Muhammad Husayn al Gharabani deputy director, prison administration 5 - Muhammad Ali Muhammad Abbas director, financial affairs 6 Ahmed Qasim Ali al 7 Sharfi deputy, administration of officer affairs - 8 Ismail Husayn al - Marwani deputy director, civil defence 9 deputy director, traffic Husayn Ismail Rawayah Ahmed Muhammad Najum al Din deputy director, local affairs 10 - Muhammad Muhammad Abd al - Wahhab 11 deputy director, information and planning - al Daylami director, public relations 12 Adil Ali Yahya Mutahir Nayyib Husayn Abdullah Ali al - Sharfi 13 director, industrial works 14 Ahmed Saleh al - Shaubi director, department of investigations - Muayyad Abd al 15 deputy director, communications Taus - Salam al 16 - Washali deputy director, leadership and command Abdullah Muhammad Ali al Muhammad Yahya Muhammad al - Murtadhi deputy director, support and insurance 17 18 - Wahhab Abbas Muhammad al - Abd al deputy director, training and qualifications Mushki 19 Mutahir Abdullah Muhammad al - Nahari deputy director, police Jabal Sharq 20 Jihad Mutahir al - Marwani deputy director, police Jahran 21 Nasir Nasir Ali al - Bukhayti deputy director, police Dhawran - al Manar 22 Ali Ali Husayn Mayis deputy director, police 23 Saleh Ahmed Husayn al - Khalqi deputy director, police Atimah 24 Naji Muhammad Ali Saleh al - Khalali deputy director, police al - Huda Wahhab al Daylami 25 Yahya Abd al - Miqa‘ah - - deputy director, police al - deputy director, Abd al - Aziz Ismail al 26 Amdi police Anis deputy director, police Greater 27 Muhammad Abdullah Sharf Abu Talib Wasab __________________ 70 overnorate, Dhamar, to illustrate how the Houthis take advantage of the This table uses the Houthi appointees in one g existing bureaucratic structure, grafting a loyalist director or deputy director on to what is already in place. www.almasdaronline.com/article/82943 http:// . 17 - 00300 108 / 242

109 S/2017/81 71 Annex 27: Prominent AQAP figures Table 27.1 Prominent AQAP figures Name Remarks Ser Role Qasim Yahya al - Raymi 1 (QDi.282)/ Leader Yemeni Ibrahim Asiri Chief 2 Saudi Engineer/Bombmaker (IED) Muhammad Abd al - Karim al - Ghazali 3 Yemeni Financial Head 4 Khaled Umar Batarfi Battle commander Yemeni Jawf Marwani Head of AQAP, al - - Yemeni 5 Khamis Arfaj al Muhammad Umar Military Commander, al 6 Yemeni - Jawf Sayf (Abu Salim al - 7 Wa’il Head of AQAP, Aden Yemeni Adani) Yemeni Head of AQAP, Lahj Lahji - Abu Yusif al 8 9 Ghalib al - Zayadi AQAP leader, Ma’rib Yemeni 10 Salim al - Najdi Media figure Saudi 11 Muhammad Abdullah Husayn Judge on Shariah Council Daramah 12 Ibrahim al - Quso Propagandist Former Guantanamo Detainee / Sudanese al Battle commander 13 Walidi - Khadr Abdullah al - AQAP leader, Lahj Khalid al - Daba 14 May be under 72 arrest 15 Muntasir Badi Financial figure in Abyan __________________ 71 This table has been compiled from a variety of sources, including confidential sources, interviews with individuals inside and outside of Yemen, open sources, news reports, and AQAP documents. 72 eived one report, which it has been unable to verify, that security forces loyal to President Hadi may The Panel has rec - have arrested Khalid al Daba. 17 - 00300 109 / 242

110 S/2017/81 Annex 28: Summary of reported PBIED and SVIED attacks (2016) Table 28.1 Summary of reported PBIED and SVIED attacks (2016) Military Civilians Military Device Civilian Claimed Date Location Ser Remarks Target 73 Injured Fatalities Injured by Type Fatalities Aden SVIED 1 SVIED AQAP 0 5 Jan 2016 8 0 4 General Shallal Shayae, Aden Police Chief 28 Jan 2016 Aden SVIED ISIL 2 2 5 ISIL Presidential Perpetrator named as Residence ‘Abu Hanifa Al - . Hollandi’ 74 Aden SVIED Police CP 7 7 ISIL 3 29 Jan 2016 Perpetrator named as ‘Oweis al Adani’. Aden 60 4 ISIL 14 SVIED Ras Abbas 17 Feb Perpetrator 2016 named as Military Camp ‘Abu Isa - Al Ansari’. ISIL Aden SVIED 0 5 0 4 0 Government 29 Feb forces in 2016 Sheikh Othman District 0 2 Mar 2016 ISIL 0 0 6 Aden SVIED 0 Brigadier Residence attacked. General Adel Al Halemi, - Aden Security Chief ISIL Aden SVIED 7 CP in Shaab 25 Mar District 2016 NK SVIED ISIL NK 8 Aden CP in Shaab 25 Mar 10 17 2016 District 9 SVIED Aden ISIL CP in 25 Mar Device in 2016 Mansura an District ambulance 2 4 7 ISIL 10 Aden PBIED 0 Government 12 Apr At bus forces in 2016 stop Sheikh Othman District SVIED Aden SVIED ISIL 11 0 0 0 0 15 Apr Foreign Ministry 2016 0 0 2 SVIED 12 4 Aden SVIED 17 Apr CP near airport 2016 __________________ 73 Excluding the ‘suicide’ bomber. 74 . Check Point 17 - 00300 / 110 242

111 S/2017/81 Device Civilian Military Civilians Military Claimed Location Date Target Remarks Ser 73 Injured Type Injured by Fatalities Fatalities Zinjibar SVIED 13 0 7 14 0 Military 24 Apr 2016 convoy SVIED Aden SVIED 0 0 14 0 2 General 28 Apr 2016 Shallal Shayae, Aden Police Chief 16 AQAP 0 5 SVIED 2 6 11 May Al - Major 2016 Qatan General - Abdul Rahman Al - Halili, Commander, st Military 1 District 17 SVIED Mukalla ISIL Gate of 12 May Perpetrator Naval Base 2016 named as ‘Hamza Al - Muhajir’. ISIL SVIED Mukalla 18 12 May Inside Naval 2016 Base 16 0 8 0 ISIL Mukalla 19 SVIED Major 12 May HQ attacked. General Faraj 2016 Salmeen, Commander, nd 2 Military District PBIED 60 ISIL 41 20 Mukalla 15 May Police Perpetrator 2016 Recruitment named as Centre, - ‘Abu Al - Fuwah Bara Al District Ansari’. 1 0 ISIL 6 21 0 Mukalla PBIED Major 15 May 2016 General - Mubarak Al Oubthani, Hadramawt Security Chief 22 Mukalla PBIED ISIL 0 0 0 0 16 May Police Recruitment 2016 Centre, Fuwah District 23 ISIL Aden SVIED 0 60 20 0 Perpetrator Military 23 May named as recruitment 2016 centre queue, ‘Abu Ali Al - Adeni’. Khor Maksar District ISIL 0 0 NK 24 25 Aden PBIED 23 May Commanders residence, 2016 queue of recruits 00300 - 17 111 242 /

112 S/2017/81 Device Civilian Claimed Military Military Civilians Target Location Remarks Date Ser 73 Injured Injured by Fatalities Type Fatalities ISIL Mukalla PBIED 25 0 0 38 24 Intelligence 27 June 2016 Base Aden SVIED 26 14 6 Jul 2016 10 0 0 AQAP Solaban Military Base AQAP 0 0 27 18 Jul 2016 Mukalla SVIED Military CP 0 0 20 Jul 2016 Aden IED Aden 28 0 6 0 AQAP 4 0 6 12 29 2 Aug 2016 Aden SVIED Military base 0 30 2 Aug 2016 Aden SVIED 7 Aug 2016 31 Lahj SVIED 0 0 10 18 Military patrol 0 4 4 AQAP 32 SVIED 0 Near 18 Aug Military Lawder, 2016 patrol Abyan 33 ISIL Aden SVIED Military base 0 72 0 80 29 Aug 2016 10 0 0 34 0 Aden SVIED 11 Sep 2016 14 0 0 35 0 Abyan SVIED 11 Sep Military position 2016 4 0 2 36 1 Oct 2016 Aden PBIED Civilians 0 AQAP Police patrol 37 IED Lawder, 27 Oct Abyan 2016 0 Aden SVIED Central Bank 38 0 0 5 29 Oct 2016 1 2 39 Governor SVIED Shabwah Nov 16 2016 ISIL 29 40 48 Aden PBIED Military base 10 Dec 2016 ISIL 50 40 41 Aden PBIED Military base 18 Dec 2016 - 00300 17 242 / 112

113 S/2017/81 75 Annex 29: US air and drone strikes in Yemen (2016) Table 29.1 Summary of US air and drone strikes in Yemen (2016) Casualties Remarks Ser Date Injured Location Fatal Shabwah 3 Feb 2016 1 6 29 Feb 2016 2 3 Hadramawt 3 22 Mar 2016 Hadramawt 56 AQAP training camp Shabwah 4 2 30 Mar 2016 5 23 Apr 2016 Ma’rib 2 6 25 Apr 2016 Shabwah 2 7 Abyan 2 25 Apr 2016 4 Shabwah 8 1 28 Apr 2016 19 May 2016 Shabwah 4 9 10 8 Jun 2016 Bayda’ 2 11 10 Jun 2016 Ma’rib 2 12 12 Jun 2016 Shabwah 2 1 13 1 Jul 2016 Shabwah 2 Shabwah 4 Jul 2016 2 14 15 (Central Yemen) 1 8 Jul 2016 16 Jul 2016 (Central Yemen) 6 1 16 4 Aug 2016 Shabwah 3 17 18 24 Aug 2016 Shabwah 4 19 30 Aug 2016 Shabwah 3 4 Sep 2016 Shabwah 6 1 20 21 20 Sep 2016 Ma’rib 2 22 22 Sep 2016 Bayda’ 2 1 Bayda’ 29 Sep 2016 1 23 24 6 Oct 2016 Shabwah 2 25 18 Oct 2016 Shabwah 6 26 21 Oct 2016 Ma’rib 5 27 20 Nov 2016 Bayda’ 1 Bayda’ 28 24 Nov 2016 2 29 30 Nov 2016 Hadramawt 3 30 13 Dec 2016 Ma’rib 3 __________________ 75 Information compiled from US Central Command. 17 - 00300 113 / 242

114 S/2017/81 76 Annex 30: Prominent ISIL figures Figure 30.1 Prominent ISIL figures Se r Role Name Remarks 1 Muhammad Said Umar Bawazir An ISIL leader (Abu Maali al - Qirshi) 77 2 Nasir al - Ghaydani Saudi Arabian An ISIL leader - (Abu Bilal al Harbi) 78 Yemeni 3 Khaled Abdullah al - Marfadi Military commander 79 - 4 (Abu Abd al - Rahman al Muhajir) Shariah official 80 (Abu Saleh) 5 Military commander 81 Yemeni - Marfadi Financial official Khaled Umar al 6 __________________ 76 This table has been compiled from a variety of sources, including confidential sources, interviews with individuals inside and outside of Yemen, open sources, and news reports. Names in parentheticals indicate a nom de guerre or kunya . 77 - In the mid Harbi had been killed in Hadramawt when a term update the Panel reported that AQAP claimed that al - hand grenade in a safe house detonated. The Panel has not been able to confirm this information. 78 al - Marfadi is from Yafa‘a. 79 al - Muhajir re portedly also uses the kunya : Abu Muhammad al - Kanani. 80 kunya : Abu Husayn. Abu Saleh reportedly also uses the 81 Also from Yafa‘a. 17 - 00300 114 / 242

115 S/2017/81 Annex 31: Government appointed Military District commanders Table 31.1 Government appointed Military District commanders. Military Area District Name 1 Sayyun Saleh Muhammad Tamis 2 Mukalla Faraj Salamin al - Bahasani 82 Adil Hashim al Ma’rib 3 - Qaymiri 4 Aden/Ta‘izz Fadhil Hasan al - Amri - Tawfiq Muhammad Abdullah al Hudaydah 5 Qayz Amran / Sa’dah Amin al - Wa‘ili 6 7 Dhamar / Sana’a Ismail Hasan Zahjuh __________________ 82 Major General Adil Hashim Al Qaymiri was appointed by Vice President and Head of the Government’s Armed - rd hsin al - Ahmar, in October 2016 following the death of the previous Commander of the 3 Military Forces, Ali Mu - District, Major General Abd al Rabb al - Shadadi, on 7 October 2016. Major General Adil Hashim al - Qaymiri is from Ta’izz. In 2011, when he was commander of the 1 25th Mechanised Brigade, he broke with then President Ali Abdullah th Saleh (YEi.003) to support the protesters. In 2012, President Hadi appointed him as commander of the 125 der in al Qaymiri was named Axis Comman - Jawf. In 2015, - Mechanized Infantry Brigade in al - Jawf, and later al th President Hadi named him commander of the 5 Military District (Hudaydah). 17 - 00300 115 / 242

116 S/2017/81 Annex 32: Timeline of key security events concerning Yemen (2016) Table 32.1 Timeline of key security events concerning Yemen (2016) Event Location Date (2016) Ser Cessation of Hostilities Agreement Yemen 10 April 1 2 Kuwait 20 April Peace talks begin 3 AQAP withdrawal from Mukalla Mukalla 25 April 4 Car bomb targeting Aden Governor, Aydrus al - Zubaydi Aden 15 July - 5 Houthi Saleh Political Council announced Sana’a 28 July 6 Border with Najran 31 July First soldier loyal to Saleh killed on border with Saudi Arabia Peace talks end Kuwait 15 August 7 - Houthi Saleh Supreme Political Council formed Sana’a 8 15 August st Houthi - Saleh Supreme Political Council issue 1 9 Decree Sana’a 15 August 10 Saudi - Arabia led coalition hits Abs hospital Hajjah 15 August 11 19 August Saudi Arabia USA announces reduction of staff in Joint Planning Cell 12 Aden 29 August ISIL suicide bombing, killing 54 Further reports of forced displacement of Northerners Aden 13 27 September 14 Houthis attack UAE SWIFT vessel Red Sea Coast 1 October rd Abd al - Rab al - Shadadi, Government 3 15 Military District 7 October Ma’rib Commander killed 16 Saudi Arabia - 8 October Sana’a led coalition strike on funeral hall, killing 200+ Red Sea Coast missiles towards two US Naval 17 9 October Houthis fire anti shipping ships 18 - shipping missiles Red Sea Coast 12 October Houthis ‘target’ USS Mason with anti US naval ship fires three Tomahawk cruise missiles at 19 Red Sea Coast 13 October Houthi radar installations 20 Mansur Mujahid Nimraan, Houthi Axis Commander in Hudaydah 14 October Hudaydah killed 21 72 - hours Cessation of Hostilities begins Yemen 19 October 22 Cessation of Hostilities ends Yemen 23 October - Houthi Sana’a 28 November 23 Saleh Supreme Political Council announces - person government formation of 42 17 - 00300 116 / 242

117 S/2017/81 Annex 33: Active ‘battle fronts’ in Yemen (2016) Ta’izz ‘front’ A. 1. Ta'izz continues to witness heavy fighting between military units loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) and militias under the command of Houthi fighters, who are arrayed against local resistance forces, which have included 83 in addition to troops loyal to President Hadi. Both sides have engaged in the Salafi fighters as well as AQAP members, targeted destruction of homes, kidnappi ngs, as well as indiscriminate shelling, which has claimed the lives of civilians. The humanitarian situation remains extremely dire. nd th Infantry Brigade, 22 The Panel has documented the following brigades taking part in the fighting: 17 2. rd th th Armoured Brigade, 35 Armoured Briga Armoured Brigade and 170 de from the Republican Guards, 33 Air Defence Brigade. Below is a brief sketch of the prominent figures in the conflict, which the Panel has identified, on the four sides: 84 men, and local “resistance”. Houthis, Saleh, Government of Ye Table 33.1 Prominent Houthi figures on the Ta’izz front Se r Position Remarks Name 1 Abdullah Yahya al - Hakim (Abu Ali) Houthi commander, (YEi.002) th military district 4 Houthi Janadi - Abdu Ali al 2 Appointed 28 November 2015 appointed - Ta’izz governor of Hakim al Abd al - Brother of #4 - Junaid Houthi commander 3 4 Mahmoud al - Junaid Houthi commander, Brother of #3 al - Sarari area, near Mount Sabr Facilitated Houthi entry Houthi commander, Akram al into Junaid 5 - Ta’izz Eastern Ta’izz - Houthi appointed director Hashidi 6 Hamud al of intelligence __________________ 83 - The Panel is aware of reports indicating that two high level ISIL commanders were killed in the fighting in Ta’izz, y verify these reports. but has been unable to independentl 84 The Panel has chosen to put “resistance” in quotes, because it realizes that not all locals in Ta’izz have sided with the “resistance.” Indeed, many have sided with the Houthis. 17 - 00300 117 / 242

118 S/2017/81 Table 33.2 Prominent figures loyal to Saleh on the Ta’izz front Position Ser Remarks Name 85 - Dhaban 1 Axis commander, Ta’izz From Saleh’s Sanhan tribe Abdullah Hizam Naji al Hamud Hasan al - Harithi Brigadier General, 2 commander of central security forces, Ta’izz Hamud al Dahmashi commander, - 3 nd armoured brigade, 22 republican guard Ali Numan Muhammad al - Saghir Lieutenant Colonel, specialist under 4 Artillery rd command of al - Dhaban armoured brigade 33 5 Lieutenant Colonel, Amar Daghish Dhaban - Under command of al rd 33 armoured brigade Ahmed al - Araj Lieutenant Colonel, Specialist in Katusha FFR, 6 rd under command of al - Dhaban armoured brigade 33 7 Mansur Mujayayr Commander of Khaled th armoured Camp for 35 brigade 8 - Muta’a republican guard Zakariya al commander - Muhammad Abd al Kidnapped on 9 November Tribal Shaykh Qahtan - Wasa al 9 2016 reportedly by forces operating under the command of Yusif al - Shiraji Table 33.3 Prominent Government of Yemen figures on the Ta’izz front Name Position Remarks Ser Fadhil Hasan al - Amri Government Commander, 1 th Military District 4 2 Khalid al - Fadhil Axis Commander, Ta’izz 86 Yusif Ali al - Shiraji Government Commander 3 Government Commander, 4 Adnan Muhammad Muhammad al - 87 th 35 Hamadi Armoured Brigade __________________ rd 85 armoured b Staff Brigadier General Abdulla h Hizam Naji a l - Dhaban is also c ommander, 33 rigade, and has a history rd in Ta’izz. In 2011, Ali Abdullah S aleh (YEi.003) named al - Dhaban c ommander, 33 armoured b rigade (he was th previously Commander, 107 otests against Saleh’s rule. As a Mechanised Brigade), where he reacted violently to pr rd Armoured Brigade was transferred to Baydha’. However, on 6 June 2015 result, under President Hadi, the 33 President Hadi fired al - Dhaban. 86 The Panel is uncertain if al - Shiraji remains in Ta’izz. He was in the city a s late as mid - November, but has since been named an ‘adviser’ to the Ministry of Defence and is no longer Axis Commander in Ta’izz, a position he took up on 15 January 2016. th 87 al - Hamadi does not have control over the entire brigade as it is split between forces loyal to President Hadi (35 th Armoured Brigade) and forces loyal to the Houthis armoured brigade). Saleh alliance (35 - 17 - 00300 118 / 242

119 S/2017/81 Ser Position Remarks Name Sadiq al Government Commander, Sarhan 5 - President Hadi appointed. nd Armoured Brigade, 22 88 Republican Guard 6 - Rahman al - Shamsani Commander, President Hadi appointed. Abd al 89 th 17 Infantry Brigade 7 - Walid Sarhan Official in the Political Abd al Security Organization 8 Nabil al - Maqrami Colonel, th 35 Armoured Brigade Table 33.4 90 Prominent “Popular Resistance” figures on the Ta’izz front Ser Name Position Remarks 1 Adil Abdu Farea (Abu al - Most powerful Resistance Salafi commander 91 Abbas) figure. 2 Hamud Said al - Mikhlafi Former Brigadier General in the Has lost funding and power in 2016 Political Security Organization (PSO) Deputy Director of Police, - 3 Head of Resistance Consultative Muhammad Ibrahim al Council, Mount Sabir appointed 1 September 2016 Mikhlafi Adimi - Nail al 4 Resistance leader Mikhlafi Abd al - Qawi al - Resistance leader, associated with 5 Islah 6 Abdu Hamud al - Saghir Resistance leader, western Ta’izz 92 - 7 Nabil al Wasili Salafi commander 93 Abu al - Suduq Salafi commander 8 __________________ 88 nd The majority of 22 armoured brigade is loyal to Saleh. h t 89 Infantry Brigade) and those loyal to the Houthis and The brigade is split between those loyal to President Hadi (17 th Saleh (17 infantry brigade) . 90 - Saleh military alliance in Ta’izz. The The Panel uses “resistance” to designate forces aligned against the Houthi “resistance” is a loose coalition of militias boun d together only by a common enemy. In 2016, Salafis, particularly - Abbas, have become the most powerful individual component to this rather nebulous constellation those under Abu al of groups. 91 Abu Abbas is the most powerful resistance fighter in Ta’izz. The Panel has documented trips he has taken to Aden in the south, as well as reports of visits to foreign countries. Abu Abbas was born in Ta’izz in 1971. He studied at Dar al - Hadith in Sa’dah before returning to Ta’izz to take part in the fight against H outhi and Saleh forces there. He is a person of interest for the Panel. For more on his background see a two - part interview he gave to al - Medina al - An, which was published in late October 2016. The Panel believes http://www.alwahdawi.net/news_details.php?sid=16867 that it is Abu al - Abbas’ forces that have welcomed AQAP fighters into the conflict in Ta’izz. 92 Studied at Dar al - Had ith in Sa’dah. 93 Hadith in Sa’dah. However, Abu al Suduq’s - - Suduq studied at Dar al Like Abu al - Abbas and Nabil al - Wasili, Abu al - - fighters have clashed with Abu al Abbas’ men. 17 - 00300 119 / 242

120 S/2017/81 Sirwah, Ma’rib B. Fighting is also ongoing in Ma’rib, largely between Houthi forces on one side and so - called “popular resistance” forces th 94 on the other, including members of the 14 The fighting has Armoured Brigade. and troops loyal to President Hadi ebbed and flowed throughout the period covered by this report, and on 1 September 2016, the Houthis and the resistance 95 The Houthi prisoners released came from several different agreed to a prisoner exchange of 12 prisoners each. governorates within Yemen, which illustrates how the group is moving fighters around the country. On 7 October 2016, rd - Rabb al - Shadadi, the military commander for the 3 Major General Abd al Military Dis trict loyal to President Hadi, was 97 96 Ahmar has also Qaymiri. - - killed. Vice President Ali Muhsin al He was replaced by Major General Adil Hashim al spent a significant amount of time in Ma’rib throughout the second half of 2016. C. Saudi border Elements of the Republican Guards loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) began fighting on the Saudi border with Jizan and Najran (Saudi Arabia) in late July and early August 2016. Fighting continues in this area, and Houthi - Saleh forces have also launched ballistic mi ssiles into these regions (see annex 42). Nihm, Sana’a D. Throughout the period covered by this report, fighting has been ongoing in the Nihm region, just east of Sana’a. Militias nd Houthi (YEi.004) and troops loyal to Ali Abdullah S aleh (YEi.003), including the 62 - loyal to Abdulmalik al 98 are allied against militias loyal to President Hadi as well as mechanised infantry brigade from the republican guards, - against regular troops. Much of the fighting has centred on the taking and re taking of mountains and other strategic points in the region. Additionally, the Saudi Arabia - led coalition continues to strike targets inside the city of Sana’a. Other areas E 99 The Panel has also noted fighting in Hajjah, particularly in Midi, continued clashes in Jawf, and per iodic raids and led coalition continues to strike targets throughout areas held by the Houthis. reprisals in Bayda’a. The Saudi Arabia - 100 Abyan, Aden and Hadramawt continue to suffer under AQAP and ISIL attacks. __________________ th 94 rmoured Brigade, which used to be part of the Republican ommander of the 14 A On 8 September 2016, the C - Daari, was wounded in the fighting. See: Guards, Staff Brigadier General Muhsin al - news/490041.html Most of the 14th Armoured Brigade has sided with President http://www.yemenakhbar.com/yemen Hadi. 95 See annex 24 for a list of the Houthi prisoners exchanged. The panel was unable to confirm the identities of the resistance fighters released. 96 - At al - Shadadi’s funeral, held on 14 Octo ber 2016, six days after the Saudi - led coalition attack on Ali al Rowayshan’s funeral in Sana’a, two bombs went off, killing al - Shadadi’s older brother, Salim Qasim al - Shadadi, and Lieutenant Muhammad Nasir Murshid Shurif, the Guard Commander for the gover norate of Sana’a. See: http://www.alkhaleej.ae/alkhaleej/page/d50574bd - be7e - 4b1c - b5cf - c49b5d9b2ec4 . 97 - Qaymiri’s previous position had been as 31. al ’s Military Commanders see annex For the Government of Yemen Inspector General for Yemen’s Armed Forces. 98 nd uards under the command of Major Murad al The 62 mechanised infantry brigade from the republican g - Awbali, which is based in Amran, participated in the fightin g in Nihm. Al - Awbali is now commander of the Republican Guards, replacing Brigadier General Ali bin Ali al - Ja’ifi, who died on 10 October 2016, from wounds sustained two days earlier in t he Saudi Arabia - led coalition attack on a community hall in Sana’a. 99 - The Panel has received information that Abd al - Khaliq al Houthi (YEi.001) is leading Houthi forces in this area and that they are figh ting alongside elements of the republican g uard. Another prominent Houthi figure, Yusif al - Madani, who is married to th - Houthi (deceased 2004) is reportedly active on this front as well. e daughter of Husayn al 100 For a list of major security events in 2016 see annex 32. 17 - 00300 120 / 242

121 S/2017/81 Annex 34: Battlefield captured weapons in Houthi or AQAP use (2016) 1. The Panel has identified a number of weapons that were in the possession of individual fighters affiliated with either the Houthis or AQAP. The weapons had been either captured after c ombat between Saudi Arabia - led coalition and - the Houthis or AQAP, or after misdirected air resupply drops by the Saudi Arabia led coalition. In the longer term the needed does not match the majority of these weapons will be of little use to Houthi or Saleh forces as the ammunition proliferation of weapons captured from the Yemeni national stockpile and now in the possession of Houthi and Saleh forces. Table 34.1 Summary of tracing requests for weapons identified in possession of Houthi fighters Manufacturer 101 State Notes / result of tracing request Weapon Typ User State e Glock 19 Gen 4 9 x 19mm self USA Manufacturer confirmed supply loading pistol to Yemen. armour Instanza, C Spain - - 90 - CR - RB anti Saudi Arabia Manufacturer confirmed supply rocket launchers to Saudi Arabia. No response from 102 Saudi Arabia to Panel enquiry. USA 66mm Light Anti Tank Weapon No tracing request sent as: 1) Saudi Arabia (LAW) Saudi Arabia known to be a user of this weapon type; and 2) over d. ten years ol - 3 SWS 12.7mm sniper rifle Canada LRT Saudi Arabia Manufacturer confirmed supply to Saudi Arabia. No response from Saudi Arabia to Panel enquiry. SSTI Kinetics, AR 80 5.56mm Singapore The weapon with this serial Assault Rifle supplied to number was initially Yugoslavia in December 1990, but this is not that weapon, it is a 103 copy. Steyr AUG 5.56mm Assault Rifle Saudi Arabia No tracing request sent as: 1) Austria Saudi Arabia known to be a user; and 2) no serial number visible. __________________ 101 ation of the The Panel is not implying that for this enquiry that any of these Member States have acted in viol targeted arms embargo on Yemen imposed by resolution 2216 (2015). The Panel’s tracing requests were aimed at better understanding how weapons are being smuggled into Yemen for the benefit of individuals listed by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) or by other individuals subject to the targeted arms embargo. 102 Panel requests to the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia dated 17 June, 8 July and 24 August 2016. 103 re dated 17 October 2016. Letter from Permanent Mission of Singapo 17 - 00300 121 / 242

122 S/2017/81 Table 34.2 Summary of tracing requests for weapons identified in possession of AQAP fighters Manufacturer 104 State Weapon Type User State Result of tracing request 105 No response to Panel enquiry. Jordan Rocket 32 - RPG Jordan Nashshab Launcher Figure 34.2 Figure 34.1 106 - 90 - Instanza C CR RB rocket launcher - AR80 5.56mm assault rifle (copy) Figure 34.3 Figure 34.4 Glock 19 Gen 4 9 x 19mm Pistol - 3 SWS 12.7mm anti - material rifle LRT __________________ 104 The Panel is not implying that for this enquiry that any of these Member States have acted in violation of the targeted arms embargo on Yemen imposed by resolution 2216 (2015). 105 Panel requests to Permanent Mission of 11 Ap ril and 8 July 2016. 106 The manufacturer, Instanlaza S.A confirmed that they had supplied this ammunition to a member State of the Saudi Arabia - led led coalition. The possession by the Houthi is as a result of a misdirected airdrop by the Saudi Arabia - coalition. - 00300 17 242 / 122

123 S/2017/81 Figure 34.6 Figure 34.5 108 107 32 ‘Nashshab’ - RPG Steyr AUG Assault Rifle Figure 34.7 66mm LAW __________________ 107 Confidential source. 108 Hoplite Report. 32 rocket launcher in Yemen. Armament Research Services (ARES). Ansar - al - Sharia with RPG - 30 . http://armamentresearch.com/tag/hashim/ March 2016. 17 - 00300 123 / 242

124 S/2017/81 Annex 35: Images of maritime seizures 109 A. FV Nasir (25 Sep 2015) Figure 35.1 Figure 35.2 9M113 Konkurs ATGW 9M113 Konkurs ATGW 110 FV Samer (27 Feb 2016) B. Figure 35.4 Figure 35.3 variant Assault Rifle Type 56 SA93 Assault Rifle Figure 35.6 Figure 35.5 RPG 7 variant AIM Assault Rifle __________________ 109 nt of Australia. Imagery from Governme 110 Ibid. 17 - 00300 124 / 242

125 S/2017/81 Figure 35.8 Figure 35.7 AKM Assault Rifle PKM Machine Gun 111 Unnamed dhow (20 Mar 2016) C. Figure 35.10 Figure 35.11 AKM variant Assault Rifle Sniper Rifle Dragunov variant Figure 35.12 9M133 Kornet or Dehlayvah variant ATGW D. FV Adris (28 Mar 2016) No images as yet supplied by the US Government. __________________ 111 Images from confidential sources. 17 - 00300 125 / 242

126 S/2017/81 Annex 36: Land route smuggling seizures Weapon types in Houthi possession A. 112 Weapons that were known to be not part of the Yemen national stockpile, or on issue to the Yemen Armed Forces at the onset of conflict, have been identified as being used by the Houthis. The Panel considers that those weapons summarised in Table 36.1 originated in Iran, bu t as yet has no details of the supply chain used. (See annex 38 for further details). Table 36.1 Summary of Iranian origin weapons types Original Supplier to 113 Iran Weapon Type Result of tracing request 114 115 Type 73 General Purpose Machine Gun No response to Panel enquiry. DPRK 116 117 50 anti - material rifle (AMR) AM Iran manufacture No response to Panel enquiry. - B. Seizure of smuggled weapons in transit to Houthi - Saleh alliance controlled areas The Panel has identified a range of weapons (table 36.2) seized, mostly on Omani registered vehicles that on traffic routes leading to Houthi - Saleh alliance controlled territory. The Panel considers that the weapons were destined for Houthi or Saleh forces, as there would be no other credible end user in their r espective territory. Table 36.2 Summary of seizures of smuggled weapons in transit to Houthi - Saleh alliance controlled areas Location Seizure Vehicle registration Date 590/11 Yemeni plate 36 vehicle radios  Thamoud, Hadramawt 19 Jul 2015  360 personal radios 118 Sep 2016 Safgir, Ma’rib RPG 27 variant  Ma’rib 18 Sep 2016 Ammunition type not known Omani licence plates  28 Sep 2016 Ma’rib  ATGW and 122mm FFR Omani licence plates 8 Oct 2016 Lahj  Ammunition type not known 18 Oct 2016 Shehn, Ma’rib ATGW  24+ x __________________ 112 Sources: 1) Janes’ Weapons; 2) Janes’ Military: 3) UN Conventional Arms Register; 4) SIPRI Annual Military Expenditure reports. 113 The Panel is not implying that for this enquiry any of these Member States have acted in violation of the targeted arms embargo on Yemen imposed by resolution 2216 (2015). The Panel’s tracing requests were aimed at better understanding how weapons are bei listed by the Security Council ng smuggled into Yemen for the benefit of individuals Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) or by other individuals subject to the targeted arms embargo. 114 Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. 115 Panel requests to Permanent Mission of DPRK of 23 May and 8 July 2016. 116 This weapon is an unlicensed copy of the Austrian Steyr HS 12.7mm AMR. Steyr supplied 800 weapons to Iran in 2005, after which unlicensed copies began to be manufactured by Defence Indus tries of Iran (DIO). The weapon has been positively identified as an AM50 as opposed to a Steyr by the unfluted barrel. 117 Panel requests to the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 23 May, 8 July and 2 November 2016. 118 Member State conf irmed seizure on 28 November 2016. 17 - 00300 126 / 242

127 S/2017/81 Figure 36.1 Figure 36.2 , Ma’rib (28 Sep 2016) ‘Kornet’ or ‘Dehlayvak’ RPG 27, Ma’rib (Sep 2016) - Figure 36.3 Shehn, Ma’rib seizure (18 Oct 2016) TBC – Concealment in transit C. Weapon shipments on the land main supply routes identified by the Panel are now well concealed in an attempt to avoid detection. Hidden compartments are being engineered in to the structure of the trailer (see figures 36.4 to 36.6), whilst other simpler concealment methods involve the use of livestock ( see figure 36.8). The time taken to load such vehicles suggests that the weapons would more likely be loaded prior to the goods been used to disguise them; this avoids double handling and reduces detection risks. Figure 36.4 gure 36.5 Fi Shehn, Ma’rib (18 Oct 2016) Shehn, Ma’rib (18 Oct 2016) 17 - 00300 127 / 242

128 S/2017/81 Figure 36.7 Figure 36.6 Shehn, Ma’rib (18 Oct 2016) Shehn, Ma’rib (18 Oct 2016) 00300 - 17 128 / 242

129 S/2017/81 Annex 37: Use or seizures of ATGW A. 9M113 ‘ Konkurs ’ or ‘ Tosan ’ ATGW The Panel has investigated seizures of, Konkurs ’ or Iranian and identified the use, of Russian manufactured 9M113 ‘ manufactured copies, the ‘ Tosan ’ ATGW as shown in the following imagery. Figure 37.1 Figure 37.2 119 ‘ Konkurs or Tosan’ – Jizan use (25 Aug 2015) FV Nasir seizure (24 Sep 2015) – ‘ Konkurs’ (Centre Ground) Figure 37.3 120 ‘ – Tosan’ or Jizan use (11 Dec 2015) Konkurs Toophan ’ ATGW B. Toophan ’ ATGW as shown in the following The Panel has investigated the seizures of an Iranian manufactured ‘ imagery. This is a copy of the US TOW system. Figure 37.4 – ‘ Toophan’ (Foreground) FV Nasir seizure (24 Sep 2015) __________________ 119 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_RUgRtpUKc . 120 16151211 - Source: 151211 VID 29. - WA0029 1 - 17 - 00300 129 / 242

130 S/2017/81 ’ ATGW C. 9M133 ‘ Kornet ’ or ‘ Dehlavyah Kornet The Panel has investigated seizures, or identified the use, of Russian manufactured 9M122 ‘ ’ or Iranian manufactured copies, the ‘ Dehlavyah ’ ATGW as shown in the following imagery. Figure 37.6 Figure 37.5 FV No Name seizure (20 Mar 2016) Ta’izz seizure (29 Nov 2015) – – ‘Kornet’ or ‘ Dehlavyah’ Dehlavyah’ or ‘ ‘Kornet’ Figure 37.8 Figure 37.7 Ma’rib seizure (28 Sep 2016) TBC ‘Kornet’ Shehn, Ma’rib seizure (18 Oct 2016) – or ‘ Dehlavyah’ – 17 - 00300 130 / 242

131 S/2017/81 Annex 38: Weapons of Iranian origin in Houthi use A. Type 73 General Purpose Machine Gun 1. The Panel has identified from imagery a weapon with characteristics similar to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPKR) manufactured Type 73 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) being used by Houthi fighters in Yemen. 2. The Type 73 GPMG is a relativ ely rare weapon outside the manufacturing country. Only Iran is known to have received exports of the weapon (in the 1970s and 1980s). Since then the weapon has been observed in the possession of Ali Brigade and the Christian Babylon Brigades. the al - Imam The Type 73 Iraqi Shi’a militias (Badr Brigade forces), the 121 has also been documented in the hands of the Syrian Arab Army operating near Palmyra, Syria. Figure 38.1 122 Type 63 GPMG with Houthi fighter B. AM - 50 Anti Material Rifle 123 - observed footage of an Iranian manufactured AM The Panel has - material rifle (AMR) being used by 50 anti 2. Houthi fighters in Yemen. Figure 38.2 124 AM50 AMR with Houthi fighter __________________ 121 ttp://armamentresearch.com/2016/03/ h . 122 Ibid. 123 This weapon is an unlicensed copy of the Austrian Steyr HS 12.7mm AMR. Steyr supplied 800 weapons to Iran in 2005, after which unlicensed copies began to be manufactured by Defence Industries of Iran (DIO). The weapon has been positively identified as an AM50 as opposed to a Steyr by the unfluted barrel. 124 in - documented - rifle . yemen/ - ARES Hoplite. http://armamentresearch.com/iranian - am50 - anti - materiel - 17 - 00300 131 / 242

132 S/2017/81 125 50 AMR in Houthi hands was provided by a Member State - 3. (figures 38.3 and A further example of an AM 38.4). Figure 38.3 Figure 38.4 Captured AM50 AMR (Serial 2200076) Captured AM50 AMR (Serial 2200076) Although these weapons are undoubtedly of Iranian origin, the Panel has no evidence to date that they have 4. 126 been supplied post the imposition of the arms embargo on 14 April 2015. Tracing requests were submitted to Iran and responses are still awaited. __________________ 125 onfidential source. C 126 Panel letters to Permanent Mission of Iran of 11 May, 8 July and 2 November 2016. Panel letters to Permanent Mission of DPRK of 23 May and 8 July 2016. 17 - 00300 132 / 242

133 S/2017/81 Annex 39: Possible ORBAT of Yemen Army (as at 30 June 2016) and summary of status of military units Military unites b A. y Military District and location 00300 - 17 242 / 133

134 S/2017/81 00300 - 17 / 242 134

135 S/2017/81 - 17 00300 242 / 35 1

136 S/2017/81 AQAP plundered units B. 00300 - 17 / 136 242

137 S/2017/81 AQAP/Houthi plundered units C. - 17 00300 242 / 137

138 S/2017/81 127 Summary of status of Yemen Armed Force units D. __________________ 127 The brigades ‘loyal’ to both sides are allocated as 0.5. 17 - 00300 242 138 /

139 S/2017/81 128 aligned to Saleh, Houthi or plundered by Houthi or AQAP Summary of units E. __________________ 128 This includes the units loyal to both sides. 17 - 00300 139 / 242

140 S/2017/81 Annex 40: Summary of black market small arms ammunition prices Figure 40.1 2016) – Graph of Black Market prices (Yemen) (2015 Figure 40.2 Graph of Black Market prices (Aden) (2016) 17 - 00300 / 242 140

141 S/2017/81 Figure 40.3 Graph of Black Market prices (Abyan) (2016) Figure 4 0.4 Graph of Black Market prices (Other) (2016) 00300 - 17 141 / 242

142 S/2017/81 Annex 41: Transfer of Taurus pistols and revolvers 129 about this arms transfer, and the subsequent investigation has The Panel was provided with initial information 1. resulted in the Panel obtaining evidence from authorities, organizations or individuals in six countries to date. 2. to, supposedly, the Ministry of Defence Negotiations for the sale of 8,000 pistols by Forjas Taurus S.A of Brazil of Djibouti began before November 2012, when the Chief of the Military Cabinet of the Presidency initially issued an 130 after which funds were The Brazilian authorities issued an initial export licence in October 2013, end use certificate. 131 Resolution transferred to pay for the weapons. The final Brazilian export licences were issued by February 2015. 2216 (2015) of 14 April 2015 imposed the arms embargo on designated individuals, which is before these weapons were ph ysically shipped on 3 July 2015. Had Taurus Forjas S.A exercised due diligence then they would have identified aspects of this arms purchase that were suspicious in relation to the targeted arms embargo on Yemen (see below), and could have stopped the ship ment. 3. The Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A acted as the shipper for 3,000 of the above 8,000 Taurus pistols and revolvers, loaded in Container Number TTNU3603161 on the MV MSC Cadiz (IMO 9480203 ), which sailed from Santos, Brazil (BRSSZ) on 3 July 2015 destined for Djibouti. 4. On, or about, 24 July 2015 the port authorities of Gioia Tauro, Italy (ITGIT) discovered 3,000 Taurus Pistols in Container Number TTNU3603161. The Italian authorities delayed the onward movement of this ISO - container, as the transit of the cargo had not been notified to the appropriate Italian authorities. Once this issue had been resolved, Container Number TTNU3603161 then departed Gioia Tauro on 27 October 2015, loaded on the MV MSC Savona (IMO 9460356 ), bound for King Abdu llah Port, Saudi Arabia (SAKAC). The Saudi Arabian authorities then seized the as they Council of Political and Security Affairs’ shipment under the authority of ‘High Decision 51145/2015 of the Itkan Assaid Al Mahdouda (Precise Fishing Limited, suspected that the shipment was actually bound for the Houth is via 132 Saudi Arabia failed to report this seizure to the Committee as required by paragraph 17 of resolution 2216 Djibouti). (2015). 5. actually used for the purchase from Taurus Subsequent investigation by the Panel established that the company 133 a son of a designated was the Itkan Corporation for General Trading, Yemen (Itkan), owned by Adeeb Mana’a, 134 individual Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana’a (SOi.008). Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana’a is a close associate of Ali 135 Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003), and a known arms trafficker who was listed by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea for directly or indirectly supplying, selling or transferring arms or related material to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo. On 26 March 2011 Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana’a was appointed by Abdulmalik al - Houthi and the Houthi political leadership as the as the Governor of __________________ 129 Confidential source. 130 All documentary evidence and references for this section are contained within the timeline at appendix A. 131 Detailed timeline is at appendix A. 132 The smuggling of Taurus Pistols to Yemen via Djibouti may have precedence. In October 2013 8,000 Taurus weapons were allegedly sent to Al Sharq Fishing and Fish. The shipment was arranged by a designated individual Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana'a (SOi.008) ( see paragraph 75 to the Panel’s final report S/2016/73 and following footnote). This allegation is the subject of an ongoing court case in Porto Alegre, Brazil against two former employees of Taurus ave not charged the company itself. (Sources: Reuters, 5 (Eduardo Pezzuol and Leonardo Sperry). The Prosecutors h September 2016, and confidential source in Brazil). 133 Although the Taurus internal Purchase Check List names Hussain Said Khaireh, Director General of Security, Djibouti first, on the same line it also includes Adeeb Mana’a, with a Yemeni E - mail and telephone number. 134 Listed under authority of paragraph 8 to resolution 1844 (2008) on 12 April 2010 by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Soma lia and Eritrea. 135 He was the Head of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s ‘presidential committee’ until late January 2010, when Yemeni authorities arrested him. 17 - 00300 142 / 242

143 S/2017/81 136 a post he held until December 2014. He is currently a minister in the new ’28 November government’ of the Sa’dah, Salah alliance. - Houthi The Panel identified a number of indicators that are inconsistent with this particular arms transfer being a 6. legitimate arms transfer to the Government of Djib outi: (a) An end user certificate was issued to support the transfer of 80,000 pistols to the Djibouti Ministry of Defence, yet the Djiboutian Armed Forces, which includes the National Gendarmerie, only consists of 16,000 active 137 personnel and 9,500 reser This is an unusually high number of weapons for such a force level; vists. The end user certificate authorised the Matrix company, headed by Abddurabuhguhqd Sale Abdo, to (b) import the weapons. Neither the name of this company, nor its head, appear on any other documentation (shipping, financial or legal) relating to this arms transfer. All the relevant documentation refers to the Itkan company and Adeeb Mana’a; (c) The address used for the Itkan company, Trading Avenue, Djibouti, could not be found in Djibouti. A request to the Government of Djibouti for the registered details of both the Matrix and Itkan companies and their 138 associated bank accounts, has not yet been responded to. The Government of Djibouti did respond to a previous 139 enquiry from th e Panel and confirmed the validity of the end use certification; (d) On 21 January 2015 Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana’a (SOi.008) entered Brazil at the invitation of 140 This visit is also a violation of paragraph 1 of Eduardo Pezzuol of Forjas Taurus S.A in relation to arms purchases. resolution 1844 (2008) and details have been passed to the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) for their consideration; Yemeni There is no logical or reasonable reason that the Government of Djibouti would need to use a (e) broker for the supply of weapons to their armed forces. Particularly a broker with close family ties to a designated individual; and (f) There were unexplained inconsistencies in the detail and dates of the Bill of Lading and the end use certific ation for this arms transfer (see appendix A for details). 7. The detailed timeline for this arms transfer is at appendix A together with the references of all relevant documentation in the possession of the Panel. 8. The Panel finds it unlikely that th is arms transfer was destined for Houthi - Saleh forces due to the types of weapons involved. Pistols and revolvers are personal protection type weapons, which are not generally used in combat. They are very attractive though to the black market in Yemen a nd elsewhere, where individuals can buy unlicensed weapons for self - protection. They are also ideal for using in criminal acts such as the protection of drug traffickers or armed holdups of banks etc as they are easily concealable. ares Mohammed Hassan Mana'a (SOi.008) and his known relationship to the Houthis The involvement of F 9. makes it possible that the financial aspects of the transfers may have been to the benefit of listed individuals, and the Panel will continue to investigate this aspect. __________________ 136 http://yemenpost.net/Deta il123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=3336 . 137 and others. Force level data from https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319215 138 Panel letter to the Permanent Mission of 14 October 2016. 139 e Permanent Mission of 26 September 2016. Letter from th 140 Confidential sources. The Federal Court of Brazil has issued a legal notice of proceedings against this individual for this action ( 42,2015.4.04.7100/RS). - Notice 710002418415, Criminal Action: 5033103 17 - 00300 143 / 242

144 S/2017/81 10. The modus operandi of the transfer, using his son Adeeb Mana’a and a Djibouti end user, was designed to circumvent normal security and customs controls. The transfer was only prevented by the diligence of the Saudi Arabian authorities. 00300 - 17 242 / 144

145 S/2017/81 Appendix A to Annex 41: Timeline of Forjas Taurus S.A. (Brazil) export of pistols revolvers and 141 Table 41.A.1 Transfer timelines 1 4 1 Reference Responsible Date Activity Remarks EUC issued for 80,000 (Eighty Thousand) 123/PRE/CMPR Chief of the Military 3 Nov 2012 Cabinet, Djibouti pistols and revolvers Military Chief of the 123/PRE/CMPR EUC issued for 80,000 pistols and revolvers 4 Nov 2012 Correction of calibre of one weapon Cabinet, Djibouti type. Specifies import agent as Abddurabuhguhad Sale Abdo of Matrix company. Expired 31 Dec 13 788/2013 MOD Brazil export process Brazilian Export Licence issued for 1,000 - October MOD Brazil 14 Oct 2013 Taurus PT 24/7 G2 9mm 17t Tenox Pistols 200.414.2013 Expired before shipment 14 Oct 2013 Brazilian Export Licence issued for 1,000 MOD Brazil export process 788/2013 - October MOD Brazil 200.414.2013 Taurus PT 24/7 G2 9mm 17t Individual Pistols Expired before shipment October - 788/2013 Brazilian Export Licence issued for 500 14 Oct 2013 MOD Brazil export process MOD Brazil 200.414.2013 Taurus PT 24/7 G2 Compact 9mm 17t Tenox Pistols Expired before shipment MOD Brazil October - 788/2013 ort Licence issued for 500 Brazilian Exp 14 Oct 2013 MOD Brazil export process 200.414.2013 Taurus PT 24/7 G2 Compact 9mm 17t Individual Pistols Expired before shipment Brazilian Export Licence issued for 2,000 MOD Brazil export process MOD Brazil - 14 Oct 2013 October 788/2013 Taurus Model 85s 0.38” SPL 200.414.2013 Revolvers Broker named as Adeeb Mana’a, Itkhan Company for Hunting Expired before shipment Initial Brazilian Export Licence issued for MOD Brazil export process MOD Brazil 14 Oct 2013 788/2013 - October 200.414.2013 1,000 Taurus Model 939 0.22” LR Revolvers Broker named as Adeeb Mana’a, Itkhan Company for Hunting Expired before shipment __________________ 141 Copies of all referenced documents are in the possession of the Panel and available for inspection by Member States on request. 00300 - 17 145 242 /

146 S/2017/81 Responsible Reference Activity Remarks Date 18 Nov 2013 US$ 45,960 transferred from International Itkhan Corporation Origin bank account in name of Itkhan Commercial Bank Djibouti (Account: Corporation for General Trading and Hunting, Trading Avenue, Djibouti 000010200451761) to Citibank, New York (Account 36942067) Receiving bank in name of Forjas Taurus S.A US$ 247,950 transferred from International 18 Nov 2013 Origin bank account in name of Itkhan Itkhan Corporation Commercial Bank Djibouti (Account: Corporation for General Trading and Hunting, Trading Avenue, Djibouti 000010200451761) to Citibank, New York (Account 36942067) Receiving bank in name of Forjas Taurus S.A US$ 249,950 transferred from International Origin bank account in name of Itkhan 3 Dec 2013 Itkhan Corporation Corporation for General Trading and Commercial Bank Djibouti (Account: Hunting, Trading Avenue, Djibouti 000010200451761) to Citibank, New York (Account 36942067) Receiving bank in name of Forjas Taurus S.A 23 Dec 2013 USD 290,430.60 aurus S.A. Forjas T 200411 Invoice issued by Taurus for 1,000 PT 24/7 G2 9mm CAL17S Pistols (Black Tenifer Made out to Djibouti Ministry of with additional magazines) Defence Invoice issued by Taurus for 1,000 Model USD 227,565.00 23 Dec 2013 Forjas Taurus S.A. 200415 959CH 22L Revolvers Made out to Djibouti Ministry of Defence 200416 23 Dec 2013 Invoice issued by Taurus for 1,000 PT 24/7 USD 288,901.85 Forjas Taurus S.A. G2 Compact 9mm 13S Pistols (Black Made out to Djibouti Ministry of Tenifer and Matt with additional Defence magazines) MOD Brazil export process MOD Brazil December - 1010/2013 26 Dec 2013 Brazilian Export Licence issued for 1,000 0.22LR Revolvers 200.415.2014 Taurus Model 939 26 Dec 2013 Brazilian Export Licence issued for 2,000 1012/2013 - December MOD Brazil MOD Brazil export process Taurus Rev .85S 0.38: Special Revolvers 200.413.2014 MOD Brazil export process Dec 2013 Brazilian Export Licence issued for 1,000 26 MOD Brazil 1013/2013 - December 200.414.2014 Taurus PT 24/7 G2 9mm 17t Carbono Tenox Pistols MOD Brazil export process Brazilian Export Licence issued for 1,000 26 Dec 2013 1015/2013 - December MOD Brazil Taurus PT 24/7 Pistols 200.414.2014 17 00300 - 146 242 /

147 S/2017/81 Date Reference Responsible Remarks Activity Chief of the Military Valid until 31 Dec 15 Undated Extension for EUC for 80,000 pistols and 123/PRE/CMPR Cabinet, Djibouti revolvers granted Origin bank account in name of Itkhan Itkhan Corporation 14 Jan 2014 US$ 144,950 transferred from International Commercial Bank Djibouti (Account: Corporation for General Trading and Hunting, Trading Avenue, Djibouti 000010200451761) to Citibank, New York (Account 36942067) Receiving bank in name of Forjas Taurus S.A Amazon Logistics ETA Djibouti 15 Mar 14 13 Mar 2014 34 boxes of weapons leave Brazil on Embarkation Certificate 4224 Emirates Airlines air cargo. Airway Bill 176 8071 1680 1,000 x PT 24/7 G2 9mm CAL 17s Black Tenifer Pistols Amazon Logistics Embarkation Certificate 4224 34 boxes of weapons leave Brazil on 13 Mar 2014 ETA Djibouti 15 Mar 14 Emirates Airlines air cargo. Airway Bill 176 0343 3210 1,000 x PT 24/7 G2 9mm CAL 17s Black Tenifer Pistols 2014 Embarkation Certificate 4272 Amazon Logistics 16 Apr ETA Djibouti 22 Apr 14 34 boxes of weapons leave Brazil on Emirates Airlines air cargo. 1,000 x PT 24/7 Pistols Confidential source Referred to the 751(1992) Committee Fares Mohamed Hassan Mana’a (SOi.008) 21 Jan 2015 Monitoring Group as a potential enters Brazil at invitation of Eduardo violation of a travel ban. Pezzuol of Forjas Taurus S.A. MOD Brazil export process Brazilian Export Licence issued for 2,000 MOD Brazil January - 040/2015 28 Jan 2015 200.414.2013 Taurus Model 85s 0.38” Pistols Replaced 14 Oct 13 export authority (Serial Numbers GZ75481 to GZ77480) 072/2015 MOD Brazil February 27 Feb 2015 Brazilian Export Licence issued for 1,000 - MOD Brazil export process Taurus Model 939 0.22” Pistols 200.414.2013 (Serial Numbers GZ72481 to GZ73480) Replaced 14 Oct 13 export authority MSCUZS275155 Bill of Lading issued for 40 boxes of 27 Jun 2015 Issued in Gioia Tauro prior to vessel MSC S.A leaving Brazil revolvers for Container TTNU3603361 4 Jul 2015 MSC Cadiz (IMO 9480203) departs Santos, Brazil (BRSSZ) with Container TTNU3603161 17 00300 - 147 242 /

148 S/2017/81 Date Reference Responsible Remarks Activity Mediterranean MSCUZS275155 Second Bill of Lading issued for 40 items 24 Jul 2015 Retrospectively by MSC Brazilian Agent Shipping do Brazil For 1 x 20’ ISO – No mention of weapons 24 Jul 2015 MSC Cadiz offloads Container Italian Customs TTNU3603161 in Port Gioia Tauro, Italy (ITGIT) Transit of weapons had not been notified Criminal procedure Italian Customs Agency and Guardia 25 Jul 2015 Italian Customs 2249/2015 mod.21 to the competent agency Finanzia confiscate Container TTNU3603161 pending investigation 9 Oct 2015 Chief of the Military Djibouti MOD declaration to Italian Cabinet Customs that the shipment is for MOD Djibouti MSC Savana (IMO 9460356) departs Port MSC 27 Oct 2015 Gioia Tauro, Italy with Container TTNU3603161 MSC 1 Nov 2015 MSC Savana arrives Port King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia (SAKAC) Saudi authorities seize Container 1 Nov 2015 Weapons remain in Saudi custody Saudi Arabia Intelligence High DG Decision 51145 TTNU3603161 pending investigation Brazilian Federal 4 Nov 2015 Brazilian authorities seize hardware and Police documentation from Taurus. Brazil Federal Court Case ongoing 9 May 2016 Notice 710002418415 Federal Court in Brazil issue a legal notice of proceedings against Eduardo Pezzuol - Criminal Action: 5033103 and Fares Mohamed Hassan Mana’a 42,2015.4.04.7100/RS (SOi.008) 24 Jul 15. 17 00300 - / 148 242

149 S/2017/81 142 Annex 42: Summary of Houthi - range ballistic missile (SRBM) or free flight rockets short (FFR) A. QAHER - 1 FFR 1. Houthi engineers have successfully modified stocks of (S - 75’‘Dvina) (SA - 2 ‘Guideline’) Surface to Air (SAM) 143 missiles, converting them into a rudimentary, improvised long range FFR. The Panel considers that two factors determined this activity: 144 - C variant (HWASONG (a) The stockpile 6) SRBM captured by the Houthi of SCUD - B and SCUD - around Sana’a was relatively small. It could soon be used up, or destroyed by retaliatory Saudi Arabia - led coalition air strikes; and (b) The Houthi realized that the S 75 SAM systems were ineffective against the advanced aircraft of the - 145 led coalition air forces and could be converted for surface - to - surface use as FFR. Saudi Arabia - 2. The standard guidance system fitted to the S - 75 consists of a ground based tracking radar and radio guidance system, which sends radio signals to the guidance computer on the missile. The guidance computer then sends the necessary adjustments to the guidance surfaces (fins), which then move to alter the course of the missile towards the aerial tar get. It is highly unlikely that this guidance system has been modified for use in a surface - to - surface role or that a new guidance system has been fitted. The missile is almost certainly being used as a FFR, and the accuracy thus been totally dependent on ballistic calculations, launch parameters and meteorological effects. 3. The ranges of free flight rockets are calculated from complex ballistic equations, combined with extensive test and evaluation to develop a set of range tables. The Panel has seen no evidence that the Houthis have undertaken such research, and thus it must be considered that the accuracy of the QAHER 1 system will be inherently very poor from just - the design perspective. SCUD B. B SRBM - 4. d with an unknown quantity of SCUD - B and at least 90 The Panel has confirmed that Yemen was supplie 146 - - B) copy. HWASONG There have been no claimed ‘SCUD’ attacks since 9 October 2016. The Panel will 5 (a SCUD continue to monitor the ’SCUD’ threat. C. Houthi ‘ZELZAL - 3’ SRBM 5. The Houthis have claimed to have designed and manufactured a missile they refer to as the ZELZAL - 3 147 (“earthquake”) missile. The Houthis claim this missile is 6m in length, 1,300kg mass and has a range of up to 65km. If this data is correct, then such a missile would have performance characteristics similar to the battlefield free flight rocket the OTR - 21 Tochka, known to be in service in Yemen. It would not have the range to threaten the Saudi Arabian cities that the Houthis have claimed to have struck with ZELZAL - 3 missiles. __________________ 142 Although a Houthi Saleh military alliance, it is only the Houthi component that has claimed responsibility for an - y rocket attacks. Hence this annex refers to Houthi armed groups only. missile or 143 They can not be considered as SRBM, as they have no guidance system and their range is less than the 300km to 1,000 km required to be considered a ballistic missile. 144 The stockpile als 21 Tochka (NATO SS o included an unknown number of OTR - - 21 Scarab) tactical ballistic missiles. As these only have a range of 70km – 185km they do not have the range to attack Saudi Arabia from the Sana’a area. - They have been used to attack Saudi Arabia - l ed coalition forces within Yemen. 145 targets - ground . - http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/12/22/950631/yemen - adapts - surface - to - air - missile - to - hit 146 Source: Jane’s Defence databases. 147 Al Masdar Online of 11 July 2016 and others. 17 - 00300 149 / 242

150 S/2017/81 6. The imagery released by the Houthis though (figure 42.1) does not correlate to their claims in terms of even dimensions. Photogrammetry suggests that the missile in figure 42.1 is no longer than 3m and is similar in design to the 333mm Iranian designed and man ufactured Shahin 1 heavy artillery rocket system (HARS) (figure 42.2), which has not been reported as ever exported. Figure 42.1 Figure 42.2 148 149 Houthi released image of ZELZAL - 3 Image of Shahin 1 7. Further analysis of other imagery of this rocket suggests that it is a ‘mock up’ only as there are no indications of any nozzle, or fuze being fitted. The fins appear to have been spot welded to the missile main body, rather than been free to move to enable flight ballistic adjustments. efence Industries Organization (DIO) produce a FFR system called the ZELZAL 8. The Iranian D - 3, which is of a significantly different design to that at figure 42.4. The Panel finds it most likely that the Houthi are using the name ZELZAL - 3 for the missile displayed for pro paganda purposes only. D. Iranian ZELZAL - 3 SRBM There have been some indicators to suggest that the Houthi claim to have this missile type may have some truth 9. in them: (a) f Saudi Arabia alleged In a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/786) the Kingdom o violations of resolution 2216 (2015) by Iran and demanded that the Council take appropriate and necessary measures - 3 SRBM on against those who have violated the relevant resolutions. These allegations included the use of ZELZAL 150 ugust 2016 against the City of Najran. The Panel requested access 31 A to any evidence or imagery the Government of Saudi Arabia may have to support this particular allegation, and to date no response has been received. The allegations were also firmly rejecte d as being “pure fabrications and unsubstantiated allegations” in a response by the Permanent Representative of Iran to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/187); __________________ 148 i 3 Ballistic Missile is Crushing Saud - . Forces Jonothan Azaziah. All Hail Ansarullah’s Ingenuity: Zelzal - zelzal http://mouqawamahmusic.net/all - hail - ansarullahs - ingenuity Mouqawama. 11 July 2016. new - - 3 - ballistic - missile - forces/ - saudi - . is - crushing 149 Janes’ We apons. 150 Panel letter of 3 October 2016. 17 - 00300 150 / 242

151 S/2017/81 eferred to by the Missile attacks on Saudi Arabia on 31 August and 4 October were specifically r (b) - 1. Houthis as being by ZELZAL - 3 SRBM. Previously they had attributed attacks to either SCUD or QAHER - If the Houthis have gained access to ZELZAL 10. 3 then this would likely have been a violation of the targeted arms embargo, as no missi le types of this type were known to have been in the pre - conflict stockpile of the Yemeni Armed Forces Missile Brigades. Notwithstanding this analysis though, the Panel believes that it is more likely that they do not possess the 11. missiles, but want the people to believe they have this capability, as such a technical threat would maintain the strategic pressure being exerted on Saudi Arabia by the Houthi ‘missile campaign’. Figure 42.3 shows a missile claimed to be a - 3 by the Houthis, whereas figu re 42.4 shows a real Iranian version. ZELZAL Figure 42.3 Figure 42.4 151 152 Houthi released image of ZELZAL 3 - Iranian ZELZAL - 3 SOMOD FFR E. 12. The Houthis have also claimed to have manufactured and designed a missile they refer to as the SOMOD (a.k.a SOMOUD) (‘Steadfastness”). Imagery though shows a rocket very similar to that they claim as the ZELZAL - 3 (see section C). __________________ 151 All Hail 3 Ballistic Missile is Crushing Saud Forces Ansarullah’s Ingenuity: Zelzal - . Mouqawama. Jonothan Azaziah. - - crushing - is - 11 July 2016. http://mouqawamahmusic.net/all - hail - ansarullahs - ingenuity missile new - zelzal - 3 - ballistic - - . saudi forces/ 152 Janes’ Weapons. 17 - 00300 151 / 242

152 S/2017/81 Figure 42.5 Figure 42.6 Houthi released image of SOMOD Houthi released image of SOMOD leads the Panel to the same conclusions as made for the Houthi claimed 13. Analysis of the imagery of this rocket - ‘ZELAL 3’. It is a ‘mock up’ only as there are no indications of any nozzle, or fuze being fitted. The fins appear to have been spot welded to the missile main body, rather than been f ree to move to enable flight ballistic adjustments. The nose appears possibly to have been blackened by the addition of plastic adhesive tape. 14. The Panel made some ballistic estimates for the range of such a rocket (see appendix A), which used ‘best cas e’ data and still the maximum likely range would be no more than 44km. Systems accuracy for the free flight rockets F. 15. The Circular Error Probability (CEP) is a measure of a weapon system’s precision or accuracy. It is defined as the radius of a circ le, centred about the mean, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50 per cent of the warheads. Thus theoretically 50% of munitions will land within one CEP, 93.7% within two CEP and 99.8% within liptical confidence region for indirect fire weapons such as FFR, and accuracy thus three CEP. In reality the CEP is an el 153 The CEP is heavily influenced by the missile guidance system for guided weapons. even more difficult to predict. such as: 1) wind strength and direction along flight path; 2) Accuracy will be further degraded by operational factors alignment or mis - mis orientation of the launcher from the target; 3) propellant age and degradation within the missiles; - 4) launcher vibration; and 5) thrust misalignment due to damage to the ro cket. International humanitarian law aspects G. FFR are specifically designed to be an area weapon, as precision accuracy cannot be guaranteed. Since the blast 16. and fragmentation danger areas are primarily based on the size and design of the explosive warhead, its likely impact on 154 civilians is often foreseeable, especially when directed at a civilian populated areas. Its effects, depending on the 155 circumstances, may violate IHL principles relating to the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks. Summary of technical data for Houthi possible missile and rocket types H. Table 42.1 also includes explosives engineering analysis that predicts the blast danger areas for humans. Many more fatalities and injuries from fragmentation effects can be expecte greater ranges though. d at far __________________ 153 More detailed information on CEP and accuracy of free flight rocket systems may be found in Cross K et al. – Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas Technical considerations relevant to their use and effects. pp.28 – 34. Armament Research Services. Australia. May 2016. 154 OCHA Report “Protecting Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas” at - Latest.pdf . Sheet https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/EWIPA Fact 155 See ICRC Customary IHL Study Rule 11 and 12. 17 - 00300 152 / 242

153 S/2017/81 157 156 Table 42.1: Summary of possible Houthi missile types Permanent Warhead 156 NEQ hearing damage Diameter Range Length 99% fatalities (m) CEP Remarks FFR/SRBM type (km) (m) (@34.5KPa) (kg) (m) (m) (@1,380kPa) (m) 1 - QAHER 10.5 8.2 NK 190 0.50 10.84 Modification of S - 75 ‘Dvina”. 250 Unmodified maximum range is 157 56km. - 6.4 21 Tochka 9K79 OTR 0.65 185 482 150 73.7 14.4 300 0.88 11.25 - B 985 SCUD 93.5 450 18.2 10.94 Hwasong 5 985 300 0.88 450 B copy - DPRK SCUD 18.2 93.5 90 supplied to Yemen Shahab 1 985 300 0.88 10.94 450 93.5 18.2 Iran Hwasong 5 copy Not confirmed if any supplied to Yemen SCUD 11.25 C 0.88 700 600 - 600 15.5 79.9 770 Hwasong 6 10.94 0.88 500 DPRK SCUD C copy - 16.8 86.3 1,000 Not confirmed if any supplied to Yemen Rodong 1 770 1000+ 15.60 1.25 86.3 16.8 DPRK SCUD - C copy 1,000 See Shabab 3 770 500 0.88 10.94 Shabab 2 700 Iran Hwasong 6copy 16.8 86.3 irmed if any supplied to Yemen Not conf Shabab 3 15.60 1.25 1000+ 770 Iran Rodong 16.8 86.3 1,000 1 copy - Not confirmed if any supplied to Yemen 985 0.88 D - SCUD 700 12.29 50 18.2 93.5 1 (Volcano) - 800 0.88 Borkan 12.50 500 74.6 14.5 600 9.60 - ZELZAL 0. 61 250 3 (Iranian) Reported warhead NEQ, but not 15.5 79.9 1,300 confirmed 3 (Houthi) - ZELZAL 65 6.00 300 300 38 4.00 SOMOUD Reported but not confirmed 12.3 63.0 0.56 __________________ 156 Net Explosive Quantity. 157 Letter from Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation of 29 December 2016. 00300 - 17 153 242 /

154 S/2017/81 I. Summary of reported Houthi SRBM and FFR attacks against Saudi Arabia Table 42.2 is a summary of reported Houthi forces SRBM or free flight rocket FFR attacks against Saudi Arabia. The Government of Saudi Arabia has confirmed those shown in bold text. Table 42.2: Summary of reported Houthi missile and FFR attacks against Saudi Arabia Launch Point (LP) in Yemen Target Area Missile type Latitude Da Comments Location Longitude te Location Latitude Longitude claimed SCUD (Borkan 1) 16 Jun 2015 - Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight SCUD (Borkan - 1) 26 Aug 2015 16°53' 47”N 44°33'26”E Jazan Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight 16°53'47”N QAHER 1 Jazan - 44°33'26”E 26 Aug 2015 Intercepted and destroyed in Al 44°12'54” 15°18'05” N E flight @30km from Intercept Sabeen, Sana’a Weapon System (IWS) SCUD (Bork an - 1) 15 Oct 2015 18°18'19”N 42°44'43”E Khamis Mushayt Airport 4 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 Jazan Airport 16°53'59”N 44°35'01”E 9 Dec 2015 - 1 Jazan 16°53'47”N 44°33'26”E Al - Ain Al - Harreh military base QAHER military base - 1 Jazan 16°53'47”N 9 Dec 2015 44°33'26”E Al - Saleh QAHER 11 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 Al - Jamarak 13 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 KSA confirmed 18°18'17”N 42°43'54”E Tussen Khamis 16°25'40” 44°08'08” N Huthen Mushayt E Sada’a 18 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 Najran 17°33'19”N 44°14'33”E Impacted east of town 17°33'19”N 19 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 Najran 44°14'33”E Impacted near museum Border crossing point - Al 42°58'24”E 1630'41”N Wawal 19 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 15°23'41” 44°10'10” N E - 1 20 Dec 2015 QAHER 18°18'19”N 42°44'43”E Khamis Mushayt Airport QAHER - 1 16 21 Dec 2015 44°33'26”E Jazan °53'47”N 15°23'41” 44°10'10” Intercepted and destroyed in Geraf, E Sana’a flight @35km from IWS N QAHER 1 - Jazan Airport 16°53'59”N 44°35'01”E 21 Dec 2015 NE of 15°24'48” 44°13'05” Intercepted and destroyed in om IWS N E Pilots flight @20km fr City, Sana’a 22 Dec 2015 - 1 QAHER Jazan Aramco Facility QAHER - 1 42°44'43”E KSA confirmed 18°18'19”N 23 Dec 2015 Khamis Tussen 16°26’05” 44°03'55” Mushayt Huthen N E Sada’a 1 QAHER - 26 Dec 2015 Najran 17°33'19”N 44°14'33”E 44°14'05” tercepted and destroyed in Al In 15°50'48” Genadib flight @21km from IWS N E 27 Dec 2015 1) Najran 17°33'19”N 44°14'33”E - SCUD (Borkan Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight QAHER - 1 Jazan 16°53'47”N 44°33'26”E 27 Dec 2015 28 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 Najran 17°33'19”N 33”E 44°14' Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight 30 Dec 2015 QAHER - 1 16°53'47”N 44°33'26”E Reported as intercepted and Jazan Aramco Facility destroyed in flight - 1 31 Dec 2015 QAHER Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight 1 - QAHER KSA confirmed 18°18'17”N 42°43'54”E 1 Jan 20 16 Dabbaj 16°41'43” 43°51'51” Khamis N Mushayt E Valley QAHER - 1 7 Jan 2016 16°53'47”N Jazan 44°33'26”E Intercepted and destroyed in 44°13'35” 15°00'08” E flight @25km from IWS N - 00300 17 / 242 154

155 S/2017/81 159 158 Launch Point (LP) in Yemen Target Area Missile type Longitude Latitude Location Comments Longitude Latitude Location Da te claimed 8 Feb 2016 1 - QAHER 42°44'43”E 18°18'19”N Khamis Mushayt irport A - 1 QAHER 8 Feb 2016 18°14'22”N 42°31'33”E Abha Tussen 16°25'39” 44°08'34” Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight N E Hutn Sada’a - 1 QAHER 16°53'59”N Jazan Airport 44°35'01”E 9 Feb 2016 '33” 44°02 Intercepted and destroyed in East of 15°20'50” Sana’a N E flight @56km from IWS QAHER - 1 42°39'29”E 13 Feb 2016 18°14'10”N Abha Airport 44°04'51” Intercepted and destroyed in 16°24'23” NE of Al E N flight @18km from IES Hazm - QAHER 1 9 May 2016 18°18'19”N 42°44'43”E Khamis Intercepted and destroyed in Dabbaj 16°23'52” 44°05'01 Mushayt Valley E flight @32km from IWS N QAHER - 1 9 May 2016 Abha 18°14'22”N 42°31'33”E Tussen Intercepted and destroyed in 16°40'05” 43°50'53” Huth en flight @17km from IWS E N Sada’a 44°33'26”E 16°53'47”N 1 - QAHER 13 May 2016 Jazan 20 May 2016 QAHER - 1 Jazan 16°53'47”N 44°33'26”E 31 May 2016 QAHER - 1 Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight - SCUD (Borkan 06 Jun 2016 42°47’38”E 18°18'23”N 1) flight King Khalid Intercepted and destroyed in Airbase by Patriot PAC - 3. - 3 Jul 2016 QAHER 1 Abha 18°14'22”N 42°31'33”E Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight 17°33'19”N Najran 23 Jul 2016 44°14'33”E QAHER - 1 Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight 44°14'33”E Najran 33'19”N 23 Jul 2016 QAHER - 1 17° 1 x young female injured, Possible Tochka missile 1 - QAHER 10 Aug 2016 Reported as intercepted and Military Base destroyed in flight TBC - 1 TBC 10 Aug 2016 QAHER Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight 17°33'19”N Najran 1 - AHER Q 16 Aug 2016 7 civilians died 44°14'33”E 18°18'19”N 19 Aug 2016 Intercepted and destroyed in flight. 42°44'43”E QAHER - 1 Khamis Mushayt SCUD (Borkan 42°32’44”E 16°52'55”N 1) - 26 Aug 2016 Jizan Hamiyeh 158 Power Plant 3 Zelzal 44°14'33”E 31 Aug 2016 Najran 17°33'19”N SCUD (Borkan 2 Sep 2016 - 1) 21°28'58”N 40°32’39”E King Fahid Airbase 10 Sep 2016 Asir Province 1) - SCUD (Borkan 159 10 Sep 2016 SCUD (Borkan - 1) 17°39'46”N 42°03’44”E Al Shqaiqh Water Plant SCUD (B orkan 18°18'23”N 12 Sep 2016 - 1) 42°47’38”E Intercepted and destroyed in flight King Khalid Airbase by Patriot PAC - 3. 3 Oct 2016 Not Known Zahran Al Montazah Zelzal 3 4 Oct 2016 Military base. - QAHER 8 Oct 2016 42°43'54”E 18°18'17”N 1 Khamis Mushayt __________________ 158 Alleged launch video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BjOgyvwCZc . 159 - Reported as the fifth SCUD - C attack. http://www.yemenpress.org/yemen/scud - missile at - electricity - station - and - desalination - water . jazan.html - in - 00300 - 17 155 242 /

156 S/2017/81 Target Area Launch Point (LP) in Yemen Missile type Longitude Comments Date Latitude Longitude Location Latitude Location claimed 9 Oct 2016 SCUD (Borkan - 1) Taif 21°28'52”N 40°33'07”E Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight Jazan 20 Oct 2016 Not Known 16°53'47”N 44°33'26”E 20 Oct 2016 Not Known Najran 17°33'19”N 44°14'33”E 21°25'27”N Not Known 28 Oct 2016 39°49'35”E Reported as intercepted and Jeddah or destroyed in flight 65km from Mecca target, which is in dispute. Longest range attack to date. Not Known Jazan 16°53'47”N 44°33'26”E 1 Nov 2016 1 Nov 2016 Not Known Najran 17°33'19”N 44°14'33”E Asir province 1 Nov 2016 Not Known 21 Tochka 44°14'33”E 17°33'19”N Najran x 2 15 Nov 2016 OTR - Reported as intercepted and destroyed in flight 42°43'54”E Not Known 18°18'17”N 26 Nov 2016 Khamis Reported as intercepted and in flight Mushayt destroyed 17 00300 - 156 242 /

157 S/2017/81 Appendix A to Annex 42: Ballistic estimates for Houthi 3’ and ‘SOMOD’ rockets ‘ZELZAL - D = Cd*((ρ*V*V)/2)*A Drag Equation Drag Coefficient No Unit 0.45 ESTIMATE Cd Air Density kg/m3 ρ 1.225 V Velocity m/s 1568.5 From ESTIMATE V m/s 1737.9 Velocity From EXHAUST VELOCITY A Cross - sectional Area m2 0.2420 mm Calibre 555 D Drag N 164059.16 Ideal Rocket Equation M Mass Rocket kg 1000 1000 Mf Mass Full Rocket Motor kg Me Mass Empty Rocket Motor kg 499 501 Mass Propellant kg Mp MR Propellant Mass Ratio No Unit 2.004008016 0.695149183 Log MR ln MR SI Specific Impulse 230 ESTIMATE Specific Impulse From Exhaust Velocity 254.841998 SI t time sec 1 F kg.m.s 1 Thrust Veq Engine Exhaust Velocity 2500 ESTIMATE 9.81 g Gravity m/s2 V Velocity m/s 1568.5 From ESTIMATE 1737.9 Velocity m/s V From EXHAUST VELOCITY Terminal Velocity Vt = (2*M/(Cd * ρ * A))^0.5 M Mass Rocket (Burnt Out) kg 499 ESTIMATE 0.45 Coefficient No Unit Cd Drag ρ Air Density kg/m3 1.225 A Cross - sectional Area m2 0.2420 86.5 Terminal Velocity m/s Vt Vt Terminal Velocity kph 311.4 Range (with Drag) R = (V(0) * Vt * Cosθ) / g V(0) Initial Velocity m/s 1568.5 ESTIMATE V(0) Initial Velocity FROM EXHAUST VELOCITY 1737.9 m/s 311.4 M/S Terminal Velocity Vt 00300 - 17 242 / 157

158 S/2017/81 θ Launch Angle Deg 37 θ Launch Angle RAD 0.645771823 9.81 m/s2 Gravity g ESTIMATE 39763.2 R Range (with Drag) m m 44058.0 FROM EXHAUST VELOCITY Range (with Drag) R 17 00300 - 242 / 158

159 S/2017/81 Annex 43: Improvised explosive device technology Technology A. 1. Explosive types and commercial detonators the main filling of IEDs is replacing ammonium nitrate - toluene (TNT) in cast, ground or flake form as 1. Tri - nitro fuel oil (ANFO), although recovered explosive remnants of war (ERW) are still also been utilized as the main charge. - have developed an industrial process The use of TNT as a main filling by AQAP means that it is almost certain that they for the recovery of TNT, from captured or abandoned high explosive military ammunition. 160 2. Armed groups now have access to commercial electric detonators, which has significantly increased their acetone - operational capability as the reliability of such detonators far exceeds the reliability of the traditional AQAP tri peroxide (TATP) filled improvised detonators. Commercial electric detonators are now routinely recovered from tri - failed or neutralised improvised explos ive devices (IEDs). These commercial detonators provide armed groups with the capability to implement a sustained IED campaign. IED technology transfer 2. 3. explosively formed 2016 has seen the introduction of new, to Yemen, IED technology and tactics. This includes projectiles (EFP): first seen been used by the Red Army Faction in Germany (1989), then by Hezbollah in Lebanon (1990>) and then on a massive scale in Iraq (2003>). For example, the Quds Force of the Iranian Islamic Republican ps (IRGC) supplied and instructed insurgents in Iraq on the tandem use of EFP with Passive Infra Red (PIR) Guard Cor 161 initiation systems. This IRGC influence has now transferred to Yemen, which is demonstrated by the use of three digit 162 identification or batch codes been written onto EFP IEDs (figure 43.1) and the recovery of PIR systems (figure 43.2). Although the Panel has no evidence of the direct training of belligerents in the use of IEDs by the IRGC there are indicators as to their influence in the design and m anufacture of these PIR IED (figure 43.2): (a) Method of camouflage of the main charge; (b) The shrink - wrap protection for the electronic components; (c) The use and configuration of the stub helical antennae; and 163 . type connectors (d) The use of BNC 4. Improvised radio controlled directionally focused fragmentation charges (DFFC) have now been identified from imagery of recovered IEDs in both Abyan and Al Mukalla. h more widespread 5. Minimal metal pressure pads (MMPP) for victim operated IEDs (VOIED) have become muc in 2016, with the emergence of a “standard” design. This suggests a degree of industrialization in the manufacture of such components, such as that used by ISIL in Iraq. __________________ 160 Identified from a wide range of imagery. See later. 161 Confidential source. 162 All imagery in this annex from confidential sources. 163 Concelman. – Bayonet Neill 17 - 00300 159 / 242

160 S/2017/81 Figure 43.2 Figure 43.1: ‘Rock’ IED with possible Passive Infra Red (PIR) initiator, Probable Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) IED, Saleh, Ma’rib (30 Oct 2016) Ma’rib (12 Feb 2016). Note: Batch/Lot Number (931). Figure 43.4 Figure 43.3 “Rock” IED, Ta’izz (16 Mar2016) “Rock” IED, Ta’izz (16 Mar2016) Figure 43.6 Figure 43.5 Directional Focused Fragmentation Charge (DFFC) component EFP Radio - Controlled IED (RCIED), for IED, Al Mukalla (16 May 2016) Al Mukalla (16 May 2016) 17 - 00300 160 / 242

161 S/2017/81 Figure 43.8 Figure 43.7 “Rock” IED with Minimal Metal Pressure Plate, IED Factory, Dar Saad, Aden (21 May 2016) Location TBC (10 Jun 2016) Figure 43.10 Figure 43.9 RCIED with improvised fragmentation Suicide Vest IED (PBIED) components, 165 Al Mukalla (27 Jun 2016) Khanfar, Abyan (18 Jun 2016) NOTE: The red components are Dual Tone Multi Frequency (DTMF) circuits for 164 decoding cell phone at tack frequencies. Figure 43.12 Figure 43.11 DFFC and RCIED Find, Ibb (Aug 2016) Under Vehicle IED (UVIED), Aden (7 Aug 2016) __________________ 164 In this IED the audio output from the cell phone appears to be fed via the black 3.5mm audio jack into the input of the DTMF decoder firing switch. The decoder is probably configured for a single numeric firing signal ('9' on the one on the centre and '7' on the one on the righ t). Control of the DTMF decoder is normally via a PIC microprocessor on the The washing machine timer provides a delay to arming switch same circuit board. a common technique previously - used by IRGC trained terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq. 165 3 November 2016, 28 explosive vests/belts were seized from a bus entering Aden. On 1 17 - 00300 161 / 242

162 S/2017/81 Figure 43.13 Figure 43.14 Breeze Block container for disguised IED, Ta’izz (Nov 2016) Location TBC (25 Oct 2016) ‘Rock’ IED and EFP IED, 6. The most recent example of technological and tactical transfer of IED knowledge is that of the use of a grenade 166 in Aden on 18 December 2016. This technique has been seen cord by the suicide bomber fuze directly onto detonating in Libya, Syria and Iraq and is a departure from the more normal electrical initiation system. Figure 43.15 Suicide IED using grenade fuze, Aden (18 Dec 2016) B. Future IED clearance challenges 7. There is now an ever more significant threat to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel than that last 167 eal The few EOD teams that do exist have inadequate equipment and insufficient training to safely d reported in 2013. with such a high technical and tactical threat. Perhaps more importantly, the only organization with a base level of knowledge that could be built on to develop a credible IED Disposal (IEDD) capability is the UNDP supported Yemen 168 EMAC), Mine Action Centre (Y but their direct involvement in IEDD during conflict could jeopardize their neutrality and primary humanitarian mission of mine action. __________________ 166 - Radfani. Abu Hashim al 167 Restricted UNDP Report February 2013. – 168 eats A pilot IEDD course was run by UNDP for YEMAC in 2014, but the training team had to be withdrawn after thr were made against them. 17 - 00300 162 / 242

163 S/2017/81 The post conflict environment will provide further challenges for YEMAC humanitarian mine clearance as 8. s have been used in tandem with the anti IED personnel minefields already present to form a defensive belt around - belligerent positions. The safe clearance of these defensive integrated IED/mine belts will require the development of nd protocols for the mine clearance teams, whom will require the direct support of IEDD new operating procedures a teams. 17 00300 - 163 / 242

164 S/2017/81 Annex 44: ERW, mines and UXO summary Mines and UXO A. 1. Use of mines in IEDs by Houthi and Saleh forces 1. The Panel continues to receive evidence of the use of mines by Houthi and Saleh forces, and the use of integrated mine and IED barrier belts by AQAP, and more recently the Houthi and Saleh forces. This often includes the use of abandoned unexploded ordnance (AXO), such as landmines or HE artillery shel ls, as the main charges of an IED. 169 Figures 44.1 to 44.6 2. - show the removal of Houthi deployed IEDs, with anti tank mines as main charges, from Kamb, Saleh Directorate, Ta’izz on 24 November 2016. This was part of a clearance operation by ‘popular resista nce’ forces. The area was forcibly cleared of civilians by the Houthi in July 2015 and then used as part of a mine and IED 170 barrier belt defensive position. This effectively prevented the return of civilians until the EOD threat had been cleared. Figure 44 .1 Figure 44.2 Render Safe of IED (AT mine main charge), Render Safe of IED (anti - tank (AT) mine main charge), Ta’izz, November 2016 Ta’izz, November 2016 __________________ 169 From confidential source. 170 On 11 August 2016, official sources reported one civilian death and two injuries in this area from explosive remnants of war (ERW). 17 - 00300 164 / 242

165 S/2017/81 Figure 44.4 Removal of AT mine main charge from IED, Figure 44.3 Ta’izz, November 2016 Removal of AT mine main charge from IED, Ta’izz, November 2016 Figure 44.6 Figure 44.5 171 Render safe of IED, Location of integrated Mine/IED belt, Ta’izz, November 2016 Ta’izz, November 2016 3. voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as Displaced persons have a right to 172 IHL requires that all parties must take the necessary measures soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist. 173 to ensure the safe return of those displaced. Panel also received reports of more traditional mine laying by the Houthi near Mukalla during 2016. Figure The 4. tank mines being prepared for - 44.7 shows the hand drawn mine map of this area, whereas figure 44.8 shows the anti laying. __________________ 171 The image shows either: 1) a tripwire; 2) a pull link to a swit ch; or 3) a pressure release wire, being cut. NOTE the probable detonating cord looped over the wall. 172 ICRC Customary IHL Study Rule (CIHLR) 132. 173 Ibid. 17 - 00300 165 / 242

166 S/2017/81 Figure 44.8 Figure 44.7 174 Houthi Mine Map (Sketch), near al Mukha, 2016 tank mines, prepared for laying, Mukalla, 2016 Anti - Sea Port Town Mines ‘new’ to Yemen 2. 1. The Panel has identified APM types that have never been recorded as ever in the possession of the Yemeni Armed Forces. Yemen, as a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty (1997), completed the destruction of its stockpile of APM on 27 April 2002. Whereas Yemen re tained 4,000 APM for training and research purposes, none of these were of the type seen below. 2. As the possible deployment of these APM might be by an entity acting on behalf of individuals listed by the Committee , and/or the weapon might have been used in violation of IHL, the Panel was interested in establishing whether the presence of these APMs result from inappropriate deployment, illegal diversion, black market purchase or capture during military operations. Figure 44.9 Figure 44.10 176 175 - Mandab, October 2015 GYATA APM, Najran, December 2015 PRB M35 APM, Bab al __________________ 174 Sketch drawn by Houthi engineer involved with the task via confidential source. 175 Source: Confide ntial. The Government of Belgium confirmed to the Panel that this APM was manufactured by PRB, but regretted that they could not provide further assistance as to the end user, as their national legislation only commits them to maintaining export records fo r 5 years. 176 Source: NGO individual. The Panel submitted a tracing request to the Government of Hungary and a response is still awaited. 00300 - 17 / 242 166

167 S/2017/81 Figure 44.12 Figure 44.11 178 177 PPM2 APM, Ma’rib, 9 April 2016 PSM - 1 APM, Ma’rib, March 2016 Figure 44.14 Figure 44.13 Projector Area Defence type APM, Projector Area Defence type APM, 180 179 Lowder, Abyan, 25 May 2016 Buraida, Aden, 21 July 2016 181 Cluster munitions B. - The Panel has either obtained or verified evidence that cluster munitions have been used by the Saudi Arabia 1. 182 183 within Yemen and consulted with credible sources coalition during the conflict. The Panel has analysed imagery led __________________ 177 Source: HRW. The Government of Bulgaria confirmed to the Panel that this APM was manufactured by Arsenal J.S.Co, Kaza nluk in 1989 and was sold to the Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria in 1990. The Government of Bulgaria regretted that they could not provide further assistance as to the end user, as their national legislation only commits for 10 years. them to maintaining export records 178 Confidential sources. The Panel requested more details on this seizure from the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to allow for submission of tracing requests to appropriate Member States. No response has been received yet r government. from eithe 179 Source: Yemen Mine Action Centre (YEMAC). The Panel initially assessed that this may be a Chinese APM. China stated in a letter to the Panel of 9 December 2016 that this particular mine was not of Chinese manufacture. 180 Confidential sour ce. The Panel initially assessed that this may be a Chinese APM. China stated in a letter to the Panel of 9 December 2016 that this particular mine was not of Chinese manufacture. 181 referenced. From a wide range of credible and confidential sources unless otherwise 182 Original imagery of media and NGO sources. 183 Confidential sources with knowledge of mine action in Yemen. 17 - 00300 167 / 242

168 S/2017/81 184 about the BL - 755 cluster munition debris and unexploded bomblets received from Al - Khadra on 18 January 2016. 185 The Panel is unconvinced by clai ms from the Saudi Arabia - led coalition, or other stakeholders with an interest, that all the debris and unexploded bomblets were as the result of previous campaigns. The Panel identified the following evidence as key to their findings: (a) sufficient weathering, caused by the sand erosion of paint etc, of the unexploded bomblets There was in and debris for them to have been on the ground for any lengthy period of time; (b) Civilian casualties in the area that the debris and unexploded bomblets were rec overed from only started to occur post March 2015; (c) A highly credible and confidential source with access to the International Management System for ere Mine Action (IMSMA) data for Yemen confirmed that the areas where the debris and unexploded bomblets w recovered from were not recorded as a Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA); the closest SHA was nearly 20km away; (d) The comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) completed in July 2000 showed no indication of a SHA close to the recently discovered clust er munition strike areas; The Yemen Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) has been conducting mine and UXO clearance operations (e) in the region for the last ten years. They would undoubtedly have had legacy cluster bomblet impacted areas, or an area, reported to them during this time. No reports were received; and casualties from such The Director of YEMAC, Ahmed Alawi, confirmed in an interview with ITN (shown on 26 October (f) enior YEMAC staff who verified that 2016) that these were not legacy strikes. The Panel also consulted with previous s they had never seen any evidence of cluster munition use in this area, and that had it been previously used it would have been reported to their field teams. 186 The Panel has examined the evidence presented in an Amnesty 2. on the issue in detail, in International report addition to other independently obtained evidence, and finds the content and conclusions of the report as accurate, highly credible and compelling. __________________ 184 16°21'10.0"N 42°58'16.2"E (approximate location of al - Khadhra Village). 185 - using denies - - Widely reported. For example AFP, 10 January 2016. https://www.yahoo.com/news/saudi - led - coalition - - - bombs - yemen cluster 075855238.html?ref=gs , or ITN News, 3 November 2016. http://www.itv.com/news/2016 - 11 arabia in - . 03/saudi - yemen/ - deny - using - british - cluster - bombs - in - the - war - 186 . https://amnesty.app.box.com/s/yx7xrh9g5cz2qj4fro6ozi2ygpmpfvxj 17 - 00300 168 / 242

169 S/2017/81 187 189 Figure 44.15 Figure 44.16 188 in Al - Khadra BL - 755 cluster munition unit recovered - BL - 755 cluster munition unit recovered from Al (18 January 2016) Khadra to YEMAC explosive storehouse 3. led coalition in other - The Panel has also obtained evidence of the use of cluster munitions by the Saudi Arabia areas (see figures 44.17 to 44.20). The available evidence and the lack of weathering all strongly indicate the recent use of the cluster munitions and refute claims of them being legacy munitions. Figure 44.17 Figure 44.18 CBU 58/A cluster munition recovered in Sana’a CBU 58A /B cluster munition recovered in Sana’a (16 January 2016) (16 January 2016) __________________ 187 Source: Amnesty International. 188 Khadhra Village). 42°58'16.2"E (approximate location of al - , 16°21'10.0"N 189 e: Amnesty International. Sourc 17 - 00300 169 / 242

170 S/2017/81 Figure 44.19 Figure 44.20 CBU 58A /B cluster munition recovered Mastaba CBU 58A /B cluster munition recovered Mastaba 190 (27 March 2016) (27 March 2016) Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) in civilian areas C. In March and April 2016 a demining team found a cache of 34 items of abandoned unexploded ordnance in 1. included mines, artillery shells and TNT blocks (figure 44.21 and 44.22). Ta’izz university. This Figure 44.21 Figure 44.22 AXO, Ta’izz University (April 2016) AXO, Ta’izz University (April 2016) 2. also have being attempting to shield the In storing ammunition within the university premises, these forces may military objects from attack. IHL also requires that parties to take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian 191 population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks. ible that by storing It is poss ammunition in the University, the Houthi forces increased the likelihood of attacks against this civilian infrastructure. __________________ 190 16°13'40.80"N, 43°14'40.80"E. 191 CIHLR 22. 17 - 00300 170 / 242

171 S/2017/81 D. Use of inert aircraft bombs The Panel has identified the recent use of Mark 83 1,000lb inert 1. - filled aircraft bombs fitted with concrete 192 precision guidance units. Although not strictly UXO, the issue has been included as they can have similar disruptive effects to daily life as they look like UXO. The use of inert bombs is a deliberate tactic, although one not widely known, which has been used before in 2. 193 to attack high value targets (HVT) in built up areas where collateral damage is unacceptable. The other conflicts 194 energy of the weapon, theory being that the damage caused is limited to that imparted by the kinetic - as being non 195 explosive there is no blast, and a much reduced fragmentation danger area. Two incidents, involving multiple inert bombs, have been identified to date (table 44.1 and figures 44.23 and 44.25). The protocols surroundi ng the preparation and loading of weapons are stringent and thus it is highly unlikely that these inert bombs were loaded onto an aircraft and then dropped by mistake. Table 44.1 Incidents of inert A/C bombs Date Location Type Quantity Target Mark 82 Inert Tahir Square, Sana’a 1 Sep 2016 20 Sep 2016 Mark 82 Old City, Sana’a >5 NSB Office 196 Inert Figure 44.24 Figure 44.23 Tahir Square, Sana’a (1 Sep 2016) Tahir Square, Sana’a (1 Sep 2016) __________________ 192 5824, EMPTY BOMB MK83, P/N - NSN 1325 2015 20150 Clearly identified from engraved markings: V3682600_22KH NCAGE A4447?. 193 Northern Iraq (1999), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), Gaza and Syria . 194 The Panel has estimated by calculation that the kinetic energy of an inert Mark 82 A/C bomb is equivalent to that of 56 one tonne vehicles travelling at 100mph. 195 On 24 August 2007 a patent application was filed with the US Patent Office for a purpose designed Reduced http://patents.com/us . 7992498.html Collateral Damage Bomb (RCDB). US Patent 7992498 granted on 9 August 2011. - 196 Commercial and Government Entity ( the The manufacturer was traced from CAGE) Code A4447 engraved on the bomb to RWM Italia S.p.A, Via Industrale 8/D, 25016 Ghedi, Italy. 17 - 00300 171 / 242

172 S/2017/81 Figure 44.25 Figure 44.26 Old City, Sana’a (20 Sep 2016) Old City, Sana’a (20 Sep 2016) 3. The Panel is also interested in the deliberate use of inert aircraft bombs as it may demonstrate a new tactic been - some air strikes. It may led coalition designed to reduce the collateral damage during introduced by the Saudi Arabia provide evidence of improved consideration of Collateral Damage Estimates as required under IHL. In these two t a particular incidents, however, there is still insufficient information to assess if the inert aircraft bombs were aimed a legitimate military target. If not dropped on a specific and legitimate military objective, then their use is still a violati on of IHL. Figure 44.27 Old City, Sana’a (20 Sep 2016) 17 - 00300 172 / 242

173 S/2017/81 E. IHL aspects IHL requires that when explosive ordnance, including landmines, is used, particular care must be taken to 1. 197 In the case at paragraph C.2, and in many others, the Panel is not convinced that minimize their indiscriminate effects. s on civilians. Such precautions, at a minimum, the Houthi forces took the relevant precautions to prevent their effect would normally include the delineation and marking of minefields from all exterior approaches, and a mine awareness programme. ERW casualties and survivors F. 1. injured from ERW. For example, Human Rights Watch The Panel received multiple reports of people 198 Mwatana Organization documented ten incidents documents five ERW incidents, which killed six and wounded nine. 199 of ERW explosions, which killed 32 civilians and injured 23. reported to YEMAC This is only a fraction of that throughout Yemen, and has been included for illustrative purposes only at table 44.2. Table 44.2 ERW casualties in Ta’izz area (2016) Ser Date Location District Governorate Fatal Injured Consequences Maafer 1 Al - Nashamah Civilians on a motorbike returning Al - 25 Jan 2016 Tai’zz 3 home. 2 10 Mar 2016 al - Qua’a Al - Baidha Al - Baidha 1 1 dead child. 22 Mar 2016 Haida area Children. Hareeb 3 Ma’rib 1 1 Bus. Includes 1 dead and 4 injured 8 8 Tai’zz 4 23 Apr 2016 Al - Turbah children 17 May 2016 Al - Qaloa’a Al 5 Buraiq Aden 2 1 1 child injured - 6 19 May 2016 Wadi al - Helan Majzr Ma’rib 3 2 Includes 3 dead and 1 injured children 7 21 May 2016 Shaab al - 1 child injured Hareeb Ma’rib 2 1 Hafa’a, 8 1 dead child and 1 injured female 1 24 May 2016 1 Hareeb Nihm Sana’a Includes 6 dead and 4 injured 9 Aug 2016 Wadi Hana Al - Tai’zz 10 9 9 Wazeeiah children Truck 1 9 Aug 2016 10 Sabr district Lahj __________________ 197 CIHLR 81. 198 . victims - claim civilian https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/08/yemen - hou thi - landmines - - 199 Information provided to the Panel. 17 - 00300 173 / 242

174 S/2017/81 Annex 45: Houthi illegal taxation The Panel established that the Houthis are 1. collecting tax from the Yemeni Red Sea Corporation on weekly basis. The following evidence shows that the Houthis are asking for the collection of a tax to be collected by the Yemeni office. Red Sea Corporation, to be transferred on a weekly basis to Hudaydah post Figure 45.1: Houthi “tax demand” Panel Translation Following the outcomes of the meeting of the administrative commission of the local council of al - Hudaydah Governorate of 10 October 2016 related to the support of the Central Bank, which is an important national responsibility of the Yemeni people and primarily businessmen and entrepreneurs. Therefore, 100,000 Yemeni Riyal shall be contributed, for the support of the Central Bank, by each ship entering the port of al e carrying oil products. The payment in cash and not with checks shall be collected the Hudaydah apart from thos - - Yemeni Red Sea ports and transferred on a weekly basis to the account at the Yemeni central post service of al ha Hudaydah for the support of the Central Bank. 17 - 00300 174 / 242

175 S/2017/81 6: Houthi proxies and affiliates Annex 4 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 17 00300 - 242 / 175

176 S/2017/81 Annex 47: Saleh proxies and affiliates (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 / 176 242

177 S/2017/81 Annex 48: Financial activities of Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh 1. This annex contains the supporting documentary evidence to demonstrate that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh has been acting on behalf of his father Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003). The Panel obtained information from confidential sources that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh has 2. managed a financial structure comprising seven offshore companies, three acquired from his father and four more likely transferred from his brother according to indicators and bank accounts in Singapore and UAE. 0, XX011, The Panel analysed accounts owned directly or indirectly by Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh (XX01 XX013, XX014, XX018, XX021, XX024, XX025, XX032, XX324, XX352) during the period from January 2014 to July 2016 (table 1 below). Table 48.1 Monthly transactions equivalent to US$ 100,000 plus Total monthly Number of debit major Total monthly credit transactions US$ major transactions major transactions equivalent Month US$ equivalent Remarks 0.00 Jan 2014 7 1,604,913.72 - Feb 2014 14 43,950,192.92 6,022,101.52 - Mar 2014 1 0.00 - 1,989,396.00 Apr 2014 7 0.00 9,188,396.33 May 2014 4 0.00 22,085,925.04 Jun 2014 6 0.00 19,123,305.64 - Jul 2014 0.00 615,037.31 Aug 2014 4 - 307,511.57 386,711.57 Sep 2014 4 - 1,326,109.26 415,593.00 Oct 2014 0.00 8 34,770,278.46 7 Nov 2014 Listing of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) 6 - 281,513.16 Nov 2014 53,628,109.07 Dec 2014 35 - 181,638,247.05 263,714,684.43 Jan 2015 0 0 Feb 2015 4 0 573,614.81 Mar 2015 0 6 1,005,774.85 14 Apr 2015 Listing of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) Apr 2015 5 - 545,040.00 2,039,658.62 May 2015 3 113,967.86 - 344,351.64 Jun 2015 11 5,827,225.39 628,608.26 - Jul 2015 6 1,716,732.93 81,749.19 - Aug 2015 4 - 1,106,431.20 818,755.00 Sep 2015 2 - 1,107.37 0 Oct 2015 0 0 0 Dec 2015 3 20151,630.95 200,165.94 Jan 2016 0 0 - 3 194,851.80 194,960.81 Feb 2016 17 - 00300 177 / 242

178 S/2017/81 Total monthly Number of debit major Total monthly credit major transactions US$ major transactions Month equivalent transactions US$ equivalent Remarks 28 Feb 2016 Publication of the Panel’s Final Report 2015 Mar 2016 5 - 2,083,042.87 2,182,874.03 1 Apr 2016 150,124.46 0 1 - 135,615.49 0 May 2016 Jun 2016 2 0 1,519,299.00 14,080.29 0 Jul 2016 1 288,943,964.26 Total - 153 373,733,724.53 The Panel noted peaks in the amount of funds transferred during the designation periods, and following the 3. publication of the Panel 2015 report, which for the first timed had identified the structure used by Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003). This is likely an indicator that other funds have moved to Khaled’s accounts. The Panel continues to investigate. 17 - 00300 178 / 242

179 S/2017/81 Figure 48.1 Link of Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh and his assets with listed individuals - 17 00300 242 / 179

180 S/2017/81 Appendix A to Annex 48: Timeline of company transfers Table 48.A.1 Timeline of company transfer Weisen Limited Albula Limited (Turk and Caicos Islands (British Virgin Islands Event (E29459)) (395883)) 23 October 2014 Directors Resolution 23 October 2014 Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh entered in Register of 23 October 2014 23 October 2014 Members and Share Ledger 24 October 2014 Register of Members and Share Ledger printed 24 October 2014 28 October 2014 28 October 2014 Register of Members and Share Ledger signed 7 November 2014 Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) designated 200 Certificate of Incumbency signed by Newhaven 14 November 2014 Corporate Services Limited (BVI) 18 November 2014 Certificate of Incumbency signed by Unicorn Administration Limited (Turk and Caicos Islands) 3 December 2014 3 December 2014 Certificate of Incumbency certified as a true copy by Supreeya Tacouri of NWT Management S.A 6 December 2014 6 December 2014 Certificate of Incumbency certified as a true copy by George Sarkis (position and company unknown) __________________ 200 A Certificate of Incumbency lists individuals who have the authority to contract on behalf of the company or enter into legally binding agreements on behalf of the company. Until it is signed and deposited with the national authority into any registration those individuals listed do not have authority to enter the company y responsible for compan . legally binding contracts 17 - 00300 180 / 242

181 S/2017/81 Appendix B to Annex 48: Funds transfers 1 Evidence that Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh received US$ 33,471,993.37 and Euro 734,786.49 from Albula Limited, Foxford Management Limited and Weisen Limited companies, which he acquired from his father Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) during the period around his designation on 7 November 2014. Image 48.B.1 Confidential bank source 00300 17 - 181 / 242

182 S/2017/81 Appendix C to Annex 48: Trice Bloom Limited Figure 48.C.1 Shareholders Precision Diamond Limited and Unmatchable Limited – of Trice Bloom Limited Figure 48.C.2 Sole shareholder of Unmatchable Limited – Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh 17 - 00300 182 / 242

183 S/2017/81 Figure 48.C.3 – Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh Sole shareholder of Precision Diamond Limited Figure 48.C.4 Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh – Sole Director of Trice Bloom Limited Sources: Confidential 17 - 00300 183 / 242

184 S/2017/81 Figure 48.C.5 Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) appointed by Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh as an authorized signatory to the accounts maintained by Trice Bloom on 13 December 2013. Source: Confidential 00300 - 17 242 / 184

185 S/2017/81 Appendix D to Annex 48: Towkay Limited Figure 48.D.1 Sole shareholder of Towkay Limited – Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh Figure 48.D.2 Towkay Limited transfer of AED 1,128,400 to Raydan Investments Limited (20 August 2014) Sources: Confidential 17 - 00300 185 / 242

186 S/2017/81 Appendix E to Annex 48: Funds transfers 2 Table 48.E.1 Summary of funds transfers through the UAE dormant account of Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh Amount Equivalent (AED) Date (US$) Transaction type Account balance 5 Jan 2014 78,952.50 Deposit 20,996.99 290,000.00 8 Dec 2014 3,324,541.47 905,106.42 Transfer 3,345,538.46 9 Dec 2014 36,700,000.00 9,991,575.00 Transfer 40,045,538.46 11 Dec 2014 2,722,500.00 Cash withdrawal 30,045,538.46 10,000,000.00 11 Dec 2014 26,700,000.00 7,269,075.00 Cash withdrawal 30,016,808.46 15 Dec 2014 36,700,000.00 9,991,575.00 Transfer 40,016,808.46 15 Dec 2014 37,000,000.00 10,073,250.00 Cash withdrawal 3,016,808.46 withdrawal Cash 14,973,750.00 55,000,000.00 17 Dec 2014 - 51,943,191.54 55,050,000.00 14,987,362.50 Transfer 3,066,808.46 17 Dec 2014 55,000,000.00 14,973,750.00 Cash withdrawal 51,943,191.54 25 Dec 2014 25 Dec 2014 68,181,260.00 18,562,348.04 Transfer 16,238,068.46 28 Dec 2014 66,000,000.00 17,968,500.00 Cash withdrawal - 49,761,931.08 72,270,231.08 Transfer 122,032,162.62 33,223,256.27 28 Dec 2014 3,593,700.00 13,200,000.00 28 Dec 2014 Transfer 59,070,231.08 Transfer 68,960,181.08 30 Dec 2014 110,000.00 29,947.50 30 Dec 2014 58,960,181.08 16,051,909.30 Cash withdrawal 0.00 308,660,181.08 84,032,734.30 Total 2016) - * Based on average exchange rate 1 AED = 0.27225 US$ (2013 Source: Confidential 17 - 00300 186 / 242

187 S/2017/81 Figure 48.E.1 04) 01 - UAE bank statement (account XXX - 00300 - 17 242 / 187

188 S/2017/81 Figure 48.E.2 - 02 - (account XXX UAE bank statement 05) Sources: Confidential 17 00300 - 188 / 242

189 S/2017/81 Figure 48.E.3 UAE bank letter Source: Confidential 00300 - 17 242 / 189

190 S/2017/81 Appendix F to Annex 48: Funds transfer from Trice Bloom Limited to Raydan Investments Limited Image.48.F.1 Investments Limited Trice Bloom Limited funds to Raydan Source: Confidential 17 - 00300 / 242 190

191 S/2017/81 Appendix G to Annex 48: Raydan Investments Limited UAE commercial licence and documentation Image.48.G.1 Raydan Investments Limited UAE commercial licence 00300 - 17 242 191 /

192 S/2017/81 Image.48.G.2 Raydan Investments Limited UAE bank documentation Source: Confidential 17 - 00300 242 / 192

193 S/2017/81 Image.48.G.3 Raydan Investments Limited UAE legal relationship details Source: Confidential 00300 - 17 193 / 242

194 S/2017/81 Appendix H to Annex 48: Ansan Wikfs Investment Limited UAE commercial licence Image.48.H.1 Ansan Wikfs Investments Limited UAE commercial licence 17 - 00300 242 / 194

195 S/2017/81 Appendix I to Annex 48: Ownership of Ansan Wikfs Investment Limited Image.48.I.1 Shaher Abdulhak as owner of Ansan Wikfs Investment Limited Source: Confidential 00300 - 17 242 / 195

196 S/2017/81 Appendix J to Annex 48: Transfers from Ansan Wikfs Investment Limited to Raydan Investment Limited Image.48.J.1 Summary of funds transfers from Ansan Wikfs Investment Limited to Raydan Investment Limited Date Amount (AED) Equivalent (US$)* 17 Sep 2014 3,050,478.00 830,492.64 Account Khaled XX11 2,067,711.00 562,934.32 Account Khaled XX11 30 Oct 2014 24 Feb 2015 1,230,254.00 334,936.65 Account Raydan XX18 3 Mar 2015 761,603.00 207,346.42 Account Raydan XX18 207,885.47 763,583.00 30 May 2015 Account Raydan XX24 975,125.00 265,477.78 Account Raydan XX24 9 Jun 2015 16 Jun 2015 975,125.00 265,477.78 Account Raydan XX24 12 Dec 2015 734,500.00 199,967.63 Account Raydan XX24 24 Apr 2016 Account Raydan XX24 550,875.00 149,975.72 Total based on evidence 11,109,254.00 3,024,494.41 1,631,067.45 5,991,065.00 Total since listing of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) 2016) - Based on average exchange rate 1 AED = 0.27225 USD (2013 Source: Confidential 17 - 00300 196 / 242

197 S/2017/81 Annex 49: Air strikes affecting civilians and civilian infrastructure (2016) 201 1. This annex contains four case studies relating to ten investigations undertaken by the Panel on air strikes that impacted on civilians and civilian infrastructure. These air strikes are attributed to the Saudi Arabia - led coalition. The following is a summary of the ten case studies: .1 Table 49 Air strikes affecting civilians and civilian infrastructure Civilian Civilian Effect on civilian Location Type of EO Ser fatalities Date injured objects 1 15 Mar 2016 Al Khamees market, Infrastructure damaged. Mk 83 Bomb / 116 40+ Mastaba Paveway 2 25 Mar 2016 T’baisha, Ta’izz Not confirmed 10 0 Civilian house destroyed. 3 Civilian house destroyed. Al Mahala, Lahj Mk 82 Bomb / 25 May 6 3 Paveway 2016 4 25 May Water bottling factory Appendix A: Al 2 Mk 82 Bomb / 0 Mahala, Lahj 2016 destroyed. Paveway 5 9 Aug 2016 Nahda, Sana’a High Explosive Snack factory destroyed. 10 13 aircraft bomb 24 19 12 ‘ - GBU MSF hospital severely 6 15 Aug 2016 Abs, Hajjah Paveway II damaged. 13 Sep 2016 Ban al - Hareth, Alsonidar factory complex 7 Mk 82 Bomb / 0 0 severely damaged. Paveway IV Sana’a 22 Sep 2016 Ban al Alsonidar factory complex Hareth, 8 GBU - 24 / 0 0 - Sana’a Paveway IV severely damaged. 9 Mafraq Jiblah, Ibb Mk 82 Bomb / 24 Sep 2016 9 7 Civilian house destroyed. Paveway 10 695 Community hall 8 Oct 2016 132 al - Sala al - Kubra, 12 ‘ GBU - Sana’a destroyed. Paveway II 2. The Panel adopted a stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from accessing Yemen. See annex 2 on IHL methodology. 3. Panel further finds that given the regular occurrence of incidents of Based on its analysis of the ten strikes, the the nature described in the above mentioned incidents: 202 (a) Those responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing those air strikes that disproportionately affect civilians and civilian objects may fall within the designation criteria contained in paragraphs 17 as those who __________________ 201 The other case studies are available with the Secretariat. 202 In reference to those executing the attacks, it is possible that the pilot of the aircraft may fire his weapon in reliance of the accuracy of information that may have been previously provided to him. In these cases, the Panel finds that it is lan and decide upon the attacks, whom have at their disposal the relevant information from a variety of those who p sources, who have the greatest responsibility to ensure compliance with IHL. See also William Boothby, “The Law of 133. Targeting”, OUP (2012), pp. 132 - 17 - 00300 197 / 242

198 S/2017/81 threaten peace and security of Yemen. Their acts may also fall under paragraphs 18 (a), (b), a nd (c) of resolution 2140 (2014); All member States of the Saudi Arabia - led coalition and their allies should take necessary measures to (b) 203 IHL underscores that States “...may ensure that their forces engaged in coalition military operations respect IHL. not 204 evade their obligations by placing their contingents at the disposal of...an ad hoc coalition”; (c) All coalition member States and their allies have an obligation under the Geneva Conventions to ensure 205 This obligation is especially incumbent upon the Government in ition. respect for IHL by the Saudi Arabia - led coal 206 - led coalition is conducting air strikes; and Yemen on whose request the Saudi Arabia level military commanders in the Saudi Arabia (d) High - - led coalition are also responsible for I HL violations to the extent that they allow, or do not prevent, air strikes from taking place exclusively based on information received from third parties, even if they are Yemeni authorities, without ensuring that the forces under their command 207 and contro l undertake the necessary assessments relating to proportionality and precautions in attack. List of appendices Al Khamees market, Mastaba, Hajjah (15 March 2016). Appendix A: Appendix B: Civilian house, Al Mahala, Lahj, (25 May 2016). MSF hospital, Abs, Hajjah (15 August 2016). Appendix C: Al - Sala Al - Kubra community hall, Sana’a (8 October 2016). Appendix D: Appendix E: Summary of IHL case study evidence levels (air strikes). __________________ 203 its armed IHL requires each party to the conflict to “respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law by and other persons or forces .” (See CIHLR groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or control 139). 204 See commentary to Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 3 of The Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907, which holds States responsible for “all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces”. 205 This obligation to respect and ensure respect under Common Article 1 is not limited to those coalition States that actively participated in this air strike as stated in the Commentary. “The duty to ensure respect... is particularly strong artner in a joint operation, even more so as this case is closely related to the negative duty neither to in the case of a p encourage nor to aid or assist in violations of the Conventions. The fact, for example, that a High Contracting Party participates in the financing, e quipping, arming or training of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, or even plans, carries out and debriefs operations jointly with such forces, places it in a unique position to influence the behaviour of those forces, and thus to ensure respect fo r the Conventions”. 206 S/2015/217. 207 142 and 153. R For an overview of command responsibility in this area, see CIHL 17 - 00300 198 / 242

199 S/2017/81 Appendix A to Annex 49: Al Khamees market, Mastaba, Hajjah (15 March 2016) A. Introduction 208 This case study is one of two air strikes on civilian gatherings investigated by the Panel. 1. B. Background to events 2. At approximately 11:30 hours on 15 March 2016, items of explosive ordnance (EO) were dropped from a 209 These explosions occurred military aircraft and detonated on the Al Khamees Market, Mastaba, Hajjah Governorate. approximately five to seven minutes apart at a distance of 50m between them. The UN verified that 116 individuals, 210 211 MSF recorded over 40 wounded. including 22 childre n, were killed by the air strike, There was a military checkpoint (CP) belonging to the Houthis approximately 140m from the second airstrike 3. 212 ers. and 190m from the first air strike. This CP is usually manned by up to six fight The two air strikes did not damage 213 It is possible that there were some individual fighters present in, or in the vicinity of, the market at the time of the CP. 214 the air strike, as Houthi fighters regularly visit the market to purchase qat and other commodities. However, witnesses and other investigators consistently confirmed that there was no large gathering of Houthi militias at the CP or in, or in 215 the vicinity of, the market. __________________ 208 The other air strike was on a civilian gathering was on 8 October 2016, on a funeral hall in Sana’a. See case study at appendix D to this annex. 209 EO Strike 1, 16°13'39.31"N, 43°14'42.04"E; EO Strike 2, 16°13'40.61"N, 43°14'41.08"E. 210 “Zeid condemns repeated killing of civilians in Yemen airstrikes” at . Health officials reported 102 http://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17251&LangID=E casualties and 44 injured. See “Saudi led coalition to investigate Yemen air strikes” at - led - coalition - investigate - http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/saudi - air - strikes 20160316071229274.html - yemen lect ‘torn limbs in bags and blankets’ after Saudi - led warplanes pound market” and “Yemen: People col - people - http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/yemen ct - torn - limbs - bags - blankets - after - saudi - led - warplanes - pound - market colle 201549689 . Mwatana Organization, a Yemen - based organization documented over 131 civilian casualties, with 86 injured (information provided to the Panel on 01 December 2016). Human Rights Wa tch (HRW) reported 106 civilian - The Government . strike - market - deadliest - casualties. See https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/07/yemen used us - bombs - of Yemen stated that 65 were killed. It did not clarify how many of those were civilians and how many were fighters December 2016). (letter dated 31 211 “Yemen: MSF treats more than 40 wounded following airstrike on marketplace” at http://www.msf.org.uk/article/yemen - msf - treats - more - than - 40 - wounded - following - airstrike - on - marketplace. 212 Local sources and three investigation teams that visited the site in the aftermath of the air strikes. 213 Ibid. 214 HRW says that the air strikes “may have also killed about 10 Houthi f ight ers...” and the UN reports that ten bodies were burnt beyond recognition. See “Yemen: US Bombs Used in Deadliest Market Strike” at - - and strike https://www.hrw.org/news/20 16/04/07/yemen - us - bombs - used - deadliest market http://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17251&LangID=E. Reuters quote one source as - t rises to more than 100” stating there were around 20 fighters. “Death toll from Saudi led air strikes on Yemeni marke at http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0WJ2KB . The Panel was also infor med by one source that around twenty he market to buy qat and left twenty minutes before the air strike. The Panel could not fighters arrived at t corroborate this statement with other witnesses and investigators. 215 Assessment Team (JIAT) stating that one of the See below for details of a statement issued by the Joint Incident mili was a large Houthi gathering. In addition to Panel’s independent investigations both the UN - led tary objectives investigations and the HRW - initiated investigations found that there were no large gatherings of Houthi militias. See “U.N says Saudi - led bombin g of Yemen market may be international crime” at http://www.reuters.com/article/us - deadliest - - used - yemen - security - un - idUSKCN0WK152 and https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/07/yemen - us - bombs strike - market . 17 - 00300 1 99 / 242

200 S/2017/81 Figure 49.A.1 Location of the market and the checkpoint C. Technical analysis of physical evidence Imagery analysis determined a fragment from the location of the first air strike as being part of a rear fin from a 4. PAVEWAY terminal guidance unit for an aircraft bomb (figure 49.A.2). Figure 49.A.2 216 Rear fin from PAVEWAY terminal guidance unit __________________ 216 (taken by investigation team that visited the site in the aftermath). , Source: Confidential 17 - 00300 200 / 242

201 S/2017/81 5. Post blast crater analysis determined that the size of the crater at the first air strike was almost certainly within the dimensional parameters for the detonation of 227kg of high explosives, which is the explosive weight of the Mark 83 217 osive aircraft bomb (figure 49.A.3). variant high expl Figure 49.A.3 218 Explosion crater The only military entity operating the type of aircraft in the area that has the capability to deliver high explosive 6. led coalition. - ordnance of this type is the Saudi Arabia led coalition Response of the Saudi Arabia - D. 7. The responses of the Saudi Arabia - led coalition, JIAT and the Government of Yemen are documented below. Entity / Individual Source Statement Date 219 Document with Panel. JIAT Statement 4 August 2016 “The United Nations news centre has claimed that the coalition State bombarded, and thus massacred, an estimated 106 people, in Suq Khamis Mastaba’ in Hajjah governorate on 15 March 2016. Confirmed intelligence data shows that the target was a large gathering of armed ia recruits. The gathering was near a weekly Houthi milit market where the only activity takes place on Thursday each week. The operation took place on a Tuesday, and - value military objective the target was a legitimate, high that conferred a strategic advantage. It wa s also located 34 kilometres from the Saudi Arabian border, and therefore posed a threat to the troops positioned there”. __________________ 217 HRW Report of 7 April 2016, “ A , attributed the damage to a Mark 84 US Bombs Used in Deadliest Market strike” (2,000lb) aircraft bomb based on fragments recovered. The Panel has not seen this evidence, and is therefore, based on the crater analysis of the first air strike, the Panel erri ng on the side of caution attributes the damage to the smaller Mark 83 (1,000lb) aircraft bomb. 218 Ibid. 219 fficial UN translation. O 17 - 00300 201 / 242

202 S/2017/81 Entity / Individual Statement Source Date 220 Saudi Press Agency JIAT Statement 5 August 2016 The media also reported: “Moreover, the prosecution did claims that civilian casualties, not provide proof of the and the JIAT found no proof of any fault made by the coalition forces, in the process, and that the Coalition forces have abided by the rules of international humanitarian law”. 221 "We use the information coming from the (pro 18 March Reuters quoting Reuters - Hadi) 2016 Yemeni army because they are on the ground. The attack Brigadier army. It gave the was under the control of the Yemeni General Ahmed Asseri, target”. Reuters also stated that the spokesperson - Al Spokesperson “forwarded a graphic prepared by Hadi's government that of the Saudi said the target of the air strike was a military area where led - Arabia Houthi forces had gathered and that "they (Houthis) deceived people by saying it was a market". coalition. 222 Reuters “A statement issued on Friday by Hadi's government said 18 March Government of Yemen 2016 it had formed a committee to look into the bombing and whether it was the result of an air strike or of shelling by the Houthis, w hom it accused of often blaming the coalition for attacks they carried out themselves”. Response to a Panel 31 December “According to sources from the militia 115 have been Government of 2016 Yemen inquiry on the killed and dozens wounded. Our sources in the region confirm that the number of dead is 65. Also the incident Government of Yemen’s occurred on a Tuesday. As the name of the market role in the incident indicates people from the surrounding villag received on 31 es gather on December 2016. the market day, which is Thursday. This confirms the hypothesis that the gathering was of houthis militia and that two technicals have been observed in the entrance of the market. The Government of Yemen doesn’t have final rea is not under its control.” information as the a (Unofficial translation). 223 The Saudi Arabia - led coalition has not yet provided a response to Panel requests for information. 8. E. Panel observations on Saudi Arabia - led coalition’s statement, information provided by the Government of Yemen, and JIAT’s findings relating to the air strikes led coalition’s compliance with IHL, the Panel has given due consideration to the 9. In assessing the Saudi Arabia - official findings above. The Panel highlights that it did not have access to the information that was at the disposal of led coalition. The Panel will, therefore, base its IHL - for information to the Saudi Arabia JIAT, despite requests assessment on its own investigative findings. The Panel notes, however, discrepancies between the statements provided - led coalition spokesperson on the attribution of responsibility by the Government of Yemen and the Saudi Arabia relating to target selection (see paragraph 14). __________________ 220 “Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) on Yemen Responds to Claims on Coalition Forces' Violations in Decisive . St orm Operations” at http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1524799 221 yemen http://www.reuters.com/article/us - - security - un - idUSKCN0WK152 . 222 Ibid. 223 Panel letters dated 1 July 2016 and 21 November 2016. 17 - 00300 202 / 242

203 S/2017/81 IHL F. Analysis of violations of I 10. - led coalition, the Panel analyzed the applicable law in n the absence of a response from the Saudi Arabia 224 relation to this incident on the basis of its own independent investigations. 11. The Panel investigations demonstrated that, while it is possible that some individual fighters may have been 225 present amongst civilians, there was no demonstrable evidence of a large gathering of Houthi fighters or recruits in, or 226 in the vicinity of, the market place at the time of, or preceding, the two air strikes. Statements and imagery gathered by the Panel also demonstrated that the market was functional on 15 March 2016 and that there were civilians, including 227 children in, and in the vicinity of, the market at the time of the air strikes. 228 Ye 12. The Panel finds that it is possible that the air strike targeted some Houthi fighters. t, it is not convinced that 229 the Saudi Arabia led coalition respected relevant principles of IHL, including those relating to proportionality, for the - following reasons : (a) The Panel notes that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition did not provide the Panel w ith information that demonstrated that a significant number of those who died or injured were Houthi fighters. Instead, information collected by the UN and other organizations demonstrate that attack resulted in at least 100 civilian deaths, of which 230 appro ximately 20% were of children. This likelihood of excessive harm to civilians and civilian objects could have reasonably been (b) anticipated in the circumstances because: (i) the market place was a civilian object prima facie immune from attack; (ii) it was also a civilian gathering point; (iii) the market was functional on the day of the air strike; and (iv) that the timin g of the attack would be such as to cause a disproportionately high number of civilian causalities. It is reasonable to expect that a commander ordering these air strikes should have been aware of the above factors, given that this information is readily available, and should have taken them into consideration when assessing the ‘concrete and direct military 231 advantage’ of the air stri kes. __________________ 224 E See appendix 225 The UK views that if the Commander made reasonable effort to gather intelligenc See footnote 496. e, reviews the available intelligence, and concludes in good faith that he is attacking a legitimate military target, “he is unlikely to violate the principles of distinction if the target turned out to be of a different, civilian nature.” See William Boot hby, “The Law of Targeting”, OUP (2012), p. 61. 226 See footnote 496. 227 The Panel was informed that while the weekly market is held on Thursdays, commercial activities take place on other days, although on a lesser scale than Thursdays. The fact that civilians, including, were in a functional market at the time of the strike w as also independently verified by the UN and HRW. See section B. 228 CIHLR 8 defines a military objective as follows: “In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”. 229 Under IHL “launching an attack which may be expected to ca use incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct . military advantage anticipated , is prohibited ” . (E mphasis added) See CIHLR 14. 230 In the Galic Trial Judgement (2003), the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia held in respect of a shelling at a football tournament that “Although the number of soldiers present at the game was significant, an attack on a crowd of ap proximately 200 people, including numerous children, would clearly be expected to cause incidental loss of life and injuries to civilians excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated ” . See tj031205e.pdf - . http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal 231 See CIHLR 14. 17 - 00300 203 / 242

204 S/2017/81 (c) It is also relevant that the aircraft bombs were detonated inside a market place, and not “near” the 232 market where the gathering of militias allegedly took place, and that at least two known locations of Houthi fighters 233 in, and in the vicinity of the market, were unaffected by the strikes. IHL requires military commanders and those responsible for planning and executing decisions regarding attacks 13. feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians to take all 234 led coalition knew that this was a market place and thus and damage to civilian objects. The fact that the Saudi Arabia - a civilian location where there would ordinarily be a congregation of civilians (see paragraph 7), meant that they should have been particularly vigilant when undertaking a proportionality assessment and making use of available precautionary 235 measures to minimize the incident al loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property. It is also not clear what precautionary measures were taken by the Saudi Arabia - led coalition forces, including confirmation that the market was e attack. not active, as alleged by the JIAT, on the day of th 14. led coalition confirms that they relied exclusively on the information - The initial response of the Saudi Arabia 236 The Panel notes that this is the second incident involving mass civilian coming from the Government of Yemen. it investigated, in which the Saudi Arabia casualties, that led coalition or the JIAT alleged that parties affiliated with the - 237 Government of Yemen provided it with the target specific information. The Government of Yemen did not provide 238 It is sufficient information as to its ro le in the air strike. It referred to the gathering of Houthis as a “hypothesis”. difficult to justify an air strike on a civilian object, which is ordinarily a civilian gathering point, on the basis of a mains responsible for any violations relating to proportionality and - hypothesis. The Saudi Arabia led coalition re precautions in attack, which it incurred as the party carrying out the air strikes. Summary of findings G. The Panel finds that: 15. led coalition conducted two air strikes on a market place on 15 March 2016 that The Saudi Arabia - (a) resulted in mass civilian fatalities and casualties; The Panel is unconvinced that principles in relation to proportionality were respected in this incident. If (b) precautionary measures were taken, they were largely inadequate and ineffective; __________________ 232 JIAT statement. the See 233 The Panel finds that the nearby Houthi manned check point was unaffected by the strikes. Additionall y, HRW quotes one witness and states, “He said that some armed Houthi fighters regularly ate and slept in a restaurant about 60 meters from where one bomb detonated. The restaurant was not damaged ” . https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/07/yemen - us - used bombs - deadliest - - market - strike . 234 and CIH See Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions LR 15 - 22. 235 and the United States Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2015), p.1033, 14 , See commentary to CIHLR which requires combatants to assess in good faith the information that is available to them, when conducting attacks. 236 The spokespe rson also forwarded to the media, a graphic prepared by the G overnment of Yemen that said that the target of the air strike was a military area where Houthi forces had gathered. The Panel has not had access to this security graphic. http://www.reuters.com/article/us - yemen - - - un idUSKCN0WK152 . 237 Press Statement by JIAT on the community hall incident in Sana’a on 8 October 2016. Document available with Panel. 238 See paragraph 7 . The Government of Yemen announced on 18 March 2016 that it had formed a committee to look It appears market - deadliest . strike into the air strikes. See https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/07/yemen - us - bombs - used - - that the task was entrusted to the National Commission on Human Rights. The Panel met with the Commissioners in July 2016 in Geneva who informed the Panel that this case is under investigation. 17 - 00300 204 / 242

205 S/2017/81 - specific information, the Saudi Arabia Even if the Government of Yemen had provided it with target (c) led coalition forces are still responsible for IHL violations regarding any failure on their part to undertake the requisite to ensure that relevant detailed assessments relating to proportionality and precautions in attack and their failure precautions were taken to minimize the effects on civilians as a result of the air strikes; and Those officers of the Government of Yemen that passed the information, or who were otherwise (d) involved in the intelligence gatherin g and targeting processes in relation to this incident, may also be responsible for any IHL violations to the extent of their contribution. 17 - 00300 205 / 242

206 S/2017/81 Appendix B to Annex 49: Air strike on Civilian House in Al Mahala, Lahj (25 May 2016) A. Introduction study is one of the three investigations done on air strikes affecting civilian houses. This case 1. Background to events B. At approximately 04:00 hours on 25 May 2016, two items of explosive ordnance, that were dropped from a 2. military aircraft, detonated on, or in very close proximity to, a civilian house in the village of Al - Mahala, Lahj. The 239 killed six occupants of the house, one man, one woman, and four children, and critically injured resultant explosions ed from assisting in rescue efforts after the first strike for fear of a one woman and two children. The neighbours refrain - 5 minutes after the second strike. It is certain that had it not been for the second strike that occurred approximately 2 e attack. The only male adult of the house was a local first, some more members of the family would have survived th Deputy Director of Education. 3. Very shortly afterwards another item of explosive ordnance, highly probably dropped from the same military tres from the civilian house (figure 49.B.1). This house aircraft as above, detonated in another house located 544 me 240 This latter strike did not result in casualties. Within a belonged to a local fighter, whom some say belongs to AQAP. few minutes, a third series of air strikes impacted on a water bottling plant, which was located 8 km north of the house, 241 (case study with Secretariat). The house was located in an area under the control of the legitimate government. Figure 49.B.1 242 Relative locations of houses __________________ 239 ke at 13 01'01.60" N, 44 53'19.87"E. EO Stri 240 Locally, the fighter is called Abu Soultan. The Panel cannot independently verify his allegiance. 241 The Al Anand military base, controlled by the Yemen Armed Forces, was approximately 20 km from the house. 242 Source: Google Earth. 24 October 2016. 17 - 00300 206 / 242

207 S/2017/81 .3 49.B Figure Figure 49.B .2 243 - explosion Civilian house post explosion Armed group suspect’s house post - Technical analysis of physical evidence C. 4. Technical analysis of imagery of fragmentation recovered from the explosion at the civilian house demonstrates that: The explosive device was almost certainly fitted with a Paveway laser guidance unit. Such units are (a) usually designed to be paired with Mark 82 high explosive aircraft bombs; Figure 49.B.5 Figure 49.B.4 - Post explosion guidance fin from a Paveway laser Post explosion adapter flange from a Paveway - guidance system laser guidance system __________________ 243 Confidential sources. Imagery in this appendix was either provided to the Panel by the source or was verified as accurate by eyewitnesses. 17 - 00300 207 / 242

208 S/2017/81 Figure 49.B.6 CAGE Code 94271 Post blast crater analysis determined that the size of the crater was almost certainly within the (b) the detonation of 87kg of high explosives, which is the explosive weight of the Mark 82 dimensional parameters for variant high explosive aircraft bomb; (c) The civilian house was almost certainly destroyed by a Mark 82 high explosive aircraft bomb fitted ance system; with a Paveway laser guid (d) The only military entity operating the type of aircraft in the area that has the capability to deliver high - led coalition. explosive ordnance of this type is the Saudi Response of the Saudi Arabia - led coalition D. 244 The Panel has not yet received a response to a request for information made to the Saudi Arabia - led coalition. 5. The Governor of Lahj issued a statement in which he stated: "We know nothing about the attack. The coalition conducts attacks without informing us. The responsibi lity of this operation is on those who provide the coalition with the wrong 245 coordinates". Analysis of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL ) E. 6. I n the absence of a response from the Saudi Arabia - led coalition, the Panel analyzed the applic able law in 246 relation to this incident on the basis of its own independent investigations. The Panel finds that based on the use of precision - guided weapons and repeated strikes the residential building was the intended target of the two air strikes. __________________ 244 Letter dated 1 July 2016 and 21 November 2016. 245 “‘Human remains everywhere’: Family of 11 killed in alleged Saudi coalition strike in Yemen” at - y members killed in Saudi airstrikes 11 famil . See also “ killed/ - family - coalition https://www.rt.com/news/344445 - saudi on Lahj” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= - 4HRndZslDI . at 246 See appendix E for sources of information. Open source information included https://www.rt.com/news/344445 - - - coalition - family , “ killed/ saudi Yemeni officials: Airstrike kills 11 from same family” at kills http://bigstory.ap.org/article/e8c13a9fa4c34b5dbb2a803d0bf40a68/yemen officials - say - strike - - - 6 - 1 - family , at “ Bombing Businesses: Saudi Coalition Airstrikes on Yemen’s Civilian Economic Structures” - structures - economic - http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/bombing - businesses - saudi - coalition - airstrikes - yemen - s - civilian , “ Dea th toll from Saudi - led air rai d on Yemen’s Lahij soars to 11” at enar - http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/05/26/4 67450/Saudiled airstrike coalition - - civilians - fatalities - casualties - Mahala - - at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= Lahij - Nihm - Sanaa , and “ 11 family members killed in Saudi airstrikes on Lahi” I 4HRndZslD . 17 - 00300 208 / 242

209 S/2017/81 prima facie a civilian 7. The Panel found no explanation in the public domain as why this civilian house, which is 247 object immune from direct attack, was considered by the Saudi Arabia led coalition to be a legitimate military - 248 objective. The Panel also foun d no demonstrable evidence that the occupants of the house, who as civilians were 249 prima facie immune from attack, had lost their civilian protection. IHL requires that the civilian population, as well as 250 individual civilians, shall not be the object of at An attack on civilians and civilian objects cannot also be justified tack. 251 on the basis of military necessity. Any attack that does not distinguish between civilians and civilian objects with 252 elating to distinction. military objectives violates, amongst others, IHL principles r 8. While the Panel is not convinced that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition directed its air strike against a legitimate military target, even if it had, the Panel finds that there are serious concerns whether it respected IHL principles of 253 254 proportionality and precautions in attack. The second strike killed the head of the household as he attempted to rescue those injured, and it also further killed some of those civilians who were injured. The attack resulted in a disproportionately high number of deaths and injuries to women and children as demonstrated by the fact that eight of 255 were women and children, and the total destruction of the residential building. the nine individuals Any 256 proportionality assessment should have taken into consideration that the timing of the attack, in the early morning during Ramadan, was such that there was a high likelih ood that the women and children will be in the house. 9. It is not clear if measures were taken that would have distinguished between the intended target(s) and other that then other measures could have civilians. For example, if the target was the male occupant of the house, it is possible been reasonably used to apprehend the suspect, given that the legitimate Government of Yemen was in control of the 257 The cumulative effect on civilians and the civilian object also demonstra tes that if area and had ground presence. 258 they were largely inadequate and ineffective. precautionary measures were taken, __________________ 247 IHL requires all parties to the conflict mus t at all times distinguish betwe en civilian objects and military objectives . and that attacks may only be directed against military objectives. See CIHLR 7 – 12 248 are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their objects IHL states that “in so far as nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer s a definite military advantage ” . CIHLR 8. 249 There was no evidence that indicated that the male occupant was a fighter or was otherwise participating in hostilities at the time of the attack. In Yemen, women do not generally engage in hostilities and the children, (the oldest male child is a 11 - year old student at the local school), were highly unlikely to have been fighters or engaged in hostilities at the time of the air strikes. See Article 13 (1) and (2) of AP II relating to the p rotections afforded to civilians and Article 13 (3) on the loss of protection. See also CIHLR 1, 5 and 6. 250 Article 13(2) of AP II. See also CIHLR 1. 251 Prosecutor v Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (2005) . P aragraph 54 at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/acjug/en/corr050106.pdf . 252 IHL permits attacks directed against combatants and military objectives, however, civilian objects and civilians are II and CIHLR 1, 6, 7, and 10. prima facie immun e from attack. See Article 13 of AP 253 See CIHLR 14. An attack is disproportionate if it “...may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury , which would be excessive in relation to the concrete to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof and direct military advantage anticipated...”. Those responsible for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks necessarily have to reach their decisions on the basis of their assessment of the infor mation from all sources that is - available to them at the relevant time. See further https://ihl - databases.icrc.org/customary ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule14#Fn_29_ 33 . 254 IHL requires that all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Article 13(1) of AP II. CIHLR 15. This obligation is incumbent on those who plan and decide on the air strikes. See William Boothby, “The Law of Targeting”, particularly OUP (2012), p. 72. The specific obligations are further elaborated in CIHLR 16 – 20. 255 It is highly unlikely that the women and children were partici pating in hostilities. The Panel has further images demonstrating the total destruction of the house. 256 CIHLR 18. 257 The Al Anad military base, controlled by the Yemen Armed Forces, is in the area. 258 If precautionary measures were not taken, it is - incumbent on the Saudi Arabia led coalition to demonstrate why in measures were not feasible. precautionary those circumstances, such 17 - 00300 209 / 242

210 S/2017/81 F. Summary of findings The Panel finds that: 10. The Saudi Arabia (a) led coalition conducted air strikes on a civilian house in Al Mahala, Lahj on 25 May - and destroyed the civilian house; and deaths of six civilians and critically injured three others 2016 that resulted in The Panel is not convinced that IHL principles in relation to distinction and/or proportionality were (b) respected in this incident. If precautionary measures were taken, they were largely inadequate and ineffective. 17 - 00300 210 / 242

211 S/2017/81 Appendix C to Annex 49: Abs hospital, Abs , Hajjah (15 August 2016) A. Introduction 1. This case study is the only one in which the Panel has investigated an air strike on a medical facility in 259 Yemen. Background to events B. At approximately 15:35 hours on 15 August 2016, an unarmed civilian car entered the Abs hospital carrying 2. wounded individual(s). At approximately 15.40 hours explosive ordnance dropped fro m a military aircraft, detonated 260 resulting in nineteen fatalities and 24 injured. The casualties included within the Abs hospital premises, hospital 261 workers, patients and other civilians. The high number of civilian casualties was a result of the point o f detonation being close to the emergency department and waiting hall for patients. The car that was used to transport an injured individual was also destroyed, and its occupants killed. Figure 49.C.1 Location of the hospital __________________ 259 - This airstrike constituted the fifth attack on an MSF See MSF supported medical service in Yemen in the past year. http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/yemen_abs_investigation.pdf (hereinafter vestigation report into the incident at in Of these, M referred to as MSF investigation report). SF attributes responsibility, for at least one other attack, on a mobile clinic in the Al Houban district in Tai’zz, on 2 December 2015, to the Saudi Arabia - led coalition. Crisis Info 8 – . For Yemen, MSF (December 22 2015) at https://lakareutangranser.se/sites/default/files/yemen_crisis_info_8_final.pdf incident, see “Saudi inves tigation largely defends deadly air strikes the outcome of the JIAT investigation on this latter saudi - http://www.reuters.com/article/us - yemen - security - in Yemen” at - airstrikes idUSKCN10F23J . 260 0 0 16 11’40.47”E. 00’23.23”N, 43 261 . This included nine children, five women and eleven hospital workers MSF investigation report. 17 - 00300 211 / 242

212 S/2017/81 Technical analysis of physical evidence C. 3. Post blast crater analysis of imagery (figure 49.C.2) determined that the size of the crater was within the 262 87 kg of high explosives. the Mark 82 This is the explosive weight of dimensional parameters for the detonation of variant high explosive (HE) aircraft (A/C) bomb. The crater profile is highly indicative of that typically caused by the detonation of a high explosive aircraft bomb on, or just below, the ground surface. The Panel thus finds that, a high . losive aircraft bomb with an explosive content of approximately 87 kg was the cause of the explosion exp Figure 49.C.2 263 Post blast crater Photogrammetry analysis of imagery of fragmentation taken at the scene determined that one fragment has the 4. shape profile, and falls within the dimensional parameters, of a rear wing from a GBU 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit - (figure 49.C.3). Figure 49.C.3 264 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit rear wing - Probable GBU Explosives engineering analysis predicts that for an explosive device the size of a Mark 82 HE A/C bomb (net 5. explosive content (NEC) of 87 kg) the blast overpressure will result in 99 per cent fatalities at a radius of up to 8.3 __________________ 262 Explosive Engineers Tool Box (EETB). Assumes initiation at a burial depth of 2m due to impact. 263 Source: France 24 YouTube. This image ha s been verified as accurate by witnesses and has been crosschecked with other imagery provided to the Panel by witnesses. 264 Source: Confidential . 17 - 00300 212 / 242

213 S/2017/81 265 metres from the point of de Many tonation, with permanent hearing damage expected out to a radius of 42.4 metres. 266 more fatalities and injuries from fragmentation effects can be expected at far greater ranges, however. The only party to the conflict with the known capability to 6. deliver the Mark 82 HE A/C bomb with the GBU - 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit is the Saudi Arabia led coalition. - D. Response of the Saudi Arabia - led coalition 7. led coalition acknowledged its responsibility for the air str - ike and stated On 15 August 2016, the Saudi Arabia 267 to MSF that “the objective of the air strike was a moving vehicle that had entered the hospital compound”. 8. On 8 December 2016 JIAT provided the Panel with the following information: “Doctors without borders (MFS (sic)) posted a statement on its official website claiming that the coalition forces struck Abs - Hospital in Abs city, Hajjah Governorate, on 15 August 2016, resulted with (7) people dead, and (13) injured. The JIAT investigate d the facts and the circumstances of this incident, and found out that on 15 August 2016 the coalition forces received intelligence information about presence of Houthi Leadership gathering northern Abs City, thus they were targeted and attacked by coaliti on Air Force. After that the aircrew observed that a vehicle leaving the site, and proceeding south. The fighters followed the vehicle, and struck it l, which next to a building that does not bear any marks that would indicate before the strike that it is a hospita has appeared later that it is (Abs - Hospital). In light of the facts, the JIAT have found that, damages inflicted on the building were because of the targeted vehicle (which was a legitimate military target) next to the building tional. Thus, the JIAT have found that, the coalition forces must extend an apology for this which were uninten unintentional mistake, and provide the proper assistance to the families with affected persons. The coalition at, to identify extent of their violation of the approved Rules forces must also investigate those responsible for th Of Engagements (ROEs), and take the proper actions in this regard.” 268 9. led coalition. - The Panel has not yet received a response to a request for information made to the Saudi Arabia E. l observations on JIAT’s findings Pane 10. - led coalition’s compliance with IHL, the Panel has given due consideration to the In assessing the Saudi Arabia findings of the JIAT and media statements attributed to the coalition. The Panel highlights the fact that the Panel did not have access to the information that was at the disposal of the JIAT, despite requests for information from the Saudi 269 - led coalition. The Panel will, therefore, base its IHL assessment on its own investigative findings. Arabia 11. The Pan el finds that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition should have been aware that the vehicle entered the Abs hospital, prior to the air strike. The Panel finds that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition was provided with the coordinates for the hospital on 11 July and 1 0 and 11 August 2016. The coordinates provided, 16°00'23.03” N 43°11'39.98” E, are the coordinates of the hospital. __________________ 265 See C. N. Kingery and G. Bulmash, “Airblast parameters from TNT spherical air burst and hemispherical surface TR burst”, Technical Report ARBRL - - 0255 (Ballistics Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, United States, April 1984). Assuming p eak reflected pressure surface burst. 266 The Panel does not yet have sufficient information to model this aspect of the warhead’s capability with any degree of acceptable accuracy for this incident. 267 MSF investigation report. 268 er 2016. Letter dated 21 Novemb 269 For Panel sources see appendix E. 17 - 00300 213 / 242

214 S/2017/81 The Panel also finds that even if there were no visible markings to indicate that this was a hospital, a fact that 12. 270 MSF disputes, these distinctive emblems are only intended to facilitate identification and do not, by themselves, confer 271 Under IHL, medical personnel and objects are protected because of their function. The display of the protected status. manifestation of that function. emblems is merely a visible Analysis of violations of IHL F. 1. Panel assessments on the targeted civilian vehicle 13. The Panel finds that the vehicle was highly likely the target of the air strike and that the vehicle was within 272 hospital premises at the time it was targeted. The use of a precision - guided munition is confirmation that the intended target was hit. 14. The Panel is not convinced that the “moving vehicle that entered the compound” was a legitimate military 273 objective. The Panel’s investi gations revealed that the vehicle was a civilian car transporting wounded individual(s) 274 (those who were wounded possibly from a previous air strike elsewhere) to the hospital. The Panel cannot 275 Yet, this alone does not make the conclusively state that the wounded in the vehicle was/were f ighter/s or civilian/s. hors de combat, and are vehicle a legitimate military objective because those wounded, if they were fighters, had become 276 protected from direct attack under IHL. 15. Even if the civilian vehicle, for reasons only known to the commanders who decided on this attack, had become a military objective, the Panel is not convinced that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition forces, in carrying out the air strike on 277 a hospital, met the relevant IHL principles relat ing to proportionality. The Panel finds that it certainly did not meet the principles relating to precautions in attack, for reasons demonstrated below. If the vehicle was a target because it came from a battlefield, then it is questionable as to why the Saudi Arabia - led coalition did not target the vehicle during the 278 10 km it travelled to reach the hospital. Panel assessments on the attack on the hospital 2. The Panel finds that the hospital was protected from attack under IHL at the time of that 16. attack, and there is no 279 demonstrable evidence to indicate that the facility and medical personnel had lost their protected status under IHL. __________________ 270 . of MSF report 10 gation report. See images at p. MSF investi 271 See commentary to CIHLR 30. 272 JIAT statement, MSF statement, and pane l sources. 273 ndicate that the vehicle The Panel’s investigations i was a Toyota Corolla car that was well known in that area to operate as a “taxi”. 274 a) Panel sources at the Abs hospital; and b) MSF stated that “The car was visually inspected at the gate by the hospital ER guard who reports that the people in the car wore civilian clothes and that there were no weapons visible inside the vehicle. At the triage area, the car was approached by MSF medical staff who m subsequently checked g out a mattress/stretcher to unload availability in ER, which was full, and afterwards went to the logistics room to brin d. At this precise moment – the airstrike took place, making impact at the exact the wounde local time – at 15 .40 h ours foot note 2, p 6. place where the vehicle had stopped”. MSF investigation report, 275 Sources inform ed the Panel that the passenger was an ice cream seller who was wounded in an air strike at another location. 276 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (CA 3). 277 CIHLR 14. The Panel requires further verifiable evidence from the coalition on its i ntended target to make the relevant analysis on proportionality. The Panel has requested, but not yet received, this information. 278 Distance provided by MSF in its investigation report, p.6. 279 eing used, outside its humanitarian functions, “to commit A hospital can only lose its protected status when it is b . The fact that the hospital treats, or has Article 11(2) of AP II) acts harmful to the enemy” (CIHLR 28) or “hostile acts” ( CIHLR 28 and CA 3. ion for the hospital. within its premises, wounded fighters does not result in a loss of protect 17 - 00300 214 / 242

215 S/2017/81 280 - led coalition violated IHL principles relating to the special protections afforded to hospital. The Saudi Arabia 17. The Panel finds that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition also violated IHL principles relating to the protection of 284 281 282 283 . The air in this air strike medical personnel, persons hors de combat wounded and sick persons, and civilians strike resulted in ninete en fatalities and 24 injured persons, who were either wounded or sick, medical personnel, or caregivers. The JIAT statement demonstrates that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition did not consider the presence of, and 18. in its proportionality assessment undertaken prior to the air strikes. Any impact on, the hospital or its occupants proportionality assessment should have considered, at least: 1) the high number of civilian casualties that may result protected persons, including the wounded, the sick, medical from an attack on a functioning hospital; 2) impact on other 285 and 3) the special protection afforded to hospitals under IHL. Even if the Saudi personnel, and hors de combat; Arabia - led coalition concluded, for reasons unknown to the Panel, that the vehicle was a legitimate military objective, the Panel is unconvinced that an air strike targeting the vehicle within the hospital premises would meet the requirements of proportionality. ion did not comply with the strict IHL led coalit - 19. The JIAT media statement demonstrates that the Saudi Arabia 286 287 An attack could only have taken place after a reasonable time, obligation to issue a warning prior to the attack. 288 The Panel concludes that the Saudi Arabia when such warning has remained unheeded. - led coalition vi olated IHL principles relating to precautions in attack. G. Summary of findings The Panel finds that: 20. - led coalition conducted an air strike on the Abs hospital on 15 August 2016 that (a) The Saudi Arabia d civilians, hors de combat, or medical personnel. The air strike also damaged resulted in nineteen fatalities and 24 injure the hospital and at least one civilian vehicle; and The attack violated several IHL principles, including those relating to respect and protection of on (b) medical personnel and units, civilian objects, civilians, the wounded and sick, and hors de combat. It also violated IHL principles relating to precautions. The Panel is unconvinced that the Saudi Arabia - led coalition directed its attack against a legitimate military objective in this air strike and that it met the relevant principles of proportionality . __________________ 280 The term “medical units” refers to establishments and other units and includes, for example, hospitals and other ots and the medical and similar units, blood transfusion centres, preventive medicine centres and institutes, medical dep pharmaceutical stores of such units. See CIHLR rule 28. See also Article 11 (1) of AP II. 281 CA 3 . 282 MSF, in its investigation report, states that the air strike resulted in the death of 1 staff member, injured two Ministry of Health staff and three Ministry of Health volunteers. The Panel understands that some of these personnel were d to medical duties, and thus enjoyed special protection. Others were entitled to the protection exclusively assigne afforded to civilians. See CIHLR rule 25. 283 CA 3, CIHLR 47 (b). 284 CA 3, CIHLR 1,5, and 6. 285 MSF reports that, at the time of the air strike, there were 23 patients in surgery, 25 in the maternity ward, twelve in paediatrics and thirteen new borns in Abs hospital. MSF investigation report. - 286 Article 11(2) of the AP II and CIHLR 28. 287 MSF denies receiving any such warning, or any communication that wo uld have constituted a warning prior to the attack . MSF investigative report, footnote 2, p 12. 288 See CIHLR 28. 17 - 00300 215 / 242

216 S/2017/81 Appendix D to Annex 49: - Sala al - Kubra community hall, Sana’a (8 October 2016) al Introduction A. 289 This case study is one of the two investigations done on air strikes affecting civilian gatherings. 1. B. Background to the incident - 2. On 8 October 2016, between 15:20 and 15:30 hours (local time) explosive ordnance detonated on, or in, the al 290 The venue was hosting at least 1000 - western Sana’a. Sala al Kubra community hall in a residential area of south - taking part in a funeral ceremony for mourners Ali Al Rowayshan, the father of Major General Jalal Al Rowayshan, the acting minister of the interior under control of the Houthi - Saleh alliance. The UN reported that 132 civilians died and 291 695 were injured in this attack. Figure 49.D.1 292 Location of atta ck The 3. community hall had a capacity of 1,000 to 2,000 individuals and attendance at the funeral Sala al Kubra - al was expected to be high. The timing of the attack also coincided with a time when the funeral was expected to receive 293 Local custom r equires attendance at a funeral as both a religious and a personal the highest number of mourners. l obligation. Hence, political and military leaders, and civilians, could not avoid attending the funeral, despite the potentia oing conflict. security risks associated with such a gathering during the ong Jalal Al - a’s ministerial level position in the ministry of the interior under control of the Houthi - 4. Saleh alliance, together with the Al Rowayshan family’s prominent role in the Upper Khawlan tribe, meant that a high number of high - ranki ng political, military, and tribal guests were expected to attend the funeral. Although rumours of Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) and his son, Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, attending the funeral turned out to be untrue, many current and former senior military officers of the Houthi and Saleh forces did attend the service. High profile public funerals, such as the one convened for Ali Al Rowayshan, are one of the few events in Yemen at which so many __________________ 289 The other being the air strike on the Mustaba market at appendix A. 0 290 0 17’22.75”N, 44 12’02.60”E. 15 291 Information provided by OHCHR to the Panel on 19 December 2016. 292 Google Earth (3 October 2016). 293 30 hours. 17: – end funerals between 14:30 In Yemen, most mourners att 17 - 00300 216 / 242

217 S/2017/81 gather in a single place. Had the attack killed or seriously injured more of key figures in the Houthi - Saleh alliance would 294 then the Houthi - Saleh alliance would have been dealt a devastating political and the individuals identified by the Panel military blow. 295 C. Technical analysis of physical evidence related to the incident 296 of the available physical evidence and finds 5. The Panel has obtained and analysed post blast original imagery that: The damage was almost certainly caused by the detonation of at least two items of explosive ordna nce (a) 297 (EO), each containing a significant quantity of high explosive (HE). Such a quantity is normally contained in an aircraft bomb (figures 49.D.1 and 49.D.2); rgy from (b) The two entry points (holes) (figures 49.D.3 and 49.D.4) were caused by the kinetic ene aircraft bombs, which have hardened weapons grade steel cases. The aircraft bombs penetrated the structure of the concrete first floor before detonation inside the hall. Figure 49.D.3 shows the damage to the supporting pillars in the immediate vic inity of the blast, whilst the ones further away are relatively intact. This is a feature of both the designed that are designed to prevent a ‘progressive collapse’ in the event of the failure of any strength of the concrete pillars , and the effects of an explosion. Initially, close to an explosion, the shock wave will destroy material in supporting pillars its path, but this shock wave typically dissipates within metres to be replaced by the blast wave. This blast wave only has the power to deform mat erial in its path before its energy dissipates to such a level that it will aerodynamically flow around objects. At fifteen metres from an explosion the blast wave pressure will have dissipated to approximately 90% he explosion point; of the original blast over pressure at t Figure 49.D.2 Figure 49.D.3 298 Post blast interior Post blast aerial image __________________ 294 Information with Secretariat. 295 Available as of 12 October 2016. 296 Includin g from an investigation team visit on 8/9 October 2016. 297 Over 50kg of high explosive. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) also contain such large quantities of explosives, but there is no evidence that this was an IED attack. 298 arabia - - saudi - hall Source: ITV News UK, 9 O ctober 2016. http://www.itv.com/news/2016 - 10 - 08/yemen - funeral - airstrikes/ . 17 - 00300 217 / 242

218 S/2017/81 Figure 49.D.4 Figure 49.D.5 Entry point EO 2 Entry point EO1 (c) The precision of the attack rules also out the use of free flight rockets as a possible attack profile. Evidence from eyewitnesses, who were present in the locality, report they heard aircraft prior to the second attack and stated that there was three to eight minutes between these two explosions. The timing between the explosions indicates the deliberate use of the “double tap” tactic, the consequences of which are that individuals responding to the first explosion are caught by the second (see in IHL section of the report); (d) One fragment (figures 49.D.6 and 49.D.7) has the shape profile, and falls within the dimensional - parameters, of a fragment of a fin from a GBU 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit fitted to a Mark 82 HE aircraft bomb. It is also clearly marked as such; Figure 49.D.6 Figure 49.D.7 GBU 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit Recovered and GBU - 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit fin - 299 fragment in situ cleaned fin fragment (e) One fragment has the shape profile, and falls within the dimensional parameters, of a fragment from the wing of a guidance unit for a HE aircraft bomb (figure 49.D.8 and 49.D.9) . __________________ 299 Confidential sources. 17 - 00300 218 / 242

219 S/2017/81 Figure 49.D.8 Figure 49.D.9 GBU 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit wing - 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit wing fragment in GBU - 300 301 fragment in situ situ (f) also shows fragmentation that is Other fragmentation subsequently collected by an investigation team, certainly from the wing of a PAVEWAY - II guidance unit (figures 49.D.10 and 49.D.11); and Figure 49.D.11 Figure 49.D.10 12 PAVEWAY II - GBU guidance unit wing fragment 12 PAVEWAY II guidance unit wing fragment - GBU 302 showing manufacturers CAGE code 3FU05 __________________ 300 - 08/yemen - funeral - Source: Extracted from ITV News UK o n 9 October 2016. http://www.itv.com/news/2016 - 10 - saudi - arabia - airstrikes/ . hall 301 Ibid. 302 The Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) Code is a unique identifier assigned to suppliers to various a – government or defence agencies. 3FU05 is assigned to the Karlee Company, a USA metal fabricator. Source: Confidential visitor to crime scene. the 17 - 00300 219 / 242

220 S/2017/81 (g) Video imagery taken on a cell phone and posted on social media allegedly shows one of the explosions. Slow motion analysis of this imagery shows an aerial device falling onto the al - Sala al - Kubra community hall immediately prior to the second explosion. Th e Panel is still investigating the veracity of this imagery. 12 6. The only party to the conflict with the known capability to deliver the Mark 82 HE aircraft bomb with the GBU - led coalition, which has air sup remacy over Yemen. - PAVEWAY II guidance unit is the Saudi Arabia - Response of the Saudi Arabia D. led Coalition 303 7. The Saudi Arabia - led coalition itself has not fully clarified its role in the incident. The Joint Incident Assessment 304 - The led coalition. Team (JIAT), based on its initial investigations, attributed the r esponsibility to the Saudi Arabia 305 led coalition did not provide a response to a Panel request for information on this air strike. The - Saudi Arabia Government of Yemen provided the following information to the Panel on 31 December 2016: “According to media reports there have been more than a hundred dead and hundreds injured. The President has ordered the creation of a commission for investigation to join the JIAT of the coalition. It comprises of the head of PSO, the chief of military in telligence, and the chief of military justice. The aim is to demonstrate the Government’s responsibility and to punish those individuals who caused the incident. Three individuals have been arrested for investigations within the coalition. As soon as the result of the investigation is known legal measures will be taken.” E. Analysis of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) 8. The Panel finds that immediately preceding and during the sir strikes, hundreds of civilians, including children, 306 as were military personnel belonging to the Sala al - Kubra community hall attending the funeral wake - re in the al we 307 308 Saleh alliance. Houthi - IHL obliges the party conducting attacks to respect in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality, an d precautions in attack. - led coalition to the Panel, the Panel bases its IHL assessment 9. In the absence of a response from the Saudi Arabia 310 309 on its own investigative findings as set out in the sections below. __________________ 303 led coalition to the See letter from the Saudi Arabia Chairman of the Security Council on 9 October 2016, ( Saudi - Arabia referenced UN/2016/750). Copy of document with Panel. 304 - https://www.justsecurity.org/33615/full text - saudi - led - coalitions - statement - explanation - funeral - hall - bombing - yemen/ . 305 letter of 21 November 2016. Panel 306 IHL permits attacks directed against combatants, however, those enjoying civilian protection may not be directly targeted. See Article 13 of A P II, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and Rule 1 of the ICRC Study. 307 Houthi or Saleh military personnel are legitimate military targets. The fact that they were amongst civilians would not have rendered them immune from attack. Similarly, those civilians who are protected from attack under IHL would not lose their pr otection from direct attack, because of the military presence. 308 For the purpose of this report, the Panel considers military personnel as those individuals who are fighters on behalf of the Houthi or Saleh alliance. Individuals otherwise associated wit h a party to a conflict, for example, in the capacity of party members or political leaders, are entitled to civilian protection, unless they were also simultaneously regular fighters/combatants or unless and for such time when they directly participate in hostilities. See generally, A.13 of AP II, Common Article 3 to the Genev a Conventions and customary IHL. 309 See appendix E for Panel sources. 310 IHL principles relating to proportionality prohibits the launching of an attack “which may be expected to c ause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. See CIHLR 14, which reflects Articles 51 (5) I to the Geneva Conventions. AP (b) and 57 of 17 - 00300 220 / 242

221 S/2017/81 - le d coalition for the air strike F. Responsibility of the Saudi Arabia 10. The JIAT preliminary findings were that the attack was based on “wrong information” provided by the Yemeni 311 government in Riyadh, and that the relevant rules of engagement and procedure was not followed, and that those responsible “ did not take in account the nature of the targeted area”. The Panel notes that JIAT places the responsibility ntre for the strike on the Yemeni party that provided it with information on the military target and the Air Operations Ce 312 It was also reported in the media that “Riyadh had ordered against the attack” (AOC) in Yemen that ordered the attack. 313 and that it was a deliberate error by an individual who made “a choice made to breach operation procedures”. The Panel has not rec eived further information, as had been requested, on the identity information of this individual, his role in the incident, and measures taken pursuant to this finding of individual liability. coalition acted negligently in carrying out the strike, the 11. Even if an individual officer within the Saudi Arabia - led led coalition are still responsible for any violations relating to IHL regarding any - member States of the Saudi Arabia ng to proportionality and precautions in attack failure on their part to undertake the requisite detailed assessments relati and their failure to ensure that relevant precautions were taken to minimize the effects on civilians as a result of the air 314 beyond their powers The fact that an official acted strikes. is not an adequate ju stification under international law for 315 the relevant member States of the coalition to evade State responsibility for those wrongful acts. G. Relevant Principles under IHL call close air support mission to Based on the 12. - JIAT statement, it appears that the AOC in Yemen directed an on - led coalition aircraft in the area carried out the mission. The pilot of the aircraft target the location, and a Saudi Arabia totally on any assessments thus did not have the benefit of pre - mission preparation and target analysis, and had to rely made by the AOC. 13. The Panel finds that on the basis of the Saudi Arabia - led coalition’s assessment of the information from all 316 o conclude that: sources that were available to them at the relevant time, the AOC could reasonably be expected t there would be a significantly high number of civilians, including children, at the venue; and consequently 2) any air 1) strike would result in a high number of civilian casualties. 14. to consideration: 1) that the hall was crowded because of a Any proportionality assessment should have taken in civilian funeral; 2) the funeral was open to the public; 3) the large capacity of the hall that allows a large number of individuals to be accommodated; 4) the high prominence of the family within the Yemeni society meant that many would congregate to pay respects; 5) religious and traditional practices associated with attendance at funerals making __________________ 311 In paragraph 2 of a letter to the Chairman of the Security Council on 9 October 2016, ( Saudi Arabia referenced UN/2016/750), Saudi Arabia states that “its forces follow strict and clear rules of engagement which prohibits the targeting of civilians and civilian objects and take all possible measures to prevent dangers to civilians”. 312 with Panel . JIAT statement 313 a - . error/ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/19/saudi - coalition - bombing - of - yemen - funeral - was - deliberate - 314 See also a relevant assessment on individual and state responsibility for this strike at https://www.justsecurity.org/33872/responsible - yemen - funeral - bombing - how/ . 315 See Articles on the Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts at . See Article 7 which states: “The conduct http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exe rcise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it 9 which states: “Each party to the exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.” See also Customary IHL rule 13 conflict must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law by its armed forces and other persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or control ” . (E mphasis added). 316 See commentary to CIHLR 14 and the United States Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2015), p.1033, which requires combatants to assess in good faith the information that is available to them, when conducting attacks. at https://ihl - databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action= Also see the United Kingdom position . Accessed on 10 October 2016. F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 openDocument&documentId=0A9E03 17 - 00300 221 / 242

222 S/2017/81 attendance obligatory for both civilians and military commanders; 6) the near certain presence of chi ldren the funeral; the peak times when mourners attend funerals; and consequently 8) that any attack in that location, and at that time, 7) may result in a high number of civilian casualties. This information, and the fact that a funeral was being held at al Saba Kubra hall for the father of Major General Jalal Al Rowayshan was readily available in the public domain, and al - 317 - led coalition prior to the attack. accessible to the Saudi Arabia The attack resulted in a disproportionately high numbers of c ivilian casualties, when compared to military 15. 318 casualties, and this could have been anticipated prior to the attack. Even if the military advantage the Saudi Arabia - led 319 coalition sought to achieve by this attack is to be assessed in the context of a full w based on the ar strategy, 320 information received, the Panel is not convinced that the relevant IHL requirements on proportionality were met; (a) IHL requires that military commanders and those responsible for planning and executing decisions regarding att acks take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, 321 injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. IHL also imposes an obligation on parties to the conflict to cancel or 322 t becomes clear that its attack is likely to cause excessive civilian damage; suspend an attack, if i (b) In the absence of a response from the Saudi Arabia - led coalition, the Panel is unaware of: 1) any effective advance precautionary measures taken by the Saudi Arabia - led co alition in the planning of these airstrikes; or 2) any actions taken during the flight mission, to minimize civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects. Instead the cumulative factors surrounding the attack resulted in a high number of civilian causa lities; and (c) The second air strike, which occurred three to eight minutes after the first air strike, almost certainly resulted 323 in more casualties to the already wounded and the first responders. These first responders included civilians who 324 immediately entered the area after the first air strike to provide urgent first aid and undertake casualty evacuation. The 326 325 Panel has identified prior use of this “double of its IHL investigations. tap” tactic before in two IHL prohibits - 327 328 led coalition and the wounded. hors de combat The Panel is not convinced that the Saudi Arabia - attacks against respected its obligations in respect of persons hors de combat and the wounded in this “double tap” attack, and if it took __________________ 317 , For example, the Facebook social media post of a family member https://www.facebook.com/jalal.ali.161/posts/14813509 , which gives information as to the date and place of 05225458 the funeral. Accessed on 10 October 2016. 318 Confidential sources. 319 United States Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2015), p. 246. 320 In the Galic Trial Judgement (2003), the Inter national Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia held in respect of a shelling at a football tournament that “Although the number of soldiers present at the game was significant, an attack , would clearly be expected to cause incidental on a crowd of approximately 200 people, including numerous children loss of life and injuries to civilians excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated” . See http:// www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal - tj031205e.pdf . 321 See Article 13(1) of A P II and Rules 15 and 18 of the ICRC Customary Study. 322 CIHLR 19. The United Kingdom takes the position that this obligation applies to those “...those who have the authority and practical possibility to cancel or suspend the attack” (see the United Kingdom’s reservations and declarations made upon ratification AP I at https://ihl - of databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument& documentId =0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 . Accessed on 10 October 2016. 323 Confidential source. 324 Confidential sources. 325 1) Attack on a civilian house in Lahj (25 May 2016) (EO Strike 1 at 13 01'01.4" N 44 53'20.7"E, EO Strike 2, 13 01'01.9"N, 44 53'20.2"E); and 2) Mastaba market attack (15 March 2016) (EO Strike 1, 16°13'39.31"N, 43°14'42.04"E; EO Strike 2, 16°13'40.61"N, 43°14'41.08"E;). The Panel concluded that both these attacks were conducted in violation of IHL. 326 For a clearer understandi ng of assessments on IHL violations associated with the “double tap” attacks, see Clapham et al, “1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary”, Oxford University Press (2016), p. 786. 327 Including Common Articles 1 and 3 to the Geneva Conventions. 328 Ibid. 17 - 00300 222 / 242

223 S/2017/81 effective precautionary measures to minimize harm to civilians, including the first responders, in the second strike. The Panel continues to welcome information from the Saudi Arabia n on what measures it took to minimize - led coalitio civilian deaths and injuries and damage to civilian objects and, if measures were taken, then to provide information on how those measures contributed to the above objective. 329 nd investigation, in which mass civilian casualties were reported, The Panel notes that this is the seco 16. where the Saudi Arabia - led coalition reportedly relied exclusively on information obtained from the Yemeni authorities in Riyadh on the identification nature of the target. findings Summary of I. 17. The Panel finds that: (a) The Saudi Arabia led coalition conducted the air strike on the community hall in Sana’s that resulted in at - 330 least 827 civilian fatalities and injuries. At least 24 injured were children. The air strike also resulted in the total destruction of the community hall; (b) Given the nature of the event and those in attendance, the attack the attack resulted in a very high number of or to the attack. The Panel is unconvinced that the relevant civilian casualties and this should have been anticipated pri IHL requirements relating to proportionality were met; (c) These cumulative factors indicate that if precautionary measures had been taken, they were largely inadequate and ineffective. The JIAT also concluded that the relevant rules of engagement and procedures were not followed, and that those responsible in the Saudi Arabia - led coalition “ did not take in account the nature of the targeted area”; (d) The second air strike, which occurred three to eight minutes after the first air strike, resulted in more casualties to the already wounded civilians and to the first responders. The Saudi Arabia - led coalition violated its obligations in respect of persons hors de combat and the wounded in what was effectively a “double tap” attack probably caused by the tactics adopted by the pilots to guarantee destruction of the target; - (e) led coalition acted negligently in carrying out the Even if an individual officer within the Saudi Arabia strike, coalition forces are still responsible for the appropriate IHL violations. Under wider international law, the fact that an official acted against instructions is not an adequate justification under wider international law for the relevant member States of the coali tion to evade State responsibility for those wrongful acts; and (f) Those officers of the Government of Yemen that reportedly passed the information, or who were otherwise involved in the intelligence gathering and targeting assessment processes in relati on to this incident, may also be responsible for any IHL violations to the extent of their contribution. __________________ 329 The first being the air strikes on the al Khamees market in Mastaba, Hajjah on 15 March 2016. 330 OHCHR verified data. 17 - 00300 223 / 242

224 S/2017/81 (air attacks against Appendix E to Annex 49: Summary of IHL case study evidence levels civilians) This annex is a summary of the evidential 1. levels used for each of the case studies that in the preceding appendices. It has been consolidated into one table in order to prevent needless repetition. Table 49.E.1 IHL case study evidential levels 332 331 334 333 interviews Satellite Panel Photograph Video Location Documents Ser Open source > 5 x media reports 1 Al Khamees Market, Investigation reports of 2 NGOs 8  ✓ ✓ ✓ Mastaba  JIAT report summary  Investigation report of IO  JIAT summary  Coalition statement (media) confidential report 2  IO 4 Civilian House, ✓ ✓ T’baisha Document issued by ministry of  justice  Death certificate 1 x Media video IO confidential report Civilian House, Lahj 6  3 ✓ ✓ ✓ > 5 x media reports 1  Death certificates  Burial certificates Statement Governor of Lahj 2 x Media reports 4 Water Plant, Lahj 11 33757) - 6231  HRW report ( 978 - 1 - ✓ ✓ 5 IO confidential report 7 > 5 x media reports  Snack Factory, ✓ ✓ ✓ Sana’a  5 Reports by factory owners  Death certificates  JIAT report summary Abs Hospital, Abs 7 > 5 x Media reports 6 MSF Report (27/09/16)  ✓ ✓ ✓ Amnesty Report (19/09/16)  JIAT Report Summary  Other confidential documents  __________________ 331 This includes interviews with eyewitnesses, victims, direct reports, NGOs, INGOs, IOs and others who independently investigated the incidents. 332 The Panel has retained all of the imagery used to make these determinations and it is available to Member States on request. All imagery was either direct from a source, or verified as accurate by eyewitnesses. 333 Investigation repo rts are confidential documents that cannot be shared outside the Panel unless with the written consent of the said organization and for the specific purposes for which the consent was given. 334 ed and these are available to Member States on request. The Panel has retained copies of all open source reports us 17 - 00300 224 / 242

225 S/2017/81 332 331 333 334 interviews Panel Satellite Photograph Video Documents Ser Open source Location Alsonidar Factory, 5 7 4 x Media reports Chamber of Commerce Letter  ✓ ✓ ✓ Sana’a (1) (14/09/16)  Caprari Group Letter (07/10/16)  Addar Fer, Italy Letter (07/1016) Operational Manuals   7 Civilian House, Ibb 4 x Media reports 8 Death Certificates ✓ ✓ ✓ 4 x Media reports 9 Alsonidar Factory, Chamber of Commerce Letter  5 ✓ ✓ ✓ (2016) Sana’a (2) Caprari Group Letter (07/10/16)   Addar Fer, Italy Letter (07/1016)  Operational Manuals >10 x Media Reports >1 Community Hall, 10 JIAT report summary ✓ ✓ ✓ 0 Sana’a 17 - 00300 225 / 242

226 S/2017/81 Annex 50: Case file summaries of investigations of a particularly sensitive nature (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 / 226 242

227 S/2017/81 Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of a child Appendix A to Annex 50: (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 17 - 242 / 227

228 S/2017/81 Appendix B to Annex 50: Deprivation of liberty relating a university student (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 / 228 242

229 S/2017/81 Annex 51: Use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated a reas This annex contains appendices relating to one investigation undertaken by the Panel, as an illustration, on 1. explosions in densely populated areas, where the use of explosive ordnance (EO) is attributed to the Houthi or Saleh 335 i’zz. forces operating in Ta In these six incidents, of which four certainly involved explosive ordnance, the Panel documented fifteen deaths and twenty injuries to civilians in five of the six incidents. In the sixth incident, MSF records 336 ion to the multiple EO that impacted on Tai’zz city on 3 June 2016. twelve deaths and 122 injured in relat 2. In addition, from January to June 2016, the Panel documented of 30 incidents in which the use of land based ting potential indiscriminate attacks against explosive ordnance were used in densely populated areas in Tai’zz, represen 337 There were over 60 civilian fatalities and over 180 civilians injured. The Panel did not continue this analysis civilians. due to the sheer volume of incidents received and its inability to independently verif y each case. Summaries of the six incidents investigated by the Panel, and contained in this annex, are as follows: 3. Table 51.1 Summary of IHL case levels Date Violation Origin Civilian Civilians summary (2016) Ser fatalities Impact location injured Remarks of EO 1 Bab Al - Kabeer Explosion East A majority were women and 12 122 3 Jun Ta’izz children. Impacted on commercial buildings 3 Jun Jamal Street 2 Explosion East - 2 Impacted on commercial Ta’izz buildings. (Delux Market) 7 Jun Shamai, near the Impacted on a school. The - Explosion 3 5 East Ta’izz Revolution dead included four displaced hospital women and children from a marginalized community. - East 1 x EO Revolution 4 Affected solar panels and - 18 Sep hospital water storage. Ta’izz 3 Oct Market area in Bir 5 Twelve were children and 2 x mortars East 10 17 Ta’izz women Basha 15 Nov House, Shamseen 6 Damage to residential house. 1 x mortar East 1 (child) - Ta’izz Neighbourhood. Heavily populated residential area. __________________ 335 The other summaries are available with the Secretariat in Panel records . 336 134 casualties in one day: MSF” at - http://www.reuters.com/article/us “Hospitals supported by charity received http://www.doctorswit yemen security - taiz - idUSKCN0YS25B and - houtborders.org/article/msf - supported - hospitals - taiz - 122 receive - - - war wounded - one - day . There were severa l EO that impacted the city on 3 June 2016. All of these EO are attributed to Houthi/Saleh forces in Tabat Al Sofitel region. See “MSF Supported Hospitals in Ta’izz Receive 122 War - Wounded in One Day” and at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54192#.WDAgTTakbOg . taiz idUSKCN0YS25B http://www.reuters.com/article/us - yemen - security - - 337 Information with the Secretariat in Panel records. 17 - 00300 229 / 242

230 S/2017/81 Appendix A to Annex 51: EO in Jamal Street, Tai’zz (3 June 2016). Background A. At approximately 20:00 hours on 3 June 2016, an item of explosive ordnance detonated in the middle of Jamal 1. 338 Blast and fragmentation from the explosion damaged nearby buildings and injured, at Abdul Nasser Street, Ta’izz. least, two civilians. There were no military personnel or equipment reported in the vicinity immediately prior to or at the time of the attack. Locals stated that the missile came from the direction of th e Sofitel Hill. This area is under the control of the Houthi or Saleh forces. B. Technical analysis 2. Based on the distinctive fragmentation pattern (figure 51.A.1), it is highly probable that the explosive ordnance of a free flight rocket. The fragmentation pattern of the detonation is almost certainly used in this attack was the warhead from a warhead impacting at low angle, which eliminates a mortar bomb as the cause. The absence of a small crater, and rtillery shell as the cause. low angle of delivery, virtually eliminates an a Figure 51.A.1 339 Street Jamal Abdul Nasser Warhead detonation in The Houthi Saleh forces are operating at least one BM - 3. - 21 variant multi - barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) in 340 Ta’izz. Saleh It is highly probable, based on the likely flight path (figures 51.A.2 and 51.A.3) and reports of Houthi - forces in that area on the day that this weapon system was located in the region of Sofitel Hill, which is well within the range of Jamal Abdul Nasser Street. __________________ 338 13 ° 00’ 43.49”E. 34’ 39.28”N, 44 ° 339 Photograph taken by witness for the Panel. 340 fidential sources. Con 17 - 00300 230 / 242

231 S/2017/81 Figure 51.A.2 341 Maps showing orientation of street to direction of probable launch area Figure 51.A.3 342 Maps showing probable launch area __________________ 341 Higher resolution copies of the map are available from the Secretariat. 342 Ibid. 17 - 00300 231 / 242

232 S/2017/81 Analysis of violations of C. IHL 4. Based on information available, the Panel finds it is highly likely that the responsibility lies with the Saleh forces operating from the region of the Sofitel Hill. 343 344 5. The Panel is not convinced that the IHL requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in 345 were met as demonstrated by the following factual elements: attack (a) The street was near a market and a populated commercial area. The attack injured at least two civilians and partially damaged buildings in the vicinity; 346 (b) T he civilian street was a civilian object prima facie immune from attack. Civilians are also immune 347 from attack unless and until such time when they directly participate in hostilities. IHL requires that attacks be directed 348 against legitimate military obj ectives. The Panel could not identify any legitimate military objective. It is highly likely that Saleh fighters knew that any explosive ordinance launched into a populated (c) street would have a high likelihood of civilian casualties and damage to ci - and - Since the blast vilian objects. fragmentation zone is based on the technical specification of the explosive weapon in question, its likely impact on 349 civilians is often foreseeable; If precautionary measures were taken, they were inadequate and ineffective in these circumstances. (d) 6. The Panel requested, but did not receive a response from the Houthi or Saleh forces, information related to in this incident. __________________ 343 CIHLR 1 and 7. 344 CIHLR 14 and 18. 345 - CIHLR 15 22. 346 CIHLR 7 and 9. 347 CIHLR 6. 348 CIHLR 8. 349 OCHA Report “Protecting Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas” at . st.pdf Late - https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/EWIPA Fact Sheet 17 - 00300 232 / 242

233 S/2017/81 Appendix B to Annex 51: Summary of IHL case study evidence levels This annex is a summary of the evidential levels for each of the case studies that in the preceding appendices. 1. Table 51.B.1 Summary of IHL case levels 351 350 Se 353 352 Photograph interviews Panel Video Satellite Open source Documents r Location - 2 investigation reports  Market, Jamal Street 5 1 ✓ ✓  Medical certificate IO confidential report  2 8 Market, Bab al Kabir ✓ ✓  2 investigation reports > 5 x media reports Death certificates  School, 3 5 ✓ ✓ Criminal investigation report  Shami neighbourhood  reports. 3 investigation - Statement issued by hospital  2 4 Revolution hospital ✓ ✓  > 5 x media reports IO confidential report  5 7 Market, Bir Basha ✓ ✓ ✓  1 investigative report  Death certificates -  Medical report 6 Residential building, 2 ✓ ✓ Independent NGO  Shamseen neighbourhood investigation. __________________ 350 This includes interviews with eyewitnesses, victims, direct reports, NGOs, INGOs, IOs and others who independently investigated the incidents. 351 The Panel has retained all of the imagery used to make these determinations and it is available to Member States on request. All imagery was either direct from a source, or verified as accurate by eyewitnesses. 352 t be further shared unless the Panel receives expressed written consent of Documents provided to the Panel will no those sources. 353 The Panel has retained copies of all open source reports used and these are available to Member States on request. 17 - 00300 233 / 242

234 S/2017/81 Annex 52: Attacks against hospitals A. Attacks using explosive ordnance, threats or violence violence was In 2016, three hospitals provided Panel with information relating to nineteen incidents, where 1. threatened or used against the hospital and its staff. (table 52.A.1). T his includes: 1) attacks by the use of explosive ordnance (EO); 2) attacks on and abductions of medical personnel; and 3) the use of hospital premises to launch attacks. he Panel finds, based on its investigations that all parties to the conflict; the Saudi Arabia - T - led coalition, the Houthi Saleh military alliance, and forces associated with the Government of Yemen committed or contributed to violations against hospitals. Table 52.A.1 354 Summary of incidents Reported origin Date of EO (where Reported Violation Impact 355 356 relevant) perpetrator Ser (2016) location summary Remarks 1 3 Feb Republican Damaged maternity Likely to be 1 x EO hospital, Taizz ward Houthi or Saleh forces based on conflict 357 dynamics. 2 15 Mar Republican Heavy damage to Likely to be 1 x EO hospital, Taizz Houthi or Saleh Cardiac ward and equipment. forces based on conflict dynamics. Revolution See annex 53. Threats Confidential 3 20 Mar Annex hospital, Abductions Ta’izz 2 x EO Al Revolution 4 Damaged burns unit and 11 Jun - Salal area Houthi or Saleh doctors accommodation forces hospital, Ta’izz 5 17 Jun Revolution internal Damaged Houthi or Saleh 2 x EO Al Harir area forces medicine unit hospital, Ta’izz Damaged woman’s Republican Likely to be 6 11 Jul 1 x EO surgical ward Houthi or Saleh hospital, Ta’izz forces based on conflict dynamics. 7 15 Aug Abs hospital 1 x Paveway NA Saudi Arabia - led (see annex 53) coalition II __________________ 354 Information was collected from witnesses a nd independent investigators. Multiple images on the effects on each of the above hospitals as a result of these EO are with the Secretariat and available for examination by member States. 355 Information provided by confidential sources. 356 Ibid. 357 Conflict dynamics” takes into consideration the front lines as it relates to the Houthi and Saleh military forces and “ the forces affiliated with the legitimate government. It also considers who was in control of the area where the violation occurred. 17 - 00300 234 / 242

235 S/2017/81 Reported origin Impact Date Reported Violation of EO (where 355 356 relevant) perpetrator location (2016) Remarks summary Ser 7 Sep Republican 8 Impacted on the 23mm Unknown. woman’s surgical ward hospital, Ta’izz 28 Sep Likely to be 9 Solar panels and water 1 x EO Revolution storage unit damaged. Houthi or Saleh hospital, Ta’izz forces based on conflict dynamics. 10 26 Oct Name of See annex 53. Confidential annex Unknown EO Hospital were launched hospital from the withheld to hospital yard protect sources. Republican 1 Nov unit and water Storage Likely to be 1 x EO 11 hospital, Houthi or Saleh tanks that belonged to Ta’izz operations ward forces based on damaged (see annex 53). conflict dynamics. 3 Nov 12 Impacted around the 1 x EO Likely to be Republican hospital, Houthi or Saleh cardiac ward (damaged Ta’izz only on the outside) forces based on conflict dynamics. 13 4 Nov Republican Destroyed windows and Likely to be 1 x EO damaged cardiac ward. Houthi or Saleh hospital, Ta’izz forces based on conflict dynamics. Unknown. Sniping 14 Sniping in the hospital Republican 5 Nov yard hospital, Ta’izz Republican 7 Nov EO damaged ceiling of 15 1 x EO Likely to be cardiac ward. Houthi or Saleh hospital, Ta’izz forces based on conflict dynamics. Only the emergency Ibrahim Al Qaisi. Threats. Revolution 16 21 Nov Confidential annex section was operational. hospital, Disruption of Tai’zz Threatened hospital functions staff. Disrupted a meeting on funding. Hospital stopped functions because of dear of safety of staff. See annex 53. 17 - 00300 235 / 242

236 S/2017/81 Reported origin Impact Violation Date Reported of EO (where 355 356 perpetrator relevant) location (2016) summary Ser Remarks 17 21 Nov Military In early Nov the hospital y to be Likel Multiple EO was retaken by the Houthi or Saleh around the hospital, hospital Tai’zz forces based on popular resistance. conflict dynamics. Previously, it was used by the Houthi/Saleh forces and civilians with renal diseases. The shelling allegedly began after the transfer of the hospital to the popular resistance. 18 4 Dec Rev olution Damaged doctor’s Likely to be 1 x EO Al Salal Hill accommodation, Houthi or Saleh hospital, Tai’zz forces See annex 53. Investigations Armed men Confidential XX Dec 19 annex ongoing threatens hospital staff unless medical care is provided. The panel also received information from OHCHR that they recorded 8 attacks on hospitals by Houthi or Saleh 2. 358 forces and 16 air strikes against hospitals in 2016. 3. The three incidents relating to attacks on hospital staff are included in a confidentia l annex because of credible threats to the safety of hospital staff. These incidents violate various IHL principles, including those that ensure that 359 360 and that the wounded and sick are cared for. medical staff and units are protected from direct attack IH L also 361 prohibits the punishment of a person for performing medical duties compatible with medical ethics. It is prohibited to 362 The abduction and detention compel a person engaged in medical activities to perform acts contrary to medical ethics. of medical staff also violates several principles of IHL and may, depending on the circumstances, amount to hostage 363 taking. B. Potential future threats to hospitals 4. The Panel received information from three hospitals that they have not been provided with operating costs since around July 2016. The Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) issued a notice on 6 November 2016 stating that the salaries of 364 The Panel spoke to seven government officials, including medical staff, will be cut by 50% backdated to August 2016. do ctors across Yemen in November, who confirmed they still had not received their salaries since August, or had received 50% of their August salary in November. The Panel notes that the lack of resources may have a direct impact on the functioning of hospita ls: __________________ 358 Information provided to the Panel on 19 December 2016. 359 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, CIHLR 25, 28, 35 . 360 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, CIHLR 110,111. 361 CIHLR 27 . 362 CIHLR 27 . 363 Hostage taking is proh ibited under IHL CIHLR 96. 364 A copy of the statement issued by the Central Bank is on record with the Panel. 17 - 00300 236 / 242

237 S/2017/81 On 1 November 2016, the Revolution hospital issued a statement that stated that: 1) it had not received (a) rd funds allocated in the budget for the 3 quarter of 2016 from the CBY; 2) it had not received funds for staff salaries for th the 4 2016; 3) that while the emergency section was supported by MSF, other units had no external funding; quarter of and 4) warned that it may be compelled to stop its functions. The hospital has treated approximately 40,000 war injured 365 ce the beginning of the conflict. civilians and wounded fighters sin On 31 October 2016, the Republican hospital circulated a similar statement on social media, warning (b) of an imminent shut down of the hospital due to 1) lack of funding for hospital and staff; and 2) its inability to receive 366 humanitarian aid because of obstructions posed by armed groups . 5. The Panel also finds that finds that insufficient levels of funding, worsened by further recent reductions in direct consequences for the safety of medical staff, and the treatment received by civilians and hors de salaries, have combat. For example, the Panel has received information on multiple “disputes” between patients, their caregivers, and , or other resources to treat all staff, because hospitals lack qualified doctors, the necessary medicine and equipment patients to the extent required. These incidents were reported from Ta’izz and Hudaydah. Three of the more serious incidents are highlighted in a confidential annex. All parties should take all necessary measures to ensure that medical workers are protected, and that civilians under their protection have access to basic medical services. __________________ 365 Statement with Panel. 366 Statement with Panel. 17 - 00300 237 / 242

238 S/2017/81 Annex 53: Attacks against health workers (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 00300 - 17 238 242 /

239 S/2017/81 humanitarian assistance Annex 54: Obstructions to the delivery and distribution of (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 17 00300 - 242 / 239

240 S/2017/81 Annex 55: Full list of abbreviations A/C Aircraft Air to Ground Missile AGM Also Known As a.k.a Avtomatik Kalishnikov AK (assault rifle) AMR Anti Material Rifle Qaida Al - AQ AQAP Al - Qaida in the Arabia n Peninsula ATGM Anti - Tank Guided Missiles ATGW Anti - Tank Guided Weapon Boiling Liquid Vapour Explosions BLEVE BMP Best Maritime Practices BVI British Virgin Islands CDE Collateral Damage Estimate CIHL Customary International Humanitarian Law CMC Cluster Munition Convention CMF Combined Maritime Force CRC Convention on the Rights of Children CTF Combined Task Force (CMF) - Di DADP Peroxide - Acetone Di DFFC Directional Focused Fragmentation Charge (IED) Defence Industries of Iran DIO Democ ratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea DPRK Degtyaryova Shpagina Krupnokaliberny ( - DShK Heavy Machine Gun (HMG)) DWT Dead Weight Tonnage (Tonnes) E East ESH Explosive Storehouses FAE Fuel Air Explosion Mission - FFREM French Frégate Européenne Multi F of I Figure of Insensitiveness FS French Ship GBU Guidance Bomb Unit GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GLC Global Logistics Cluster GPC General People’s Congress GWT Gross Weight Tonnage HE High Explosive - Tank HEAT High Explosive Anti MAS H Her Majesty’s Australian Ship 17 - 00300 240 / 242

241 S/2017/81 Heavy Machine Gun HMG Hexa HMTD Methylene Triperoxide Diamine - HSV High Speed Vessel ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person(s) IED Improvised Explosive Device IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal IHL International Humanitarian Law International Maritime Organization IMO Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ( Daesh ) ISIL ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria / Islamic State of Iraq and Al - Sham ISTAR Intelligence, Surveil lance, Targeting and Reconnaissance Kinetic Energy KE Kilometre(s) km LLI Lloyds List Intelligence LMG Light Machine Gun LNG Liquid Nitrogen Gas Metres m 3 Cubic Metres m MEKP Methyl Ethyl Ketone Peroxide mm Millimetre(s) Minimal Metal Pressure Pads MMPP Maritime Mobile Service Identity MMSI Memorandum of Understanding MoU Manufacturer’s Serial Number MSN MT Mega - Tonne(s) MV Merchant Vessel N North NEC (Q) Net Explosive Content (Quantity) National Focal Point NFP Governmental organization - NGO Non NK Not Known OCHA Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) PBIED Person - Bourne IED (‘suicide bomber’) PC Patrol Craft PCIED Projectile Controlled IED PIR Passive Infra - Red PKM Pulemyot Kalashnikova (Modern ised). (LMG) RAN Royal Australian Navy Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device RCIED Recoilless Gun RCL 17 - 00300 241 / 242

242 S/2017/81 RDX Hexogen or Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine Ruchnaya Granata Distantsionnaya (distance hand grenade) RGD RPG Ruchnoy Protivotankovyy Granato myot (shoulder launched anti - tank rocket launcher) RSADF Royal Saudi Air Defence Forces RSAF Royal Saudi Air Force SAA Small Arms Ammunition Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group SEMG SGBV Sexual and Gender - Based Violence SPM Ships Protection Measures SVD Snayperskaya Vintovka sistem'y Dragunova (sniper rifle) SVIED Suicide Vehicle IED - Tri TATP Peroxide - Acetone Tri TBC To Be Confirmed TNT Tri - Nitro Toluene UAE United Arab Emirates UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNCT UN Country Team UN High Commission for Refugees UNHCR United Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF United States Dollar(s) USD USN United States Navy United States Ship USS UVIED Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device VOIED Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Devices World Food Programme WFP Weapon Storage Sites WSS Yemen Armed Forces YAF 17 - 00300 242 / 242

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