v dem democracy report 2018

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1 INSTITUTE Varieties of Democracy Democracy for All? V-Dem Annu Al Democr Acy r eport 2018

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3 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu Table of Contents Intro V-Dem I n A nut Shell umm Ary on DuctI e S executIV n number S, A Wor D from the V-Dem I coll Abor AtIon S, te Am Dology, A etho nD m IcAl V-Dem tor hIS 08 06 05 Ion 1 Sect St Ate of the Worl D 2017 – lI ber Al A nD e lector Al Democr Acy 16 Ion 2 Sect SI on IS A n Illu SI on Inclu 34 Sect Ion 2.1 Sect Ion 2.2 Ion 2.3 Sect SI on of Soc IA Women’S Inclu SI on on xcluSI ItIcAl e pol l Inclu eD on Soc AnD Acce oW er groupS SS to p bAS Io- econom Ic Inequ AlIty 38 44 52 publ S V-Dem uS V-Dem er Ic AtIon S S reference oner tI Ac prActI Ic journ Al S, ADem Icle ADem Ic S, StuDent Art Ac S, S from the V-Dem t eAm SeumS AnD mu 58 60 69 x Appen DI S country S core f o r 2 017 71

4 V-Dem is a unique approach to measuring democracy – historical, multidimensional, nuanced, and disaggregated – employing state- of-the-art methodology. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) produces the largest V-Dem measures hundreds of different attributes of democracy. V-Dem enables new ways to study global dataset on democracy with some 19 million data for 201 countries from 1789 to 2017. Involving the nature, causes, and consequences of democracy embracing its multiple meanings. over 3,000 scholars and other country experts, V-Dem is or has been funded by (not in order of magnitude): Development Agency, no - RAD/the n orwegian Research Coun Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Knut & Alice Wallenberg Foundation, cil, International ID eA, Fundação Francisco m anuel dos Santos, arcus Wallenberg Foundation, the Swedish Research marianne & m niversity, the Quality of Government Institute and the Aarhus u Council, the m o Ibrahim Foundation, the e uropean Research university of n otre Dame, with co-funding from the Vice Chancel - uropean u Council, the Danish Research Council, the e nion/the lor, the Dean of the Social Sciences, and the Department of p oliti - inistry of Foreign Affairs-Sweden, the european Commission, the m niversity of Gothenburg. cal Science at u ministry of Foreign Affairs-Denmark, the Canadian International This publication has been produced with the assistance of the The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the european u nion. The contents of this publication are the sole authors and do not necessarily reflect an official position of the responsibility of the V-Dem Institute and can in no way be taken V-Dem p roject or the V-Dem Steering Committee. to reflect the views of the e nion or any other donor. uropean u produced by the V-Dem Institute eam: V-Dem Data and m anagement t Joshua Krusell, V-Dem Institute: at the u othenburg niversity of g Johannes von Römer, Kyle m arquardt, Farhad m iri, Dan olitical Science Department of p pemstein, Josefine p itan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Brigitte ernes, e university of Gothenburg lead Author ührmann ( Anna l eam: eport t V-Dem Annual r Seim Sprängkullsgatan 19, po 711 aura indberg, l and Coordination), Sirianne Dahlum, Staffan I. l editors: Anna l ührmann, Staffan I. l indberg Se 405 30 Gothenburg Sweden illai, Constanza maxwell, Valeriya m echkova, m oa o lin, Shreeya p reading: John Jennings editing/ proof- [email protected] Sanhueza p etrarca, Rachel Sigman, natalia Stepanova. Anders Wennerström, Spiro Kommunikation AB Design: +46 (0) 31 786 30 43 printing: Ma y 2018 Response Tryck, Borås. www.v-dem.net Copyright ©2018 by V-Dem Institute. All rights reserved. n S S o folloW u l me IA DIA oc facebook.com/vdeminstitute website: www.v-dem.net twitter.com/vdeminstitute

5 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 5 A Word from the Team We are pleased to present our second Annual Democracy Report. erik indberg, Svend- John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I l We are proud and delighted to count you among our readers, and ro - Skaaning, Jan Teorell – and the core group of scholars who are p we hope that you find the report interesting, timely, and useful. anagers, to the global network of Country e xperts, Country ject m managers. We work with some 3,000 Coordinators and Regional In the 2018 Democracy Report we find that global levels of democ - - individuals from almost all the countries in the world in order to as racy are still close to an all-time high. However, even though the semble the 19 million data points in the V-Dem datasets. Without electoral aspects of democracy have improved in many countries - our truly experienced and knowledgeable experts providing nu in recent years, freedom of expression, media, and civil society are anced, precise, and local expertise, V-Dem would not exist today. - under threat in other parts of the world. The report identifies dis We would like to extend a big thank you to our Country e xperts, quieting trends in several key countries, such as Brazil, India, poland, Country Coordinators and Regional m anagers! Russia, Turkey, and the u nited States. even though V-Dem is an academic mission at heart, we always The V-Dem project is a global collaboration headquartered at the strive to be relevant to the “real world”. o ver the past years, we have V-Dem Institute, Department of political Science, Gothenburg uni - had the opportunity to collaborate and engage with many inter - versity. While more than 3,000 scholars and experts constitute the Gos, ranging from the national organizations, governments, and n global V-Dem team, the Institute is run by us - a team of 19 people. In - World Bank, to the Swedish government, organizations like Bibli addition to our aim of producing cutting edge research, we work all otheca Alexandrina, and grassroots groups in n epal. With our V- year round employing unique, state of the art techniques to provide Dem Regional Centers around the globe that we are so proud of, you and other users with global data of the highest possible quality. - our outreach activities continue to grow. We look forward to anoth er year of fruitful collaboration with our partners around the world. over the past year, we have focused on improving and expanding the vast V-Dem dataset even further – culminating in the release of We also hope that you will also find the series of working papers, the - version 8. For the very first time, data from ‘Historical V-Dem’ is in - matic briefs, country briefs, and policy briefs available on the website tegrated – expanding the coverage to 228 years from 1789 to 2017. (www.v-dem.net) helpful to support of democracy in practice. We are excited that the dataset now includes more than 200 politi - cal units and over 450 indicators and indices of democracy. We would like to thank everyone who has made, and continues to make, the V-Dem journey possible. Team spirit and a collaborative nature are key elements of V-Dem and the Institute. It permeates all the work we do and all parts of Sincerely, the team, from the p ichael Coppedge, rincipal Investigators – m The V-Dem Institute Team

6 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 6 executive summary the focus of the V-Dem Annual Democracy r eport 2018 is “Democracy for All?” for two reasons. D, e rSt, cIt fI S – not just the territorial unit in which Secon Izen Ven In Democr AcIe S, some groups – - women, social groups, and the poor – are systemati they live – are central to democracy. In addition to the cally disadvantaged from access to political power. conventional averages across countries, we therefore We therefore analyze political exclusion by gender, analyze liberal and electoral democracy across the world weighted by the size of each country’s popula social groups, and socio-economic status. - his metric captures better how many people in tion. t the world enjoy democratic rights and freedoms. the key findings are as follows. global levels of democracy remain high, but autocratization – the decline of democratic attributes – affects 2.5 billion people and is gaining momentum Autocratization is now manifesting in a number of large Democracy is still in good standing across the world. Global   levels of democracy remain close to their all-time high. nited countries including Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, and the u States. For the first time since 1979, the number of countries back -  Autocratization affects one third of the world’s population, or sliding (24) on democracy is again the same as the number of  some 2.5 billion people. This represents a massive reduction countries advancing. in the global protection of rights and freedoms. ultiparty elections continue to improve, but are at m risk of losing their meaning Aspects of democracy that make elections truly meaningful Core electoral aspects of democracy continue to improve in   edia autonomy, freedom of expression and are in decline. m many countries. alternative sources of information, and the rule of law have undergone the greatest declines among democracy metrics in recent years. This trend affects both autocracies and de - mocracies. Despite gradual advances, inclusion remains an illusion - - liberal democracies are systematically better than other politi ven in democracies, however, some groups – women, minori e   cal regimes at ensuring the de facto ties and the poor – are systematically disadvantaged in their ability of all citizens to in - access to political power. p fluence the political process – including women, various social olitical exclusion reduces the scope of liberal and electoral democratic rights and freedoms. groups, and individuals with different socio-economic status.

7 ARY umm e S CuTIV exe 7 global average levels of inclusion of women and minority social groups remain stable o nly 15 percent of the world’s population, or 1.1 billion peo - - Global average levels of inclusion of women and minority so   ple, live in a society where political power is distributed at cial groups remain stable. least somewhat equally by gender. - Several countries have continued to advance in terms of in  Half a billion people live in countries with higher levels of ex - clusion for women.  clusion of minority social groups than ten years ago. political exclusion due to socio-economic status is making the rich even more powerful exclusion due to socio-economic status has continuously - Insufficient access to healthcare or education limits the abil   become more severe since the 1970s. Intensified political ex - ity for political participation for an increasing share of the population in 16 and 15 countries respectively, while only five clusion now affect poorer groups in countries home to one- quarter of the world’s population, or almost 2 billion people. (health) and four (education) countries improved. o nly six countries registered a higher level of inclusiveness  - in the distribution of political power by socio-economic sta tus between 2007 and 2017, while 14 nations declined signifi - cantly. The countries with the greatest backsliding are Burun - di, m anama. auritania, Iraq, Yemen, and p

8 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 8 S V-Dem I n number 5 Indices for A Vast International Collaboration Democracy Ideals • 6 Principal Investigators and 14 liberal, • Electoral, project m participatory, deliberative, anagers • V-Dem Institute with 17 staff and egalitarian democracy and their component indices • 30 Regional Managers, 170 Country • 47 mid-level indices and coordinators • 3,000 Country Experts from 177 • 350+ specific indicators countries Dataset Version 8 p ublications • 201 countries with • 66 V-Dem Working Papers a yearly coverage: 1789-2017 • 26 Country Briefs/Reports • 15 Briefing Papers • 12 new indices • 23 papers published in • 19 million data points academic journals utreach o • More than 480 presentations at academic conferences and policy forums • Over 65 visiting scholars at V-Dem Institute since 2014 • Total dataset downloads: 24,000 times from more than 150 countries • Users of Online Analysis Tools: more than 40,000 users. • Website V-Dem.net: 150,000 unique visitors from 195 countries, and 2,360,000 page views

9 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 9 Aggregating V-Dem m ethodology: expert Assessments laura m ührmann arquardt and Anna l . m axwell, Kyle l V-Dem h AS innovative methods for aggregating D DeVelope uestion: Is there academic freedom and free 1. q box m - - expert judgments in a way that produces valid and reliable esti dom of cultural expression related to political issues? mates of difficult-to-observe concepts. This aspect of the project responses: is critical because many key features of democracy are not directly 0: n - ot respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimi observable. For example, it is easy to observe and code whether - dation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural ex or not a legislature has the legal right to investigate the executive pressions are severely restricted or controlled by the gov - ernment. when it engages in corruption. However, assessing the extent to Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom 1: - which the legislature actually does so requires the evaluation of ex and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasion - perts with extensive conceptual and case knowledge. ally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression. - 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic free In general, expert-coded data raise concerns regarding compa - dom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced rou - rability across time and space. Rating complex concepts requires tinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes judgment, which may vary across experts and cases. m oreover, be - met with repression. 3: m ostly respected by public authorities. There are few limita - - cause even equally knowledgeable experts may disagree, it is im tions on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expres - perative to report measurement error to the user. We address these sion, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft. issues using both cutting-edge theory and methods, resulting in Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restric - 4: tions on academic freedom or cultural expression. valid estimates of concepts relating to democracy. We have recruited over 3,000 country experts to provide their judg - pemstein et al. (2018) have developed a Bayesian Item-Response ment on different concepts and cases. These experts come from al - Theory (IRT) estimation strategy that accounts for many of these most every country in the world, which allows us to leverage the concerns, while also providing estimates of remaining random - opinions of experts from a diverse set of backgrounds. We typical measurement error. We use this strategy to convert the ordinal re - ly gather data from five experts for each observation, which ena - sponses experts provide into continuous estimates of the concepts bles us to statistically account for both uncertainty about estimates being measured. The basic logic behind these models is that an and potential biases that experts may evince, using a custom-built unobserved latent trait exists, but we are only able to see imper - Bayesian measurement model. fect manifestations of this trait. By taking all of these manifest items (in our case, expert ratings) together, we are able to provide an es - We ask our experts very detailed questions about specific con - timate of the trait. In the dataset, we present the user with a best cepts. In addition to being of interest in their own right, experts , as well (the point estimate) estimate of the value for an observation are better suited to the task of coding specific concepts rather than , a Bayesian corol - (the credible regions as an estimate of uncertainty broader concepts such as “democracy.” Box m.1 provides the V- lary of confidence intervals). Dem question on academic freedom as an example. The IRT models we use allow for the possibility that experts have As Box 1 makes clear, we endeavor to both make our questions clear - different thresholds for their ratings. These thresholds are estimat to experts and craft response categories that are not overly open to ed based on patterns in the data, and then incorporated into the interpretation. However, we cannot ensure that two experts under - final latent estimate. In this way, we are able to correct for the pre - stand descriptions such as ‘somewhat respected’ in a uniform way viously-discussed concern that one expert’s “somewhat” may be (a response of “2” in Box m .1)—even when ‘somewhat’ is accompa - another expert’s “weakly” (a concept known as Differential Item nied by a carefully formulated description. p ut simply, one expert’s Functioning). Apart from experts holding different thresholds for ‘somewhat’ may be another expert’s ‘weakly’ (a response of “1” in each category, we also allow for their reliability (in IRT terminolo - .1), even if they perceive the same level of freedom of expres Box m - gy, their “discrimination parameter”) to idiosyncratically vary in the sion in a particular country. of equal importance, all experts code IRT models, based on the degree to which they agree with other more than one indicator over time, and their level of expertise may experts. e xperts with higher reliability have a greater influence on vary, making them more or less reliable in different cases.

10 eGATI TS eSS SS A RT nG e xpe men GGR : A GY oDolo TH V-Dem me 10 concept estimation, accounting for the concern that not all experts regions. These estimates are the best to use for statistical analysis. are equally expert on all concepts and cases. However, they are difficult for some users to interpret in substantive terms (what does -1.23 mean with regard to the original scale?). We To facilitate cross-country comparability, we have encouraged coun - therefore also provide interval-level point estimates that have been try experts to code multiple countries using two techniques. We re - linearly transformed back to the original coding scale that experts fer to the first as bridge coding , in which an expert codes the same use to code each case. These estimates typically run from 0 to 4, and set of questions for the same time period as the original country they users can refer to the V-Dem codebook to substantively interpret - coded. This form of coding is particularly useful when the two coun ach them. Finally, we also provide ordinal versions of each variable. e tries have divergent regime histories because experts are then more of the latter two is also accompanied by credible regions. likely to code the full range of the ordinal question scale, providing us with more information as to where an expert’s thresholds are. By box m erms. .2. Key t extension, this information also provides us with a better sense of A best estimate of a concept’s value. stimate: point e - the thresholds of her colleagues who only coded one of the coun - confidence Intervals: Credible regions for which the up tries she coded. The second technique is lateral coding . This has per and lower bounds represent a range of probable values for a point estimate. These bounds are based on the interval the purpose of gaining a great deal of information regarding an indi - in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the vidual expert’s thresholds by asking her to code many different cases - probability mass for each score, which is generally approxi that utilize a wide variety of other experts. By comparing her codings mately equivalent to the upper and lower bounds of one to those of many other experts, we are able to gain a greater sense of standard deviation from the median. Significant Differences or c When the upper and hanges: how she systematically diverges from experts who code other cases; lower bounds of the confidence intervals for two point es - - conversely, we also gain information on how those other experts di timates do not overlap, we are confident that the difference verge from her. Both of these techniques provide us with more pre - between them is real and not a result of measurement error. cise and cross-nationally comparable concept estimates. references Finally, we employ anchoring vignettes to further improve the odels emstein. Forthcoming. “IRT m . and Daniel p marquardt, Kyle l estimates of expert-level parameters and thus the concepts we for e anel Data.” Political Analysis xpert-Coded p . measure. Anchoring vignettes are descriptions of hypothetical cases that provide all the necessary information to answer a given arquardt, e itan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, pemstein, Daniel, Kyle l . m question. Since there is no contextual information in the vignettes, easurement Joshua Krusell, and Farhad m iri. 2018. “The V-Dem m - they provide a great deal of information about how individual ex national and Cross-Tem atent Variable Analysis for Cross- model: l - perts understand the scale itself. Furthermore, since all experts can - poral expert-Coded Data.” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of De - code the same set of vignettes, they provide insight into how ex : Working p mocracy Institute o. 21, 3d edition. aper n perts systematically diverge from each other in their coding. In - - corporating information from vignettes into the model thus pro evaluating pemstein, Daniel, e itan Tzelgov and Yi-ting Wang. 2015. “ vides us with further cross-national comparability in the concept national odels for Cross- and Improving Item Response Theory m estimates, as well as more precision in the estimates themselves. expert Surveys.” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy In - The output of the IRT models is an interval-level point estimate of the stitute : Working p aper n o. 1. latent trait that typically varies from -5 to 5, along with the credible b l e m cAtorS .1: VerSI on S of the V-Dem In DI tA . Ale De Scr Sc Suff Ix Ipt Ion recommen Se DeD u Regression analysis None Interval Original output of the V-Dem measurement model _osp Interval Linearized transformation of the measurement Substantive interpretation of graphs and data model output on the original scale Substantive interpretation of graphs and data Most likely ordinal value taking uncertainty Ordinal _ord estimates into account Interval One Standard deviation above (_codehigh) Evaluating differences over time within units _codelow / and below (_codelow) the point estimate _codehigh _sd Interval Standard deviation of the interval estimate Creating confidence intervals based on user needs

11 eGATI 11 TH oDolo GY : A GGR V-Dem me nG e xpe RT A SS eSS men TS

12 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 12 First Release of Historical V-Dem istorical V-Dem data. t he h istorical V-Dem this year, for the very first time, we release the h project is a unique data collection effort coding numerous indicators of democracy and evolution and continuing all the way other institutional features dating from the f rench r istorical V-Dem, through to the early twentieth century, covering 91 polities. by including h around 200 of the V-Dem indicators extend as far back as 1789. oa o eorell an t lin and j enrik Knutsen, m carl h covers 91 polities from 1789 new indicators The Historical V-Dem sample includes 14 polities from Africa and In addition to extending existing V-Dem indicators and indices – such as V-Dem’s e iddle e the m ast, 21 from the Americas, 14 from Asia and the p - acific, lectoral Democracy Index; see Figure H.1 – His and 42 from e urope. Altogether 91 polities are covered, although torical V-Dem introduces 70 new indicators. These include both indicators coded by country experts and many indicators coded coverage is somewhat lower for most indicators. The integration - by research assistants. The new indicators pertain to various in - of Historical V-Dem in the V-Dem dataset means that many coun stitutional features, some of which were particularly relevant for tries have data coverage on numerous V-Dem indicators from 1789 19th century polities. For example, as the 19th century was an era to the present. These include all major countries with continuous lineage as independent states from the 18th or 19th centuries, but of state building, Historical V-Dem includes new indicators focus - ing on the state and features of bureaucracy, as well as indicators also some major colonies such as India and Indonesia that are cov - ered for the full time period. Historical V-Dem also contains several on the support coalitions of political regimes. additional historical polities that have ceased to exist, for example Bavaria and the Two Sicilies.

13 l V-Dem 13 oRICA HIST f I g u r e h .1: e rAnce n f eDI) I Dex ( Acy In Al Democr lector SI rench r eVolut nce the f Ion, 1789-2017. 1 .9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 .3 .2 .1 0 1910 1790 1830 1850 1870 1890 1810 1930 1950 1970 2010 1990 the creation of historical V-Dem/ ethodology m which are leveraged by the V-Dem measurement model that, to The Historical V-Dem project started in 2013 and has since acquired the extent it is possible, minimizes coder error and addresses issues - significant human and financial support. A number of research as of comparability across countries and over time. - sistants from several universities have been involved in coding in istorical V-Dem team the h dicators that did not require the attention of country experts. In niversity in und u The Historical V-Dem project is managed from l addition, one or sometimes two highly qualified country experts orway. The project works Sweden and the u niversity of o slo in n were identified and recruited to code each polity for indicators of a in collaboration with the V-Dem Institute at Gothenburg u - niver more evaluative nature. The ideal Historical V-Dem country expert niversity, and sity, Aarhus u niversity, Boston u niversity, Harvard u has an accomplished academic record of working on the political the lund university) and university of Texas at Austin. Jan Teorell ( history of the country, identifiable competencies in a broad range - slo) are the principal investiga university of o Carl Henrik Knutsen ( of political-institutional features and comparative knowledge of tors on the project. other countries. The historical country experts conducted their coding through the V-Dem web-platform, which was customized Historical V-Dem is mainly funded through two large research for Historical V-Dem’s purposes. The country expert coding started orwegian and Swedish Research Councils. grants from the n in December 2015 and is still ongoing to improve the coverage for some countries. For the V-Dem dataset, released in April this year, the Historical V- tor n S em I IcAl V-D hIS hort Dem data is merged with existing V-Dem indicators. Hence, many data back V-Dem existing • Extends new and adds to 1789 of the V-Dem indicators now extend back to 1789. In order to en - indicators sure comparability of the V-Dem and Historical V-Dem scores, and - • Includes of democracy and other 250 indicators in around that the data from 1789 to 2017 constitute consistent time series, stitutional features - several measures have been taken. To indicate one example, His • Covers 91 polities torical V-Dem experts always code twenty years of history from the • Releases data incorporated in the V-Dem V8 dataset 20th century, thus providing “coding overlap” with other V-Dem experts. These measures provide valuable pieces of information,

14 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 14 nD e Vent S V-Dem coll Abor AtIon S A Gothenburg, Sweden Notre Dame, USA Lisbon, Portugal Lusaka, Zambia “

15 AB TS Ven nD e 15 V-Dem C oll S A oRATI on Tartu, Estonia Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic “ Lusaka, Zambia

16 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 16 S e c t i o n 1: State of the World 2017 iberal and e lectoral Democracy – l hile the global level of democracy is not changing dramatically, and the majority of the world’s population lives in a democracy, one third of the world’s population – 2.5 billion people – live in countries with declining democratic traits. W the most visible feature of democracy – elections – remains robust and is even improving in some places. Where backsliding occurs, it does so in more obscure ways, such as by undermining media freedom, freedom of expression, and the rule of law. With continued decline in these areas, the meaningfulness of elections may also become threatened. Anna l indberg ührmann, Valeriya m echkova and Staffan I. l AtIc is the world today? When addressing this Democr hoW ur dual metric tional arena in ways that small countries do not. o - question, most analyses report on the number or share of coun approach recognizes the importance of each state, but also each tries that are democratic, authoritarian, or change. Yet citizens— individual’s rights. not just the territorial unit in which they live—are central to de - Democracy in the World 2017 mocracy. Bhutan’s recent transition to democracy serving 800 000 - The state of the world in terms of liberal democracy 2017 is de people is laudable but 1.4 billion people still breathe under dicta - picted in Figure 1.1. It is based on V-Dem’s l iberal Democracy Index - torship in China. The recent significant declines in liberal democ (lDI), where each quintile on the 0-1 scale has been given its own racy in India and the u nited States alone have affected some 1.6 color-code. This is a broad stroke that does not take into account billion people, while less than 1 million people benefited from the the confidence intervals around each country’s point estimate. l ib - improvements in Bhutan and Vanuatu. eral democracy is measured as the existence of electoral democ - racy in combination with three additional components: rule of law This first section of the Democracy for All? Democracy Report 2018 ensuring respect for civil liberties, and constraints on the executive analyzes the state of democracy in the world as of 2017. In view of 1 by the judiciary, as well as by the legislature. this year’s theme we introduce a new metric, in addition to conven - tional country average measures: levels of democracy weighted By this measure, as the world map shows, liberal democracy is by by the size of each country’s population. These measures better the end of 2017 still most well-established and remains relatively reflect how many people in the world enjoy democratic rights and strong in portions of the Americas, e urope, Southern Africa, and freedoms. Furthermore, countries with larger populations typical - South- east Asia. The exact ratings and changes over the last ten - ly exert influence over neighbouring countries and in the interna Al Democr Acy I n 2017. Ate of lI the St ber f I g u r e 1.1: 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1. The V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index reflects both the liberal and electoral principles of democracy, each of which constitutes one half of the scores for theLiberal Democracy Index (LDI). V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) is the first systematic measure of the de facto existence of all institutions in Robert Dahl’s (1971, 1989) famous articulation of “polyarchy” as electoral democracy. For details about the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of all V-Dem’s democracy indices, see Coppedge et al. (2018b) and Pemstein et al. (2018).

17 TAT CRACY oRA CT le nD e l A eRA RlD 2017 – lIB e Wo F TH e o l Demo on 1: S CTI Se 17 means democratization in autocratization The term reverse. It denotes a decline of democratic qualities. Simply put, regardless whether the country is a democracy or autocracy, it is becoming worse. We use autocratization and backsliding interchangeably. years for all countries are found below in Figure 1.6, and the more tests across the Global South, saw a gradual but steady increase in - detailed statistics across all varieties of democracy are in the Ap liberal democracy until around the year 2005. Since then, levels of pendix. But what are the trends and main recent changes in the democracy have been relatively stable across the world. world? notably, however, there is a small decline, although this is within A g lobal t rend of Autocratization the confidence bounds, over the past few years. It is particularly xcept in Africa – e noticeable for the three regions with the highest average levels Figure 1 displays the average global level of liberal democracy, orth America, l atin America of democracy: Western e urope and n 3 based on 178 countries in the world, from 1972 to 2017, accompa - urope. Thus, the autocratization and the Caribbean, and e astern e trend we are witnessing today seems to occur primarily in the more nied by confidence intervals capturing the full range of uncertainty 2 It also depicts the average levels for democratic regions of the world. Yet, that depiction conceals that associated with the estimates. each of the regions of the world. The left-hand panel is based on - some of the most populous countries are part of this autocratiza traditional averages across all countries. It captures the well- known tion trend. “third wave” of democratization, which began with the 1974 over - Therefore, the right-hand panel in Figure 1.2 displays levels of de - dictatorship in p Estado Novo throw of the - ortugal. Subsequent dec - mocracy weighted by the size of each country’s population. Cal - ades, characterized by the end of the Cold War and frequent pro lI ber Al Democr Acy: g lob gure 1.2: Al A nD r eg Ion Al A fI Ver Age S AtIon- ght p (rI ). eIghteD Anel popul W 1 1 .9 .9 .8 .8 .7 .7 .6 .6 .5 .5 .4 .4 .3 .3 .2 .2 .1 .1 0 0 1982 2017 2012 2007 2002 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977 1972 1972 1977 1987 2017 2012 2007 2002 1997 1992 Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average Latin America and the Caribbean MENA Western Europe and North America Sub−Saharan Africa Asia−Pacific 3. Autocratization naturally has a “floor effect” in that extremely 2. Following V-Dem’s methodology, “countries” includes semi-sovereign political units like Palestine. The number of autocratic countries cannot become much worse, but in principle countries in the dataset varies in the chosen period, from 157 in 1972 to 178 in 2017, dependent on the emergence of new countries and the dissolution of others. For a full account of the political units, see Coppedge et al. (2018d). autocratization can affect countries at any level on the scale.

18 DS CRACY – S nD T uS A l Demo eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 18 TAT Ren culating the averages in this manner allows us to understand the lation-weighted metric even shows a small increase in the region’s level of democracy that the average citizen in each region is living level of democracy. under. First, the levels of liberal democracy and its components are hallenge rowing c A g overall much lower when weighted by population. This reflects the Another way to look at the global development of democracy is fact that that a number of small states score very high on the lDI, displayed in Figure 1.3. while countries like China with large populations, do not. The left-hand panel displays the number of countries experiencing more pronounced when Second, the current reversal is much significant change over the prior ten years in terms of the l DI, for we take the size of the population into account. The population- each year since 1972. The right-hand panel depicts it weighted by weighted estimates show a particularly steep decline in the last population size. few years, suggesting that recent trends in autocratization are af - fecting large portions of the global population. From this perspec - We measure change by taking the difference of the score at time tive, the global level of democracy peaked around 2004 and in . This ten-year measure is designed to capture both t t and time terms of these point estimates, we now back to the global level of -10 rapid and gradual change. We report only significant changes, by nion in democracy recorded shortly after the end of the Soviet u 4 which we mean that the confidence intervals provided in the V- 1991. The last six years has brought us back 25 years in time. 5 - These confidence intervals can be rela Dem data do not overlap. In terms of the share of the population enjoying democratic rights tively wide, meaning that our measure is conservative since it is urope and n and freedoms, Western e - orth America are back to lev more likely to err on the side of not reporting a change. els of liberal democracy last seen nearly 40 years ago, and l atin The dashed green line depicts the number of countries each year America some 25 years ago. These are, indeed, worrying findings. DI. The solid red line for which there was advancement on the l The only region that does seem to be relatively resilient to the cur - shows the number of countries that experienced backsliding. By rent autocratization trend is sub-Saharan Africa, which in the popu - hAnge fI gure 1.3: S on number of c ountr IeS WI IfIcAnt c Ign th S Anel popul lI eIghte W AtIon- Ight p ber Al Democr Acy In Dex (r D). 55% 80 75 50% 70 45% 65 60 40% 55 35% 50 45 30% 40 25% 35 Number of Countries 30 20% Share of World Population 25 15% 20 15 10% 10 5% 5 0 0% 1972 2002 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977 2007 1982 1977 1972 2012 2002 1997 1992 1987 2017 2012 2007 2017 Backsliders Advancers 4. The confidence intervals, or highest posterior densities, that V-Dem brings along from all the baseline country-level indicators, indicate that with some amount of possibility, we could still be at 2012 levels of democracy in the world. At the same time, these also indicate, with the same probability, that we could possibly already have reversed back to 1978-levels of democracy. While taking the estimations of uncertainty seriously, we have chosen here, in this report, to focus on the point estimates that are the levels with the highest probability, for the sake of parsimony and to avoid making the text unnecessarily dense to digest (see methodology section at the beginning of this report). 5. See methodology section at the beginning of this report.

19 l Demo DS nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S Ren eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 19 these measures, the height of the third wave occurred between - nited States, Brazil, Russia, Democratic Republic of Con India, the u 1993 and 1999 when over 70 countries made significant advances kraine and p go, Turkey, Thailand, u oland. Thus, key countries across on the l DI each year, while only four to six countries were sliding - the democracy-autocracy spectrum are shrinking whatever demo back. In fact, this imbalance in favour of democratic advances over cratic space was present. This is one important metric to capture setbacks has persisted every year to varying degrees since 1978 – - what is actually happening: a much larger share of the world popu until 2017. lation is experiencing autocratization than the share experiencing democratization. - There is a clear downward trend in the number of countries mak ajority of the p opulation Still l ive in A m ing democratic advancements since at least 2008. Conversely, the Democracies - number of countries registering significant change towards autoc until now, we have analysed trends based on significant changes since roughly around the turn of the century. increased racy has along the spectrum that V-Dem’s indices and indicators provide. last year, the number of backsliding countries recorded is the same Another important perspective is qualitative shifts from one type ( N =24) as the number of countries making advancements. This has of regime to another, in particular when such transitions cross the not occurred since 1979. democracy-autocracy divide. Despite evidence of a trend towards autocratization, a majority of the world’s population (52 percent) one aspect that makes this even more worrying is that the popu - 6 , but only 14 percent in still live in democracies, as Figure 1.4 shows lation living in the 24 countries backsliding on liberal democracy - the liberal variety. The largest share, 38 percent, of the world popu by 2017 outnumbers the population living in advancing countries. lation, lives in the more limited form of electoral democracy. n ever - The share of the world population living in countries experiencing theless, these statistics show that for a majority of people the most an advancement or decline over the same period depicted in the common form of rule is still democracy. right-hand graph in Figure 1.3 testify to this. The bar for being classified as an “electoral democracy” is reasonable During the last two years, there is a striking rise in the share of the but not exceedingly demanding: holding fairly free and fair multi - world’s population living in countries backsliding on democracy. party party elections and an average score on V-Dem’s e lectoral De - By 2017, one third of the world’s population – or 2.5 billion people – mocracy Index ( eDI) above 0.5, reflecting achievement of Dahl’s in - lived in countries that are part of a global autocratization trend. The 7 There stitutional prerequisites of democracy to a reasonable extent. countries with the largest population exhibiting decline in 2017 are: were 56 electoral democracies in the world in 2017. - liberal democra gure 1.4: n 2017. fI ype I Ime t Sh AtIon by r opul Are of p eg cies fulfil a more demanding notion of democracy that also includes the rule of law and horizontal constraints on the executive. o nly 39 countries met this standard in 2017. In total 95 out of the 178 coun - ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ tries in the V-Dem dataset were classified as democracies in that year. ♂♂♂ ♂ ♂♂♂♂♂♂ In electoral autocracies, elections are held and some political and civil liberties exist but their meaningfulness is undermined by ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ government repression, censorship, and intimidation. Another 56 ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ countries had this type of regime in 2017. Countries rated extreme - - ly low in terms of democracy, where the chief executive is not ac ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ countable to citizens, are classified as closed autocracies. We find 27 such countries in 2017. ♂ ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ ♂♂ ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ ♂ ♂♂♂♂♂ ♂♂♂♂ ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ ♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂♂ lect y tocrac losed Au yC tocrac Au oral Liberal Democrac yE emocrac toral D lec yE 7. Lührmann et al. (2018). 6. This builds on the regime-classification by Lührmann et al. (2018). While using V-Dem’s data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).

20 CTI DS 20 Se on 1: lIB eRA l Demo CRACY – S TAT uS A nD T Ren Among the 17 countries that improved, six closed autocracies have acksliders Advancers and b advanced significantly: n epal and Bhutan became electoral de - Where are citizens most likely to experience declines or advance aldives electoral mocracies, and Fiji, myanmar, Bangladesh and m in access to democracy, political rights, and civil liberties? Here we autocracies. Tunisia is the only country that transitioned from au - report the findings for all countries, focusing on states where there tocracy to become a liberal democracy, while eight additional - have been significant changes. We start with the regime perspec countries advanced to become electoral democracies, including - tive, in which countries are classified as liberal- and electoral de alawi. oldova, and m Guinea-Bissau, m mocracies, or as electoral- and closed autocracies. We then look at countries with Significant c hanges more fine-grained changes along the V-Dem indices, focusing on ast t in the p en y ears significant changes over the last ten years, followed by a look at the Figure 1.5 plots the changes taking place over the past ten years, alterations of the past two years. comparing levels of liberal democracy in 2007 to levels in 2017 and regime b reakdowns and the more fine-grained V-Dem index for liberal democracy. l abelled transitions to Democracy countries are those with significant changes over the past ten years. Based on the Regimes of the World - classification, Table A7 in the Ap pendix shows the status and changes in regime type between 2007 There are also a number of countries with significant advances in var - 8 l ooking at changes over the past 10 and 2017 for all 178 countries. N ious liberal-democratic traits over the past ten years ( =24). These years, 20 countries have slipped down one category. Among them countries have made significant improvements on the l DI but most - we find four members of the eu lost the status as liberal democ of these are countries with rather small populations, save n igeria. ithuania, racy to become electoral democracies: Hungary, p oland, l and Slovakia. But three other countries are also downgraded from Yet, a large number of countries register significant and substan - auritius, and South Africa. liberal to electoral democracies: Israel, m tive rates of autocratization. We find the world’s most populous de - nited States and India – as backsliders on democ mocracies – the u - notably, eight democracies broke down over the past ten years racy for the first time in the V-Dem data. They are thus joining other - and are now classified as electoral autocracies: Comoros, Hondu democracies we registered as backsliders already last year, such as kraine, and Zambia. Four ras, Iraq, nicaragua, Tanzania, Turkey, u poland, and Suriname. Several world and regional Brazil, Hungary, countries that used to be electoral democracies are now classified powers are found among the backsliders, which gives additional 9 In particular, the zbekistan. as closed: p alestine (West Bank), Syria, Yemen, and u cause for concern since diffusion is “no illusion.” S on the lI chAnge Al Democr Acy In fI Dex, 2007-2017. ber g u r e 1.5: 1 .9 .8 USA .7 Surinam e Vanuatu Tunisia .6 Poland Georgia Brazil Burkina Faso Bhutan Guatemala .5 Hungary Nepal Sri Lanka Guyana India Nigeria .4 Kyrgyzstan Ecuador Liberal Democracy 2017 Macedonia Fiji Serbia .3 Gambia Zambia Myanmar Dominican Republic Eastern Europe and Central Asi a Ukrain e .2 MENA Libya Western Europe and North America Turkey Nicaragua .1 Latin America and the Caribbean Burundi Yemen Sub−Saharan Africa 0 c Asia−Pacifi .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 Liberal Democracy 2007 Note: Countries above the diagonal line have improved from 2007 to 2017. Countries below the diagonal line have declined. Only countries with significant changes are labeled. 8. Lührmann et al. (2018). 9. Coppedge (2018).

21 eRA DS uS A TAT CRACY – S l Demo nD T on 1: lIB CTI Se 21 Ren b l e 1.1: tA mAI n ADVAncer S, er lID cKS D bA S An pAS t tW eArS. o y cKS S bA lID er DI 2015 change l DI 2017 l Brazil -0.19 0.57 0.76 -0.19 0.60 Poland 0.79 - 0.16 0.12 0. 27 Turkey -0.13 0.55 0.68 Croatia Romania -0.12 0.49 0.61 United States 0.73 0.85 -0.12 ADVAncer S change l DI 2017 l DI 2015 Burkina Faso 0.50 0.30 0.20 0.11 Gambia 0.19 0.30 Note: The table displays only countries with significant (without overlapping confidence intervals) and substantively relevant changes (more than 0.1 difference on the LDI scale). people participated in peaceful and competitive multi-party elec - united States’ decline combined with an explicit denunciation of tions in n ovember, 2015. Burkina Faso’s rating on the l DI has now democracy as a foreign policy priority by the Trump administra - reached an all-time high. Gambia’s incumbent autocrat of 23 years, tion does not bode well. Three emerging powers among the BRICS president Yahya Jammeh, lost the 2016 elections and eventually - nations also register significant backsliding – Brazil, Russia and In stepped down in the midst of eCoWAS’s intervention in January dia. China remains at the end of the autocratic regime spectrum. Among the eastern european countries, - 2017. It remains to be seen if the new Gambian government will fa poland and Hungary are key regional power players that are backsliding significantly. cilitate a full transition to democracy. countries with Significant c hanges last t en y ears – o verview of All c ountries over the l ast t wo y ears The last ten years’ developments on the index of liberal democ - - Some of the significant changes displayed in Figure 1.5 have oc racy for all countries, and taking the confidence intervals into ac - curred only recently. Table 1.1 presents a list of the countries signifi - count, is provided in Figure 1.6. Here the reader finds every country cant changes have occurred over the last two years. For example, among the 178 contemporary states V-Dem measures, and their nited States has taken place pri democratic backsliding in the u - status as of 2017 compared to 2007. Green country names and dots marily during these past two years. Turkey continues its descent with confidence interval bars indicate significant advancers, while into dictatorship with every passing year, but it has now comes red names, dots, and bars designate the significant backsliders. - close to hitting rock-bottom on the scale with a score of 0.12. Bra The reader should note that a few of the latter are countries at the zil, Croatia, poland, and Romania are now at middling levels on the very lowest levels of democratic quality. They are simply extremely lDI after also suffering from significant declines over the last two undemocratic in all respects with a high degree of certainty, and years. In p oland, swift and far-reaching constitutional changes have therefore very small substantive changes register as significant. But 10 reduced checks and balances, affecting in particular the judiciary. - there are also some countries, presented in grey because the con Similarly, the Romanian government has limited the rule of law and fidence intervals overlap, for which the substantive changes are 11 individual liberties – allegedly in order to curb corruption. large and those should be noted. Among these we find, for ex - ample, Greece with the l DI dropping by 0.12 points. However, this Both two cases of significant democratization over the past two drop is not noted as significant, possibly because V-Dem experts - years are from West Africa – Burkina Faso and the Gambia. In par disagree about what the economic crisis and subsequent political - ticular, the case of Burkina Faso is remarkable since it shows that au changes in Greece mean for the quality of democracy. o n the oth - - resident Blaise Com tocratization can be rapidly reversed: In 2014 p er hand, V-Dem experts agree that media freedom has declined paore, who had held power since 1987, attempted to modify the in Greece over the last ten years, reflecting the fact that both the constitutional term limits but was ousted after massive protests. Syriza government and its predecessor have taken measures un - 12 After a short period of uncertainty and military rule, the Burkinabe dermining media pluralism. 12. OSF (2015). 10. Rohac, Dalibor (2018). 11. Clark, David (2017).

22 l Demo DS nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S Ren eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 22 countr IeS by Score on V-Dem’ S lI ber Al Democr Acy In Dex ( lDI) 2017 A nD 2007. fI g u r e 1.6: Score and Confidence Intervals ● Norway ● Sweden ● Estonia ● Switzerland ● Denmark ● Costa Rica ● Finland ● Australia ● New Zealand ● Portugal ● Belgium ● Netherlands ● France ● Germany ● Iceland ● United Kingdom ● Slovenia ● Chile ● Ireland ● Canada ● Uruguay ● Czech Republic ● Italy ● Austria ● Japan ● Luxembourg ● Latvia ● Cyprus ● Lithuania ● Slovakia ● United States of America ● Jamaica ● Cape Verde ● South Korea ● Spain ● Mauritius ● Greece ● Taiwan ● Barbados ● Trinidad and Tobago ● Vanuatu ● Argentina ● South Africa ● Tunisia ● Suriname ● Benin ● Panama ● São Tomé and Príncipe ● Peru ● Poland ● Bulgaria ● Namibia ● Israel ● Senegal ● Botswana ● Brazil ● Croatia ● Georgia ● Ghana ● Mongolia ● Hungary ● Bhutan ● Timor−Leste ● Guatemala ● Burkina Faso ● Colombia ● Liberia ● Guyana ● Romania ● Nepal ● Mexico ● Indonesia ● Malawi ● Paraguay ● Sri Lanka ● Albania ● El Salvador ● Seychelles ● Nigeria ● Solomon Islands ● India ● Lesotho ● Moldova ● Bolivia ● Mali ● Tanzania ● Niger ● Sierra Leone 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 Liberal Democracy index ● ● ● ● 2017 − Backslider 2017 2007 2017 − Advancer

23 l Demo DS nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S Ren eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 23 Score and Confidence Intervals ● Ivory Coast ● Philippines ● Ecuador ● Singapore ● Montenegro ● Kyrgyzstan ● Macedonia ● Kenya ● Fiji ● Mozambique ● Papua New Guinea ● Guinea−Bissau ● Lebanon ● Hong Kong ● Serbia ● The Gambia ● Somaliland ● Kosovo ● Iraq ● Gabon ● Pakistan ● Kuwait ● Uganda ● Zambia ● Morocco ● Honduras ● Bosnia and Herzegovina ● Haiti ● Madagascar ● Myanmar ● Dominican Republic ● Comoros ● Togo ● Armenia ● Jordan ● Ukraine ● Central African Republic ● Afghanistan ● Guinea ● Malaysia ● Rwanda ● Zimbabwe ● Democratic Republic of Vietnam ● Palestine/West Bank ● Libya ● Algeria ● Bangladesh ● Zanzibar ● Mauritania ● Cameroon ● Iran ● Maldives ● Angola ● Somalia ● Kazakhstan ● Oman ● Djibouti ● Egypt ● Venezuela ● Belarus ● Turkey ● Nicaragua ● Russia ● Republic of the Congo ● United Arab Emirates ● Ethiopia ● Sudan ● Democratic Republic of Congo ● Thailand ● Swaziland ● Chad ● Laos ● Qatar ● Cambodia ● Cuba ● Palestine/Gaza ● Azerbaijan ● Tajikistan ● China ● Burundi ● Bahrain ● Equatorial Guinea ● Uzbekistan ● Turkmenistan ● Yemen ● Saudi Arabia ● Syria ● Eritrea ● North Korea 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 Liberal Democracy index ● ● ● ● 2017 − Backslider 2017 − Advancer 2017 2007

24 DS Ren nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S l Demo eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 24 and its components and the e DI and the three components of the Which Aspects of Democracy liberal dimension. Are at r isk? iberal Democra - until now, the analysis has focused on the V-Dem l - The left-hand graph in Figure 1.8 is again based on traditional aver lDI), which captures both liberal and electoral aspects of cy Index ( ages across countries and it shows that the liberal subcomponents lCI) and the iberal Component Index ( democracy by joining the l - measuring judicial constraints on the executive and rule of law al electoral Democracy Index ( eDI). The nuanced nature of the V-Dem ready had relatively high global average levels before the “third 14 With the third wave starting in 1974, data makes it possible to discern unevenness in trends across these wave” of democratization. these improved further. At the same time, this period meant that different traits, down to the level of specific indicators. the third subcomponent capturing the extent to which legislatures - can also constrain the power of the executive, caught up to a sig To help the reader follow this “drilling-down” into the various as - nificant extent. While rule of law seems to have clearly reached the pects of democracy, Figure 1.7 presents the conceptual structure highest average levels globally, it is also the subcomponent with of the l DI and e DI, their main- and subcomponents, and the indi - the most measurable decline in recent years. The electoral democ - vidual indicators of those subcomponents. racy component was, and still is, at significantly lower levels. The l DI and the l CI. The lib - DI has two main components: the e When weighted by population size, as in the right-hand panel, the lCI) in turn has three sub-components, while the eral component ( 13 , each measured by a series of indicators. recent trend of autocratization is more pronounced, in ways simi - electoral ( eDI) has five The l DI pattern has already been discussed above and we start the lar to the regional comparisons in the previous section. It seems DI analysis here at the next level in the conceptual scheme: the l to affect all aspects to some extent but he electoral democracy DI and the three components of the and its components and the e eDI) in particular, registers a steep downward curve after measure ( liberal dimension. around 2010. It seems that a large portion of the downward trend in the overall levels of liberal democracy is in fact due to this auto - - The l CI. The lib DI and the l DI has two main components: the e cratization in the electoral arena. lCI) in turn has three sub-components, while the eral component ( 13 , each measured by a series of indicators. electoral ( eDI) has five In order to analyze what aspects of the e DI are driving this change, DI pattern has already been discussed above and we start the The l Figure 1.9. drills down into developments amongst the constitu - DI analysis here at the next level in the conceptual scheme: the l ent components of the eDI, from 1972 until 2017. As above, the lector fI g u r e 1.7: expl AnAtIon of lI ber Al Democr Acy, e S. Al Democr Acy, A nD t he Ir c omponent Acy In V-Dem lIber Al Democr Dex omponent Index liberal c electoral Democracy Index LEGISLATIVE UALIT y BEFORE JUDICIAL Eq FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CONSTRAINTS ON CONSTRAINTS ON ThE LAW AND FREEDOM OF CLEAN ELECTED AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES SUFFRAGE ThE EXECUTIVE LIBERT ThE EXECUTIVE INDIVIDUAL ELECTIONS ASSOCIATION OFFICIALS OF INFORMATION INDEX INDEX INDEX 16 4 8 5 6 1 9 20 Indicator Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators 14. See Figure A.2 in Appendix, which illustrates how they have developed over time 13. These capture all the institutional requisites of Dahl’s formulation of polyarchy. See Teorell et al. (2018). and in different regions.

25 l Demo DS nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S Ren eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 25 left-hand graph shows the levels of democracy averaged by coun - of magnitude. However, during the 2000s, until the end of the se - try, while the right-hand graph depicts the levels of democracy ries, the Clean e lection Index is the only one for which we register weighted by the size of the population. a small, but steady, increase on its scores. In short, whatever small decline we find in the overall levels of electoral democracy on this The straight averages across countries in the left-hand graph show unweighted metric are due to a small decline in more recent years that three out of the four subcomponents started with levels be - on freedom of expression in particular. The right-hand, popula - tween 0.3 and 0.4. Suffrage was already in the early 1970s some - - tion weighted metric makes the autocratization trend more pro thing of a non-issue. The elected officials index improves steadily - nounced after around 2010. In particular, a shrinking space for free throughout the period. The big boost in scores in 1992-93 registers dom of expression is particularly obvious in the right-hand graph in particular for freedom of expression and freedom of association, in Figure 1.9 after 2012. While the subcomponent measuring free - reaching around 0.7 before a small decline appears at the end of - dom of expression also takes a dip, and somewhat later, the elec - the time series for the latter and a much more marked, steeper de toral components seems to be hovering around a relatively con - cline in the former. fficials Index. lected o stant level – or even increase as is the for the e DI measure is to a large degree due Thus, the decline in the overall e elections in - The improvements in the quality of elections (Clean - to autocratization in the form of reduction of freedom of expres dex) during the same period were much more modest in terms sion and alternative sources of information. 1 1 g u r e 1.8: tren fI DS I n lI ber Al Democr Acy .9 .9 (lDI) A nD It S S, component .8 .8 1972-2017 (r Ig ht- , popul AtIon hAnD .7 .7 eIghte W D). .6 .6 .5 .5 .4 .4 .3 .3 .2 .2 Liberal Democracy Index (LDI ) x Judicial Constraints Inde .1 .1 ) Electoral Democracy Index (EDI Legislative Constraints Index 0 0 Rule of Law Index 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 1972 2012 2017 2007 1 1 elec tor Al fI gure 1.9: Acy In Dex ( eDI) Democr S c omponent S AnD It .9 .9 (r Ig ht- h An D, W popul AtI on- D). eIghte .8 .8 .7 .7 .6 .6 .5 .5 .4 .4 .3 .3 Electoral Democracy Index (EDI ) .2 .2 x Freedom of Association Inde Share of Population with Suffrage .1 .1 Freedom of Expression Index Clean Elections Inde x 0 0 Elected Officials Index 1972 1977 2007 2017 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2002 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977 1972 2012 1982

26 l Demo DS nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S Ren eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 26 iberal and changes – by c omponents of l - improving in only a few. In particular, this concerns the subcompo electoral Democracy nent measuring freedom of expression and alternative sources of Given the trends discussed above, there is a need to further dissect information that has been affected negatively in 19 countries over what has happened in the past ten years with the subcomponents - the last ten years, while improving in only eleven. The subcompo of the liberal and electoral democracy aspects. - nents measuring rule of law and freedom of association also regis ter more backsliders than advancers. Figure 1.10 displays the number of countries that have improved or declined substantially on indices capturing the subcomponents of Since these are key institutional requisites of electoral democracy, 15 we pursue the disaggregation further to the the l CI and the e DI. For subcomponent indices appearing above as Dahl once argued, most precise level of analysis: the individual indicators. Figure 1.11 - the diagonal line, more countries have improved than have de shows the same type of graph as Figure 1.10, comparing 2007 to clined, and the reverse is true for those appearing below the diago - 2017, but displays now the 25 specific indicators that constitute the nal line. Figure A2 in the online appendix specifies which countries DI. For ease of use, we have coded indicators components of the e have changed on these indices, as well as on additional aspects of 16 by components. democracy. All indicators measuring the freedom of expression and alternative Disaggregating the subcomponents reveals additional information sources of information component, are found below the diago - - about the ongoing autocratization trend. In particular, it demon All indicators measuring electoral aspects in the index for nal line. strates why it is so hard to detect. Key characteristics of democracy, - clean elections are either above or very close to the line. In particu - such as the Clean election Index (capturing how free and fair elec lar, two of the most fundamental indicators related to elections – tions are), and the index measuring the extent to which elected the extent to which the elections were multiparty in practice and officials are actually vested with power on a national level ( elected national officials are subject to elections -– record more countries officials Index), have improved significantly in a large number of improving than declining. The freedom of association indicators countries over the last ten years, while declining in only a few. Such are mostly close to the line with two exceptions found below the trends give the appearance of robust democracy, particularly to line that both measure the extent to which civil society can operate outsiders or when taken on the aggregate level. freely from government interference or repression, and one above the line that measures an electoral characteristic. Figure 1.10 also show that despite advances in the electoral fac - ets of democracy, less visible changes in rights, freedoms, and the Figure 1.11 thus gives a precise picture of how the current trend of rule of law are undermining democracy. These important aspects autocratization is unfolding, and how some ruling elites go about of democracy are in significant decline in many countries, while S of lI lector Al Democr Acy: ber nD e fI g u r e 1.10: by c omponent Al A Ign IeS WI number of c ountr S, 2007-2017. hAnge IfIcAnt c th S 20 Clean Elections 18 16 Elected Officials 14 12 Freedom of Expression 10 8 Legislative Constraints Rule of Law Judical Constraints 6 Freedom of Association Number of Countries Improving 4 Suffrage 2 0 18 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Number of Countries Declining Liberal Component Electoral Democracy 17. For instance, Bermeo (2016) argues that contemporary backsliding is not characterized 15. Dahl (1971, 1989). by the disappearance of electoral regimes but by more clandestine strategies such as 16. The Elected Officials index (v2x_elecoff ) is an index that is constructed from 16 factual indicators that are conditional on each other in a complex formula. See Teorell et al. (2018) for details. manipulations of the media.

27 l Demo DS nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S Ren eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 27 pursuing undemocratic agendas. It corroborates findings in some Acy: Al Democr lector S of e cAtor DI by In g u r e 1.11: f I number of c hAnge IeS WI th S Ign IfIcAnt c S ountr of the earlier research on backsliding but provides much greater 2007-2017. 17 - The institutions surrounding elections that are emblem detail. - atic of democracy typically remain in good standing or even im 35 prove. elections are very visible events that attract attention, not Voters’ registry. 30 only from national groups but also from international media, multi - Elections free/fair Election irregularity lateral organizations, and other watch-dog institutions. Changes in El. intimidation 25 electoral institutions and practices also tend to be more verifiable Vote buying than many other aspects of democracy, and there are normally a Multiparty elections 20 EMB capacity Media censorship number of processes available to conduct such verification. Academic and cultural expression Media harras. EMB autonomy Freedom of disc. (m) Elected Officials 15 Media range Election peace CSO repression By contrast, we find that the most negative developments occur Freedom of disc. (w) CSO entry/exit Media self−censorship Opposition parties aut. Number of Countries Improving in ways that are less conspicuous violations. Government censor - Media bias 10 Barriers to parties Media critical ship of the media and harassment of journalists can occur gradual - Party ban ly by relatively obscure means such as inducements, intimidations, 5 Suffrage and co-optation. These tactics lead naturally to increasing levels 0 of self-censorship and fewer explicit criticisms of the government 10 0 5 35 15 20 25 30 expressed in the media. The predictable result is a narrower range Number of Countries Declining of political perspectives in the public sphere, as well as a general Core Election Indicators Clean Election Index decline in the freedom of expression. Correspondingly, leaders can Freedom of Expression & Alternative Sources of Information Freedom of Association incrementally constrain the permitted space for autonomous aca - tion party oversight, compliance with the judiciary, and executive demia, civil society organizations, and cultural institutions to impair respect for the constitution have all declined. Thus, the V-Dem data their abilities to function as pro-democratic actors, while carving testifies that the principal issue testing the resiliency of American out an increasing level of acceptance for such measures. democracy concerns the role of Congress in holding the execu - tive responsible for following the constitution and adhering to the While elections typically occur once every four or five years, these law. At the same time, we also register some significant negative - rights, freedoms, and the rule of law are either maintained or com changes in the overall fairness of elections, freedom of discussion, promised on an everyday basis. e ach step can appear relatively in - and the range of political perspectives in the media. significant. The effects add up and are now apparent in Figure 1.11. Critically, the rights and institutions being diminished are the ones atterns of Autocratization Different p that make electoral processes meaningful and fully democratic. Another important finding in the annual Democracy Report 2018 This is a worrisome set of developments, posing a clear challenge - is that there are different patterns of decline in the more demo to the future of democracy. cratic countries compared to the less democratic ones. V-Dem is the first dataset to capture not only liberal and electoral aspects of The pattern of backsliding in the most populous democracy – In - democracy, but also to measure the egalitarian, participatory and dia – exemplifies this trend. We discuss it more in detail at the end deliberative components of democracy. The figure below depicts of this section. In India, the infringements on media freedom and that breadth and provides an overview of which subcomponents the civil society activities of democracy following the election of across all the varieties of democracy that register significant chang - a Hindu-nationalist government have started to undermine the es – without overlapping confidence intervals – over the last ten longest-standing and most populous democracy in the Global years, comparing scores from 2007 to 2017. Countries are sorted, - South. Yet, the main indicators of the core electoral aspects of de - first by Regimes of the World-type, and second, within each cat mocracy do not show significant decline. It remains to be seen if egory, on how many aspects have changed, from many to few, - this trend will be reversed in the coming years or if India will de - based on the summary scores in the right-most columns. The tint scend further into the authoritarian regime spectrum – as during ed colors indicate cases in which the index did not change, but one their authoritarian interlude from 1975-77. or more of its constitutive indicators did. nited States is now Following the election of Donald Trump, the u The figure enables comparison across categories, from liberal- and - significantly less democratic in 2017 than it was in 2007 but the pat electoral democracy to electoral- and closed autocracies, with re - tern is slightly different. The backsliding is mainly found in the liber - gard to the number of changes that occurred in each and whether measures of effective oversight and al components of democracy. such changes represented advances or backsliding. o ne can also use of the legislature’s power to investigate the executive, opposi - 18. The picture is only slightly different when looking at the regime categories based on countries’ status in 2007: one third of countries that qualified as liberal democracy in 2007 experienced significant changes by 2017, compared to 58 percent of electoral democracies, 64 percent of electoral autocracies and 71 percent of closed autocracies.

28 l Demo DS nD T uS A TAT CRACY – S Ren eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 28 compare within categories to see if countries tended to advance or In short, decline among democracies take place in areas that are backslide and in which aspects of democracy these changes reg - less visible and that can be derailed significantly before the threat istered. The figure also provides column summary scores, making to democracy becomes obvious to the extent that other countries - it easy to identify the subcomponents of the different varieties af and international bodies react. At the same time, degeneration of fected the most, and the least, by positive or negative develop - the democratic quality in such areas threatens to undermine the ments over the past ten years, from 2007 to 2017. viability and meaningfulness of core institutions, such as elections and freedom of association. our first observation is that volatility – the number of aspects that are improving or declining – is overall lower in both democratic electoral autocracies In patterns of autocratization reflect a much regime categories, than in the two autocratic ones. Democratic more direct, widespread attack on core democratic institutions one third of all liberal democ - countries tend to be more stable. and freedoms. Freedom of expression and the quality of public racies record some significant changes, and the same is true for debate are on a downward trajectory in many countries, and this about half of all electoral democracies. Conversely, some change is also true for freedom of association and the liberal subcompo - is registered in two thirds of countries in the electoral- and closed - nents of democracy. In five countries elections are now significant 18 autocratic regime categories. ly less free and fair than ten years ago – Burundi, Turkey, Venezuela, Zambia, and Comoros. - Second, there are only nine countries that have changed signifi cantly in more than five areas of democracy during the last ten - Among the 56 countries that are classified as electoral autocra years. These include developments in Tunisia, Bhutan, myanmar, democracies cies in 2017, seven of them had qualified as electoral in ibya, as well as drastic deteriorations in Burundi, Yemen, Tur - and l 2007 – Turkey, u kraine, n icaragua, Serbia, Comoros, Honduras and key, Venezuela and Thailand. Somalia also exhibits a high level of Iraq. Hence, these are countries that we can now, unfortunately, volatility as the textbook example of a fragile state. identify as instances of democratic breakdown. Yet, we should also - note that there are five countries in this regime category with sig most other countries have changed significantly only with regards nificant improvements in several areas, myanmar, Zimbabwe, Fiji, to one or two selected aspects, whereas most components are sta - and Gambia. However, on balance there are still many more coun - nited States it is mainly the legislative con ble. For instance, in the u - - tries with more negative changes than positive, in this regime cat straints on the executive that have weakened significantly along egory. The trend of autocratization in the world seems to affect with the quality of public reasoning. In Greece the main negative electoral autocracies considerably. developments are in the area of freedom of expression and local elections, and so on. In sum, most democratic change, whether , some rulers seem to make an attempt closed autocracies even in positive or negative, is gradual and affecting only an area or two at - at improving the outlook of (mainly legislative) elections, as indi a time, even in this medium-term, ten-year perspective. cated by the seven countries with positive significant changes on - subcomponents related to elections. This further illustrates the cur A third observation that stands out is that not a single democracy ven in countries with among the most rent trends in the world. e - – neither in the liberal nor in the electoral category – has record authoritarian political systems, rulers try to improve their image by ed significant decline in the purely electoral aspects of democracy making the symbolic elections look a little more democratic. We or in freedom of association. These highly visible and symbolically zbekistan, freedom of expression and quality of also note that in u important aspects are not affected by the current global trend of deliberation have improved slightly - but remain at very low levels. autocratization. Rather, positive changes tend to be found in these aspects. Among liberal democracies most declines are found in - Among the more substantial changes, we note that in Yemen, Bah nited States, Albania the quality of public debates – namely in the u rain, and Thailand even the very limited freedom of expression and and Ghana – and freedom of expression (Greece and Spain). Addi - association is under attack, and the rule of law and quality of de - tionally, legislative constraints on the executive are evidently under liberation have also declined. However, in this regime category the nited States, as is the rule of law in Australia. stress in the u numbers have to be interpreted with care. The confidence intervals tend to be much narrower for countries in this regime category the picture is similar, with five countries In electoral democracies than for countries in the other categories. This is simply because - declining in terms of freedom of expression and four on public de the V-Dem country experts tend to have a high degree of agree - liberation. Judicial constraints on the executive have declined sig - ment that the situation in closed autocracies scores extremely low nificantly in poland, Haiti, macedonia and Suriname, whereas leg - on most indicators. Thus, with tight confidence intervals around islative constraints on the executive have improved significantly in point estimates, even small changes become significant, but they eru. Bhutan and p are not always substantially noteworthy.

29 DS Ren uS A TAT CRACY – S l Demo eRA on 1: lIB CTI Se 29 nD T A : Acy by c ountry. n Sub- S I hAnge yeAr c ten- S of Democr g u r e 1.12 f I component ation m or ponent ponent ponent e e e Sources of Inf y Com e Com e Constraints w of Expression fficials ecutiv ecutiv nativ of Association ian Com x Change Inde ticipator e/P ositiv e Negativ r udical Constraints lean Elections Legislativ Freedom J Elected O Suffrage C Pa Egalitar Freedom Rule of La Deliberativ otal) (T on the Ex on the Ex and Alter 0/9 (9) T unisia United States 2/0 (2) Albania 1/0 (1) 1/0 (1) ustralia A 0/1 (1) A ustr ia 1/0 (1) France Ghana 1/0 (1) 1/0 (1) Greece 0/1 (1) Iceland Ireland 0/1 (1) 1/0 (1) Slo v enia Spain 1/0 (1) Sweden 1/0 (1) 0/1 (1) United Kingdom Barbados 0/0 (0) CY 0/0 (0) Belgium 0/0 (0) Canada 0/0 (0) erde Cape V 0/0 (0) Chile 0/0 (0) Costa Rica Cypr us 0/0 (0) 10/13 (23) Cz lic 0/0 (0) ech Repub Denmar k 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) Estonia Finland 0/0 (0) LIBERAL DEMOCRA many 0/0 (0) Ger Italy 0/0 (0) J apan 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) Latvia Lux 0/0 (0) embourg Nether lands 0/0 (0) Ne 0/0 (0) w Zealand 0/0 (0) ay Norw Po r tugal 0/0 (0) orea 0/0 (0) South K er land 0/0 (0) Switz an aiw 0/0 (0) T inidad and T Tr 0/0 (0) obago Ur y 0/0 (0) ugua 0/6 (6) Bhutan Sr 0/4 (4) i Lanka 3/0 (3) Brazil Croatia 2/1 (3) Nepal 0/3 (3) 3/0 (3) P oland Dominican Repub 2/0 (2) lic ana 0/2 (2) Guy India 2/0 (2) 0/2 (2) y Coast or Iv 1/1 (2) Romania Bulgar 0/1 (1) ia kina F 0/1 (1) aso Bur Haiti 1/0 (1) Hungar y 1/0 (1) ia 1/0 (1) Liber Macedonia 1/0 (1) wi Mala 0/1 (1) Niger ia 0/1 (1) ru Pe 0/1 (1) 0/1 (1) Senegal 1/0 (1) iname Sur CY nuatu 0/1 (1) Va 0/0 (0) Argentina 0/0 (0) Benin Bolivia 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) ana Botsw 0/0 (0) Colombia Ecuador 0/0 (0) ador 0/0 (0) El Salv 18/26 (44) Georgia 0/0 (0) ORAL DEMOCRA 0/0 (0) Guatemala Guinea−Bissau 0/0 (0) Indonesia 0/0 (0) ELECT 0/0 (0) Israel 0/0 (0) amaica J 0/0 (0) Lebanon 0/0 (0) Lesotho Lithuania 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) Mali 0/0 (0) Maur itius Me 0/0 (0) xico Moldo 0/0 (0) va 0/0 (0) Mongolia Namibia 0/0 (0) Niger 0/0 (0) anama P 0/0 (0) Pa ragua y 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) Philippines 0/0 (0) ychelles Se 0/0 (0) Sierra Leone akia v Slo 0/0 (0) Solomon Islands 0/0 (0) South Afr 0/0 (0) ica íncipe São T 0/0 (0) omé and Pr Timor−Leste 0/0 (0) Inde x Change 5/10 (15) 7/4 (11) 4/1 (5) 1/3 (4) 2/1 (3) 0/2 (2) 7/4 (11) 0/8 (8) 0/2 (2) 0/1 (1) 2/3 (5) otal) e (T ositiv e/P Negativ Only significant changes – without o ve r lapping confidence x Decrease Inde Indicator Decrease als – are displa inter v y ed. The tinted colors indicate cases where Indicator Increase x Increase Inde the inde ut one or more of its sub−indicators did. , b x did not change

30 on 1: lIB DS TAT CRACY – S l Demo eRA uS A CTI Se 30 nD T Ren Acy by c S of Democr component n Sub- S I hAnge yeAr c ten- g u r e 1.12 b : f I ountry. ation m or ponent ponent ponent e e e Sources of Inf y Com e Com e Constraints w of Expression fficials ecutiv ecutiv nativ of Association ian Com x Change Inde ticipator r e/P ositiv e Negativ udical Constraints lean Elections ule of La eliberativ Legislativ Freedom J Elected O Suffrage C Pa Egalitar Freedom R D (T otal) on the Ex on the Ex and Alter 9/0 (9) Bur undi My anmar 0/9 (9) 7/0 (7) r Tu key 5/1 (6) V enezuela 0/5 (5) yrgyzstan K Gambia 0/4 (4) 4/0 (4) itania Maur Zambia 4/0 (4) e 0/4 (4) Zimbabw 2/1 (3) Egypt Fiji 0/3 (3) Ke ny a 1/2 (3) 3/0 (3) Nicaragua Ukraine 3/0 (3) Bangladesh 0/2 (2) 2/0 (2) Cambodia 0/2 (2) Guinea 0/2 (2) Sudan 2/0 (2) T ajikistan Ar menia 0/1 (1) 1/0 (1) Comoros 0/1 (1) Congo 0/1 (1) Gabon 1/0 (1) Iraq CY 0/1 (1) Maldiv es anda 0/1 (1) Rw OCRA 1/0 (1) Serbia Singapore 0/1 (1) UT 0/1 (1) T ogo Zanzibar 1/0 (1) 46/42 (88) 0/0 (0) Afghanistan ORAL A Alger 0/0 (0) ia 0/0 (0) erbaijan Az Belar us 0/0 (0) ELECT 0/0 (0) Bosnia and Herz ego vina Cameroon 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) Central Afr lic ican Repub Chad 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) Djibouti 0/0 (0) ial Guinea Equator Ethiopia 0/0 (0) Honduras 0/0 (0) Iran 0/0 (0) Kazakhstan 0/0 (0) vo oso 0/0 (0) K Madagascar 0/0 (0) ysia Mala 0/0 (0) Montenegro 0/0 (0) Mozambique 0/0 (0) P akistan 0/0 (0) w Guinea apua Ne P 0/0 (0) Repub lic of the Congo 0/0 (0) Russia 0/0 (0) Somaliland 0/0 (0) T 0/0 (0) anzania Uganda 0/0 (0) Libya 0/7 (7) 7/0 (7) emen Y 1/5 (6) Somalia 5/0 (5) Bahrain 5/0 (5) Thailand 0/2 (2) Angola est Bank alestine/W 1/1 (2) P Syr 2/0 (2) ia 0/2 (2) Uzbekistan 0/1 (1) Cuba CY 0/1 (1) itrea Er 0/1 (1) Morocco 0/1 (1) Sw aziland OCRA menistan Tu rk 0/1 (1) UT United Arab Emirates 0/1 (1) Vietnam 0/1 (1) 21/24 (45) 0/0 (0) China ong Hong K 0/0 (0) CLOSED A 0/0 (0) Jordan 0/0 (0) ait w Ku Laos 0/0 (0) th K Nor orea 0/0 (0) Oman 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) alestine/Gaza P Qatar 0/0 (0) 0/0 (0) Saudi Arabia South Sudan 0/0 (0) Inde x Change 4/7 (11) 12/7 (19) 8/3 (11) 6/5 (11) 5/3 (8) 9/5 (14) 10/6 (16) 8/11 (19) 1/12 (13) 1/1 (2) 3/6 (9) e (T Negativ otal) e/P ositiv Only significant changes – without o ve r lapping confidence x Decrease Indicator Decrease Inde y als – are displa v inter ed. The tinted colors indicate cases where Indicator Increase x Increase Inde the inde x did not change , b ut one or more of its sub−indicators did.

31 In TH Tl IGHT e Spo 31 m atthew c . Wilson S Ate D St unIte liberal Democracy under Stress The United States’ ranking on the V-Dem Liberal Democ .S. ratings in the presence of unconstitutional activities. The u - are also plunging for the extent to which the executive branch racy Index fell from seven in 2015 to 31 in 2017. There is clear evidence of autocratization on several indicators. respect the constitution, which is one indicator of judicial con - The lower quality of liberal democracy stems primarily straints on the executive. from weakening constraints on the executive. The negative changes associated with executive respect for the constitution and legislative constraints are congruent V-Dem data indicate that the u nited States is significantly less with the untempered behavior of the current president and democratic in 2017 than it was in previous years. We can at - tribute this decrease to changes that have occurred in the last —which controls the legislative op the unwillingness of the G two years—specifically, to weakening executive constraints. resident Trump’s actions branch—to censor him. Some of p in 2017 that exemplify this trend include legally question Figure 1.13 shows how indicators have changed between 2015 - able immigration bans, executive orders to withhold federal and 2017; labeled variables are those that significantly changed - in the past two years. Indicators that fall to below the diago money from sanctuary cities, expanding the scope of the nal line have decreased since 2015, while positive changes are presidential pardon, diplomacy by social media, and potential moluments Clause. Despite the Trump ad above the line. n violations of the e otably, the greatest number of declines—as - .S. legislators appear either unable or ministration’s actions, u well as the declines of greatest magnitude—have occurred for unwilling to take formal actions to prevent them. indicators of legislative constraints. This includes the extent to which opposition parties exercise oversight, investigatory func - party loyalties and increased polarization between Democrats tions, and the likelihood that Congress or another body would and Republicans have undermined congressional oversight investigate the executive and render an unfavorable decision functions as Republican leaders so far double down in sup - port of the president. This was made apparent by the House Figure 1.13. Aspects of Liberal Democracy in the Intelligence Committee investigation over possible collusion United States, 2015 and 2017. between the president and Russia, which House Democrats 4 argued was prematurely ended and shelved. Its conclusion in 2018 illustrated the weakness of opposition party oversight Freedom of Discussion, men and the decreased likelihood of Congress investigating and rendering an unfavorable decision against the executive. 3.5 Freedom of Foreign Movement The other main component of liberal democracy, which Freedom from Torture lectoral Democracy Index measures, shows the the V-Dem e united States falling from 8th place in 2015 to rank 32 out of 3 Free and Fair Elections 178 countries in 2017. This decline is largely due to significant Score 2017 decreases in the freedom of discussion and in the fairness of Legislature Investigates elections in the past two years. Executive Respects Constitution Executive Oversight 2.5 decade , significant declines have also regis - Across the last tered in election intimidation and the range of media per - - spectives provided. Changes in the indicators reflect allega 2 tions of election meddling and unlawful election practices in the 2016 election, as well as the acuteness of citizen antipathy 2.5 3 3.5 4 2 Score 2015 lectoral integrity in the toward opposing political views. e - united States has been negatively affected by partisan disa Freedom of Association Clean Elections Rule of Law Freedom of Expression greements over voting procedures and attempts to control Judicial Constraints Legislative Constraints

32 32 In TH Tl IGHT e Spo that the integrity of electoral democracy in the u nited States or suppress voting, as exemplified by challenges to voter ID laws and gerrymandering practices that were put before fed - has remained robust despite these threats to election quality and the expression of alternative views. eral courts in 2017 and 2018. party polarization has also resulted in a noticeable lack of nited States is thus largely Democratic backsliding in the u confined to constraints on the executive. Figure 1.14 com - confidence among Americans in the media; declarations that - pares the u .S. to other countries by ranking it on opposi particular outlets constitute ‘fake news’ likely exacerbates this - tion party oversight, legislative investigation, and executive lack of confidence. The change in values of the overall e lec toral Democracy Index is not significant, however, suggesting respect for the constitution, all of which have significantly decreased in the last two years. The figure also shows how .S. ranks on compliance with the judiciary, which is sig the u - Figure 1.14. United States ranking on select nificantly lower in 2017 than it was ten years ago. For the in - indicators, 2007-2017. nited States dicators of executive constraints on which the u 0 6 shows significant decreases, it has fallen below the upper 10 12 12 quartile of highest-ranking countries. 15 17 20 26 32 In summary, the V-Dem data shows evidence that there nited has been a significant democratic backsliding in the u 40 Rank States which is attributable to weakening constraints on 48 the executive. e lectoral democracy remains fairly strong in 55 nited States and there is little change in freedoms and the u 60 the rule of law. The biggest issues testing the resiliency of 67 72 American democracy concern the ability of Congress and the 80 courts to hold the executive responsible to the constitution. 2015 2013 2009 2007 2017 2011 Legislature Opposition Parties Compliance with Judiciary Legislature Investigates in Practice Executive Respect for Constitution illai Shreeya p DIA In the Decline of Democracy in India arendra m odi assumed inister, n rime m leader, the current p The most populous democracy in the world, India, is at risk. Its level of democracy has declined significantly office. Described as a hard-line Hindu n ationalist, he and his party ran on a campaign promise to revitalise India’s slump over the last decade. The disquieting trend particularly - concerns freedom of speech and alternative sources of ing economy. information, civil society, the rule of law, and some elec - iberal Democ - However, multiple indicators in the V-Dem l toral aspects. racy Index show that this pursuit has come at the expense of a reduction in the overall quality of India’s democracy. much of these changes have taken place after the Bharatiya Figure 1.15 depicts all indicators, with the score for 2007 on Janata p arty won the parliamentary elections in 2014 and its

33 33 Tl e Spo In TH IGHT 4 - A hard line Hindu nationalist was arrested in connec 2 017. Figure 1.15. Aspects of Liberal 5 tion to her murder but no sentence has been handed down. Democracy in India, 2007 and 2017. The sharp decline in the V-Dem indicators on Freedom of 4 expression − in particular self- censorship and media har - Voters’ Registry assment − reflect the increasingly adverse environment for Elections free/fair members of the media. 3.5 Election intimidation Freedom of Association and Civil Society 3 Media bias EMB capacity The autocratization-process in India has also led to a partial EMB autonomy closing of the space for civil society. The government increas - 2.5 Range of views Academic/Cultural Expression Score 2017 ingly restricts the entry and exit of civil society organizations Election peace Executive oversight Election irregularity by using a law on foreign funding for n Gos, the Foreign Freedom from political killings 2 Media critical CSO repression Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA). As of 2017, 20,000 CSo s Transparent laws Media censorship – mainly working on human rights and environmental issues 1.5 – have lost their licenses. After that only 13,000 CSo s remain CSO entry/exit Media harrassment 6 Vote buying Three un special rap - to continue working unconstrained. Media self−censorship inister m porteurs have urged p odi to repeal the FCRA, rime m 1 - claiming it is progressively used more to “silence organisa 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 4 3.5 Score 2007 tions involved in advocating civil, political, economic, social, environmental or cultural priorities, which may differ from Clean Elections Freedom of Association 7 Rule of Law Freedom of Expression those backed by the government.” A noticeably large drop Legislative Constraints Judicial Constraints in the V-Dem indicators on the ease of entry and exit, and the level of repression of civil society organizations in India, reflects the current challenges. the horizontal axis and the score for 2017 on the vertical axis. Indicators that are below the diagonal line have declined and These above also illustrate that law enforcement is gradually indicators above the line have improved in this ten-year peri - becoming less predictable, and that the state fails to effec - nly indicators with significant changes are labelled. o od. o nly tively protect its citizens from politically motivated killings. one indicator – for the quality of the voters’ registry – has A decline in the respective V-Dem indicators reflects these improved. All others have either stayed the same or declined ther liberal aspects of democracy – such adverse changes. o over the last ten years, and the latter include no fewer than as legislative and executive oversight − remain at a constant, 19 indicators. Several of them measures aspects of how free but relatively modest level. - and fair the elections are, a couple taps into freedom of asso ciation but the greatest number are indicators of freedom of Elections in India expression and alternative sources of information. These are key institutional prerequisites of electoral democracy accord - elections in Asia’s oldest democracy have remained free ing to the famous democracy theorist Robert A. Dahl (1971). and fair and open to multi-party competition. n evertheless, We therefore discuss them in the context of India in some - several indictors capturing how clean elections are, have de further detail. clined. In particular, intimidation and violence have increased at polling stations. p arty agents intimidate, harass and bribe Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of voters, in effect preventing them from casting their votes Information in India - lectoral violence includes deadly attacks against poll freely. e ing officials and voters on their way to polling stations. While there are about 12,000 newspapers circulating in In - uman Rights Watch (2017). 1. h dia today, the media is increasingly being censored. Several 2. Reporters Without Borders (2017); The Constitution of India (2017). newly introduced or more harshly enforced laws hinder free 3. Reporters Without Borders (2017). 4. Reporters Without Borders (2017). speech and encourage censorship. For example, India’s law 5. The Guardian (2018). on defamation contains prison sentences of up to two years uman Rights Watch (2017). 6. h 1 7. The Guardian (2016). and is used to silence critical journalists at an increasing rate. 8. Foreign Policy (2013). moreover, sedition laws that were upheld by the courts in 9. The New y ork Times (2014). - 2016 even allow harsh punishment of people accused of in citing “dissatisfaction” – disloyalty and all feelings on enmity – 2 Its existence serves as a deterrent towards the government. and encourages self-censorship. any journalists Harassment of journalists is also on the rise. m have been murdered or threatened for reporting critically on the actions of the ruling party. Three journalists were killed 3 ankesh, For example, the editor Gauri l in m arch 2018 alone. who was a known feminist and critic of the caste system as well as of the Hindu nationalists, was shot dead in September

34 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu 34 Section 2: Inclusion is an Illusion olitical exclusion is undermining the relevance of democratic rights and freedoms. After 40 years of mostly steady growth, several egalitarian aspects of democracy are now on the decline and this trend affects about 2 billion people in the world. As a result, only p one-in-seven people now lives in a society where political power is distributed at least somewhat equally by gender and socio-economic status. t he rich have gained significantly more power in countries that are home to one-fourth of the world’s population over the past decade. Among different regime types, only liberal democracies tend to provide consistent safe-guards for its citizens against exclusion based on structural inequalities. en W emocr Acy is advancing, social complexity eV here D (equal Access Index), and access to resources such as education and competition often produce inequalities that advantage some - and health care to the extent that individuals’ political efficacious 1 Such inequalities affect the extent to which groups over others. equal Distribution of Resources Index). A detailed ness is derailed ( 2 Thus, groups can participate meaningfully in the political process. description of the measure and a table with country scores can be 3 threaten - democracy risks becoming less legitimate and effective, found in the Appendix. 4 - politi ing also the survival or further advancement of democracy. 5 and cal inequality and exclusion are also associated with poverty Figure 2.1 shows the global trends in the egalitarian indices from 6 When exclusion of various groups is severe, de - violent conflict. 1972 to 2017. What is striking in this graph is that after 40 years of mocracy is undermined as a viable system of rule. It is therefore mostly steady growth, levels of equality have been worsening again important to consider not only changes in the liberal and electoral over the past five years, slightly less so for e qual Access to p ower. facets of democracy, but also the degree to which the countries in the world attain the principles of equality and inclusion. When weighted by population (right-hand panel), the egalitarian indices paint a more pessimistic picture. First, the growth in index political inclusion here refers to the ability of all individuals and scores prior to 2010 seen in the unweighted measures (left-hand 7 - Whereas liberal concep groups to influence the political process. panel) disappears, turning into a decline. The level recorded in tions of democracy tend to emphasize institutional guarantees 2017 is lower than in 1972 for all of the indices. This is because large of rights and freedoms in addition to the rule of law, democratic countries such as China have remained politically unequal or have inclusion emphasizes de facto use of rights and access to power seen growing economic inequality. But it tells us that the positive 8 e ven Dahl’s influential discussion of the across societal groups. development of decreasing inequality displayed in the first graph prerequisites for polyarchy – the basis for the V-Dem’s understand - is eradicated when we take the size of population into account, and - ing of electoral democracy − calls for a system in which “preferenc that the positive developments have therefore affected countries 9 Based on that es [ought to be] weighted equally in government.” otably, for a large with a small fraction of the world’s population. n insight, this section focuses on political inclusion. qual Access to p proportion of the world’s population, the e ower Index has declined substantially in the past five years to a degree olitical rotection Index. p qual p similar to, or even greater than, the e the V-Dem egalitarian Index exclusion is in this perspective on the rise. - The V-Dem e galitarian Component Index captures whether mate atterns of Inclusion regime t ypes and p rial and immaterial inequalities fundamentally constrain citizens’ 10 The measure encom egalitarian Component Index across Figure 2.2 compares levels of - actual exercise of formal rights and liberties. 11 Countries labelled above the box are passes to what extent differences in socio-economic status, gen regime categories in 2017. - over-performers for their regime type, while countries below it are der, and social group (such as caste, ethnicity, language, race, re - under-performers. The line in the box plot indicates the median gion, religion, or some combination thereof ) affect the protection level of inclusion for all countries in that category. of civil liberties ( equal p rotection Index), access to political power oule (2009); Svolik (2008). oung (2000). 2. For an overview of the relationship between inequality and participation, see Sigman and Lindberg (2018). 3. Dahl (1971). 4. Boix (2011); h 1. y 5. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013). 6. Cederman et al. (2010). 7. c.f. World Bank (2013). 8. This focus on de facto inclusion is central to V-Dem’s principle of egalitarian democracy, see Sigman and Lindberg (2018). 9. Dahl (1971) our emphasis. 10. Sigman and Lindberg (2018). 11. This builds on the regime-classification by Lührmann et al. (2018; see also section 1 of this report). While using V-Dem’s data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).

35 SIon n Illu A SIon IS lu on 2: InC CTI Se 35 IAn In DI ce S, 1972-2017 f I glob Al t ren DS I n e gAl ItAr g u r e 2 .1: AnD W (r Ight-h AtIon). D by popul eIghte 1 1 .9 .9 .8 .8 .7 .7 .6 .6 .5 .5 .4 .4 .3 .3 .2 .2 .1 .1 0 0 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 1982 2017 1972 1977 2012 2007 2002 1997 1992 1987 1972 Equal Protection Index Egalitarian Component Index Equal Distribution of Resources Index Equal Access Index S, 2017. ype Ime t eg SS r AlIty Acro qu ItIcAlly e ol cto p fI leVel of De fA gure 2.2: 1.00 ay Norw Denmar k Lux embourg lands Nether Belgium land Switz er Lithuania Belar us oland P Bhutan y Hungar Cuba ong Hong K ia Bulgar erde Cape V Ur y ugua Benin itius Maur Barbados Singapore Georgia T unisia iname Sur alestine/WB P v akia Slo Lesotho 0.75 T ogo T anzania BiH Ghana Ar menia ia Alger USA K yrgyzstan Gabon Er itrea Montenegro Vietnam K oso vo UA E Albania Chile ianism Lebanon 0.50 Me xico Colombia Egalitar Mala wi Guinea−Bissau Philippines Laos Pa y ragua lic Dominican Repub Az erbaijan El Salv ador Bangladesh Eq. Guinea Guatemala T ajikistan Afghanistan ia Syr Angola Somalia 0.25 Haiti Chad Maur itania Cambodia Sudan Egypt Y emen South Sudan Liberal Democracy Electoral A Electoral Democracy Closed A utocracy utocracy Electoral Democracy Closed A utocracy Electoral A utocracy Liberal Democracy

36 36 Se on 2: InC lu SIon IS A n Illu SIon CTI rends regional t In general, democracies fare better in terms of egalitarianism than qual qual Distribution of Resources Index and the e Trends in the e autocracies. n otably, almost all liberal democracies score higher on Access to p - ower Index – two key aspects of the egalitarian compo the e galitarian Component Index than most autocracies, as well as nent index – also vary considerably across regions (Figure 2.3). The iberal democracies tend to a majority of electoral democracies. l levels have declined on both indices in e astern e urope and Central - excel in achieving equal distribution of political power across struc ore recent declines on these Asia since the end of the Cold War. m tural inequalities. Hence, when countries backslide from liberal de - atin America and Asia. Decline on the indices are most evident in l mocracy, inclusion may be threatened. u- equal Distribution of Resources Index also registers in Western e - exceptions to this pattern are Albania, Chile, Ghana, and the u nit A region. Sub-Saha orth America, as well as in the men rope and n - ed States – countries that are liberal democracies but stand out ran Africa is the only region with continued upward trajectories, - with noticeable low egalitarian scores. Among the liberal democ most definitely so on the e ower Index. qual Access to p orway, european countries – n ordic and Western- racies, several n qual Access to p Regional comparisons also show that the e ower Denmark, netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Germany – have the and e qual Distribution of Resources indices do not necessarily main - highest levels of egalitarian democracy, as expected. tain similar levels within a single region, nor do they change in tan - - That said, there is a large amount of variation among countries clas qual Distribution A region, for example, levels of e dem. In the men sified as closed and electoral autocracies, as well as those classified are considerably higher than levels of e qual Access. The opposite is as electoral democracies. Countries across regime categories score qual true in l atin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where levels of e comparably on the egalitarian component. For example, closed - Access tend to be considerably higher than levels of e qual Distribu autocracies such as Cuba and Hong Kong, electoral autocracies like tion. These different regional configurations suggest that political Belarus and Singapore, and Benin, Bulgaria, and Hungary among inclusion ( equal Access) and socio-economic inclusion ( - equal Distri electoral democracies have largely indistinguishable ratings. bution) are in fact distinct aspects of egalitarian democracy. At the other end of the spectrum, Guatemala and Haiti are both - Additionally, it is clear that the two indices do not necessarily de - electoral democracies but register very similar levels on the egali velop together at the same time in the same places. p articularly in tarian component index to electoral autocracies such as Afghan - qual Access to A region and in Sub-Saharan Africa, the e the men istan, Chad, and Tajikistan, as well as Angola, Syria and Somalia power Index has improved in the last several years while the e qual among the closed autocracies. Distribution of Resources Index remains stagnant. The improve - ments in the e ower Index may reflect the fact that qual Access to p The most important take-away is that only liberal democracies more countries have adopted gender quotas and power-sharing seem to be able to safe-guard their citizens from gross inequalities arrangements between social-groups. However, the distribution of in the protection of civil liberties, access to political power and the power based socio-economic status has become less substantially distribution of politically relevant resources, across gender, social equal in recent years. Furthermore, there is little evidence, to sug - groups, and socio-economic status. gest that such improvements in access to power necessarily lead to Al Acce fI gure 2.3: reg Ion Al t ren DS I n e qu Al D IS tr Ibut Ion of r eSource Dex. er In oW SS to p S In qu nD e Dex A MENA Latin America and Caribbean East Europe and Central Asia 1 .8 .6 .4 .2 0 Asia−Pacific Sub−Saharan Africa West Europe and North America 1 .8 .6 .4 .2 0 2012 1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 1982 1992 2002 2012 1972 1982 1992 1972 2002 Equal Distribution of Resources Index Equal Access Index

37 Se on 2: InC lu SIon IS A n Illu SIon CTI 37 opul er, 2017. ItIcAl p ol Ion of p Ibut tr IS AtIon by D oW Are of p Sh gure 2.4: fI 100 0.1% 0.2% 3.6% 14.4% 14.3% 26.9% 75 opulation 60.8% ld P 37.5% 50 or 72.8% ercent of W P 25 28.8% 20.3% 9.4% 4.3% 3.3% 3.1% 0 Po y social group wer dist. b Po y gender wer dist. b Po wer dist. b y socio−econ group e y f ed b Monopoliz Equal w groups what Unequal Some what Equal y f Dominated b Some w groups e power distributions are somewhat unequal (61 percent for power dis changes in equal distribution of resources, such as in the provision - tribution by social group, and 61 to 73 percent for power distributions of health and education. by socio-economic status and gender). For each of the three catego - In figure 2.3, we consider three cleavages of particular significance ries, three to four percent of the population live in places where pow - for power distribution in greater detail: gender, social group, and er distributions are completely monopolized by a dominant group. socio-economic position. This means that 5.5 billion people live in countries where women nequal power Distributions Are m ostly u - are discriminated against when it comes to political rights and free Figure 2.4 provides a snapshot of all three of V-Dem’s unique in - doms. States that allow the less wealthy to be partly excluded from dicators measuring the distribution of political power by gender, the political process account for 4.6 billion people today. 12 ach indicator e social group, and socio-economic status in 2017. ranges from 0 (monopoly of power by one group) to 4 (roughly Figure 2.4 reveal that men and people in higher income groups tend equal power distribution between groups). to have a strong hold on political power in countries where 86 per - nequal distribution of power cent of the world population resides. u The figure shows that only a very small proportion of the world’s by social group, where one or more social groups have more politi - population has enjoyed more or less equal distribution of political cal influence than others, affects some 69 percent of the population. power by gender, social group, and socioeconomic status. Almost no one lives in societies with equal power by gender, less than four The overall situation is getting worse, not better. By 2017, one- percent of the population lives in countries where power is distrib - fourth of the world’s population – or almost 2 billion people – lived uted evenly between social groups, and political equality by socio- in countries where the rich have gained significantly more power economic status is also virtually non-existent. compared to 2007. The growing inequalities are affecting massive amounts of people. even for the lower bar, “somewhat equal” power distribution, it is not much better. o nly 14 percent of the world population lives in In the subsequent sections we continue to analyze the state of po - countries achieving this standard for gender, 27 percent for social litical inclusion. The next subsection 2.1 focuses on inclusion by groups, and about 14 percent of citizens enjoy this regardless of gender, while 2.2 and 2.3 explore whether inequalities in social and socio-economic status. socio-economic characteristics affect political inclusion. We high - light the global trends and discuss important changes in specific The vast majority of the world’s population lives in countries where regions and countries. 12. V-Dem gave the following instructions to its expert coders: “Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f ) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions.” V-Dem Codebook V8, p.184.

38 RT 2018 38 Al Repo V-Dem Annu S e c t i o n 2.1: Women’s Inclusion and Access to p ower or the first time in about 70 years, the global level of women’s political inclusion and empowerment is no longer advancing. At the same time, global gender equality is not in decline, which means that the recent trend of democratic f backsliding is not affecting women disproportionally. lin oa o Sirianne Dahlum and m We first examine global and regional trends in the Women’s p o- AtIc free are unevenly distributed between Democr S Dom mpowerment Index. Second, we look more closely at re - litical e men and women in many places. Although women’s political cent changes in women’s empowerment, including differences inclusion and equal access to power is prominent on the global between countries, and present lists with the top ten advancers agenda, as reflected in the u ations Sustainable Develop - nited n 1 for example, many democracies (and autocracies) fail and backsliders. We also examine which aspects of women’s po - ment Goals to include women on an equal footing with men in political pro - litical empowerment have been most affected. Finally, we identify cesses. This subsection analyzes the extent to which democratic - countries that have a “gender gap,” in the sense that they under components such as elections, civil liberties, and civil society au - - perform or over-perform on gender equality relative to their de tonomy also apply to women. mocracy level. - We find that although women’s political empowerment has im proved dramatically over the past century, stagnated set in over n Women’ reg Age Ver Al A Ion S gure 2.5: fI S I the last ten years. However, there is no evidence of a recent back - ItIcAl e ex, 1900-2017. pol mpo W erment InD sliding on political gender equality. Among the different compo - 1 nents, women’s political participation has changed the most over the past ten years, with many countries experiencing an increase. .9 We also show that among the main under-performers on the gen - der gap are several countries in the m iddle east, Japan, and India, .8 while the over-performers are predominantly post-communist states. .7 .6 Women’s p olitical e mpowerment Index - mpowerment Index builds on a defini olitical e V-Dem’s Women’s p .5 tion of women’s political empowerment as “a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and par - .4 2 - Women’s political empower ticipation in social decision-making”. - ment is a complex concept, and the index seeks to capture differ .3 ent aspects by building on three different sub-indices – Women’s Civil l iberties Index, Women’s Civil Society p articipation Index, .2 articipation Index. These three indices are and Women’s p olitical p .1 weighted equally in the overall index. The Women’s Civil l iberties Index includes indicators on freedom of domestic movement, free - 0 dom from forced labor, the right to private property, and access to 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1900 1990 2000 2010 2017 - justice. The Women’s Civil Society p articipation Index includes in World Average Eastern Europe and Central Asia dicators on freedom of discussions on political issues, participation Latin America and the Caribbean MENA in civil society organizations, and representation among journalists. Sub−Saharan Africa Western Europe and North America Asia−Pacific olitical p Finally, the Women’s p - articipation Index includes indica 2. Sundström et al. (2015). 1. UN (2015).

39 SI on A eR o p eSS T CC nD A oW Clu S In on 2.1: Women’ CTI Se 39 tors of women’s share in the overall distribution of power, as well powerment during the 1920s and 1930s, but dropped drastically during World War II, to recover again during the 1950s and 1960s. as the percentage of female legislators. All indices range from zero - to one, where “0” represents a low degree of women’s political em pacific also improved latin America and the Caribbean and Asia- powerment, and “1” represents a high degree. gradually and had levels of women’s political empowerment hov - egional t rends global and r ering around the global average level until the late 1980s, when Figure 2.5 illustrates that the global level of women’s political em - latin America and the Caribbean improved substantially, and are powerment has advanced substantially since 1900, with most of urope and Central Asia. astern e today at the same level as e that improvement occurring from the late 1940s until the mid- 2000s. However, this gradual advancement of women’s political A region with the lowest level of women’s political em - The men empowerment stagnated, and levels have been relatively stable - powerment in the world throughout most of the period, still im - for the past ten years. At the same time, there is no evidence sug proved gradually over the last century, albeit at a somewhat slower gesting a backlash against women’s political empowerment at the - pace than the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa had approx global level. Hence, although the first section of this Democracy - iamately the same and low level of women’s political empower Report 2018 shows evidence of democratic backsliding, this has ment as the men A region until the 1970s, after which it picked up a not affected women disproportionately in a negative way. steeper upward trajectory. Which Aspects are c hanging? - All regions of the world experienced significant and gradual im - While Figure 2.5 illustrates developments in the aggregate Wom provements in women’s political empowerment from 1900 to 2017. mpowerment Index, we also want to explore wheth - olitical e en’s p north America show a higher not surprisingly, Western europe and - er there are differences between the sub-components. For in level of political empowerment for women throughout the entire stance, is women’s political participation improving more or less europe, and eastern north America, urope and period. Western e - than women’s civil liberties? In Figure 2.6, we compare the Wom Central Asia while at different levels, developed very similar over en’s p olitical e mpowerment Index, its three sub-indices and the time, albeit with slightly stronger swings in e astern e urope. e astern europe also had comparably high levels of women’s political em - glob Al A Ver Age S of Women’ S p ol ItIcAl e mpo W erment In Dex A nD It S Sub-In DI ce S fI gure 2.6: AtIon). D to e Acy S Ince 1972 ( rI ght- hA nD We Ighte D by p opul Al Democr Are comp lector 1 1 .9 .9 .8 .8 .7 .7 .6 .6 .5 .5 .4 .4 .3 .3 .2 .2 .1 .1 0 0 2015 2010 2000 1995 1980 2005 1970 1985 1975 1990 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 1975 1970 2015 2010 Women’s Civil Liberties Women’s Political Empowerment Women’s Political Empowerment Women’s Civil Liberties Women’s Civil Society Participation Women’s Political Participation Women’s Civil Society Participation Women’s Political Participation Electoral Democracy Electoral Democracy

40 40 Se on 2.1: Women’ S In Clu SI on A nD A CC eSS T o p oW eR CTI While two countries have experienced significant decline in share electoral Democracy Index, focusing on the more recent period, - of female journalists, more than 24 countries have improved. Fig 19 7 2 -2 017. ure 2.7 also shows that there is some advancement on indicators overall, all three sub-indices have improved gradually since 1972 such as share of female legislators, property rights for women, and iberties Index the most. and among them the Women’s Civil l power distributed by gender. While both that measure and Women’s Civil Society p articipation Index stabilized around 2000, Women’s p articipation Index By contrast, many more countries register a decline (14) in their olitical p level of freedom from forced labor than nations advancing (5). - continues to improve even during the recent years’ global demo Freedom of discussion for women has also declined overall, with cratic backsliding. - around 22 countries experiencing significant decline on this indi - When weighting country-states based on population, the im cator compared to only 13 registering an improvement. The lat - provements in women’s political empowerment since 1973 appear ter development is in line with a general backsliding in democracy somewhat more moderate (see Figure 2.6, right-hand side graph). components related to elections and civil society – for both men Although also the population-weighted level of gender equality and women – in many countries around the globe. indicates a substantive improvement since 1970, this change may regressing and Advancing c ountries not be significant (as indicated by the confidence intervals). o n the While the graphs presented so far show developments at either - other hand, the population-weighted measures show little evi the global or regional level, this section compares the recent tra - - dence of a downward trend in levels of women’s civil society par jectories of different countries. Figure 2.8 plots changes over the ticipation and civil liberties. past ten years, comparing levels on Women’s p olitical empower - labeled countries are those ment Index in 2007 to levels in 2017. - Disaggregating further, we also consider changes in all the differ with significant changes. ent indicators that constitute the three subcomponent-indices of women’s political empowerment. There is noteworthy variation - Figure 2.8 confirms that the level of gender equality has been rela between different indicators of women’s political empowerment, tively stable over the past ten years. o - nly two countries have reg which adds further nuance to the analysis. istered a significant decline in women’s empowerment from 2007 eanwhile, eleven countries to 2017 - the m aldives and Thailand. m - The most striking finding in Figure 2.7 is the large group of coun have improved their level of women’s political empowerment, in - tries that have improved their share of female to male journalists. D ADVAnc ng An S of Women p ItIcAl SSI regre cAtor DI by In gur e 2.7: fI gure 2.8: fI ol Ing eS r W IeS, 2007-2017. countr empo erment: n umber of c ountrI egIS terI ng SIgn IfIcAnt c hAnge S. Female journalists 1 24 22 Tunisia .9 S.Tomé & P. 20 Algeria Bhutan .8 Fiji 18 Bangladesh .7 Thailand 16 Myanmar .6 14 Sudan Power by gender Somalia Freedom of discussion .5 12 Maldives Freedom of domestic movement Libya Property rights 10 .4 Access to justice 8 Female legislators Number of Countries Improving Saudi Arabia .3 CSO womens participation 6 Freedom from forced labor Women’s Political Empowerment Index 2017 .2 4 .1 2 0 0 1 .9 .8 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 16 18 20 22 24 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Women’s Political Empowerment Index 2007 Number of Countries Declining Latin America and the Caribbean Eastern Europe and Central Asia Women civil liberties index Women political participation index MENA Sub−Saharan Africa Women civil society participation index Western Europe and North America Asia−Pacific

41 CC Se S In Clu SI on A nD A on 2.1: Women’ eSS T o p oW eR CTI 41 S, 2017. gure 2.9: ItIcAl e mpo W erment In Dex Acro SS r eg Ime t ype ol fI leVel of Women p Norw ay w Zealand Ne Estonia Sweden Lithuania ia Bulgar Hong K ong v akia Slo Guy ana J amaica P oland y Hungar Chile Mongolia Croatia BiH Cape V erde Lux embourg Belar us us Cypr yrgyzstan K Serbia S K orea Kazakhstan Singapore Ghana Albania anzania T Ukraine Vietnam apan J Morocco Mala wi Guatemala Va nuatu Cuba Angola Nepal y ragua Pa Guinea−Bissau India ment Index Haiti er Lebanon CAR ajikistan T Congo men’s Empow apua NG P Wo Iran Solomon Islands DRC Egypt key r Tu Oman orea N K Qatar Saudi Arabia Y emen Closed A utocracy Electoral A utocracy Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy

42 42 Se oW o p eSS T CC eR SI on A Clu S In on 2.1: Women’ CTI nD A cluding Algeria, Bhutan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Tunisia. Several of the ad - vancers are countries in men A, the region historically lagging behind the rest of the world when it comes to gender equality (and democracy). nder-performers over-performers and u Figure 2.9 visualizes how countries perform in terms of women’s political em - powerment compared to other countries within the same regime category but 3 - Countries posi also how regime categories tend to compare to each other. tioned above the box perform better on gender equality than expected given their regime type, while countries positioned below are under-performers. - Four noteworthy patterns stand out. First, countries with a socialist or commu nist past tend to perform better on gender equality than other countries in the same regime category, probably reflecting the legacy of women’s high degree of involvement in the labor market in those societies. This applies across both regions and regime types, from the closed autocracies of Hong Kong, Cuba and Vietnam, over electoral autocracies of Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kyrgyzstan, to the electoral democracies of lithuania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. - Beyond the post-communist states, n epal and Jamaica over-perform on gen der among the electoral democracies. Second, almost all of the under-performers in the group of closed autocracies are from the men A region, including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Given that many of them are harshly autocratic regimes, their underperformance on gender equality highlights just how poor women’s conditions in these coun - - A countries also appear as under-performers on gender inclu tries are. men egypt and Turkey) and electoral democracies sion among electoral autocracies ( (lebanon). Third, two African countries – Rwanda and Tanzania – stand out as over-per - formers in gender inclusiveness among the electoral autocracies, reflecting their embrace of progressive gender policies in recent decades. For instance, gender quotas in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide in 1994 guarantee that 30 percent of parliamentary seats are reserved for women. The government also implemented targeted policies encouraging girls’ education and the ap - pointment of women to leadership roles (e.g. government ministers and police chiefs). Today, around 60 percent of parliamentarians in Rwanda are women. Finally, there is also some variation in gender inclusiveness within the group of liberal democracies. The Scandinavian countries score the highest, but these - countries are also the most democratic among the full democracies, suggest ing that they do not necessarily over-perform compared to their democracy level. When accounting for the level of democracy, Germany is the main over- performer in this group. Conversely, Japan is the worst under-performer among liberal democracies. Its low score reflects its low proportion of female lawmakers and cabinet ministers, low fe - male labor participation, and a large gender wage gap. In fact, Japan scores worse on gender inclusion than inclusive autocracies such as Hong Kong and Vietnam. 3. This categorization is based on the Regimes in the World regime classification - closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy, and liberal democracy (see Lührmann et al. 2017).

43 SI on A 43 CTI on 2.1: Women’ S In Clu Se nD A CC eSS T o p oW eR

44 V-Dem Annu RT 2018 44 Al Repo Section 2.2: Inclusion of Social Groups ince the third wave of democratization in the early 1970s, power distribution by social groups and social group equality in respect for civil liberties have et, over the last five years and coinciding advanced in all regions of the world. y S with the democratic decline reported in the first section of this year’s Democracy report, there is evidence of countries backsliding also in terms of inclusion of social groups. As a result, over half a billion people live in countries with higher levels of social exclusion than ten years ago. etrarca axwell and c onstanza Sanhueza p laura m do different social groups have access to pow - hAt extent to W metric shows an incremental but steady upturn in the global level er and enjoy the same levels of civil rights around the globe? In - of power distribution by social group, while there is significant re this section we examine political inclusion and the protection of gional variation. rights for social groups. V-Dem defines social groups as being dis - Western e urope and astern e orth America, as well as e urope and n tinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste. Central Asia, remain virtually unchanged in their level of power dis - The first indicator we use in the analysis below is “power distribu - tribution by social group from the late seventies up until the past tion by social group.” It evaluates the degree of inclusion in politics 1 The second indicator is “social group decade, when there is some variation. The level in Western e urope of all relevant social groups. equality in respect for civil liberties,” which measures the extent to orth America declined from around 2012, and power has be - and n 2 Both for all social groups. protected which civil liberties are equally - come slightly more monopolized also in e astern e urope and Cen indicators range from zero to four. Zero corresponds to a complete tral Asia in more recent years. absence of inclusion and protection, and a score of four indicates that these social groups are included and protected. atin America, Asia- By contrast, in l pacific and sub-Saharan Africa - there have been steady gains in the last decades. Considerable im The inclusion and protection of social groups and democratiza - pacific during the atin America and Asia- provements ensued in l tion have improved in close association during the three waves of third wave of democratization. The most significant improvements electoral Democracy Index is positively democratization. V-Dem’s are recorded in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, coinciding correlated with power distribution by social groups (correlation = - with massive improvements in South Africa after the end of Apart 0.75) and the equal protection of civil liberties for all social groups heid and the introduction of multi-party elections in a vast major - (correlation = 0.63) from 1900 to today. A region lags behind ity of countries across the continent. The men others despite significant improvements in the period leading up roup Distribution of p ower by Social g to and during the Arab Spring. Figure 2.10 presents the global development, as well as regional variation, of power distribution by social group from 1972 to 2017. The right-hand side of figure 2.10 shows the global and regional The left-hand panel is based on unweighted country averages. This averages weighted by population. Compared to the simple coun - 1. q uestion: “Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, 2. q uestion: “Is political power distributed according to social groups?” Response options: “0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 1: Political power more favorable position?” Response options: “0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population. 1: Members of some social groups is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 2: Political power enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population. 2: Members of some is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population. 3: Members monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 3: Either all social groups of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population. 4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.” Source: Coppedge possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power et al. 2018b, p164. for a period of time, followed by another – but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power. 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.” Source: Coppedge et al. 2018b, p184.

45 S Roup l G CIA F So SIon o lu CTIon 2.2: InC Se 45 tr IS er D poW g u r e 2 .10 : Ion by Soc Ibut f I IA l g roup: De Velopment S by r eg Ion ght- AtIon) eIgthe Anel W nD p hA D by popul rI nD 2017. ( een 1972 A W bet 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 .5 .5 0 0 1977 1987 2007 2002 1997 2017 2012 2007 2002 1997 1992 1982 1992 1972 2017 1972 1977 1982 1987 2012 World Average Eastern Europe and Central Asia MENA Latin America and the Caribbean Sub−Saharan Afric a Western Europe and North Americ a Asia−Pacific l lI bert IeS: De Velopment S by f I g u r e 2 .11: Soc IA l g roup e qu AlIty I n r eSpect for cIVI nD 2017. ( eIgthe reg Ion bet W een 1972 A AtIon) Anel W rI ght- hA nD p D by popul 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 .5 .5 0 0 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 1992 2007 2012 2017 2002 2007 2012 2017 1987 1997 1982 1972 1977 2002 Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average MENA Latin America and the Caribbean a Western Europe and North Americ a Sub−Saharan Afric Asia−Pacific

46 SIon o S l G CIA F So Roup lu on 2.2: InC CTI Se 46 try averages, it shows more noticeable declines in levels of power America, the population-weighted averages are lower than the distribution by social group for an increasing share of the world’s simple averages for every year displayed in this plot testifying that population during the last five years. equality is higher in smaller countries on average. The recent de - clines in Western europe and north America are also more pro - The greatest difference when weighting by population is found in nounced when taking population into account, reflecting mainly the e astern e urope and Central Asia region. The largest country in the developments in the u nited States. the region drives the sudden drop in the late 1980s – Russia – fol - lowed by improving levels of power distribution by social group in Interestingly, the situation seems to be the opposite in sub-Saharan more exclusive poli - poland and ukraine when they democratized. Africa. When population weights are taken into account, average tics dominates the region since then with worsening levels as a re - levels are higher throughout the period, and there is no decline in sult, pushing the regional average back closer to the world mean. recent years. It seems that in this region, the larger and more popu - lous countries are better on average than small countries in pro - Social g quality in respect roup e tecting social group equality in respect for civil liberties. iberties ivil l for c Figure 2.11 depicts the global average and regional variation of so - Finally, the men A region appears more volatile when the size of cial group equality in respect for civil liberties. The left-hand panel populations are taken into account, closely following the trends of - shows a gradual global increase from 1972 to 2012 and a slight neg the large countries Iraq and Turkey, and more recently, the declines ative trend in the last five years. The decline is more pronounced gypt. in e orth America, e in Western e urope and n urope and Central astern e backsliding and Advancing c ountries atin America, A. While at different average levels, l Asia, and men Which countries have changed the most? Figure 2.12 details the pacific follow the global trend closely sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia- specific countries in which power distribution by social group and and only very minor declines in the past five years. social group equality in respect for civil liberties advanced or fell back between 2007 and 2017. Countries with labels above the line Regional variation in declines in civil liberties for social groups be - advanced while countries with labels below the line backslid sig - come more apparent when population size is taken into account nificantly. For power distribution by social group (left-hand panel in (right-hand panel in Figure 2.11). In Western e urope and n orth tr IS er D poW g u r e 2 .12 : IA nD cIVI f I l lI bert IeS by Soc Anel) A Ion by Soc roup (left p l g Ibut IA l lIDI DVA nc Ing c W IeS bet ountr nD 2017. group (r Ight p Anel): bA cKS een 2007 A ng A nD A 4 4 Uruguay Gambia Greece Japan Fiji Lithuania Nigeria Ivory Coast Tunisia 3 3 Malawi Algeria Greece Botswana Pakistan Libya Macedonia Guyana Sierra Leone Mongolia Gambia Burundi Togo 2 2 Fiji Ukraine Maldives Myanmar Uganda Egypt Somalia Civil liberties by social group 2017 Power distribution by social group 2017 Afghanistan Libya Nicaragua 1 1 Zimbabwe Ethiopia Turkey Turkey Palestine/Gaza Haiti Dominican Republic Azerbaijan Egypt North Korea Qatar 0 0 4 3 2 1 0 1 0 4 3 2 Power distribution by social group 2007 Civil liberties by social group 2007 Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean MENA Sub−Saharan Africa Western Europe and North America Asia−Pacific

47 S l G CIA F So SIon o lu CTIon 2.2: InC Se 47 Roup f I g u r e 2 .13: chAnge S I n p oW er D IS tr Ibut roup l g IA nD Soc roup A l g IA Ion by Soc equ n r eSpect for cIVI l lI bert IeS, Selecte D c ountr IeS (2000-2017). AlIty I Greece Turkey Egypt 4 3 2 1 0 2015 2010 2000 2015 2015 2005 2000 2005 2010 2005 2000 2010 Power Distribution by Social Group Equality of Civil Liberties by Social Group Figure 2.12), the number of advancers (eight) and backsliders (nine) - substantially after 2012. This reflects disquieting developments fol ost of the significant changes in either direction is rather even. m ovember 2011 elections won by p lowing the n ohamed resident m befell countries that had a highly unequal distribution of power in morsi and p inister Hisham Qandil forming a government rime m 2007 (below 2). Among them power distribution by social group largely from the muslim Brotherhood, a period of autocratic ex - ibya, improved significantly in for example the Gambia, Guyana, l cesses, protests, and then a new military overthrow lead by, now and Tunisia over the past ten years. Below the line, Haiti, n icaragua, president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Turkey, and Zimbabwe are among the backsliders. Across the m editerranean in Greece, changes are in the opposite By contrast, more countries have regressed (16) than advanced (ten) gypt: equality of respect for civil liberties direction compared to e - on social group equality in respect for civil liberties (right-hand pan improved while power distribution declined. n aturally, Greece el in Figure 2.12). The majority of the significant improvements oc - gypt. The improvement of social started from a higher level than e curred in countries with already decent levels of equality in 2007, group equality in respect for civil liberties in the past year coincides - while backsliders are found across the spectrum. The most pro with the Greek government beginning to include refugee children nounced improvements were accomplished in Gambia, Greece, into the school system, along with a long-awaited vote in parlia - acedonia, ithuania, m Ivory Coast, and u ruguay. Backsliders include l ment to begin the construction of an official mosque in Athens. eone, while the largest deteriorations occurred malawi and Sierra l - However, as shown in Figure 2.13, Greece’s rating on power distri orth Korea and Turkey. in Dominican Republic, e thiopia, n bution by social group declined significantly after 2012, amid the debt crisis, an influx of immigration and a parliamentary election. What is driving the decline of power distribution by social group nationalist parties like Golden Dawn and Independent Greeks, that and social group equality in respect for civil liberties? In order to - are anti-immigrant and opposed to multiculturalism gained signifi shed light on this question, we present two cases where power cant representation in parliament. This reflects a political climate distribution by social group and protection have developed in op - increasingly hostile to immigrants and ethnic minorities. egypt and Greece. Furthermore, we discuss the posite directions: - dramatic upsurge of exclusionary politics in Turkey. Figure 2.13 pre Finally, Turkey plunges on both aspects after 2012, among many sents the country trends. other things probably reflecting the crackdown on the Gezi p ark protests, as well as an increase in detention of those that criticize During the Arab spring, citizens from diverse social groups in e gypt president Recep Tayyip erdoğan, as Islam and the government of became more involved in politics, reflected by a substantial uptick well as the increasingly harsh repression of social minorities includ - in 2012 of power based on social groups shown in Figure 2.13. At ing the Kurds. the same time, social group equality in respect for civil liberties fell

48 SIon o S l G CIA F So Roup lu on 2.2: InC CTI Se 48 Inclusive Democracies? mocracies, and 19 percent immigrated from liberal democracies. How does social inclusion relate to levels of democracy? In Figure 3 - and pow 2.14 we examine the relationship between regime type In terms of the destination countries, liberal democracies stand out er distribution by social group in 2017. Countries labeled above the - iberal democracies collec as the modal destination for migrants. l - box are over-performers in their regime type category, while coun tively has been the destination for over half of the total stock of tries with labels below the box are under-performers. The line in migrant population, m oreover, compared to the proportion of the the box plot indicates the median level of power distribution by total population that lives in liberal democracies (14 percent), the social group across all countries in that category. stock of migrant population disproportionately decide to migrate to the most free regime type, by far. There is a clear relationship between regime type and the level of equality in the distribution of power by social group. e ven so, It is also notable that migrants leaving liberal democracies only in within each regime type, there is substantial variation, especially extremely rare cases destinies for less democratic countries. The among autocracies. As expected, liberal democracies tend to have flows from liberal democracies to any kind of autocracy almost - higher scores on social group inclusion, compared to all other re never happens. xceptions to this pattern are Austria, Canada, Cyprus, gime types. e Greece, and l atvia, which coincides with the presence of far-right even electoral democracies is a much less favored destination than populist parties or institutionalized separatist movements. liberal democracies, recipients of 13 percent of the stock of mi - grants. About half of that flow is from autocracies. A vast majority Among electoral democracies , we find the under-performers with - of migrants leaving electoral autocracies head for another democ the lowest power distribution by social group in Haiti, Guatemala nly a smaller share ends up in autocracies. racy. o hilippines, registering social inclusion scores lower than and the p the average closed autocracy. The exception to this overall pattern of pro-democratic favoritism among migrants, is people leaving electoral autocracies. A slim Among the , many under-performing countries, autocratic regimes majority of them head for another autocracy, sometimes to the such as e thiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Turkey have a worse category of closed ones. history of ethnic conflict. There is also a pattern among the over- performers in these less democratic settings. Communist and - Combining the information about the sending and receiving coun post-communist/socialist societies such as Armenia, Belarus, Bul - tries, we find that by 2017, 45 percent of the migrant population garia, Cuba, Kosovo, l ithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Tanzania, Vietnam, moved to a country that is more democratic than their country of and Zambia do well in terms of social group inclusion compared to origin, with an additional 35 percent living in a country of the same other countries of their regime type. regime type. Thus, only 20 percent of all immigrants have moved to a country of a more autocratic regime type than their country of origin. igration and Democracy: m m inorities in the m aking? It is notable that more than 13 percent of the stock of migrant pop - Today, 258 million people live outside of their country of birth and - ulation still lives in closed autocracies, though in terms of propor this represents a large recent increase – it is 49 percent more than tions this is much less than the global population living in closed 4 Thus, it is important to analyze the relationship also be - in 2000. autocracies (25 percent). - tween migration and democracy. By combining the V-Dem’s de 5 - we examine the re mocracy data with bilateral migration stocks, However, despite migrating to relatively democratic countries, the lationship as of 2017. - political inclusion of migrants is not guaranteed. Almost 8 per cent of migrants live in countries that have experienced significant - Fig. 2.15 displays the regime type of sending and receiving coun backsliding in terms of social inclusion and protection over the 6 - tries by share of the migratory population. The left side of the fig past ten years. - ure depicts countries of origin by regime type and by the propor - In addition to democracy, economic factors are naturally impor tion of emigrants. The right side shows the destination countries by - tant for migration patterns. Countries with both higher levels of de the same parameters. mocracy and greater GD p per capita typically receive higher shares 7 orth American countries − and the e uropean and n of migrants. By 2017, half of all the stock of migrants are from countries located K in particular − are home to the united States, Germany, and the u - on the autocratic side of the spectrum, one third left electoral de 3. As defined by the Regimes of the World measure (Lührmann et al. 2018). 4. UN DESA (2017). 5. The UN bilateral migration dataset measures the stock of migrants between directed pairs of countries in 2017. The migrant population is defined as the collection of people “who change his or her country of usual residence” (UN DESA 2017). 6. This is nearly identical to the portion of the global population (7.5 percent) living in countries backsliding on these indicators. 7. We examined the relationship between the Electoral Democracy Index (V-Dem Data Set Version 8), GDP per Capita (World Bank) and Migration Population in 2017 (World Bank).

49 S Roup l G CIA F So SIon o lu CTIon 2.2: InC Se 49 Ibut Ion by Soc IA l g roup. fI reg Ime t ype A nD p oW er D IS tr gure 2.14: embourg Lux nuatu Va Po r tugal Italy Italy land er Switz Benin erde Cape V Lithuania y Ger man Mali Belgium orea S K Lesotho menia Ar Solomon Islands T anzania J amaica Comoros P alestine/WB oso K vo Liber ia Mozambique ogo T v Slo akia Bulgar ia Senegal Estonia ustr ia A Greece Cuba Belar us Russia Latvia P akistan P apua NG Cypr us Zambia Libya Vietnam Morocco in & T obago Tr Hong K ong Canada y Social Group India Chile Pe ru Se ychelles itius Maur Croatia ution b ib Colombia Guinea−Bissau wer Distr Po ragua y Pa Nicaragua Zimbabw e anda Rw Maur itania Philippines Guatemala key r Tu Haiti Eq. Guinea kmenistan Tu r Az erbaijan Syr ia aziland Sw ajikistan T Chad Sudan Bahrain Qatar Ethiopia South Sudan Electoral A Liberal Democrac utocracy utocracy Closed A y Electoral Democracy

50 lu S CIA F So SIon o l G on 2.2: InC CTI Se 50 Roup largest proportions. n otably, among closed autocracies, there are - It is difficult to disentangle whether democracy or economic de several countries with highly developed economies – Saudi Arabia, velopment are the most relevant pull-factors for mass migration oman, and Qatar – which are the country of destination for about ever because more democratic countries also tend to be richer. n - two-thirds of those immigrants living in closed autocracies. These theless, the analysis shows that migrants tend to migrate from less are predominantly economic migrants. to more democratic countries. Sh eg Ime t ype for c ountr IeS of o rIgIn A nD De StInAtIon, 2017. Are of the mI AtIon by r g u r e 2 .15: f I opul gr Ant p Liberal Democracy (19%) Percentage of Population to Destination Countries Liberal Democracy (52%) Electoral Democracy (34%) Electoral Democracy (13%) Electoral Autocracy (32%) Electoral Autocracy (22%) Percentage of Population from Origin Countries Closed Autocracy Closed Autocracy (15%) (13%) Note: the numbers in parentheses on each side of the plot represent the percentage of the immigrant stock originating from or residing in that regime type, respectively. Spotlight: oreign m ovement around the World reedom of f limited f many public authorities restrict the freedom of citizens to travel since 2002, and Sudan, which has implemented restrictions from and to the country, a practice that is often aggravated by alestine, Yemen, Syria, u oreover, l since 1989. m zbekistan, aos, p severe punishment for transgressors and their families. Among South Sudan and Turkmenistan also restrict the freedom of orth Korea, which has imposed restrictions the worst cases are n movement of their citizens. on foreign movement since 1947, e ritrea, with tough restrictions

51 51 Se CTIon 2.2: InC lu SIon o F So CIA l G Roup S

52 52 RT 2018 V-Dem Annu Al Repo p olitical e xclusion Based on Section 2.3: economic Inequality Socio- olitical and economic inequalities threaten to undermine the legitimacy and his section shows that socio-economic effectiveness of democracy (Dahl, 1971). t inequalities are increasing in many parts of the world in ways that reinforce p democratic backsliding. In particular, recent declines in health and educational equality, as well as the distribution of power by socio-economic status throughout the world, give cause for concern. oa o achel Sigman Valeriya m echkova, m lin and r S Surroun DI ng socio-economic inequality are the pol ItIc Ic econom Io- S of Soc Spect by A g u r e 2 .16: f I If Inequ AlIty: n umber of c ountr Ie S WI IcAnt th S Ign increasingly more palpable. Anti-elite rhetoric, large-scale populist chAng e S, 2007-2017. - movements, and nationalist backlashes to global economic inte - gration are now commonplace in many countries. These develop 20 ments put the future of democracy at risk when combined with 18 undemocratic agendas pursued by political leaders. 16 The liberal perspective, taking center stage in the first part of this Particularistic or public goods 14 report, emphasizes institutional guarantees of rights and free - Power by Gender 12 doms of democracy, such as the right to vote and participate politically, freedom to express oneself, and legal protections for 10 Means−tested v. universalistic policy access to justice. However, the mere guarantee of rights and free - Power by Social Group 8 doms does not mean that all individuals are capable of exercising Power by Socio−Economic Group 6 ack of economic or their rights and enjoy the freedoms equally. l Health Equality Number of Countries Improving Education Equality social means can prevent people from doing so, and economic 4 inequalities can make less wealthy individuals vulnerable to po - 2 litical domination. 0 20 12 6 16 18 10 4 2 0 8 14 In this section, we therefore focus on the ways that social and so - Number of Countries Declining cio-economic inequalities augment current trends of democratic Equal Distribution of Resources Equal Access backsliding. We explore how inequalities in health, education, and the distribution of power by socio-economic group have changed in the last ten years. We find that such inequalities have worsened qual Distribution of Resources Index and the four indicators of the e in recent years. This suggests that democracy is becoming less and are displayed in green. less accessible to poor people across the world. Which Aspects of - The largest magnitude of backsliding has affected indicators meas Socio- economic Inequality uring the share of the population whose political efficaciousness is have c hanged the m ost? undermined by educational and health inequalities, and the level Figure 2.16 reports the number of countries that have advanced of equality in terms of distribution of power by socio-economic (above the diagonal line) or declined (below the diagonal line) over group. This finding indicates that socio-economic inequalities is a the last ten years on indicators of socio-economic inequality. The grave concern in a growing number of countries. three indicators constituting V-Dem’s e qual Access Index are in red

53 l e QuAlITY eC CIo- eD on So AS SIon B xClu onom ITICA ol on 2.3: p CTI Se 53 IC Ine f I oW nD p AlIty, A qu eAlth e nD h AtIon A uc n eD DS I ren Al t glob g u r e 2 .17: er DIS Ibute D). Ighte on-We AtI opul nel p ght pA rI on ( oSItI Ic p econom o- D by SocI tr 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 .5 .5 0 0 1997 1997 1972 1982 1987 2017 2012 2007 2002 1977 1992 1987 1982 1972 2002 2007 2012 2017 1992 1977 Health Equality Educational Equality Power distributed by Socio−Economic Posiiton The level of equal distribution of power by socio-economic status Figure 2.17, left-hand panel, shows unweighted global over-time - declined significantly in 14 countries, while the number of coun developments for the same three indicators. By these measures, - tries with positive changes is only six. The countries with the larg - both education and health equality improved gradually but sig est increases in inequality on this measure on the past ten years are nificantly from 1972 until the 1990s to then journey slightly down - anama, and Yemen. auritania, p Burundi, Iraq, m wards again in recent years. Despite the improvements, the global averages reach just above the middle of the scale, which corre - - The countries registering the biggest improvements are all emerg sponds to a situation in which the ability of ten to twenty-five per - ing from tumultuous periods of political instability: e gypt, Somalia cent of adult citizens to participate is impaired due to poor access and Tunisia. However, even after the upturns in recent years, the to healthcare and education. scores for e gypt and Somalia are still in the lower half on the scale - reflecting a situation in which more wealthy people enjoy a domi The scores on these two measures of equality are even lower when 1 nant or very strong hold on political power. we look at the scores weighted by population (right-hand panel - of Figure 2.17), and the declines in recent years are also more pro A matching concern is unequal access to healthcare and education nounced. In other words, equality tends to be better in smaller that lead to inability to participate in political activities (such as vot - countries than in more populous ones, and the decline in recent - ing and engagement in political parties). The level of equality in ac years has affected larger countries more. cess to healthcare or to education declined significantly in 16 and 15 countries respectively, while progressing in only five (for health) The dissimilarities between country average measures and the and four (for education). scores weighted by population are the largest for the indicator of power distribution by socio-economic position. The estimations 1. The scale on this indicator is from 0 to 4, where 0 stands for a virtual monopoly on political power by wealthy people, and 4 corresponds to more or less equally distributed power across economic groups (see Coppedge et al. 2018b, p. 184).

54 l e QuAlITY eC CIo- eD on So AS SIon B xClu onom ITICA ol on 2.3: p CTI Se 54 IC Ine AlIty SI AtIon A qu eAlth e nD h nce 1972. uc n eD f I g u r e 2 .18 : reg Ion Al t ren DS I MENA Latin America and Caribbean East Europe and Central Asia 4 3 2 1 0 Asia−Pacific West Europe and North America Sub−Saharan Africa 4 3 2 1 0 1972 2012 1972 2002 1992 2002 2012 1982 1982 1992 2002 2012 1972 1982 1992 Health Equality Education Equality quality health and education (In-)e weighted by population fall markedly between 1975 and 2017. This - Figure 2.18 shows that health and education equality are, as of re finding again indicates that more populous countries are becom - cently, declining in all regions, except sub-Saharan Africa where it ing increasingly unequal, and that negative change is affecting a has remained stable since the 1980s albeit at a very low level. Asia large share of the world’s population. - pacific, the A region, and and the men latin America and the Carib In the next section, we explore these trends in greater detail by bean also have comparatively low levels of health and education looking at which regions and countries are driving these changes. equality. e urope and Central Asia have a somewhat higher astern e level than those other regions but also register the steepest sub - S I hAnge e c AtIV eg nD n e A tIV oSI IfIcAnt p Ign Ing S ter IS eg IeS r ountr All c tAble 2.1: n eD uc AtIon A nD h eAlth e qu AlIty, 2007-2017. AlIty heAlth e Al Ity qu qu on e AtI uc eD t en-year gains en-year gains t ten-year losses ten-year losses 0.89 Venezuela -2.03 Swaziland 1.25 -1.21 Eritrea Syria Romania 0.98 Tanzania -1.02 Central African Republic -1.47 Namibia 0.85 Saudi Arabia Turkey -1.31 Eritrea 0.61 0.96 -0.91 Mauritania 0.73 -0.84 Rwanda Afghanistan 0.59 Oman -1.14 Sri Lanka Laos Timor-Leste 0.58 -1.01 -0.82 Iran -0.99 Ukraine -0.78 Libya -0.76 -0.97 Romania Mauritania -0.71 Spain Cambodia -0.89 Bulgaria -0.85 Burundi -0.71 Syria -0.84 -0.70 Maldives -0.84 -0.69 Slovenia Brazil -0.57 Armenia -0.76 Central African Republic haiti -0.49 -0.75 Iraq -0.48 Sudan -0.53 Somaliland Lithuania United States -0.46 -0.48 -0.45 Spain 2. Reuters (2017).

55 xClu QuAlITY onom eC CIo- eD on So AS SIon B IC Ine l e ITICA ol on 2.3: p CTI Se 55 stantive decline following the fall of the Soviet ritrea versely, the countries registering improvements – such as e union in the early 1990s. The highest and most stable levels of health and education and Swaziland – are still found at the bottom end of the index urope and n orth America. because the gains were relatively small. These are also countries equality are recorded for Western e where such improvements mean little since there are few political - Table 2.1 lists all the countries with significant positive and nega rights and freedoms to begin with. tive changes in health and education equality over the past ten economic p osition power Distributed by Socio- f the 16 countries backsliding on health equality between years. o - While measures of health and educational equality help us to un 2007 and 2017, the decline in Venezuela is the worst. Following an derstand whether citizens are equally empowered to participate economic inflation rate of 2,616 percent in 2017, millions of people 2 politically, V-Dem’s measure of power distribution by socio-eco - suffered from severe shortages of food, medicine and healthcare. Iran, Romania, Sri l anka, and Turkey have also experienced severe nomic status measures the extent to which poorer groups in socie - declines in healthcare equality. ty can actually access positions of power or exert political influence. - educational equality declined significantly in four of the post-com Figure 2.19 illustrates the global average of power distribution by munist countries over the last ten years: Armenia, Bulgaria, Roma - socio-economic status as well as the regional developments. While nia and u kraine. Yet the biggest declines in education equality are the unweighted global levels (left-hand panel) have remained mauritania aos, found in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, l comparable during the last decades, global levels weighted by ritrea, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia and nly four countries – e and Syria. o population (right-hand panel) have decreased substantially since Tanzania register – positive changes. ore and more people live in nations where the rich have 1972. m much more access to political power than poorer people. In sum, global levels of inequality in terms of education and health make substantial portions of the world’s population partly incapa - urope and Central Asia, hence many post-communist coun - eastern e ble of fully using their political rights and freedoms, even where tries, are driving much of this global decline in power distribution by these are institutionally guaranteed. Recent backsliding on health socio-economic group, alongside a drastic decline is also evident in - and education equality threaten to further undermine the possibil Asia- pacific in recent years and smaller drops in other regions. ity for individuals to fully exercise their rights and freedoms. Con - econom Io- Ion by Soc g u r e 2 .19 : tIon er D oSI Ic p Ibut tr IS f I oW reg Ion Al t ren DS I n p hA AtIon) opul D by p Ighte nD We ght- (rI 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 .5 .5 0 0 2002 2007 2012 2017 2017 1992 1987 2002 2007 2012 1972 1977 1982 1982 1997 1977 1972 1987 1992 1997 Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average MENA Latin America and the Caribbean a Western Europe and North Americ a Sub−Saharan Afric Asia−Pacific

56 xClu QuAlITY onom eC CIo- eD on So AS SIon B IC Ine l e ITICA ol on 2.3: p CTI Se 56 orth America power distribution notably for Western e urope and n Ing S tAble 2.2: All c ountr IeS r eg ISter Ign IfIcAnt W tIV e A nD n eg AtIV e c Ion Ibut tr er DIS hAnge n po S I poSI - by socio-economic position only shows a decline in the popula by SocI o-econom Ic po SItI on. tion-weighted figure, which reflects a trend of less equal access to nited States. power in large countries like the u t ten-year losses en-year gains Improvements during the 1980s and 1990s are clearly visible in l at - 0.98 -1.84 Tunisia Burundi -1.47 Egypt Mauritania 0.95 in America and the Caribbean in particular when considering the -1.46 Somalia Iraq 0.81 population size of countries, but also a substantial drop the last few 0.74 -1.10 Venezuela yemen 0.69 -1.02 Ecuador Panama years. -0.85 Greece India 0.57 -0.82 Fiji -0.82 Iran Table 2.2 shows that substantially more countries register losses (14 -0.71 Burma/Myanmar countries) than gains (six countries) in access to power by socio- Mali -0.63 Bangladesh -0.61 - economic group over the past ten years. Burundi is the worst back -0.60 Vanuatu - slider on this metric. o ther countries with a significant and substan -0.58 Pakistan Turkmenistan -0.43 tial decline in power distribution by socio-economic status include Fiji, India, Iraq, m anama, and Yemen. auritania, p - The only country over this period that transitioned from an autoc racy to a liberal democracy – Tunisia – also saw the largest advance Among electoral democracies, l - oland, and several coun ithuania, p gypt, Soma on power distribution by socio-economic group, but e - - cuador, Ja atin America and the Caribbean – Bolivia, e tries from l ecuador also register significant increases but lia, Venezuela, and maica, p eru and Suriname – stand out as over-performers in terms also from quite low levels. of this indicator of political equality, with scores similar to the av - ountries m ore Socio- Are Democratic c erage liberal democracy. Conversely, Guinea-Bissau is an outlier, economically Inclusive? with scores that match most closed and electoral autocracies, with Figure 2.20 shows V-Dem’s measure of power distribution by socio- a score indicating that wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on economic position across regimes types. There is a clear J-shaped power and even people of average income have little say. - relationship. The median scores for closed and electoral autocra - cies cluster at lower levels compared to those for electoral and lib - Some electoral autocracies are extreme over-performers (Bela eral democracies and between the two latter liberal democracies rus and Venezuela), and compare favorably even to many liberal score much higher than electoral. However, there is also substantial democracies. Countries such as Bangladesh, m auritania, Sudan, variation within all regime types. Tajikistan and u kraine are on the opposite end of the spectrum. - These countries have highly skewed distributions of political pow notably, liberal democracies tend to be rated at high levels on this er based on socio-economic status, even compared to other elec - indicator. Substantively, this means that economic stratification toral autocracies. tends not to translate directly to very unequal political power in these countries. There are a few exceptions to this pattern, includ - Several closed autocracies undergoing or coming out of recent ing Albania, Chile, Costa Rica, the u nited States, and u ruguay. They conflicts are also under-performing with respect to egalitarianism: are liberal democracies but stand out with substantively lower Angola, Syria and Yemen. Cuba and l ibya score far higher on egali - scores on this indicator compared to other countries in the same tarian democracy than the average in this category. category. In this group, liberal democracy is coupled with substan - tially more power accruing to the wealthier part of the population, Some of the former Soviet Republics – Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turk - and poorer citizens having real influence only over issues that do kraine – are found at the bottom of the scoreboard menistan and u not matter much to wealthy people. in terms of levels of power distributed by wealth and are under- performers when compared to their level of democracy. ordic countries, alongside The At the other end of the scale, the n netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Germany, have the highest lev - - The key conclusion from this section is that while there are excep els of inclusion. In these liberal democracies, wealthy people tend - tions, liberal democracies tend to provide more or less equal pos not to have much more influence over political decisions than sibilities for people of all income groups to access and influence - poorer segments of the population, according to the V-Dem coun politics. try experts.

57 xClu QuAlITY onom eC CIo- eD on So AS SIon B IC Ine l e ITICA ol on 2.3: p CTI Se 57 eg Ime S. fI poW er D IS tr Ibut Ion by Soc Io- econom Ic p oSI tIon A cro SS D Ifferent r gure 2.20: Greece k Denmar Nether lands V enezuela Bolivia Finland embourg Lux J apan us Belar Libya Belgium Sweden Ecuador amaica J P oland nuatu Va Lesotho Pe ru Er itrea Comoros Cuba alestine/WB P key r Tu Serbia AE U Benin Lithuania Sur iname Bhutan Uganda Mala ysia K yrgyzstan BiH anzania T Ghana Barbados CAR USA obago Tr in & T Ur ugua y Costa Rica Chile y Socio−Economic Status ution b wi Mala ib Albania Macedonia Lebanon xico Me ragua y Pa Niger ia Guatemala Haiti Philippines wer Distr El Salv ador Po Guinea−Bissau Cambodia e Zimbabw Bur undi orea N K Chad akistan P Angola Syr ia Y emen erbaijan Az Bangladesh Tu r kmenistan Sudan itania Maur Ukraine T ajikistan Electoral A utocracy Liberal Democracy utocracy Closed A Electoral Democracy

58 SeRS V-Dem DATA u 58 What do you use the V-Dem data for? #1: p ractitioners Ar ticle 19 ARTIC le 19 joined with V-Dem to launch a unique, authoritative assessment of freedom of expression and information worldwide in n le 19 has worked with V-Dem to select 32 ovember 2017. ARTIC indicators out of the 350 measured by V-Dem to provide a rich and multi-faceted view on the challenges facing freedom of expression and information globally. These indicators have been aggregated le 19’s assessment of the five defin - into five indices based on ARTIC xpression ing elements of freedom of expression, as set out in our e tributes and 16 sub-attributes of democracy and includes 98 in - - rotection of Journalists and human rights de Agenda strategy: p dicators from 14 different sources. The partnership between the luralism and Freedom; Civic Space; Transparency edia p fenders; m eA has been essential for Varieties of Democracy Institute and ID and Accountability; and Freedom of e xpression in the Digital Age. the development of the GSoD Indices. V-Dem data is one of the With V-Dem’s new approach to measuring democracy, the findings - extensive coverage in terms of coun key data sources due to its xpression Agenda ( of our e xpA) metric reveal the key threats fac - The development of the GSoD Indi tries, years and indicators. - ing freedom of expression and information, enabling us not only to I from V-Dem, and our erik Skaaning, a p ces was guided by Svend- target our advocacy more effectively, but to measure the impact of expert advisory board benefitted from the participation of many our work, as well as provide a lobbying tool for our partners around eA of the V-Dem experts. I hope that the collaboration between ID a reliable new source of insight for journalists, the world and and V-Dem on this project can be a source of inspiration to others activists, and policymakers. as to how the data can be used in different initiatives. Quinn McKew, Deputy Executive Director, Article 19 Mélida Jiménez, Acting Programme Manager, International IDEA #2: Academics Since 2016 we have been engaged in a knowledge transfer project, in which we aim to illustrate the complex nature of democracy using the insights gained from empirical research on democracy, most importantly those provided by the Varieties of Democracy project and the Democracy Barometer project. - using game devel opment as an innovative teaching approach in higher education, we invited students to become actively involved in the process of designing a non-digital game about democracy. As a means to il - lustrate the empirical complexity and normative nature of different - models of democracy, we drew on both the conceptual documen tation as well as the data set of the Varieties of Democracy pro - eA International ID - ject. The set goal for the students was to develop a game proto - eA) launched its first Global State of Democ eA (ID International ID type that includes both a cooperative element, in which players, racy report “ ovember 2017. exploring Democracy’s Resilience” in n acting together, need to ensure a minimum level of democracy The report was also accompanied by the release of “The Global (i.e. electoral democracy) to win the game; as well as a competitive State of Democracy Indices,” which is ID eA’s first comprehensive element, such that each player should aim to maximize different - democracy measure. The first edition of the Global State of De aspects of democracy, striving to implement different models of mocracy Indices (GSoD Indices) measures democracy across 5 at - - democracy (majoritarian, consensus, liberal, deliberative, participa

59 | SeRS V-Dem DATA u 59 tive, or egalitarian). The course led to a two-year teaching project - paper in which I compare democratic de niversity of Zurich, and the development of game-based at the u velopment in South Africa and Tunisia. l at - learning material. er on, I used an aggregated index made by V-Dem called “Women’s political em - Dr. Saskia Ruth, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Dr. Rebec - powerment” in order to test whether the ca Welge, Freelance Trainer & Demokrative and Robert Lovell, Instruc - number of women in the workforce in a tional Game Designer country is positively correlated with wom - en’s political empowerment. However, to university of Alabama be honest, what I maybe liked the most is undergraduate students on my courses on Democratization and that the analysis online tool produces re - African politics at the university of Alabama have increasingly relied ally good looking graphs! on V-Dem’s online data analysis tools for depicting cross-time in democracy. For instance, during and cross-country variations Tove Wikelhult, Program Coordinator, the - fall 2017, students conducted a group presentation on democrat QoG Institute latin America and used V-Dem’s electoral democracy ic trends in index (variable graph) to depict democratic changes across l atin useums #4: m America in general, as well as in the individual countries of Brazil, Argentina, m exico, Venezuela and Honduras between 1990 and the m othenburg ulture in g useum of World c 2017. In the same semester, students on my African politics course In the exhibition “Crossroads” at the museum of World Culture in made use of the clean elections index to explore trends in elec - Gothenburg, the audience can explore the m - otion Charts provid tion quality over time for countries in Southern Africa. Although ed by V- Dem. This enables them to explore how the relationship I expose students to several expert-based sources for measuring between two variables changes over time. For the average visitor democracy, students seem to prefer V-Dem, in part because the to the museum the tool is quite complicated to fully comprehend, project includes a wide however, it enlightens the audience as to the complexity of array of democracy-relat - democracy. The data serves as a good starting point for explora - - ed indicators, but also be tion and ongoing discussions for visiting schools and other groups. cause of the relative ease An extension of the work to include the principles of democracy with which students can is found in the interactive exhibition “demokrativäven” (A weave manipulate data and gen - - of Democracy) where visitors can choose their “must-have” demo erate graphs for presenta - cratic principle that together with others creates a weave of De - tions and research papers. mocrac y. Nicholas Kerr, Assistant Lina Malm, Exhibition producer, Museum of World Culture Professor, University of Alabama #3: Students experience with V-Dem data as a student As a student enrolled on the p rogram at aster’s p olitical Science m the u niversity of Gothenburg, I chose to take the “V-Dem-course.” It was an intensive two months, which consisted of producing papers and attending weekly seminars. n ot only did we get an in-depth understanding of the theory behind V-Dem, but we were also in - troduced to the dataset and online analysis tools. The opportunity to use the V-Dem dataset, and particularly the online analysis tools, - during the V-Dem course, opened up new possibilities for pro - ducing interesting and trustworthy research material quick What was also beneficial was that the data considers almost all ly. countries across a very long period of time. I used V-Dem data in a

60 60 S on BlICATI V-Dem pu political Regimes and Institutions: easurement Change and m sified with a high degree of certainty from those with “upper” lusive Agreement, ultiple measurements, e m and “lower” bounds in each category. Finally, a comparison of and u utcomes in the Study of nstable o - disagreements with extant datasets (7%–12% of the coun regime c hange. try-years), demonstrates that the RoW classification is more conservative, classifying regimes with electoral manipulation 80:2, 736-741 | Journal of Politics. 2018 and infringements of the political freedoms more frequently - “This comprehensive analysis of regime change indicators re as electoral autocracies, suggesting that it better captures the veals that problems of conceptualization and measurement are opaqueness of contemporary autocracies.” major reasons why current quantitative research fails to draw compelling conclusions that foster cumulative knowledge. The - article first proposes the distinction between two forms of re gime change—rupture and reform—and discusses the specific conceptual and measurement challenges scholars encounter yet largely fail to address when studying either form of change. Second, the article shows that agreement between indicators - of regime change is low and driven by focal points such as elec tions and coups, suggesting that such measures often reflect Anna l ührmann annerberg m arcus t notable events instead of regime change per se. This implies that indicator choice determines the set of cases for causal in - ference. Finally, a robustness check of nine articles on regime change published in top journals demonstrates that findings are often not robust to alternative indicators, implying that indi - cator choice influences the results of quantitative studies.” Staffan I. l indberg eneral t heory of p A g oncentration: ower c Demographic Influences on p olitical ueders hans l ust ellen l organization Forthcoming 2018 | European Political Science Review . “Why is the exercise of political power highly concentrated in pening n ew regimes of the World ( roW): o some polities and widely dispersed in others? We argue that Avenues for the c omparative Study of opulous polities one persistent causal factor is demographic. p political regimes are characterized by less concentrated structures of authority. To explain this relationship we invoke two mechanisms: effi - | Politics and Governance 2018 6 (1) : 6 0 -7 7. ciency and trust. The theory is demonstrated with a wide vari - “Classifying political regimes has never been more difficult. ety of empirical measures and in two settings: (1) cross-country most contemporary regimes hold de-jure multiparty elections analyses including most sovereign states and extending back with universal suffrage. In some countries, elections ensure to the 19th century and (2) within-country analyses focused on that political rulers are—at least somewhat—accountable nited States.” states, counties, and localities in the u to the electorate whereas in others they are a mere window dressing exercise for authoritarian politics. Hence, regime types need to be distinguished based on the de-facto implementa - sing V-Dem tion of democratic institutions and processes. u data, we propose with Regimes of the World (RoW) such an operationalization of four important regime types—closed and electoral autocracies; electoral and liberal democracies— with vast coverage (almost all countries from 1900 to 2016). We also contribute a solution to a fundamental weakness of extant m jillian jaeger erring atthew m aguire john g - typologies: The unknown extent of misclassification due to un certainty from measurement error. V-Dem’s measures of uncer - tainty (Bayesian highest posterior densities) allow us to be the first to provide a regime typology that distinguishes cases clas -

61 V-Dem pu on S BlICATI 61 easures: beyond Democracy-Dictatorship m apturing e xecutive b ases ew f A n ramework c of p ower, 1789-2016 | Perspectives on Politics. Forthcoming “This paper attempts to integrate the literatures on authori - tarian regime types and democratic forms of government. . m Kelly m ann cm We propose a theoretical framework of five dimensions of executive appointment and dismissal that can be applied in both more democratic and more authoritarian regimes: the - hereditary, military, ruling party, direct election and confi dence dimensions, respectively. Relying on the Varieties of acksliding? uch Democratic b how m Democracy data, we provide measures of these five dimen - 2 017 | Journal of Democracy 28(4): 162-169. . sions for 3,937 individual heads of state and 2,874 heads of government from 192 countries across the globe from 1789 - “Democracy is facing challenges across the world, yet sugges to the present. After presenting descriptive evidence of their tions of a global crisis are not warranted. Based on data from prevalence, variation and relationship to extant regime typol - the largest democracy database ever compiled, the Varieties ogies, a set of exploratory probes gauge the extent to which roject (V-Dem), we find that the number of de of Democracy p - - the five dimensions can predict levels of repression, corrup mocracies worldwide declined slightly from 100 in 2011 to 97 - tion, and executive survival, controlling for aspects of democ today, and 16 countries transitioned to democracy over the last racy. This leads to generation of a set of original hypotheses epal, and n ten years, including Tunisia, n igeria. However, there that we hope can serve as building blocks for explanatory - is a fair degree of volatility. In 2013 alone, five countries transi theory. We conclude by discussing some limitations of these tioned to democracy but nine went the other way. Worrisome novel data.” trends include gradual erosion of freedom of expression and association in several countries, among them Turkey, Hungary, poland, and Brazil.” jan t indberg Staffan I. l eorell Anna l Valeriya m echkova ührmann easuring Subnational Democracy: t m oward Improved r egime t ypologies and t heories of regime c hange 2018 | Democratization 2 5 (1) : 19 -37. “Social scientists and practitioners have been limited in their work by the paucity of data about subnational institutions indberg Staffan I. l and practices. Such data could help scholars refine regime typologies, improve theories of democratization and regime change, better understand subnational democracy, and il - luminate issues of development, conflict, and governance. They could also enable democracy and development ad - vocates to design more effective programs and officials to create better policies. This paper addresses the lack of data by introducing 22 subnational measures from a new data - set, Varieties of Democracy. Validity tests demonstrate that the measures’ strengths outweigh their weaknesses. The measures excel in covering all subnational levels for most - countries, capturing different elements of subnational elec tions, and including a variety of dimensions of elections and civil liberties. The measures also offer unmatched global and temporal coverage. The paper demonstrates how these strengths can provide scholars and practitioners with the See m ore r esearch Spotlights and V-Dem benefits described above.” ur Website: publications on o www.v-dem.net

62 62 S on BlICATI V-Dem pu The role of political Institutions for e nvironmental policy outcomes: sustainability, peace and growth insights from environmental political science research, which ow Democratization in c onflict Studies: h o2 emission models would gain explanatory suggests that C perationalization conceptualization Affects o leverage if moderators gauging political institutions were esting o and t utcomes - considered. We test these theories by estimating the poten tially moderating effects of democracy, corruption, number of 2 017 43(6): 941-966. | International Interactions veto points and players, and civil society activity. We find that “using the debate over democratization and conflict, we o2 elasticity of GD the per capita C p becomes non-monotonic - demonstrate how the connection between conceptualiza p per capita increases in countries with and diminishing as GD tion and operationalization can play a decisive role in testing democratic non-corrupt governments and high civil society falsifiable hypotheses. We discuss seven different opera - - participation. The moderating impact of this political-institu tionalizations of regime change based on three different tional configuration is relatively small, suggesting only limited conceptualizations of democracy. Although we find high - support for theories in environmental political science. How correlations between different measures of democracy, when ever, the results are robust and add an important specification they are used to capture regime change, the correlations to the studies in environmental economics that find positive drop precipitously. In multivariate estimations of the effect of and monotonic GD p-C o2 relationship: the adverse effect of regime change on a range of conflict variables, we gener - GD o2 emissions is not profound in rich well- p per capita on C ate widely disparate results, providing no consistent support governed countries with active civil societies.” that democratization affects conflict. We thus demonstrate that decisions about conceptualization and subsequent op - erationalization have decisive impact on the inference we - produce. In contrast, our controls for the effect of institution alized democracy consistently show a negative relationship between joint democracy and conflict. Finally, autocratic regime change seems to be more robustly correlated with a range of conflict behaviors than heretofore recognized in this literature.” ovitkina m ole m artin l ægreid arina p ‘gimme Shelter’: t he r ole of Democracy and Institutional q uality in Disaster preparedness ernhard ichael b m aruk Örsün Ömer f 2 017 | Political Research Quarterly 70(4): 833-847. “natural disasters cause suffering for millions of people around - the globe every year, and as climate change unfolds, the like lihood of natural catastrophes is increasing. While weather shocks such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods are beyond our control, the governments’ capacity to protect populations largely determines the degree of human suffering in disasters. - Democracies, with freedom of speech, broad public participa tion, and representation, are believed to protect their popula - ayer reşat b tions better than nondemocratic regimes. However, demo - cratic institutions are insufficient for securing protection from disasters in contexts of corruption, poor planning, and public - administration incompetence. We argue that the effect of de olitical Institutions m Do p oderate the g Dp- mocracy on the extent of human suffering in disasters is con - tingent on the ability of governments to implement their tasks 2 relationship? co or the quality of implementing institutions. We test this inter - | Ecological Economics 2018 145: 441-450. action hypothesis using time-series cross-sectional data from p per capita “empirical studies of the relationship between GD the Varieties of Democracy project, the Quality of Government and country-level C o2emissions tend to focus on the direct pidemiology of dataset, and the Centre for Research on the e - effect of per capita GD p growth, rarely taking political institu Disasters. The results show that more democracy is associated tions into consideration. This paper introduces theoretical with fewer people being affected by natural disasters only in

63 S on BlICATI V-Dem pu 63 settings where institutional quality is high. When institutional economic Development and Democracy: quality is low, more people seem to suffer in democracies than An e lectoral c onnection in authoritarian states.” 2018 | European Journal of Political Research - “Scholars continue to debate whether economic develop ment affects regime type. We argue that a clear relationship exists between development and the electoral component of democracy, but not – or at least less so – between develop - ment and other components of broader understandings of de - mocracy. This is so because development enhances the power - resources of citizens and elections provide a focal point for col ovitkina m arina p tove Ahlbom lective action. The theory is tested with two new datasets – Va - lectoral Democracy rieties of Democracy and l exical Index of e – that allow us to disaggregate the concept of democracy into - meso- and micro-level indicators. Results of these tests cor rowth conomic g party Strength and e roborate the theory: only election-centered indicators are ro - bustly associated with economic development. This may help 70(2): 275-320. | World Politics 2018 to account for apparent inconsistencies across extant studies “While a large literature suggests an important role for political and shed light on the mechanisms at work in a much-studied parties in development, this article is the first attempt to layout relationship. Further analysis shows that development affects - and test a comprehensive theory connecting parties to eco - electoral democracy by reducing electoral fraud, election vio nomic growth. The authors argue that strong parties broaden lence, and vote buying.” the constituencies to which policymakers respond and help politicians solve coordination problems. These features help to ensure better economic management, public services, and political stability. And this, in turn, enhances economic growth. - Drawing on a novel measure of party strength from the Varie ties of Democracy data set, the authors test this theory on data drawn from more than 150 countries observed annually from 1901–2010. They identify a sizeable effect that is robust to vari - - ous specifications, estimators, and samples. The effect oper ates in both democracies and autocracies, and is fairly stable carl- henrik john erik Svend- across regions and time periods.” Knutsen gerring Skaaning john fernando Staffan I. jan m ichael henrik carl- gerring bizzarro coppedge lindberg te o r e l l Knutsen Allen Svend- erik m ichael Skaaning hicken bernhard See m ore r esearch Spotlights and V-Dem Staffan m ichael ur Website: publications on o I. l indberg coppedge www.v-dem.net

64 V-Dem pu 64 on S BlICATI elections: At the Core of Democracy importance for democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, the public trust in manipulated elections: t he post-communist region, l atin America and the Caribbean, role of election administration and media orth Africa, the relation ast and n - iddle e and Asia. For the m freedom ship is weaker and less robust. Finally, the results suggest that reiterated sequences of multiparty elections are associated 50: 50-67. | Electoral Studies 2 017 with improvements to liberal and deliberative components “As multiparty elections have become a global norm, scholars of democracy more so than egalitarian components.” and policy experts regard public trust in elections as vital for regime legitimacy. However, very few cross-national studies have examined the consequences of electoral manipulation, including the manipulation of election administration and the media, on citizens’ trust in elections. This paper addresses this gap by exploring how autonomy of election management em Bs) and media freedom individually and conjointly bodies ( shape citizens’ trust in elections. Citizens are more likely to ex - press confidence in elections when em - Bs display de-facto au Amanda b echkova Valeriya m . edgell tonomy, and less likely to do so when mass media disseminate information independent of government control. Additionally, - B autonomy may not have a positive ef we suggest that em m- fect on public trust in elections if media freedom is low. e pirical findings based on recent survey data on public trust in B autonomy and 47 elections and expert data on de-facto em media freedom support our hypotheses.” m ichael b ernhard David Altman nicholas Kerr Anna l ührmann Staffan I. l indberg When and where do elections matter? lections? h Strong States, Weak e ow State A global test of the democratization by capacity in Authoritarian r egimes c onditions elections hypothesis, 1900–2010 the Democratizing p ower of e lections 25(3): 422-444. 2 017 | Democratization 39(1): 49-66. | International Political Science Review 2 017 - “Successive multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa are as sociated with incremental democratization. Yet tests in other “State capacity may be a crucial factor conditioning the de - on-significant findings regions are less than encouraging. n mocratizing power of elections in authoritarian regimes. This on l atin America and post-communist e urasia, as well as paper develops a two-phase theory considers the different conceptual criticism regarding the theory’s application in the effects of state capacity on turnover in elections and demo - iddle e ast, suggest that this may be a case contemporary m cratic change after elections. In regimes with limited state of African exceptionalism. This article moves these debates capacity, manipulating elections and repressing opposition forward by posing a comprehensive, global set of tests on - is more difficult than in regimes with extensive state capac the democratizing effect of elections. We seek to establish ity, rendering turnover in elections more likely in weak states. the scope conditions of the argument geographically, tem - - However, if the new incumbent has limited capacity to de porally, and substantively. Although we find a correlation liver public services and make policy changes after coming between reiterated multiparty elections and improvements to power, sustainable democratic change is unlikely. Hence, in the liberal-democratic components of electoral regimes state capacity is hypothesized to have a negative effect on globally since 1900, the relationship is only substantial in the turnover, but a positive effect on democratic change. These xpe - period since the onset of the third wave of democracy. e hypotheses are confirmed in a sample of 460 elections in 110 riences with iterated multiparty elections have substantive authoritarian regimes taking place in the period 1974 to 2012

65 S on BlICATI V-Dem pu 65 - the differences between incumbent and opposition actors’ using the Varieties of Democracy dataset. The findings sug - strategies. We theorize that choices for specific types of ma - gest a need to revisit strong-state-first theories of democra nipulation are driven by available resources and cost consid - tization.” erations for both incumbents and opposition actors, and are mutually responsive. We also suggest that costs of manipu - lative strategies are shaped by the level of democratization. We test our hypotheses on a time series, cross-sectional data set with observations for 286 African elections from 1986 to 2012. We find that democratization makes ‘cheap’ forms of electoral manipulation available to incumbents such as intimidation and manipulating electoral administration less brigitte Seim carolien van h am viable, thus leading to increases in vote buying. The future of democracy in Africa thus promises elections where the administration of elections becomes better and better but ot all things go at the same time vote buying will increase. n together, at least not all the time. The future of democracy in When guardians matter most. e xploring the Africa will mean more money in politics, more patronage and conditions under which emb institutional more clientelistic offers thrown around, at least in the short to medium term.” design affects election integrity 2015 | Irish Political Studies 30(4): 454-481. “problems with election fraud and election integrity are of in - - creasing interest in both established and transitional democ - racies. In many transitional democracies, independent elec Bs) have been championed as em toral management bodies ( a key institutional reform measure to successfully strengthen election integrity. However, empirical findings regarding the carolien van h indberg Staffan I. l am B institutional design on election integrity are impact of em mixed. While regional studies have found a positive impact atin America of independent em Bs on election integrity in l and Africa, global comparative studies appear to show that em B institutional design is either negatively, or only very united n ations’ e lectoral Assistance: weakly related to election integrity. In this paper, we examine eaf? m ore than a f ig l B institutional design on election integrity the effects of em using the new Varieties of Democracy dataset and data from | International Political Science Review. 2018 the International ID eA. We find that the mixed findings on “Between 2007 and 2014 the un assisted more than one em B institutional design are due to the differences between third of all national elections worldwide. Its experts routinely transitional and established democracies on the one hand, provide substantial technical advice on election manage - and regimes with low and high quality of government on the ment, logistical support such as the procurement of ballot other. The paper concludes with a reflection on results and a - papers and financial assistance. However, it remains doubt discussion of implications of these findings for the debate on ful if and under which conditions such assistance contributes electoral reform in Ireland.” to free and fair elections or has a positive long-term impact on democratization. This study assesses the impact of un une igeria and l ibya. It electoral Assistance ( A) in Sudan, n finds that such assistance contributed to election quality in the presence of regime elites prioritizing electoral credibility igeria, it seems plausible ibya (2012). In n in n igeria (2011) and l A had a medium-term impact on democratization. that une However, if regime elites undermine electoral freedom and indberg carolien van h am Staffan I. l fairness - as in Sudan (2010) - such positive effects are unlikely. Furthermore, in such contexts, the involvement of the un may legitimize authoritarian practices.” arrots: e from Sticks to c lectoral anipulation in Africa, 1986–2012 m 2015 | Government and Opposition 50(2): 521-548. “over 90 per cent of the world’s states currently select their national leaders through multiparty elections. However, in Africa the quality of elections still varies widely, ranging from Anna l ührmann elections plagued by violence and fraud to elections that are relatively ‘free and fair’. Yet, little is known about trade-offs between different strategies of electoral manipulation and

66 | In TH po TlIGHT 66 S on BlICATI V-Dem pu e S measuring Democracy: ethodology and Indices The V-Dem m aking e ransparent: mbedded Knowledge t lobal otential of Direct Democracy: A g the p m m how the V-Dem Dataset o pens n ew Vistas in e asur e (19 0 0 -2014) 133(3): 1207-12 27. 2 017 | Social Indicators Research civil Society r esearch 2 017 | Perspectives on Politics 15(2): 342-360. “To what extent is direct democracy achieved in current polities? To answer this question, I develop an index, Direct Democracy “We show how the V-Dem data opens new possibilities for practice p otential, which is applied to 200 polities worldwide. studying civil society in comparative politics. We explain how This index results from the aggregation of the scores of four V-Dem was able to extract embedded expert knowledge to types of mechanisms of direct democracy: popular initiatives, create a novel set of civil society indicators for 173 countries popular referendums, obligatory referendums, and authorities’ from 1900 to the present. This data overcomes shortcomings in plebiscites. This index measures: (1) how easy it is to initiate and the basis on which inference has been made about civil soci - approve each type of popular vote, and (2) how consequential ety in the past by avoiding problems of sample bias that make ase of initiation is measured by: (a) the that vote is (if approved). e generalization difficult or tentative. We begin with a discus - - existence of a direct democracy process, (b) the number of sig sion of the reemergence of civil society as a central concept in ase of natures needed, and (c) time limits to collect signatures. e comparative politics. We then turn to the shortcomings of the approval is measured by quorums pertaining to: (a) participation, existing data and discusses how the V-Dem data can over - (b) approval, (c) supermajority, and (d) district majority. Regard - come them. We introduce the new data, highlighting two new ing how consequential the vote is, it considers its decisiveness indices—the core civil society index (CCSI) and the civil society (whether the decision is binding), and the threat capability of cit - participation index (CS pI)—and explain how the individual izen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy as measured by indicators and the indices were created. We then demonstrate the frequency with which direct popular votes have been used how the CCSI uses embedded expert knowledge to capture and approved in the past. Finally, the study tests the validity of - the development of civil society on the national level in Ven the new measure, discussing its strengths and limitations.” ezuela, Ghana, and Russia. We close by using the new indices to examine the dispute over whether post-communist civil so - ciety is “weak.” Time-series cross-sectional analysis using 2,999 country-year observations between 1989 and 2012 fails to find that post-communist civil society is substantially different from other regions, but that there are major differences between the post-Soviet subsample and other post-communist coun - tries both in relation to other regions and each other.” David Altman istorical: m going h easuring Democraticness before the Age of m ass Democracy Dong- joon j ernhard ichael b m ung 2016 | International Political Science Review 37(5): 679 - 689. ost studies of democratic developments are limited to the “m period after World War II. However, political regimes varied according to different aspects of democracy long before the establishment of modern liberal mass democracies. We come down strongly in favor of collecting disaggregate and fine-grained historical data on democratic features. Based on a distinction between competition, participation, and con - zelgov m eitan t oppedge ichael c - straints on the executive, we discuss previous attempts at his torical measurement and address the specific challenges that pertain to scoring political regimes in, first, the “long 19th urope.” century” and, second, medieval and early modern e Staffan I. l indberg

67 In TH po TlIGHT | e S S on BlICATI V-Dem pu 67 m easuring h igh l evel Democratic p rinciples using the V-Dem Data 37(5): 580 -593. 2016 | International Political Science Review “While the definition of extended conceptions of democracy has been widely discussed, the measurement of these con - structs has not attracted similar attention. In this article we ichael c zelgov m oppedge eitan t - present new measures of polyarchy, liberal democracy, de liberative democracy, egalitarian democracy, and participa - tory democracy that cover most polities in the period 1900 to 2013. These indices are based on data from a large number of indicators collected through the Varieties of Democracy (V- - Dem) project. We present and discuss the theoretical consid - erations and the concrete formula underlying the aggrega tion of indicators and components into high level measures of democracy. In addition, we show how these measures re - Staffan I. l indberg flect variations in quality of democracy, given the respective ideals, in 2012. In the conclusion scholars are encouraged to make use of the rich dataset made available by V-Dem.” ordinal Versions of V-Dem’s Indices: When Interval m easures Are n ot u seful for classification, Description, and Sequencing urposes Analysis p 2016 | Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8 ( 2 ) : 76 –111. “In the wake of the Cold War democracy has gained the status Staffan I. l oppedge ichael c m indberg of a mantra. The transition to democracy and its consolidation remain key issues in global development today. Yet, uncertainty persists over why some countries become and remain demo - cratic and others do not. o ne of the obstacles to advancement in the field of democratization studies is the absence of a wide- ranging database that tracks multifarious aspects of countries’ institutional histories. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) provides a new set of 350 indicators of various facets of democracy, 34 indicies of various components building off these indicators, erik Skaaning Svend- jan t eorell - and five main democracy indices. All indices are interval rang ing from 0 to 1. Based on a conceptual discussion of the nature of the concept of “democracy,” this articles makes the argument that for many descriptive purposes, as well as a series of impor - tant analytical endeavors, interval indices are not particularly useful (despite their many important advantages). Indices like all the ones V-Dem produces are thus in need of ordinal versions allowing for survival analyses, classification of regime catego - ries, understanding and explaining successful transitions to de - mocracy, breakdown of democratic regimes, as well as for the emerging area of sequence analysis. This article then advances a set of coding rules that transforms the existing, original V- Dem indices to ordinal indices with three, four and five levels respectively. u sers can determine which level of distinction is most useful for the research project, or the task of descriptive representation at hand. For the democracy indices that V-Dem supplies at the highest level of aggregation, the paper also sug - gests a classification of the levels into varying regime types.” See m ore r esearch Spotlights and V-Dem publications on o ur Website: Staffan I. l indberg www.v-dem.net

68 V-Dem pu 68 on S BlICATI Democracy for All: olitical Decision m aking Inclusion in p Women’s political empowerment: A new Women’s rights in democratic transitions: A global sequence analysis, 1900–2012 global index, 1900-2012 | European Journal of Political Research 94: 321–335. | World Development 2 017 56(4): 735-756. 2 017 “What determines countries’ successful transition to democ “The political empowerment of women is a societal process - crucial to development and progress. The V-Dem women’s racy? This article explores the impact of granting civil rights I) provides information pe political empowerment index (W in authoritarian regimes and especially the gendered aspect about women’s civil liberties, civil society participation, and of this process. It argues that both men’s and women’s liberal political participation globally. Spanning from 1900 to 2012, rights are essential conditions for democratisation to take place: providing both women and men rights reduces an ine three dimensions of empowerment, and over 170 countries, it - - is among the most comprehensive measures of women’s em quality that affects half of the population, thus increasing the powerment available. This paper presents a conceptualization costs of repression and enabling the formation of women’s of women’s political empowerment and provides an overview organising – historically important to spark protests in initial - phases of democratisation. This argument is tested empiri of the construction of the index and operationalization of its cally using data that cover 173 countries over the years 1900– - three sub-dimensions: Women’s civil liberties, civil society par 2012 and contain more nuanced measures than commonly - ticipation, and political participation. Compared to other indi ces measuring women’s empowerment, such as the GDI, the used. Through novel sequence analysis methods, the results , the GII, and the CIRI data on human rights, the V-Dem Gem suggest that in order to gain electoral democracy a country first needs to furnish civil liberties to both women and men.” index allows more precise measurement and is superior in temporal scope and coverage of countries of the Global South. The paper demonstrates the benefits of this new index and its sub-dimensions through several empirical illustrations.” patrik l indenfors yi-ting Wang Aksel Sundström . paxton pamela p ansson fredrik j Aksel Sundström Staffan I. l indberg yi-ting Wang Staffan I. l indberg pamela paxton See m esearch Spotlights and V-Dem ore r publications on o ur Website: www.v-dem.net

69 69 RT 2018 Al Repo V-Dem Annu References ollowing Key r ainly builds on the f ublication m this p eferences Dology Document V8 oDeboo V-Dem c V-Dem m etho K V8 Skaaning, Svend- Coppedge, m erik, Jan Teorell, Joshua Krusell, Kyle l . m arquardt, ichael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Valeriya m emstein, Josefine p ernes, l aura Saxer, lindberg, Svend- echkova, Daniel p erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, m ichael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, m . Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam natalia Stepanova, eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Steven Wilson. Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna l Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 2018. “V-Dem m ethodology V8.” ar - . m ührmann, Kyle l echkova, m cmann, Valeriya m quardt, Kelly m - amela p lin, p ax Project . oa o ton, Daniel p emstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, uca eitan Tzelgov, l Aksel Sundtröm, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. “V-Dem Codebook V8.” - Varieties of Democ racy (V-Dem) Project. AtA Set V8 V-Dem D Coppedge, m ichael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, m lindberg, Svend- ichael Bernhard, m. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna l - üh rmann, Kyle l cmann, Valeriya m echkova, Juraj arquardt, Kelly m . m moa olin, pemstein, Josefine medzihorsky, pamela paxton, Daniel pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey atalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundström, e itan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Staton, n Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018b. “V-Dem Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Country-Year Dataset V8.“ Additional references Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2013. “Why Nations Fail: anguage” egypt’s War on Honest l Cook, Steven. 2014. “ Foreign The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. ” n ew York: Broadway Policy . April 30, 2014. Business erik Skaaning, and Staffan Coppedge, m ichael, Jan Teorell, Svend- on Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of ancy. 2016. “ Bermeo, n olyarchy Across the Globe, 1900- easuring p lindberg. 2018. “m , 27, no 3: 5-19. Democracy Studies in Comparative International Development. 2 017. ” Boix, Carles. 2011. “Democracy, Development and the International ichael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan Coppedge, m 105, no 4: 809-28. American Political Science Review System.” erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Vlad Ciobanu, and I. l indberg, Svend- Varieties of nits v8” lin. 2018. ”V-Dem Country Coding u moa o Cederman, l ars- erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian m in. 2010. “Why Democracy (V-Dem) Project. do e ew Data and Analysis.” World Politics 62, thnic Groups Rebel? n no 1: 87-119.

70 ReF 70 en CeS eR “Democracy and Its Critics.” ew Haven: Yale Dahl, Robert A. 1989. n Scharff, m ichael. 2013. “ policing e lectoral Violence in India.” Foreign ress. university p Policy arch 21, 2013. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/21/ . m policing-electoral-violence-in-india/ “Polyarchy.” n ew Haven: Yale u niversity p ress. Dahl, Robert A. 1971. indberg. “Democracy for All: Sigman, Rachel, and Staffan I. l . Andreev, and vgenij m ., Andrej G. Volkov, e eonid e Darskij, l Political galitarian Democracy”, easuring e Conceptualizing and m “Naselenie Sovetskogo Sojuza: 1922-1991” . Char’kova. 1993. Tat’jana l Science Research and Methods nline first: https://doi.org/10.1017/ . o moscow: nauka. psrm.2018.6, 2018. Houle, Christian. 2009. “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality axton, Yi-ting Wang, Staffan I amela p p Sundström, Aksel, p World ot Affect Democratization.” Harms Consolidation But Does n ew Global mpowerment: A n olitical e lindberg. (2017). ”Women’s p Politics 61, no 04: 589–622. World Development Index, 1900-2012.” 94: 321-335 Human Rights Watch. 2017. “World Report 2017: Rights Trends in The Constitution of India 2017, § 124A. India.” The Guardian. 2017. “Romania’s Corruption Fight is a Smokescreen edia p olicy and Iosifidis, p etros, and Dimitris Boucas. 2015. “m David Clark . January 10, 2017. https:// to Weaken its Democracy.” Independent Journalism in Greece”, Open Society Foundations. www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/10/romanias-corruption- fight-is-a-smokescreen-to-weaken-its-democracy indberg. 2018. lührmann, Anna, m arcus Tannenberg, Staffan I. l ew Avenues for the “Regimes of the World (RoW): o pening n ew York Times. 2017. “India: e The n lection Violence in 2 6, olitical Regimes.” Comparative Study of p Politics and Governance eaves 7 Dead.” April 24, 2014. https://www.nytimes. Regions l no 1: 60-77 com/2014/04/25/world/asia/india-election-violence-in-2-regions- leaves-7-dead.html. itan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, arquardt, e . m pemstein, Daniel, Kyle l iri. 2018. “The V-Dem m easurement Joshua Krusell and Farhad m an Arrested over murder of Indian The Guardian. 2018. “m atent Variable Analysis for Cross- national and Cross- model: l arch 10, 2018. https://www. ankesh.” m Journalist Gauri l University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Temporal e xpert-Coded Data.” theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/10/man-arrested-over-of- o. 21, 3rd edition. Democracy Institute: Working Paper n indian-journalist-gauri-lankesh. Reporters Without Borders. 2018. “India: Deadly Threat from m odi’s The Guardian. 2016. “India Accused of muzzling n Gos by Blocking nationalism” https://rsf.org/en/india. Foreign Funding.” n ovember 24, 2016. https://www.theguardian. com/global-development/2016/nov/24/india-modi-government- rominent Woman Reporters Without Borders. 2017. “India: p accused-muzzling-ngos-by-blocking-foreign-funding. Journalist Gunned down in Bangalore.” https://rsf.org/en/news/ india-prominent-woman-journalist-gunned-down-bangalore. un . 2015. Resolution (70/1), “Transforming o ur World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, UN General Assembly A/ Rohac, Dalibor. 2018. “Hungary and p oland Aren’t Democratic. RES/70/1 . , February 5, 2018. http:// They’re Authoritarian.” Foreign Policy foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/hungary-and-poland-arent- World Bank. 2013. “Inclusion m atters: The Foundation for Shared democratic-theyre-authoritarian/ prosperity.” Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Reuters. 2017. ”Venezuela 2017 Annual Inflation at 2,616 percent: World Bank. 2018. “World Development Indicators.” Washington, https://www.reuters.com/ opposition lawmakers.” January 8, 2018. D.C.: World Bank. article/us-venezuela-economy-inflation/venezuela-2017-annual- n1ex 23B uSKB inflation-at-2616-percent-opposition-lawmakers-id xford arion. 2002. Young, Iris m “Inclusion and Democracy.” o xford: o ress. university p Go l Reuters. 2017. “ egypt Issues n aw Cracking Down on Dissent.” ay 29, 2017 https://www.reuters.com/article/ , m Ahmed Aboulenein ?il=0 p1ol n18 uSKB us-egypt-rights-id

71 oR 2017 CoReS F TRY S x: Coun DI Appen 71 Dex: Worl D A nD f I g u r e A1.1: lI ber Al Democr Acy In Age Al A Ion reg Ver S, 1900 to 2017. Appendix 1: l iberal 1 Democracy Index .9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 .3 T he V-Dem l lDI) captures both liberal and iberal Democracy Index ( electoral aspects of democracy based on the 71 indicators included .2 electoral Democracy lCI) and the liberal Component Index ( in the .1 - DI reflects a relatively ambitious idea of electoral de eDI). The e Index ( mocracy where a number of institutional features guarantee free and 0 fair elections such as freedom of association and freedom of expres - 1940 2000 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950 2017 1930 1920 1910 1900 2010 CI goes even further and captures the sion (see Appendix 2). The l Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average limits placed on governments in terms of two key aspects: The pro - MENA Latin America and the Caribbean tection of individual liberties; and the checks and balances between Sub−Saharan Africa Western Europe and North America Asia−Pacific institutions (see Appendix 3). the V-Dem lI gure A1.2: ber Al Democr Acy In Dex fI e xpl AnAtIon of Al Democr Acy In Dex V-Dem lIber liberal c omponent Index electoral Democracy Index UALIT LEGISLATIVE Eq y BEFORE JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CONSTRAINTS ON CONSTRAINTS ON ThE LAW AND FREEDOM OF CLEAN ELECTED AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES SUFFRAGE LIBERT INDIVIDUAL ThE EXECUTIVE ThE EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATION ELECTIONS OFFICIALS OF INFORMATION INDEX INDEX INDEX 9 5 4 1 20 16 8 6 Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicator

72 72 Appen DI x: Coun TRY S CoReS F oR 2017 ountry Scores for the l iberal Democracy Index ( lDI) and all c omponents Indices table A1: c liberal Democracy liberal c omponent egalitarian c omponent participatory Deliberative c omponent electoral Democracy Index ( Index ( ec I) Index ( component Index ( pc I) Index (lc I) Index (D cI) lDI) eDI) Score SD+/- Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- country rank rank 0.05 2 0.05 1 0.973 0.02 1 0.963 0.03 23 0.657 0.01 1 0.987 0.01 1 Norway 0.867 0.904  5 0.971 0.02 3 9 0.921 0.05 30 0.643 0.03 0.863 2 0.968 0.02 2 Sweden 0.902 0.04 0.04 0.913 0.604 9 0.949 0.03 13 0.909 0.06 49 1 0.06 20 0.921 0.04 Estonia 3 0.860 0.04 0.04 0.876 5 5 0.960 0.02 8 0.929 0.03 1 0.04 0.02 4 0.974 0.02 0.05 0.853 4 Switzerland 0.897 6 0.896 0.04 7 0.954 0.02 2 0.951 0.03 Denmark 0.708 0.02 2 0.977 0.02 5 0. 8 41 0.04 9 0.04 0.888 0.04 12 0.943 0.03 18 0.888 0.05 16 0.680 0.04 7 0.951 0.02 Costa Rica 6 0.830 7 10 29 0.05 6 0.960 0.02 7 0.930 0.04 0.06 0.646 0.02 13 0.930 0.04 Finland 7 0.827 0.876 19 0.04 0.04 4 0.960 0.02 32 0.857 0.05 0.875 0.666 0.03 14 0.928 0.03 0.827 8 Australia 12 0.05 9 0.878 0.05 8 0.950 0.03 22 0.880 0.06 3 0.763 0.03 96 0.666 0.12 New Zealand 9 0.825 0.06 0.876 0.821 0.06 11 0.944 0.03 11 0 .917 0.04 35 0.634 0.05 17 0.924 0.04 Portugal 10 11 0.06 8 0.04 18 0.927 0.03 5 0.934 0.04 24 0.654 0.02 11 0.933 0.03 11 Belgium 0. 819 0.886 18 0.673 0.05 3 0.961 0.02 6 0.933 0.04 18 0.05 0.04 9 0.945 0.03 Netherlands 12 0. 813 0.860  27 0.899 0.05 0.625 0.05 15 0.907 0.05 39 0.899 0.05 0.05 0.05 27 0.897 0. 812 13 France 4 0.05 16 0.863 0.05 10 0.948 0.02 4 0.939 0.03 27 0.652 0.02 6 0.952 0.03 Germany 14 0.809  29 0.892 0.05 0.04 0.929 0.03 12 0.913 0.06 13 0.689 0.03 13 0. 874 0.04 17 Iceland 15 0.806  40 0.856 0.06 0.931 0.03 28 0.862 0.06 14 0.684 0.02 0.873 0.05 0.04 16 0.806 14 United Kingdom 16 37 0.867 0.06  13 0.940 0.03 27 0.866 0.06 Slovenia 0.758 0.03 17 0.792 0.06 22 0.856 0.05 4 0.787 15 0.864 0.04 21 0.924 0.04 92 0.631 0.06 47 0.605 0.04 24 0.904 0.04 18 Chile 0.09  0.06 24 0.843 0.06 15 0.933 0.03 19 0.883 0.05 66 0.575 0.10 8 0.948 0.03 Ireland 19 0.776 20 0.770 21 0.857 0.05 26 0.903 0.05 35 0.834 0.08 26 0.652 0.02 18 0.922 0.04 Canada 0.06 0.768 Uruguay 0.860 0.05 30 0.892 0.04 41 0. 813 0.08 2 0. 814 0.03 19 0.922 0.04 0.06 21 19 0.05 20 0.04 28 0.895 0.04 21 0.880 0.07 51 0.602 0.05 62 0.791 0.08 22 Czech Republic 0.768 0.859 28 0.74 6 0.04 22 0.922 0.03 16 0.898 0.05 5 0.06 0.03 22 0.907 0.05 Italy 23 0.765 0.837  39 0.866 0.05 0.707 0.04 20 0.882 0.06 10 0. 8 41 0.02 0.07 0.07 24 0.918 0.763 24 Austria 25 0.05 29 0.832 0.06 20 0.924 0.05 10 0.919 0.04 52 0.600 0.04 16 0.924 0.04 Japan 25 0.758 0.06 0.757 0.863 0.05 37 0.869 0.04 3 0.949 0.02 99 0.496 0.08 3 0.974 0.02 Luxembourg 26 17 21 0.06 0.05 34 0.879 0.06 24 0.878 0.05 0.849 0.659 0.05 58 0.804 0.08 0.751 23 Latvia 27 0.07 26 0. 8 41 0.06 29 0.894 0.03 25 0.877 Cyprus 76 0.560 0.05 43 0.847 0.07 28 0.747 0.06 0.734 36 0.798 0.04 14 0.937 0.03 29 0.862 0.05 6 0.729 0.05 52 0. 812 0.07 29 Lithuania 0.06 0.729 0.05 27 0.837 0.05 39 0.865 0.04 50 0.761 0.07 Slovakia 0.724 0.04 102 0.651 0.12 30 7  32 0.822 0.04 33 0.879 0.04   0.695 0.09 22 0.659 0.01 94 0.669 0.10 67 31 0.06 USA 0.727 0.722 0.06 0.829 0.07 36 0.871 0.04 85 0.649 0.09 46 0.607 0.05 36 0.868 0.05 Jamaica 32 30 0.06 0.07 0.790 0.06 23 0.919 0.04 40 0.816 0.715 90 0.522 0.07 57 0.804 0.08 Cape Verde 33 38 0.05 0.713 0.791 0.06 25 0.916 0.03 23 0.880 37 50 0.602 0.05 12 0.932 0.04 34 South Korea 0.06 0.703 0.04 39 0.771 0.06 19 0.925 0.03 26 0.867 0.07 34 0.634 0.03 31 0.891 0.05 Spain 35 0.696 0.07 31 0.827 0.05 51 0.829 0.06 43 0.803 0.08 89 0.528 0.08 28 0.895 0.05 Mauritius 36 0.05 0.695 0.816 0.06 45 0.844 0.06 17 0.888 33 33 0.638 0.06 21 0.916 0.04 37 0.08 Greece 0.691 0.06 34 0.800 0.06 38 0.866 0.04 14 0.908 Taiwan 11 0.704 0.03 32 0.877 0.05 38 0.05 39 0.06 40 0.768 0.06 35 0.872 0.06 44 0.803 0.668 145 0.278 0.04 66 0.763 0.09 Barbados 0.08 0.877 0.05 0.06 43 0.758 0.05 42 0.854 0.06 34 0. 8 41 0.08 83 0.544 0.07 33 Trinidad and Tobago 40 0.647 0.05 65 45 0.743 0.07  43 0.854  0.705 0.07 96 0.505 0.08 25 0.904 0.05 41 0.06 Vanuatu 0.636 42 0.631 0.07 41 0.765 0.07 53 0 . 817 0.06 76 0.676 0.08 40 0.619 0.04 71 0.742 0.09 Argentina 43 South Africa 50 0.730 0.06 40 0.859 0.06 100 0.599 0.08 58 0.587 0.06 35 0.869 0.06 0.622 0.06 0.08  0.702 0.08  31 0.891 0.03  47 0.780 57  104 0.484 0.04  10 0.940 0.03  0.621 Tunisia 44 0.06 0.05  0.798 0.06 68 0.743 0.08  48 0.775 0.08 55 0.594 0.05 56 0.810 0.07 45 Suriname 0.614 35 52 0.07 0.08 46 0.838 0.06 42 0.803 0.06 44 0.608 0.05 38 0.866 0.06 Benin 46 0. 612 0.724 72 0.06 0.08 59 0.786 0.06 58 0.728 0 .11 0.762 0.564 0.06 41 0.856 0.06 0 . 611 47 Panama 42 0.07 54 0.714 0.06 41 0.854 0.04 80 0.669 0.10 68 0.569 0.05 55 0.810 0.07 S.Tomé & P. 48 0.609 0.07 46 0.74 0 0.06 54 0.807 0.05 113 0.560 0.10 15 0.682 0.05 61 0.792 0.08 Peru 49 0.603 0.860 0.630 0.06  56 0.803 0.07  31 0.731 0.05 36 49 0.06 116 0.575 0.12  0.596 0.07 Poland 50 63 0.786 0.09  32 0.889 0.05 39 Bulgaria 0.06 8 0.710 0.05 51 0.593 0.05 62 0.676 0.05 0.820 0.578 48 0.736 0.07 61 0.770 0.06 77 0.675 0.07 84 0.543 0.07 49 0. 819 0.07 52 Namibia 0.06 0.577 0.06 59 0.693 0.05 47 0.837 0.05 53 0.747 0.09 56 0.593 0.05 67 0.762 0.09 Israel 53 0.577 51 54 0.725 0.07 60 0.782 0.06 55 0.732 0.05 127 0 . 417 0.06 48 0.822 0.08 Senegal 0.06 0.576 Botswana 0.710 0.05 55 0.807 0.05 62 0.713 0.07 71 0.565 0.04 53 0 . 811 0.08 0.05 55 55 0 .11 45 0.06  74 0.729 0.06  108 0.568 0.749 44 0.607 0.05  104 0.645 0 .11   0.568 0.05 Brazil 56 0.05 63 0.669 0.07  50 0.833 0.06 64 0.705 Croatia  17 0.678 0.05  82 0.702 0 .11 57 0.553 0.07 0.792  47 0.737 0.08  80 0.716 0.05 46 0.07 0.08 101 0.488 0.07 47 0.826 0.06 58 Georgia 0.550  0.05 69 0.639 0.06 48 0.837 0.06 Ghana 0 . 717 0 .11 132 0.376 0.05 46 0.829 0.07 59 0.537 60 60 0.07 61 0.683 0.06 67 0.752 0.05 52 0.754 0.07 74 0.564 0.05 44 0.847 0.06 Mongolia 0. 531 36 0.830 0.630 0.05  52 0.822 0.05 73  0.06 31 0.643 0.07 12 3 0.532 0.14 0.522 hungary 61 0.05  0.877  77 0. 613 0.08  44 0.846 0.04 0.06 33 0.847 0.08 54 0.597 0.05  34 0.05 0. 521 Bhutan 62 0.568 0. 510 53 0.715 0.05 89 0.671 63 109 0.06 0.09 81 0.545 0.07 78 0.716 0.10 Timor-Leste 0.08 0.12 0.593 112  64 0.669 0.06 75 0.729 0.08 16 4 0.290 0.09 77 0.559 0.06 0.06 64 0.506 Guatemala 0.08 0.833 45  56 0.709 0.07 91 0.661 0.06  101 0.590 0.09 78 0.558 0.05 0.08 0.503 Burkina Faso 65 0.492 Colombia 0.634 0.06 66 0.757 0.06 127 0.473 0.12 28 0.651 0.07 54 0 . 811 0.07 0.05 66 70  0.469 0.05 64 0.763 0.06 96 0.616 0 .11 116 0.625 0.03 84 0.698 0 .11 0.05 0.490 Liberia 67 74 0.07  58 0.696 0.07 90 0.664 0.08 74 0.676 0.08 79 0.552 0.05 106 0.636 0.12 Guyana 68 0.488  0.05 0.687 0.05 88 0.672 0.07 59 0.722 0.07 61 0.582 0.08 142 0.403 0.13 60 Romania 69 0.487 0.07 0.05 76 0 . 617 0.07  63 0.764 0.06 81 0.667 0.484 113 0.474 0.06  80 0.708 0.10 70 Nepal  Mexico 0.06 67 0.648 0.05 79 0.716 0.07 126 0.476 0.07 60 0.583 0.06 70 0.747 0.09 71 0.476 72 0.04 72 0.632 0.06 76 0.725 0.05 104 0.580 0.09 63 0.579 0.06 30 0.892 0.05 Indonesia 0.475  65 0.766 0.10 62 0.788 0.07 133 0.433 0 .11 79 0.580 0.06 0.474 0.598 0.09 58 73 0.06 Malawi 0.468 0.06 66 0.650 0.07 84 0.680 0.07 156 0.342 0.06 Paraguay 0.577 0.08 127 0.495 0.14 74 64 103   71 0.633 0.05  82 0.709 0.06  0.07 0.586 0.10 67 0.572 0.05  51 0. 812 0.465 0.04 Sri Lanka 75 76 0.463 0.05 88 0. 551 0.06 49 0.833 0.05 88 0.6 41 0.10 88 0. 531 0.05 136 0.459 0.13  Albania 77 0.661 0.04 65 El Salvador 0.06 93 0.657 0.04 159 0.306 0.07 92 0 . 517 0.06 105 0.639 0 .11 0.459 78 0.452 85 0.560 0.04 57 0.791 0.05 73 0.677 0.10 147 0.276 0.05 64 0.766 0.09 Seychelles 0.05 120 0.520 0.587 0.07  69 0.742 0.07  81  0.09 41 0.619 0.04 68 0.755 0.09 0.451 Nigeria 79 0.07 0.560 0.651 101 0.07 0.501 83 0.681 0.06 111 0.12 0 .11 98 0.06 0.447 75 0.05 80 Solomon Islands 0.620 0. 561 78  82 0.571 0.07   0.722 0.06 110 0.15 0.08 82 0.545 0.07 128 0.494 0.05 81 India 0.429 82 0.424 0.05 84 0.562 0.06 85 0.676 0.07 51 0.756 0.08 112 0.474 0.05 93 0.675 0 .11 Lesotho 83 72 0.03 86 0.559 0.06 Moldova 0.732 0.06 86 0.648 0 .11 97 0.504 0.07 118 0.560 0.13 0.420 84 0.397 68 0.647 0.07 107 0.564 0.08 70 0.689 0.06 12 0.694 0.05 111 0.606 0.13 Bolivia 0.05 0.699 85 89 0.547 0.06 86 0.673 0.06 66 0.06 0.09 106 0.481 0.08 60 0.793 0.08 Mali 0.393 86 0.386 0.04 96 0.493 0.06 70 0.736 0.05 Tanzania 0.730 0.07 12 5 0.431 0.08 76 0.725 0.09 56 Niger 0.376 0.04 91 0. 541 0.07 101 0.636 0.05 79 0.672 0.09 20 0.661 0.06 26 0.904 0.05 87 106 88 0.05 80 0.589 0.07 108 0. 561 0.05 0.372 0.579 0.09 37 0.629 0.03 23 0.906 0.04 Sierra Leone

73 V-Dem Annu RT 2018 Al Repo 73 indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty. electoral Democracy liberal c omponent egalitarian c omponent participatory Deliberative c omponent liberal Democracy ec I) I) component Index ( pc I) lDI) Index (lc Index (D cI) Index ( Index ( Index ( eDI) rank SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- Score Score rank country SD+/- 0 .11 0.652 104 0.585 0.08 94 0.619  25 0.05 42 0.850 0.06  83 0.570 Ivory Coast 89 0.369 0.05 0.07 0. 615 0. 514 99 0.647 0.08 14 6 0.383 0.10 43 0.05 0.05 74 0.727 0.10 0.05 0.363 90 Philippines 94  78 0.606 0.09 118 0. 519 0.06 61 0.715 0.10 32 0.639 0.06 15 0.924 0.04 0.05 Ecuador 91 0.359 Singapore 0.453 0.05 73 0.730 0.07 45 0.801 0.06 167 0.181 0.05 69 0.751 0.10 0.357 0.03 107 92 0.605 110 81 0.715 0.07 75 0.676 0.12 48 0.06 0.06 89 0.688 0.12 Montenegro 93 0.352 0.04 0.446  97 0.484 0.06  102 0.634 0.06  69 0.691 0.08  0.454 0.08 59 0.804 0.07 122 0.04 Kyrgyzstan 94 0.339 0.07  0.556 0.06 117 0. 521 0.05  Macedonia 0.629 87 57 0.588 0.05 83 0.699 0.09 0.05 0.334 95 93  0.15 0.424 139  0.04 0.650 0.467 0.07 42 0. 615 0.05 97 128 0.4 61 103 0.04 0.333 Kenya 96 0.06 0.04  106 0.455 0.05  92 0.657 0.09  98 0.608 0.09 151 0.262 0.06 120 0.546 0.13 Fiji 97 0.329 0.04 102 0.04 100 0.642 0.07 118 0.539 0.10 73 0.564 0.07 99 0.655 0 .11 98 Mozambique 0.327 0.462 111 85 0.04 94 0.654 0.08 14 4 0.393 0.08 0.03 0.540 0.06 131 0.482 0.12 Papua New Guinea 99 0.324 0.444 141 0.04 0.06 119 0.502 0.08 135 0.418 0.10 0.543 0.287 0.08 153 0.337 0.15 0. 316 100 Guinea-Bissau 90 0.04 95 0. 512 0.09 116 0.526 0.06 122 0.509 0.07 120 0.454 0.10 95 0.667 0.12 Lebanon 101 0. 314 0.02 0.06 0.347 0.02 62 0.769 0.06 38 0.825 0.06 14 8 0.273 0. 310 86 0.693 0.09 hong Kong 102 12 5 0.652 0.10 0.05  103 0.595 0.06  84 0.452 108 59 0.586 0.06 72 0.742 0.09  Serbia 103 0.04 0.305   129 0.326 0.03 65 0.759 0.06  87 0.648 0.10 111 0.476 0.09 73 0.739 0.09 0.03 The Gambia 0.296 104 0.05 98 0.479 0.06 110 0.542 0.07 149 0.362 0.09 95 0 . 511 0.06 126 0.500 0.14 Somaliland 105 0.293 0 .11 0.04 0.472 0.06 115 0.527 0.08 82 0.659 100 126 0.420 0.08 98 0.661 0 .11 0.292 Kosovo 106 0.543 121 0.06 0. 512 0.05  106 0.14 0.07 153 0.352 0.09  94 0.576 0.396 0.04 0.290 107 Iraq 118 0.287 0.03 0.431 0.04 105 0.578 0.08 71 0.683 0.08 38 0.628 0.05 91 0.685 0.10 108 Gabon 113 0.05 109 0.06 111 0. 541 0.06 160 0.306 0 .11 109 0.480 0.07 77 0.722 0.10 Pakistan 109 0.286 0.452 0.228 133 71 0.734 0.07 91 0.637 0.08 156 0.02 0.06 100 0.652 0 .11 0.03 0. 314 Kuwait 110 0.281 121 0.359 0.03 95 0.654 0.06 12 5 0.486 0.09 65 0.576 0.06 Uganda 0.716 0 .11 111 0.279 0.03 79 0.08 12 3 0.350 0.03  96 0.654 0.08  107 0.569  110 0.479 0.06  108 0.624 0.09  0.276 112 Zambia 0.03 0.02 135 0.303 0.02 77 0.722 0.06 112 Morocco 0.07 69 0.566 0.06  50 0. 814 0.07 113 0.272 0.560 0.271 104 0.459 0.04 12 3 0.489 0.07 15 4 0. 351 0.07 75 0. 561 0.06 97 0.663 0.12 honduras 114 0.05 80 0.266 0.338 0.02 98 0.648 0.06 57 0.728 0.08 128 0.548 0.05 88 0.690 0 .11 115 0.02 Bosnia and h erzegovina 0.04 93 0. 521 0.06 132 0.418 0.07 171 0.236 haiti 119 0.455 0.08 145 0.369 0.14 116 0.264 0.08 0.263 105 0.456 0.05 124 0.485 0.09 147 0.373 0.04 87 0. 531 0.09 13 4 0.465 0.12 117 Madagascar 0.10 0 .11 0.07  119 0.395   114 0.534 0.08  130 0.445 0.09  102 0.487 0.07  90 0.688 0.255 0.04 Myanmar 118 0.255 Dominican Republic 92 0.535 0.06 138 0.375 0.06 157 0. 331 0.09  114 0.473 0.07  81 0.706 0.10 0.03 119  70 0.03 0.04 129 0.442 0.07 89 0.640 0.09 0.462 0.566 0.07 107 0.633 0.12 Comoros 120 0.252 101 0.10  99 0.475 0.06  135 0.390 0.06 54 0.74 4 0.10 150 0.266 0.07 92 0.683 0.240 0.04 To go 121  113 0.591 0.13 105 0.482 0.06 63 Armenia 0.09 117 0.484 0.08 0.03 0.399 0.03 12 5 0.239 122 0.712 0.235 0.02 149 0.250 0.02 87 0.673 0.08 117 Jordan 0.10 138 0.302 0.08 110 0.607 0 .11 12 3 0.539 0.09 116 0.399 0.04  126 0.478 0.07  12 3 0.501 0.07 53 0.599 0.06 87 0.691  124 0.03 Ukraine 0.232 0.07 0.232 0.406 0.04 127 0.470 0.07 158 0. 331 115 15 4 0.239 0.07 117 0. 561 0.13 12 5 0.03 CAR 0. 216 0.03 126 0.345 0.03 121 0.495 0.06 166 0.281 Afghanistan 149 0.273 0.07 122 0.537 0.13 126 0.08 142 0.02  112 0.439 0.04  137 0.376 0.05 0.15 0.401 0.08 13 4 0.347 0.05 119 0.550 0. 214 Guinea 127 108 0. 210 0.03 132 0. 318 0.04 120 0.500 0.09 105 0.579 0.09 Malaysia 0.480 0.07 115 0.577 0.12 128 0.15 109 0. 551 0.08 90 0.637  107 0.481 0.08 132 0.476 0.09 0.205 0.03 141 0.278 0.03 Rwanda 129 13 4 0.12 130 0.325 0.03  128 0.468 0.06  0.421 0.09 131 0.385 0.07 129 0.486 130 Zimbabwe 0.200 0.03 78  0.259 0.02  113 0.536 0.06  147 0.672 0.10 86 0.537 0.07 109 0.621 0.12 0.195 Vietnam 131 0.02 0.769  0.02  112 0.538 0.04  49 0.245 0.09 100 0.490 0.08 75 0.726 0 .11 151 132 Palestine/West Bank 0.19 0 0.01  0.548 0. 274 0.02  122 0.493 0.06  116 142 0.10 12 3 0.448 0.08  85 0.695 0 .11  0.02 0.187 133 Libya 0.693 0.350 0.04 136 0.384 0.06 68 Algeria 0.10 152 0.260 0.05 103 0.647 0.12 0.18 0 0.03 124 13 4 0.13  120 0.360 0.03  14 0 0. 361 0.07 162 0.299 0.09 91 0. 521 0.08 135 0.460 0.02 Bangladesh 135 0 .17 7 136 0.03 0.03 133 0.418 0.08 95 0 . 617 0.08 0.292 0. 331 0.07 152 0.337 0.13 136 0 .17 2 Zanzibar 136 0.582  114 0 . 417 0.06 155 0.256 0.06  173 0.232 0.16  133 0. 374 0.09 114 0.08 0.03 Mauritania 137 0.158 0.09 0.02 0. 321 0.03 14 4 0.338 0.05 0.15 4 0.587 131 157 0.223 0.07 14 6 0.359 0.13 138 Cameroon 102 0.152 0.02 15 4 0.222 0.02 131 0.435 0.07 129 0.466 0.10 155 0.238 0.07 124 0. 531 0.16 Iran 139  14 0 0.420 0.14 0.150 150 0.299 0.06 14 0 0.509 0.10 118 0.456 0.07 121 122 0.352 0.03 Maldives 0.02 0.09 0 .11 139 0.363 0.07 169 0.262  165 0.191 0.07 149 0.344 0.141 0.252 0.03 Angola 0.02 141 14 8 130  0.386 0.07 138 0.427 0.15  0.07 0.02 0 .178 0.03 130 0.438 0.08 170 0.258 0.138 161 Somalia 142 0.02 150 0.246 0.03 143 0.343 0.05 99 Kazakhstan 0.08 158 0 . 217 0.08 158 0.278 0 .11 143 0.131 0.600 0.131 159 0.19 0 0.02 13 4 0.391 0.05 97 0.610 0.02 137 0. 312 0.06 165 0.18 8 0.10 14 4 Oman 0.09 0.126 0.02 14 6 0.260 0.03 14 8 0.309 0.05 119 0. 531 0.09 121 Djibouti 0.08 137 0.454 0.14 145 0.454 0.239 0.12  0 . 211 0.02 141 0.350 0.07 176 0 .176 0.06 14 6 0.277 0.07 161 14 6 0.02 155 Egypt 0.12 5  0.12 3 0.272 0.03  151 0.286 0.06 114 0. 551 0.08 143 93 0. 514 0.07 174 0 .117 0.09  147 0.02 Venezuela 0.120 0.01 145 0.268 0.03 152 0.281 0.03 30 0.860 Belarus 142 0.287 0.08 160 0. 241 0 .11 14 8 0.05 139   127 0.343 0.04  162 0. 213 0.05  0.12 0.408 0.09  117 0.4 61 0.08 157 0.290 0 .119 0.02 Turkey 149 150 0 .117 0.02  13 4 0.307 0.03  156 0.243 0.05  124 0.487 0 .11 115 0.472 0.07 151 0.339 0.14  Nicaragua 151 0 .115  14 4 0.270 0.02 153 0.262 0.04 115 0.549 0.10 135 0.332 0.07 150 0. 341 0.13 Russia 0.01  14 4 0.377 0.15 0 .110 0.240 0.06 167 0.277 0.09 103 0.485 0.08 0.02 0.281 0.03 158 Congo 152 139 0.658 0.08 142 0.344 0.06 83  163 0.193 0.09 130 0.482 0.12 0.02 166 0.107 0.152 153 United Arab Emirates 0.02 0.107 0.01 152 0.242 0.03 15 4 0. 261 0.04 145 0.389 0.10 14 4 0.278 0.09 141 0.408 0.12 Ethiopia 15 4 175  0.279 0.02  159 0.230 0.05 14 0 0.19 9 0.07 143 0.285 0.07 159 0.246 0.15 0.10 6 155 Sudan 0.02 14 0 0.09 137 0.288 0.03 161 0. 214 0.05  0.407 124 0.439 0.07 143 0.378 0 .17 0.10 4 156 DRC 0.02  131 170 0.142 0.02  145 0.329 0.05  0.445 0.10 139 0.301 0.08 168 0 .171 0.10  157 0.101 Thailand 0.01 158 0.10 0 0.02 165 0.15 4 0.02 147 0. 315 0.07 14 8 0.367 0.08 129 0.402 0.09 155 0.304 0.14 Swaziland 159 0.094 138 0.287 0.03 16 4 0.18 6 0.06 17 2 0.233 0.07 128 0.405 0 .11 14 8 0.347 0.12 Chad 0.01 0.091 0.03 0.096 0.01 14 6 0.323 0.09 155 0.344 0.08 166 0.181 0.05 167 0 .174 0 .11 160 Laos 173 0.05 0.084 0.087 0.01 149 0.303 0.05 141 0.403 17 7 176 0.093 0.02 147 0.359 0.13 161 qatar 0.01 0.323 15 4  153 0.235 0.02  165 0.183 0.05 174 0.13 0.06 14 0 0.289 0.07 0.19 9 0.01 162 Cambodia 0.082 0.04 0.298 160 0.19 0 0.02  160 0.221  37 0.828 0.06 169 0 .171 0.05 156 0 .11 163 0.081 Cuba 0.01 0.414 0.078 169 0.14 4 0.02 157 0.240 0.06 137 0.02 0.09 153 0.254 0.06 162 0.228 0.12 Palestine/Gaza 16 4 165 0.067 0.01 157 0.202 0.02 167 0.16 4 0.04 161 0.303 0.08 16 4 0.192 0.04 166 0 .176 0.10 Azerbaijan 165 0.10 162 0 .176 0.01  170 0.150 0.02  0.281 0.08 170 0.161 0.03 17 2 0.156 166 Tajik is t an 0.059 0.01 0.058 138 174 0.093 0.01 163 0.19 9 0.05 167 0.409 0.08 17 2 0.14 4 0.07 12 5 0.507 0.12 China 0.01 0.085 168 16 4 0.155 0.01 168 0.162 0.05 178 0.02 0.05 160 0.201 0.08 169 0.16 6 0.10 South Sudan 0.058  0 .11 0.191  163 0.159 0.01  171 0.149 0.04  150 0.360 0.07  162 0.195 0.06  16 4 0.01 Burundi 0.055 169 0.054 0 .11  171 0.128 0.02  169 0.15 4 0.05 143 0.397 0.07 174 0.103 0.04  171 0.16 0 170  0.01 Bahrain 0.298 0.053 158 0.195 0.02 174 0 .119 0.04 163 0.01 0.08 168 0 .17 7 0.05 170 0.162 0.09 171 Equatorial Guinea  0.12 0.466 133 0.04 0.131  175 0 .111 0.03 132 0.434 0.07 173 0.02 Uzbekistan 0.01 0.052 17 2 0.203 156 152 0.049  167 0.151 0.01  173 0.130 0.04  0.01 0.354 0.08 171 0.159 0.03 176 0.070 0.06 Turkmenistan 173  0.04 0.032  17 2 0.10 4 0.01  17 2 0.14 0 0.05  17 7 0.131 0.05 159 0.209 0.05  17 7 0.01 174 yemen 0.044 175 0.044 0.01 178 0.022 0.01 166 0 .171 0.04 136 0.416 0.05 175 0.095 0.04 163 0.198 0.10 Saudi Arabia  0.088 168 0.147 0.01 176 0.075 0.02  168 0.268 0.10 161 0.195 0.05 175 0.07 176 Syria 0.01 0.033  178 0.032 0.02 173 0.127 0.09 17 7 0.02 Eritrea 0.682 0.08 72 0.00 176 0.088 0.00 17 7 0.042 0.016 151 178 0.00 175 0.088 0.01 178 0.019 0.01 0.010 0.358 0.06 17 7 0.060 0.03 178 0.026 0.03 North Korea

74 74

75 oR 2017 Appen DI x: Coun TRY S CoReS F 75 Dex: f I g u r e A 2 .1: t he V-Dem e lector Al Democr Acy In Age S, 1900 to 2017. D A nD r eg Ion Al A Ver Worl Appendix 2: The 1 electoral Democracy .9 .8 Index .7 .6 .5 For several decades, scholars and practitioners alike have depict - .4 ed democracy in the world as though the extant measures really .3 captured what is meant by the concept “electoral democracy”. Yet, 1 V-Dem is the first system - we have all known that they did not. .2 atic effort to measure the existence of all the institutions de facto - in Robert Dahl’s famous articulation of “polyarchy” as electoral de .1 mocracy. The V-Dem e lectoral Democracy Index ( eDI) captures not only the extent to which regimes hold clean, free and fair elections, 0 but also their actual freedom of expression, alternative sources of 2017 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1900 1920 1910 information, and association, as well as male and female suffrage Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average MENA Latin America and the Caribbean and the degree to which government policy is vested in elected Sub−Saharan Africa Western Europe and North America political officials (Figure 2.1). Asia−Pacific Dex Acy In Al Democr lector he V-Dem e t gure A2.2: fI expanded freedom of expression index Government censorship Print/broadcast Government censorship Print/broadcast harassment of Media Media self- media perspectives censorship bias effort - Internet media critical effort – Media journalists Freedom of Freedom of discussion Freedom of academic discussion for men for women and cultural expression Share of population with suffrage freedom of association index Party Barriers to Opposition parties Elections CSO entry CSO Percent of population with suffrage multiparty parties and exit ban repression autonomy clean elections index EMB Election free EMB Election other Election government Election voter Election other Election vote autonomy registry voting irregularities capacity intimidation electoral violence and fair buying elected officials index

76 76 Appen DI x: Coun TRY S CoReS F oR 2017 table A2: c ountry Scores for the e lectoral Democracy Index ( eDI) and its m ain c omponents clean e lection freedom of electoral Democracy freedom of Association Index ( eDI) expression Index Index Index Score country Score SD +/- rank Score SD +/- rank Score SD +/- SD +/- rank rank 0.04 10 0.04 1 0.977 0.01 3 0.973 0.01 1 Estonia 0.913 0.910 15 0.904 4 0.973 0.02 1 0.978 0.01 2 Norway 0.905 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.910 0.973 0.01 8 0.964 3 11 0.04 Sweden 3 0.902 0.04 0.926 0.03 14 0.955 0.02 7 France 0.02 4 0.899 0.05 3 0.964 5 0.04 21 0.943 0.03 4 0.920 0.01 0.04 0.897 5 Switzerland 0.970 4 0.921 0.04 17 0.950 0.03 Denmark 0.975 0.01 6 0.896 0.04 2 0.04 0.926 0.04 9 0.962 0.02 20 0.946 0.02 Costa Rica 7 0.888 2 0.965 32 8 0.962 0.02 6 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.887 Belgium 8 0.886 9 0 . 911 0.04 11 0.957 0.02 New Zealand 0.939 0.03 9 0.878 0.05 25 0.05 0.889 0.05 10 0.961 0.02 31 0.947 0.02 0.876 10 Finland 17 0.06 36 0.884 0.05 2 0.976 0.01 21 0.945 0.02 Portugal 11 0.876 0.875 0.04 0.915 0.04 7 0.963 0.02 24 0.939 0.03 Australia 12 6 0.04 18 0.04 5 0.965 0.02 23 0.9 41 0.02 13 Iceland 0. 874 0.901 0.955 12 30 0.927 0.04 12 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.910 United Kingdom 14 0.873 35 0.885 0.05 6 0.965 0.02 Chile 0.947 0.02 15 0.864 0.04 19 0.05 0.870 0.05 18 0.947 0.03 51 0.965 0.02 0.863 16 Germany 5 0.05 23 0.896 0.05 15 0.955 0.02 15 0.953 0.02 Luxembourg 17 0.863 0.860 0.05 0.870 0.05 13 0.957 0.02 16 0.948 0.02 Netherlands 18 52 18 0.05 0.05 12 0.957 0.02 0.890 0.947 0.02 0.860 Uruguay 19 29 0.04 30 0.890 0.05 19 0.947 0.03 29 0.931 0.03 Czech Republic 20 0.859 0.857 0.05 0.875 0.05 16 0.954 0.03 26 0.937 0.03 Canada 21 47 0.03 0.856 0.906 0.04 20 0.946 13 47 0.872 0.04 22 Slovenia 0.05 0.849 0.05 16 Latvia 0.04 36 0.912 0.05 27 0.937 0.03 23 0.904 24 0.06 25 0.894 0.05 33 0.922 0.05 10 0.955 0.02 Ireland 0.843 0. 8 41 Austria 0.883 0.05 37 0.910 0.04 9 0.956 0.02 0.07 25 39 0.06 26 0.06 29 0.929 0.03 22 0.943 0.03 Cyprus 43 0. 8 41 0.881 0.937 61 23 0.937 0.03 28 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.851 Slovakia 27 0.837 33 0.885 0.06 27 0.932 0.04 Italy 0.925 0.03 28 0.837 0.04 31 0.877 0.04 0.04 32 0.922 0.04 17 0.06 0.903 0.832 29 Japan 45 0.07 24 0.896 0.05 42 0.871 0.06 Jamaica 0.954 0.02 30 0.829 14 0.827 26 0.893 0.05 31 0.924 0.04 37 0.895 0.04 Mauritius 31 0.05 0 . 911 0.04 0.03 46 0.859 0.06 32 0.934 0.04 0.822 1 USA 32  27 0.892 0.05 24 0.935 0.04 Greece 0.889 0.04 33 0.816 0.06 40 0.800 40 0.883 0.05 34 0.916 0.06 41 0.887 0.04 34 Taiwan 0.04 0.798 0.06 58 0.855 0.06 26 0.932 0.04 Suriname 0.830 0.05 35 64 36 0.04 62 0.849 0.06 35 0.916 0.04 33 0 . 911 0.04 Lithuania 0.798 0.791 South Korea 0.827 0.06 28 0.931 0.04 13 0.954 0.02 0.06 37 75 0.868 0.06 0.04 41 0.877 0.05 49 0.914 0.05 0.790 7 Cape Verde 38  65 0.844 0.06 22 0.9 41 0.03 Spain 0.905 0.03 39 0.771 0.06 34 0.768 53 0.869 0.05 57 0.799 0.06 30 0.928 0.03 40 Barbados 0.08 0.765 0.07 14 0.905 0.04 54 0.823 0.07 Argentina 0.883 0.04 41 44 42 0.08 46 0.876 0.05 44 0.867 0.06 59 0.839 0.06 Panama 0.762 0.07 0.758 0.885 0.05 47 0.858 34 50 0.863 0.05 Trinidad and Tobago 43 0.05 0.07 0.05  45 0.879 0.06 39 0.883  73 0.803 0.749 0.06 Brazil 44 0.787 0.743  37 0.884 45 60 0.07 0.09  36 0.899 0.04 Vanuatu 0.05 46 0.74 0 0.06 73 0.835 0.06 40 0.878 0.06 39 0.889 0.04 Peru 0.759  20 0.899 0.04 66 0.09 53 0.851 0.05 47 0.08 Georgia 0.737 48 0.736 0.07 28 0.891 0.05 62 0.780 0.08 38 0.890 0.04 Namibia 0.934  79 0. 818 0.07 25  0.03 106 0.698 0.08 49 0.731 Poland 0.06 0.730 South Africa 0.898 0.04 59 0.791 0.10 52 0.856 0.05 0.06 50 21  0.07 0.07 67 0.742 0.10 11 0.955 0.02 51 Senegal 63 0.725 0.847 8 61 0.04 63 0.774 0.09 0.08 0.835 0.05 Benin 52 0.724 0.912 84 0.05 0.07 43 0.867 0.06 0.842 0.777 0.06 0.715 53 Timor-Leste 68 0.06 69 0.840 0.06 52 0.830 0.07 60 S.Tomé & P. 0.05 54 0.714 0.838 0.710 44 0.880 0.05 51 0. 831 0.07 68 0. 812 0.06 Botswana 55 0.05 35  0.903 0.03 61 0.781 0.09 0.07 0.709 0.828 0.07 Burkina Faso 56 74 0.09  59 0.853 0.06  65 0.761   43 0.883 0.05 0.702 57 Tunisia 0.08 0.696 0.07 22 0.896 0.04 72 0 . 717 0.10 66 0.823 0.06  Guyana 58 0.693 Israel 102 0.765 0.08 45 0.860 0.05 71 0.809 0.06 59 0.05  90 0.764 0.06 0.687 0.852 0.07 60 0. 812 0.06 49 0.05 Romania 84 0.06 0 .11 0. 861 0.05 81 0.683 0.683 48 0.870 0.05 Mongolia 61 55 0.09 0.676 0.872 0.05 64 0.764 49 85 0.773 0.06 62 Bulgaria 0.05  0.08  76 0.823 0.07 38 0.890 0.05 110 0.678 0.07 63 Croatia 0.669 0.669 0.06 50 0.870 0.05 69 0.723 0 .11 72 0.806 0.05 Guatemala 64 0 .11 0.661 0.862 0.06 82 0.670 54 46 0.872 0.05 65 0.06 El Salvador 0.650 0.07 64 0.846 0.06 73 Paraguay 0 .11 87 0.766 0.06 66 0.709 67 0.05 80 0. 818 0.06 68 0.648 0.10 75 0.800 0.06 Mexico 0.737 68 0.647 0.07 86 0.808 0.07 74 0.705 0.09 82 0.780 0.06 Bolivia 69 0 .11 0.06 38 0.883 0.05 86 0.645 Ghana 51 0.860 0.05 0.639 70 0.634 19 0.901 0.04 88 0.639 0.10 65 0.824 0.05 Colombia 0.06 0.09  0.838 0.07 76 0.699 71 86 0.767 0.08  0.633 Sri Lanka 71 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.759 0.09 71 0.719 0.632 56 0.850 0.05 Indonesia 72 104 0.08  90 0.794 0.08 53 0.828  108 0.690 0.08 0.630 73 hungary 0.05 0.625 0.05 41 0.883 0.05 94 0.583 0.13 54 0.850 0.06 Liberia 74 75 0.620 70 0.839 0.07 91 0.616 0.12 58 0.843 0.05 Solomon Islands 0.06 0.636 0.10 0.844 0.06 89 66   74 0.803 0.06 0 . 617 Nepal 76 0.07 50 0.763  116 0.659 0 .11  0.07 0.833 0.07  91 0.08 0. 613 Bhutan 77 0.723 0.606 109 0.707 78 70 0.09 0.10 76 0.794 0.06 Ecuador 0 .11 79 0.598 0.09 60 0.853 0.06 105 0.528 0.12 55 0.850 Malawi 0.05 Sierra Leone 0.589 0.07 88 0.798 0.07 93 0.590 0.10 63 0.830 0.05 80 0.566 0.04 87 0.804 0.09 98  0 .11  42 0.884 81 0.587 Nigeria 0.07 77 0.698 106 0.725 0.10  0 .11 12 3 0.639 0.09  82 0.571 India 0.07 0.685 83  85 0 . 811 0.08 79 0.07 0.10  109 0.680 0.08 Ivory Coast 0.570 84 0.562 0.06 42 0.883 0.05 56 0.800 0.09 101 0.713 0.08 Lesotho 85 99 0.04 Seychelles 0.773 0.08 78 0.694 0.10 105 0.700 0.07 0.560 0.651 86 95 0.775 0.08 85 0.06 0 .11 103 0.710 0.08 Moldova 0.559 87 0.556 0.06 81 0.816 0.07 80 0.684 0.10 100 0.716 0.07 Macedonia 98 0.721 0.06 Albania 0.859 0.06 106 0.526 0.13 88 0.06 57 0. 551 110 Mali 0.06 92 0.788 0.09 0.547 0.501 0.12 57 0.848 0.05 89

77 V-Dem Annu RT 2018 Al Repo 77 indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty. SD+/- electoral Democracy freedom of Association clean e lection freedom of expression Index Index Index Index ( eDI) rank Score rank Score SD +/- rank Score SD +/- Score rank country SD +/- SD +/- 0.09 0.775 0. 574 0 .11 107 0.695 97 96 0.09 Guinea-Bissau 90 0.543 0.06 0. 813 0.07 109 0.501 0.13 62 Niger 0.05 91 0. 541 0.07 83 0.832 98 0.08 100 0.536 0.13 94 0.773 0.07 0.06 0.535 92 Dominican Republic 0.759 48 0.873 0.06 121 0.370 0.12 79 0.790 0.08 haiti 93 0. 521 0.06 91 0.789 0.07 111 0.472 0.12 77 0.793 0.07 Philippines 94 0. 514 0.05 0.764 103 103 0. 531 0.12 89 0.09 0.06 0.09 Lebanon 95 0. 512 0.760 107 0.724 0.08 99 0.550 0.12 117 0.667 0.09 Tanzania 96 0.493 0.06  122 0.634 0.12 104 0.530 0.12  92 0.762 0.07  0.06 0.484 97 Kyrgyzstan 0.532 0.699 0 .11 102 98 0.12 113 0.672 0.09 Somaliland 0.06 112 0.479 0.787  0.07 0.679 0.10 115 0.454 0.13  81 113 0.06 To go 99 0.475 0.06 100 0.08 92 0 . 611 0.12 111 0.677 0.08 Kosovo 94 0.472 0.777 0.729  96 0.07 0.12 93 117 0.08 0.405 0.04 Comoros 101 0.462 0.784 72 0.838 0.07 13 4 0.292 0 .11 80 0.788 0.07 Mozambique 102 0.462 0.04 77 0.04 0.07 135 0.291 0.13 93 0.760 0.07 Kenya 103 0.4 61 0.823 102 0.04 0.05 120 0.377 0.12 0.843 0.712 0.08 0.459 104 honduras 67 0.05 56 Madagascar 0.06 132 0.302 0.13 78 0.790 0.07 105 0.456 0. 861  105 0.74 8 0.08 83  0 .11  137 0.463 0.10 0.654 0.455 Fiji 106 0.05 143 0.05 0.10 48 0.856 0.07 0.640 0.387 0.12 Singapore 107 0.453 120   101 0.765 0.08 107 0.525 0.13 133 0.539 0.09 0.05 0.452 Serbia 108 0.14 0.06 0.639 0.12 Pakistan 0.358 121 83 0.779 0.07 0.452 109 12 5 0.446 0.06 78 0. 818 Montenegro 136 0.290 0.09 95 0.733 0.08 110 0.06 111 0.04 89 0.796 0.07 142 0.280 0.12 67 0. 814 0.06 Papua New Guinea 0.444 0.329  0.770 0.09  128 100 0.13  99 0.719 0.08 0.439 0.04 112 Guinea 0.04 0.431 0.08 151 0.237 0.12 69 0. 812 0.06 97 113 Gabon 0.774  14 0 0.14 113 0.460 0.13 120 0.06 0.10 0.648 Mauritania 114 0 . 417 0.509 104 114 0 .11 131 0.302 0.13 0.679 0.706 0.08 0.406 115 CAR 0.04   124 0.606 0 .11  122 0.368 0.12 116 0.668 0.08 0.04 0.399 Ukraine 116 0.03 110 0.703 0.09 129 0. 312 0 .11 122 0.643 0.08 117 0.399 Armenia 114  0.550 0.14 119 0.380 0.12 133 0.671 0.09 Iraq 118 0.396 0.05   12 3 0.609 0.12  101 0.536 0.12  129 0.586 0.09 0.395 0.07 Myanmar 119 0.12 0.03 118 0.645 0 .11 Bangladesh 0.282   127 0.608 0.09 0.360 120 14 0 0.359 0.03 128 0.586 0.10 155 0. 213 0.09 97 0.724 Uganda 121 0.08 122 0.03 13 4 0.548 0.12 114 0.455 0.15 141 0.426 0.09 Maldives 0.352 0 .11  0.643 0 .11 14 8 0.246 119  12 5 0.628 0.08 0.350 12 3 Zambia 0.03 126 0.04 0.13 12 3 0.360 0.12 0.454 0.621 0.08 0.350 142 Algeria 124 0.02 108 0 . 7 11 0.09 75 0.700 hong Kong 70 0 . 811 0.06 12 5 0.347 0 .11 0.345 117 0.648 0.10 156 0.18 8 0.03 115 0.668 0.09 126 Afghanistan 0.10 0.07 0 .11  127 0.599 0.12 96 0.579   157 0.255 0.343 0.04 Turkey 127 128 Bosnia and h 82 0. 815 0.08 87 0.642 0.12 88 0.766 0.07 0.338 erzegovina 0.02 0.03 0.422 0.567 0 .11 116 0.326 0.15 147 0.342 0.10 129 The Gambia 130 0.12 111 0.10 150 0.242 0.701 139 0.4 41 0 .11   130 Zimbabwe 0.03 0.325 131 0.03 137 0. 518 0.12 15 4 0. 321 0.12 124 0.632 0.08 Cameroon 0. 214 132 0. 318 0.04 0.10 0.605 0 .11 133 0.301 0.12 145 0. 361 Malaysia 12 5 Kuwait 0. 314 0.02 16 4 0 .119 0.06 55 0.806 0.08 119 0.656 0.08 133 143 0.09 14 8 0.362 0.10   0.279 0.10 131 0.559 13 4 0.307 Nicaragua 0.03 0.303 Morocco 0.676 0.09 84 0.652 0 .11 118 0.665 0.07 0.02 135 115 0.03 0.292 0.12 159 0.167 0 .11 136 0.496 0.10 136 136 Zanzibar 0.535 0.583 14 6 157 0 .179 0.10 130 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.436 DRC 137 0.288 135 0.540 0.12 163 0.098 0.08 Chad 0.523 0 .11 138 0.287 0.03 13 4 0.03 0.509 0.12 160 0.156 0 .11 139 0.438 0.12 0.281 139 Congo 14 0 0. 318  145 0.438 0.13 126 0.347 0.12  149 0.10 0.02 Sudan 14 0 0.279 0.14  0.10 108 0. 521 0. 251 155 150 0. 315 0.09  Rwanda 141 0.03 0.278   126 0.603 0.10  171 0.000 0.00 121 0.645 0.07 0.02 0. 274 Libya 142 0.03  141 0.499 0.12 139 0.283 0 .11  14 4 0.376 0.09 Venezuela 143 0.272  0.270 147 0.370 0.10 124 0.359 0.02 151 0. 312 0.09 14 4 Russia 0.13 0.268 0.03 14 4 0.4 41 0.10 145 Belarus 0 .11 14 8 0.335 0.10 145 0.258 0.08 143 0.453 0.12 0.03 0.253 0.10 155 0.294 14 6 14 6 Djibouti 0.260 0.619  0.077 0.05 90 169 0.13 153 0.298 0.09 0.259 147 Vietnam 0.02 0.10  0.10 147 0.252 0.567 131 135 0. 510 0.10  0.252 0.03 Angola 14 8 0.02 138 0.509 0 .11 112 Jordan 0 .11 132 0.546 0.10 149 0.250 0.471 0.246 157 0. 215 0.10 137 0.290 0.03 14 6 0.359 0.10 150 Kazakhstan 0.12 0.676 0.00  132 0.564 0.13 176 0.000 0.08  112 0.245 0.02 Palestine/West Bank 151 0 .11 0.242 0.278 0.10 141 0.281 15 4 15 4 0.298 0.10 Ethiopia 0.03 152  0.09  153 0.297 0 .11  14 4 0.258 0.13 156 0.267 0.02 153 Cambodia 0.235 0.222 0.02 159 0 .17 2 0.09 118 0.390 0.12 138 0.442 0.12 Iran 15 4  161 0 .175 0.09  0 .11 0. 231 0.02 0 . 211 156 0. 251 0 .11 153 Egypt 155 156 0.203 0.02  160 0.167 0.10 130 Uzbekistan 0.13 16 4 0.16 8 0.07  0.309 Azerbaijan 0.202 0.02 150 0.335 0 .11 166 0.062 0.05 159 0. 214 0.09 157 158 Equatorial Guinea 0.306 0 .11 165 0.079 0.07 166 0.163 0.07 0.195 0.02 152 167 0.02 0.04 58 0.797 0.08 0.060 0.162 0.07 Oman 159 17 2 0.19 0 0.05  176 0.040 0.03 127 0.346 0.15 173 0.079 0.02 0.19 0 Cuba 160  128 0.598 0.09 158 0 .175 0.09 161 0 .178 0.03 129 0.575 0 .11 Somalia 0.055 0.05 0.15 4 0.08  167 161  165 0.167 0.08  0.01 162 Tajik is t an 0 .176 0.159 0.01  162 0.135 0.08  168 0.026 0.03  171 0.130 0.06  Burundi 163 0.155 16 4 0. 313 0 .11 174 0.000 0.00 162 0 .170 0.08 South Sudan 0.01 151  142 0.064 0.05 149 0.243 0.14 171 0.401 0 .11 0.15 4 165 Swaziland 0.02 0.152 0.02  167 0.094 0.07 95 0.581 0.14 160 0.185 0.09 United Arab Emirates 166 176  174 0.058 0.05 16 4 0.097 0.09 0.034 0.03 0.151 0.01 167 Turkmenistan  174 0.078 0.05 0.097 0.06 Syria 0.000 0.00 168 0.147 0.01 166 17 2 Palestine/Gaza 0.14 4 0.02 149 0.352 0.13 173 0.000 0.00 152 0.304 0.09 169 138  165 0.097 0.07   0.288 0.12 158 0.240 0.08 170 0.142 Thailand 0.02 0.128 0.235  163 0.122 0.09  152 171 0 .11 169 0.136 0.06  Bahrain 0.02 0.000 17 2  158 0.192 0.08  175 0.01 0.00  170 0.133 0.06  yemen 0.10 4 173 0.096 0.01 170 0.074 0.05 161 0.138 0.09 175 0.040 0.03 Laos 168 0.089 0.06 17 7 0.000 0.00 163 0.16 8 0.07 174 0.01 0.093 China 0.136 175 178 0.026 0.02 162 0.01 0.10 17 7 0.025 0.02 North Korea 0.088 176 0.088 0.00 175 0.049 0.04 178 0.000 0.00 178 0.023 0.02 Eritrea qatar 17 7 0.01 173 0.060 0.05 169 0.000 0.00 168 0.137 0.06 0.087 170 Saudi Arabia 0.01 17 7 0.037 0.03 0.022 0.000 0.00 17 2 0.124 0.07 178

78 78

79 Appen DI x: Coun TRY S CoReS F oR 2017 79 g u r e A 3.1: Al c f I t he V-Dem lI ber Dex: omponent In Al A Age nD r Ion Ver D A S, 1900 to 2017. Worl eg Appendix 3: The 1 liberal Component .9 Index .8 In V-Dem’s conceptual scheme the liberal principle of democra - .7 cy embodiesthe importance of protecting individual and minor - ity rights against both the tyranny ofthe state and the tyranny .6 - of the majority. It also captures the “horizontal” methods of ac .5 countability between more or less equally standing institutions - that ensure the effectivechecks and balances between institu .4 tions and in particular, limit the exercise of executivepower. This is achieved by strong rule of law and constitutionally protected civil .3 liberties,independent judiciary and strong parliament that are able .2 - to hold the executive to accountand limit its powers. The three in dices that capture these dimensions are: the equalitybefore the .1 law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive(v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive 0 (v2xlg_legcon). Taken togetherthey measure the V-Dem l iberal 1940 2017 2010 1950 1960 1970 1900 1910 1920 1930 1980 1990 2000 Component Index (v2x_liberal). World Average Eastern Europe and Central Asia MENA Latin America and the Caribbean Western Europe and North America Sub−Saharan Africa Asia−Pacific lc ber I) he V-Dem lI Al c omponent In Dex ( t gure A3.2: fI equality before the law and individual liberty index Rigorous and impartial Transparent laws with Property rights Access to justice Access to justice Property rights for predictable enforcement public administration for men for women women for men Freedom from Freedom from Freedom from forced Freedom from forced Freedom of Freedom of foreign political killings torture labor for women religion labor for men movement Freedom of domestic Freedom of domestic movement for women movement for men judicial constraints on the executive index Executive respects Lower court Compliance with Compliance with high court judiciary high court independence independence constitution legislative constraints on the executive index Legislature questions Legislature Legislature investigates Executive oversight officials in practice in practice opposition parties

80 80 Appen DI x: Coun TRY S CoReS F oR 2017 ain c omponents ta b l e A 3: c ountry Scores for the l iberal c omponent Index ( lc I) and its m omponent equality before the law and legislative constrains on judicial constraints on liberal c the executive index individual liberty index the executive index Index (lc I) Score country Score SD +/- rank Score SD +/- rank Score SD +/- SD +/- rank rank 0.02 1 0.01 1 0.974 0.02 2 0.983 0.01 Norway 2 0.973 0.986 6 0.968 3 0.967 0.02 9 0.963 0.02 2 Sweden 0.977 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.974 0.965 0.02 7 0.965 5 Netherlands 3 0.961 0.02 10 0.02 0.985 0.01  4 0.965 0.02 1 0.03 0.931 Australia 4 0.960 0.02 39 0.973 0.977 10 7 0.03 4 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.960 5 Switzerland 0.946 8 0.977 0.01 2 0.971 0.02 Finland 0.948 0.03 6 0.960 0.02 18 0.02 0.986 0.01 21 0.925 0.04 5 0.971 0.02 Denmark 7 0.954 1 0.975 13 14 0.935 0.04 3 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.969 New Zealand 8 0.950 5 0.980 0.01 19 0.931 0.04 Estonia 0.955 0.03 9 0.949 0.03 13 0.02 0.984 0.01 6 0.959 0.03 3 0.909 0.05 0.948 10 Germany 28 0.03 4 0.982 0.01 22 0.919 Portugal 10 0.963 0.02 11 0.944 0.04 0.943 20 0.964 0.02 8 0.948 0.03 11 0.959 0.02 Costa Rica 12 0.03 0.03 13 0.02 7 0.953 0.03 23 0.929 0.04 Slovenia 21 0.940 0.962 0.946 29 12 0.942 0.03 19 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.950 Lithuania 14 0.937 11 0.971 0.01 26 0.899 0.05 Ireland 0.964 0.02 15 0.933 0.03 8 0.03 0.958 0.02 11 0.944 0.03 25 0.900 0.05 0.931 16 United Kingdom 31 0.03 16 0.968 0.01 37 0.858 Iceland 15 0.952 0.03 17 0.929 0.07 0.927 17 0.966 0.02 27 0.898 0.06 26 0.913 0.04 Belgium 18 0.03 17 0.03 0.01 35 0.864 0.05 0.968 0.951 0.03 0.925 14 Spain 19 0.05 15 0.968 0.02 9 0.948 Japan 43 0.875 0.07 20 0.924 0.03 0.924 36 0.935 0.03 20 0.926 0.04 6 0.969 0.02 21 Chile 0.04 0.922 0.03 18 0.966 0.02 17 0.931 0.04 36 0.888 Italy 22 0.05 23 0.04 38 0.933 0.03 23 0.918 0.05 21 0.938 0.04 Cape Verde 0.919 0.918 24 0.970 0.01 29 0.888 0.06 24 0.925 0.04 0.04 Austria 12 0.03 35 0.03 25 0.907 0.05 20 0.938 0.03 25 South Korea 0.916 0.940 26 27 0.02 40 0.847 0.08 0.05 0.912 0.05 Canada 26 0.903 0.956 40 0.05 0.02 32 0.882 0.06 0.960 0.882 0.06 0.897 27 France 22 0.04 34 0.940 0.03 58 0.800 0.10 38 0.883 0.06 Czech Republic 28 0.895 34 0.892 0.05 0.03 39 0.848 0.07 0.9 41 0.894 0.03 Cyprus 29 33 25 0.04 0.02 52 0. 812 0.09 0.960 0.922 0.04 Uruguay 30 0.892 23 0.06  45 0.913 0.04  16 0.932   44 0.865 0.04 0.03 Tunisia 31 0.891 0.06 0.05 0.898 0.04 0.889 0.887 49 32 0.896 0.05 32 Bulgaria 30 0.04 0.933  31 0.943 0.02 62 0.787 0.10  22 0.04 33 USA 0.879 0.879 0.06 28 0.952 0.02 65 0.768 0.10 14 0.953 0.03 Latvia 34 0.872 0.06 0.943 0.02 75 0.727 0 .11 16 0.952 0.03 Barbados 35 30 33 0.04 0.06 44 0.842 0.08 0.863 0.894 0.05 0.871 60 Jamaica 36 0.04 9 0.976 0.01 15 0.932 Luxembourg 71 0.753 0.09 37 0.869 0.04 0.866 19 0.965 0.02 45 0.836 0.04 52 0. 819 0.08 38 Taiwan 0.08 0.865 0.04 41 0.926 0.03 46 0.828 0.08 41 0.877 0.06 Slovakia 39 0.859 0.06 69 0.826 0.06 28 0.891 0.06 37 0.883 0.06 South Africa 40 0.04 0.854 0.933 0.03 18 0.931 37 84 0.702 0.10 41 S.Tomé & P. 0.04 0.854 0.06 42 0.920 0.03 42 0.845 0.09 49 0.836 0.08 Trinidad and Tobago 42 0.854 0.05 51 0.894 0.04 36 0.860 0.07 46 0.852 0.08 Vanuatu 43 50 0.816 61 0.855 0.06  0.08  29 0.907 0.05 44 0.846 Bhutan 0.04 45 0.844 0.06 24 0.958 0.02 38 0.852 0.08 65 0.767 0.10 Greece 46 0.09 0.06 27 0.952 0.02 72 0.738 0 .11 54 0 . 811 Benin 0.838 47 0.837 59 0.865 0.05 24 0.914 0.04 78 0.721 0.12 Israel 0.05 0.837 Ghana 0.919 0.04 51 0. 813 0.08 55 0.810 0.10 0.06 48 43 0.05 44 0.04 33 0.880 0.06 91 0.667 0 .11 49 Albania 0.833 0 .917 52 56 0.05 56 0.803 0.10 0.06 0.803 0.10 Croatia 50 0.833 0.885 50 0.06 0.05 49 0.820 0.08 0.885 0. 831 0.08 0.829 51 Mauritius 53 0.05 40 0.929 0.03 70 0.750 0.10 48 0.837 0.08 hungary 52 0.822 0.06 0.839 0 . 817 0.05 48 0.822 0.09 59 0.778 0.09 Argentina 53 68 72  0.750 0 .11 0.942 0.04 0.05 0.738 0.08 13 0.807 94 Peru 54 0.05 56 0.877 0.05 53 0.809 0.08 Botswana 0.765 0.09 55 0.807 66 0.713  65 0.842 0.06  79  0.12 81 0.708 0 .11 0.07 56 Poland 0.803 0.791 0.05 66 0.842 0.05 89 Seychelles 0.13 45 0.858 0.08 57 0.677 58 0.07 91 0.74 6 0.07 34 0.868 0.06 67 0.764 0.09 Malawi 0.788 0.796 0.10 88 0.676 0.12 0.786 0.905 0.04 59 0.06 Panama 59 47 0.06 0.09 0.878 0.05 68 0.763 0.782 82 0.704 0 .11 Senegal 60 55 0.13 0.770 0.883 0.05 102 0.603 54 42 0.875 0.07 61 Namibia 0.06 0.769 0.06 32 0.942 0.02 118 0.484 0.13 35 0.889 0.06 hong Kong 62 0.764 103 63 0.710 0.08 41 0.846 0.08 70 0.754 0.09 Nepal 0.06 0.09 0.763 0.867 0.06 57 0.803 58 73 0.750 0 .11 Liberia 64 0.06 0.03 0.957  78 0.804 0.06  113  0.15  12 0.538 0.06 65 The Gambia 0.759 0.696 0.757 98 0.720 66 80 0.06 0.13 58 0.780 0.10 Colombia 0.08 67 0.752 0.05 73 0 . 817 Mongolia 90 0.672 0.13 75 0.739 0 .11 0.06  63 0.847 0.06 54  0.09 98 0.623 0.14 0.805 0.08 Suriname 0.743 68 69 0.742  83 0.782 0.07 47 0.826 0.08 102 0.593 0.16 Nigeria 0.07 0.736 Tanzania 0.775 0.07 73 0.733 0.10 60 0.776 0.10 0.05 70 86 0.07 0.09 0.706 0.09 63 0.776 0.734 61 0.773 0.10 Kuwait 71 104 0.14 0.732 0. 813 0.06 101 0.604 74 53 0. 815 0.09 72 Moldova 0.06 0.730 0.07 48 0.902 0.04 81 0.694 Singapore 90 0.667 0.12 73 0.13 0 .11 85 0.776 0.08  0.650 0.12 68 0.763 94 74 0.06 Brazil 0.729 0.729 67 111 0.676 0.09 75 0.763 0.10 69 0.757 0.10 Guatemala 0.08 0.767 76 99 0.718 0.09 66 0.05 0.10 63 0.768 0.10 Indonesia 0.725 77 0.722 0.06 97 0.731 0.08 69 0.752 0 .11 80 0.709 0.12 Morocco 78 78 0.06 122 0.614 0.10 India 0.715 0 .11 74 0.749 0.10 0.722 79 0.716 113 0.669 0.09 77 0.722 0 .11 64 0.767 0.09 Mexico 0.07 0.09 0.716 0.793 0.08 60 0.792 81 101 0.602 0.14 80 0.05 Georgia 0.715 0.07 67 0.840 0.06 106 0.586 Montenegro 57 0.797 0.10 81 0.16 129 0.05  79 0.800 0.07  0.903 0.402 0.16 30 0.709 0.06 Sri Lanka 82 83 0.681 0.06 80 0.799 Solomon Islands 107 0.584 0.14 51 0.830 0.08 0.07 Paraguay 0.680 0.07 84 0.777 0.07 96 0.635 0.13 99 0.616 0.15 84 0.596 85 96 0.733 0.08 103 0.07 0.14 47 0.846 0.07 Lesotho 0.676 86 0.673 0.06 106 0.704 0.08 Mali 0.680 0 .11 103 0.590 0.16 88 Jordan 0.673 0.08 90 0.74 8 0.08 87 0.594 0.14 92 0.654 0.14 104

81 V-Dem Annu RT 2018 Al Repo 81 indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty. SD+/- equality before the law and omponent legislative constrains on liberal c judicial constraints on the executive index Index (lc the executive index individual liberty index I) Score rank Score SD +/- rank Score SD +/- SD +/- Score country SD +/- rank rank 0 .11 0. 818 0. 515 0.15 76 0.734 116 72 0.07 0.672 88 Romania 0.07 Timor-Leste 0.08 99 0.606 0.13 93 0.648 0.14 89 0.671 0.08 87 0.762 87 0.12  124 0.438 0 .17 0.686 0.876 0.05 0.08 0.664 90 Guyana 57  71 0.821 0.06 117 0.491 0.16 97 0.626 0.14 0.661 0.06 Burkina Faso 91 0.808 0.06 95 0.642 0.13 112 0.478 0.18  76 Fiji 0.09 0.657 92 0.696 117 91 0.654 0.14 85 0.08 0.12 0.04 El Salvador 93 0.657 0.653 101 0.714 0.09 98 0. 612 0.14 83 0.702 0.10 Papua New Guinea 94 0.654 0.08 120 0.624 0 .11 64 0.774 0.09 94 0.633 0.13 Uganda 95 0.654 0.06 107  0.738 0.08 84 0.684 0.12  0.536 0.15 93 0.08 0.654 96 Zambia 0.06 Kenya 0.434 0.10 55 0.805 0.09 62 0.770 0.10  97 0.650 142 98 0.06 62 0.853 0.05 122 0.459 0.14 100 0.614 0.13 Bosnia and h erzegovina 0.648 0.08 99 0.08 108 0.581 0.14 86 0.695 0.14 Philippines 102 0.647 0.713 0.709 100 114 0.534 0.16 79 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.718 Mozambique 100 0.642 64 0.844 0.06 74 0.730 0.12 127 0.366 Niger 101 0.636 0.05 0.13  108 0.686 0.08 61 0.788 0.09  108 0.533 0.13  0.634 102 Kyrgyzstan 0.06 0.06  70 0.824 0.06 120 Serbia 0.14 113 0.474 0.15 103 0.595 0.475 0.585 92 0.745 0.08 105 0.589 0.14 117 0.453 0.14 Ivory Coast 104 0.08 120  12 5 0.438 0 .17 0.421 0.15 0.895 0.08 0.05 0.578 50 Gabon 105 0.07 150 0. 321 0.09 43 0.842 Iraq 104 0.583 0.16 106 0.576 0.08 0.564 82 0.792 0.08 128 0.407 0.08 111 0.491 0.15 107 Bolivia 0.15 0. 561 0.05 88 0.755 0.07 97 Sierra Leone 0.13 130 0. 341 0.15 108 0.625 109 0.08 114 0.666 0 .11 109 0.578 0.14 145 0.226 0.15 Rwanda 0. 551 0.542 Somaliland 0. 615 0 .11 87 0.681 0.12 131 0. 331 0.12 0.07 110 121 0.06 111 0.12 85 0.682 0.13 77 0.722 0 .11 Pakistan 153 0. 541 0.308 0.06  0.08 178 39 0.882 0.750  89 0.04 Palestine/West Bank 112 0.538  112 0.671 0.10 92 0.653 0.14 13 4 Vietnam 0 .17 113 0.536 0.06 0.304 0.14 143 0.432 0 .11  111 0.547  89 0.675 0.13  0.534 114 Myanmar 0.08 0.08 127 0.586 0 .11 110 Kosovo 0.15 105 0.575 0 .17 115 0.527 0.572 0.526 115 0.665 0 .11 112 0.544 0.15 129 0.346 0.15 Lebanon 116 0.06 0.12 156 0.07 93 0.651 0.807 77 0.129 0 .11   0. 521 0.05 Macedonia 117 0.06 46 0.906 0.04 12 3 Ecuador 0 .17 14 0 0.237 0.15 118 0. 519 0.440 0.502 130 0.549 0.10 142 0.266 0.08 96 0.627 0.14 119 Guinea-Bissau 0.12 0.500 0.09 116 0.660 0.08 131 0.368 Malaysia 109 0.503 0.15 120 0.14 121 0.06 14 8 0. 351 0.12 71 0.74 0 0.12 118 0.437 0.16 Afghanistan 0.495 0.06  0.136 0.07 31 0.887 173  116 0.457 0.16  0.493 122 Libya 0.06 124 0.07 0.09 133 0.354 0.16 0.683 0.395 0.16 0.489 109 honduras 12 3 0.09 126 0.592 0 .11 126 0.436 Madagascar 122 0.414 0 .17 124 0.485 0.12 0.482 75 0 . 811 0.06 135 0.333 0.06 137 0.282 0.15 12 5 Armenia 0.16 82 0.187  128 0.569 0.10  0.10 0.691 0.12 147 0.07 0.478 Ukraine 126 0.14 0.470 0.352 0.12 86 0.681 147 12 5 0.381 0.15 CAR 0.07 127 0.13 0.565 106  0.12  83 0.689 0 .11 139 0.06 0.468 128 0.451 Zimbabwe 0.442 0.07 110 0.681 0.10 14 4 0.222 0.15 115 0.459 Comoros 129 0 .17 76 0.14 0.326 133 0 .11  0.727 0.438 0 .11 0.293 159 0.08 Somalia 130 131 0.435 0.07 138 0.464 0.12 100 0.605 0.15 143 0.234 0.13 Iran  132 0.07 132 0.537 0 .11 115 0.529 0.16 151 0.152 0 .11 0.418 haiti 133 0.418 12 5 0.601 0.09 139 0.305 0 .17  135 0.292 0.13 Zanzibar 0.08 0.391 0.05 0.609 0.09 153 0.158 0 .11 12 3 0.403 0.13 Oman 13 4 124 0.06 118 0 .11 130 0.397 0.15 163 0 .111 0.10 135 To go 0.390 0.643 119 136 0 .11 145 0.222 0 .17 0.06 0.290 0.18 Algeria 136 0.384 0.633 142 0.05 0.10 137 0 . 317 0.16 0.545 0.236 0 .11 0.376 137 Guinea 131 0.06 107 0.694 0.09 16 4 0.075 0.10 128 0. 361 0.16 Dominican Republic 138 0.375 0.363 0.07 0.491 0 .11 149 0.16 8 0.10 110 0.491 0 .17 Angola 139 136 126 0.07 0.12 147 0.209 0.15 0.451 0.368 0.15 0. 361 14 0 Bangladesh 14 0 0.07 166 0 . 211 0.09 121 0.465 Egypt 119 0.432 0.16 141 0.350 0.15 0.344 95 0.734 0.10 14 8 0 .178 0.06 159 0.124 0.12 142 United Arab Emirates 0.13 0.343 0.05 12 3 0 . 611 0.10 150 0.16 4 0.12 14 4 0.230 0.10 Kazakhstan 143 0.338 137 14 4 0.477 0.13 13 4 0.353 0.16 153 0.14 8 0 .11 Cameroon 0.05 0.063  0.265 0.10  169 163 0.08  95 0.631 0.14 0.329 0.05 145 Thailand 114 0.09 0.07 136 0. 321 0.19 0.152 0.468 0.15 0.323 171 Laos 14 6 0.07 149 0. 341 0.12 132 0.363 Swaziland 139 0.260 0.14 147 0. 315 0.14 0.309 133 0.536 0.12 157 0.136 0.05 14 6 0. 219 0.14 14 8 Djibouti 0.10 0.303 0.05 14 4 0.423 0.12 176 qatar 0.06 121 0.418 0.14 149 0.038 150 0.06 15 4 0.300 0.10 127 0.418 0.14 149 0.165 0.13 Maldives 0.299 0 .17  119 0.476  171 0.058 0.07 0.286 0.287 0.09 160 151 0.06 Venezuela 0.281 0.03 105 0.704 0.09 Belarus 0.0 61 0.06 17 2 0.058 0.07 152 170 153 0.04 135 0.495 0 .11 151 0.262 0.13 158 0.128 0.10 Russia 0.161 15 4 0. 261 0.04 13 4 0. 516 0 .11 159 0.105 0.10 157 0.129 Ethiopia 0.12 0.14 158 0.295 0 .11   0.12 3 0 .11  138 0. 261 158 Mauritania 0.256 0.06 155 0.075 0.08 129 0.565 0.10 165  0.07  169 0.063 156 0.243 Nicaragua 0.05 0.240 0.06 0.354 0.12 17 7 132 0.327 0.15 Palestine/Gaza 157 14 6 0.06 161 0. 313 0.10 14 6 0. 219 0.16 0.240 0 .119 0 .11 Congo 158 152 0.16 0.230 0.182 0.08 14 0 0.298 168 150 0.163 0.13 159 Sudan 0.05 0.221 0.04 141 0.443 0 .11 163 0.076 0.07 160 0 .119 0.09 Cuba 160 0. 214 0.152 17 2 161 0.07 138 0. 310 0.16 14 8 0.181 0.10 DRC 0.05 0.158 0.13 0.299 0.10  152 157   162 0 .113 0.10  0. 213 162 0.05 Turkey 0.19 9 0.05 156 0.299 China 161 0.092 0.09 15 4 0.14 8 0.09 163 0.09 16 4 0.06 161 0.267 0 .11 15 4 0.18 6 0.13 16 4 0.103 0.09 Chad 0.147 165 0.183 0.05 151 0. 318 0.10 162 0.091 0.09 155 0.131 0 .11 Cambodia 166 0.04 Saudi Arabia 170 0.16 0 0.08 168 0.063 0.07 141 0.237 0.13 0 .171 167 0.16 4 145 0.358 0 .11 160 0.092 0.09 176 0.019 0.03 Azerbaijan 0.04 0.13 0.162 0.080 0.05 143 0.232 174 152 0.150 0.10 South Sudan 168 0.05 0.044 0.059 170 0.06 0 .11  174 0.12 0.15 4 162 0.05 169 Bahrain 0.266 0.064 0.150 155 170 0.12 167 0.02 0.06 173 0.056 0.06 Tajik is t an 0.300 0.07 0.086 166  167 0.203 0.10  155  0.12  0.139 0.04 171 Burundi 0.149 141 17 2  176 0.054 0.03  0.05 0.279 0.19 167 0.082 0.08 0.14 0 yemen 0.094 165 0.07  165 0. 231 0.10 17 2 0.048 0.09 0.04 173 Turkmenistan 0.130 0.038 174 0.04 169 0.161 0.07 156 0.137 0.12 174 Equatorial Guinea 0.04 0 .119 173 Uzbekistan 0.03 16 4 0.258 0.10 0 .111 0.044 0.05 175 0.021 0.03 175

82 82

83 TRY S oR 2017 CoReS F x: Coun DI Appen 83 f I g u r e A 4 .1: t he V-Dem e gAlItArIA n c omponent In Dex: nD r Ver Worl D A S, 1900 to 2017. Age eg Al A Ion Appendix 4: 1 galitarian The e .9 Component Index .8 .7 .6 .5 T he egalitarian principle of democracy measures to what extent all .4 social groups enjoy equal capabilities to participate in the political arena. It relies on the idea that democracy is a system of rule “by the .3 - people” where citizens participate in various ways, such as mak - ing informed voting decisions, expressing opinions, demonstrat .2 ing, running for office or influencing policy-making in other ways. .1 The egalitarian principle of democracy is fundamentally related to political participation, as systematic inequalities in the rights and 0 resources of citizens of specific social groups limit capabilities to 2017 2010 2000 1990 1980 1910 1900 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 participate in the political and governing processes. Therefore, a Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average - more equal distribution of resources across groups results in politi Latin America and the Caribbean MENA Western Europe and North America Sub−Saharan Africa cal equality and hence democracy. Asia−Pacific gAlItArIA t n c omponent In Dex fI gure A4.2: he V-Dem e equal protection index Weaker civil liberties Social class equality in Social group equality in population respect for civil liberties respect for civil liberties equal access index Compliance with Power distributed by Power distributed by social Power distributed by gender group high court socioeconomic position equal distribution of resources index Means-tested vs. universalistic welfare health equality Educational equality Encompassingness

84 84 Appen DI x: Coun TRY S CoReS F oR 2017 ountry Scores for the e omponents table A4: galitarian c omponent Index ( ec I) and its m ain c c equal protection equal access egalitarian c equal distribution omponent index of resources index index I) ec Index ( rank Score rank country Score rank SD (+/-) Score rank SD (+/-) Score SD (+/-) SD (+/-) 0.02 Norway 0.955 2 0.01 0.978 1 0.03 0.969 2 0.03 0.963 1 5 1 0.972 0.02 2 Denmark 0.951 9 0.949 0.03 0.962 0.03 0.03 0.02 Luxembourg 0.952 4 0.03 0.944 15 0.03 0.977 1 0.02 0.949 3 0.953 3 0.954 0.03 0.939 4 Germany 0.03 0.942 0.03 0.03 10 16 0.03 Belgium 0.927 12 0.02 0.960 5 0.05 0.955 9 0.04 0.934 5 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.933 10 6 Netherlands 24 0.03 7 0.947 0.924 0.949 0.03 0.939 8 0.03 0.944 14 0.04 0.951 11 0.04 0.930 7 Finland 0.950 0.03 5 0.949 0.04 0.937 16 0.03 0.929 8 Switzerland 0.05 8 0.05 19 0.934 0.04 6 0.949 0.04 Sweden 9 0.921 0.05 19 0.934 0.967 0.02 10 0.919 0.04 3 Japan 3 0.966 0.02 24 0.875 0.07 0.03 0.884 0.05 10 0.931 0.04 38 0.965 4 0.04 0 .917 11 Portugal 0.909 0.908 0.02 0.971 2 0.06 16 26 0.06 0.913 12 Iceland 0.06 0.944 0.04 6 0.959 0.03 26 0.865 0.08 Estonia 13 0.909 0.06 13 0.942 0.877 14 0.908 0.05 15 Taiwan 0.04 11 0.948 0.03 22 0.07 0.928 0.05 0.906 17 0.938 0.04 11 France 15 0.907 0.05 28 0.05 0.04 Italy 0.926 13 0.06 0.897 33 0.05 0.945 12 0.05 0.898 16 0.892 0.934 0.04 0.888 17 0.07 Greece 0.05 0.907 0.04 9 33 29 0.04 0.862 29 0.04 0.914 25 0.09 0.934 18 0.05 0.888 18 Costa Rica 47 0.842 0.07 19 0.888 0.07 6 0.05 0.883 19 Ireland 0.959 0.03 0.958 0.03 22 0.920 0.04 52 0.809 0.10 Austria 20 0.882 0.06 7 0.05 0.925 21 0.880 0.07 23 Czech Republic 7 0.953 0.03 33 0.850 0.10 0.881 0.07 0.907 27 0.910 0.05 0.06 20 27 0.06 0.880 22 New Zealand 0.851 0.09 0.02 0.964 4 0.07 30 42 0.05 0.880 23 South Korea 0.860 0.956 0.03 41 0. 874 0.07 44 Latvia 0.10 24 0.878 0.05 8 0.824 0.10 25 0.877 0.06 30 0.897 Cyprus 13 0.945 0.03 54 0.806 0.07 0.882 0.05 23 0.876 0.08 0.07 0.935 0.05 40 Spain 26 0.867 17 0.864 27  0.07 35 0.05 0.890 Slovenia 0.05 0.924 25 0.06 0.866 27 0.06 0.05 41 0.826 0.09 United Kingdom 28 0.06 31 0.900 32 0.862 0.894 0.912 15 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.908 28 43 0.843 Lithuania 29 0.862 0.06 0.886 40 0.828 0 .11 0.860 30 32 35 Belarus 0.05 0.899 0.07 0.05 0.930 0.833 0.07 0.853 46 0.05 38 21 0.05 0.860 31 Poland 0.10 0.930 0.05 45 0.855 0.06 35 0.844 0.10 Australia 32 0.857 0.05 20 0.894 0.801 33 0.847 0.08 31 Bhutan 0.07 20 0.932 0.04 55 0 .11 0.776 0.13 0.856 37 0.886 0.07 0.08 60 40 0.08 0. 8 41 34 Trinidad and Tobago 0.829 0 .11 0.04 0 .917 24 0.09 47 46 0.08 0.834 35 Canada 0. 818 51 0. 815 0.09 51 0. 818 0.07 34 0.849 0.08 hungary 36 0.830 0.06 0.733 46 37 0.828 0.06 76 Cuba 0.14 18 0.937 0.04 0. 819 0.09 0.04 64 0.757 0 .11 54 0.10 21 0.926 hong Kong 38 0.825 0.06 0.800 0.09 0.06 0.855 32 0.10 0.754 65 0.09 0.862 39 Bulgaria 39 0.820 48 0.08 42 0.825 0 .11 40 0.10 Cape Verde 0.07 0.816 48 0.834 0.828 0.888 0.13 0.08 0.828 49 0.07 61 34 0.08 0. 813 41 Uruguay 0.771 56 0.789 0.10 63 0.756 0 .11 17 0.906 0.06 Benin 42 0.803 0.07 0.875 91 43 0.803 0.08 37 Mauritius 0.08 30 0.901 0.05 0.643 0 .17 0.05 51 0 . 811 0.09 75 0.14 0.739 34 0.896 0.08 0.803 44 Barbados 0.942 0.18 0.05 0.919 23 0.04 0.636 14 0.06 0.801 45 Singapore 93 87 0.698 0.14 39 0.883 0.06 63 0.761 Georgia 46 0.792 0.08 0.13  0.10 0. 818 48  22 0.926 0.14 86 0.644 0.05 Tunisia 0.08 0.780 47 47 0.829 0.09 74 0.713 0 .11 43 0.825 0 .11 Suriname 0.775 0.08 48 0.13 Palestine/West Bank 0. 812 50 0.10 0.772 60 0 .11 0.74 8 68 0.09 0.769 49 0.07 64 0.09 53 0.808 0.10 Slovakia 50 0 .11 56 0.788 0.761 0.765 0.12 Lesotho 0.895 18 0.12 0.666 79 0.07 0.74 0 72 0.08 0.756 51 58 62 0.763 0.12 52 Mongolia 0.754 0.788 61 0.764 0.10 0.07 0 .11 0.12 Israel 0.713 72 0.10 0.784 57 0.13 0.770 61 0.09 0.747 53 0.739 0.785 0.13 0.74 4 54 To go 0.10 0.14 0.74 8 0.10 58 74 66 0.12 0 . 817 49 0.10 0.659 83 0 .11 0.777 60 0.05 0.732 55 Senegal 76 0.691 0.13 21 0.878 0.07 95 0.07 0.730 56 Tanzania 0.646 0.15 0.08 81 0.708 0.13 68 0.735 0 .11 82 0.685 0.16 Bosnia and h erzegovina 57 0.728 62 0 .11 70 0.720 0.15 Panama 58 0.728 0.725 0.769 0.13 71 0 .11  0.16 0.679 84 0.560 0.07 0.07 0.722 59 Romania 0.14 29 0.898 98 0.856 31 0.15 0.540 101 0.12 0.74 0 73 0.09 0 . 717 0 .11 Ghana 60 0.16 0.10 61 0.715 109 0.608 Ecuador 75 0.709 0.12 45 0.824 0.10 0.10 80 0.694 0.14 83 0.13 62 0.757 Botswana 62 0.713 0.07 0.707 0 .11 0.08 0.604 102 0. 819 50 0.18 0.783 59 0.09 Armenia 63 0.712 95 0.634 0.15  0.659 43 0.864 0.15 0.07 93 Croatia 0.705 64 0.07 0.833 0.09 0.14 0.450 116 0.09 25 45 0.07 0.705 65 Vanuatu 0.866 53 0.803 0.13 96 0.581 0.15 59 0.784 0 .11 Mali 66 0.699 0.09 0 .11 0.09 USA 67 0.695 78 0.728 0.13 89 0.628 0 .11 57 0.791 0.624 0.747 68 0.693 0.10 0 .17 Algeria 97 0.09 0.802 54 0.13 69 0.08 80 0 . 7 11 0.14 77 0.677 0.10 76 0.702 0.16 Kyrgyzstan 69 0.691 0.822 0.14 70 0.689 0.06 49 Bolivia 0.09 121 0.425 36 0.838 0.09 82 0.661 0.13 101 0.606 0.18 0.08 0.794 0.12 Gabon 71 0.683 55 0.15 0 .17 122  0.10 0.781 58 0.525 0.702 86  0.08 0.682 72 Eritrea 36 0.887 0.06 120 0.532 0.20 73 96 0.677 0.643 0.16 Seychelles 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.742 67 0.12 0.539 102 0.13 0.788 57 Guyana 74 0.676 71 0.08 121 0.527 0 .17 75 0.13 Montenegro 0.12 0.676 52 0 . 817 0.743 0.670 0.15 0.13 0.653 85 0.14 68 90 0.08 0.676 76 Argentina 0.737 97 0.640 0.15 84 0.654 0.13 66 0.74 8 0.15 Namibia 77 0.675 0.06 0.871 111 78 0.672 0.10 38 Vietnam 0.09 94 0.592 0.16 0.579 0.20 0.14 77 0.701 0.13 41 0.08 0.852 114 0.465 0.09 0.672 79 Niger 0.702 0.14 0 .11 0.588 95 0.13 0.750 85 0.10 0.669 80 S.Tomé & P. 65 0.07 44 0. 8 41 0.09 135 0.357 0.14 39 0.829 0.10 Nepal 81 0.667 0.18 0.659 82 0 .11 100 0.631 Kosovo 88 0.633 0.13 85 0. 674 0.16 59 0.773 0.08 113 0.560 0.19 0.08 0.614 0.18 United Arab Emirates 83 0.658 107 0 .17 0.652 0.651 89 0.10 0.716 73 0 .17 0.622 103 0.10 Serbia 84 0.09 0.14 14 0.916 0.05 Jamaica 0.486 85 129 0.649 0 .17 99 0.557 0.686 0.14 0.12 0.619 91 0.12 0.646 88 0 .11 0.648 86 Moldova 90 0.10 67 0.750 0.13 87 0.640 0 .11 110 0.579 0.18 The Gambia 87 0.648 0.16 0.10 Albania 88 0.6 41 106 0 . 617 0.16 80 0.665 0.13 78 0.696 56 98 89 0.640 0.13 0.801 Comoros 0.14 0. 515 108 0.16 0.638 0.09

85 V-Dem Annu Al Repo RT 2018 85 indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty. SD+/- equal protection equal access egalitarian c equal distribution omponent index of resources index index I) ec Index ( SD (+/-) SD (+/-) Score rank country rank SD (+/-) rank Score SD (+/-) rank Score Score 0.602 0.542 0 .11 0.74 4 67 0 .17 119 112 0.09 0.637 90 Rwanda 0. 21 0.08 117 91 0.582 0.16 12 0.945 0.03 143 0.422 0.18 Kuwait 0.637 0.13 0.16 98 0.14 0 . 517 107 0.620 0.755 65 0.09 0.631 92 Chile 0.586 0 .17 70 0.726 0.09 115 0.559 0.19 93 0.629 114 Macedonia 0.07 0 .11 Ivory Coast 0.715 71 0.15 0.382 129 0.15 0.768 63 0 .11 0.619 94 0 . 617 0.598 0.12 79 0.696 0.15 Zanzibar 0.520 0.08 0 .17 93 95 124 0.16 0.864 28 0.13 0.343 139 0.08 0.681 89 0 .11 0.616 96 Liberia 120 0.564 0.18 42 0.868 0.06 155 0.340 0.22 97 Oman 0.610 0.09 0.608 0.09 66 0.754 0.13 97 0.579 0.13 128 0.484 0.23 Fiji 98 0.19 0.600 99 0.08 113 0.599 Kazakhstan 64 0.755 0.09 133 0.466 0. 21 0. 815 0 .11 143 0.297 0.15 73 0.08 0.710 0.15 0.599 50 100 South Africa 0.879 0 .17 99 0.15 141 0.08 0.618 36 0.09 0.590 101 Burkina Faso 0 . 317 102 0.587 0.09 91 0.667 0.13 112 0.493 0.15 118 0. 551 0.19 Cameroon 0.15 103 0.586 0.10 121 0.563 Sri Lanka 90 0.622 0.15 103 0.600 0.18 0.09 102 0.623 0.15 111 0.495 0.14 94 0.635 0.14 104 Indonesia 0.580 0.18 0.18 112 0.08 0.803 53 0.573 0.394 139 0.09 0.579 105 Malaysia 0.569 0 .17 122 0.579 0.423 0.13 0.09 75 0.704 0.15 106 Sierra Leone 119 0. 814 0.18 92 0.13 14 6 0 .11 0.640 52 0.08 0.569 107 Zambia 0.264 108 0.568 0 .11 116 0.583 0.16 12 5 0.402 0.16 74 0.710 0.16 Brazil 0.719 138 109 0.568 0.09 79 Timor-Leste 0.13 0.345 0.16 83 0.683 0.16 0.08 77 0.732 0.13 132 0.375 0. 561 0.16 107 0.593 0.19 110 India 0.708 0.15 86 0.14 0.360 0.14 0.664 82 0 .11 0.560 111 Solomon Islands 13 4 Morocco 112 0.560 0.07 70 0.747 0.13 131 0.378 0.14 106 0.596 0.19 Peru 0.382 0.729 69 0.16 130 0.16 0.618 105 0.10 0.560 113 0.14  0.837 37  0.12 0.10 168 0.14 0.659 92 0.147 0.08 Venezuela 0. 551 114 0.392 0.16 116 0.10 0.733 69 0.20 0.558 14 0 0.10 0.549 115 Russia Libya 12 5 0. 512 0.19 105 0. 521 0.14 87 0.660 0 .17 116 0.10 0.548 0.664 0.22 117 0.539 0.10 0.403 145 0.10 108 81 0.16 0.609 Jordan 0.16 0.16 0.685 81 0 .17 152 0.10 0.246 118 94 0.652 Mozambique 0.539 0.621 0 .17 117 0.15 12 3 0.16 0. 551 104 0.09 0. 531 119 Djibouti 0.418 120 0.520 0.09 84 0.705 0.14 133 0.371 0.15 12 3 0. 521 0. 21 Nigeria 0.607 119 121 0.509 0.10 110 Maldives 0.16 0.442 0.13 127 0.485 0.19 0.07 122 0.532 0 .17 100 0.542 0.509 0.12 139 0.442 0.19 122 Lebanon 0.371 0.20 132 0.09 0.719 0.19 0.475 142 0.07 0.501 12 3 Ukraine 72 Nicaragua 124 0.487 0 .11 126 0.504 0. 21 104 0.527 0 .17 137 0.444 0.23 0.428 0.18 12 5 0.486 0.09 135 Uganda 0.19 118 0.449 0.16 100 0.614 Mexico 0.476 0.07 128 0.493 0 .17 127 0.398 0.12 108 0.585 0.18 126 0.428 Colombia 124 0.19 0.451 115 0 .17 0.508 13 4 0.19 0.12 0.473 127 Kenya 138 0.400 0 .17 120 0.428 0.467 0.14 114 0.560 0.18 128 0.07 0.479 0.20 153 0.16 0.530 0.16 0.363 130 0.10 0.466 129 Iran 103 0.15  127 0.497 0 .17 151 0.248 0.14 96 0.624 Myanmar 130 0.445 0.09 0.15 0.597 0.508 0.16 Thailand 131 0.445 0.10 16 4 0.203 0.15 110 105 0.206 0.394 Uzbekistan 132 0.434 0.07 163 0.19 0.16 78 0.668 0.12 147 Malawi 0 .11 145 0.369 0.20 14 0 133 0.328 0.13 109 0.582 0.18 0.433 0.447 0. 21 165 0.16 0.400 126 0.275 133 0.09 0.421 13 4 Zimbabwe 0.18 0.18 Guinea-Bissau 135 0.418 0.10 101 0.625 0.15 165 0.16 8 0.14 14 8 0.393 0.14 0.161 Saudi Arabia 136 0.416 0.05 167 0.185 0.14 44 0.857 0.07 171 0.18 0. 318 157 0.18 0. 510 109 Palestine/Gaza 0.20 0.357 14 8 0.09 0.414 137 0.394 0.20 0.409 China 0.08 153 0.305 0 .17 117 0.449 0.12 14 6 138  0.308 159  0.15 0.24 128 0 .17 0.524 12 3 0.385 0.09 139 Turkey 0.408 0.22 0.20 130 0 .11 0.289 145 0.482 0.363 147 0.09 0.407 14 0 DRC 0.149 0.16 26 0 . 911 0.05 173 0.14 8 0.15 141 0.403 17 2 qatar 0.05 0 .17 0.449 136 0.13 0.19 4 162 0.20 0.584 115 0.08 0.401 142 Guinea 0.07 162 0.220 0.19 55 0.800 0.09 170 0.169 0.18 Bahrain 143 0.397 14 4 0.393 0.08 111 0.605 0.15 174 0.121 0.12 141 0.439 0.22 Papua New Guinea 0.19 145 0.389 0.10 132 0.459 Ethiopia 124 0 . 417 0.16 166 0.257 0.19 0.10 14 6 0.368 0.22 142 0. 310 0.383 0.14 14 0 0.440 0 .17 14 6 Philippines 0.370 0.16 104 0.09 0 .117 0.20 0.599 143 0.10 0.373 147 Madagascar 175 Swaziland 14 8 0.367 0.08 141 0.379 0.22 113 0.475 0.15 16 4 0.285 0.22 0.20 0.478 131 0.12 0.19 6 160 0.22 0.408 137 0.09 Somaliland 0.362 149  0.288 163 0.13 0 .17 161 0.16 0.635 99 0.19 4 0.360 0.07 Burundi 150 0.097 0.385 0.14 0.599 92 0.12 149 176 0.06 0.358 151 North Korea 0.19 0.08 149 0.353 0.19 152 106 0 . 517 0.354 0.18 176 0.141 0.16 Turkmenistan 152 0.22 14 4 0.13 0.355 0.23 0. 314 0.420  136 0.09 0.352 153 Iraq honduras 15 4 0. 351 0.07 15 4 0.305 0.18 159 0.208 0.12 12 5 0.506 0.20 0.335 0.19 155 0.344 0.08 151 Laos 137 0.346 0.16 151 0.382 0.18 Paraguay 0.342 0.06 14 4 0.370 0.19 166 156 0.16 4 0.10 138 0.444 0.19 157 0.18 126 0.13 0.232 155 0.255 0.502  0.19 0.09 0. 331 157 Dominican Republic 0.657 0.16  88 0.14 CAR 158 0. 331 0.07 175 0.13 4 169 0.143 0.12 0. 21 0.306 161 0.227 0.15 153 0.245 0.13 129 0.484 El Salvador 159 0.07 0.20 135 0.13 0.193 163 0.18 0.16 8 169 0 .11 0.306 160 Pakistan 0.455 0 .17 0.18 17 2 0.14 0 .176 16 4 0.159 0.575 Azerbaijan 118 0.08 0.303 161 0.09 159 0.230 0.18 150 0.250 0.16 15 4 0. 361 0. 21 162 Bangladesh 0.299 0 .17 0.330 156 0.12 0.262 147 0.19 0.304 155 0.08 0.298 163 Equatorial Guinea 0.290 0.09 165 0.201 0.18 157 0. 215 0.10 142 0.432 0.23 Guatemala 16 4 Tajik is t an 165 0.281 0.08 131 0.476 0.22 149 0.257 0.12 178 0.079 0.12 0 .17 Afghanistan 0.281 0.08 168 0 .171 166 14 8 0. 261 0.13 150 0.383 0.19 Congo 0.277 0.09 171 0.153 0.20 14 4 167 0.296 0.14 160 0.305 0 .17 0.16 175  0.142 0.13 0. 213 0.18 158 136 0.10 0.268 168 Syria 0 . 417 0.24 Angola 169 0.262 0.09 170 0.16 0 0.20 156 0 . 217 0 .11 152 0.382 13 4 0.18 0.19  156 0.302  176 0.096 0.08 0.456 0.07 0.258 170 Somalia 0.15 4 166 0.08 0.236 171 haiti 0.18 0.304 0.23 0.192 0.13 167 161 Chad 0.19 6 168 0.13 0.238 15 4 0.18 0.228 160 0.18 0.07 0.233 17 2 0.135  0.19 9  0 .11 0.20 171 0.26 0.338 150 167 173 0.232 0.08 Mauritania 0.13 0. 21 158 0.10 0.12 3 173 0. 316 173 0.06 0.19 9 174 Cambodia 0.14 8 0 .17 175 0.19 9 0.07 158 0.238 0.20 17 2 0.13 4 Sudan 17 7 0.14 0 0.09 0.296 Egypt 176 0 .176 0.06 174 0.14 6 0.14 170 0.135 0.10 162 0.19 0 .11 0.22 169 0.09 0.079 17 7 0.19 0 0.069 17 7 0.05 0.131 17 7 yemen South Sudan 178 0.085 0.05 178 0.052 0.09 178 0.026 0.04 174 0.14 4 0.15

86 | In TH e S po TlIGHT 86

87 TRY S oR 2017 CoReS F x: Coun DI Appen 87 Appendix 5: The participatory Component Index IcIpAtory c t rt f I g u r e A 5.1: he V-Dem pA omponent Ver D A In nD r Age S, 1900 to 2017. eg Ion Al A Dex: Worl 1 .9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 .3 T he participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active par - ticipation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non- .2 electoral. This principle prefers direct rule by citizens as practicable. .1 pCI) takes into account articipatory Component Index ( The V-Dem p four important aspects of citizen participation: civil society organ - 0 izations, mechanisms of direct democracy, and participation and 1970 2017 2010 1980 1960 1950 2000 1990 1940 1930 1920 1910 1900 representation through local and regional governments (Figure Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average 5.1). Four different V-Dem indices capture these aspects and are the MENA Latin America and the Caribbean Western Europe and North America Sub−Saharan Africa CI. basis for the p Asia−Pacific t he V-Dem pA rt pc omponent In Dex ( IcIpAtory c I) fI gure A5.2: civil society participation index Candidate selection- CSO womens CSO participatory CSO consultation participation National/local environment local government index Direct popular vote index Local government Local government Local offices relative power elected exists regional government index Regional government Regional government Regional offices relative power exists elected

88 88 oR 2017 CoReS F TRY S x: Coun DI Appen ain c omponents ta b l e A 5: c ountry Scores for the p articipatory c omponent Index ( pc I) and its m civil Society p local g overnment regional g overnment omponent participatory c Direct p articipation opular Vote pc Index ( Index Index Index Index I) Score SD (+/-) Score SD (+/-) rank Score SD (+/-) Score rank SD (+/-) Score rank country SD (+/-) rank rank 0.00 1 0.019 9 0.989 0 . 011 0.02 0.968 4 0.02 0.876 1 21 Switzerland 0.679 0.981  5 0.993 0.007 29 0.547 2 0.07 0.897 23 0.03 0. 814 2 Uruguay 0.973 0.00 0.027 0.981 0.00 0.406 4 0.06 0.906 21 0.03 0.763 3 New Zealand 0.019 20 178 0.08 0.957 15 4 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.418 3 37 0.864 38  0.043 0.03 0.758 4 Slovenia 0.969 Italy 28 0.965 0.035 5 0.74 6 0.03 33 0.880 0.07 7 0.379 0.00 33 0.031  0.006 166 0.000 0.000 3 0.00 0.389 0.994 0.09 0.830 52 0.05 0.729 6 Lithuania 6 4 Slovakia 0.009 23 0.971 0.029 7 0.724 0.04 58 0.821 0.10 10 0.332 0.00 0.991 0.395 35 0.959 0.0 41  120 0.056 0.025  79 0.769 0.12 5 0.00 8 Bulgaria 0.710 0.05 0.990 0.010 12 0.985 0.015 0.03 0.185 0.00 6 0.960 37 Denmark 9 0.708 0.02 7 0.00 22 0.980 0.020 14 0.982  12 0.946 0.04 31 0.193 0.018 0.02 0.707 10 Austria 9 0.989 0 . 011 20 0.975 0.05 17 0.03 0.704 11 Taiwan 0.925 40 0 .179 0.00 0.025 0.00 39 0.953 0.046 59 0.810 0.077 Bolivia 12 0.694 0.05 50 0.838 0.08 11 0. 310 0.000 0.15 4 0.979 0.021 163 0.000 25  8 0.958 0.03 50 0.00 0.689 0.03 13 Iceland 0.135 0.00 0.845 0.083 26 0.968 0.032 0.03 0.963 6  55 76 0.02 0.684 14 United Kingdom Peru 0.023 11 0.988 0. 012 0.741 0.250 16 15 0.682 0.05 0.13 0.00 28 0.977 90 36 0.959 0.0 41 174 0.000 0.000 Costa Rica 16 0.680 0.04 22 0.899 0.06 43 0 .174 0.00 12 0.00 0.886 0 .112 35 0.930 0.070  0.307 60 0.12 0.792 72  0.05 0.678 Croatia 17 0.00 71 0.857 0.128 37 0 .917 0.082 Netherlands 18 0.673 0.04 24 0.895 0.06 39 0.183 0.00 0.167 0.980 0.020 3 0.993 0.007 Australia 19 0.666 0.03 19 0.914 0.06 46 23 0.00 38 0.025 32 0.949 0.051 0.06 0.888 28 0.06 0.661 20 Niger 116 0.185 0.475  21 0.028 151 0.000 0.000 0.00 0. 213 0.972 0 .11 0 . 811 62 0.05 0.659 21 Latvia 30 0.00 49 0.928 0.063 1 0.998 0.002 22 0.659 0.01 1 0.983 0.01 166 USA 0.000 0.035 31 0.952 0.047 34 0.965 0.015 0.00 0.01 0.982 2 0.01 0.657 23 Norway 127 0 . 017 0.00 2 0.994 0.006 19 0.976 0.024 Belgium 24 0.654 0.02 9 0.956 0.03 12 5 0.244 Ivory Coast 75 0.849 0.12 3 65 0.679 0.138 25 0.652 0.05 44 0.851 0.08 18 0.00 0.015 0.02 0.971 0.029 10 0.988 0. 012 0.973 3 0.02 0.00 0.652 26 Canada 128 32 0.00 145 0.045 4 0.993 0.007 0.02 0.967 5 0.02 0.652 27 Germany 38 0 . 011 0.955 17 0. 215 22 0.973 0.027 20 0.13 0.74 4 88 0.07 0.651 28 Colombia 0.984 0.00 0.016  131 86 0.364 0.102 1 0.00 0.015 0.004 0.04 0.943 14 0.02 0.646 29 Finland 0.996 Sweden 24 0.979 0.021 43 0.884 0.084 30 0.643 0.03  16 0.937 0.04 107 0.028 0.00 0.00 0.920 0.076 33 0.947 0.052 0.365 53 0 .17 0.650 119 0.07 0.643 31 hungary 8 0.00 70 0.859 0.129 40 0.900 0.10 0 32 0.639 0.06 111 0. 674 0.15 9 Ecuador 0.350 0.200 124 0. 341 0 .170 52 0.850 0.14 6 Greece 33 0.638 0.06 34 0.877 0.07 28 0.00 10 0.00 0. 012 34 0.939 0.056 0.091 Spain 0.988 34 0.634 0.03 57 0.825 0.09 68 0.00 7 0.989 0 . 011 150 0.000 0.000 Portugal 35 0.634 0.05 63 0 . 811 0.10 62 0 .112 44 0.00 0.987 0. 013 49 0.860 0.072 0.169 11 0.13 0.681 107 0.06 0.630 Poland 36 0.009 0.00 42 0.944 0.056 54 0.840 0.16 0 Sierra Leone 37 0.629 0.03 13 0.945 0.04 149  96 0.209 0.077 0.033 0.05 26 0.977 0.023 Gabon 38 0.628 30 0.884 0.07 100 0.00 95 0.843 31 0.971 0.029 27 0.967 0.033 48 0.033  0.10 0.00 0.05 0.625 39 France Argentina 0.909 0.067 7 0.992 0.008 130 40 0.619 0.844 0.015 0.00 57 0.04 0.10 47 0.019 0.981  15  0.055 0.945 0.00 0.007 Nigeria 41 0.619 0.04 27 0.888 0.08 150 41  0.131 77 57 0.13 4  62 0.760 0.137 0.00 0.08 0.866 37  0.05 0. 615 42 Kenya 0. 8 41 0.070 0.00 65 0.873 0.086 30 0.963 0.037 Philippines 43 0. 615 0.05 64 0.807 0.10 77 0.020 0.893 45 0.938 0.062 12 5 0.047 0.029 Benin 44 0.608 0.05 25 0.07 122 0.00 0.15 63 16 0.985 0.015 21 0.973 0.027 0.00 0.725 97  0.10 4 0.05 0.607 45 Brazil 0.026 0.00 12 0.987 0. 013 175 0.000 0.000 Jamaica 46 0.607 0.05 45 0.846 0.09 109 0.015 126 47 0.931 0.069 79 0.435 0.159 Chile 47 0.605 0.04 39 0.862 0.08 0.00 0.13 61 51 0.927 0.073 17 7 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.775 76 0.06 0.605 0 .116 48 Montenegro 69 0.090 0.00 15 0.985 0.015 74 0.484 0.016 Estonia 49 0.604 0.06 93 0.729 0.14  2 0.996 0.004 103 0.016 South Korea 0.00 18 0.984 50 0.602 0.05 40 0.860 0.09 0.031 87 0.832 55 0 .917 0.071 36 0.927 0.051 51 0.053 0.08 0.05 0.602 51 Czech Republic 0.00 0. 013 0.10 0.987 0. 013 6 0.992 0.008 0. 813 60 0.04 0.600 52 0.00 Japan 136 13 0.00 67 0.075 100 0 .178 0.078 0.12 0.74 6 86 0.06 0.599 53 Ukraine 52 0.096 0.925 111 0.00 0.072 57 0.823 0.129  0.020 50 0.928 0.08 0.856 41  0.05 0.597 54 Bhutan 91 0.716 0.222 55 0.834 0.092 55 0.594 0.05 35 0. 874 0.07 117 0.020 Suriname 0.00 0.00 27 0.977 0.023 153 0.000 0.000 Israel 56 0.593 0.05 75 0.781 0.12 14 0 0. 013 0.00 Macedonia 0.982 0.018 171 0.000 0.000 57 0.588 0.05 114 0.667 0.15 45 0.169 19 114 0.00 0.096 44 0.879 0.10 0 0.020 59 0.904 0.08 0.845 46 0.06 0.587 58 South Africa Serbia 54 0.920 0.080 29 0.965 0.035 59 0.586 0.06 13 4 0.591 0.16 49 0.156 0.00 0.055 0.00 8 0.989 0 . 011 8 0.990 0.010 Mexico 60 0.583 0.06 103 0.692 0.15 84 0. 251 61 99 0.657 0.124 53 0.847 0.147 Romania 0.582 0.08 109 0.681 0.14 15 0.00 13 4 0.883 69 0.859 0.130  16 4 0.000 0.000 31  0. 013 0.07 0.00 Malawi 62 0.580 0.06 56 0.864 0.122 24 0.969 0.031 159 0.10 0.06 0.579 0.825 0.000 0.00 67 63 Indonesia 0.00 14 0.987 0. 013 17 0.980 0.020 64 0.577 0.08 135 0.587 0 .17 Paraguay 0.158 48 0.161 0.00 105 0.622 0.262 63 0.736 0 .174 Uganda 65 0.576 0.06 61 0. 812 0 .11 47 0.208 Ireland 108 0.585 0.308 162 0.000 0.000 66 0.575 0.10 10 0.953 0.03 25 0.00  0.109 0.031 0.00 93 0.708 0.130 46 0.868 0.10  55 0.826 104 0.05 0.572 67 Sri Lanka 0.969 0.00 40 0.945 0.055 25 0.733 0.031 0.569 68 S.Tomé & P. 92 0.13 0.05 0.020 119 0.12 33 0.189 0.00 109 0.581 0.281  61 0.774 0.141  96 0.727  Morocco 69 0.566 0.06 66 0.10 0 0.00 43 0.942 0.057 13 0.983 0 . 017 0.566 130 0. 612 0 .17 Comoros 70 0.07  58 0.816 0.109 93 0.804 81 0.796 0.084 65 0.04 0.565 71 Botswana 0.037 0 .11 0.00 0.10 0 0.9 41 0.059  84 0.397 0.091 0.00 64 44 0.06 0.564 72 Panama 0.13 0.728 94  62 0.121 14 8 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.031 0.879 106 0.10 0.801 66 0.07 0.564 73 Mozambique Mongolia 98 0.672 0.143  71 0.567 0.159  74 0.564 0.05 67 0.801 0 .11 35 0.18 6 0.00 0.068 0.00 66 0.870 0.10 6 78 honduras 0.049 75 0. 561 0.06 83 0.759 0.12 81 0.438 175 0.00 79 0.820 0.15 4 82 0.415 0.085 Cyprus 76 0.560 0.05 42 0.854 0.09 0.000 0.00 0.033 0.915 0.085 156 0.000 0.000 101 56 77 0.13 0.741 91 0.06 0.559 Guatemala  0.00 87 0.734 0 .119 72 0. 541 0.085 78 0.558 0.05 20 0.913 0.06 94 Burkina Faso 0.033 142 0. 013 0.00 90 0.730 0.14 8 Guyana 0. 861 0.126 79 0.552 0.05 80 0.769 0.12 48 0.675 161 0.000 0.00 64 0.873 0 .115 18 0.979 0.021 Bosnia and h erzegovina 80 0.548 0.05 110 0.15  75 0.474 0.026 124 0.698 46 0.934 0.066 101 0.07 0.545 81 Timor-Leste 0.018 0.15 0.00 0.000 0.020 83 0.779 0.079 16 0.980 17 7 India 82 0.545 0.07 122 0.638 0 .17 0.00 0.13 156 73 0.854 0.14 6 161 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.766 82 0.07 0.544 83 Trinidad and Tobago 0.000 105 0.031 0.00 88 0.734 0 .110 50 0.858 Namibia 84 0.543 0.07 85 0.754 0.13 0 .117 0.15 0. 013 0.00 48 0.929 0.071 41 0.899 0.092 Papua New Guinea 85 0.540 0.06 117 0.659 135 121 0.099 0.00 78 0.827 0 .112 39 0.900 0.15 Vietnam 86 0.537 0.07 106 0.683 0.020 0.025  132 0.021 0.636 0.227 0 .11 0.00 0 .17 7 103 0.793 71 0.09 0. 531 87 Madagascar 41

89 indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  V-Dem Annu Al Repo RT 2018 89 indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty. omponent civil Society p articipation Direct p opular Vote local g overnment regional g overnment participatory c Index Index Index Index I) pc Index ( rank Score SD (+/-) SD (+/-) rank Score Score SD (+/-) rank rank Score country SD (+/-) rank SD (+/-) Score 42 0.891 0.10 6  Albania 0. 531 0.05 137 0.580 0.18 86 0.053 0.00 5 0.990 0.010 88 0.009 Mauritius 0.000 142 0.14 6 0.854 72 0.00 0.000 147 0 .11 0.785 74 0.08 0.528 89 0.000 Cape Verde 0.000 167 0. 218 0.696 95 0.00 0.063 82 0.09 0.829 53 0.07 0.522 90 173 0.13 0.691 105 0.08 0. 521 91 Bangladesh 0.000 0.859 68 0.00 0.000 167 0.131 0.000  0.00 0.000 0.000 152 0 .117 0.877 63 El Salvador 0. 013 137 0.18 0.650 120 0.06 0 . 517 92  Venezuela 0.088 0.616 68 0.076 0.789 82 0.00 0.250 17 0.18 0.470 150 0.07 0. 514 93 0.124 0. 512 94 Iraq 129 0 .118 0.00 0.068 79 0.16 0.283 45 0.663 116 0.06 0.876 0.042 Somaliland 0.447 77 0.143 0.776 84 0.00 0.053 89 0.14 0.701 100 0.06 0 . 511 95 0.000 Vanuatu 0.000 145 0. 251 0.640 102 0.00 0. 013 141 0.07 0.881 32 0.08 0.505 96 0 .170 0.00 0.14 4 53 0.15 0.666 115 0.07 0.504 97 Moldova 64 0.193 0.634 104 0.679 0.000 51 98 0.07 12 5 0.632 0.16 152 0.501 0.00 168 0.000 0.000 0.858 0.109 Solomon Islands 0.04 0.943 27 Luxembourg 99 0.496 0.08 15 0.203 0.000 0.000 14 4 0.16 6 0.378 122 0.00 178 0.16 0. 674 112 0.08 0.490 100 Palestine/West Bank 0.000 74 159 0.14 8 0.850 0.00 0.000 0.000  0.092 0.185 99 0.07 49 0.839 101 0.09 36 0.185 0.00 118 0.468 0 .178 Georgia 0.488 14 8  0.907 38  0.169 0.525 111 0.00 0.009 0.070  0.19 0.560 14 0  0.07 0.487 Myanmar 102 96 0.687 0.044  109 0.096 0.060 Congo 103 0.485 0.08  104 0.692 0 .17 51 0.151 0.00 72 0.028 0.472 76  18 0.921 0.05  0.087 0.081 0.00 138 0.19 6  104 0.04 0.484 Tunisia 0.08 Armenia 105 0.484  131 0.602 0.14 54 0.141 0.00 86 0.749 0.165  114 0.085 0.038 0.187 117 0.077 0.033 106 Mali 106 0.481 0.08 54 0.828 0 .11 96 0.603 0.033 0.00  97 0.206 0.079 119 69 0.10 24 107 0.00 0.793 0.463 0.200 Rwanda 0.08 0.481 0 . 211 17 7 0.00 0.000 160 0.15 118 0.07 0.480 108 Malaysia 0.12 5 0.652 56 0.830 47 0.133 0.867  Pakistan 0.480 0.07 149 0.476 0.18 109 0.068 0.00 110 0.538 0. 215 80 0.025 0.022   78 0.770 0.12 56 0.133 0.00 113 0. 521 0.127  133 110 0.479 0.06 Zambia 0.669 The Gambia 111 0.476 0.09 87 0.74 4 0.13 108 0.026 0.00 121 0.427 66 0.137 0.16 8 0. 013 Lesotho 0.474 0.05 36 0. 874 0.07 138 112 0.00 120 0.455 0 .173 73 0.486 0.014  87 0.340 0.129  0.00 0.525 0.145  29 0.886 0.07 120 0.020 112 113 Nepal 0.06 0.474 94 0.069 0.409 83  0.14 0 0.704 Dominican Republic 0.00 0.032 102 0.12 0.696 102  0.07 0.473 114 0.000 176 0.105 0.764 85 0.00 0.080 74 0.19 0.623 128 0.07 0.472 115 Nicaragua 0.000 0.079 80 Liberia 0.00 0.428 0.057 0.766 81 0.03 0.469 116 0 .11 0.359 0.078 75 12 3 0.0 41 0.046 126  80 163 0.20 13 117 0.00 0.306 0.796 0.197 0.08 0.4 61 Turkey 0.259 0.090 98  0.090 0.906 58 0.00 0.121 58  0.20 0.348 159   0.204 0.456 118 Maldives 0.07 67 0.000 174 0.19 0.484 147 0.08 0.455 119 haiti 0.667 0. 219 61 0.883 0.00 0 .117 165 0.000 157 0.250 0.602 107 0.00 0.000 0.000 0 .11 0.786 73 0.10 0.454 Lebanon 120 0.233 0 .114 Djibouti 121 0.454 0.08 121 0.647 0.18 90 0.040 0.00 92 0.710 0.127 93 30 117 122 0.454 0.08 95 0.727 0.14 Kyrgyzstan 0.195 0.00 0.469 0.161 121 0.056 0.028 0.000  126 0.625 0.18  14 6 0 . 011 0.00 89 0.730 0.183  170 0.000 12 3 Libya 0.08 0.448 0.07 153 0.4 41 0.19 70 0.088 0.00 139 60 0.777 0.120 DRC 0.068 0.439 124 0.192 0.16 4 115 0.00 0.015 129 0 .11 0.793 0.498 0.08 0.431 12 5 Tanzania 90 0.301 0.058 70 17 2 0.000 0.000 Kosovo 126 0.420 0.08 133 0.596 0 .17 162 0.000 0.00 97 0.681 0 .115  0.00 0.075 0 .176 101 0.10 4 0.270 130 Senegal 0.151 52 0.07 0.889 26 0.06 0 . 417 127 0.066 Chad 0.095 110  0.352 0 . 511 114 0.00 0.088 71 0 .17 0.637 124 0 .11 0.405 128 0.644 0.559 141 0.09 0.402 129 Swaziland 0.142 0.083 0.038 0.00 0. 013 101 133 0.19 115 0.672 13 4 0.00 0.033 98 0.15 0.223 113 0.07 0.386 130 Somalia 0.143 81 0.428 0.069 0.200 0.078 0.385 0.07 98 0.722 0.16 29 131 0.00 135 0. 212 0.101 102 0.158 Zimbabwe 0.024 14 0 110 0.04 0.948 11 0.05 0. 012 0.376 132 Ghana 0.009 0 .176 141 0.00 0.10 6 Mauritania 133 0. 374 0.09 138 0.577 0 .17 22 0. 213 0.00 127 0.309 0 .17 2 88 0.320 0.135 0.00 13 4 0.347 0.05 68 0.798 0 .11 78 0.069 Guinea 147 0 .113 0.074 129 0.036 0.031 0.130  0.07 160 0.334 0.19 85 0.055 0.00 12 5 0. 331 0.137 69 0.597 Russia 135 0.332 0.00 0.000 136 0. 331 0.07 136 0.584 0.19 26 0.205 Zanzibar 145 0.130 0.086 168 0.000 0.077 119  0.034 0.000 0.655 100 0.00 0.18 169 0.325 161 0.06 0. 312 137 Oman 0.132 15 4 0.086 138 0.302 0.08 12 3 0.637 0.16 Jordan 0.000 0.00 133 0.229 0.089 0.056 112  0.000 Thailand 0.000 158 0.133 0.320 126 0.00 0.000 16 4 0 .17 0.614 129 0.08 0.301 139 0.289  Cambodia 14 0 0.128 0.280 91  0.127 0.297 128 0.00 0.000 173 0. 21 0.484 14 6 0.07 0.090 99 0.08 0.287 141 Guinea-Bissau 0.059 0.155 0.101 0.00 0.020 112 0.13 0.707 150 105 0.10 4  95 0. 210 0.08 14 8 0.483 0.18 65 0.10 0 0.00 143 0.141 0.059 Belarus 142 0.287 118 0.137 143 0.285 0.07 143 0.525 0.19 Sudan 0.020 0.00 151 0.084 0.045 89 0 . 311 70 0.09 0.278 14 4 Ethiopia 0.082 152 0.580 0.00 0. 013 139 0 .17 0.243 167 0.0 61 0.226 155 Barbados 0.278 0.04 43 0.852 0.09 145 0.000 0.00 178 147 0.000 0.000  14 6 0.00 0.047 0.120 106 0.054 0.058 155 Egypt 0. 213 23 0.19 0.429 15 4 0.07 0.277 0. 012 Seychelles 0.276 0.05 77 0.774 0.12 143 0.000 0.00 166 0.005 0.008 149 0.000 147 0.06 59 0. 819 0 .11 hong Kong 0.000 0.00 169 0.000 0.000 160 0.000 0.000 0.273 14 8 170 0.048 0.042 Afghanistan 149 0.273 0.07 89 0.743 0.15 115 0.020 0.00 160 0.032 0.046 12 3 88 0.034 0.266 0.07 108 0.681 0.15 150 0.042 0.00 173 113 0.085 To go 0.756 Fiji 151 0.262 0.06 84 0.12 151 0.007 0.00 17 2 135 0.023 0.018 0 .117 Algeria 0.042 0.077 118 0.091 0 .179 14 0 0.00 152 59 0.18 0.452 152 0.05 0.260 0.06 0.254 153 127 0.624 0 .17 163 0.000 0.00 14 4 0.13 4 0.068 143 0.000 0.000 Palestine/Gaza 0. 013 CAR 0.07 132 0.598 0.16 132 0.239 0.00 176 107 0.109 0.066 15 4 130 0.031 0.029 Iran 155 0.238 0.07 155 0. 413 0.19 99 0.033 0.00 136 0.209 0.079 142 0.00 0.000 168 0.16 0. 541 0.06 0.228 156 Kuwait 142 0.151 0.067 14 6 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.022 0.223 0.07 14 4 0. 515 0.18 116 157 0.00 159 0.033 0.034 131 0.028 Cameroon 91 0.20 0.453 151 0.035 0.08 0 . 217 158 Kazakhstan 0.056 108 0.036 158 0.00 0.037 0.097 0.10 6  170 0.220 0 .17 92 0.037 0.00 137 0.208 0.084 85 0.369  0.05 0.209 159 yemen 0.00 157 0.376 0. 21 113 0.020 160 162 0.019 0.023 94 South Sudan 0.230 0.201 0.08 0 .116 124 0.047 0.030 Syria 161 0.195 0.05 175 0.130 0.14 34 0.18 8 0.00 132 0.235 0 .117 0 .117 0 . 011 16 4 0.288 0.15  60  0.00 14 8 0.10 6  0.016 0.070 139 0.195 0.06 Burundi 162 0.20 0. 012 163 0.193 0.09 145 0.502 United Arab Emirates 157 0.000 0.00 175 138 0 . 011 0.036 104 174 0.04 0.192 16 4 Azerbaijan 156 0.071 0.00 0. 218 19 0.16 0.162 0.057 0.155 12 3 Angola 0.191 0.07 156 0.405 0.19 165 0.018 0.00 174 103 0.155 0.088 Laos 0.181 166 0.048 0.050 122 0 .119 0.255 131 0.00 0.000 176 0 .17 0.264 165 0.05 167 Singapore 14 4 0.000 165 0.000 0.000 171 0.000 0 . 011 0.18 0. 561 139 0.05 0.181 0.00 0.05 171 0.206 0 .17 42 0 .176 0.00 15 4 168 0.070 0.058 136 Equatorial Guinea 0.019 0 .17 7 0.015 0 .112 92 0.065 0.127 14 6 0.00 0.033 0.265 0.20 0.18 8 173 0.05 0 .171 169 Cuba 97 13 4 0.023 0.027 Tajik is t an 170 0.161 0.03 166 0. 251 0.16 32 0.193 0.00 163 0.018 0.018 0.258 0.038 0.159 0.03 176 0.091 0.12 14 171 0.00 153 0.072 0.037 116 0.079 Turkmenistan 0.018 China 17 2 0.14 4 0.07 158 0.368 0 .17 171 0.000 0.00 149 0.10 6 0.037 127 0.038 128 0.18 0.037 Uzbekistan 173 0.131 0.04 162 0.307 76 0.073 0.00 161 0.029 0.028 0.037 83 0.000 0.000 155  168 0.237 0.18 0.014 0.056 0.00 165 0.008 174 0.04 0.103 Bahrain 0.009 Saudi Arabia 175 0.095 0.04 169 0. 231 0.19 17 2 0.000 0.00 16 4 0.009 0. 012 141 0.010 0.16 0.000 0.000 170 0.00 0.080 73 169 0.19 9 17 2 0.02 0.093 176 qatar 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.036 North Korea 17 7 0.060 0.03 178 0.035 0.06 153 0.000 0.00 157 0.054 111 0.094 158 0.014 178 0.032 0.02 17 7 0.055 0.09 Eritrea 0.000 0.00 167 0.004 0.008 137 0.020

90 90

91 Appen DI x: Coun TRY S CoReS F oR 2017 91 Appendix 6: The Deliberative Component Index Dex: omponent In e c AtIV Iber g u r e A6 .1: f I the V-Dem Del S, 1900 to 2017. nD r Worl Age Ver Al A Ion D A eg 1 .9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 T V-Dem Deliberative Component Index (DCI) captures to what ex - .3 - tent the deliberative principle of democracy is achieved. It assess es the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A delib - .2 erative process is one in which public reasoning, focused on the common good, motivates political decisions—as contrasted with .1 emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or co - 0 ercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than 2000 2017 2010 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be re - Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Average spectful dialogue at all levels —from preference formation to final Latin America and the Caribbean MENA decision— among informed and competent participants who are Western Europe and North America Sub−Saharan Africa Asia−Pacific open to persuasion. e c AtIV Iber cI) Dex (D fI gure A6.2: the V-Dem Del omponent In Deliberate c omponent index Engaged society Reasoned justification Common good Respect counterarguments Range of consultation

92 92 oR 2017 CoReS F TRY S x: Coun DI Appen c ountry Scores for the Deliberative c omponent Index (D cI) and its c omponents ta b l e A6 : ood range of engaged reasoned omponent Deliberative c common g respect for justification cI) Index (D consultation counterarguments society justification Score SD+/- Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- SD+/- Score rank rank SD+/- Score rank country rank 0.25 10 0.32 1 4.933 0.07 2 4.620 0.36 0.10 2.902 1 4 3.742 0.01 0.987 1 Norway 4.204 3 3.851 6 4.643 0.35 1 4.663 0.33 3 0.24 2.734 12 0.02 0.977 2 Denmark 4.208 0.15 0.43 3 4.622 4.785 0.22 39 3.688 0.43 1 Luxembourg 2 0.974 0.02 8 0.29 2.797 0.20 13 3 . 7 11 0.29 3.680 0.36 4 4.738 0.26 6 4.4 61 0.40 Switzerland 4 0.974 0.02 3 2.873 0.13 50 3. 312 0.39 10 3.458 2 .749 3 4.743 0.23 4 4.469 0.40 18 0.10 Sweden 5 0.971 0.42 0.02 10 0.23 3.903 2 0.30 4.072 18 4.663 5  0.29 2.758 0.24 36 3.438 0.29 25 3. 314 Germany 6 0.952 0.03 9 0.33 0.15 3.829 0.40 24 4.007 0.33 17 4.079 0.42 Costa Rica 7 0.951 0.02 6 2. 831 0 .17 4 3.851 6 0.56 0.47 3.485 0.47  11 4.302 0.47 15 4.099 2.718   2 2.886 0 .11 106 17 0.03 0.948 8 Ireland 4.342 3.428 0.36 7 4.608 0.35 8 33 0.37 62 0.03 0.945 9 Netherlands 0.26 2.023 0.33 19 3.468 5 3.835 0.16  26 3 . 311 0.46  15 4.256 0.46   4.376 0.44  51 2 .145 0.23  7 Tunisia 10 0.940 0.03 0.63 28 3.254 0.41 8 4. 561 0.38 35 3.804 0.42 16 0.26 82 2.994 Belgium 11 0.933 0.03 2.645 0.37 3.467 0.45 18 4.135 0.55 11 4. 213 0.50 15 34 0.37 2.399 31 0.04 0.932 12 South Korea 3.566 3.340 22 16 4.256 0.40 5 4.465 0.41 0.52 0.40 2.323 130 0.26 2.565 20 0.04 0.930 13 Finland Australia 3.588 0.39 10 4.330 0.44 27 3.883 0.41 14 0.928 0.03 43 2. 251 0.25 15 3.691 0.29 14 0.56  41 3.019 0.48  13 4.265 0.55  13 4.18 6 0.07 3.932 Ecuador 15 0.924 0.04 67 1.978 0.29 1 0.28 9 3 . 7 11 0.35 34 3.798 0.38 43 3.598 0.30 16 0.924 0.04 4 2.866 0.13 43 3.389 Japan Portugal 0.22 0.33 14 4.262 0.48 73 3.183 0.40 3.792 17 0.924 0.04 3.775 17 2.598 0.35 8 8 0.45 4.092 16  9 23 0.47 0.70 2.620 73 0.32 Canada 18 0.922 0.04 2.535 0.37 16 3.677 4.391 0.41 19 4 .111 0.60 19 4.036 0.63 0.46 3.640 3.299 53 0.37 2.563 21 0.04 0.922 19 Uruguay 12 69 3.133 0.37 51 2.869 0.42 27 3.949 0.49 10 4 . 217 0.43  5 0.16 2.839 0.04 0.921 20 Estonia  3.732 37 0.52 3.838 31 0.55 47 2 .18 4 0.39 60 3. 212 0.45 2 4.352 0.48 21 0.04 Greece 0.916 2.845 0.52 3.079 0.46 12 4.280 0.43 24 3.954 0.52 93 0.32 2.481 25 0.05 0.907 22 Italy 34 2.823  24 3.320 0.47 26 3.966 0.64 14 4 .12 3 0.56  0.70 96  0.32 2.567 18 0.04 0.906 23 Sierra Leone 0.04 2 .917 0.39  17 4.226 0.42  29 0.904 0.42 3.871 2.482 0.33 26 3.556 24 0.34 46 Chile 24 0.44 29 0.50 22 4.034 0.54 22 3.976 0.59 3. 241 2.803 97 0.43 33 0.05 0.904 25 Vanuatu 2.384 0.48 27 3.270 0.45 25 4.005 0.45 33 Niger 0.44 26 0.904 0.05 40 2.305 0. 31 30 3.507 3.810 3.504 119 1.949 0.56 21 4.045 0.58 32 3. 819 0.52 France 27 0.899 0.05 7 2.805 0.19 31 0.41 3.490 3.907 3.676 0.43 49 11 0.49  26 0.54  0.52 Mauritius 28 0.895 0.05 14 2.660 0.28 128 2.402 0.41 0.33 2 .745 0.37 44 3.569 0.42 44 3.597 63 21 0.26 2.738 11 0.05 0.892 29 Iceland 3.642 12 3.715 0.28 16 3.554 0.48 32 3. 813 0.50 23 3.968 0.58  0.23 Indonesia 30 0.892 0.05 64 2 .015 4.324  0.44 48 3.506 0.44  9 31 0.29 11 3.733 Spain 79 2.560 0.59 0.27 0.05 45 2.243 0.891 2.905 0.35 3.367 0.43 39 3.679 0.44 41 3.635 0.32 0.27 2.565 19 0.05 0.877 32 Taiwan 89 20  25 3.942 0. 51 3.228 0.58 0.45 0.53 20 4.094 2.785 Trinidad and Tobago 33 0.877 0.05 36 2.333 58 57 0. 31 3.642 0.36  5 4.008 0. 51  30 3.856 0.62 81 3.019 0.53  22 0.29 2. 319 38 0.06 0.877 34 Bhutan 3.103 0.37 50 2.877 0.56 36 3.759 0.43 56 3.414 0.40 South Africa 35 0.869 0.06 15 2.654 0.32 71  62 3.338 0.45 39 69 3.151 0.43 3.410 7 3.810 0.49 Jamaica 36 0.868 0.05 42 2.272 0.25 0.35 0.41 3.402 2.837 0.37 38 3.710 0.34 45 3.575 53 Slovenia 37 0.867 0.06 28 2.422 0.27 40 0.43 32 3.470 0.32 71 2.629 0.35  113 2 .19 6 0.33   4.470 0.45  3 0.25 2.701 13 0.06 0.866 38 Benin 3. 514 0.37 80 2. 551 0.34 39 3.606 0.41 28 3.877 0.37 Austria 0.866 0.05 29 2.407 0.36 29 41 44 3.388 0.35 37 3.0 61 0.35 37 3.727 0.36 42 3. 613 0.34 United Kingdom 40 0.856 0.06 37 2.332 0.25 3.726 83 42 3.016 0.45 35 3.778 0.58 38 0.35 0.60 Panama 41 0.856 0.06 0.40 49 2 .16 6 2.990 0.33  19 3.664 0.32  70 2.632 0.53 47 3.542 0.41 58 3.385 0.50   30 2.401 0.06 0.850 42 Ivory Coast 0.07 0.62 76 2.597 0.45 45 3.558 0.48 48 3.549 0.55 Cyprus 43 0.26 104 26 2.725 0.847 2.467 12 79 3.618 0.39 59 3. 241 0.48 13 4.200 0.30  3. 012  0.46 1.619 96 0.06 0.847 44 Mongolia 0.20 0.39 64 3.063 0.43 28 3.940 0.56 55 3.419 0.57 0.40 1.633 94 0.08 0.833 45 Burkina Faso  3 .179 35  3.300 2.339 0.32  29 3.873 0.42  40 3.681 0.28 93 52 0.34 0.25 1.875 72   0.07 0.829 46 Ghana  30 3.132 0.33 61 3.223 0.34  Georgia 3.573 0.32 47 0.826 0.07 70 1.896 0.24 6 3.810 0.19 46  3.157 2.924 58 3.253 0.45 60 3. 351 0.36 45 0.50 66 0.29 2 .19 4 46 0.08 0.822 48 Senegal 0.52 0.42 59 2.785 0.36 42 3.604 0. 51 66 3.289 0.42 Namibia 49 0. 819 0.07 60 2.033 0.26 84 2 .974 2.607  2.758 0.38  97 61 0. 31 63 3.323 0. 31 0.34 50 0. 814 0.07 48 2 .17 7 0.30 23 3.638 Morocco 3.491 28  57 2.792 0.30  88 2.783 0.46  52 0.36 0.41   3. 515 2 . 313 39  0.29 0.07 0. 812 51 Sri Lanka 3.755 0.24 68 2.666 0. 31  40 3. 613 Lithuania  64 3. 313 0.28 52 0. 812 0.07 74 1.865 0.18  9 0.35 3. 312 36 3.062 0.32 33 3.802 0.53 67 3.282 0.29 49 0.18 1.678 90 0.08 0 . 811 53 Botswana 0.37 121 2.534 0.68 31 3.127 0.50 52 3.377 0.52  51 3. 515 0.34   0.36 Colombia 54 0 . 811 0.07 58 2.043 2.946 0.30 56 2.797 0.35 50 3.419 0.39 70 3. 241 0.41 55 0.07 52 2 .13 4 0.24 85 S.Tomé & P. 0.810 0. 51 24 2.502 0.32 43 3.576 83 31 3.862 0.56 3.591  0.40 0.07 0.810 0.33 56 Suriname 1.473 116  106 2.613 0. 31 3.799 0.56 0.20 0.33 65 3. 210 2.612 Cape Verde 75 57 0.804 0.08 35 2.347 0. 31 7 0.45 69 2.644 0.35 57 3.266 0.38 54 3.439 0.33 Latvia 58 0.804 0.08 44 2.247 0.30 86 2.942 3.162 80 0.28 47 2 .912 0.47  79 2.925 0.42 75 3.008 0.33   0. 31 2.394 32  0.07 0.804 59 Kyrgyzstan 3.086 0.47 87 2.458 0.41 55 3.334 0.45 34 3.804 0.45 Mali 60 0.793 0.08 92 1.657 0.29 73 3.400 0.792 44 2.944 0.43 89 2 .747 0.48 65 3.299 0.45 Peru 61 0.08 61 2.024 0.20 41 0.40 0.35  59 3.369 67 3 .171 0.48 3.385 2.776 0.46 60 45 Czech Republic 62 0.791 0.08 0.48 73 1.873 0.23 2.580 0.52 90 2.405 0.43 23 4.016 0.38 57 3.405 0.47 Bulgaria 63 0.786 0.09 100 1. 587 0.20 117 3.097 68 21 3.356 0.48 90 2 .745 0.47 90 2.851 0.39 72 Seychelles 64 0.766 0.09 0.32 1.947 0.25 0.36 76 0.59 87 2.898 0.44 2.978 2.864 0.45 3.445 35  52 0.22 Malawi 65 0.766 0.10 82 1.805 135  0.48  84 2.492 0.44 2 . 213 1.693 0.39  72 3.189 0.39 135 Barbados 0.763 0.09 104 1.555 0.20 66 20 3.660 62 2 .74 6 0.40 92 2.676 0.34 71 3.205 0.48 1.764 85 0.09 0.762 67 Israel 0.37 0.34 2.642 0.27 2.903 0.34 74 2.995 0.32 76 3.16 0 0. 31 115 0.33 1.923 69 0.09 0.755 68 Nigeria 48 3.540 0.42 0.59 84 2.844 0.63 119 2.340 0.58 2.710 65 Singapore 69 0.751 0.10 27 2.443 0.45 27 0.34 49 2.891 0.35 71 3 .112 0.44 96 2.763 0.39 Mexico 70 0.747 0.09 81 1. 811 0.20 78 3.030 0.41  107 2. 361 0.38 69 3.259 0. 51 3.036 0.43 39 2.777 101 0.42 1.858 75 0.09 0.742 71 Argentina 113 2.652 0.95 12 5 1.892 0.45 83 2.844 0.56 30 3.866 0.63  0.48 Serbia 72 0.742 0.09 93 1.649 2.702 0.67 32 3 .118 0.39  85  0.58  100 2.696 0.33  2 . 811 53 2 .119 0.42  108 The Gambia 0.09 73 0.739 3.522 3.665 2.080 0.41  111 2.236 0.47  50 107 0.49 18 0.33 Philippines 74 0.727 0.10 66 1.983 0.30 2.880 0.95 33 3 .116 0.78 103 2.445 0.57 Palestine/West Bank 2.306 0.57 75 0.726 0 .11 22 2.536 0.37 90 12 3 77 0.25 74 2.616 0.53 53 3.364 0.42 114 3.0 41 0.44 0.18 1.602 97 0.09 0.725 76 Tanzania 2.404 147 2 . 013 0.71 54 2.822 0.46 73 3.006 0.55 20 4.021 0.65 Pakistan 77 0.722 0.10 149 1.066 0.28 46 0.45 0.26 55 2 . 815 0.34 82 2.853 0.53 98 2.704 0.33 Timor-Leste 78 0.716 0.10 88 1.692 3.368 91 2.299 94 2.285 0.40 70 3.124 0.46 113 2 . 413 0.35  41 0 .11 2.864 0.25 0.40 0.716 79 Uganda 2.990 99 2 .19 9 0.30 63 3. 219 0.47 83 105 0.63 98 Nepal 80 0.708 1. 590 2.721 0.10 0.45 0.25 1.152 0.71 115 1.972 0.43 75 2.978 0.47 21 3.992 0.62 Dominican Republic 81 0.706 0.10 107 1. 537 0.37 165 2.405 127 143 1.479 0.48 64 3 . 217 0.84 85 2.945 0.36 Croatia 82 0.702 0 .11 63 2.021 0.35 0.56 79  117 2 .133 0.36  3.069 0.53 0.42 3.225 58 43 2.946 0.37 1.846 77 0.09 0.699 83 Macedonia 0.36 0.35 56 3.263 0.62 85 2.469 0.63 12 3 2.018 0.71  86 2.909 0.39   34 2.373 84 Liberia 0.698 0 .11 0. 21  129 2.336 0.37 78 2.565 0.34  51 3.405 0.52  102 2.679 0.38  0 .11 118 1.4 49 Libya 85 0.695  0.30 141 122 1.918 0.32 60 3. 231 0.38 92 2.796 0.35 0.27 2 .192 50 hong Kong 86 0.693 0.09 2 .150  3.707 0.29 100 2 .19 4 0.29 101 2. 521 0.60 111 Ukraine 0.47 87 0.691 0.09 54 2 .102 0.33 14 2.457 1. 526 167 1.098 0.53 64 2.728 0.49 112 2.225 0.44 36 3.778 0.61 108 0 .11 0.690 88 erzegovina Bosnia and h 0.62

93  indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. V-Dem Annu Al Repo RT 2018 93 indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty. SD+/- common g engaged ood reasoned respect for Deliberative c range of omponent society consultation counterarguments justification justification cI) Index (D Score Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- SD+/- Score rank country SD+/- Score SD+/- rank rank Score SD+/- rank rank 86 2.443 94 2.768 0.35 88 0.35 2. 316 131 0.25 1.823 79 2.799 0.38 0.12 0.688 89 Montenegro 0.44 3.320  105 2.395 0.32  99 2.697 0.37  0.62 2.783 99  0.57 0.20 1. 503 111  23  Myanmar 90 0.688 0 .11 95 74 3.16 6 0.45  2.674 72 3.066 0.50 111  0.42 1. 268 137 2.260 0.84 0.10 0.685 91 Gabon 0.49 81 0.45 0.25  3. 221 131 62  0. 51 2.536 1.894 0.43 2.863 92 0.35 2.084 56 0.10 0.683 92 To go  78 3.105 0.41 93 0.675 0 .11 83 1.791 0.19 118 2.573 0.60 142 1. 510 0.63 66 3.192 Lesotho 0.49 0.32  115 2 .152 0.35  49 3.533 0.37   89 1.680 0 .17  145 2 .110 0.59  109 2.070 USA 94 0.669 0.10 111 0.69 126 2 .19 0 0.42  Lebanon 0.56 54 3.349 95 0.667 0.12 76 1.854 0.39 109 2.688 0.58  2.025 1.792 2.475 2 . 815 0.58 102 0.77 96 0.666 0.12 57  0.73 91 130 0.41 3.156 67 0.34 2.078 New Zealand 0.43 3.467 53  119 1.4 47 0.36 14 4 2 .150 0.50 117 1.967 0.33 96 2.608 honduras 97 0.663 0.12 0.45 2.936 0.49 107 2.598 0.42 Kosovo 98 0.661 0 .11 109 1. 519 0.44 75 3.077 0.58 103 2 .128 0.56 78 81 0.65 104 2.639 0.29  2.859 99 0.655 0 .11 55 2.098 0.30 51 0.54 40 3.019 0.46 3.305 Mozambique 1.833 0.32 3.342 0.47 1.994 112 0.39 3.002 81 0.43 1.709 87 0.36 131 0 .11 0.652 100 Kuwait 61  82 0.46 0.33 2.439 Solomon Islands 101 0.651 0.12 133 3.014 1. 278 0.39 76 3.044 0.41 97 2.258 0.46 104 0.44 89 2 . 874 0.50 Slovakia 102 0.651 0.12 106 1. 54 4 0.25 132 2.284 0.38 102 2 .13 4 0.45 80 2.924 0.38 0.39 2.664 0.46 2.629 94 0.36 1.932 120 103 3.365 47 0.35 95 0.12 0.647 103 Algeria 1.624 2.689 0.36 68  0.56  121 2. 316 0. 51  113 1.482 0.24  119 2.564 0.40  66 3.16 0 Brazil 104 0.645 0 .11 46 3.543 0.57 128 2 .130 0.41 0.39 108 2.076 0.43 El Salvador 105 0.639 0 .11 117 1.470 0.19 12 3 2.4 61   56  88 2.892 0.40 0.41 3.295 1.877 126 0.46 0.30 2.801 98 0.23 1. 501 112 0.12 0.636 106 Guyana 2.938 0.57 120 2. 319 0.54 107 0.633 0.12 141 1. 220 0.29 151 1.824 0.43 38 3.046 0.45 Comoros 77 1.867 0.29  109  0.37  93 2.780 0.33 78 1.832 0.25 122 2.496 0.30  127 2.330 0.09 0.624 108 Zambia 87 2.794  115 2.402 0.70 0.47 2 . 515 82 0.49 1. 264 Vietnam 109 0.621 0.12 91 1.678 0.29 162 0.72 120 2.681 105 2.614 0.34 67 0.53 2.672 112 0.32 2 .111 1.476 115 0 .11 0.607 0.41 110 Jordan 0.28 14 0 1.559 47 3.569 0.36  138 0.54 3.084 74  1.640 0.27 0.35 0. 21 1.479 114 0.13 0.606 111 Bolivia 0.593 2.765 0.34 149 Guatemala 112 114 0.60 0.12 127 1.873 1.975 0.34 93 2.655 0.50 95 1. 337 0.26 0.36 77 3 .115 0.41 Armenia 113 0.591 0.13 126 1. 355 0.40 61 3.206 0.37 98 2.201 0.39 136 1.693 2.258 12 5 2.256 0.57  110  0.69 0. 51 1.957 0.16 0.63 2 .749 103 0.39 1. 815 80 0.582 114 Mauritania 118 1.648 0.46  116 2.393 0.53 115 0.577 0.12 71 1.893 0. 31 94 2.842 0.63 104 2 .10 8 0.47 Malaysia 139 0.48 2.086 0.40 68 3.273 0.44  48 3. 313 0.34 136 1. 595 121 Poland 0.30 1.102 14 8 0.12 0.575 116 0.68 110 2.465 0.64 0.49 1.467 0.76 132 0.13 0. 561 117 CAR 158 72 2.628 0.65 98 2.605 1. 286 2.367 0.48 124 2.296 0.41 118 0.560 0.13 122 1.408 0.28 124 2.418 0.61 Moldova 2 .156 0.36 106 101 0.65 118 2 .133 0.61 13 4 1.842 0.44  70 3 .114 0.53 105 2 .10 6 0.550 Guinea 119 0.15 103 1.559 0.35 0.46 13 4 1.705 42 127 2 .145 0.62  3.396 0.48  110 2.062 0.50 Fiji 120 0.546 0.13 101 1. 583 0.25  0.40  80 3.022 0.48 157 1.18 8 0.59 1.714 152 0.36 2.005 65 0.14 1.690 0.543 121 Iraq 0.52 135 159 1.985 2.972 0.36 Afghanistan 122 0.537 0.13 127 84 0.783 0.32 139 2 .195 0. 51 0.33 2.437 89 0.83 126 1.988 0.44 143 1. 524 0.36   96 2.259 0.28 0.57 2.020 14 6 0.32 1. 548 0.14 0.532 12 3 hungary 105 122 2.082 0.57 145 1.416 0.38 Iran 124 0. 531 0.16 86 1.764 0.53 95 2.835 0.67 91 2.372 0.57  1. 255 1.974 0.49 112 2.414 0.57 128 88 2.926 0.26  152 0.25 0.12 China 12 5 0.507 102 1. 566 0.23 136 1.705 0.43  0.41 0.53 0.43 2 .173 2.4 61 86 114 2.558 120 0.24 1.001 153 0.14 0.500 126 Somaliland 91 2.676 0.42 109 2.543 0.39 127 0.495 0.14 162 0.722 0.28 160 1. 365 0.53 116 1.970 Paraguay 0.27 13 4 1.713 0.45  95 2.610 0.64  157 1. 227 0.45   128 1. 323 0.27  59 3.225 0.37 0.15 0.494 128 India 2.678 2.523 0.38 129 2.046 0.42 0.30 1. 277 13 4 0.12 0.486 129 Zimbabwe 110 0.39 1.032 0.36 100 158 99 1.16 8 108 2.595 0.75 155 0.89 2 .19 6 138 0.45 1.138 147 0.12 0.482 130 United Arab Emirates 2.580 0.40 0.70 1. 323 2.016 1.651 0.38 Papua New Guinea 131 0.482 0.12 129 139 0.26 13 4 2.227 0.45 106 2 .10 0 0.38 124 0.33 133 1.760 0.54 150 1. 334 0.58  0.83 0.15 132 0.476 0.50 2.595 77 Rwanda 2 .19 4 14 0 0.67 1.405 12 3  0.29  12 5 2.003 0.39  151 1.333 0.35  14 0 1. 261 0.25  17 3.669 0.32  12 3 1.912 0.466 Uzbekistan 0.12 133 14 6 1.414 0.36 117 2.375 0. 51 13 4 0.465 0.12 110 1. 510 0.23 12 5 2 . 412 0.47 14 4 1.477 Madagascar 0.48 1. 345 132 1.808 0.30  97 2.736 0.62  150 0.30 Bangladesh 135 0.460 0.13 0.39 2.408 126 0.29 1.043 151 0.55 14 8 1. 394 0.37  130 124 0.50  1.966  1. 395 0.26  143 2 .174 0.58 124 1.909 Albania 136 0.459 0.13 142 1. 501 0.37 122 2 . 315 0.38 137 0.454 0.14 120 1.425 Djibouti 136 2.207 0.66 147 1.415 0.34 0.23  14 8 1. 383 0.42 129 1.9 41 0.35  141 1.589 0.56   99 1.589 0.30  166 1.12 5 0.37 0.15 0.427 138 Somalia 102  161 1.101 0.44  14 0 1. 613 0.57  1.789 84  0.15 0.424 139 Kenya 2.775 141 1. 529 0.43 0.37 0.49 0.36 145 0.35 142 1. 574 0.29 137  0. 51 3.296 54 0.22 1. 275 135 1. 576 0.14 0.420 14 0 Maldives 1.4 48 137 1.849 14 8 1. 357 0.30 129 0.43 3 .17 2 65  1.678 0.42 0.36 Ethiopia 141 0.408 0.12 14 4 1.193 0.25  158 0.33 0.37  135 1.798 0.36 3.19 4 1.176 145 63 0.36  145 1.470 0.32   1.185 0.13 0.403 142 Romania 2.358 0.61 17 2 0.671 0.30  143 0.378 0 .17 14 6 1.141 0.41 161 1. 329 0.57 113 1.976 DRC 108 0.66 0.47 1.881 0.41 132 1.889 0.71 1.931 121 0.50 130 159  0.24 0. 531 168 0.15 0.377 14 4 Congo 1.421  149 1. 376 0.44  101 2.682 0.34 152 0.41 1.020 160 0.44 0.9 41 171 0.38 1.024 0.14 0.369 145 haiti 0.33  118 0.46 2 .139 116 2.346 1.776 132 0.43 0.729 174 0.36 0.359 0.13 175 0. 251 0.12 Cameroon 14 6  0.32 162 1.062 0.33 1. 288 155 qatar 147 0.359 2.350 155 0 . 911 0.30 87 2.929 0.35 0.28 92 0.13 14 4 1.495 0.35 133 1.881 0.54 Chad 14 8 0.347 0.12 157 0.858 0.27 17 2 0.900 0.45 133 1.753 0.39 0.32 0.37 1. 376 0.26 163 1.046 0.33 1.777  116 2.595 131 150 0.24 1. 263 139 0 .11 0.344 149 Angola 3.421 0. 51 0.44 0.44 38  1. 356 168 0.880 149  137 1.695 0.35 1.0 61 0.37 Russia 150 0. 341 0.13 150 156 1.16 4 153 1. 308 0.39  147 1.401 0.33  2.780 100  0.28 1. 390 12 5  0.32 0.36 Nicaragua 151 0.339 0.14 0.78 0.40 156 1. 228 0.45 133 0.56 152 1. 320 0.39 1. 321 130 0.13 0.337 14 0 152 Zanzibar 2.260 1. 541 0.46 119 152 1. 326 0.34 0.35 2 .131  1. 547 139 0.54 1.038 168 0.34 0.738 161 0.15 0.337 153 Guinea-Bissau  0.32 158 1.18 4 0.32 15 4 0.323 0.13 136 1. 269 0.23 157 1. 517 0.45 157 1.136 0.27 151 Cambodia 1. 331 160 1.156 0.35 165 0.960 0.39 Swaziland 155 0.304 0.14 138 1. 265 0.44 153 1.672 0.44 128 1.855 0.34 156 0.298 0.30 170 0.687 0.28 Cuba 156 0 .11 59 2.034 0.30 25 3.581 0.33 17 2 0.381 0 .17 1. 263 0.46 0.38 0.23  149 1. 355 0.36  1.439 169 14 6 0.826 2.648 114 0.26 1. 212 142  0.12 0.290 157 Turkey 171 0.718 0.26 14 6 1.406 0.32 158 0.278 0 .11 131 1. 308 0.29 150 1.855 0.43 15 4 Kazakhstan 0.33 1.195 0.39 159 1.165 0.45 138 1. 674 0.52 Sudan 159 0.246 0.15 160 0.743 0.35 170 0.972 0.37 161 0.937 0.37 170 0.37 14 4 1.444 0.39 163 0.35 3.434 37 0.37 0 . 7 11 16 4 0 .11 0. 241 160 Belarus 0.842 0.779 0.689 0.50 16 4 0.988 0.29  160 1.109 0.46  2 .198 137  0.39 1.19 9 143  0.28 167  Egypt 161 0.239 0.12  174 0.495 0. 21 171 0.684 0.32  62 153 0.52 1. 246 3.202  0.18 1.416 121 0.12 0.228 162 Palestine/Gaza 0.44 143 1. 501 0.43 166 0.932 0.34 163 0.198 0.10 156 0.898 0.35 17 7 0.348 0.20 169 Saudi Arabia 0.24 0.558 162 0.34  162 1.088 0.35  153 1. 301 0.41  0.849 1. 24 4 163  0. 21 0.460 169  0.50 0 .11 0.191 16 4 Burundi 0.666 0.36 165 0.916 0.27 15 4 1. 291 0.36 Oman 165 0.18 8 0.10 163 0 . 717 0.32  169 1.020 0.41 168 1.024 0.32 1. 299 0.30 169 0.701 0.41  159 15 4 0.459 Azerbaijan 1.614 155 0.23 0.42 170 0.10 0 .176 166 0.29 0.35 168 0.721 0.169 Laos 0 .11 0.13 55 0 .174 176 3. 274 0.52 170 0.455 0.22 141 1. 507 167 1. 312 0.35  17 2 0.660 0.26   0.439 0.24  15 4 0.940 0.24  68 3.14 6 0.50 151 17 7 0.10 0 .171 168 Thailand 147 1.410 0.47 159 1.175 0.24 175 0.35 0.324 173 0.10 0.16 6 169 South Sudan 0.728 165 0.760 0.26 0.14 0.35 166 0.907 0.25 161 1.065 0.28 Equatorial Guinea 170 0.162 0.09 166 0.686 0.25 173 0.882 0.32 166 0.739 176 0.13 4  138 1.656 0.44 155 1. 24 4 0.46  1.669 15 4  0.20 0.380 17 2  0.59 0.12 Bahrain 171 0.16 0 0 .11  163 1.057 0. 31 175 0.474 0. 21 107 174 0.46 2.710 0.13 0.25 0.857 158 0.10 0.156 17 2 Tajik is t an 0.276 0.18 167 0.892 0. 31 167 0.757 0.40 Eritrea 173 0.127 0.09 165 0.694 0.29 16 4 1.162 0.46 173 0.330 0. 51  0.22  176 0.349 0 .17  16 4 0.987 0.38  0.452 2 .175 142  0.26  167 0.654 171 0.09 0 .117 174 Venezuela 0.32 175 0.447 0.23  176 0.451 0.20 Syria 175 0.088 0.07 171 0.410 0.24 176 0.640 0.28 16 4 0.772 0.070 0.12 0.23 173 0.602 0.27 Turkmenistan 176 0.222 0.558 173 0.06 174 0.281 0 .11 156 1. 548 0.40 175  17 7 0.133 0 .11  17 7 0. 316 0.16  174 0.543 0.25   178 0 .115 0.08  178 0.064 0.07 0.032 0.04 17 7 yemen 0.06 178 0.191 0.10 178 0.181 0.09 0.53 0.09 0.139 17 7 0.03 0.026 178 North Korea 1.901 178 0.0 61 14 8

94 94 Appen x: Coun TRY S CoReS F oR 2017 DI r egimes of the World 2007/2017. ta b l e A7: 2017 2007 2017 country 2007 2017 country 2007 2017 country country 2007 Singapore LD ED Solomon Isl. ED- ED ED+ EA EA+ LD Australia Namibia LD Panama Austria ED+ tanzania eD- LD ED+ EA+ EA EA+  Somaliland eA LD ED+ ED+ LD eD-  São Tomé and Pr. Sri l anka eA  eD Belgium zambia LD LD Vanuatu ED+ ED+ guinea- biss. EA+  eD- Sudan EA EA Canada LD Costa Rica ED ED Kosovo EA+ EA+ Syria eA  cA LD- Argentina  LD ED ED+ lebanon EA+ Benin eD- Tajik is t an EA EA Cyprus LD LD LD Bolivia ED ED Madagascar EA+ EA+ The Gambia EA EA Denmark EA LD ED ED Mauritania EA+ Brazil To go EA EA+ LD Estonia LD LD Bulgaria ED ED+ m oldova EA+  eD- tunisia eA  lD- Finland Burkina Faso LD LD EA ED ED Montenegro EA+ EA Uganda France EA Germany LD Croatia ED ED Mozambique EA+ EA+ yemen eA  cA LD  LD ED ED- Seychelles EA+ Dominican Rep. eD- Zanzibar EA EA Greece LD- lD  eD Ecuador ED ED Venezuela EA+ EA Zimbabwe EA EA hungary LD Iceland El Salvador ED ED Afghanistan EA EA uzbekistan eA-  cA LD EA LD Georgia ED ED Algeria LD EA Kuwait CA+ CA+ Ireland Japan LD LD Guatemala ED ED Armenia EA EA m aldives CA+  eA lithuania lD eD Guyana ED ED Azerbaijan EA EA Angola CA CA  EA LD India ED ED Belarus LD EA Bahrain CA CA Luxembourg Netherlands LD LD Indonesia ED ED Bih EA EA bangladesh cA  eA Burundi New Zealand LD Jamaica ED ED LD EA EA bhutan cA  ED+ eA Norway LD LD Lesotho ED ED Cambodia EA EA m yanmar cA  ED ED+ Liberia LD CA CA China EA EA Cameroon Portugal LD Slovenia LD ED ED- CAR EA EA Cuba CA CA LD- Macedonia EA LD ED ED- Chad EA Mali DR of Vietnam CA CA+ South Korea LD LD LD Mexico ED ED DRC EA EA Eritrea CA CA Sweden EA LD ED ED Djibouti EA Mongolia fiji cA  EA+ LD Switzerland LD LD Niger ED ED- Egypt EA EA hong Kong CA CA Taiwan Trinidad and Tobago LD LD Paraguay ED ED Eq. Guinea EA EA Jordan CA CA EA UK ED ED Ethiopia EA Peru Laos CA CA LD LD LD LD Romania ED ED Gabon EA EA Libya CA CA USA CA CA LD Senegal ED ED+ Guinea EA EA Morocco Uruguay LD Iran Cape Verde LD- Serbia eD  EA+ LD- EA EA nepal cA  eD CA Chile LD- LD- Sierra Leone ED ED Ivory c oast eA  eD North Korea CA Czechia CA CA Oman EA EA ED ED Kazakhstan Suriname LD- LD EA Ghana ED ED Kenya EA Timor-Leste Palest. Gaza CA CA LD- LD- lD- Kyrgyzstan ED+ tu rkey eD  eA Israel EA EA+ qatar CA CA  Italy LD- LD- ukraine eD  eA m alawi eA  eD Saudi Arabia CA CA CA Latvia LD- LD- Albania eD-  lD- Malaysia EA EA Somalia CA Swaziland eA m auritius lD-  ED+ Colombia ED- ED nigeria  eD- CA CA EA poland comoros eD-  EA+ Pakistan eD EA+ Thailand CA CA  lD- CA+  ED+ haiti ED- ED- palestine Wb eA  cA Turkmenistan CA Slovakia lD- South Africa lD-  ED+ honduras eD-  eA Papua New G. EA EA UAE CA CA eA Spain LD Iraq eD-  LD- R Congo EA EA South Sudan CA EA barbados ED+  lD- nicaragua eD-  eA Russia EA Rwanda EA ED Philippines ED+ EA ED- ED- Botswana The sign “-” indicates that taking uncertainty into account, the country could belong to the lower Note: The countries are sorted by regime type in 2007, and after that in alphabetical order. They are category, while “+” signifies that the country could also belong to the higher category. The countries classified based on the Regimes of the World measure, where LD stands for Liberal Democracy; that see a movement upwards or downwards from one level to another are displayed in bold. ED - Electoral Democracy; EA - Electoral Autocracy; and CA- Closed Autocracy. This builds on the regime-classification by Lührmann et al. (2018). While using V-Dem’s data, this We incorporate V-Dem’s confidence estimates in order to account for the uncertainty and potential measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem measurement error due to the nature of the data but also to underline that some countries are placed in democracy indices have such an endorsement). the grey zone between regime types.

95 V-Dem Annu Al Repo RT 2018 95 Headquarters INSTITUTE With support from

96 Global Standards, local Knowledge INSTITUTE Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO 711 SE 405 30 Gothenburg Sweden [email protected] +46 (0) 31 786 30 43 www.v-dem.net www.facebook.com/vdeminstitute www.twitter.com/vdeminstitute

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