2018+Government+in+the+Sunshine+Manual

Transcript

1 2018 GOVERNMENT-IN-THE-SUNSHINE MANUAL GOVERNMENT-IN- THE-SUNSHINE MANUAL 2018 Edition A Reference For Compliance with Florida’s Public Records and Open Meetings Laws Volume 40

2 government-in-the-sunshine-manual introduction ... xi ighlights ... 2017 legislative h xii First amendment Foundation, i nc ... xiv PART I GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE LAW e oF the sunshine la W ...1 a. sCoP What entities are CovereD BY B. W? aPPliCation oF the sunshine la W to: ...1 the sunshine la dvisory boards ...1 1. a a. a dvisory boards created by a single public official ...2 b. Fact-finding committees ...2 c. s taff committees ...3 Candidates or members-elect ...5 2. a. Candidates ...5 b. m embers-elect ...5 3. Commissions created by the Florida Constitution ...6 4. e x officio board members ...5 5. Federal entities ...6 6. g overnor and Cabinet ...6 7. i ndividual board members ...7 a. i ndividual board member meeting with a member of another public board ...7 b. m ayor meeting with city commissioner or city council member ...8 c. u se of nonboard members or staff to act as liaisons or to conduct a de facto meeting of the board ...8 d. Delegation of authority to individual to act on behalf of the board ...9 8. Judiciary ...11 Criminal proceedings ...11 a. Civil proceedings ...12 b. c. Depositions ...12 d. Florida Bar grievance proceedings ...13 g rand juries ...13 e. Judicial nominating commissions/Judicial Qualifications Commission ...13 f. m ediation proceedings ...14 g. (1) Court-ordered mediation ...14 ther mediation proceedings ...14 (2) o tatutes providing for closed court proceedings ...14 h. s (1) a doption ...14 (2) Dependency ...14 (3) g uardian advocate appointments ...15 (4) hiv test results ...15 (5) Pregnancy termination notice waiver ...15 (6) t ermination of parental rights ...15 ictim and witness testimony in certain circumstances ...15 (7) v 9. legislature ...15 10. m arried couple serving on the same board ...16 11. Private organizations ...16 a. Private entities created pursuant to law or by public agencies ...16 b. Private entities providing services to public agencies ...17 c. a pplication of the s unshine law to specific private entities ...18 (1) Direct-support organizations ...18 (2) e conomic development organizations ...18 omeowners’ associations ...18 (3) h i

3 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (4) Political parties ...19 olunteer fire departments ...19 (5) v 12. s taff member or public official also serving as member of public board ...19 C. What meetings oF memBers oF BoarDs are CovereD? aPPliCation sunshine W to: ...20 oF the la 1. Board members attending meetings or serving as members of another public board ...20 2. Board member meeting with his or her alternate ...21 Community forums sponsored by private organizations ...21 3. 4. Confidential records discussions ...21 5. e-mail, text messages, and other written communications between board members ...22 Fact-finding or inspection trips ...23 6. nformal discussions, workshops, organizational sessions, election of officers ...24 7. i nvestigative meetings ...25 8. i 9. litigation meetings ...25 ettlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures ..25 a. s trict compliance with statutory conditions ...26 (1) s (2) Permitted discussions during closed session ...27 ntity involved in pending litigation ...27 (3) e Persons authorized to attend closed session ...28 (4) (5) Determination of “conclusion” of the litigation ...29 b. risk management exemption ...29 10. Personnel matters ...30 a. Collective bargaining discussions ...30 (1) s trategy sessions ...30 egotiations ...31 (2) n Disciplinary, grievance, and complaint review proceedings ...31 b. c. e valuations ...32 d. s election and screening committees ...32 11. Purchasing meetings ...33 Quasi-judicial matters, proceedings, or hearings ...34 12. eal property negotiations ...34 13. r 14. s ecurity meetings ...35 15. s ocial events ...35 16. t elephone conversations and meetings ...35 a. Private telephone conversations ...35 b. a uthorization to conduct and participate in public meetings via telephone, video conferencing, or other electronic media ...36 (1) s tate boards ...36 (2) local boards ...36 (a) m eetings ...36 (b) Workshops ...36 D. notiCe anD ProCeDures ...37 1. agenda ...37 2. location of meetings ...38 a. Facilities that discriminate or unreasonably restrict access ...38 b. uncheon meetings ...38 l c. o ut-of-town meetings ...38 d. s ize of meeting facilities ...39 3. m inutes ...39 a. scope of minutes requirement ...40 Content of minutes ...40 b. ii

4 government-in-the-sunshine-manual c. ape recording or i nternet archive as minutes ...40 t se of transcript as minutes ...41 d. u otice requirements ...41 4. n a. r easonable notice ...41 n otice requirements when meeting adjourned to a later date ...42 b. n otice requirements when board acting as quasi-judicial body or taking action c. affecting individual rights ...42 d. Paid advertising requirements and additional notice provisions imposed by other statutes, codes, or ordinances ...42 5. Public comment ...43 6. r estrictions on public attendance ...44 a. Cameras and tape recorders ...44 b. e xclusion of certain members of the public ...44 i naudible discussions ...45 c. 7. t ime and length of meeting ...45 8. u se of codes or preassigned numbers in order to avoid identifying individuals ...45 9. v oting ...46 a. a bstention ...46 b. Proxy votes ...46 c. r oll call votes ...46 d. Written or secret ballots ...47 e. statutor Y eXemPtions ...47 1. Creation and review of exemptions ...47 2. e xemptions are narrowly construed ...48 3. effect of statutory exemptions ...48 a. otice requirements ...48 n a b. ttendance at closed meetings ...48 c. Disclosure of matters discussed at closed meetings ...49 4. s pecial act exemptions ...49 remeDies anD P enalties ...49 F. 1. Criminal penalties ...49 emoval from office ...49 2. r 3. n oncriminal infractions ...50 ttorney’s fees ...50 4. a 5. Civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief ...51 6. v alidity of action taken in violation of the s unshine law and subsequent corrective action ...52 7. Damages ...54 PART II PUBLIC RECORDS e oF the PuBliC reCorDs a a. sCoP Ct ...54 B. What entities are CovereD? aPPliCation oF the PuBliC reCorDs aCt to: ...55 1. a dvisory boards ...55 2. Private organizations ...56 a. Private entities created pursuant to law or by public agencies ...56 b. Private entities contracting with public agencies or receiving public funds ...56 (1) “totality of factors” test ...57 (2) “Delegation of function” test ...58 Private company delegated authority to keep certain records ...60 c. iii

5 government-in-the-sunshine-manual d. s ubcontractors ...60 o ther statutory provisions governing records of private entities ...60 e. (1) Contract requirements ...60 (2) legislative appropriation ...61 Public funds used for dues ...61 (3) 3. Judiciary ...61 a. Public r ecords a ct inapplicable to judicial records ...61 b. Public access to and protection of judicial branch records, Fla. r. Jud. dmin. 2.420 ...61 a (1) scope of the rule ...61 (2) Confidential judicial records ...62 (3) Procedures for accessing judicial branch records under rule 2.420 ...63 c. Discovery material ...63 Florida Bar ...64 d. e. Judicial Qualifications Commission and judicial nominating commissions ...64 Jury records ...65 f. (1) g rand jury ...65 rial jury ...66 (2) t g. unshine in litigation a ct ...66 s 4. legislature ...66 overnor and Cabinet ...67 5. g Commissions created by the Constitution ...67 6. What reCorDs are CovereD? aPPliCation oF the PuBliC reCorDs C. aCt to: ...68 doption and birth records ...68 1. a 2. a utopsy and death records ...68 a. a utopsy reports ...68 b. a utopsy photographs and recordings ...69 Photographs, video, and audio recordings that depict or record the killing of a c. law enforcement officer ...69 d. Death certificates ...69 3. Child and vulnerable adult abuse and protection records ...69 Department of Children and Families abuse records ...70 a. (1) Confidentiality of abuse records ...70 elease of abuse records ...70 (2) r Foster home, licensure, and quality assurance records ...71 b. g uardians ad litem and court monitors ...71 c. d. s tatus of abuse records held by law enforcement agencies ...71 4. Direct-support organizations ...72 5. Domestic violence and stalking records ...72 6. Drafts and notes ...73 7. e ducation records ...75 Charter schools ...75 a. b. s tudent records ...75 Children in government-sponsored recreation programs ...76 c. d. t esting materials ...77 8. e lection records ...77 a. Ballots ...77 v oter registration and voter records ...77 b. 9. e lectronic and computer records ...78 a. e lectronic databases and files ...78 b. Consideration of public access in design of electronic recordkeeping system ...78 c. e-mail ...79 d. Facebook ...79 iv

6 government-in-the-sunshine-manual e. ext messages ...80 t witter ...80 f. t mergency records ...80 10. e a. e mergency “911” records ...80 b. e mergency evacuation plans ...81 e mergency medical services records ...81 c. mergency notification ...81 d. e e mergency planning information furnished to Division of e mergency e. management ...81 s pecial needs registry ...81 f. 11. Financial records ...82 a. a udit reports ...82 (1) a uditor g eneral audits ...82 (2) local government audits ...82 (3) s tate agency inspector general audits ...82 b. Bids, proposals, and financial statements ...83 c. Budgets ...83 d. e conomic development records ...84 (1) Business location or expansion plans ...84 (2) Convention center booking business records ...85 e. ...85 ownership records for registered public obligations f. Personal financial records ...85 (1) Bank account, debit, and credit card numbers ...85 (2) Consumer financial information ...85 (3) Financial information submitted by state licensure applicants ...86 (4) t emporary cash assistance program participant ...86 (5) t oll payment personal identifying information ...86 (6) u tility payment records ...86 t g. axpayer records ...86 12. Firearms records ...87 13. h ospital and medical records ...87 a. Communicable or infectious disease reports ...87 h ospital records ...88 b. Public hospitals ...88 (1) Private hospitals/private organizations operating public hospitals ...88 (2) c. Patient and clinical records ...88 (1) Patient and clinical records generally ...89 (2) Disclosure of patient records ...89 d. e mergency medical services ...89 e. h ospital employees ...90 14. i nvestigative records of non-law enforcement agencies ...90 i a. nvestigative records generally ...90 b. s tatutory exemptions ...91 (1) Discrimination investigations ...91 (2) e mployee misconduct investigations ...92 (3) e thics investigations ...92 (4) local government inspector general investigations ...92 (5) s tate inspector general investigations ...92 (6) s tate licensing investigations ...93 (7) Whistle-blower investigations ...93 (a) Whistle-blower identity ...93 (b) a ctive investigations ...94 15. law enforcement records ...94 a. arrest and crime reports and the exemption for active criminal investigative and intelligence information ...94 v

7 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (1) arrest and crime reports ...94 (2) Purpose and scope of exemption ...95 Definition of active criminal investigative or intelligence information (3) ...95 considered to be criminal investigative or not nformation that is (4) i intelligence information and must be released unless some other exemption applies ...96 (5) r ecords released to the defendant ...97 ..98 (6) a ctive versus inactive criminal investigation or intelligence information ctive criminal investigative information ...98 (a) a (b) a ctive criminal intelligence information ...99 (c) Pending prosecutions or appeals ...100 Criminal defendant’s public records request ...100 (7) (8) Disclosure of active criminal investigative information to the public ...100 Disclosure of active criminal investigative information to another (9) criminal justice agency ...101 ecords containing both active criminal investigative information and (10) r non-exempt information ...103 Criminal investigative or intelligence information received from other (11) states or the federal government ...103 (12) Criminal investigative or intelligence information received prior to January 25, 1979 ...103 b. “Baker a ct” reports prepared by law enforcement officers ...103 Body camera recordings ...104 c. d. Confessions ...104 e. Confidential informants ...104 f. Criminal history information ...105 Criminal history information generally ...105 (1) ealed and expunged records ...106 (2) s g. Fingerprint records ...106 h. Forensic behavioral health evaluations ...106 i. Juvenile offender records ...106 Confidentiality and authorized disclosure ...106 (1) xceptions to confidentiality ...107 (2) e (a) Child traffic violators ...107 (b) Felony arrests and adult system transfers ...108 (c) m andatory notification to schools ...108 (d) Criminal history information relating to juveniles ...108 (e) v ictim access ...109 j. m otor vehicle records ...109 (1) a utomated license plate recognition system records ...109 (2) Crash reports ...109 (3) Department of h ighway s afety and m otor vehicles motor vehicle records ...110 (4) law enforcement agency records ...110 k. Pawnbroker records ...110 l. Polygraph records ...110 m. Prison and inmate records ...111 n. r esource inventories and emergency response plans ...111 o. s urveillance techniques, procedures, or personnel ...112 p. ndercover personnel ...112 u q. v ictim information ...112 (1) amount of stolen property ...113 (2) Commercial solicitation of victims ...113 (3) Documents regarding victims which are received by an agency ...113 ome or employment address, telephone number, assets ...113 (4) h vi

8 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (5) i nformation identifying or depicting victims of sex offenses and of child abuse ...114 (a) law enforcement and prosecution records ...114 (b) Court records ...116 (c) Department of Children and Families abuse records ...116 omicide victims and witnesses ...116 (6) h (7) h uman trafficking victims ...117 elocated victim or witness information ...117 (8) r 16. litigation records ...117 a. ttorney-client communications ...117 a a ttorney work product ...118 b. (1) scope of exemption ...119 (a) a ttorney bills and payments ...119 (b) r ecords prepared prior to litigation or for other purposes ...119 (c) s ettlement records ...120 (2) Duration of exemption ...121 o c. ther statutory exemptions relating to litigation records ...122 d. a ttorney notes ...122 17. Personal records not made or received in the course of official business ...123 18. Personnel records ...125 a. annuity or custodial account activities ...125 b. a pplications for employment, references, and resumes ...125 c. Collective bargaining ...125 (1) r elationship of collective bargaining agreement to personnel records ...125 (2) Collective bargaining work product exemption ...125 d. Complaints against employees ...126 (1) law enforcement and correctional officers ...126 (a) scope of exemption and duration of confidentiality ...126 (b) limitations on disclosure ...128 (c) u nauthorized disclosure penalties ...128 Public school system employees ...129 (2) ystem institution employees ...129 (3) s tate university and Florida College s Conditions for inspection of personnel records ...129 e. Privacy issues ...129 (1) (2) s ealed records ...130 Criminal history information ...130 f. Deferred compensation ...131 g. Direct deposit ...131 h. i. Drug test results ...131 j. mployee assistance program ...131 e k. e mployment search or consultant records ...131 l. e valuations of employee performance ...132 (1) h ospital employees ...132 Public school employees ...132 (2) (3) s tate university and Florida College s ystem institution employees ...132 m. e xamination questions and answer sheets ...133 n. h ome addresses, telephone numbers, and other personal information ...133 (1) listing of public officers and employees covered by exemptions ...134 (a) a buse investigators ...134 (b) Code enforcement officers ...134 (c) County tax collectors ...134 (d) Domestic violence and specified other crime victims ...134 (e) e mergency medical technicians or paramedics ...135 (f ) Firefighters ...135 uardians ad litem ...135 (g) g vii

9 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (h) h ospital employees ...135 uman resources managers (local governments) ...135 (i) h mpaired practitioner consultants ...136 (j) i (k) i eneral and internal audit personnel ...136 nspectors g (l) i nvestigators and inspectors of the Department of Business and Professional r egulation ...136 (m) i nvestigators of the Department of Financial s ervices and office of Financial r egulation with specified duties ...136 (n) Judges, magistrates, and hearing officers (state) ...137 (o) Juvenile Justice juvenile probation and detention officers and counselors ...137 (p) law enforcement and correctional personnel ...137 (q) Personnel of the Department of h ealth with specified duties ...138 Prosecutors and judges (federal) ...138 (r) Prosecutors (state) ...138 (s) Public defenders and other specified counsel ...138 (t) (u) r evenue collection and enforcement or child support enforcement ...139 (v) u.s. military servicemembers ...139 uthority to release protected information ...139 (2) a (3) r ecords held by agencies that are not the employer of the designated ...140 officers or employees pplication of exemption to ...140 (4) a elephone numbers of cellular telephones issued by agencies ...140 (a) t (b) list of names of designated officers and employees ...141 Prior home addresses ...141 (c) aps showing physical location of homes ...141 (d) m (e) h ome addresses of persons who are not the owner of the property ...141 (f ) Booking photographs ...141 m ...142 o. edical information and health insurance participant information (1) m edical information and medical claims records ...142 (2) h ealth insurance participant information ...142 p. Payroll deduction records ...142 r etiree lists ...142 q. s r. alary records ...143 t ravel records ...143 s. t. ndercover personnel of criminal justice agencies ...143 u 19. s ecurity system information and blueprints ...143 a. Blueprints ...143 b. s ecurity system records ...144 (1) s ecurity system (alarm) permits and applications ...144 urveillance video recordings ...144 (2) s c. s ecurity issues relating to electronic records ...144 20. s ocial security numbers ...145 21. t elephone records ...145 22. t rade secrets and proprietary confidential business information ...146 a. rade secrets ...147 t (1) s tatutory exemptions for specific trade secrets ...146 (a) t rade secrets held by specified agencies ...146 (b) Computer systems and software trade secrets ...146 (2) t rade secrets identified as confidential and submitted to an agency ...146 Proprietary confidential business information ...147 b. viii

10 government-in-the-sunshine-manual D. ProviDing PuBliC reCorDs ...148 alidity of agency conditions on access ...148 1. v ...149 2. i ndividuals authorized to inspect and receive copies of public records Purpose of request ...150 3. ole of the records custodian ...150 4. r 5. r equests for copies versus requests to inspect public records ...151 ecords maintained by more than one agency ...151 6. r ecords not in physical possession of agency ...152 7. r “overbroad” public records requests ...152 8. 9. Written request or form requirements ...153 dentification of requester ...153 10. i 11. r emote access ...154 12. r equests to create new records, answer questions about the records, or reformat existing records ...154 13. r ecords available in more than one medium ...155 14. amount of time allowed for response to public records requests ...156 a. Duty to acknowledge requests promptly ...156 b. utomatic delay impermissible ...156 a c. u njustified delay ...156 d. arbitrary time for inspection ...158 e. s tanding requests ...158 15. Confidentiality agreements ...158 16. r edaction of confidential or exempt information ...160 17. Privacy rights ...161 18. liability for disclosure ...161 e. statutor Y eXemPtions ...162 1. Creation of exemptions ...162 2. s trict construction ...162 etroactive application of new exemptions ...163 3. r 4. r etroactive application of statutes eliminating confidentiality. ...164 Difference between exempt and confidential records ...164 5. a. Confidential records ...164 b. xempt records ...165 e 6. Discovery of exempt or confidential records ...165 FeDeral la W anD the FloriDa PuBliC reCorDs la W ...166 F. pplication of federal confidentiality requirements to Florida public records ...166 1. a 2. Copyrighted records ...167 a. Copyrights held by agencies ...167 Copyrighted material obtained by agencies ...167 b. Fees For insP eCting anD CoPYing PuBliC reCorDs ...168 g. 1. i nspection of public records ...168 2. Copies of public records ...168 pecial service charge for extensive use of clerical or supervisory labor or extensive 3. s information technology resources ...169 a. m eaning of the term “extensive” ...169 b. m eaning of the term “information technology resources” ...169 c. Cost to review records for exempt information ...170 d. Calculation of labor cost ...170 e. r easonable deposit or advance payment ...171 4. r equests for information regarding costs to obtain public records ...171 5. r equests for free copies of public records ...171 uthority to charge for development, overhead, or travel costs ...172 6. a ix

11 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 7. Fees to obtain agency records held by private companies ...173 8. s ales tax ...173 9. Confidential records ...173 10. r equester makes his/her own copies ...173 11. Fee issues relating to specific records ...174 a. Clerk of court records ...174 (1) County records ...174 (2) Judicial records ...174 b. Department of h ighway s afety and m otor vehicles crash reports ...174 h. remeDies anD P enalties ...175 oluntary mediation program ...175 1. v Civil action ...175 2. emedies ...175 a. r (1) m andamus ...175 (2) i njunction ...176 (3) Declaratory relief sought by agencies ...176 (4) Damages ...177 Procedural issues ...177 b. (1) Discovery ...177 (2) h earing ...177 (3) i n camera inspection ...178 (4) m ootness ...179 (5) s tay ...180 c. a ttorney’s fees and costs ...180 Criminal and noncriminal infraction penalties ...182 3. maintenanCe, storage, anD retention reQ uirements ...183 i. 1. m aintenance and storage of records ...183 Delivery of records to successor ...183 2. 3. t ransition records of certain officers-elect ...184 4. r etention and disposal of records ...184 a. r etention schedules ...184 b. Disposal of records ...184 c. e xempt records ...185 d. e vidence obtained by law enforcement agencies ...185 e. Duplicate records ...185 APPENDICES a. PuBliC reCorDs anD meetings Constitutional amenDment ...186 B. government in the sunshine la W anD relateD statutes ...186 C. the PuBliC reCorDs a Ct ...191 D. eXemPt , ConFiDential, anD limiteD a CCess PuBliC reCorDs anD meetings - eXemPtion summaries ...225 e. seCtion 11.0431, FloriDa statutes-legislative reCorDs; eXemPtions From PuBliC DisClosure ...296 F. taBle oF aPP ellate Cases ...297 ...317 inDeX to manual anD eXemPtions x

12 government-in-the-sunshine-manual A Public Policy of Open Government INTRODUCTION upon learning that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had begun the proceedings by adopting a secrecy requirement, Thomas Jefferson decried their decision as an “abominable precedent” and added: “n othing can justify this example but the innocence of their intentions, and ignorance of the value of public discussions.” Florida’s constitution and laws unambiguously reflect the open government philosophy underlying Jefferson’s comments. i n our state, transparency is not up to the whim or grace of public officials. i nstead, it is an enforceable right of the people. The benefits of open government are frequently acknowledged---transparency promotes accountability, aids the search for truth, and fosters consistency and fairness in governmental decision making. Fortunately, though, Florida’s laws do not require that open government be justified by reference to these desirable consequences. We live in a state that values open government for its own sake, and for that we should all be thankful. sunshine This year’s edition of the government in the manual incorporates laws, judicial decisions, and a eneral opinions in place as of o ctober 1, 2017. a dditional information ttorney g about Florida’s s unshine laws, including answers to frequently asked questions, is available through the office of the a ttorney g eneral’s i nternet homepage, which may be reached at www. myfloridalegal.com. suggestions from those who use this m anual are welcome and appreciated. Please forward comments to: office of the a ttorney g eneral, The Capitol, Pl-01, tallahassee, Florida 32399. Pam Bondi Attorney General xi

13 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Legislative Highlights The following are some of the more significant actions which occurred during the 2017 legislative session relating to the public’s right of access to meetings and records. r evises the circumstances under which a court must Attorney fees in public records lawsuits— assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement against an agency in a civil action to enforce ch. 119, F.s. Chapter 17-21, Laws of Florida, amending s. 119.12, F.S. Campus emergency response— Creates an exemption from public records and meetings requirements relating to a postsecondary educational institution’s emergency response to an act of Chapter 17-184, Laws of Florida, creating terrorism or other public safety crisis or emergency. s. 1004.0962, F.S. Complaint information held by Department of Elderly Affairs— Provides confidentiality for specified identifying information about a complainant or ward held by the Department of elderly affairs in connection with a complaint or investigation pursuant to part ii of ch. 744, F.s. Chapter 17- 176, Laws of Florida, creating s. 744.2111, F.S. Dependent eligibility verification— Provides confidentiality for records held by the Department of m anagement s ervices for purposes of dependent eligibility verification services conducted for the state group insurance program. Chapter 17- 128, Laws of Florida, amending s. 110.12301, F.S. Provides confidentiality for certain Health information held by Department of Corrections— Chapter 17- 114, Laws protected health information held by the Department of Corrections. of Florida, amending s. 945.10, F.S. Home addresses, telephone numbers etc., of specified officers and employees and their families— amends s. 119.071(4)(d), F.s., to: a. Create an exemption for certain personal information relating to the office of Financial r egulation nonsworn investigators performing listed duties. Chapter 17-53, Laws of Florida b. nclude information of former as well as current firefighters. Chapter 17- 96, i Laws of Florida a c. dd uniformity by including dates of birth for additional personnel and their families and removing certain preconditions required for some personnel to claim the exemption. Chapter 17-66, Laws of Florida Insurance fraud— Provides an exemption for records relating to the investigation and tracking of insurance fraud submitted by insurers to the Department of Financial s ervices. Chapter 17-179, Laws of Florida, amending s. 626.9891, F.S. Creates an exemption for personal identifying information of International trust company— customers of an international trust entity and for certain confidential information received by the office of Financial r egulation from other jurisdictions. Chapter 17-84, Laws of Florida, creating s. 633.416(2), F.S. Involuntary assessment and stabilization— Provides confidentiality for petitions for involuntary assessment and stabilization, court orders, and related records filed with or by a court under part v of ch. 397, F.s. Chapter 17-25, Laws of Florida, creating s. 397.6760, F.S. Medical marijuana— m odifies an existing provision to establish confidentiality for personal health identifying information of patients, caregivers, and physicians held by the Department of xii

14 government-in-the-sunshine-manual in the medical marijuana use registry, and all personal identifying information held in the registry or by the department pertaining to a physician certification for marijuana and the dispensing therefor. Chapter 17-213, Laws of Florida, amending 381.987, F.S. Mug shots— Prohibits a person or entity engaged in publishing or disseminating arrest booking photographs from soliciting or accepting a fee or other payment to remove a photograph. authorizing a civil action. Chapter 17-130, Laws of Florida, creating s. 901.43, F.S. Effective date: July 18, 2018. Murder witnesses— Provides that criminal intelligence or investigative intelligence information that reveals the personal identifying information of a witness to a murder is confidential for 2 years after the date on which the murder is observed. Chapter 17-11, Laws of Florida, creating s. 119.071(2)(m), F.S. Nonviable birth certificates— Provides that certain information in a nonviable birth certificate is confidential and exempt. Chapter 17-39, Laws of Florida, amending s. 382.008, F.S. Protective injunctions— Provides an exemption for petitions for certain protective injunctions that are dismissed in cited circumstances. Chapter 17-14, Laws of Florida, amending s. 119.0714(1), F.S. Postsecondary institution information technology security— Creates an exemption from public records and meetings requirements for certain records and portions of meetings relating to information technology security matters in state universities and colleges. Chapter 17- 109, Laws of Florida, creating s. 1004.055, F.S. Sexual harassment victims— Provides confidentiality for personal identifying information of the alleged victim in an allegation of sexual harassment. Chapter 17-103, Laws of Florida, amending s. 119.071(2), F.S. Workers’ compensation— Provides confidentiality for personal identifying information of an injured or deceased employee which is contained in records of the Department of Financial services pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation law. Chapter 17-185 , Laws of Florida, creating s. 440. 1851(1), F.S. xiii

15 government-in-the-sunshine-manual FOUNDATION 2018 FIRST AMENDMENT TRUSTEES OF BOARD CAROL JEAN LOCICERO, MIKE DEESON CHAIRWOMAN Retired Senior Reporter Attorney DEESON MEDIA LLC THOMAS & LOCICERO 4712 West Clear a venue 601 s outh Boulevard tampa, Fl 33629 tampa, Fl 33606 Phone: (813) 245-0320 Phone: (813) 984-3060 e-mail: [email protected] Fax: (813) 984-3070 twitter: @m ikeDeeson e-mail: [email protected] GARY GREEN JIM BALTZELLE, VICE CHAIRMAN Deputy News Editor & Digital Director Director of Regional Media, Southeast INNOVATION NEWS CENTER THE ASSOCIATED PRESS College of Journalism & Communications uite 111 treet, s 911 nW 36th s university of Florida miami, Fl 33178 2310 Weimer hall Phone: (305) 594-5825 1885 s tadium Drive Fax: (305) 594-9265 gainesville, Fl 32611 e-mail: [email protected] Phone: (352) 294-1502 twitter: @jbaltzelle e-mail: [email protected] twitter: @garywgreen FRANK DENTON, TREASURER Editor at Large CINDY McCURRY-ROSS THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION Executive Editor & VP of Content P.o. Box 1949 THE NEWS-PRESS Jacksonville, Fl 32231 uther King Jr. Boulevard artin l 2442 Dr. m Phone: (904) 359-4197 Fort m yers, Fl 33901 e-mail: [email protected] Phone: (239) 335-0520 e-mail: [email protected] JON KANEY, GENERAL COUNSEL twitter: @cmccurryross Attorney JONATHAN D. KANEY JR., P.L.L.C. SAMUEL J. MORLEY ranada Boulevard, s uite 105 700 West g General Counsel ormond Beach, Fl 32174 FLORIDA PRESS ASSOCIATION Phone: (386) 265-5823 336 e College a uite 203 venue, s e-mail: [email protected] tallahassee, Fl 32301 Phone: (321) 283-5353 DICK BATCHELOR Fax: (850) 577-3629 Founder & President e-mail: [email protected] DICK BATCHELOR MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC. TIM NICKENS obinson, s uite 220 200 east r Editor of Editorials orlando, Fl 32801 TAMPA BAY TIMES Phone: (407) 841-4311 P.o. Box 1121 Fax: (407) 841-4313 st. Petersburg, Fl 33731 e-mail: [email protected] Phone: (727) 893-8532 e-mail: [email protected] ickensFl twitter: @n xiv

16 government-in-the-sunshine-manual PATRICK RICE PETE WEITZEL Editor Founder & Director Emeritus THE DAYTONA BEACH NEWS- FIRST AMENDMENT FOUNDATION JOURNAL 1121 Crandon Boulevard, a partment F603 901 6th s treet Key Biscayne, Fl 33149 Daytona Beach, Fl 32120 Phone: (202) 251-6672 Phone: (386) 681-2222 e-mail: [email protected] Fax: (386) 258-8465 e-mail: [email protected] CHARLEY WILLIAMS twitter: @n ewsJournaledit Past State Board LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS DEAN RIDINGS OF FLORIDA President & CEO Director, Business Development, GEC INTERSECT MEDIA SOLUTIONS/ P.o. Box 2126 FLORIDA PRESS ASSOCIATION Winter Park, Fl 32790 1025 g reenwood Boulevard, s uite 191 Phone: (321) 352-8967 ary, Fl 32746 lake m Fax: (407) 467-5515 Phone: (321) 283-5277 e-mail: [email protected] Fax:(850) 577-3600 twitter: @537votes e-mail: [email protected] twitter: Deanridings DAVE WILSON Senior Editor BOB SHAW THE MIAMI HERALD Retired Editor venue 3511 nW 91 a venue yer a 546 s h miami, Fl 33172 orlando, Fl 32801 3685 Phone: (305) 376- Phone: (407) 898-5259 Fax: (305) 376-5287 e-mail: rdshaw44[email protected] e-mail: [email protected] twitter: @DaveWilson13 CAITIE SWITALSKI Broward County General Assignment Reporter WLRN PUBLIC MEDIA treet ortheast 15th s 172 n miami, Fl 33132 Phone: (850) 570-0435 e-mail: [email protected] twitter: @caitielee0917 xv

17 government-in-the-sunshine-manual xvi

18 government-in-the-sunshine-manual PART I GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE LAW A. SCOPE OF THE SUNSHINE LAW Florida’s g overnment in the s unshine law, s. 286.011, F.s., commonly referred to as the s unshine law, provides a right of access to governmental proceedings of public boards or commissions at both the state and local levels. The law is equally applicable to elected and appointed boards, and applies to any gathering of two or more members of the same board to embers-elect to discuss some matter which will foreseeably come before that board for action. m such boards or commissions are also subject to the s unshine law, even though they have not yet taken office. There are three basic requirements of s. 286.011, F.s.: (1) meetings of public boards or commissions must be open to the public; (2) reasonable notice of such meetings must be given; and (3) minutes of the meetings must be taken and promptly recorded. The complete text of the g overnment in the s unshine law and related statutes may be found in a ppendix B. a constitutional right of access to meetings of collegial public bodies is recognized in art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const. See Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company v. Magaha, 769 s o. 2d 1012, 1021 (Fla. 2000), noting that the s unshine law “is of both constitutional and statutory dimension.” virtually all collegial public bodies are covered by the open meetings mandate of this constitutional provision with the exception of the judiciary and the state legislature, which has its own constitutional provision requiring access. The only exceptions are those established by law or by the Constitution. The complete text of art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., may be found in appendix a of this manual. The g overnment in the s unshine law applies to “any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision.” The statute thus applies to public collegial bodies within this state, at all the local as well as state level. City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 s o. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971). “ governmental entities in Florida are subject to the requirements of the sunshine law unless Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Sarasota, 48 s specifically exempted.” Sarasota o. 3d 755, 762 (Fla. 2010). The s unshine law is equally applicable to elected and appointed boards or commissions. pecial district boards (ago 74-169) and boards created by interlocal agreement ago 73-223. s And see i nf. o p. to m artelli, July 20, 2009 (s tate Fair a uthority, (ago 84-16) are also included. created by statute as a public corporation, subject to sunshine law). Cf. Turner v. Wainwright, 379 s affirmed and remanded, 389 s o. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1980) o. 2d 148, 155 (Fla. 1st DCa 1980), (legislative requirement that certain board meetings must be open to the public does not imply that the board could meet privately to discuss other matters). B. WHAT ENTITIES ARE COVERED BY THE SUNSHINE LAW? APPLICATION OF THE SUNSHINE LAW TO: 1. Advisory boards advisory boards and committees created by public agencies may be subject to the s unshine law, even though their recommendations are not binding upon the entities that create them. The “dispositive question” is whether the committee has been delegated “decision-making authority,” as opposed to mere “information-gathering or fact-finding authority.” Sarasota so. 3d 755, 762 (Fla. 2010). “Where Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Sarasota, 48 1

19 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the committee has been delegated decision-making authority, the committee’s meetings must be open to public scrutiny, regardless of the review procedures eventually used by the traditional governmental body.” Id. 296 s Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, o. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974), a citizen For example, in planning committee appointed by a city council to assist in revision of zoning ordinances was Gradison court, concluding that the committee unshine law. The found to be subject to the s served as the alter ego of the council in making tentative decisions, stated that “any committee established by the town Council to act in any type of advisory capacity would be subject to the provisions of the government in the sunshine law.” See also Spillis Candela & Id. at 476. 535 s o. 2d 694, 695 (Fla. 3d DCa 1988) (committee Partners, Inc. v. Centrust Savings Bank, which compiled a report that was perfunctorily accepted by the board made a significant ruling affecting decision-making process and was subject to s. 286.011; an “ad hoc advisory board, even if its power is limited to making recommendations to a public agency and even if it possesses no authority to bind the agency in any way, is subject to the s unshine law”); and Lyon v. Lake County, o. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000) (s unshine law applies to site plan review committee 765 s created by county ordinance to serve in an advisory capacity to the county manager). Accord s 98-13 (citizen advisory committee appointed by city council to make recommendations ago to the council regarding city government and city services), and 01-84 (school advisory council created pursuant to former s. 229.58 [now s. 1001.452], F.s). The s unshine law does not establish a lesser standard for members of advisory committees sunshine law. See Monroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, that are subject to the inc., 647 s o. 2d 857, 869 (Fla. 3d DCa 1994) (“[ t]he s unshine law equally binds all members of governmental bodies, be they advisory committee members or elected officials”). accordingly, in the absence of statutory exemption, any gathering of two or more members to discuss any matter on which foreseeable action may be taken must be open to the public, noticed to the public, and minutes kept. a. Advisory boards appointed by a single public official unshine law applies to advisory committees appointed by a single public official The s , 442 s o. 2d as well as those appointed by a collegial board. For example, in Wood v. Marston upreme Court determined that the s 934 (Fla. 1983), the Florida s unshine law applied to an ad hoc advisory committee appointed by a university president to screen applications and make recommendations for the position of law school dean, because the committee, in deciding which applicants to reject from further consideration, performed a policy-based, decision-making See also Silver Express Company v. District Board of Lower Tribunal Trustees function. o. 2d , 691 s 1099 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997) (committee established by agency purchasing director to consider and unshine law). Accord ago rank various contract proposals subject to s s 05-05 (fact that advisory group was created by chief of police and not city commission and its recommendations were made to police chief would not remove group from ambit of the s unshine law); 85-76 (ad hoc committee appointed by mayor for purpose of making recommendations concerning legislation); 87-42 (ad hoc committee appointed by mayor to meet with Chamber of Commerce and draft proposal for transfer of city property); and i nf. o ugust 2, 1993 (transition team p. to lamar, a appointed by mayor to make recommendations regarding governmental reorganization). b. Fact-finding committees a limited exception to the applicability of the s unshine law to advisory committees has been recognized for advisory committees established for fact-finding only. “[a] committee is not subject to the s unshine law if the committee has only been delegated information-gathering or fact-finding authority and only conducts such activities.” Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Sarasota , 48 s o. 3d 755, 762 (Fla. 2010). See also National Council on Compensation Insurance v. Fee, 219 s o. 3d 172 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017); and Cape Publications, Inc. v. City of Palm Bay, 473 s o. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCa 1985). Accord ago 95- 06 (when a group, on behalf of a public entity, functions solely as a fact-finder or information gatherer with no 2

20 government-in-the-sunshine-manual decision-making authority, no “board or commission” subject to the s unshine law is created). unshine law, the actual function “i n determining whether a committee is subject to the s of the committee must be scrutinized to determine whether it is exercising part of the decision- making function by sorting through options and making recommendations to the governmental body.” inf. op. to randolph, June 10, 2010. Thus, if an advisory committee has a decision- unshine law is applicable. See Wood v. Marston making function in addition to fact-finding, the s , 442 s o. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 1983), recognizing that while a “search and screen” committee had a fact-gathering role in soliciting and compiling applications, the committee also “had an equally undisputed decision-making function in screening the applicants” by deciding which of the applicants to reject from further consideration, and thus was subject to the s unshine law. ttorney g eneral’s office advised that the s unshine law similarly, in ago 94-21, the a governed the meetings of a negotiating team (composed of the mayor, the city manager’s designee, and a person designated by the sports authority) that was created by a city commission to negotiate with a sports organization on behalf of the city. e ven though the resolution creating the team provided that the negotiations were subject to ratification and approval by the city commission, the team was authorized to do more than mere fact-finding in that it would be “participating in the decision-making process by accepting some options while rejecting others for presentment of the final negotiations to the city commission.” Id. moreover, the “fact-finding exception” applies only to advisory committees and not to boards that have “ultimate decision-making governmental authority.” Finch v. Seminole County School Board , 995 s o. 2d 1068, 1071-1072 (Fla. 5th DCa 2008). i n Finch , the court held that the “fact-finding exception” did not apply to a school board as the ultimate decision-making unshine body; thus the board could not take a fact-finding bus tour without complying with the s law even though school board members were separated from each other by several rows of seats, did not discuss their preferences or opinions, and no vote was taken during the trip. And see i nf. op. to s ugarman, a ugust 5, 2015 (pension board not authorized to travel out of state to meet with financial consultants). c. Staff committees unshine law applies to meetings of elected or appointed boards; it does not ordinarily The s Occidental Chemical Company v. Mayo , 351 s o. See, e.g., apply to staff committees or meetings. , 613 s o. 2d 403 (Fla. disapproved in part on other grounds, Citizens v. Beard 2d 336 (Fla. 1977), 1992); , 670 s o. 2d 99, 101 (Fla. 1st School Board of Duval County v. Florida Publishing Company DCa 1996); and ago 89-39. Thus, a committee composed of staff that is responsible for advising and informing the decision-maker through fact-finding consultations is not subject to the s unshine law. Bennett v. Warden , 333 s o. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCa 1976) (meetings of committee appointed by public college president to report on employee working conditions not subject to sunshine law). Cf. ago 08-63 (although s unshine law does not apply to orientation sessions held by counties for special magistrates hired to hear value adjustment board petitions, “nothing would preclude a county from allowing the public to attend such orientations in order to enhance the knowledge of citizens who appear before value adjustment boards”). accordingly, a state agency did not violate the s unshine law when agency employees conducted an investigation into a licensee’s alleged failure to follow state law, and an assistant director made the decision to file a complaint as “[c]ommunication among administrative staff in fulfilling investigatory, advisory, or charging functions does not constitute a ‘s unshine’ law violation.” Baker v. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 937 so. 2d 1161 (Fla. 4th DCa 2006), review denied, 954 s o. 2d 27 (Fla. 2007). And see Knox v. District School Board of Brevard, 821 so. 2d 311, 315 (Fla. 5th DCa 2002), holding that the sunshine law did not apply to a group of school board employees meeting with an area superintendent to review 3

21 government-in-the-sunshine-manual applications, which were then sent by the area superintendent to the school superintendent with unshine violation does not occur when a governmental executive her recommendation: “[a] s uses staff for a fact-finding and advisory function in fulfilling his or her duties.” 765 s similarly, the court in o. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000), ruled Lyon v. Lake County, that the s unshine law did not apply to informal meetings of staff where the discussions were “merely informational,” where none of the individuals attending the meetings had any decision- making authority during the meetings, and where no formal action was taken or could have been 837 s o. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d DCa 2002) taken at the meetings. See also Molina v. City of Miami, unshine law because the committee “is (police discharge of firearms committee not subject to s nothing more than a meeting of staff members who serve in a fact-finding advisory capacity to the chief ”); and J.I. v. Department of Children and Families, 922 s o. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCa 2006) (s unshine law not applicable to Department of Children and Families permanency staffing meetings conducted to determine whether to file a petition to terminate parental rights); and , 219 s National Council on Compensation Insurance v. Fee o. 3d 172, 179 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017) (s unshine law inapplicable to meetings “held solely for the purpose of gathering information”). however, if a staff committee has been delegated decision-making authority as opposed to mere fact-finding or information-gathering, the s See unshine law applies to the committee. Wood v. Marston, 442 s o. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 1983). i t is the nature of the act performed, not the makeup of the committee or the proximity of the act to the final decision, which determines unshine law. whether a committee composed of staff is subject to the s See News-Press Id. Publishing Company, Inc. v. Carlson, 410 so. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 2d DCa 1982), concluding that it would be “ludicrous” to hold that “a certain committee is governed by the s unshine law when it consists of members of the public, who are presumably acting for the public, but hold that a committee may escape the s unshine law if it consists of individuals who owe their allegiance Evergreen the Tree Treasurers to, and receive their salaries from, the governing authority;” and 810 s o. 2d 526, of Charlotte County, Inc. v. Charlotte County Board of County Commissioners, 531-532 (Fla. 2d DCa 2002) (staff committee members delegated decision-making authority from public officials no longer function as staff members but “stand in the shoes of such public officials” insofar as the s unshine law is concerned). Silver Express Company v. District Board of Lower Tribunal Trustees, 691 Thus, in so. 2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997), the district court determined that a committee composed primarily of staff that was created by a college purchasing director to assist and advise her in evaluating contract proposals was subject to the s unshine law. The committee’s job to “weed through the various proposals, to determine which were acceptable and to rank them accordingly” was sufficient to bring the committee within the scope of the s unshine law. See also Roscow v. Abreu, no. 03-Ca-1833 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. a ugust 6, 2004) (committee created by the state department of transportation and composed of officials from state, local, and federal agencies was subject to the law because the committee was responsible for screening and evaluating potential sunshine uncoast Parkway); ago 05-06 (city corridors and alignments for a possible expansion of the s development review committee, composed of several city officials and representatives of various unshine city departments to review and approve development applications, is subject to the s law); and ago 86-51 (land selection committee appointed by water management district and delegated decision-making authority to consider projects for inclusion on a list of proposed acquisition projects must comply with s unshine law “even though such committee may be composed entirely of district staff and its decisions and recommendations are subject to further action by the district’s governing board”). similarly, in Dascott v. Palm Beach County, 877 s o. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCa 2004), the court held that a meeting of a pre-termination conference panel established pursuant to a county ordinance and composed of a department head, personnel director, and equal opportunity director should have been held in the s unshine. e ven though the county administrator had the sole authority to discipline employees, that authority had been delegated to the department head 4

22 government-in-the-sunshine-manual who in turn chose to share that authority with the other members of the panel. Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Sarasota, 48 s By contrast, in o. 3d 755, 763 (Fla. 2010), the Court found that a county administrator’s discussions with staff and consultants while negotiating a memorandum of understanding with a baseball team did not violate the law because the administrator’s “so-called negotiations team only served an sunshine informational role.” a ccording to the Court, “[t]his is not a situation where [the administrator] and the individuals he consulted made joint decisions. [supra].” Cf. Dascott v. Palm Beach County, See also McDougall v. Culver, 3 s o. 3d 391 (Fla. 2d DCa 2009) and Jordan v. Jenne, 938 s o. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCa 2006). 2. Candidates or members-elect a. Candidates The s unshine law does not apply to candidates for office, unless the candidate is an incumbent seeking reelection. ago 92-05. b. Members-elect The requirements of the s unshine law apply not only to meetings of covered boards or commissions but also to “meetings with or attended by any person elected to such board or commission, but who has not yet taken office.” section 286.011(1), F.s. Thus, members-elect are subject to the s unshine law in the same manner as board members who are currently in office. See also Hough v. Stembridge, 278 s o. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d DCa 1973) (individual, upon election to public office, loses his or her status as a private individual and acquires a position more akin to that of a public trustee and therefore is subject to s. 286.011, F.s.). Cf. i nf. o p. to lamar, august 2, 1993 (s unshine law applies to transition team made up of citizens appointed by the mayor to make recommendations on city government reorganization). a candidate who is unopposed is not considered to be a member-elect subject to the Accord sunshine law until the election has been held. ago 98-60. ugust inf. o p. to Popowitz, a 12, 2016. The Popowitz opinion references a 2010 opinion from the Division of e lections (Div. lections o of e p. 10-09, July 26, 2010), finding that the date of a candidate’s election to office could be deemed to be either the date specified by a court in an election case, election day itself, the date the final canvassing board certifies the election results, or some other date, depending upon the particular factual situation involved. 3. Commissions created by the Florida Constitution Boards or commissions created by the Constitution which prescribes the manner of the exercise of their constitutional powers are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s., when carrying out such See constitutionally prescribed duties. Kanner v. Frumkes, 353 s o. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCa 1977) (judicial nominating commissions are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s.). Cf. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 s o. 2d 561 (Fla. 1976) (clemency power does not exist by virtue of legislative enactment; rather Constitution sufficiently prescribes rules for the manner of exercise of the power); and ago 77-65 (Ch. 120, F.s., inapplicable to Constitution r evision Commission established by art. Xi, s. 2, Fla. Const.). Turner v. Wainwright, 379 s o. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st Compare DCa), affirmed and remanded, 389 s o. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1980), holding that the Parole Commission [now known as the Florida Commission on offender r eview, see s. 1, Ch. 14-191, laws of Florida] which art. iv , s. 8(c), Fla. Const., recognizes may be created by law , is subject to s. 286.011, F.s. however, art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., establishes a constitutional right of access to meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government by providing that such meetings must be open and noticed to the public unless exempted by the legislature pursuant to art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., or specifically closed by the Constitution. 5

23 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 4. Ex officio board members unshine law regardless of whether he or she an ex officio board member is subject to the s is serving in a voting or non-voting capacity. ago 05-18. 5. Federal entities Federal agencies, , agencies created under federal law, operating within the state, do not i.e. come within the purview of the state s unshine law. ago 71-191. Thus, meetings of a federally- created council are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s. ago 84-16. however, if a board is created pursuant state law, the s unshine law applies even if federal i nf. op. to m arkham, september 10, 1996 (technical oversight See officials serve on the board. committee established by state agencies as part of settlement agreement in federal lawsuit subject unshine law); and i nf. o p. to g reen, December 11, 1998 (tri-state river commission to s state and established pursuant to sunshine law). See also inf. op. to federal law is subject to the t. Johns river alliance, i Knox, January 6, 2005 (s nc., a non-profit corporation formed to help eritage rivers i nitiative and the associated intergovernmental carry out the federal american h Partnership agreement among state, local and federal governmental entities, is subject to s. 286.011, F.s., requirements); and Roscow v. Abreu, o. 03-Ca-1833 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. a ugust 6, n 2004) (committee created by the state department of transportation and composed of officials from state, local, and federal agencies was subject to the s unshine law because the committee was responsible for screening and evaluating potential corridors and alignments for a possible expansion of the s uncoast Parkway). Cf. Brown v. Denton, 152 s o. 3d 8 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014) , review denied, o. sC14-2490 (Fla. February 24, 2016) (closed-door federal mediation sessions n which resulted in changes to pension benefits of city employees in certain unions constituted collective bargaining negotiations which should have been held in the s unshine). 6. Governor and Cabinet article iv , s. 4 of the Florida Constitution, establishes “a cabinet composed of an attorney general, a chief financial officer, and a commissioner of agriculture.” The g overnor and Cabinet n addition, the g overnor serve as the head of certain departments within the executive branch. i and Cabinet have responsibilities that arise under the Constitution. See , s. 8, Fla. Const. art. iv (clemency). The s unshine law does not apply to those powers of the g overnor and Cabinet which derive from the Constitution; thus, the g overnor and Cabinet in dispensing pardons and the other forms of clemency authorized by art. iv , s. 8(a), Fla. Const., are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s. Cf. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 so. 2d 561 (Fla. 1976) (Constitution sufficiently prescribes rules for the manner of exercise of gubernatorial clemency power; legislative intervention is, therefore, unwarranted). section 286.011, F.s., however, does apply to those functions of the governor and Cabinet which are statutory responsibilities as opposed to duties arising under the Constitution. Thus, the g overnor and Cabinet are subject to the s unshine law when sitting in their capacity as a board created by the legislature or whose powers are prescribed by the legislature, such as the Board of trustees of the internal improvement trust Fund or the Florida Department of law enforcement. i overnor and Cabinet are not exercising powers derived from n such cases, the g the Constitution but are subject to the “dominion and control” of the legislature. moreover, art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., requires that meetings of “any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government” be open and noticed to the public. The only exceptions to this constitutional right of access are those meetings which have been exempted by the legislature pursuant to art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., or which are specifically closed by the Constitution. And see article iii s. 4(e), Fla. Const., providing, in relevant part that “all prearranged gatherings, between . . . the governor, the president of the senate, or the speaker of the house of representatives, the purpose of which is to agree upon formal legislative action 6

24 government-in-the-sunshine-manual that will be taken at a subsequent time, or at which formal legislative action is taken, regarding pending legislation or amendments, shall be reasonably open to the public.” 7. Individual board members section 286.011, F.s., applies to public boards and commissions, i.e. , collegial bodies, and has been applied to meetings of “two or more members” of the same board or commission when discussing some matter which foreseeably will come before the board or commission. Therefore, the statute does not ordinarily apply to an member of a public board or commission individual or to public officials who are not board or commission members. See National Council of Compensation Insurance v. Fee , 219 so. 3d 172, 179 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017); and Mitchell v. School Board of Leon County, 335 s o. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCa 1976). See also i nf. o p. to Dillener, January 5, 1990 (s law not normally applicable to meeting of town council member with private unshine citizens). Cf. Jennings v. Dade County, 589 s o. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCa 1991), review denied, 598 so. 2d 75 (Fla. 1992), stating that ex parte ( i.e. , from one side only) communications in quasi- judicial proceedings raise a presumption that the contact was prejudicial to the decision-making process; and s. 286.0115, F.s., enacted in response to the Jennings case, relating to access to local public officials in quasi-judicial proceedings. however, there have been circumstances where the application of the s unshine law to individual board members has been considered. as stated by the s upreme Court, the s unshine law is to be construed “so as to frustrate all evasive devices.” Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 s o. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974). ago 89-39 (aides to county commissioners are not And see unshine law unless they have been delegated decision-making functions outside of subject to the s the ambit of normal staff functions, are acting as liaisons between board members, or are acting in place of the board or its members at their direction). a. Individual board member meeting with a member of another public board The s unshine law does not apply to a meeting between individuals who are members of boards unless different one or more of the individuals has been delegated the authority to act on behalf of his or her board. Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Authority, 461 s o. 2d 72 (Fla. 1984). Accord ago 84-16 (meeting between the chair of a private industry council created pursuant to federal law and the chair of a five-county employment and training consortium created pursuant to state law is not subject to s unshine law, unless there is a delegation of decision-making authority to the chair of the consortium); and i nf. o p. to m cClash, a pril 29, 1992 (s unshine law generally not applicable to county commissioner meeting with individual member of metropolitan planning And see News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. v. Lee County, Florida, 570 s o. 2d organization). 1325 (Fla. 2d DCa 1990) (s unshine law not applicable to mediation proceeding attended by individual members of city and county boards who were in litigation because only one member of each board was present at the proceedings and no final settlement negotiations could be made during the mediation conference). an individual city council member may, therefore, meet privately with an individual member of the municipal planning and zoning board to discuss a recommendation made by that board since two or more members of either board are not present, provided that no delegation of decision-making authority has been made and neither member is acting as a liaison. ago 87-34. Accord ago s 99-55 (school board member meeting with member of advisory committee established by school board), and 97-52 (discussions between individual member of community college board of trustees and school board member regarding acquisition of property by school board). 7

25 government-in-the-sunshine-manual b. Mayor meeting with individual city commissioner or city council member if the mayor is a member of the council or has a voice in decision-making through the power to break tie votes, meetings between the mayor and a member of the city council to discuss some matter which will come before the city council are subject to the s unshine law. owever, if a decision falls within the administrative functions of s 83-70 and 75-210. h ago the mayor and would not come before the city council for consideration, discussions between an individual member of the city council and the mayor are not subject to the s unshine law since such discussions do not relate to a matter which will foreseeably come before the city council for action. Id. a member of the city council and does not possess on the other hand, if the mayor is not any power to vote even in the case of a tie vote but possesses only the power to veto legislation, the mayor may privately meet with an individual member of the city council without violating the s unshine law, provided the mayor is not acting as a liaison between members and neither ago s 90-26 and individual has been delegated the authority to act on behalf of the council. And see 85-36. nf. o p. to Cassady, a pril 7, 2005 (mayor who is not a member of the city i council and cannot vote even in the event of a tie, may meet with an individual council member to discuss the mayor’s recommendations to the council concerning prospective appointees). Cf. City of Sunrise v. News and Sun-Sentinel Company, 542 s o. 2d 1354 (Fla. 4th DCa 1989) (since mayor was responsible under the city charter for disciplining city employees, mayor in carrying out this function was not subject to s. 286.011, F.s.). Use of nonboard members or staff to act as liaisons or to conduct a de facto meeting c. of the board as a general rule, individual board members “may call upon staff members for factual information and advice without being subject to the s unshine law’s requirements.” Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Sarasota, 48 s o. 3d 755, 764 (Fla. 2010). And see ago 81-42 (the fact that a city council member has expressed his or her views or voting intent on an upcoming matter to a news reporter prior to the scheduled public meeting does not violate unshine law so long as the reporter is not being used by the member as an intermediary the s no. in order to circumvent the requirements of s. 286.011, F.s.). Compare, State v. Dorworth, range Co. Ct. o affirmed, n o. 14-aP-48 (Fla. 9th Cir. 14-mm-5841 (Fla. o ctober 21, 2014), Ct. a ugust 19, 2015), dismissing a misdemeanor charge against a lobbyist who was accused of violating the s unshine law by relaying information between board members and thereby aiding unshine law. The trial judge determined that the members to meet without complying with the s by charging the lobbyist, the state attorney “expanded the reach of the s unshine law to private citizens; and, the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to private citizens.” however, the sunshine law is applicable to meetings between a board member and an individual who is not a board member when that individual is being used as a liaison between, or to conduct a de facto meeting of, board members. See ago 74-47 (city manager is not a member of the city council and thus may meet with individual council members; however, the manager may not act as a liaison for board members by circulating information and thoughts of individual council members). See also nf. o p. to g oren, o ctober 28, 2009 (while individual i city commissioners may seek advice or information from staff, city should be cognizant of the potential that commissioners seeking clarification by follow-up with staff when staff responses are provided to all commissioners could be considered to have participated in a de facto meeting of the commissioners by using staff as a conduit between commissioners). Compare Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Sarasota, supra at 765 (private staff meetings with individual county commissioners in preparation for a public hearing on a proposed memorandum of understanding [mou] did not violate the s unshine law because the meetings were “informational briefings regarding the contents of the mou” and “[t]here is no evidence that [county] staff communicated what any commissioner said to any other commissioner”). 8

26 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Therefore, a city manager should refrain from asking each commissioner to state his or her position on a specific matter which will foreseeably be considered by the commission at a public meeting in order to provide the information to the members of the commission. ago See also ago 75-59 (director should refrain from calling each member of the board 89-23. separately and asking each member to state his or her position on a matter which will foreseeably be presented for consideration to the entire board in open session). Blackford v. School Board of Orange County, 375 s additionally, in o. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCa 1979), the court held that a series of scheduled successive meetings between the school superintendent and individual members of the school board were subject to the s unshine law. While normally meetings between the school superintendent and an individual school board member would not be subject to s. 286.011, F.s., these meetings were held in “rapid - fire succession” in order to avoid a public airing of a controversial redistricting problem. Thus, even though the superintendent was “adamant that he did not act as a go-between during these discussions and [denied] that he told any one board member the opinions of the others,” the one-to-one meetings amounted to a de facto meeting of the school board in violation of s. 286.011, F.s. Id. at 580. See also State v. Foster, 12 F.l.W. s upp. 1194a (Fla. Broward Co. Ct. september 26, 2005), in which the court rejected the argument that the sunshine law permitted city commissioners to attend a private breakfast meeting at which the sheriff spoke and the commissioners individually questioned the sheriff but did not direct comments or questions to each other. The court denied the commissioners’ motion for summary judgment and ruled that the discussion should have been held in the s unshine because the sheriff was a “common facilitator” who received comments from each commissioner in front of the other commissioners. similarly, in Citizens for a Better Royal Palm Beach, Inc. v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, no. ay 14, 1992), the court invalidated a contract for the sale Cl 9114417 aa (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. m of municipal property when it determined that after the proposal to sell the property which had been discussed and approved at a public meeting collapsed, the city manager met individually with council members and from those discussions the property was sold to another group. The circuit court found that these meetings resulted in a substantial change in the terms of sale and that the execution of the contract, therefore, violated the s unshine law. See also Sentinel n o. Ci92-0045 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Communications Company v. School Board of Osceola County, april 3, 1992) (series of private meetings between school superintendent and individual school board members to consider staff recommendations concerning administrative structure of the school system and to privately address any of the board’s concerns, should have been held in the sunshine; while individual board members are not prohibited from meeting privately with staff or the superintendent for informational purposes or on an ad hoc basis, the s unshine law “shall be construed to prohibit the scheduling of a series of such meetings which concern a specific agenda”); and ago 93-90 (board that is responsible for assessing the performance of its chief executive officer [Ceo] should not use a review procedure in which individual board members evaluate the Ceo’s performance and send their individual written comments to the board chair for compilation and subsequent discussion with the Ceo). not all staff decisions, however, are required to be made or approved by a board. Thus, the district court concluded in 364 s o. 2d Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Thomas, 480 (Fla. 1st DCa 1978), that the decision to appeal made by legal counsel to a public board after discussions between the legal staff and individual members of the board was not subject to the sunshine law. And see inf. op. to Biasco, July 2, 1997 (administrative officers or staff who serve public boards should not poll board members on issues which will foreseeably come before the board although an administrative officer is not precluded from contacting individual board members for their views on a matter when the officer, and not the board, has been vested with the authority to take action). d. Delegation of authority to individual to act on behalf of the board unshine law does not provide for any ‘government by delegation’ exception; a “The s 9

27 government-in-the-sunshine-manual public body cannot escape the application of the s unshine law by undertaking to delegate the IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach , 279 conduct of public business through an alter ego.” so. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 4th DCa 1973), certified question answered sub nom., Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison so. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974). See also News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. v. Carlson , , 296 410 s o. 2d 546, 547-548 (Fla. 2d DCa 1982) (when public officials delegate de facto authority to act on their behalf in the formulation, preparation, and promulgation of plans on which foreseeable action will be taken by those public officials, those delegated that authority stand in the shoes of such public officials insofar as the s unshine law is concerned). in News-Press Publishing Company v. Lee County , 570 s o. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d DCa 1990), a newspaper challenged the trial court’s decision to require the parties (two cities and a county) to participate in mediation and to each appoint a representative “with full authority to bind them.” The judge then amended the order to allow the parties to limit the representatives’ authority so n appeal, that no final settlement decisions could be made during the mediation conference. o the district court concluded that the mediation’s narrow scope did not give rise to a substantial delegation affecting the board’s decision-making function so as to require the mediation to be o. 2d at 1327. , 660 s o. 2d 288, open to the public. 570 s And see Broward County v. Conner 290 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995), review denied , 669 s o. 2d 250 (Fla. 1996) (since s unshine law provides that actions of a public board are not valid unless they are made at an open public meeting, a county’s attorneys would not be authorized to enter into a settlement agreement on the commission’s behalf “without formal action by the county commission at a meeting as required by the statute”). Compare Lee County v. Pierpont , 693 s o. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCa 1997), affirmed , 710 s o. 2d 958 (Fla. 1998) (authorization to county attorney to make settlement offers to landowners not to exceed appraised value plus 20%, rather than a specific dollar amount, did not violate the sunshine law).m oreover, the attorney general’s office has advised that a single member of a board who has been delegated the authority to negotiate the terms of a lease on behalf of the board “is subject to the s unshine law and, therefore, cannot negotiate for such a Accord ago 84-54. s lease in secret.” ago 74-294. imilarly, when an individual member of a public board, or a board member and the executive director of the board, conducts a hearing or investigatory proceeding on behalf of the entire board, the hearing or proceeding must be held in the sunshine. ago And see ago 10-15 (special magistrate subject to the s 75-41 and 74-84. sunshine law when exercising the delegated decision-making authority of the value adjustment board). moreover, the a ttorney g eneral’s office has advised that a single member of a board who has been delegated the authority to negotiate the terms of a lease on behalf of the board “is subject to the s unshine law and, therefore, cannot negotiate for such a lease in secret.” ago 74-294. Accord imilarly, when an individual member of a public board, or a board member ago 84-54. s and the executive director of the board, conducts a hearing or investigatory proceeding on behalf of the entire board, the hearing or proceeding must be held in the sunshine. ago s 75-41 and 74-84. And see ago 10-15 (special magistrate subject to the s unshine law when exercising the delegated decision-making authority of the value adjustment board). however, if the board member has been authorized only to gather information or function ttorney g eneral’s office has concluded that the s unshine law does not as a fact-finder, the a See e.g. ago s 95-06, 93-78, and 90-17 (if board member is authorized only to explore apply. various contract proposals, with such proposals being related back to the governing body for consideration, the discussions between the board member and the applicant are not subject to the s Cf. State, Department of Management Services v. Lewis , 653 s o. 2d 467 (Fla. unshine law). 1st DCa 1995) (issuance of an order of reconsideration by a board chair does not violate the sunshine law where the purpose of the order is to provide notice of a hearing to the parties and allow them an opportunity to provide argument on the issue). more recently, the First District Court of a ppeal ruled that a statute (s. 627.091[6], F.s.), unshine requiring a “committee” of a national insurance rating organization to comply with the s 10

28 government-in-the-sunshine-manual law when meeting to discuss the need to alter Florida rates, did not apply to an actuary who National Council on Compensation Insurance v. performed this function instead of a committee. , 219 s o. 3d 172, 179 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017). i n Fee , the court noted that the term “committee” Fee has been defined as a “subordinate group,” not a single person, and that “the multi-person concept of the term ‘committee’ further finds support in well-established precedent construing unshine law.” the s moreover, if the individual, rather than the board, is vested by law, charter, or ordinance with the authority to take action, such discussions are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s. See City of Sunrise v. News and Sun-Sentinel Company , 542 s o. 2d 1354 (Fla. 4th DCa 1989) (since the mayor was responsible under the city charter for disciplining city employees and since the mayor was not a board or commission and was not acting for a board, meetings between the mayor and a city employee concerning the employee’s duties were not subject to s. 286.011, F.s.). Cf. ago 13-14 (where contract terms regarding the police chief ’s employment have been discussed and approved at a public city commission meeting, s unshine law does not require that the written employment contract drafted by the town attorney as directed by the commission be subsequently presented to and approved at another commission meeting). 8. Judiciary The open meetings provision found in art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., does not include meetings of the judiciary. i unshine n addition, separation of powers principles make it unlikely that the s law, a legislative enactment, could apply to the courts established pursuant to art. v, Fla. Const. ago 83-97. Thus, questions of access to judicial proceedings usually arise under other constitutional guarantees relating to open and public judicial proceedings, amend. vi, u.s. Const., and freedom of the press, amend. i, u.s. Const. however, a circuit conflict committee established by the legislature to approve attorneys handling conflict cases is subject to the sunshine law, even though the chief judge or his or her designee is a member, because the “circuit conflict committees are created by the Legislature, subject to its dominion and control.” ago 83-97. And see Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, unshine law applies to quasi-judicial functions; 278 s o. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973) (s a board exercising quasi-judicial functions is not a part of the judicial branch of government). Criminal proceedings a. a court possesses the inherent power to control the conduct of proceedings before it. Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Lewis, 426 s o. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); and State ex rel. Miami 340 s o. 2d 904 (Fla. 1976). a three-pronged test for Herald Publishing Company v. McIntosh, criminal proceedings has been developed to provide “the best balance between the need for open government and public access, through the media, to the judicial process, and the paramount right of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to a fair trial before an impartial jury.” Lewis, supra at 7. And see Morris Publishing Group, LLC v. State, 136 s o. 3d 770, 779 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014); and Miami Herald Media Company v. State , 218 s o. 3d 460 (Fla. 3d DCa 2017) 1) it is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice; 2) no alternatives are available, other than change of venue, which would protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial; and 3) closure would be effective in protecting the defendant’s rights without being broader than necessary to accomplish that purpose. article i, s. 16(b), Fla. Const., provides that victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. See Sireci v. State, 587 s o. 2d 450 112 s.Ct. 1500 (1992) (court did not err by allowing the wife and son (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 11

29 government-in-the-sunshine-manual of the victim to remain in the courtroom after their testimony). See also s. 960.001(1)(e), F.s., restricting exclusion of victims, their lawful representatives, or their next of kin. Civil proceedings b. all trials, civil and criminal, are public events and that there is a strong stressing that presumption of public access to these proceedings, the s upreme Court in Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, o. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988), set forth the following factors which must i nc., 531 s be considered by a court in determining a request for closure of civil proceedings: 1) a strong presumption of openness exists for all court proceedings; 2) both the public and news media have standing to challenge any closure order with the burden of proof being on the party seeking closure; closure should occur only when necessary 3) to comply with established public policy as set forth in the Constitution, a) statutes, rules or case law; b) to protect trade secrets; to protect a compelling governmental interest; c) d) to obtain evidence to properly determine legal issues in a case; to avoid substantial injury to innocent third parties; or e) to avoid substantial injury to a party by disclosure of matters protected by a f ) common law or privacy right not generally inherent in the specific type of civil proceeding sought to be closed. 4) whether a reasonable alternative is available to accomplish the desired result and if none exists, the least restrictive closure necessary to accomplish its purpose is used; 5) the presumption of openness continues through the appellate review process and the party seeking closure continues to have the burden to justify closure. And see Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, o. 2d 208, 209 723 s Barron (Fla. 1998), reiterating support for the standards and stating that “public access to court proceedings and records [is] important to assure testimonial trustworthiness; in providing a wholesome effect on all officers of the court for purposes of moving those officers to a strict conscientiousness in the performance of duty; in allowing nonparties the opportunity of learning whether they are affected; and in instilling a strong confidence in judicial remedies, which would be absent under a system of secrecy;” and 193 s o. 3d 932, 934 (Fla. 4th DCa 2016) Lake v. State, (trial court did not depart from essential requirements of law by refusing to close Jimmy r yce a ct civil commitment review proceeding; statutory provision requiring that certain treatment records introduced into evidence be maintained under seal unless opened by the judge “does not require that the press and public be barred from any discussion of treatment or treatment records during a review hearing”). c. Depositions While the courts have recognized that court proceedings are public events and the public generally has access to such proceedings, the general public and the press do not have a right under the First amendment or the rules of procedure to attend discovery depositions. See Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 504 s o. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 108 s.Ct. 346 (1987), stating that while discovery depositions in criminal cases are judicially compelled for the purpose of allowing parties to investigate and prepare, they are not judicial proceedings. Accord Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. v. State, 510 s o. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987) (media not entitled to notice and opportunity to attend pretrial discovery depositions in criminal cases); and o. 2d 796 (Fla. 4th DCa 2002) (upholding SCI Funeral Services of Florida, Inc. v. Light, 811 s 12

30 government-in-the-sunshine-manual protective order closing depositions to the media based on privacy concerns). Cf. Lewis v. State, o. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCa 2007) (while applied to unfiled depositions made during 958 s Burk an ongoing, active criminal prosecution, materials related to defendant’s prosecution, including depositions, are subject to disclosure after the case becomes final). Florida Bar grievance proceedings d. unshine law by refusing to allow him an attorney’s claim that the Florida Bar violated the s to attend a grievance committee meeting of the Bar was rejected in Florida Bar v. Committee, 916 so. 2d 741, 744-745 (Fla. 2005): “The grievance committee meetings of the Bar are private, and therefore the Bar is justified in prohibiting [the attorney] from attendance.” The Court reiterated its statement from The Florida Bar: In re Advisory Opinion, 398 s o. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1981), that “[n]either the legislature nor the governor can control what is purely a judicial function.” Grand juries e. section 905.24, F.s., provides that “[g]rand jury proceedings are secret”; thus, these proceedings are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s. See Clein v. State, 52 s o. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 1950) (it is the policy of the law to shield the proceedings of grand juries from public scrutiny); and In re Getty , 427 s o. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. 4th DCa 1983) (public disclosure of grand jury proceedings “could result in a myriad of harmful effects”). The grand jury has also been referred to as a “coordinate branch of the judiciary, and as an arm, appendage, or adjunct of the circuit court.” State ex rel. Christian v. Rudd, 302 s o. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 1st DCa 1974). Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 s.Ct. 1376 (1990), striking down a Florida statute to the extent that it prohibited a witness from disclosing his own testimony before a grand jury after the grand jury’s term has ended. in addition, hearings on certain grand jury procedural motions are closed. The procedural steps contemplated in s. 905.28(1), F.s., for reports or presentments of the grand jury relating to an individual which are not accompanied by a true bill or indictment, are cloaked with the same degree of secrecy as is enjoyed by the grand jury in the receipt of evidence, its deliberations, and final product. Therefore, a newspaper has no right of access to grand jury procedural motions and to the related hearing. In re Grand Jury, Fall Term 1986, 528 s o. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCa 1988). And 460 s o. 2d 406 (Fla. 4th DCa 1984) (hearing ancillary see Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., v. Doe, or related to a grand jury session constitutes a proceeding which comes within the protection of s. 905.24); and In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1989) (while a court must hold a hearing and give reasons for closure of criminal court proceedings, a court is not required to give newspapers a hearing and give reasons for closure of grand jury proceedings). f. Judicial nominating commissions/Judicial Qualifications Commission Judicial nominating commissions for the s upreme Court of Florida, the district courts of appeal, or for a judicial circuit for the trial courts within the circuit are not subject to the Kanner v. Frumkes, 353 s o. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCa 1977). article v, s. 11(d), sunshine law. Fla. Const., however, requires that except for its deliberations, the proceedings of a judicial nominating commission and its records are open to the public. While the deliberations of a commission are closed, such a limitation appears to be applicable to that point in the proceedings when the commissioners are weighing and examining the reasons for and against a choice. i nf. op. to r ussell, a ugust 2, 1991. The statewide judicial nominating commission for workers’ compensation judges, however, is not a judicial nominating commission as contemplated by the Constitution; thus, such a commission created pursuant to the workers’ compensation law is subject to s. 286.011, F.s. ago 90-76. Proceedings of the Judicial Qualifications Commission are confidential. h owever, upon a finding of probable cause and the filing of formal charges against a judge or justice by the 13

31 government-in-the-sunshine-manual commission with the Clerk of the s upreme Court, all further proceedings of the commission are v, s. 12(a)(4), Fla. Const. public. article g. Mediation proceedings Court-ordered mediation (1) Court-ordered mediation and arbitration are to be conducted according to the rules of upreme Court. s ections 44.102(1) and 44.103(1), practice and procedure adopted by the Florida s rule 10.360(a), Florida rules For Certified and Court-a ppointed F.s. a And see mediators (“ except where mediator shall maintain confidentiality of all information revealed during mediation disclosure is required or permitted by law or is agreed to by all parties.”). (e.s.) Public access to court-ordered mediation proceedings between two cities and a county News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. v. Lee County, Florida, 570 s o. 2d 1325 (Fla. was raised in nitially, the judge required the parties to have present a representative “with 2d DCa 1990). i full authority to bind them”; however, after the media objected to the closure of the mediation proceeding, the judge amended the order to limit the representatives’ authority so that no final on appeal, the district settlement decisions could be made during the mediation conference. court noted that no two members of any of the public boards would be present at the mediation proceedings and that the mediation’s narrow scope did not give rise to a substantial delegation affecting the boards’ decision-making function so as to require the mediation to be open to the o. 2d at 1327. Cf. Brown v. Denton, public. 570 s o. 3d 8 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014), review 152 s denied, n o. sC14-2490 (Fla. February 24, 2016) (closed-door federal mediation sessions which resulted in changes to pension benefits of city employees in certain unions constituted collective bargaining negotiations which should have been held in the s unshine; “[w]e cannot condone hiding behind federal mediation, whether intentionally or unintentionally, in an effort to thwart the requirements of the s unshine law.”). similarly, in O’Connell v. Board of Trustees, upp. 285 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1 F.l.W. s unshine law; thus, 1993), the court noted that as to public agencies, mediation is subject to the s And no more than one member of a collegial body should attend the mediation conference. see Fla. r. Civ. P. 1.720(d), stating that “ [i]f a party to mediation is a public entity required to statutes, that party shall be deemed to appear operate in compliance with chapter 286, Florida at a mediation conference by the physical presence of a representative with full authority to negotiate on behalf of the entity and to recommend settlement to the appropriate decision- Accord Fla. r. a pp. P. 9.720(a). making body of the entity.” (2) Other mediation proceedings mediation meetings conducted pursuant to the Florida g overnmental Conflict r esolution act, ss. 164.101-164.1061, F.s., which involve officials or representatives of local governmental entities who have the authority to negotiate on behalf of that governmental entity are subject to the sunshine inf. o p. to mcQuagge, February 13, 2002. s imilarly, a closed attorney- law. client session may not be held to discuss settlement negotiations on an issue that is the subject of ongoing mediation pursuant to a partnership agreement between a water management district and others. ago 06-03. h. Statutes providing for closed court proceedings Certain court proceedings may be closed in accordance with Florida s tatutes as follows: (1) Adoption: doption a ct are closed. s ection 63.162(1), hearings held under the Florida a F.s. See In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 s o. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1984) (statute providing that all adoption hearings shall be held in closed court is not unconstitutional). (2) Dependency: except as provided in s. 39.507, F.s., dependency adjudicatory hearings are open to the public unless, by special order, the court determines that the public interest 14

32 government-in-the-sunshine-manual or welfare of the child is best served by closing the hearing. s And ection 39.507(2), F.s. 523 s review dismissed, 529 s o. 2d 694 see Mayer v. State, o. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCa), (Fla. 1988) (former version of statute requiring hearings to be closed did not violate First amendment). Guardian advocate appointments: hearings for appointment of guardian advocates are (3) confidential. s ection 39.827(4), F.s. HIV test results: Court proceedings in cases where a person is seeking access to human (4) immunodeficiency virus (hiv ) test results are to be conducted in camera unless the person tested agrees to a hearing in open court or the court determines that a public hearing is necessary to the public interest and proper administration of justice. s ection 381.004(2) (e)9., F.s. (5) Pregnancy termination notice waiver: h earings conducted in accordance with a petition for a waiver of the notice requirements pertaining to a minor seeking to terminate her pregnancy shall remain confidential and closed to the public, as provided by court rule. section 390.01114(4)(f ), F.s. (6) Termination of parental rights: h earings involving termination of parental rights are confidential and closed to the public. s ection 39.809(4), F.s. See Natural Parents of J.B. v. Florida Department of Children and Family Services, 780 so. 2d 6 (Fla. 2001), upholding the constitutionality of the statute. And see J.I. v. Department of Children and Families, 922 s o. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCa 2006) (s unshine law does not apply to Department of Children and Families permanency staffing meetings conducted to determine whether to file petition to terminate parental rights). Cf. Stanfield v. Florida Department of Childen o. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997) (trial court may not issue “gag” order and Families, 698 s preventing a woman from discussing a termination of parental rights case because “[t]he court cannot prohibit citizens from exercising their First amendment right to publicly discuss knowledge that they have obtained independent of court documents even though the information may mirror the information contained in court documents”). (7) e xcept as provided in s. Victim and witness testimony in certain circumstances: 918.16(2), F.s., if any person under 16 years of age or any person with an intellectual dis- ability is testifying in any civil or criminal trial concerning any sex offense, the judge shall f the victim ection 918.16(1), F.s. i clear the courtroom, except for listed individuals. s of a sex offense is testifying concerning that offense, the court shall clear the courtroom, except for listed individuals, upon request of the victim, regardless of the victim’s age or ection 918.16(2), F.s. 566 s o. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCa), Cf. Pritchett v. State, mental capacity. s 570 s o. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1990) (where a trial court failed to make any findings review denied, to justify closure, application of s. 918.16, F.s., to the trial of a defendant charged with capital sexual battery violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial). Accord Kovaleski v. State , 854 s o. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCa 2003), cause dismissed , 860 s o. 2d 978 (Fla. 2003). ppendix D and the i ndex. For a more complete listing of statutory exemptions, please see a 9. Legislature article i, s. 24, Fla. Const., requires that meetings of the legislature be open and noticed as provided in art. iii, s. 4(e), Fla. Const., except with respect to those meetings exempted by art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., or specifically closed by the Constitution. the legislature pursuant to And see art. iii, s. 4(c), Fla. Const. (votes of members during final passage of legislation pending before a committee and, upon request of two members of a committee or subcommittee, on any other question, must be recorded). Pursuant to art. iii, s. 4(e), Fla. Const., the rules of procedure of each house of the legislature must provide that all legislative committee and subcommittee meetings of each house uch rules must also provide: and joint conference committee meetings be open and noticed. s 15

33 government-in-the-sunshine-manual [a]ll prearranged gatherings, between more than two members of the legislature, or between the governor, the president of the senate, or the speaker of the house of representatives, the purpose of which is to agree upon formal legislative action that will be taken at a subsequent time, or at which formal legislative action is taken, regarding pending legislation or amendments, shall be reasonably open to the public. all open meetings shall be subject to order and decorum. This section shall be implemented and defined by the rules of each house, and such rules shall control admission to the floor of each legislative chamber and may, where reasonably necessary for security purposes or to protect a witness appearing before a committee, provide for the closure of committee meetings. each house shall be the sole judge for the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of this section. ouse of r epresentatives in accordance with article iii, s. 4(e), both the s enate and the h have adopted rules implementing this section. senate rules may be found online at www. flsenate.gov ules of the h ouse of r epresentatives may be found at www.myfloridahouse.gov . . r 10. Married couple serving on the same board per se unshine law for a husband and wife to serve on the same There is no violation of the s public board or commission so long as they do not discuss board business without complying with the requirements of s. 286.011, F.s. ago 89-06. Private organizations 11. ttorney g eneral’s office has recognized that private organizations generally are not The a subject to the sunshine law unless the private organization has been created by a public entity, has been delegated the authority to perform some governmental function, or plays an integral part in the decision-making process of a public entity. ago 07-27. however, as discussed below, the s unshine law applies to private entities created by law or by public agencies, and to private entities providing services to governmental agencies and acting on behalf of those agencies in the performance of their public duties. Private entities created pursuant to law or by public agencies a. The s upreme Court has stated that “[t]he legislature intended to extend application of the ‘open meeting’ concept so as to bind every ‘board or commission’ of the state, or of any county or City of Miami Beach political subdivision over which [the legislature] has dominion or control.” 245 s o. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1971). v. Berns, accordingly, if a private entity has been created by law or by a public agency to perform a public function, the s unshine law applies. s ee National Council on Compensation Insurance v. Fee , 219 s o. 3d 172, 180 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017), noting the application of the s unshine law to governmental bodies and to private entities created by a public entity. ago 00-08 (“a Accord board or commission created by a public agency or entity is subject to section 286.011, Florida statutes”). For example, in ago 04-44, the a ttorney g eneral advised that a nonprofit corporation established by state law to manage corrections work programs of the Department of Corrections, was subject to the s unshine law. And see ago s 98-42 (association legislatively designated as the governing organization of athletics in Florida public schools), 97-17 (not-for-profit corporation created by a city redevelopment agency to assist in the implementation of its redevelopment plan), and 16-01 and 98-01 (board of trustees of an insurance trust fund created pursuant to collective bargaining agreement between a city and the employee union). Cf. s. 20.41(6) and (8), F.s., providing that area agencies on aging, described as “nongovernmental, independent, 16

34 government-in-the-sunshine-manual not-for-profit corporations” are “subject to [the Public r ct], and, when considering any ecords a contracts requiring the expenditure of funds, are subject to ss. 286.011-286.012, relating to public meetings.” Private entities providing services to public agencies b. much of the litigation regarding the application of the open government laws to private organizations doing business with public agencies has been in the area of public records, and the courts have often looked to Ch. 119, F.s., in determining the applicability of the s unshine law. 390 s o. 2d 1216, See Cape Coral Medical Center, Inc. v. News-Press Publishing Company, Inc., 1218n.5 (Fla. 2d DCa 1980) (inasmuch as the policies behind Ch. 119, F.s., and s. 286.011, F.s., are similar, they should be read together); Wood v. Marston, 442 s o. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 1983); and Krause v. Reno, 366 s o. 2d 1244, 1252 (Fla. 3d DCa 1979). as the courts have emphasized in analyzing the application of Ch. 119, F.s., to entities doing business with governmental agencies, the mere receipt of public funds by private corporations, is not, standing alone, sufficient to bring the organization within the ambit of the open government requirements. See, e.g., News and Sun-Sentinel Company v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural 596 so. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992) (records of private architectural firm not subject to Ch. Group, Inc., 119, F.s., merely because firm contracted with school board). similarly, a private corporation performing services for a public agency and receiving compensation for such services is not by virtue of this relationship alone subject to the s unshine law unless the public agency’s governmental or legislative functions have been delegated to it. McCoy Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 392 s o. 2d 252 (Fla. 1980) (airlines are not by virtue of their lease with the aviation authority public representatives subject to the s unshine law); and ago 98-47 (s unshine law does not apply to private nongovernmental organization when the organization counsels and advises private business concerns on their participation in a federal loan program made available through a city). Cf. ago 80-45 (the receipt of m edicare, m edicaid, government grants and loans, or similar funds by a private nonprofit hospital does not, standing alone, subject the hospital to the s aetz and Coley, December 17, unshine law); and i nf. o p. to g 2009 (mere receipt of federal grant does not subject private economic development organization to s unshine law). unshine law simply however, although private entities are generally not subject to the s unshine law can apply if a public entity has because they do business with public agencies, the s delegated “the performance of its public purpose” to a private entity. Memorial Hospital-West 729 s o. 2d 373, 382-383 (Fla. 1999). Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corporation, Accord National Council on Compensation Insurance v. Fee , 219 s o. 3d 172, 180 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017). For example, in Keesler v. Community Maritime Park Associates, Inc., 32 s o. 3d 659, 660 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010), review denied, 47 s o. 3d 1289 (Fla. 2010), the court deemed it “undisputed” that a not-for-profit corporation charged by the City of Pensacola with overseeing the development of public waterfront property “is subject to the requirements of the s unshine law.” ttorney g eneral’s office has found meetings in accordance with these principles, the a unshine law: Family services Coalition, i nc., of the following entities to be subject to the s board of directors, performing services for the Department of Children and Families which services would normally be performed by the department, ago 00-03; astronauts m emorial Foundation when performing duties funded under the g eneral a ppropriations a ct, ago 96- 43; nonprofit organization designated by county to fulfill role of county’s dissolved cultural affairs council, ago 98-49; nonprofit corporation specifically created to contract with county for operation of a public golf course on county property acquired by public funds, ago 02-53; downtown redevelopment task force which, although not appointed by city commission, stood in place of the city commission when considering downtown improvement issues, ago 85- 55; and a private nonprofit corporation, if the county accepts the corporation’s offer to review, 17

35 government-in-the-sunshine-manual recodify, and prepare draft amendments to the county zoning code, ago 83-95. i nf. o p. Cf. to Bedell, December 28, 2005 (private nonprofit organization which entered into an agreement with a city to operate a theater, received city funding in the form of a loan for this purpose, and law when holding discussions or leased property from the city, should comply with the sunshine making decisions regarding the theater). By contrast, the First District determined a national insurance rating organization with statutory responsibility to file proposals for changes in Florida rates was not subject to the sunshine law. The court determined that the state insurance agency retained the responsibility to approve or disapprove rates and “did not delegate any authority to carry out an agency function required to be performed in the sunshine.” National Council on Compensation Insurance o. 3d 172, 180 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017). v. Fee , 219 s And see Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. , 927 s o. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th DCa 2006), in which the Fifth District v. News-Journal Corporation applied the “totality of factors” test set forth in News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & , 596 s o. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992), and determined that a private Hanser Architectural Group, Inc. corporation that purchased a hospital it had previously leased from a public hospital authority was not “acting on behalf of ” a public agency and therefore was not subject to the Public records unshine law. act or the s Application of the Sunshine Law to specific private entities c. (1) Direct-support organizations in ago 05-27, after reviewing the responsibilities of a nonprofit corporation created pursuant to statute as a direct-support organization and the organization’s relationship to the attorney general’s public agency, the office concluded that the organization was subject to the s unshine law. See also i nf. o p. to Chiumento, June 27, 1990 (s unshine law applies to school district direct-support organizations created pursuant to statute; although the direct- support organizations “constitute private nonprofit corporations, they seek to assist the district school board in carrying out its functions of meeting the educational needs of the students in the county”). ago s 92-53 (John and m able ringling m useum of art Foundation, i nc., And see established pursuant to statute as a not-for-profit corporation to assist the museum in carrying out its functions subject to s unshine law applies to Biscayne Park unshine law), and 11-01 (s inc., created as a nonprofit foundation to act as an instrumentality on behalf of Foundation, village of Biscayne Park and intended to enhance the the village’s opportunities to raise monies village). through special events, sponsorships, donations, and grants for the The legislature has specifically exempted portions of meetings of some direct-support organizations. For example, any portion of a meeting of the board of directors of a university direct-support organization, or of the executive committee or other committee of the board, at which any proposal seeking research funding from the organization or a plan or program for either initiating or supporting research is discussed is exempt from s. 286.011, F.s. s ection 1004.28(5)(c), F.s. See also s. 292.055(9), F.s. (portions of meetings of Department of veterans’ affairs direct-support organization during which the identity of a donor or potential donor who wishes to remain anonymous is discussed are exempt). Economic development organizations (2) several attorney general sunshine law applies to opinions have considered whether the private economic development organizations. These opinions have concluded that the sunshine law applies when there has been a delegation of a public agency’s authority to conduct public business such as carrying out the terms of the county’s economic development strategic plan. ago 10-30. ago 10-44 (s unshine law applies to nonprofit corporation delegated See also authority to carry out the terms of the county’s green economic development plan). Compare inf. o p. to g aetz and Coley, December 17, 2009 (open government laws did not apply to private economic development corporation since no delegation of a public agency’s governmental function was apparent and the corporation did not appear to play an integral part in the decision- 18

36 government-in-the-sunshine-manual making process of the agency). Economic Development Commission v. Ellis, 178 s o. 3d 118, Cf. 123 (Fla. 5th DCa 2015) (trial court erred by using the “delegation of function” test to conclude that a private entity under contract with a county to provide economic development services was ecords a ct because there was “not a clear, compelling, complete delegation subject to the Public r of a governmental function” to the entity; instead, the court should have used the “totality of factors” test to make this determination). For more information on the “delegation of function” and “totality of factors” tests, please refer to the discussion on pages 57-60. (3) Homeowners’ associations The s unshine law does not generally apply to meetings of a homeowners’ association board of directors. i nf. o p. to Fasano, June 7, 1996. o ther statutes govern access to records and meetings of these associations. See, e.g., s. 720.303(2), F.s. (homeowners’ association board of directors); s. 718.112(2)(c), F.s. (condominium board of administration); s. 719.106(1) (c), F.s. (cooperative board of administration); and s. 723.078(2)(c), F.s. (mobile home park homeowners’ association board of directors). Cf. ago s 99-53 (an architectural review committee of a homeowners’ association is subject to the s unshine law where that committee, pursuant to county ordinance, must review and approve applications for county building permits), and 07-44 (property owners association subject to open government laws when acting on behalf of a municipal services taxing unit). (4) Political parties meetings of political parties are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s. i nf. o p. to armesto, september 18, 1979. (5) Volunteer fire departments eneral advised that boards of directors of volunteer fire in ago 04-32, the a ttorney g departments that provide firefighting services to the county and use facilities and equipment acquired with county funds are subject to the s Cf. ago 00-08 (meetings of lee unshine law. County Fire Commissioner’s Forum, a nonprofit corporation created by fire districts operating in lee County, at which two or more members of the same district board discuss matters that may unshine law). And see foreseeably come before the board for official action are subject to the s 352 s o. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCa 1977), Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Department, cert. denied, o. 2d 132 (Fla. 1978) (private nonprofit volunteer fire department, which 358 s had been given stewardship over firefighting, which conducted its activities on county-owned property, and which was funded in part by public money, was an “agency” for purposes of the Public records act, and its membership files, minutes of its meetings and charitable activities were subject to disclosure). 12. Staff member or public official also serving as member of public board in some cases, staff members or public officials also serve as members of public boards. if so, discussions between those board members that involve matters which foreseeably could unshine. For example, a 1993 a ttorney g eneral come before the board must be held in the s opinion concluded that communications between the sheriff and the state attorney, as members of the county’s criminal justice commission, would be subject to the s unshine law when such discussions involve matters which foreseeably would come before the commission. ago 93-41. Cf. ago 11-04, noting that if the state attorney and sheriff elect to appoint individuals to serve on a county criminal justice commission in the place of each officer, as authorized by county ordinance, neither the state attorney nor the sheriff would be a member of the commission so as to make these communications subject to the s unshine law. See now, s. 286.01141, F.s. (2013), creating a s unshine law exemption for that portion of a meeting of a duly constituted local advisory criminal justice commission at which members of the commission discuss active criminal intelligence or investigative information that is currently being considered by or which may foreseeably come before the commission, provided that public disclosure of the discussion is made at any public meeting of the commission at which the matter is being considered. 19

37 government-in-the-sunshine-manual however, the s unshine law is applicable only to discussions of matters which may unshine law would not apply to meetings foreseeably come before the board. For example, the s between the mayor and city commissioners where a mayor performs the duties of city manager and the city commissioners individually serve as the head of a city department when the meeting is held solely by these officers in their capacity as department heads for the purpose of coordinating administrative and operational matters between executive departments of city government for which no formal action by the governing body is required or contemplated. Those matters which normally come before, or should come before, the city commission for discussion or action, Accord ago s 83-70 and 75- however, must not be discussed at such meetings. ago 81-88. 210 (mayor may discuss matters with individual city council member which concern his or her administrative functions and would not come before the council for consideration and further action). similarly, the sunshine law would not apply to a school faculty meeting simply because two or more members of school advisory council who are also faculty members attend the faculty meeting as long as council members refrain from discussing matters that may come before the council for consideration. i p. to h ughes, February 17, 1995; and i nf. o p. to Boyd, m arch 14, 1994. nf. o WHAT MEETINGS OF MEMBERS OF BOARDS ARE COVERED? APPLICATION C. OF THE SUNSHINE LAW TO: Board members attending meetings or serving as members of another public board 1. Board members attending meetings of another public board a. ttorney g eneral o pinions have considered whether one or more members of a several a board may attend or participate in a meeting of another public board. For example, in ago 99- 55, the a ttorney g eneral’s office said that a school board member could attend and participate in the meeting of an advisory committee appointed by the school board without prior notice of his or her attendance. h owever, the opinion cautioned that “if it is known that two or more members of the school board are planning to attend and participate, it would be advisable to note their attendance in the advisory committee meeting notice.” moreover, while recognizing that commissioners may attend meetings of a second public board and comment on agenda items that may subsequently come before the commission for final ttorney g eneral o pinions have also advised that if more than one “commissioner is action, the a in attendance at such a meeting, no discussion or debate may take place among the commissioners Accord ago 98-79 (city commissioner may attend a public on those issues.” ago 00-68. community development board meeting held to consider a proposed city ordinance and express his or her views on the proposed ordinance even though other city commissioners may be in attendance; however, the city commissioners in attendance may not engage in a discussion or debate among themselves because “the city commission’s discussions and deliberations on the proposed ordinance must occur at a duly noticed city commission meeting”). See also ago s 05-59 and 77-138. Board members serving as members of another public board b. Board members who also serve on a second public board may participate in the public meetings of the second board held in accordance with s. 286.011, F.s., and express their opinions without violating the s unshine law. ago 07-13. i n other words, “when two county commissioners are presently serving on [a regional planning] council this does not turn a meeting of the planning council into a county commission meeting, and the s unshine law does not require any additional or different notice of planning council meetings because of the presence of these county commission members.” Id. s imilarly, ago 98-14 concluded that membership of three city council members on the metropolitan planning organization did not turn a council meeting into a metropolitan planning organization meeting that required separate notice. Because, however, the discussion of metropolitan planning organization matters was planned for 20

38 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the council meeting, the city council had properly included mention of such items in its notice of the council meeting. similarly, in ago 91-95, the a eneral’s office concluded that a county ttorney g commissioner may attend and participate in the discussion at a public meeting held by the governing board of a county board on which another commissioner serves. h owever, “in an unshine law,” the opinion also recommended that the published effort to satisfy the spirit of the s notice of the county board “include mention of the anticipated attendance and participation of county commission members in board proceedings.” Id. 2. Board member meeting with his or her alternate since the alternate is authorized to act only in the absence of a board or commission member, there is no meeting of two individuals who exercise independent decision-making authority at the meeting. There is, in effect, only one decision-making official present. Therefore, a meeting between a board member and his or her alternate is not subject to the s unshine law. ago 88-45. Community forums sponsored by private organizations 3. a “Candidates’ n ight” sponsored by a private organization at which candidates for public office, including several incumbent city council members, will speak about their political philosophies, trends, and issues facing the city, is not subject to the s unshine law unless the council members discuss issues coming before the council among themselves. ago 92-05. Compare inf. o p. to Jove, January 12, 2009, concluding that a public forum hosted by a city council member with city council members invited to attend and participate in the discussion would be subject to s. 286.011, F.s. similarly, in ago 94-62, the a ttorney g eneral’s office concluded that the s unshine law does not apply to a political forum sponsored by a private civic club during which county commissioners express their position on matters that may foreseeably come before the commission, so long as the commissioners avoid discussions among themselves on these issues. And see ago 08-18 (participation by two city council members in a citizens police academy does unshine law; “[t]he educational course is not changed into a meeting of a board not violate the s or commission . . . by the attendance and participation of members of the city council in the course work of the academy”). however, caution should be exercised to avoid situations in which private political or community forums may be used to circumvent the statute’s requirements. ago 94-62. See Town 296 s o. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974) (s of Palm Beach v. Gradison, unshine law must be construed “so as to frustrate all evasive devices”). For example, in State v. Foster, 12 F.l.W. s upp. 1194a (Fla. Broward Co. Ct. s eptember 26, 2005), the court rejected the argument that the s unshine law permitted city commissioners to attend a private breakfast meeting at which the sheriff spoke and the commissioners individually questioned the sheriff but did not direct comments or questions to each other. The court denied the commissioners’ motion for summary judgment and ruled that the discussion should have been held in the s unshine because the sheriff was a “common facilitator” who received comments from each commissioner in front of the other commissioners. 4. Confidential records discussions The Florida s upreme Court has stated that in the absence of a statute exempting a meeting in which privileged material is discussed, s. 286.011, F.s., should be construed as containing no exceptions. City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 s o. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971). The Public r ecords a ct was amended in 1991 after several district courts held that certain proceedings could be closed when considering confidential material. s ection 119.07(7), F.s., provides that an exemption from s. 119.07, F.s., “does not imply an exemption from s. 286.011. The exemption from s. 286.011 must be expressly provided.” Thus, exemptions from the Public 21

39 government-in-the-sunshine-manual records a ct do not by implication allow a public agency to close a meeting where exempt records unshine law. See s are to be discussed in the absence of a specific exemption from the s ago 10-04 and 91-75 (school board), 04-44 (PriDe), 93-41 (county criminal justice commission), and 91-88 (pension board). For example, while s. 288.075(2), F.s., allows a private corporation to request confidentiality for certain records relating to a planned corporate relocation to Florida, this exemption “applies only to records and does not constitute an exemption from the provisions of the g overnment in Accord ago 80-78 and i nf. o the s ooney, June 8, 2011. unshine law . . . .” ago 04-19. p. to r ttorney g eneral advised that a federal law prohibiting similarly, in ago 05-03, the a disclosure of certain identifying information did not authorize a state committee to close its meetings, although the committee should take steps to ensure that identifying information is See also not disclosed at such meetings. s 96-75 (since transcript of a closed attorney-client ago session is open to public inspection once the litigation is concluded, city and its attorney should be sensitive to any discussions of confidential medical reports during such a meeting and take precautions to protect the confidentiality of such medical reports so that when the transcript is opened for inspection, the privacy of the employee will not be breached) and 12-20 (county transportation board designated as “appropriate local official” authorized by statute to receive and investigate whistle-blower complaints must comply with the open meetings requirements in the sunshine law; however, the board must also “protect the confidential information it is considering at a meeting and must not disclose the name of the whistle-blower unless one of the Cf. specific circumstances listed in the statute is present”). ago 96-40 (a town may not require a complainant to sign a waiver of confidentiality before accepting a whistle-blower’s complaint for processing since the legislature has provided for confidentiality of the whistle-blower’s identity). 5. E-mail, text messages, and other written communications between board members The s unshine law requires boards to meet in public; boards may not take action on or engage in private discussions of board business via written correspondence, e-mails, text messages, or other electronic communications. See ago 89-39 (members of a public board may not use computers to conduct private discussions among themselves about board business). similarly, city commissioners may not use an electronic newsletter to communicate among nf. o yrkus, themselves on issues that foreseeably may come before the commission. i p. to s october 31, 2000. And see ago 09-19 (members of a city board or commission may not engage on the city’s Facebook page in an exchange or discussion of matters that foreseeably will nf. o p. to m artelli, July 20, come before the board or commission for official action); and i 2009 (authority should discuss business at publicly noticed meetings “rather than in a series of letters between authority members”). Cf. i nf. o p. to g alaydick, o ctober 19, 1995 (school board members may share laptop computer even though computer’s hard drive contains information reflecting ideas of an individual member as long as computer is not being used as a means of communication between members). Thus, a procedure whereby a board takes official action by circulating a memorandum for each board member to sign whether the board member approves or disapproves of a particular unshine law. i nf. o p. to Blair, m issue, violates the s And see Leach-Wells v. City ay 29, 1973. of Bradenton, 734 s o. 2d 1168, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCa 1999) (selection committee created by city council to evaluate proposals violated the s unshine law when the city clerk unilaterally ranked the proposals based on the committee members’ individual written evaluations; the court held that “the short-listing was formal action that was required to be taken at a public meeting”); Schweickert v. Citrus County Port Authority, n o. 12-Ca-1339 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. s eptember 30, 2013) (ad hoc committee appointed by board violated the s unshine law when the members submitted individual written evaluations of the proposals to the staff, which then compiled the scores and ranked the proposals for submission to the board; the committee should have ranked ago 93-90 (board not authorized to use employee the proposals at a public meeting); and 22

40 government-in-the-sunshine-manual evaluation procedure whereby individual board members send their individual written comments to the board chair for compilation and subsequent private discussion with the employee). however, a commissioner may send a written report to other commissioners on a subject unshine law, if prior to the that will be discussed at a public meeting without violating the s meeting, there is no interaction related to the report among the commissioners and the report, which must be maintained as a public record, is not being used as a substitute for action at a ago 89-23. And see ago 01-20 (e-mail communication of information from public meeting. one council member to another is a public record but does not constitute a meeting subject to the s unshine law when it does not result in the exchange of council members’ comments or responses on subjects involving foreseeable action by the council). Cf. i nf. o p. to Kessler, november 14, 2007 (procedural rule requiring county commissioner to make a written request to commission chair to withdraw an item from the consent agenda does not violate the s unshine law). if, on the other hand, the report is circulated among board members for comments with such comments being provided to other members, there is interaction among the board members which is subject to s. 286.011, F.s. ago 90-03. s imilarly, in ago 96-35, the a ttorney g eneral’s office concluded that while a school board member may prepare and circulate an informational memorandum or position paper to other board members, the use of a memorandum to solicit comments from other board members or the circulation of responsive memoranda by other board members would violate the s unshine law. “s uch action would be equivalent to private meetings discussing the public business through the use of memoranda without allowing an opportunity for public input.” Id. in addition, the a ttorney g eneral’s office stated that while it is not a “direct violation” of the s unshine law for members to circulate their own written position papers on the same subject as long as the board members avoid any discussion or debate among themselves except at an open See also public meeting, this practice is “strongly discourage[d].” ago 07-35. ago 01-21 (city council’s discussions and deliberations on matters coming before the council must occur at a duly noticed city council meeting and the circulation of position statements must not be used to circumvent the requirements of the statute); ago 08-07 (city commissioner may post comment regarding city business on blog or message board; however, any subsequent postings by other commissioners on the subject of the initial posting could be construed as a response subject to the s unshine law); and i nf. o p. to Jove, January 22, 2009 (posting of anticipated vote on blog). 6. Fact-finding or inspection trips unshine law does not prohibit The s boards from conducting inspection trips advisory provided that the board members do not discuss matters which may come before the board for official action. See Bigelow v. Howze, 291 s o. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d DCa 1974); and ago 02-24 (two or more members of an advisory group created by a city code to make recommendations to the city council or planning commission on proposed development may conduct vegetation surveys without subjecting themselves to the requirements of the s unshine law, provided that they do not discuss among themselves any recommendations or comments the committee may make). unshine law, however, does not apply to a board with The “fact-finding exception” to the s “ultimate decision-making authority.” See Finch v. Seminole County School Board, 995 s o. 2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCa 2008), holding that a district school board, as the ultimate decision-making body, violated the s unshine law when the board, together with school officials and members of the media, took a bus tour of neighborhoods affected by the board’s proposed rezoning even though board members were separated from each other on the bus, did not express any opinions or their preference for any of the rezoning plans, and did not vote during the trip. See also Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. School Board of Martin County, 125 s o. 3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCa 2013) (three school board members violated the s unshine law when they visited an adult education school and talked with a school administrator, teachers, and students, because the “undisputed 23

41 government-in-the-sunshine-manual evidence showed that the defendant board members, without providing notice, conducted a meeting at the adult education school relating to matters on which foreseeable action would have Cf. Citizens for Sunshine v. City of Sarasota , n been taken.”). o. 2013 Ca 007532 (Fla. 12th Cir. o. 2D16-3173 (Fla. 2d DCa a , n per curiam affirmed Ct. July 8, 2016), pril 5, 2017), in which the trial judge held that a city commissioner did not violate the s unshine law when she spoke about city commission issues at a private event organized by local merchants even though another with the large body commissioner was in the audience, noting that “one cannot harmonize Finch unshine law as gatherings of members of a of Florida law that defines ‘meetings’ under the s governmental entity for the purpose of dialogue, decision, and action about a subject within the entity’s purview.” 7. Informal discussions, workshops, organizational sessions, election of officers The s unshine law extends to the discussions and deliberations as well as the formal action taken by a public board or commission. There is no requirement that a quorum be present or that an item be listed on a board agenda in order for a meeting of members of a public board or commission to be subject to s. 286.011, F.s. as the Florida s upreme Court said, “collective inquiry and discussion stages” are embraced within the terms of the statute. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 s o. 2d 474, 477 (Fla. 1974). accordingly, the law is applicable to any gathering, whether formal or casual, of two or more members of the same board or commission to discuss some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the public board or commission. Sarasota Citizens for Responsible 48 s o. 3d 755, 764 (Fla. 2010). And see City of Miami Beach v. Government v. City of Sarasota, 245 s o. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); and Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 Berns, so. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969). it is the how and the why officials decided to so act which interests the public, not merely the final decision. as the court recognized in Times Publishing Company v. Williams, 222 s o. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 2d DCa 1969), disapproved in part on other grounds, Neu v. Miami Herald 462 s Publishing Company, o. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985): every thought, as well as every affirmative act, of a public official as it relates to and is within the scope of his official duties, is a matter of public concern; and it is the entire decision-making process that the legislature intended to affect by the enactment of the statute before us. Thus, two members of a civil service board violated the s unshine law when they held a private discussion about a pending employment appeal during a recess of a board meeting. n o. 2010Ca4387nC (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. February Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 27, 2012). s imilarly, the a ttorney g eneral’s office advised that the following gatherings are subject to the s unshine law: a public forum hosted by a city council member with city council members invited to attend and participate in the discussion, i nf. to Jove, January 12, 2009; “executive work sessions” held by a board of commissioners of a housing authority to discuss policy matters, ago 76-102; “workshop meetings” of a planning and zoning commission, ago 74-94; and “conference sessions” held by a town council before its regular meetings, ago 74- 62. Cf. ago 04-58 (“coincidental unscheduled meeting of two or more county commissioners to discuss emergency issues with staff” during a declared state of emergency is not subject to s. 286.011 if the issues do not require action by the county commission); and i nf. o p. to s pencer, april 23, 2003 (where city charter provides that special meeting of the council may be called by three members of the council, s unshine law is not violated if three members call a special meeting; “[t]he members must, however, be mindful not to discuss substantive issues which may come before the council in their consideration of whether a special meeting is necessary”). similarly, the s unshine law applies to an organizational session of a board. Ruff v. School so. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2d DCa 1983). Discussions between two Board of Collier County, 426 24

42 government-in-the-sunshine-manual members of a three-member complaint review board regarding their selection of a third member dditionally, the s are subject to s. 286.011, F.s. ago 93-79. a unshine law is applicable to meetings held to elect officers of the board. ago s 72-326 and 71-32 (boards may not use secret ballots to elect officers). The s unshine law is, therefore, applicable to all functions of covered boards and commissions, whether formal or informal, which relate to the affairs and duties of the board t]he s unshine law does not provide that cases be treated differently based or commission. “[ upon their level of public importance.” Monroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, i nc., 647 so. 2d 857, 868 (Fla. 3d DCa 1994). See, e.g., i nf. o p. to n elson, m ay 19, 1980 (meeting with congressman and city council members to discuss “federal budgetary matters which vitally concern their communities” should be held in the sunshine because “it appears extremely likely that discussion of public business by the council members [and perhaps decision making] will take place at the meeting”). 8. Investigative meetings The s unshine law is applicable to investigative inquiries of public boards or commissions. The fact that a meeting concerns alleged violations of laws or regulations does not remove it from the scope of the law. ago 74-84; and Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 s o. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973). a number of statutory exemptions to the s unshine law have been enacted to close meetings of some agencies (usually state agencies) when those agencies are making investigatory determinations. For example, s. 112.324(2)(c)(d) and (e), F.s., provides that any proceeding related to a complaint, referral, or preliminary investigation conducted by the Commission on ethics or other specified entities is exempt from open meetings requirements until the complaint is dismissed as legally insufficient, the alleged violator requests in writing that the proceedings be made public, the Commission on e thics determines that it will not investigate a referral, or until the Commission or other specified entity determines whether probable cause exists to believe that a violation has occurred. ss. 455.225(4) and 456.073(4), F.s. (meetings of probable Compare cause panels of the Department of Business and Professional r egulation and Department of health exempt from s unshine law until 10 days after probable cause is found to exist or until confidentiality waived by subject of investigation). Litigation meetings 9. in the absence of a legislative exemption, discussions between a public board and its attorney are subject to s. 286.011, F.s. Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 462 s o. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985) (s. 90.502, F.s., providing for the confidentiality of attorney-client communications under the Florida e vidence Code, does not create an exemption for attorney-client communications at public meetings; application of the s law to such discussions does not usurp supreme unshine Court’s constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law, nor is it at odds with Florida Bar rules providing for attorney-client confidentiality). Cf. s. 90.502(6), F.s., stating that a discussion or activity that is not a meeting for purposes of s. 286.011, F.s., shall not be construed to waive the attorney-client privilege. And see Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Thomas, 364 s o. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCa 1978), stating that all decisions taken by legal counsel to a public board need not be made or approved by the board; thus, the decision to appeal made by legal counsel after private discussions with the individual members of the board did not violate s. 286.011, F.s. There are statutory exemptions, however, which apply to some discussions of pending litigation between a public board and its attorney. a. Settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures section 286.011(8), F.s., provides: notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), any board or commission of any state 25

43 government-in-the-sunshine-manual agency or authority or any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, and the chief administrative or executive officer of the governmental entity, may meet in private with the entity’s attorney to discuss pending litigation to which the entity is that the following conditions presently a party before a court or administrative agency, provided are met: The entity’s attorney shall advise the entity at a public meeting that he or she desires advice (a) concerning the litigation. (b) The subject matter of the meeting shall be confined to settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures. (c) The entire session shall be recorded by a certified court reporter. The reporter shall record the times of commencement and termination of the session, all discussion and proceedings, the names of all persons present at any time, and the names of all persons speaking. n o portion of the session shall be off the record. The court reporter’s notes shall be fully transcribed and filed with the entity’s clerk within a reasonable time after the meeting. (d) The entity shall give reasonable public notice of the time and date of the attorney-client session and the names of persons who will be attending the session. The session shall commence at an open meeting at which the persons chairing the meeting shall announce the commencement and estimated length of the attorney-client session and the names of the persons attending. a t the conclusion of the attorney-client session, the meeting shall be reopened, and the person chairing the meeting shall announce the termination of the session. The transcript shall be made part of the public record upon conclusion of the litigation. (e) (e.s.) (1) Strict compliance with statutory conditions it has been held that the legislature intended a strict construction of s. 286.011(8), F.s. City of Dunnellon v. Aran, 662 s o. 2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCa 1995). “The clear requirements of the statute are neither onerous nor difficult to satisfy.” Id. Accord School Board of Duval at 1027. 670 s County v. Florida Publishing Company, o. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCa 1996). While section 286.011(8), F.s., does not specify who calls the closed attorney-client meeting, it requires that the governmental entity’s attorney “shall advise the entity at a public meeting that he or she desires advice concerning the litigation.” Thus, the exemption merely provides a governmental entity’s attorney an opportunity to receive necessary direction and information ccordingly, one of from the governmental entity regarding pending litigation. ago 04-35. a the conditions that must be met prior to holding a closed attorney-client meeting is that the city attorney must indicate to the city council at a public meeting that he or she wishes the advice of the city council regarding the pending litigation to which the city is presently a party before a court or administrative agency. i nf. o p. to vock, July 11, 2001. “i f the city attorney does not advise the city council at a public meeting that he or she desires the council’s advice regarding the litigation, the city council is not precluded from providing such advice to the city attorney but it must do so at a public meeting.” Id. The requirement that the board’s attorney advise the board at a public meeting that he or she desires advice concerning litigation is not satisfied by a previously published notice of the closed session; such an announcement must be made at a public meeting of the board. ago 04-35. The request may be made during a special meeting provided that the special meeting at which the request is made is open to the public, reasonable notice has been given, and minutes are taken. ago 07-31. in City of Dunnellon v. Aran, supra, the court said that a city council’s failure to announce the names of the lawyers participating in a closed attorney-client session violated the s unshine law. The court rejected the city’s claim that when the mayor announced that attorneys hired by 26

44 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the city would attend the session (but did not give the names of the individuals), his “substantial Cf. Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, so. 2d at compliance” was sufficient to satisfy the statute. 722 901, noting that deviation from the agenda at an attorney-client session is not authorized; while such deviation is permissible if a public meeting has been properly noticed, “there is no case law affording the same latitude to deviations in closed door meetings.” (2) Permitted discussions during closed session section 286.011(8)(b), F.s., states that the subject matter of the meeting shall be confined to settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures. i f a board goes beyond the “strict parameters of settlement negotiations and strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures” and takes “decisive action,” a violation of the sunshine law results. Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, 722 s o. 2d at 900. And see ago 99-37 (closed-meeting exemption may be used only when the attorney for a governmental entity seeks advice on settlement negotiations or strategy relating to litigation expenditures; such meetings should not be used to finalize action or discuss matters outside these two narrowly prescribed areas). Accord ago 04-35. section 286.011(8), F.s., “simply provides a governmental entity’s attorney an opportunity to receive necessary direction and information from the government entity. n o final decisions on litigation matters can be voted on during these private, attorney-client strategy meetings. The decision to settle a case, for a certain amount of money, under certain conditions is a decision which must be voted upon in a public meeting.” School Board of Duval County v. Florida Publishing Company, 670 s o. 2d 99, 100 (Fla. 1st DCa 1996), quoting s taff of Fla. h.r. Comm. mpact s on g ov’t o perations, Cs/hB 491 (1993) Final Bill analysis & e conomic i tatement 2 (Fla. s tate archives), at 3. Thus, “[t]he settlement of a case is exactly that type of final decision contemplated by the drafters of section 286.011(8) which must be voted upon in the sunshine.” Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, 722 s o. 2d at 901. Accord ago 08-17 (any action to approve a settlement or litigation expenditures must be voted on in a public meeting). accordingly, a court found that a city did not comply with s. 286.011(8), F.s., when it held closed meetings that “covered a wide range of political and policy issues not connected to” settlement of pending litigation regarding a comprehensive plan amendment or litigation expenses relating to the pending cases which at that point were on appeal. “While some of the discussion at these meetings did in fact involve the costs associated with the pending litigation, by and large the meetings pertained to finding a way to readopt the comprehensive plan amendment that had been invalidated by the court and to avoid future litigation regarding the readopted amendment.” Anderson v. City of St. Pete Beach, 161 s o. 3d 548, 553 (Fla. 2d DCa 2014). See also Freeman v. Times Publishing Company, 696 s o. 2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCa 1997) (discussion of methods or options to achieve continuing compliance with a long-standing federal desegregation mandate [such as whether to modify the boundaries of a school zone to achieve racial balance] must be held in the sunshine). 823 s o. 2d 167, Compare Bruckner v. City of Dania Beach, 172 (Fla. 4th DCa 2002) (closed city commission meeting to discuss various options to settle a lawsuit involving a challenge to a city resolution, including modification of the resolution, authorized because the commission “neither voted, took official action to amend the resolution, nor did it formally decide to settle the litigation”). (3) Entity involved in pending litigation section 286.011(8) permits an entity to use the exemption if the entity “is presently a party before a court or administrative agency . . . .” For example, a city council and its attorney may hold a closed-door meeting pursuant to this statute to discuss settlement negotiations or strategy related to litigation expenditures for pending litigation involving a workers’ compensation suit against the city because the system prescribed in ch. 440, F.s., “operates as a means of adjudicating workers’ compensation claims and would be considered litigation before an administrative 27

45 government-in-the-sunshine-manual agency.” ago 96-75. Brown v. City of Lauderhill, 654 in so. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995), the court said it could “discern no rational basis for concluding that a city is not a ‘party’ to pending litigation in And see Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, o. 2d at 900 (city which it is the real party in interest.” 722 s was presently a party to ongoing litigation by virtue of its already pending claims in bankruptcy proceedings); and ago s 09-15 (exemption applicable when city is real party in interest of a pending lawsuit despite not being a named party at the time of the meeting), and 08-17 (health care district may hold a closed attorney-client meeting to discuss settlement negotiations and strategies related to litigation expenditures for pending litigation in which its wholly-owned subsidiary holding company is the named party). although the Brown decision established that the exemption could be used by a city that was a real party in interest on a claim involved in pending litigation, that decision does not mean threat that an agency may meet in executive session with its attorney where there is only the of litigation. ago s 04-35 and 98-21 (s. 286.011[8] exemption “does not apply when no See lawsuit has been filed even though the parties involved believe litigation is inevitable”). similarly, s. 286.011(8), F.s. “may not be used to conduct a closed meeting during a mandatory arbitration proceeding, when there is no pending legal proceeding in a court or before ago 13-17. And see ago s 06-03 (exemption not applicable to an administrative agency.” pre-litigation mediation proceedings), 09-14 (exemption not applicable to discussion of terms governmental Conflict of mediation in conflict resolution proceedings under the “Florida resolution act,” ss. 164.101-164.1061, F.s.), and 09-25 (town council which received pre-suit notice letter under the Bert J. harris act, s. 70.001, F.s., is not a party to pending litigation for purposes of s. 286.011[8], F.s.). (4) Persons authorized to attend closed session only those persons listed in the statutory exemption, i.e. , the entity, the entity’s attorney, the chief administrative officer of the entity, and the court reporter are authorized to attend a closed attorney-client session. Thus, other staff members, consultants, or officials are not allowed School Board of Duval County v. Florida Publishing Company, 670 s o. 2d at 101. to be present. , 722 s o. 2d 891, 898 (Fla. 4th DCa 1998), review denied, 735 s See Zorc v. City of Vero Beach o. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999) (city charter provision requiring that city clerk attend all council meetings does not authorize clerk to attend closed attorney-client session; municipality may not authorize what the legislature has expressly forbidden); ago 01-10 (clerk of court not authorized to attend); and ago 09-52 (attorneys representing superintendent not authorized to attend closed session to discuss settlement of administrative action in which school board is the named party). Cf. ago 15-13 (mayor who is a voting member of the city council not precluded from attending closed session relating to pending litigation in which city council is a party, even though plaintiffs have also sued the mayor in his individual capacity). since the entity’s attorney is permitted to attend the closed session, if the school board hires outside counsel to represent it in pending litigation, both the school board attorney and the litigation attorney may attend a closed session. ago 98-06. See Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, 722 so. 2d at 898 (attendance of special counsel authorized). in rejecting the argument that the exemption should be construed so as to allow staff to attend closed attorney-client sessions, the courts have noted that individual board members are free to meet privately with staff at any time since “staff members are not subject to the s unshine law.” 722 s o. 2d at 899; School Board of Duval County v. Florida Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, Publishing Company, 670 s o. 2d at 101. Cf. ago 95-06 (s. 286.011[8], F.s., does not authorize the temporary adjournment and reconvening of meetings in order for members who are attending such a session to leave the room and consult with others outside the meeting). 28

46 government-in-the-sunshine-manual however, as the a eneral’s office recognized in ago 08-42, qualified interpreters ttorney g ct as auxiliary aids in the nature of for the deaf are treated by the americans with Disabilities a hearing aids and other assistive devices and may attend litigation strategy meetings of a board or commission to interpret for a deaf board member without violating section 286.011(8), F.s. (5) Determination of “conclusion” of the litigation section 286.011(8)(e), F.s., provides that transcripts of closed meetings “shall be made part of the public record upon conclusion of the litigation.” ago 15-03 (transcript of a litigation See strategy session which was closed to the public while the litigation was ongoing became a public record once the litigation was concluded). Cf. ago 97-75 (disclosure of medical records to a city council during a closed-door meeting under s. 286.011[8], F.s., does not affect requirement that the transcript of such meeting be made a part of the public record at the conclusion of the litigation). The statute does not recognize a continuation of the exemption for “derivative claims” made in separate, subsequent litigation. ago 13-13. For example, a transcript of a closed meeting to discuss settlement of a quiet title lawsuit became a public record upon the entry of a final judgment in that case, even though the same parties were now embroiled in an inverse condemnation lawsuit. Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 161 s o. 3d 521 (Fla. 2d DCa 2014). s imilarly, a claim for payment of attorney’s fees does not extend the application of the exemption after a final judgment has been entered and a mandate issued. i nf. o p. to Boutsis, December 13, 2012. accordingly, a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement that confers continuing jurisdiction on the court to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement operates as a conclusion of the litigation. ago 15-03. By contrast, litigation that is ongoing but temporarily suspended pursuant to a stipulation for settlement has not been concluded for purposes of s. 286.011(8), F.s., and a transcript of meetings held between the city and its attorney to discuss such litigation may be kept confidential until conclusion of the litigation. ago 94-64. And see ago 94-33 (public agency may maintain the confidentiality of a record of a strategy or settlement meeting between a public agency and its attorney until the suit is dismissed with prejudice or nf. o p. to Boutsis, supra (legislative history of the applicable statute of limitations has run); and i s. 286.011[8], F.s., indicates “that the legislature intended the exemption to continue through Cf. Wagner v. Orange County, 960 s o. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th the appeals segment of the litigation”). DCa 2007), concluding that the phrase “conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings” for purposes of the attorney work product exemption from the public records law found in s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s., encompasses postjudgment collection efforts such as a legislative claims bill. in ago 13-21, the a eneral’s office observed that s. 286.011(8)(e), F.s., “should ttorney g be seen as a tool which governmental boards or commissions may employ in their discretion but the statute should not be read as a prohibition against the release of such records prior to the conclusion of . . . litigation.” Therefore, a city council, as the collegial body to which the exemption applies, may waive the exemption and release transcripts of meetings held pursuant to s. 286.011(8), F.s., prior to the conclusion of litigation. Id. b. Risk management exemption section 768.28(16)(c), F.s., states that portions of meetings and proceedings relating solely to the evaluation of claims or to offers of compromise of claims filed with a risk management program of the state, its agencies and subdivisions, are exempt from s. 286.011, F.s. The minutes of such meetings and proceedings are also exempt from public disclosure until the termination of the litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident. s ection 768.28(16) (d), F.s. This exemption is limited and applies only to tort claims for which the agency may be 29

47 government-in-the-sunshine-manual liable under s. 768.28, F.s. ago 04-35. The exemption is not applicable to meetings held oreover, a prior to the filing of a tort claim with the risk management program. ago 92-82. m meeting of a city’s risk management committee is exempt from the s unshine law only when the meeting relates solely to the evaluation of a tort claim filed with the risk management program or relates solely to an offer of compromise of a tort claim filed with the risk management program. ago 04-35. unlike s. 286.011(8), F.s., s. 768.28(16), F.s., does not specify the personnel who are ag0 00-20, advising that personnel of the school district authorized to attend the meeting. See who are involved in the risk management aspect of the tort claim being litigated or settled may attend such meetings without jeopardizing the confidentiality provisions of the statute. 10. Personnel matters in the absence of a specific statutory exemption, meetings of a public board or commission unshine law. to discuss personnel matters are subject to the s Times Publishing Company v. Williams, o. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCa 1969), disapproved in part on other grounds, Neu v. Miami 222 s 462 s Herald Publishing Company, o. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985). a. Collective bargaining discussions (1) Strategy sessions a limited exemption from s. 286.011, F.s., exists for discussions between the chief executive officer of the public employer, or his or her representative, and the legislative body of the public employer relative to collective bargaining. s ection 447.605(1), F.s. a similar exemption is contained in s. 110.201(4), F.s., for discussions between the Department of m anagement overnor, between the department and the a services and the g dministration Commission or agency heads, or between any of their respective representatives, relative to collective bargaining. a duly-appointed labor negotiating committee of a city that does not have a city manager or city administrator qualifies as the “chief executive officer” for purposes of s. 447.605(1), F.s., and may use the exemption when meeting with the city council to discuss collective bargaining. And see ago 85-99. ago 99-27, concluding that a committee formed by the city manager to represent the city in labor negotiations may participate in closed executive sessions conducted pursuant to s. 447.605(1), F.s. The exemption also extends to meetings of the negotiating committee itself which are held to discuss labor negotiation strategies, including when the committee adjourns during negotiations to hold a caucus among its members to determine the strategy to be employed in ongoing negotiations. Id. if a school superintendent’s responsibility to conduct collective bargaining on behalf of the school board has been completely delegated to a separate labor negotiating committee and the superintendent does not participate in the collective bargaining negotiations, the exemption afforded by s. 447.605(1), F.s., applies to discussions between the committee and the school board only and does not encompass discussions among the committee, school board and superintendent. ago 98-06. The exemption afforded by s. 447.605(1), F.s., applies only in the context of actual and impending collective bargaining negotiations. ago 85-99. i t does not allow private discussions of a proposed “mini-P er C ordinance” or the stance a public body intends to adopt in regard to unionization and/or collective bargaining. ago 75-48. m oreover, a public body may not conduct an entire meeting outside the s unshine law merely by discussing one topic during the course of that meeting which may be statutorily exempt from s. 286.011, F.s. ago 85-99. section 447.605(1), F.s., does not directly address the dissemination of information that may be obtained at the closed meeting, but there is clear legislative intent that matters discussed during such meetings are not to be open to public disclosure. ago 03-09. 30

48 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (2) Negotiations The collective bargaining negotiations between the chief executive officer and a bargaining agent are not exempt and pursuant to s. 447.605(2), F.s., must be conducted in the sunshine. once the collective bargaining process begins, when one side or its representative, whether before or after the declaration of an impasse, meets with the other side or its representative to discuss anything relevant to the terms and conditions of the employer-employee relationship, the meeting is subject to the s unshine law. City of Fort Myers v. News-Press Publishing Company, Inc., o. 2d 408, 412 (Fla. 2d DCa 1987). Accord Brown v. Denton, 152 s o. 3d 8 (Fla. 1st DCa 514 s review denied, 2014), o. sC 16-2490 (Fla. February 24, 2016). See also ago 99-27. as with n nf. other meetings subject to s. 286.011, F.s., minutes of the negotiation meeting must be kept. i op. to Fulwider, June 14, 1993. The legislature has, therefore, divided s unshine law policy on collective bargaining for public employees into two parts: when the public employer is meeting with its own side, it is exempt from the s unshine law; when the public employer is meeting with the other side, it is unshine law. City of Fort Myers v. News-Press Publishing Company, required to comply with the s Inc., 514 s And see Brown v. Denton, 152 s o. 3d at 12 (By holding closed-door o. 2d at 412. negotiations that resulted in changes to public employee pension benefits, “the [city and pension board] ignored an important party who also had the right to be in the room -- the public.”). Cf. Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers’ Association v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 411 so. 2d 1375, 1376 (Fla. 4th DCa 1982) (collective bargaining agreement cannot be used “to circumvent the requirements of public meetings” in s. 286.011, F.s.). b. Disciplinary, grievance, and complaint review proceedings meetings of a board or commission to conduct disciplinary proceedings are subject to the s unshine law. See, e.g., ago 92-65 (employee termination hearing conducted by housing And see News-Press Publishing Company v. Wisher, authority commission). o. 2d 646, 647- 345 s 648 (Fla. 1977), in which the Court disapproved of a county’s use of “pseudonyms or cloaked references” during a county commission meeting held to reprimand an unnamed department head. Thus, two members of a civil service board violated the s unshine law when they held a private discussion about a pending employment appeal during a recess of a board meeting. Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, n o. 2010Ca4387nC (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. February And see Barfield v. City of West Palm Beach, n o. Cl94-2141-a C (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 27, 2012). unshine may 6, 1994) (complaint review board of a city police department is subject to the s Cf. ago 93-79 (discussions law; ago 80-27 (sheriff civil service board created by special act). between two members of a three-member complaint review board regarding their selection of the third member of the board must be conducted in accordance with s. 286.011, F.s.). similarly, in 877 s o. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCa 2004), the court Dascott v. Palm Beach County, held that a meeting of a pre-termination conference panel established pursuant to county ordinance and composed of a department head, personnel director, and equal opportunity unshine. e ven though the county administrator had director should have been held in the s the sole authority to discipline employees, that authority had been delegated to the department head who in turn chose to share that authority with the other members of the panel. See also ago 10-14 (team created by charter school board of directors to review employment decisions is subject to the s unshine law). Cf. ago 77-132 (personnel council composed of citizens appointed by members of county commission to hear appeals from county employees who have been disciplined not authorized to deliberate in secret). a grievance committee established as “the final hearing body for all matters determined to be grievances and [authorized] to uphold, modify, or deny any grievance” is subject to the sunshine law “because the [committee] clearly exercises decision-making authority.” Dascott v. law applies to staff grievance Palm Beach County, supra at 13. And see ago 84-70 (s unshine 31

49 government-in-the-sunshine-manual committee created to make nonbinding recommendations to a county administrator regarding Cf. Palm Beach County Classroom Teacher’s Association v. disposition of employee grievances). o. 2d 1375 (Fla. 4th DCa 1982), in which the court School Board of Palm Beach County, 411 s affirmed the lower tribunal’s refusal to issue a temporary injunction to exclude a newspaper reporter from a grievance arbitration hearing. a collective bargaining agreement cannot be used “to circumvent the requirements of public meetings” in s. 286.011, F.s. at 1376. Id. 938 s By contrast, in Jordan v. Jenne, o. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 4th DCa 2006), the court unshine law did not apply to a professional standards committee responsible determined that the s for reviewing charges against a sheriff’s deputy and making recommendations to the inspector general, because the inspector general made the “ultimate decision” on discipline and did not See also McDougall v. Culver, 3 s o. 3d 391 (Fla. 2d DCa 2009) deliberate with the committee. (i nternal affairs memorandum containing findings and recommendations circulated to senior officials for review and comment before submission to the sheriff for a decision on disciplinary unshine law since officials only provided a action did not constitute a meeting under the s recommendation but did not deliberate with the sheriff or have decision-making authority). similarly, if the mayor as chief executive officer, rather than the city council, is responsible under the city charter for disciplining city employees, meetings between the mayor and a city employee concerning discipline of the employee are not subject to the s unshine law. City of 542 s Sunrise v. News and Sun-Sentinel Company, And see ago o. 2d 1354 (Fla. 4th DCa 1989). 07-54 (while post-termination hearings before city manager are not subject to the sunshine law, hearings before a three-member panel appointed by the city manager should be open). c. Evaluations The sunshine law applies to meetings of a board of county commissioners when interviewing applicants for county positions appointed by the board, when conducting job evaluations of county employees answering to and serving at the pleasure of the board, and when conducting employment termination interviews of county employees who serve at the pleasure of the board. ago 89-37. a board that is responsible for assessing the performance of its chief executive officer (Ceo) should conduct the review and appraisal process in a proceeding open to the public as prescribed by s. 286.011, F.s., instead of using a review procedure in which individual board members evaluate the Ceo’s performance and send their individual written comments to the board chair for compilation and subsequent discussion with the Ceo. ago 93-90. h owever, meetings of individual school board members with the superintendent to discuss the individual unshine law when such evaluations do not board members’ evaluations do not violate the s become the board’s evaluation until they are compiled and discussed at a public meeting by the school board for adoption by the board. ago 97-23. d. Selection and screening committees The s unshine law applies to advisory committees created by an agency to assist in the selection process. i n Wood v. Marston, 442 s o. 2d 934 (Fla. 1983), a committee created to screen applications and make recommendations for the position of a law school dean was held to be subject to s. 286.011, F.s. By screening applicants and deciding which applicants to reject from further consideration, the committee performed a policy-based, decision-making function delegated to it by the president of the university. See also Krause v. Reno, 366 s o. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d DCa 1979) (s unshine law governs advisory group created by city manager to assist in screening applications and to recommend several applicants for the position of chief of police), and ago 77-43 (s unshine law applies to committee selected by a county bar association on behalf of the school board to screen applicants and make recommendations for the position of school board attorney). Cf. Dore v. Sliger, n o. 90-1850 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. July 11, 1990) (faculty of university law school prohibited from conducting secret ballots on personnel hiring matters). 32

50 government-in-the-sunshine-manual however, if the sole function of the screening committee is simply to gather information for the decision-maker, rather than to accept or reject applicants, the committee’s activities are outside the s 473 s o. 2d 222 (Fla. unshine law . See Cape Publications, Inc. v. City of Palm Bay, 5th DCa 1985), holding that the s unshine law was not violated when the city manager, who was responsible for selecting the new police chief, asked several people to sit in on the interviews, as the only function of this group was to assist the city manager in acquiring information on the applicants he had chosen by asking questions during the interviews and then discussing the qualifications of each candidate with the city manager after the interview. And see Knox v. District School Board of Brevard, o. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 5th DCa 2002), holding that an 821 s interview team composed of staff was not subject to s. 286.011, F.s., even though the team made recommendations since “all the applications went to the superintendent and he decided which applicants to interview and nominate to the school board.” 11. Purchasing meetings a. Application of Sunshine Law a committee appointed by a public college’s purchasing director to consider proposals submitted by contractors was held to be subject to the s unshine law because its function was to “weed through the various proposals, to determine which were acceptable and to rank them accordingly.” Silver Express Company v. District Board of Lower Tribunal Trustees, 691 s o. 2d Accord inf. o p. to lewis, m arch 15, 1999 (panels established 1099, 1100 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997). by state agency to create requests for proposals and evaluate vendor responses are subject to the sunshine law), and ago 80-51 (s unshine law applicable to city selection committee screening proposals from consultants and audit firms). And see Leach-Wells v. City of Bradenton, 734 s o. 2d 1168, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCa 1999) (selection committee created by city council to evaluate proposals violated the s unshine law when the city clerk unilaterally ranked the proposals based on the committee members’ individual written evaluations; the court held that “the short- listing was formal action that was required to be taken at a public meeting”); and Schweickert no. 12-Ca-1339 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. v. Citrus County Port Authority, september 30, 2013) (ad hoc committee appointed by board violated the s unshine law when the members submitted individual written evaluations of the proposals to the staff, which then compiled the scores and ranked the proposals for submission to the board; the committee should have ranked the proposals at a public meeting). Compare Carlson v. Department of Revenue , 42 F.l.W. D2083, 2084 (Fla. 1st DCa s valuation team” members who eptember 29, 2017) (state agency “e individually evaluated the competitors’ proposals, individually assigned scores, and individually egotiation team” were not required to conduct submitted their scores for consideration by the “n valuation team [or more accurately, a public meeting to perform these functions because “the e its individual members] neither ranked the competitors nor excluded any from consideration of the ultimate decider, the n egotiation team”). Port Everglades Authority v. International Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1922-1, in 652 so. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995), the court ruled that a board’s selection and negotiation unshine law when competing bidders were requested to excuse committee violated the s themselves from the public committee meeting during presentations by competitors. Cf. Pinellas County School Board v. Suncam, Inc., 829 s o. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCa 2002) (school board violated the s unshine law when it refused to permit videotaping of a public meeting held to evaluate general contractor construction proposals). See now s. 286.0113(2)(b), F.s., discussed below, providing an exemption from the s unshine law for certain competitive solicitation meetings and requiring a complete recording of the exempt meeting. b. Recording requirement for exempt meetings section 286.0113(2)(b)1. and 2., F.s., provide that any portion of a meeting at which a negotiation with a vendor is conducted pursuant to a competitive solicitation, at which a vendor makes an oral presentation as part of a competitive solicitation, or at which a vendor answers n addition, any questions as part of a competitive solicitation, is exempt from the s unshine law. i 33

51 government-in-the-sunshine-manual portion of a team meeting at which negotiation strategies are discussed is also exempt. See Carlson , 42 F.l.W. D2083 (Fla. 1st DCa september 29, 2017), in which the v. Department of Revenue of any meeting court rejected the agency’s argument that the exemption applies to the entirety at which negotiation strategies are discussed, even those portions that have nothing to do with procurement. h owever, the court also said that “the exempted ‘portion’ includes not only the negotiation-strategies discussions themselves, but also meeting activities inextricably intertwined at 2085. Cf. with those discussions.” Id. s. 255.0518, F.s. (sealed bids received pursuant to a competitive solicitation for construction or repairs of a public building or public work must be opened at a public meeting conducted in compliance with the s unshine law). The term “[c]ompetitive solicitation” means “the process of requesting and receiving sealed bids, proposals, or replies in accordance with the terms of a competitive process, regardless of the method of procurement.” s ection 286.0113(2)(a)1., F.s. The term “team” means a group of members established by an agency for the purpose of ection 286.0113(2)(a)2., F.s. conducting negotiations as part of a competitive solicitation. s a complete recording must be made of the exempt meeting; no portion of the exempt meeting may be held off the record. s Cf. ago 10-42 (where statute ection 286.0113(1)(c), F.s. required that closed proceedings of state committee be recorded and that no portion be off the record, audio recording of the proceedings “would appear to be the most expedient and cost- efficient manner to ensure that all discussion is recorded”). The recording and any records presented at the exempt meeting are exempt from public disclosure until the agency provides notice of an intended decision or until 30 days after opening the bids, proposals, or final replies, whichever occurs earlier. s ection 286.0113(2)(c)1. and 2., F.s. And see s. 286.0113(2)(c)3., F.s. (exempt status of recording if the agency rejects all bids, proposals, or replies, and concurrently provides notice of its intent to reissue a competitive solicitation). Cf. s. 255.065(15), F.s. (recording requirement for the portion of a meeting to discuss an exempt unsolicited proposal received as part of the public-private partnership process authorized under s. 255.065, F.s.). 12. Quasi-judicial matters, proceedings or hearings unshine law does not authorize boards to conduct closed-door hearings or The s Canney v. Board deliberations simply because the board is acting in a “quasi-judicial” capacity. of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 s o. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973). And see Occidental Chemical 351 s Company v. Mayo, disapproved in part on other grounds, o. 2d 336, 340n.7 (Fla. 1977), Citizens v. Beard, 613 s o. 2d 403 (Fla. 1992) (characterization of the Public s ervice Commission’s decision-making process as “quasi-judicial” did not exempt it from s. 286.011, F.s.); and Palm Beach County Classroom Teacher’s Association v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 411 s o. 2d 1375 (Fla. 4th DCa 1982), affirming the lower court’s refusal to issue a temporary injunction to exclude a newspaper reporter from a grievance hearing. Thus, in the absence of statutory exemption, “[t]he fact that a board or commission is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity does not remove it from the reach of section 286.011, Florida statutes.” ago 10-04. And see ago s 92-65, 83-43 and 77-132. Cf. ago 10-15 (special magistrate subject to the s unshine law when exercising the delegated decision-making authority of the value adjustment board). Real property negotiations 13. in the absence of a statutory exemption, the negotiations by a public board or commission for the sale or purchase of property must be conducted in the sunshine. See City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 s o. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1971) (city commission not authorized to hold closed sessions to discuss condemnation issues). i n addition, if the authority of the public board or commission to acquire or lease property has been delegated to a single member, that member is subject to s. 34

52 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 286.011, F.s., and is prohibited from negotiating the acquisition or lease of the property in secret. Cf. ago 74-294. ago 95-06 (statutory exemption from Ch. 119, F.s., for certain records relating to the proposed purchase of real property does not authorize a city or its designee to conduct negotiations for purchase of property outside the s unshine law). advisory committees charged with land acquisition responsibilities are also subject to sunshine law. the ago s 87-42 (ad hoc committee appointed by mayor to meet with the See Chamber of Commerce to discuss a proposed transfer of city property), and 86-51 (land selection committee appointed by water management district to evaluate and recommend projects for acquisition). Cf. Monroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, Inc., 647 s o. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCa 1994) (committee established by county commission to negotiate lease agreement subject to s. 286.011). Security meetings 14. While there is no general exemption from open meetings requirements that applies to all discussions relating to “security,” s. 281.301(1), F.s., provides an exemption for meetings relating directly to or that would reveal the security systems for any property owned by or leased to the state or any of its political subdivisions or for any privately owned or leased property which is in the possession of an agency. The statute does not merely close such meetings; it exempts the meetings from the requirements of s. 286.011, F.s., such as notice. ago 93-86. And see s. 286.0113(1), F.s., stating that the portion of a meeting that would reveal a security system plan or portion thereof made confidential and exempt by s. 119.071(3)(a), F.s. (providing an exemption from the Public records act for a “security system plan”) is exempt from open meetings requirements. Cf. s. 1004.0962(5), F.s. (exemption for portions of meetings held to discuss a postsecondary educational institution’s “campus emergency response”); and s. 1004.055(2), F.s. (exemption for meetings held to discuss specified information technology security records maintained by postsecondary educational institutions). 15. Social events unshine law from members of a public board or commission are not prohibited under the s meeting together socially, provided that matters which may come before the board or commission are not discussed at such gatherings. ago 92-79. Accord i nf. o p. to Batchelor, m ay 27, 1982. Therefore, a luncheon meeting held by a private organization for members of a public board or commission at which there is no discussion among such officials on matters relating to public business would not be subject to the s unshine law merely because of the presence of two or more members of a covered board or commission. ago 72-158. Cf. ago 71-295, cautioning that “[p]ublic bodies should avoid secret meetings, from which the public and the press are effectively excluded, preceding official meetings, even though such secret meetings are held ostensibly for purely social purposes only and with the understanding that the members of the public body will, in good faith, attempt to avoid any discussion of official business.” 16. Telephone conversations and meetings a. Private telephone conversations Private telephone conversations between board members to discuss matters which foreseeably will come before that board for action violate the s unshine law. See State v. Childers, no. 02-21939-mmC; 02-21940-mmB (escambia Co. Ct. June 5, 2003), per curiam affirmed, 886 s o. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCa 2004) (private telephone conversation during which two county commissioners and the supervisor of elections discussed redistricting violated the sunshine law). See also the discussion on pages 22-23 regarding the application of the sunshine law to emails, text messages and other written communications between board members. 35

53 government-in-the-sunshine-manual b. Authorization to conduct and participate in public meetings via telephone, video conferencing, or other electronic media (1) State boards eneral’s office concluded that s. 120.54(5)(b)2., F.s., in ago 98-28, the a ttorney g state boards to conduct public meetings via entirely electronic means provided authorizes that the board complies with uniform rules of procedure adopted by the state a dministration Commission. These rules contain notice requirements and procedures for providing points of See r ule 28-109, F.a.C. access for the public. Local boards (2) (a) Meetings as to boards, the a ttorney g eneral’s office has noted that the authorization in s. local 120.54(5)(b)2., to conduct meetings entirely through the use of electronic media technology applies only to agencies. ago 98-28. state ttorney g The a eneral’s office has observed that a local board’s use of electronic media technology to increase public participation in meetings and the use of such media to allow members of a board or commission to participate in a duly noticed public meeting does not necessarily raise s unshine law issues, “but rather implicates the ability of a board or commission to conduct public business with a quorum.” See i nf. o p. to s tebbins, December 1, 2015. For example, since s. 1001.372(2)(b), F.s., requires a district school board to hold its meetings at a “public place in the county,” a quorum of the board must be physically present Id. And see s 09-56 (where a quorum is required and at the meeting of the school board. ago absent a statute to the contrary, the requisite number of members must be physically present at a meeting in order to constitute a quorum), and 10-34 (city may not adopt an ordinance Cf. s. allowing members of a city board to appear by electronic means to constitute a quorum). 163.01(18), F.s., authorizing certain entities created by interlocal agreement to conduct public meetings and workshops by means of communications media technology. however, if a quorum of a local board is physically present, “the participation of an absent member by telephone conference or other interactive electronic technology is permissible when such absence is due to extraordinary circumstances such as illness[;] . . . [w]hether the absence of a member due to a scheduling conflict constitutes such a circumstance is a determination that must be made in the good judgment of the board.” ago 03-41. For example, if a quorum of a local board is physically present at the public meeting site, a board may allow a member with health problems to participate and vote in board meetings through the use of such devices as a speaker telephone that allow the absent member to participate in discussions, to be heard by other board members and the public and to hear discussions taking place during the meeting. ago 94-55. And see ago s 92-44 (participation and voting by ill county commissioner), and 02-82 (physically-disabled city advisory committee members participating and voting by electronic means). (b) Workshops The physical presence of a quorum has not been required where electronic media technology (such as video conferencing and digital audio) is used to allow public access and participation at workshop meetings where no formal action will be taken. The use of electronic media technology, however, does not satisfy quorum requirements necessary for official action to be taken. See inf. o p. to s tebbins, December 1, 2015 (approval of board meeting minutes constitutes official action; vote to approve minutes not exempted from quorum requirements). 36

54 government-in-the-sunshine-manual For example, the a eneral’s office advised that airport authority members may ttorney g nternet, provided proper notice is given, conduct informal discussions and workshops over the i ago 01-66. such interactive access and interactive access by members of the public is provided. must include not only public access via the i nternet but also at designated places within the authority boundaries where the airport authority makes computers with i nternet access available internet access. Id. For meetings, however, to members of the public who may not otherwise have where a quorum is necessary for action to be taken, the physical presence of the members making up the quorum would be required in the absence of a statute providing otherwise. i nternet Id. Id. access to such meetings, however may still be offered to provide greater public access. Cf. ago 08-65, noting that a city’s plan to provide additional public access to on-line workshop meetings by making computers available at a public library “should ensure that operating-type assistance is available at the library where the computers are located.” however, the use of an electronic bulletin board to discuss matters over an extended period of days or weeks, which does not permit the public to participate online, violates the law sunshine And see i by circumventing the notice and access provisions of that law. ago 02-32. p. to nf. o Ciocchetti, m arch 23, 2006 (even though the public would be able to participate online, a town commission’s proposed use of an electronic bulletin board to discuss matters that foreseeably may come before the commission over an extended period of time would not comply with the spirit or letter of the s unshine law because the burden would be on the public to constantly monitor the site in order to participate meaningfully in the discussion). ago 08-65 (city advisory Compare boards may conduct workshops lasting no more than two hours using an on-line bulletin board if proper notice is given and interactive access to members of the public is provided). m oreover, there is no apparent authority for the use of electronic media technology to allow board members to remove a workshop or meeting from within the jurisdiction in which the board is empowered to carry out its functions and claim compliance with the sunshine law by providing the public electronic access to the remote meeting. i ugust 5, nf. o p. to s ugarman, a 2015. D. NOTICE AND PROCEDURES 1. Agenda The s that an agency provide notice of each item to be unshine law does not mandate ttorney office has recommended the discussed via a published agenda although the a general’s publication of an agenda, if available. The courts have rejected such a requirement because it could effectively preclude access to meetings by members of the general public who wish to bring specific issues before a governmental body. 278 s o. 2d 288 (Fla. See Hough v. Stembridge, 3d DCa 1973); and Yarbrough v. Young, 462 s o. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCa 1985) (posted agenda unnecessary and public body not required to postpone meeting due to inaccurate press report which was not part of the public body’s official notice efforts). Thus, the s unshine law does not require boards to consider only those matters on a published agenda. “[W]hether to impose a requirement that restricts every relevant commission or board from considering matters not on an agenda is a policy decision to be made by the legislature.” 670 so. 2d 1014, 1016 Law and Information Services, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, And see Grapski v. City of Alachua, (Fla. 4th DCa 1996). so. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010), 31 review denied, 47 s o. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010) (s unshine law does not prohibit use of consent agenda procedure). even though the law does not prohibit a board from adding topics to the agenda sunshine of a regularly noticed meeting, the a ttorney g eneral’s office has advised boards to postpone formal action on any added items that are controversial. See ago 03-53, stating that “[i]n the spirit of the s unshine law, the city commission should be sensitive to the community’s concerns that it be allowed advance notice and, therefore, meaningful participation on controversial issues coming before the commission.” 37

55 government-in-the-sunshine-manual While the s , not of the individual items which may unshine law requires notice of meetings be considered at that meeting, other statutes, codes, or ordinances may impose such a requirement See p. to m attimore, February and agencies subject to those provisions must follow them. i nf. o 6, 1996. dministrative For example, s. 120.525(2), F.s., requires that agencies subject to the a Procedure a ct must prepare an agenda in time to ensure that a copy may be received at least 7 days before the event by any person in the state who requests a copy and who pays the reasonable cost of the copy. The agenda, along with any meeting materials available in electronic form excluding confidential and exempt information, shall be published on the agency’s website. Id. Id. after the agenda has been made available, changes may be made only for good cause. Location of meetings 2. Facilities that discriminate or unreasonably restrict access to the facility a. section 286.011(6), F.s., prohibits boards or commissions subject to the s unshine law from holding their meetings at any facility which discriminates on the basis of sex, age, race, creed, color, origin, or economic status, or which operates in such a manner as to unreasonably And see s. 286.26, F.s., relating to accessibility of public restrict public access to such a facility. meetings to the physically handicapped. Public boards or commissions, therefore, are advised to avoid holding meetings at places ago 71-295. Thus, a police pension where the public and the press are effectively excluded. board should not hold its meetings in a facility where the public has limited access and where there may be a “chilling” effect on the public’s willingness to attend by requiring the public to provide identification, to leave such identification while attending the meeting, and to request permission before entering the room where the meeting is held. ago 96-55. And see i p. nf. o to g alloway, a ugust 21, 2008, in which the a ttorney g eneral’s office expressed concerns about holding a public meeting in a private home in light of the possible “chilling effect” on the public’s willingness to attend. While a city may not require persons wishing to attend public meetings to provide identification as a condition of attendance, it may impose certain security measures on members of the public entering a public building, such as requiring the public to go through metal detectors. ago 05-13. b. Luncheon meetings Public access to meetings of public boards or commissions is the key element of the s unshine law, and public agencies are advised to avoid holding meetings in places not easily accessible to the public. The a eneral’s office has suggested that public boards or commissions ttorney g avoid the use of luncheon meetings to conduct board or commission business. These meetings may have a “chilling” effect upon the public’s willingness or desire to attend. People who would otherwise attend such a meeting may be unwilling or reluctant to enter a public dining room without purchasing a meal and may be financially or personally unwilling to do so. i nf. o p. to Campbell, February 8, 1999; and i nf. o p. to n elson, m ay 19, 1980. i n addition, discussions at such meetings by members of the board or commission which are audible only to those seated at Cf. City of Miami the table may violate the “openness” requirement of the law. ago 71-159. Beach v. Berns, 245 s o. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1971), in which the Florida s upreme Court observed: “ a secret meeting occurs when public officials meet at a time and place to avoid being seen or heard by the public.” c. Out-of-town meetings The fact that a meeting is held in a public room does not make it public within the meaning of the s unshine law; for a meeting to be “public,” the public must be given advance o. 2d 645, notice and provided with a reasonable opportunity to attend. Bigelow v. Howze, 291 s 38

56 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 647-648 (Fla. 2d DCa 1974). the discussion on pages 23-24 relating to inspection and See also fact-finding trips. accordingly, a school board workshop held outside county limits over 100 miles away sunshine law where the only advantage to the board from the board’s headquarters violated the resulting from the out-of-town gathering (elimination of travel time and expense due to the fact that the board members were attending a conference at the site) did not outweigh the interests Rhea v. School Board of Alachua of the public in having a reasonable opportunity to attend. 636 so. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCa 1994). The court refused to adopt a rule prohibiting any County, board workshops from being held at a site more than 100 miles from its headquarters, instead applying a balancing of interests test to determine which interest predominates in a given case. as stated by the court, “[t]he interests of the public in having a reasonable opportunity to attend a Board workshop must be balanced against the Board’s need to conduct a workshop at a site beyond the county boundaries.” Id. at 1385. And see inf. op. to sugarman, august 5, 2015 (no apparent authority for use of electronic media technology to allow board members to remove a workshop or meeting from within the jurisdiction in which the board is empowered to carry out its functions and claim compliance with the s unshine law by providing the public with electronic access to the remote meeting). in addition, there may be other statutes which limit where board meetings may be held. See, e.g., s. 125.001, F.s. (meetings of the board of county commissioners may be held at any appropriate public place in the county); s. 1001.372, F.s. (school board meetings may be held at any appropriate public place in the county). And see ago s 08-01 and 03-03 (municipality may not hold commission meetings at facilities outside its boundaries). See now ss. 166.0213(1), F.s. (governing body of municipality with 500 or fewer residents may hold meetings within 5 miles of the exterior jurisdictional boundary of the municipality at such time and place as may be prescribed by ordinance or resolution); 166.0213(2), F.s. (governing body of a municipality may hold joint meetings to receive, discuss, and act upon matters of mutual interest with the governing body of the county within which the municipality is located or the governing body of another municipality at such time and place as shall be prescribed by ordinance or resolution); and 125.001(2), F.s. (authorizing boards of county commissioners to hold joint public meetings with governing boards of adjacent counties or municipalities upon due public notice within the jurisdiction of all participating counties and municipalities; provided that an authorizing resolution is adopted, no official vote is taken at the joint meeting, and the joint meeting may not take the place of a public hearing required by law). Conduct which occurs outside the state which would constitute a knowing violation of unshine law is a second degree misdemeanor. s ection 286.011(3), F.s. s uch violations the s are prosecuted in the county in which the board or commission normally conducts its official business. s ection 910.16, F.s. d. Size of meeting facilities The sunshine law requires that meetings of a public board or commission be “open to the public.” i f a large turnout is expected for a particular meeting, the a ttorney g eneral’s office has recommended that public boards and commissions take reasonable steps (such as moving nf. o p. to g alloway, the meeting to a larger room) to accommodate those who wish to attend. i august 21, 2008. i f the largest available public meeting room cannot accommodate all of those who are expected to attend, the use of video technology ( e.g. , a television screen outside the meeting room) may be appropriate. See Kennedy v. St. Johns River Water Management District, no. 2009-0441-Ca (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. s eptember 27, 2010), per curiam affirmed, 84 s o. 3d 331 (Fla. 5th DCa 2011) (even though not all members of the public were able to enter the meeting room, board did not violate the s unshine law when it held a meeting at the board’s usual meeting place and in the largest available room; the court noted, however, that the board set up a computer with external speakers so that those who were not able to enter the meeting room could view and hear the proceedings). 39

57 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 3. Minutes Scope of minutes requirement a. section 286.011(2), F.s., requires that minutes of a meeting of a public board or commission be promptly recorded and open to public inspection. Workshop meetings are not exempted s 08-65 and 74-62. no. And see Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, from this requirement. ago 502007Ca007552XXXXmBan (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 9, 2009), per curiam affirmed, 46 s o. 3d 573 (Fla. 4th DCa 2010) (minutes required for city council’s agenda review meetings). Because the term “promptly” is not defined in the statute, it “should be construed in p. to Board of trustees, January 27, 2009. The informal nf. o its plain and ordinary sense.” i advisory opinion notes that Webster’s n ew u niversal u nabridged Dictionary (2003) defines “prompt” as done, performed, delivered, etc., at once or without delay. Draft minutes of a board meeting may be circulated to individual board members for corrections and studying prior to approval by the board, so long as any changes, corrections, or deletions are discussed and adopted during the public meeting when the board adopts the minutes. ago Cf. i nf. o p. to s tebbins, December 1, 2015 (vote to approve s 02-51 and 74-294. minutes constitutes official action of a board; no authority to exempt a vote to approve minutes from quorum requirements). The minutes are public records when the person responsible for preparing the minutes has performed his or her duty even though they have not yet been sent to the board members or officially approved by the board. ago 91-26. And see Grapski v. City of Alachua, 31 s o. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010), review denied, 47 s o. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010) (city violated both the language and the purpose of s. 286.011[2] by denying public access to its minutes until after approval). section 286.011, F.s., does not specify who is responsible for taking the minutes of public meetings. This appears to be a procedural matter which the individual boards or commissions nf. o must resolve. i p. to Baldwin, December 5, 1990. b. Content of minutes The term “minutes” as used in s. 286.011, F.s., contemplates a brief summary or series of brief notes or memoranda reflecting the events of the meeting; accordingly a verbatim transcript is And see State v. Adams, n o. 91-175-CC (Fla. s not required. ago 82-47. umter Co. Ct. July 15, 1992) (no violation of sunshine law where minutes failed to reflect brief discussion concerning a proposed inspection trip). Cf. s. 20.052(5)(c), F.s., requiring that minutes, including a record of all votes cast, be maintained for all meetings of an advisory body, commission, board of trustees, or other collegial body adjunct to an executive agency. c. Tape recording or Internet archive as minutes The s unshine law does not require that public boards and commissions tape record their See ago 86-21. h owever, other statutes may require that certain proceedings be meetings. See Carlson v. Department of Revenue , 42 F.l.W. D2083 (Fla. 1st DCa s eptember 29, recorded. 2017) (statute mandating that a “complete recording” be made of portions of a closed negotiation team meeting requires more than an agenda and meeting notes). Cf. ago 10-42 (where statute requires that all closed proceedings of child abuse death review committee be recorded and that no portion be off the record, audio recording of the proceedings “would appear to be the most expedient and cost-efficient manner to ensure that all discussion is recorded”). however, while a board is authorized to tape record the proceedings if it chooses to do so, the s unshine law also requires written minutes. ago 75-45. s imilarly, while a board may archive the full text of all workshop discussions conducted on the i nternet, written minutes of the workshops must also be prepared and promptly recorded. ago 08-65. 40

58 government-in-the-sunshine-manual moreover, the tape recordings are public records and their retention is governed by nformation s schedules established by the Division of library and i ervices of the Department of state in accordance with s. 257.36(6), F.s. ago 86-21. Accord ago 86-93 (tape recordings of school board meetings are subject to Public r ecords a ct even though written minutes are required to be prepared and made available to the public). Use of transcript as minutes d. although a written transcript is not required, a board may use a written transcript of the meeting as the minutes, if it chooses to do so. i nf. o p. to Fulwider, June 14, 1993. 4. Notice requirements a. Reasonable notice required a vital element of the s unshine law is the requirement that boards subject to the law provide “reasonable notice” of all meetings. See s. 286.011(1), F.s. e ven before the statutory amendment in 1995 expressly requiring notice, the courts had stated that in order for a public meeting to be in essence “public,” reasonable notice of the meeting must be given. Hough v. See Stembridge, o. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 3d DCa 1973); Yarbrough v. Young, 462 s o. 2d 515, 517 278 s (Fla. 1st DCa 1985). reasonable public notice is required for all meetings subject to the s unshine law and is required even though a quorum is not present. ago 90-56. And see Baynard v. City of Chiefland, Florida, n o. 38-2002-Ca-000789 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. July 8, 2003) (reasonable notice required even if subject of meeting is “relatively unimportant”). n otice is required even though meetings of the board are “of general knowledge” and are not conducted in a closed door manner. TSI overnmental bodies who Southeast, Inc. v. Royals, 588 s o. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991). “g hold unnoticed meetings do so at their peril.” Monroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, Inc. , 647 s o. 2d 857, 869 (Fla. 3d DCa 1994). The s unshine law does not define the term “reasonable notice.” Therefore, the type of notice is variable and depends upon the facts of the situation and the board involved. i n each case, an agency must give notice at such time and in such a manner as to enable the media and the general public to attend the meeting. ago s 04-44, 80-78 and 73-170. And see Rhea v. City 574 s o. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991) (purpose of the notice requirement is of Gainesville, to apprise the public of the pendency of matters that might affect their rights, afford them the opportunity to appear and present their views, and afford them a reasonable time to make an appearance if they wish). Cf. Lyon v. Lake County, 765 s o. 2d 785, 790 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000) (where county attorney provided citizen with “personal due notice” of a committee meeting and its function, it would be “unjust to reward” the citizen by concluding that a meeting lacked adequate notice because the newspaper advertisement failed to correctly name the committee). See also Suncam, Inc. v. Worrall, n o. Ci97-3385 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. m ay 9, 1997) (s unshine law requires notice to the general public; agency not required to provide “individual notice” to company that wished to be informed when certain meetings were going to occur). While the a ttorney g eneral’s office cannot specify the type of notice which must be given in all cases, the following notice guidelines are suggested: 1. The notice should contain the time and place of the meeting and, if available, an agenda, or if no agenda is available, a statement of the general subject matter to be considered. 2. The notice should be prominently displayed in the area in the agency’s offices set aside for that purpose, e.g. , for cities, in city hall, and on the agency’s website, if there is one. 3. e xcept in the case of emergency or special meetings, notice should be provided at least 7 days prior to the meeting. e mergency sessions should be afforded the most appropriate and effective notice under the circumstances. pecial meetings should have no less than 24 and preferably at least 72 hours reasonable 4. s 41

59 government-in-the-sunshine-manual notice to the public. o. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCa 1985) (three See Yarbrough v. Young, 462 s no. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, days notice of special meeting deemed adequate) and per curiam affirmed, 79 so. 3d 502008Ca027882 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. December 8, 2010), law where notice of special meeting 36 (Fla. 4th DCa 2012) (no violation of sunshine held on monday september 15 was posted at city hall and faxed to the media on Friday september 12, and members of the public [including the media] attended the meeting). The use of press releases, faxes, e-mails, and/or phone calls to the local news media is highly 5. effective in providing notice of upcoming meetings. The notice procedures set forth above should be considered as suggestions which will See ago 73-170 (“i f the vary depending upon the circumstances of each particular situation. purpose for notice is kept in mind, together with the character of the event about which notice is to be given and the nature of the rights to be affected, the essential requirements for notice in that See also ago s 00-08, 94-62 and 90-56. situation will suggest themselves”). Rhea v. City of Gainesville , 574 s o. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991), the court held Thus, in that a complaint alleging that members of the local news media were contacted about a special meeting of the city commission one and one-half hours before the meeting stated a sufficient unshine law had been violated. Compare cause of action that the s News and Sun-Sentinel Company v. Cox, 702 F. s unshine law violation occurred when upp. 891 (s.D. Fla. 1988) (no s arch 31, a “general notice” of a city commission meeting scheduled for a on m pril 5 was posted on the bulletin board outside city hall). The determination as to who will actually prepare the notice or agenda is essentially “an integral part of the actual mechanics and procedures for conducting that meeting and, therefore, aptly relegated to local practice and procedure as prescribed by . . . charters and ordinances.” Hough o. 2d at 291. , 278 s b. Notice requirements when meeting adjourned to a later date if a meeting is to be adjourned and reconvened later to complete the business from the agenda of the adjourned meeting, the second meeting should also be noticed. ago 90-56. c. Notice requirements when board acting as quasi-judicial body or taking action affecting individual rights section 286.0105, F.s., requires: each board, commission, or agency of this state or of any political subdivision thereof shall include in the notice of any meeting or hearing, if notice of the meeting or hearing is required, of such board, commission, or agency, conspicuously on such notice, the advice that, if a person decides to appeal any decision made by the board, agency, or commission with respect to any matter considered at such meeting or hearing, he or she will need a record of the proceedings, and that, for such purpose, he or she may need to ensure that a verbatim record of the proceedings is made, which record includes the testimony and evidence upon which the appeal is to be based. Where a public board or commission acts as a quasi-judicial body or takes official action on matters that affect individual rights of citizens, in contrast with the rights of the public at large, the board or commission is subject to the requirements of s. 286.0105, F.s. ago 81-06. d. Paid advertising requirements and additional notice provisions imposed by other statutes, codes, or ordinances public notice be given, a public While the s unshine law requires only that reasonable 42

60 government-in-the-sunshine-manual agency may be subject to additional notice requirements imposed by other statutes, charters or n such cases, the requirements of that statute, charter, or code must be strictly observed. codes. i p. to m attimore, February 6, 1996. inf. o For example, while the sunshine law does not mandate that an agency use a paid advertisement to provide public notice of a meeting, other statutes may specify publication See Yarbrough v. Young, 462 s o. 2d 515, 517n.1 (Fla. 1st DCa requirements for certain actions. 1985) (s unshine law does not require city council to give notice “by paid advertisements” of its intent to take action regarding utilities system improvements, although the legislature “has required such notice for certain subjects,” e.g., 166.041[3][c], F.s.). See also s. 189.015(1), F.s. (notice requirements for meetings of the governing bodies of special districts); and s. 1001.372(2) (c), F.s. (school board meetings). dministrative Procedure similarly, a board or commission subject to Ch. 120, F.s., the a act, must comply with the notice and publication requirements of that act. See, e.g., s. 120.525, F.s. Those requirements, however, are imposed by Ch. 120, F.s., not s. 286.011, F.s., although the notice of a board or commission meeting published pursuant to Ch. 120, F.s., also satisfies the notice requirements of s. 286.011, F.s. Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Baranko, 407 s o. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCa 1982). 5. Public comment Prior to the adoption of s. 286.0114, F.s. (2013), Florida courts had determined that s. 286.011, F.s., provides a right to attend public meetings, but does not provide a right to be heard. See Herrin v. City of Deltona, 121 s o. 3d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCa 2013) (phrase “open to the public” as used in s. 286.011, F.s., means that “meetings must be properly noticed and reasonably accessible to the public, not that the public has the right to be heard at such meetings”). See also 32 s Keesler v. Community Maritime Park Associates, Inc., review o. 3d 659 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010), denied, 47 s Grapski v. City of Alachua, 31 s o. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCa o. 3d 1289 (Fla. 2010); and review denied, o. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010). 2010), 47 s Herrin , s. 286.0114(2), F.s., now mandates that however, as the court observed in “[m]embers of the public shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on a proposition before a board or commission.” The opportunity to be heard does not have to occur at the same meeting at which the board or commission takes official action if the opportunity “occurs at a meeting that is during the decisionmaking process and is within reasonable proximity in time before the meeting at which the board or commission takes the official action.” s ection 286.0114(2), F.s. The terms “proposition” or “official action” are not defined in the statute, nor is there a distinction between official action taken at a formal meeting versus an informal setting, such as a workshop. i nf. o p. to Jacquot, a pril 25, 2014. “i n light of the purpose of the statute to allow public participation during the decisionmaking process on a proposition, it should be liberally Id. construed to facilitate that purpose.” section 286.0114(3), F.s., states that the public’s “opportunity to be heard” does not apply to: 1. an official act that must be taken to deal with an emergency situation affecting the public health, welfare, or safety, if compliance with the requirements would cause an unreasonable delay in the ability of the board or commission to act; 2. an official act involving no more than a ministerial act, including, but not limited to, approval of minutes and ceremonial proclamations; 3. a meeting that is exempt from s. 286.011; or 4. a meeting during which the board or commission is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. ago 17-01 (s. 286.0114, F.s., does not require that members of the public be given See 43

61 government-in-the-sunshine-manual a reasonable opportunity to be heard at quasi-judicial code enforcement hearings held by a special magistrate pursuant to authority delegated from the county code enforcement board). The statute does not prohibit a board or commission from “maintaining orderly conduct n addition, the opportunity or proper decorum in a public meeting.” s ection 286.0114(2), F.s. i to be heard is “subject to rules or policies adopted by the board or commission” as provided in s. 286.0114(4), F.s. These rules or policies are limited to those that: 1. Provide guidelines regarding the amount of time an individual has to address the board or commission; Prescribe procedures for allowing representatives of groups or factions on a proposition to 2. address the board or commission, rather than all members of such groups or factions, at meetings in which a large number of individuals wish to be heard; 3. Prescribe procedures or forms for an individual to use in order to inform the board or commission of a desire to be heard; to indicate his or her support, opposition, or neutrality on a proposition; and to indicate his or her designation of a representative to speak for him or her or his or her group on a proposition if he or she so chooses; or Designate a specified period of time for public comment. 4. if a board or commission adopts such rules or policies and thereafter complies with them, it is deemed to be acting in compliance with the statute. s ection 286.0114(5), F.s. And see Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 1989) (mayor’s actions in attempting to confine the speaker to the agenda item in the city commission meeting and having the speaker removed when the speaker appeared to become disruptive constituted a reasonable time, place and manner regulation and did not violate the speaker’s First amendment rights). a circuit court is authorized to issue injunctions for the purpose of enforcing s. 286.0114, F.s. s ection 286.0114(6), F.s. h owever, an action taken by a board or commission which is found to be in violation of that statute is not void as a result of the violation. s ection 286.0114(8), F.s. 6. Restrictions on public attendance a. Cameras and tape recorders a board or commission may adopt reasonable rules and policies which ensure the orderly conduct of a public meeting and require orderly behavior on the part of those persons attending a public meeting. a board, however, may not ban the use of nondisruptive recording devices. Pinellas County School Board v. Suncam, Inc., 829 s o. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCa 2002) (school board’s Accord ago 91-28. And see ban on unobtrusive videotaping invalid). ago 77-122 (silent nondisruptive tape recording of district meeting permissible). The legislature in Ch. 934, F.s., appears to implicitly recognize the public’s right to silently record public meetings. ago 91-28. Chapter 934, F.s., the s ecurity of Communications a ct, regulates the interception of oral communications. s ection 934.02(2), F.s., however, defines “[o]ral communication” to specifically exclude “any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting . . . .” i nf. o p. to g erstein, July 16, 1976, stating that public officials See also may not complain that they are secretly being recorded during public meetings in violation of s. 934.03, F.s. b. Exclusion of certain members of the public The term “open to the public” as used in the s unshine law means open to all persons who choose to attend. ago 99-53. Cf. Ribaya v. Board of Trustees of City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in City of Tampa, 162 s o. 3d 348, 356 (Fla. 2d DCa 2015) (although there appears to be no case law “squarely resolving” whether a wrongful exclusion of one person would void all actions taken at the meeting, “there is legal support for that proposition”). 44

62 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Thus the court in Port Everglades Authority v. International Longshoremen’s Association, Local 652 s 1922-1, o. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995), ruled that a procurement committee violated the sunshine law by requesting that bidders voluntarily excuse themselves from each See now s. 286.0113(2), F.s., providing an exemption from the s unshine other’s presentations. law for any portion of a meeting at which a vendor makes an oral presentation or answers questions as part of a competitive solicitation, and requiring a complete recording of the exempt portion of the meeting. staff of a public agency clearly are members of the public as well as employees of the agency; they cannot, therefore, be excluded from public meetings. ago 79-01. s ection 286.011, F.s., however, does not preclude the reasonable application of ordinary personnel policies, for example, the requirement that annual leave be used to attend meetings, provided that such policies do not frustrate or subvert the purpose of the s unshine law. Id. although not directly addressing the open meetings laws, courts of other states have ruled that in the absence of a compelling governmental interest, agencies may not single out and exclude a particular news organization or reporter from press conferences. See, e.g., Times- Picayune Publishing Corporation v. Lee, 15 m edia l. r ep. 1713 (e.D. la. 1988); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. s upp. 906 (D. h awaii 1974); Quad-City Community News Service, Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. supp. 8 (s.D. i owa 1971); and Southwestern Newspapers Corporation v. Curtis, 584 s.W.2d 362 (tex. Ct. a pp. 1979). c. Inaudible discussions ttorney g in ago 71-159, the a eneral’s office advised that discussions of public business which are audible only to “a select few” who are at the table with the board members may violate the “openness” requirement of the law. Cf. Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, no. 2010Ca4387nC (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. February 27, 2012) (two members of a civil service board violated the s unshine law when they held a private discussion concerning a pending employment appeal during a recess of a board meeting). 7. Time and length of meeting Greenbarg v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 618 so. 2d 760 in (Fla. 3d DCa 1993), the court held that there was “no impropriety” when a county commission continued to meet until the “early morning hours.” 8. Use of codes or preassigned numbers in order to avoid identifying individuals section 286.011, F.s., requires that meetings of public boards or commissions be “open to the public at all times . . . .” See Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 462 s o. 2d 821, 823 (Fla. 1985), disapproving a procedure permitting representatives of the media to attend a city council meeting provided that they agreed to “respect the confidentiality” of certain matters: nder the s unshine law, a meeting is either fully open or fully closed; there are no intermediate “u categories.” The use of preassigned numbers or codes at public meetings to avoid identifying the names of applicants violates s. 286.011, F.s., because “to permit discussions of applicants for the position of a municipal department head by a preassigned number or other coded identification in order to keep the public from knowing the identities of such applicants and to exclude the public from the appointive or selection process would clearly frustrate or defeat the purpose of the s unshine law.” ago 77-48. Accord ago 76-240 (s unshine law prohibits the use of coded symbols at a public meeting in order to avoid revealing the names of applicants for the position of city manager). And see News-Press Publishing Company v. Wisher, 345 so. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 1977) (“public policy of this state as expressed in the public records law and the open meetings statute eliminate any notion that the commission was free to conduct the county’s personnel business by pseudonyms or cloaked references”). 45

63 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 9. Voting Abstention a. section 286.012, F.s., provides: a member of a state, county, or municipal governmental board, commission, or agency who is present at a meeting of any such body at which an official decision, ruling, or other official act is to be taken or adopted may not abstain from voting . . . and a vote shall be recorded or counted for each such member present, unless, with respect to any such member, there is, or appears to be, a possible conflict of interest under s. 112.311, s. 112.313, or s. 112.3143, or additional or more stringent standards of conduct, if any, adopted pursuant to s. 112.326. i f there is or appears to be a possible conflict under s. 112.311, s. 112.313, or s. 112.3143, the member shall comply with the disclosure requirements of s. 112.3143. i f the conflict is one arising from the additional or more stringent standards adopted pursuant to s. 112.326, the member shall comply with any disclosure requirements adopted pursuant to s. 112.326. i f the official decision, ruling, or act occurs in the context of a quasi-judicial proceeding, a member may abstain from voting on such matter if the abstention is to assure a fair proceeding free from potential bias or prejudice. (e.s.) a member of a state, county, or municipal board who is present at a meeting is thus prohibited from abstaining from voting except as authorized in s. 286.012, F.s. See ago 02-40 Cf. i nf. o p. to (s. 286.012, F.s., applies to advisory board appointed by a county commission). ugust 10, 2006 (nothing in the language of s. 286.012 indicates that a member who Dickens, a temporarily absents himself or herself from the dais [but is still present in the meeting room] during a vote should be recorded as an affirmative vote). Failure of a member to vote, however, does not invalidate the entire proceedings. City of 313 s cause dismissed sua sponte, Hallandale v. Rayel Corporation, o. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th DCa 1975), 322 s o. 2d 915 (Fla. 1975) (to rule otherwise would permit any member to frustrate official And see action merely by refusing to participate). nf. o p. to Dickens, supra (failure of a member i to vote does not render a voted matter invalid if a quorum is present and the required number of affirmative votes have been cast by the voting members). section 286.012, F.s., applies only to state, county, and municipal boards. ago 04-21. special district boards are not subject to its provisions and may adopt their own rules regarding s 04-21, 85-78 and 78-11. abstention, subject to s. 112.3143, F.s. ago Questions as to what constitutes a conflict of interest and when board members are prohibited from voting under the above statutes should be referred to the Florida Commission on e thics. b. Proxy votes i n the absence of statutory authority, proxy voting by board members is not allowed. ago 78-117. c. Roll call vote While s. 286.012, F.s., requires that each member present cast a vote either for or against the proposal under consideration by the public board or commission, it is not necessary that a roll call vote of the members present and voting be taken so that each member’s specific vote on each subject is recorded. The intent of the statute is that all members present cast a vote and that Ruff v. the minutes so reflect that by either recording a vote or counting a vote for each member. 46

64 government-in-the-sunshine-manual School Board of Collier County, o. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2d DCa 1983) (roll call vote so as to record 426 s Cf. the individual vote of each such member is not necessary). s. 20.052(5)(c), F.s., requiring that minutes, including a record of all votes cast, be maintained for all meetings of an advisory body, commission, board of trustees, or other collegial body adjunct to an executive agency. d. Written or secret ballot unshine law. See a secret ballot violates the s ago 73-264 (members of a personnel board may not vote by secret ballot during a hearing concerning a public employee). Accord ago s 72- 326 and 71-32 (board may not use secret ballots to elect the chair and other officers of the board). however, board members are not prohibited from using written ballots to cast a vote as long as the votes are made openly at a public meeting, the name of the person who voted and his or her selection are written on the ballot, and the ballots are maintained and made available for public inspection in accordance with the Public r ecords a See ago 73-344. ct. in addition, because the s unshine law expressly requires that public meetings be open to the public “at all times,” after the ballots are marked, it may be advisable for the person who tallies the votes should announce the names of the persons who voted and their votes. For example, a judge found that a board violated the s unshine law when the board members’ individual votes for each applicant were not announced at the public meeting. a ccording to the court, “[t]he fact that the ballots are preserved as public records available for public inspection does not satisfy the requirement of openness.” Schweickert v. Citrus County Port Authority, n o. 12-Ca-1339 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. s eptember 30, 2013). See also ago 71-32 (if at any time during a public meeting, the proceedings become “covert, secret or not wholly exposed to the view and hearing of the public,” that portion of the meeting is not “open to the public at all times”). E. STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS Creation and review of exemptions 1. article i, s. 24(b), Fla. Const., requires that all meetings of a collegial public body of the executive branch of state government or of local government, at which official acts are to be taken or at which the public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, be open and noticed to the public. all laws in effect on July 1, 1993, that limit access to meetings remain in force until they are repealed. article i, s. 24(d), Fla. Const. The legislature is authorized to provide by general law passed by two-thirds vote of each house for the exemption of meetings, provided such law states with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and is no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law. article i, s. 24(c), Fla. Const. s. 119.011(8), F.s., defining the term “exemption” to See include a provision of general law which provides that a “specified . . . meeting, or portion thereof, is not subject to the access requirements” in s. 286.011, F.s., or art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const. And see Halifax Hospital Medical Center v. News-Journal Corporation, 724 s o. 2d 567 (Fla. 1999) (open meetings exemption for certain hospital board meetings unconstitutional because it did not meet the constitutional standard of specificity as to stated public necessity and limited breadth to accomplish that purpose). Compare Baker County Press, Inc. v. Baker County Medical Services, Inc. , 870 s o. 2d 189, 195 (Fla. 1st DCa 2004), upholding a more recent public meetings exemption because “the constitutional concerns expressed by the Florida s upreme Court in Halifax ” were met due to a more specific legislative justification accompanied by adequate findings to support the breadth of the exemption. section 119.15, F.s., the o pen g overnment s unset r eview a ct, provides for legislative review of exemptions from the open government laws. Pursuant to the a ct, in the fifth year after enactment of a new exemption or expansion of an existing exemption, the exemption shall be repealed on o ctober 2 of the fifth year, unless the legislature acts to reenact the exemption. section 119.15(3), F.s. The two-thirds vote requirement for enactment of exemptions set forth 47

65 government-in-the-sunshine-manual in art. i, s. 24(c), Fla. Const., applies to re-adoption of exemptions as well as initial creation of exemptions. ago 03-18. 2. Exemptions are narrowly construed as a statute enacted for the public benefit, the s unshine law should be liberally construed to give effect to its public purpose, while exemptions should be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 s o. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Wood v. o. 2d 934 (Fla. 1983). Marston, 379 s o. 2d 148, 155 (Fla. 1st 442 s And see Turner v. Wainwright, affirmed and remanded , 389 s o. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1980) (rejecting a board’s argument DCa 1980), that a legislative requirement that certain board meetings must be open to the public implies that Carlson v. Department of Revenue the board could meet privately to discuss other matters); and , 42 F.l.W. D2083 (Fla. 1st DCa s eptember 29, 2017), rejecting an agency’s argument that a statute providing an exemption for “[a]ny portion of team meeting at which negotiation strategies are discussed” covered the entirety of any meeting at which negotiation strategies were discussed. unshine law should be construed so as to frustrate all The courts have recognized that the s evasive devices. City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 s o. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); Blackford v. School Board of Orange County, o. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCa 1979); Wolfson v. State, 344 s o. 2d 611 (Fla. 375 s 2d DCa 1977). as the Florida supreme Court stated in Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 s o. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1973): various boards and agencies have obviously attempted to read exceptions into the g unshine law which overnment in the s ven though their intentions may be sincere, do not exist. e such boards and agencies should not be allowed to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute. The benefit to the public far outweighs the inconvenience of the board or agency. i f the board or agency feels aggrieved, then the remedy lies in the halls of the legislature and not in efforts to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute by devious ways in the hope that the judiciary will read some exception into the law. if a board member is unable to determine whether a meeting is subject to the s unshine law, he or she should either leave the meeting or ensure that the meeting complies with the sunshine law. See City of Miami Beach v. Berns, supra at 41; Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 so. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974) (“The principle to be followed is very simple: When in doubt, the members of any board, agency, authority or commission should follow the open-meeting policy of the s tate.”). Effect of statutory exemptions 3. a. Notice requirements if a statute exempts meetings from the requirements of s. 286.011, F.s., the meetings are also exempt from the notice provisions in that statute that would otherwise apply. ago 93-86. Accord ago 07-28. b. Attendance at closed meetings in some cases, a statutory exemption specifies the persons who are permitted to attend a closed session. For example, s. 286.011(8), F.s., establishing an open meetings exemption for certain discussions pertaining to pending litigation, provides that only the entity, the entity’s attorney, the entity’s chief administrative officer, and a court reporter may attend the closed meeting. See ago 01-10 (clerk of court not authorized to attend). however, where an exemption for certain public hospital board meetings relating to a “written strategic plan” did not specify who may attend (other than a court reporter), the a ttorney general’s office recommended that the board “strictly limit attendance to only those individuals 48

66 government-in-the-sunshine-manual who are essential to the purpose of the meeting, , to discuss, receive a report on, modify, or i.e. approve a strategic plan, in order to avoid what the courts might consider to be a disclosure to the public.” ago 07-28. ago 06-34 (members of a local advocacy council, who are And see attending a closed session of the statewide advocacy council during the discussion of one of the local council’s cases, may not remain in the closed session when the statewide advocacy council is considering cases from other advocacy councils which are unrelated to the local advocacy council’s cases). Disclosure of matters discussed at closed meeting c. attorney general’s office considered whether the in a 2014 informal opinion, the unauthorized disclosure by a council member of information discussed during a closed “shade meeting” held pursuant to s. 286.011(8), F.s., would violate the s unshine law or have other legal consequences. The opinion concluded that the prohibitions and penalties for violation of the s unshine law that are set forth in s. 286.011(3), F.s., appear to be directed only at persons who attend closed meetings that should have been open to the public. i nf. o p. to Pritt, See november 26, 2014. a ccordingly, the a ttorney g eneral’s office was unable to conclude that unauthorized disclosure of matters disclosed at a valid closed session would violate the sunshine law. Id. h owever, other statutory provisions, such as ss. 112.313(8), 112.51, or 839.26, F.s., relating to disclosure of privileged information could apply to this situation. Id. And see ago 03-09 (exemption for collective bargaining strategy sessions in s. 447.605[1], F.s., does not directly address the dissemination of information that may be obtained at the closed meeting, but there is clear legislative intent that matters discussed during such meetings are not to be open to public disclosure). 4. Special act exemptions Prior to July 1, 1993, exemptions from the s unshine law could be created by special act. article i, s. 24, Fla. Const., however, now limits the legislature’s ability to enact an exemption from the constitutional right of access to open meetings established thereunder. While exemptions in effect on July 1, 1993, remain in force until repealed, the Constitution requires that exemptions enacted after that date must be by general law. s uch law must state with specificity the public necessity for the exemption and be no broader than necessary to accomplish that stated purpose. F. REMEDIES AND PENALTIES Criminal penalties 1. knowing violation of the s unshine law is a misdemeanor of the second degree. s ection a 286.011(3)(b), F.s. a person convicted of a second degree misdemeanor may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 60 days and/or fined up to $500. s ections 775.082(4)(b) and 775.083(1)(e), F.s. The criminal penalties apply to members of advisory councils subject to the s unshine law as well as to members of elected or appointed boards. ago 01-84 (school advisory council members). Conduct which occurs outside the state which constitutes a knowing violation of the sunshine law is a second degree misdemeanor. s ection 286.011(3)(c), F.s. s uch violations are prosecuted in the county in which the board or commission normally conducts its official business while violations occurring within the state may be prosecuted in that county. s ection 910.16, F.s. 2. Removal from office When a method for removal from office is not otherwise provided by the Florida Constitution or by law, the g overnor may suspend an elected or appointed public officer who is indicted or informed against for any misdemeanor arising directly out of his or her official duties. section 112.52(1), F.s. i f convicted, the officer may be removed from office by executive order of the g overnor. s ection 112.52(3), F.s. a person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who is found guilty is, for purposes of s. 112.52, F.s., deemed to have been convicted, notwithstanding 49

67 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the suspension of sentence or the withholding of adjudication. Cf. s. 112.51, F.s. (municipal Id. , s. 7, Fla. Const. (state and county officers). officers) and art. iv 3. Noncriminal infractions unshine section 286.011(3)(a), F.s., imposes noncriminal penalties for violations of the s law by providing that any public officer violating the provisions of the s unshine law is guilty of a noncriminal infraction, punishable by a fine not exceeding $500. The state attorney may 12 F.l.W. s upp. 1194a (Fla. Broward pursue such actions on behalf of the state. State v. Foster, Accord ago 91-38. Cf. State v. Foster, 13 F.l.W. s upp. 385a (Fla. Co. Ct. s eptember 26, 2005). 17th Cir. Ct. January 25, 2006) (no right to jury trial is triggered when an individual faces a unshine law). noncriminal violation of the s unshine law, its board of directors constitute if a nonprofit corporation is subject to the s See Goosby v. State, no. “public officers” for purposes of s. 286.011(3)(a), F.s. ago 98-21. cert. denied, gF05-(001122-001130,001135)-Ba (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. December 22, 2006), no. 2D07-281 (Fla. 2d DCa m ay 25, 2007) (members of the Polk County o pportunity Council, which had assumed and exercised a delegated governmental function, were “public officers” for sunshine law and subject to the imposition of the noncriminal infraction fine). purposes of the State v. Dorworth, n o. 14-mm-5841 (Fla. o range Co. Ct. o ctober 21, 2014), affirmed, Compare, no. 14-aP-48 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. a ugust 19, 2015), dismissing a misdemeanor charge against a lobbyist who was accused of violating the s unshine law by relaying information between board members and thereby aiding the members to meet without complying with the s unshine law. The trial judge determined that by charging the lobbyist, the state attorney “expanded the reach of the s unshine law to private citizens; and, the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to private citizens.” Attorney’s fees 4. reasonable attorney’s fees will be assessed against a board or commission found to have unshine law. s ection 286.011(4), F.s. See Indian River County Hospital District v. violated the s 766 s Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., o. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 4th DCa 2000), concluding that the trial court erred by failing to assess attorney’s fees against a nonprofit hospital corporation unshine law. And see s. 286.011(5), F.s., authorizing the assessment found to have violated the s unshine law of attorney fees if a board appeals an order finding the board in violation of the s and the order is affirmed. While s. 286.011(4), F.s., authorizes an award of appellate fees if a person successfully appeals a trial court order denying access, the statute “does not supersede the appellate rules, nor does it authorize the trial court to make an initial award of appellate attorney’s fees.” School Board of Alachua County v. Rhea, 661 s review denied, 670 s o. 2d o. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCa 1995), 939, 332 (Fla. 1996). Thus, a person prevailing on appeal must file an appropriate motion in the Id. i f a board appeals an order finding appellate court in order to receive appellate attorney’s fees. the board in violation of the s unshine law, and the order is affirmed, “the court shall assess a reasonable attorney’s fee for the appeal” against the board. s ection 286.011(5), F.s. attorney’s fees may be assessed against the individual members of the board except in those ection 286.011(4) and (5), cases where the board sought, and took, the advice of its attorney. s F.s. if a member of a board or commission charged with a violation of s. 286.011, F.s., is subsequently acquitted, the board or commission is authorized to reimburse that member for any portion of his or her reasonable attorney’s fees. s ection 286.011(7), F.s. Cf. ago 86-35, stating that this subsection does not authorize the reimbursement of attorney’s fees incurred during an investigation of alleged sunshine violations when no formal charges were filed, although common law principles may permit such reimbursement. 50

68 government-in-the-sunshine-manual reasonable attorney’s fees may be assessed against the individual filing an action to enforce the provisions of s. 286.011, F.s., if the court finds that it was filed in bad faith or was frivolous. section 286.011(4), F.s. The fact that a plaintiff may be unable to prove that a secret meeting See Bland took place, however, does not necessarily mean that attorney’s fees will be assessed. v. Jackson County, 514 s o. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCa 1987), concluding that although the plaintiff was unable to prove that a meeting in violation of the s unshine law took place, the evidence showed that the county commission unanimously voted on the issue in an open public meeting without identifying what they were voting on and without any discussion and under these circumstances an inference might reasonably be drawn that the commissioners had no need to discuss the action being taken because they had already discussed and decided the issue before the public meeting. 5. Civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief section 286.011(2), F.s., states that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to issue injunctions upon application by any citizen of this state. See Allen v. United Faculty of Miami-Dade College, 197 s o. 3d 604 (Fla. 3rd DCa 2016) (Public e mployees r elations Commission [P er C] properly dismissed unfair labor practice charge alleging a violation of the s unshine law, as s. 286.011, F.s., er C). is enforceable only by the courts, not by P While normally irreparable injury must be proved by the plaintiff before an injunction may be issued, in s unshine law cases the mere showing that the law has been violated constitutes “irreparable public injury.” Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 s o. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974); and Times Publishing Company v. Williams, 222 s o. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCa 1969), disapproved in part on other grounds, Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 462 s o. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985). The plaintiff’s burden is to “establish by the greater weight of the evidence” that a meeting which should have been held in the sunshine took place on the date alleged. Lyon v. Lake County, 765 so. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000). a complaint for injunctive relief must allege by name or sufficient description the identity of the public official with whom the defendant public official has violated the s unshine law. Deerfield Beach Publishing, Inc. v. Robb, 530 And see Forehand so. 2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCa 1988). 600 s v. School Board of Gulf County, Florida, o. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992) (plaintiff was not denied a fair and impartial hearing because the board only briefly deliberated in public before a vote was taken as there was no evidence that the board had privately deliberated on this issue); and Law and Information Services v. City of Riviera Beach, 670 s o. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th DCa 1996) (patent speculation, absent any allegation that a nonpublic meeting in fact occurred, is insufficient to state a cause of action). sunshine although a court cannot issue a blanket order enjoining any violation of the law based upon a finding that the law was violated in particular respects, a court may enjoin a future violation that bears some resemblance to the past violation. See Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 s o. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. 1969), Port Everglades Authority v. International Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1922-1 , 652 s o. 2d 1169, 1173 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995), and 125 s o. 3d 184 (Fla. 4th Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. Martin County School Board, DCa 2013). See also Wood v. Marston, 442 s o. 2d 934 (Fla. 1983) (trial court’s permanent injunction affirmed). Compare Leach-Wells v. City of Bradenton, 734 s o. 2d 1168, 1170n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCa 1999), in which the court noted that had a citizen appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion for temporary injunction based on a selection committee’s alleged violation of the s unshine law, the appellate court “would have had the opportunity to review this matter before the project was completed and to direct that the City be enjoined from entering into a final contract with the developer until after such time as the ranking of the proposals could be accomplished in compliance with the s unshine law.” The future conduct must be “specified, with such reasonable definiteness and certainty that the defendant could readily know what it must refrain from doing without speculation and 51

69 government-in-the-sunshine-manual conjecture.” Port Everglades Authority v. International Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1922-1, Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 And quoting from supra, so. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969). no. 502007Ca007552XXXXmB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June see Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, per curiam affirmed, 46 s o. 3d 573 (Fla. 4th DCa 2010) (injunctive relief against 9, 2009), future violations of city to record minutes of certain meetings appropriate in light of city’s past conduct and consistent refusal to record such minutes even after being advised to do so by the city attorney and because the city “has continuously taken the legal position that local governments are not required by the s unshine law to record minutes”). Declaratory relief is not appropriate where no present dispute exists but where governmental ttorney g eneral and agencies merely seek judicial advice different from that advanced by the a the state attorney or an injunctive restraint on the prosecutorial discretion of the state attorney. Askew v. City of Ocala, 348 s o. 2d 308 (Fla. 1977). Validity of action taken in violation of the Sunshine Law and subsequent corrective 6. action section 286.011, F.s., provides that no resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at an open meeting. unshine law should be construed so as to frustrate all evasive recognizing that the s Town devices, the courts have held that action taken in violation of the law is void ab initio. o. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974). of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 s Accord Sarasota Citizens For Responsible , 48 s o. 3d 755, 762 (Fla. 2010), noting that “where officials Government v. City of Sarasota See Silver Express Company have violated section 286.011, the official action is void ab initio.” 691 s o. 2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997) (selection v. District Board of Lower Tribunal Trustees, committee rankings resulting from a meeting held in violation of the s unshine law are void ab TSI Southeast, initio and agency enjoined from entering into contract based on such rankings); 588 s o. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991) (contract for sale and purchase of real property Inc. v. Royals, voided because board failed to properly notice the meeting under s. 286.011, F.s.); Grapski v. City of Alachua, 31 s review denied, 47 s o. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010) o. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010), (by failing to open its minutes to public inspection and copying in a timely and reasonable manner, prejudice is presumed and therefore city’s approval of minutes is null and void ab initio); Brown v. Denton, 152 s o. 3d 8 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014), review denied, n o. sC14-2490 (Fla. and February 24, 2016) (upholding trial court ruling that voided an agreement reached after closed- door mediation sessions which resulted in changes to pension benefits of city employees in certain unions). s. 286.0114(8), F.s. (an action taken by a board or commission which is found Compare to be in violation of s. 286.0114, F.s. [providing a right to be heard on a proposition before a state or local board or commission] “is not void as a result of that violation”). similarly, a circuit judge found that where two members of civil service board held a private discussion about a pending case during a recess, the board’s subsequent findings in the case were “null and void” and city must reconvene the board and hear the evidence de novo . Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, n o. 2010Ca4387nC (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. February 27, 2012). And see Ribaya v. Board of Trustees of City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in City of Tampa, o. 3d 348, 356 (Fla. 2d DCa 2015) (although there appears to be no case law 162 s “squarely resolving” whether a wrongful exclusion of one person would void all actions taken at the meeting, “there is legal support for that proposition”). a violation need not be “clandestine” in order for a contract to be invalidated because “the principle that a s unshine law violation renders void a resulting official action does not depend upon a finding of intent to violate the law or resulting prejudice.” Port Everglades Authority v. International Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1922-1 , 652 s o. 2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995). But see Killearn Properties, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 366 s o. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCa 1979), cert. denied, 378 so. 2d 343 (Fla. 1979) (city which had received benefits under contract was unshine estopped from claiming contract invalid as having been entered into in violation of the s 52

70 government-in-the-sunshine-manual law). Where, however, a public board or commission does not merely perfunctorily ratify or ceremoniously accept at a later open meeting those decisions which were made at an earlier secret meeting but rather takes “independent final action in the sunshine,” the decision of the board or commission will not be disturbed. Tolar v. School Board of Liberty County, 398 s o. 2d 427, 429 Accord Bruckner v. City of Dania Beach, 823 so. 2d 167, 171 (Fla. 4th DCa 2002) (Fla. 1981). unshine”). (s unshine violations “can be cured by independent, final action completely in the s And see Monroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, i nc., 647 s o. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 3d DCa 1994) (adoption of the open government constitutional amendment, art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., did not overrule the Tolar “standard of remediation”). Cf. Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County v. Webber, 658 s o. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCa 1995) (no evidence suggesting that board members met in secret during a recess to reconsider and deny a variance and then perfunctorily ratified this decision at the public hearing held a few minutes later); B.M.Z. Corporation v. City of Oakland Park, o. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCa 1982) (where no evidence that any decision was 415 s made in private, subsequent formal action in sunshine was not merely perfunctory ratification of secret decisions or ceremonial acceptance of secret actions). Thus, in a case involving the validity of a lease approved by a board of county commissioners after an advisory committee held two unnoticed meetings regarding the lease, a court held that the s law violations were cured when the board of county commissioners held open unshine public hearings after the unnoticed meetings, an effort was made to make available to the public the minutes of the unnoticed meetings, the board approved a lease that was markedly different from that recommended by the advisory committee, and most of the lease negotiations were conducted after the advisory committee had concluded its work. Monroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, Inc., 647 s o. 2d 857, 860-861 (Fla. 3d DCa 1994). similarly, a school board remedied an inadvertent violation of the s unshine law when it subsequently held full, open and independent public hearings prior to adopting a redistricting plan. 995 s o. 2d 1068, 1073 (Fla. 5th DCa 2008). And Finch v. Seminole County School Board, 48 s see Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Sarasota, o. 3d 755 (Fla. 2010) (any possible violations that occurred when county commissioners circulated e-mails among each Cf. Anderson v. City of St. Pete Beach, 161 s o. other were cured by subsequent public meetings). 3d 548, 553-554 (Fla. 2d DCa 2014), noting that “even when an illicit action is ‘cured’ it does sunshine law in the first instance; not absolve a public body of its responsibility for violating the it simply provides a way to salvage a void act by reconsidering it in s unshine”). it must be emphasized, however, that only a full open hearing will cure the defect; a violation of the s unshine law will not be cured by a perfunctory ratification of the action taken outside of the sunshine. Spillis Candela & Partners, Inc. v. Centrust Savings Bank, 535 s o. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d DCa 1988). See also Anderson v. City of St. Pete Beach, o. 3d at 553 (city failed 161 s unshine law violation since it merely perfunctorily ratified in public session what had to cure s already been decided in closed meetings). For example, in Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, 722 s o. 2d 891, 903 (Fla. 4th DCa 1998), review denied, 735 s o. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999), the Fourth District explained why a subsequent city council meeting did not cure the council’s prior violation of the s unshine law: it is evident from the record that the meeting was not a full reexamination of the issues, but rather, was merely the perfunctory acceptance of the City’s prior decision. This was not a full, open public hearing convened for the purpose of enabling the public to express its views and participate in the decision-making process. instead, this was merely a Council meeting which was then opened to the public for comment at the City’s request. There was no significant discussion of the issues or a discourse as to 53

71 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the language sought to be included. The City Councilmen were provided with transcripts of the hearings, but none reviewed the language previously approved, and the Council subsequently voted to deny reconsideration of the wording. similarly, a public hearing held by a county commission following an advisory committee’s unshine law failed to cure the “s violation of the s unshine law problem” because the county commission did not “review the complete deliberative process fully in the sunshine.” Florida o. Ca- Keys Aqueduct Authority v. Board of County Commissioners, Monroe County, Florida, n And see Gateway Southeast Properties, Inc. v. K-00-1170 (Fla. 16th Cir. Ct. m ay 16, 2001). Town of Medley, 14 F.l.W. s upp. 20a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. o ctober 24, 2006) (subsequent public meeting did not cure the defects of earlier closed meeting where no evidence was presented and Cf. no questions asked or discussion pursued by council members at subsequent open meeting); ago 12-31 (audit committee’s statutorily prescribed function to create a request for proposals may not be delegated to a subordinate entity; the committee may not, therefore, ratify a defective request for proposals which was created and issued by the county’s financial officer contrary to the requirements of the law). moreover, an appellate court warned that while subsequent public board meetings may unshine law violation, “if a pattern of s unshine law violations existed before this have “cured” a s violation, then perhaps we may have found that any subsequent school board actions were merely ‘perfunctory ratification[s] of secret actions and decisions.’” Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. Martin County School Board, 125 s o. 3d 184, 189 (Fla. 4th DCa 2013). See Bert Fish Foundation v. Southeast Volusia Hospital District, n o. 2010-20801-Cins (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. February 24, 2011) (series of public meetings did not “cure” s unshine law violations that resulted from 21 closed door meetings over 16 months; “[t]here was so much darkness for so long, that a giant infusion of sunshine might have been too little or too late”). 7. Damages The only remedies provided for in the s unshine law are a declaration of the wrongful Dascott v. Palm Beach County, 988 s o. 2d 47 (Fla. action as void and reasonable attorney fees. review denied, 6 s o. 3d 51 (Fla. 2009) (equitable recovery of back pay not 4th DCa 2008), authorized for employment termination conducted in violation of s unshine law). PART II PUBLIC RECORDS A. SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT Florida’s Public r ecords law, Ch. 119, F.s., provides a right of access to the records of the state and local governments as well as to private entities acting on their behalf. i n the absence of a statutory exemption, this right of access applies to all materials made or received by an agency in connection with the transaction of official business which are used to perpetuate, communicate or formalize knowledge. a ccess to public records has been described as a “cornerstone of our political culture.” In re Report & Recommendations of Judicial Mgmt. Council of Fla. on Privacy & Elec. Access to Court Records, 832 s o. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. 2002) section 119.011(2), F.s., defines “agency” to include: any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government created or established by law including, for the purposes of this chapter, the Commission on e thics, the Public service Commission, and the office of Public Counsel, and any 54

72 government-in-the-sunshine-manual other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency. a right of access to records is also recognized in art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., which applies to virtually all state and local governmental entities, including the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. The only exceptions are those established by law or by the Constitution. section 119.011(12), F.s., defines “public records” to include: all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing software, or other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or means of transmission, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency. The Florida s upreme Court has interpreted this definition to encompass all materials made or received by an agency in connection with official business which are used to perpetuate, communicate or formalize knowledge. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, schaffer, r eid and associates, inc., 379 s o. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980). all such materials, regardless of whether they are in final form, are open for public inspection unless the legislature has exempted them from disclosure. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Company, 372 so. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979). The text of Ch. 119, F.s., the Public r ecords a ct, is found in a ppendix C and summaries of exemptions not included in Ch. 119, F.s., are contained in a ppendix D. The term “public record” is not limited to traditional written documents. as the statutory definition states, “tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing software, or other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or means of transmission” can all constitute public records. And see National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press, 18 review denied, so. 3d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCa 2009), so. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010) (“public records law 37 is not limited to paper documents but applies, as well, to documents that exist only in digital n o. 97-688Ci-07 (Fla. 6th Cf. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. v. Wood, form”). Cir. Ct. February 27, 1997) (physical specimens relating to an autopsy are not public records because in order to constitute a “public record” for purposes of Ch. 119, “the record itself must be susceptible of some form of copying . . . .”). Clearly, as technology changes the means by which agencies communicate, manage, and store information, public records will take on increasingly different forms. Yet, the comprehensive scope of the term “public records” will continue to make the information open to public inspection unless exempted by law. article i, s. 24, Fla. Const., establishes a constitutional right of access to any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except those records exempted pursuant to art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., or specifically made confidential by the Constitution. See State ex rel. Clayton v. Board of Regents, 635 s o. 2d 937 (Fla. 1994) (“[o]ur Constitution requires that public officials must conduct public business in the open and that public records must be made available to all Rhea v. District Board of Trustees of Santa Fe College, 109 s o. 3d 851, members of the public.”); and 855 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013) (“ a citizen’s access to public records is a fundamental constitutional right in Florida”). The complete text of art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., the Public r ecords and m eetings amendment, may be found in a ppendix a. B. WHAT ENTITIES ARE COVERED? APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT TO: Advisory boards 1. 55

73 government-in-the-sunshine-manual The definition of “agency” for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s., is not limited to governmental entities. a “public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency” is also subject to the requirements of the Public r See ecords a ct. art. i, s. 24(a), Fla. Const., providing that the constitutional right of access to public records also extends to “any public body, officer, or employee of the state, . . or persons acting on their behalf . .” (e.s.) general’s office has concluded that the records of an employee Thus, the attorney advisory committee, established pursuant to special law to make recommendations to a public hospital authority, are subject to Ch. 119, F.s., and art. i, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. ago 96-32. And see i nf. o p. to n icoletti, n ovember 18, 1987, stating that the loxahatchee Council of inc., formed by eleven public agencies to study and make recommendations on governments, local governmental issues was an “agency” for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s. 2. Private organizations a more complex question is presented when a private corporation or entity provides services for, or receives funds from, a governmental body. The term “agency,” as used in the ecords a ct, includes private entities “acting on behalf of any public agency.” s ection Public r 119.011(2), F.s. The Florida s upreme Court has stated that this broad definition of “agency” ensures that a public agency cannot avoid disclosure by contractually delegating to a private News and Sun-Sentinel Company entity that which would otherwise be an agency responsibility. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., 596 s Cf. Booksmart o. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992). 718 s Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble College Bookstores, Inc., o. 2d 227, 229n.4 (Fla. 3d DCa 1998) (private company operating state university bookstores is an “agency” as defined in s. 119.011[2], F.s., “[n]otwithstanding the language in its contract with the universities that purports to deny any agency relationship”); and Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Department, 352 s o. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCa 1977), cert. denied, 358 s o. 2d 132 (Fla. 1978) (private nonprofit volunteer fire department, which had been given stewardship over firefighting, which conducted its activities on county-owned property, and which was funded in part by records public money, was an “agency” for purposes of the Public act, and its membership files, minutes of its meetings and charitable activities were subject to disclosure). While the mere act of contracting with, or receiving public funds from, a public agency is not sufficient to subject a private entity to Ch.119, F.s., the following discussion considers when the statute has been held applicable to private entities. a. Private entities created pursuant to law or by public agencies The fact that a private entity is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation is not dispositive as records act, but rather the issue is whether the entity is “acting on to its status under the Public behalf of ” a public agency. The a ttorney g eneral’s office has issued numerous opinions advising that if a private entity is created by law or by a public agency, it is subject to Ch. 119 disclosure requirements. The following are some examples of such entities: Pace Property Finance a uthority, inc., created as a Florida nonprofit corporation by s anta r osa County to provide assistance in the funding and administration of certain governmental programs, ago 94-34; s outh Florida Fair and Palm Beach County e xpositions, i nc., created pursuant to Ch. 616, F.s., ago 95-17; rural health networks established as nonprofit legal entities to plan and deliver health care services on a cooperative basis pursuant to s. 381.0406, F.s., i nf. o p. to e llis, m arch 4, 1994. And see s. 20.41(8), F.s., providing that area agencies on aging, described as “nongovernmental, independent, not-for-profit corporations” are “subject to [the Public r ecords a ct], and, when considering any contracts requiring the expenditure of funds, are subject to ss. 286.011-286.012, relating to public meetings.” b. Private entities contracting with public agencies or receiving public funds There is no single factor which is controlling on the question of when a private corporation, 56

74 government-in-the-sunshine-manual not otherwise connected with government, becomes subject to the Public r ct. h owever, ecords a See, the courts have held that the mere act of contracting with a public agency is not dispositive. News and Sun-Sentinel Company v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., supra e.g., (private corporation does not act “on behalf of ” a public agency merely by entering into a contract to provide architectural services to the agency); Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade 429 so. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCa 1983); County, 695 so. 2d 501, 503 Stanfield v. Salvation Army, (Fla. 5th DCa 1997) (contract with county to provide services does not in and of itself subject the organization to Ch. 119 disclosure requirements). And see Weekly Planet, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 829 s o. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCa 2002) (fact that private development is located on land the developer leased from a governmental agency does not transform the leases between the developer and other private entities into public records). similarly, the receipt of public funds, standing alone, is not dispositive of the organization’s status for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s. See Sarasota Herald-Tribune Company v. Community Health 582 s o. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCa 1991) (mere provision of public funds to the Corporation, Inc., private organization is not an important factor in this analysis, although the provision of a Times Publishing substantial share of the capitalization of the organization is important); and Company v. Acton, no. 99-8304 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. november 5, 1999) (attorneys retained by individual commissioners in a criminal matter were not “acting on behalf of ” a public agency for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s., even though county commission subsequently voted to pay the legal expenses in accordance with a county policy providing for reimbursement of legal expenses to officers successfully defending charges filed against them arising out of the performance of their official duties). Cf. i nf. o p. to Cowin, n ovember 14, 1997 (fact that nonprofit medical center is built on property owned by the city would not in and of itself be determinative of whether the medical center’s meetings and records are subject to open government requirements). The courts have relied on “two general sets of circumstances” in determining when a private entity is “acting on behalf of ” a public agency and must therefore produce its records under Ch. 119, F.s. See Weekly Planet, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, o. 829 s B & S Utilities, Inc. v. Baskerville-Donovan, Inc., o. 2d 970, 974 (Fla. 2d DCa 2002); 988 s 2d 17 (Fla. 1st DCa 2008), review denied, 4 s o. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2009); and County of Volusia v. 39 s Emergency Communications Network, Inc., o. 3d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCa 2010). each of these circumstances or tests is discussed below. (1) “Totality of factors” test recognizing that “the statute provides no clear criteria for determining when a private entity is ‘acting on behalf of ’ a public agency,” the s upreme Court adopted a “totality of factors” test to serve as a guide for evaluating whether a private entity is subject to Ch. 119, F.s. News and Sun-Sentinel Company v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., 596 s o. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992). See New York Times Company v. PHH Mental Health Services, Inc., o. 2d 616 s Wells v. Aramark Food Service Corporation, 27 (Fla. 1993); o. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th DCa 2004). 888 s accordingly, when a public agency contracts with a private entity to provide goods or services to facilitate the agency’s performance of its duties, the courts have considered the “totality of factors” in determining whether there is a significant level of involvement by the public agency so as to subject the private entity to Ch. 119, F.s. See Weekly Planet, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, supra at 974. The factors listed by the s upreme Court in Schwab include the following: 1) the level of public funding; 2) commingling of funds; 3) whether the activity was conducted on publicly owned property; whether the contracted services are an integral part of the public agency’s chosen decision- 4) 57

75 government-in-the-sunshine-manual making process; 5) whether the private entity is performing a governmental function or a function which the public agency otherwise would perform; the extent of the public agency’s involvement with, regulation of, or control over the 6) private entity; 7) whether the private entity was created by the public agency; 8) whether the public agency has a substantial financial interest in the private entity; for whose benefit the private entity is functioning. 9) Thus, the application of the totality of factors test will often require an analysis of the statutes, ordinances or charter provisions which establish the function to be performed by the private entity as well as the contract, lease or other document between the governmental entity and the private organization. eneral’s office, following a review of the For example, in ago 92-37 the a ttorney g articles of i ncorporation and other materials relating to the establishment and functions of the tampa Bay Performing arts Center, inc., concluded that the center was an “agency” subject to records act, noting that the center was governed by a board of trustees composed the Public of a number of city and county officials or appointees of the mayor, utilized city property in See also carrying out its goals to benefit the public, and performed a governmental function. s 97-27 (documents created or received by the Florida i ago nternational m useum after the date of its purchase/lease/option agreement with city subject to disclosure under Ch. 119, F.s.), 92-53 able ringling m (John and m nc., subject to Public r ecords a ct), and useum of art Foundation, i Cf. i nf. o p. to g oodman, s eptember 26, 2016 (in the absence of a request from the chief 11-01. of the volunteer fire department or additional information making the relationship between the town and the fire department clearer, the a ttorney g eneral’s office may not respond formally to town attorney’s inquiry about the application of the Public r ecords a ct to the town’s volunteer fire department). By contrast, an architectural firm providing architectural services associated with construction of school facilities was found to be outside the scope of the Public r ecords a ct. See News and Sun-Sentinel Company v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., supra. See n o. Ci96 ay 29, 1996), also Sipkema v. Reedy Creek Improvement District, 114 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. m 697 s review dismissed, 699 s o. 2d 1375 per curiam affirmed, o. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCa 1997), (Fla. 1997) (private security force providing services on Walt Disney World property, including traffic control and accident reports is not subject to Ch. 119); Trepal v. State, o. 2d 498 704 s (Fla. 1997) (soft drink company cooperating with law enforcement in the testing of soda bottles during an investigation of a poisoning death is outside the scope of the Public r ecords a ct); and inf. o p. to m ichelson, January 27, 1992 (telephone company supplying cellular phone services to city officials for city business is not an “agency” since the company was not created by the city, did not perform a city function, and did not receive city funding except in payment for services rendered). Cf. National Council on Compensation Insurance v. Fee o. 3d 172, 182 (Fla. 1st , 219 s ecords DCa 2017) (trial court conclusion that insurance rating organization violated Public r act was erroneous because the court “expressly declined to apply the factors” prior to Schwab making this determination). (2) Delegation of function test While the mere act of contracting with a public agency is not sufficient to bring a private entity within the scope of the Public r ecords a ct, there is a difference between a party contracting with a public agency to provide services to the agency and a contracting party which provides services in place of the public body. News-Journal Corporation v. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc., 695 s o. 2d 418 (Fla. 5th DCa 1997), approved, 729 s o. 2d 373 (Fla. 1999). And see Weekly o. 2d 970, 974 (Fla. 2d DCa 2002). Planet, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 829 s 58

76 government-in-the-sunshine-manual For example, if a private entity contracts to relieve the public body from the operation of a public obligation such as operating a jail or providing fire protection, the open government laws apply. so. 2d 418 (Fla. 5th News-Journal Corporation v. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc., 695 729 s approved, And see Dade Aviation Consultants v. Knight DCa 1997), o. 2d 373 (Fla. 1999). 800 s Ridder, Inc., o. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. 3d DCa 2001) (consortium of private businesses created to manage a massive renovation of an airport was an “agency” for purposes of the Public r ct ecords a because it was created for and had no purpose other than to work on the airport contract; “when a private entity undertakes to provide a service otherwise provided by the government, the entity is bound by the Fox v. News-Press Publishing Company, act, as the government would be”); and 545 s o. 2d 941, 943 (Fla. 2d DCa 1989) (upholding a trial court decision finding that business records maintained by a towing company in connection with its contract with a city were public records, as the company “was clearly performing what is essentially a governmental function, i.e., the removal of wrecked and abandoned automobiles from public streets and property”). See also ago s 08-66 (Public r ct applies to not-for-profit corporation contracting with city to ecords a carry out affordable housing responsibilities and screening applicant files for such housing); 99-53 (while not generally applicable to homeowners associations, Ch. 119 applies to an architectural review committee of a homeowners association which is required by county ordinance to review and approve applications for county building permits as a prerequisite to consideration by the county building department); and 07-44 (property owners association, delegated performance of services otherwise performed by municipal services taxing unit, subject to Public r ecords a ct when acting on behalf of the taxing unit). Compare ago 87-44 (records of a private nonprofit corporation pertaining to a fund established for improvements to city parks were not public records since the corporation raised and disbursed only private funds and had not been delegated any governmental responsibilities or functions). Thus, in Stanfield v. Salvation Army, 695 s o. 2d 501 (Fla. 5th DCa 1997), the Fifth District recognized that the delegation of function test was the appropriate standard to use to determine that records generated by the s alvation army in performing a contract to provide misdemeanor services for a county were subject to Ch. 119, F.s. as stated by the court: “Because we find the statutory and contractual delegation of governmental responsibility so compelling .” in this case, it is unnecessary to engage in the factor-by-factor analysis outlined in Schwab Stanfield, 695 s 988 s o. 2d. 17, 21 o. 2d at 503. B & S Utilities v. Baskerville-Donovan Inc., 729 Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., (Fla. 1st DCa 2008), citing to n Baskerville, the court recognized that while the “totality of factors” so. 2d 373 (Fla. 1999). i test favored a private engineering firm’s position that it was not an agency, “the fact that the City dispositive .” Baskerville, 988 s o. delegated its municipal engineering functions” to [the firm] “is 2d at 22. (e.s.) The following are other examples of private businesses and nonprofit entities which were delegated a governmental function and thus determined to be subject to the Public r ecords a ct in carrying out that function: Corrections company operating county jail: Times Publishing Company v. Corrections Corporation of America, n o. 91-429 Ca 01 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. December 4, 1991), 611 s o. affirmed per curiam, 2d 532 (Fla. 5th DCa 1993). And see Prison Health Services, Inc. v. Lakeland Ledger Publishing Company, 718 s o. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d DCa 1998), review denied, 727 s o. 2d 909 (Fla. 1999) (medical services). Employment search firm: Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc. 379 s o. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980). Accord ago 92- 80 (materials made or received by recruitment company in the course of its contract with a public agency to seek applicants and make recommendations to the board regarding the selection of an executive director, subject to Ch. 119). Putnam Humane society investigating animal abuse for county: 59

77 government-in-the-sunshine-manual County Humane Society, Inc. v. Woodward, o. 2d 1238 (Fla. 740 s 5th DCa 1999). however, the “delegation of function” test should not be used unless there is a “clear, compelling, complete delegation of a governmental function” to the private entity. Economic o. 3d 118, 123 (Fla. 5th DCa 2015). i Ellis, the Fifth 178 s Development Commission v. Ellis, n District found that the trial judge should not have used the delegation test to determine whether a private economic development entity (eDC) under contract with the county to provide services was an “agency.” The appellate court explained that the eDC was the county’s “primary” but not its “sole” agency for economic development activity. Id. The county “continued to carry out economic development activities itself through its own paid county employees and in Id. i n other words, “eDC did not conjunction with other entities to the exclusion of eDC.” take over the county’s role or completely assume the county’s provision of economic development services.” Because “eDC provided services to, not in place of, the county,” the trial judge Id. Id. should have applied the “totality of factors” test instead of the “delegation of function” test. Private company delegated authority to keep certain records c. if a public agency has delegated its responsibility to maintain records necessary to perform See, e.g., Harold v. its functions, such records have been deemed to be accessible to the public. 668 s o. 2d 1010 (Fla. 5th DCa 1996) (where county hired a private company to Orange County, be the construction manager on a county project and delegated to the company the responsibility of maintaining records necessary to show compliance with a “fairness in procurement ordinance,” the company’s records for this purpose were public records). See also Booksmart Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble College Bookstores, Inc., 718 s o. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCa 1998), review denied, 729 s o. 2d 389 (Fla. 1999) (private company operating a campus bookstore pursuant to a contract with a state university is the custodian of public records made or received by the store in connection with university business). d. Subcontractors a circuit court has addressed whether a subcontractor may be subject to the Public records a ct if both the subcontractor and contractor have been delegated a public function. i n n o 03-3474-g (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct. December Multimedia Holdings Corporation v. CRSPE, Inc., 3, 2003), the court required a consulting firm to disclose its timesheets and internal billing records generated pursuant to a subcontract with another firm (CrsP e) which had entered into a contract with a town to prepare a traffic study required by the Department of transportation. rejecting the subcontractor’s argument that Ch. 119, F.s., did not apply to it because it was a subcontractor, not the contractor, the court found that the study was prepared and submitted jointly by both consultants; both firms had acted in place of the town in performing the tasks required by the department: “[ t]he Public r ecords a ct cannot be so easily circumvented simply by CrsP e delegating its responsibilities to yet another private entity.” e. Other statutory provisions governing records of private entities (1) Contract requirements section 119.0701, F.s., mandates that all agency contracts for services must contain specific provisions requiring the contractor to comply with public records laws, including retention and public access requirements. The term “contractor” is defined to mean “an individual, partnership, corporation or business entity that enters into a contract for services with a public agency and is acting on behalf of the public agency as provided under s. 119.011(2), [F.s.].” section 119.0701(1)(a), F.s. (e.s.). “Thus, based on the terms of section 119.0701(1)(a), Florida statutes, the nature and scope of the services provided by a private contractor determine whether he or she is ‘acting on behalf of ’ an agency and thus, would be subject to the requirements of the statute.” ago 14-06. For more information on when a private entity is determined to be “acting on behalf of ” a public agency for purposes of s. 119.011(2), F.s., please refer to the preceding discussion on pages 56-60. 60

78 government-in-the-sunshine-manual in addition, contracts entered into or amended after July 1, 2016, must contain a statement, in the form prescribed by the statute, providing the contact information for the public agency’s custodian of public records in the event that the contractor has questions about its ection 119.0701(2)(a), F.s. a request duty to provide public records relating to the contract. s for records for records relating to the contract must be made directly to the public agency. section 119.0701(3)(a), F.s. i f the public agency does not possess the requested records, the public agency shall immediately notify the contractor of the request, and the contractor must provide the records to the public agency or allow the records to be inspected or copied within a reasonable time. s ections 119.0701(3) and (4), F.s., establish consequences in the event of a Id. contractor’s noncompliance. section 287.058(1)(c), F.s., provides, with limited exceptions, that every procurement for contracted services by a state agency be evidenced by a written agreement containing a provision allowing unilateral cancellation by the agency for the contractor’s refusal to allow public access to “all documents, papers, letters, or other material made or received by the contractor in conjunction with the contract, unless the records are exempt” from disclosure. (2) Legislative appropriation section 11.45(3)(e), F.s., states that all records of a nongovernmental agency, corporation, or person with respect to the receipt and expenditure of an appropriation made by the legislature to that entity “shall be public records and shall be treated in the same manner as other public records are under general law.” Cf. ago 96-43 (astronauts m emorial Foundation, a nonprofit corporation, is subject to the s unshine law when performing those duties funded under the general a ppropriations a ct). (3) Public funds used for dues section 119.01(3), F.s., provides that if an agency spends public funds in payment of dues or membership contributions to a private entity, then the private entity’s financial, business and membership records pertaining to the public agency are public records and subject to the provisions of s. 119.07, F.s. 3. Judiciary Public Records Act inapplicable to judicial records a. relying on separation of powers principles, the courts have consistently held that the judiciary is not an “agency” for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s. See, e.g., Times Publishing Company 660 s o. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995) (the judiciary, as a coequal branch of government, is not v. Ake, an “agency” subject to supervision or control by another coequal branch of government); and Locke v. Hawkes, 595 s o. 2d 32 (Fla. 1992). Cf. s. 119.0714(1), F.s., stating that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to exempt from [s. 119.07(1), F.s.] a public record that was made a part of a court file and that is not specifically closed by order of court . . . . ” (e.s.) And see Tampa Television, Inc. v. Dugger, o. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCa 1990) (legislature has recognized 559 s the distinction between documents sealed under court order and those not so sealed, and has provided for disclosure of the latter only). however, the Florida s upreme Court has expressly recognized that “both civil and criminal proceedings in Florida are public events” and that it will “adhere to the well established common law right of access to court proceedings and records.” Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 531 so. 2d 113, 116 (Fla. 1988). See also Russell v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 570 s o. 2d 979, 982 (Fla. 2d DCa 1990), in which the court stated: “[W]e recognize that the press has a general right to access of judicial records.” b. Public access to and protection of judicial branch records, Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420 Scope of the rule (1) 61

79 government-in-the-sunshine-manual although the judiciary is not an “agency” for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s., there is i, s. 24, of the Florida art. a constitutional right of access to judicial records established by n accordance with this directive, access to records of the judicial branch is governed Constitution. i by Florida r ule of Judicial a dministration 2.420 (formerly 2.051), entitled “Public a ccess to See 2.420(a), Fla. r. Jud. a dmin., providing that and Protection of Judicial Branch r ecords.” “[t]he public shall have access to all records of the judicial branch of government except as , 223 s o. 3d 439 (Fla. 5th DCa 2017), noting that provided [in the rule].” Cf. Morency v. State “electronic records, videotapes, or stenographic tapes of depositions or other proceedings filed with the clerk, and electronic records, videotapes or stenographic tapes of court proceedings” are included within the scope of the rule. according to the Florida s upreme Court, rule 2.420 is “intended to reflect the judiciary’s In responsibility to perform both an administrative function and an adjudicatory function.” re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration--Public Access to Judicial Records, 608 s o. 2d 472 (Fla. 1992). i n its administrative role, the judiciary is a governmental entity expending public funds and employing government personnel. Thus, “records generated while courts are acting in an administrative capacity should be subject to the same standards that govern similar records of other branches of government.” Id. See also Media General at 472-473. Convergence, Inc. v. Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 840 s o. 2d 1008, 1016 (Fla. 2003) (when an individual complains to a chief circuit judge about judicial misconduct involving sexual harassment or sexually inappropriate behavior by a judge, the records made or received by the chief judge “constitute ‘judicial records’ subject to public disclosure absent an applicable exemption”). an online version of Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.420 is also available at: http://www.floridabar.org. (2) Confidential judicial records rule 2.420(c)(1) through (6) contains a list of confidential and exempt judicial branch xamples include trial and appellate court memoranda, complaints alleging misconduct records. e against judges and other court personnel until probable cause is established, periodic evaluations implemented solely to assist judges in improving their performance, information (other than names and qualifications) about persons seeking to serve as unpaid volunteers unless made public by the court based upon a showing of materiality or good cause, and copies of arrest and search warrants until executed or until law enforcement determines that execution cannot be made. rule 2.420(d)(1) provides that the clerk of court shall designate and maintain the confidentiality of any information contained within a court record that is described in subdivision (d)(1)(a) or (d)(1)(B) of the rule. s ubdivision (a) references “information described by any of the subdivisions (c)(1) through (c)(6).” s ubdivision (B) contains a list of specific And see Fla. r. Jud. a statutory exemptions. dmin. 2.420(d)(2)-(5) establishing procedures for filing material designated as confidential. Cf. s. 119.0714(2)(g), F.s., providing that the clerk of court is not liable for the release of information that is required by the Florida r ules of Judicial administration to be identified by the filer as confidential if the filer fails to make the required identification of the confidential information to the clerk. although rule 2.420(c)(1)-(6) lists specific confidential and exempt records, subdivision (c) (8) of the rule provides a general exemption from disclosure for records deemed to be confidential by court rule, Florida s tatutes, prior Florida case law, and by rules of the Judicial Qualifications Commission. See Florida Publishing Company v. State, 706 s o. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st DCa 1998), review dismissed , 717 s o. 2d 531 (Fla. 1998) and State v. Buenoano, 707 s o. 2d 714, 718 (Fla. 1998). i n addition, Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.420(c)(7) provides an exemption for “all records made confidential under the Florida and u nited s tates Constitutions and Florida and federal law.” subdivision (c)(9) of rule 2.420 incorporates the holdings in Barron v. Florida Freedom 426 Newspapers, 531 s o. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988), and Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Lewis, 62

80 government-in-the-sunshine-manual so. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982) by “establishing that confidentiality [of court records] may be required to protect the rights of defendants, litigants, or third parties; to further the administration of justice; or to otherwise promote a compelling governmental interest.” Commentary, In re Amendments to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051.--Public Access to Judicial Records, 651 so. 2d 1185, 1191 (Fla. 1995). The degree, duration, and manner of confidentiality ordered by the court shall be no broader than necessary to protect these interests. Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.420(c)(9)(B). “The Barron, supra burden of proof . . . shall always be on the party seeking closure.” at 118. Procedures for judicial determinations of requests for confidentiality of court records and for obtaining access to confidential court records are referenced in rule 2.420(e)-(j). For example, rule 2.420(f )(3) states that “any motion to determine whether a court record that pertains to a plea agreement, substantial assistance agreement, or other court record that reveals the identity of a confidential informant or active criminal investigative information is confidential under subdivision (c)(9)(a)(i), (c)(9)(a)iii, (c)(9)(a)(v), or (c)(9)(a)(vii) of this rule may be made in the form of a written motion captioned ‘m otion to Determine Confidentiality of Court r ecords.’” See also Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.425, governing the filing of sensitive personal information, and establishing categories of personal information that must not be filed or must be truncated or redacted before filing. (3) Procedures for accessing judicial branch records under rule 2.420 “r equests and responses to requests for access to records under this rule shall be made in a reasonable manner.” Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.420(m). r equests must be in writing and directed to the custodian. Id. See Morris Publishing Group, LLC v. State, 13 s o. 3d 120 (Fla. 1st DCa 2009), in which the court denied a Florida newspaper’s records request for an audio tape related to a shooting since the request was made orally instead of in writing as required by the rule. i n a commentary to the decision incorporating the written request provision, the Court cautioned that the “writing requirement is not intended to disadvantage any person who may have difficulty writing a request; if any difficulty exists, the custodian should aid the requestor in reducing the request to writing.” Commentary, In re Report of the Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Records, 825 s o. 2d 889, 898 (Fla. 2002). a public records request “shall provide sufficient specificity to enable the custodian to identify the requested records. The reason for the request is not required to be disclosed.” Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.420(m)(1). The custodian “is required to provide access to or copies of records but is not required either to provide information from records or to create new records in response to a request.” 825 s o. 2d 889, 898 Commentary, In re Report of the Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Records, (Fla. 2002). The custodian shall determine whether the requested records are subject to the rule, whether there are any exemptions, and the form in which the record is provided. Fla. r. Jud. admin. 2.420(m)(2). i f the request is denied, the custodian shall state in writing the basis for the denial. Id. expedited review of denials of access to administrative records of the judicial branch shall dmin. be provided through an action for mandamus, or other appropriate relief. Fla. r. Jud. a 2.420(l). See Jacobs Keeley, PLLC v. Chief Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 169 so. 3d 192 (Fla. 4th DCa 2015). Discovery material c. The Florida supreme Court has ruled that there is no First amendment right of access to unfiled discovery materials. Palm Beach Newspapers v. Burk, 504 s o. 2d 378 (Fla. 1987) (discovery in criminal proceedings); and Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Gridley, 510 s o. 2d o. 884 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 108 s.Ct. 1224 (1988) (civil discovery). Cf. Lewis v. State, 958 s 63

81 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCa 2007) ( Burk applies to a request for unfiled depositions made during an ongoing, active criminal prosecution but does not extend to a defendant’s request for deposition transcripts after the conviction becomes final; such transcripts must be produced in accordance with Ch. 119, F.s.). And see SCI Funeral Services of Florida, Inc. v. Light, o. 2d 796, 798 811 s (Fla. 4th DCa 2002), noting that even though there is no constitutional right of access to prefiled discovery materials, “it does not necessarily follow that there is a constitutional right to prevent access to discovery.” (emphasis supplied by the court). even though unfiled discovery material is not accessible under the First amendment, it may be open to inspection under Ch. 119, F.s., if the document is a public record which is 493 otherwise subject to disclosure under that law. See, e.g., Tribune Company v. Public Records, so. 2d 480, 485 (Fla. 2d DCa 1986), review denied sub nom., Gillum v. Tribune Company, 503 so. 2d 327 (Fla. 1987), in which the court reversed a trial judge’s ruling limiting inspection of police records produced in discovery to those materials which were made part of an open ecords a ct.” And see court file because “this conflicts with the express provisions of the Public r ., 730 s Smithwick v. Television 12 of Jacksonville, Inc o. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCa 1999) (trial court properly required defense counsel to return discovery documents once it realized that its initial order permitting removal of the documents from the court file had been entered in error because the requirements of rule 2.420 had not been met). Thus, in 520 s o. 2d 32 (Fla. 1988), the Court Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. McCrary, noted that where pretrial discovery material developed for the prosecution of a criminal case had reached the status of a public record under Ch. 119, F.s., the material was subject to public inspection as required by that statute in the absence of a court order finding that release of the material would jeopardize the defendant’s right to a fair trial. See also Rameses, Inc. v. Demings, 29 so. 3d 418 (Fla. 5th DCa 2010) (government not precluded from asserting applicable statutory exemptions to public records that have been disclosed during discovery to a criminal defendant). And see Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. v. Doe, 612 s o. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992) (public’s statutory right of access to pretrial discovery information in a criminal case must be balanced against a nonparty’s constitutional right to privacy). Florida Bar d. iven that The Florida Bar is ‘an official arm of the court,’ see r. r egulating Fla. Bar, “g introduction, [the Florida s upreme] Court has previously rejected the legislature’s power to The Florida Bar v. regulate which Florida Bar files were subject to public records law . . . .” 916 s o. 2d 741, 745 (Fla. 2005). See also The Florida Bar, In re Advisory Opinion Committee, Concerning the Applicability of Ch. 119, Florida Statutes, 398 s o. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1981) (Ch. 119, F.s., does not apply to unauthorized practice of law investigative files maintained by the Bar). Cf. Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Florida Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 676 s o. 2d 372 (Fla. 1996) (no merit to argument that xaminers should be under art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., all records in possession of Board of Bar e open for inspection by applicant and the public). Judicial Qualifications Commission and judicial nominating commissions e. Proceedings by or before the Judicial Qualifications Commission are confidential until formal charges against a justice or judge are filed by the Commission with the clerk of the Florida supreme Court; upon a finding of probable cause and the filing of formal charges with the clerk, the charges and all further proceedings before the Commission are public. See art. v, s. 12(a)(4), Fla. Const; Media General Convergence, Inc. v. Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 840 so. 2d 1008 (Fla. 2003). With regard to judicial nominating commissions, art. v, s. 11(d), Fla. Const., provides that “[e]xcept for deliberations of the . . . commissions, the proceedings of the commissions and ovember 4, 1987, concluding their records shall be open to the public.” See i nf. o p. to Frost, n 64

82 government-in-the-sunshine-manual that correspondence between a member of a judicial nominating commission and persons appeal is a public record wishing to obtain an application for a vacant seat on a District Court of subject to disclosure. however, records pertaining to voting, including vote sheets, ballots, and ballot tally sheets “are clearly part of the deliberation process” and, therefore, are not subject to public disclosure. Justice Coalition v. The First District Court of Appeal Judicial Nominating Commission, 823 s o. 2d 185, 192 (Fla. 1st DCa 2002). i n addition, personal notes of individual commission members made during the deliberation process are not subject to disclosure because they are mere “precursors” of governmental records, and thus fall outside the definition of “public record.” Id., citing Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates Inc., 379 s o. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980). f. Jury records (1) Grand jury Proceedings before a grand jury are secret; therefore, records prepared for use of the grand jury during the regular performance of its duties are not subject to s. 119.07(1), F.s. See Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 206 so. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCa 1968), modified , 230 so. 2d 9 (Fla. 1969) (grand jury proceedings are “absolutely privileged”); and In re Grand Jury, Fall Term 1986 , 528 s o. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCa 1988), affirming a trial court order barring public disclosure of motions filed in accordance with s. 905.28, F.s., to repress or expunge stemming from a grand jury presentment not accompanied by a true bill or indictment. See also ago 90-48 (as an integral part of the grand jury proceeding to secure witnesses, grand jury subpoenas would fall under the “absolute privilege” of the grand jury and not be subject to disclosure under Ch. 119, F.s.). Thus, a letter written by a city official to the grand jury is not subject to public inspection. Wood v. ago 73-177. s imilarly, a circuit court held that the list of grand jurors is confidential. Childers, no. 13-Ca-000877 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. per curiam affirmed, 130 so. 3d april 16, 2013), Accord owever, the clerk p. to alexander, s eptember 8, 1995. h 1282 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014). inf. o of court is not authorized to redact the name of a grand jury foreperson or the acting foreperson from an indictment after it has been made public. ago 99-09. it is important to emphasize, however, that the exemption from disclosure for grand jury records does not apply to those records which were prepared by a public agency independent of a grand jury investigation. Thus, public records which are made or received by an agency in the performance of its official duties do not become confidential simply because they are subsequently viewed by the grand jury as part of its investigation. as the court stated in In re Grand Jury Investigation, Spring Term 1988, 543 s o. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 2d DCa 1989): nor can we allow the grand jury to become a sanctuary for records which are otherwise accessible to the public. The mere fact that documents have been presented to a grand jury does not, in and of itself, cloak them in a permanent state of secrecy. accordingly, a state attorney and sheriff must provide public access to investigative records regarding a judge that were compiled independently of and prior to a grand jury’s investigation In re Grand Jury Investigation, Spring Term 1988, supra. See also In re Subpoena To of the judge. Testify Before Grand Jury, 864 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1989) (trial court’s authority to protect grand jury process enabled court to prevent disclosure of materials prepared for grand jury proceedings; however, court not empowered to prohibit disclosure of documents assembled independent of grand jury proceedings). There are a number of statutes which relate to secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See ss. 905.24-905.28, F.s., and s. 905.395, F.s. (statewide grand jury). But see Butterworth v. Smith, 110 s.Ct. 1376 (1990) (provisions of s. 905.27, F.s., which prohibit “a grand juror . . . reporter . . . or any other person” appearing before a grand jury from ever disclosing testimony before 65

83 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the grand jury except pursuant to a court order were unconstitutional insofar as they prohibit a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended). (2) Trial jury 886 s in o. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCa 2004), the appellate court ruled that Kever v. Gilliam, the clerk of court was required to comply with appellant’s public records request for names and addresses of trial court jurors empanelled in his trial. Accord ago 05-61 (statute requiring Department of h otor vehicles to provide driver license information to ighway s afety and m courts for purposes of establishing jury selection lists does not operate to exempt from public disclosure jurors’ names and addresses appearing on a jury list compiled by the clerk of court). 916 s Cf. Sarasota Herald-Tribune v. State, o. 2d 904, 909 (Fla. 2d DCa 2005) (while “[t]here are unquestionably times when it might be necessary for a trial judge to impose media restrictions on the publication of juror information, . . .” trial court order prohibiting news media from publishing names and addresses of prospective or seated jurors in the high profile murder trial WPTV-TV v. State, 61 s o. 3d 1191 (Fla. 5th DCa constituted a prior restraint on speech); and 2011) (given exceptional media coverage and public interest in upcoming criminal trial, trial court’s decision to withhold location of jury selection until a time proximate to the start of the trial was not a material departure from essential requirements of law). Sunshine in Litigation Act g. The s unshine in litigation a ct, s. 69.081, F.s., provides, with limited exceptions, that no court shall enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or which has the purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from a public hazard. See State v. American Tobacco Company, n o. Cl 95-1466-ah (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. July 28, 1997) (upholding constitutionality of s unshine in litigation a ct). additionally, s. 69.081(8), F.s., provides, subject to certain exceptions, that any portion of an agreement which has the purpose or effect of concealing information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim or action against an agency is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced. s ettlement records must be maintained in compliance with Ch. 119, F.s. See inf. o p. to Barry, June 24, 1998 (agency not authorized to enter into a settlement agreement authorizing the concealment of information relating to an adverse personnel decision from the remainder of a personnel file. a governmental entity, except a municipality or county, settling a claim in tort which requires the expenditure of more than $5,000 in public funds, is required to provide notice pursuant to Ch. 50, F.s., of the settlement in the county in which the claim arose within 60 days of entering into the settlement. n o notice is required if the settlement has been approved by a court of competent jurisdiction. s ection 69.081(9), F.s. 4. Legislature The Public r ct does not apply to the legislative branch. Locke v. Hawkes, 595 ecords a so. 2d 32 (Fla. 1992) (definition of “agency” in the Public r ecords a ct does not include the legislature or its members). There is, however, a constitutional right of access to legislative records provided in art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., which provides that “[e]very person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body . . . .” This right of access specifically includes the legislative branch. article i, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. The legislature, however, may provide by general law for the exemption of records provided that such law must state with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law. article i, s. 24(c), Fla. Const. each house of the legislature is authorized to adopt rules governing the enforcement of this section for records of the legislative branch. Id. any statutes providing limitations on access which were in effect on July 1, 1993, continue in force and apply to records 66

84 government-in-the-sunshine-manual of the legislative branch until repealed. article i, s. 24(d), Fla. Const. enate and h epresentatives in accordance with art. i, s. 24(c), Fla. Const., the s ouse of r have adopted rules relating to records of the legislative branch. These rules may be accessed online at www.flsenate.gov (Florida s enate) and www.myfloridahouse.gov (Florida h ouse of representatives). in addition, s. 11.0431(2), F.s., lists legislative records which are exempt from inspection ppendix e. See League of Women Voters v. and copying. The text of s. 11.0431, F.s., is set forth in a Florida House of Representatives, 132 s o. 3d 135, 153 (Fla. 2013) (“We agree that the first issue to be decided is whether the draft [apportionment] plans fall within the scope of the public records exemption in section 11.0431[2][e], Florida s tatutes [2012], and that this exemption should be strictly construed in favor of disclosure”). And see s. 11.26(1), F.s. (legislative employees are forbidden from revealing to anyone outside the area of their direct responsibility the contents or nature of any request for services made by any member of the legislature except with the consent of the legislator making the request); and s. 15.07, F.s. (the journal of the executive session of the senate shall be kept free from inspection or disclosure except upon order of the s enate itself or some court of competent jurisdiction). 5. Governor and Cabinet The g overnor and Cabinet have duties which derive from both the Constitution and the legislature. Because of separation of powers principles, the legislatively created Public r ecords act does not apply to records gathered in the course of carrying out a specific duty or function which has been assigned to the g overnor and Cabinet by the Constitution rather than by statute. See ago 86-50, stating that materials collected by the former Parole and Probation Commission [now known as the Florida Commission on offender r eview] pursuant to direction of the governor and Cabinet for pardons or other forms of clemency authorized by art. iv , s. 8(a), Fla. Const., are not subject to Ch. 119, F.s. overnor and Cabinet when sitting The Public r ecords act, however, does apply to the g in their capacity as a board created by the legislature or whose powers are prescribed by the nternal i trust Fund. i n such trustees of the i mprovement legislature, such as the Board of cases, the g overnor and Cabinet are not exercising powers derived from the Constitution but are subject to the “dominion and control” of the legislature. in addition, art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., establishes a constitutional right of access by providing that “every person” shall have a right of access to public records of the executive branch and of “each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution” except as otherwise provided in this section or specifically made confidential in the Constitution. 6. Commissions created by the Constitution a board or commission created by the Constitution is not subject to Ch. 119, F.s., inspection requirements when such board or commission is carrying out its constitutionally prescribed duties. Cf. Kanner v. Frumkes, o. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCa 1977) (judicial 353 s nominating commissions are not subject to s. 286.011, F.s.); and ago 77-65 (Ch. 120, F.s., is inapplicable to Constitution r evision Commission established by art. Xi, s. 2, Fla. Const., because the commission is authorized in that section to adopt its own rules of procedure). accordingly, the Public r ecords a ct does not apply to the clemency investigative files and reports produced by the Florida Commission on offender review [formerly the Parole Commission] on behalf of the g overnor and Cabinet relating to the granting of clemency; release of such materials is governed by the r ules of e xecutive Clemency adopted by the g overnor and Cabinet, sitting as the clemency board. Parole Commission v. Lockett, 620 s o. 2d 153 (Fla. 1993). ago 86-50. Accord Jennings v. State, 626 s o. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1993). And see 67

85 government-in-the-sunshine-manual There is, however, a difference between the status of a commission created by the Constitution which exercises constitutional duties and a commission whose creation is merely authorized by the Constitution and whose duties are established by law. While the former is ct, it has been held that a commission performing duties not subject to the Public r ecords a See Turner v. assigned to it by the legislature must comply with the open government laws. Wainwright, affirmed and remanded , 389 s o. 2d 1181 (Fla. o. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCa 1980), 379 s 1980), holding that the Parole Commission [now known as the Florida Commission on offender , s. 8(c), Fla. Const., recognizes may be created by law, is subject to s. review] which art. iv 286.011, F.s., in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities relating to parole. moreover, art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., provides a constitutional right of access for public records of each branch of government, and “each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.” The only exceptions to the right of access are those records exempted pursuant to s. 24 or specifically made confidential by the See King v. State, Constitution. article i, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. o. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2003) 840 s (clemency records exempt pursuant to s. 14.28, F.s., providing that records made or received by any state entity pursuant to a Board of e xecutive Clemency investigation are not subject to public disclosure). C. WHAT RECORDS ARE COVERED? APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT TO: ecords a This section discusses the application of the Public r ct to various records made or received by agencies in the course of official business. m any, but not all of the statutory exemptions to disclosure for particular records or information are also referenced. For a more complete listing of statutory exemptions, please refer to a ppendices C and D and the i ndex. 1. Adoption and birth records except for birth records over 100 years old which are not under seal pursuant to court order, all birth records are considered to be confidential documents and exempt from public inspection; ection 382.025(1), F.s.; ago 74-70. such records may be disclosed only as provided by law. s Cf. s. 383.51, F.s. (the identity of a parent who leaves a newborn infant at a hospital, emergency medical services station, or fire station in accordance with s. 383.50, F.s., is confidential). adoption records are also confidential and may not be disclosed except as provided in s. 63.162, F.s. an unadopted individual, however, has the right to obtain his or her birth records which include the names of the individual’s parents from the hospital in which he or she was born. 520 s o. 2d 30 (Fla. 1988). Atwell v. Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola, in the absence of court order issued for good cause shown, the name and identity of a birth parent, an adoptive parent, or an adoptee may not be disclosed unless the birth parent authorizes in writing the release of his or her name; the adoptee, if 18 or older, authorizes in writing the release of his or her name; or, if the adoptee is less than 18, written consent is obtained from an adoptive parent to disclose the adoptee’s name; or the adoptive parent authorizes in writing the release of his or her name. s ection 63.162(4), F.s. And see s. 63.165(1), F.s. (state adoption registry); and s. 63.0541, F.s. (putative father registry). Autopsy and death records 2. a. Autopsy reports autopsy reports made by a district medical examiner pursuant to Ch. 406, F.s., are public records and are open to the public for inspection in the absence of an exemption. ago 78-23. And see Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 476 s o. 2d 775, 777 (Fla. 4th DCa 1985), review denied, 488 s o. 2d 67 (Fla. 1986), noting that a former statutory exemption precluding release of autopsy reports had been repealed. Cf. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. v. no. 97-688Ci-07 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. February 27, 1997) (physical specimens relating to an Wood, 68

86 government-in-the-sunshine-manual autopsy are not public records). although autopsy reports are subject to Ch. 119, F.s., “[d]ocuments or records made confidential by statute do not lose such status upon receipt by the medical examiner.” ago 78- See Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. v. Wood, supra (predeath medical records in 23. the possession of the medical examiner are not subject to public inspection). in addition, statutory exemptions from disclosure, such as the exemption for active criminal investigative information, may apply to an autopsy report. ago 78-23. See Williams v. City of Minneola, o. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCa), review denied, 589 s o. 2d 289 (Fla. 1991), 575 s noting the application of the active criminal investigative information exemption to information contained in autopsy records. b. Autopsy photographs and recordings section 406.135(2), F.s., provides that a photograph or video or audio recording of an autopsy held by a medical examiner is confidential and may not be released except as provided by See ago s 03-25 and 01-47, discussing court order or as otherwise authorized in the exemption. the circumstances under which autopsy photographs and recordings may be viewed or copied. And see i nf. o p. to l ynn, July 25, 2007 (exemption applies to photographs and recordings taken or made by the medical examiner as a part of the autopsy process, including those taken before, during, and after the medical examiner performs the actual autopsy procedure). Cf. Campus Communications, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 s o. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCa 2002), review denied, 848 s o. 2d 1153 (Fla. 2003) (upholding trial court finding that newspaper failed to establish good cause for release of autopsy photographs of race car driver). Sarasota Herald-Tribune v. State, Compare 924 918 so. 2d 293 (Fla. 2005), cert. dismissed , review denied, so. 2d 8, 14 (Fla. 2d DCa 2005), 126 s. Ct. 1139 (2006), in which the district court reversed a trial court order that had barred the media from viewing autopsy photographs that were admitted into evidence in open court during a murder trial; according to the appellate court, s. 406.135, F.s., “does not render these confidential.” (e.s.) court exhibits Photographs, video and audio recordings that depict or record the killing of a law c. enforcement officer a photograph or video or audio recording that depicts or records the killing of a law enforcement officer acting in accordance with his or her official duties is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s., and may not be disclosed except as authorized in the exemption. s ection 406.136, F.s. For more information on this exemption, please refer to the discussion on pages 116-117. d. Death certificates information relating to cause of death in all death and fetal death records, and the parentage, marital status, and medical information of fetal death records are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s., except for health research purposes as approved by the Department of health. s ection 382.008(6), F.s. And see s. 28.2221(5)(a), F.s. (clerk of court not authorized to place certain records, including death certificates, on a publicly available i nternet website); s. 382.008(8), F.s. (confidential information in nonviable birth certificates). section 382.025(2)(a), F.s., provides for the Department of h eath to authorize the issuance of a certified copy of all or part of a death or fetal death certificate, excluding the portion that is confidential pursuant to s. 382.008, F.s., upon payment of the fee prescribed by that section. The statute also specifies those persons and governmental agencies authorized to receive a copy of a death certificate that includes the confidential portions. all portions of a death certificate cease to be exempt 50 years after the death. s ection 382.025(2)(b), F.s. Child and vulnerable adult abuse and protection records 3. 69

87 government-in-the-sunshine-manual a. Department of Children and Families abuse records Confidentiality of abuse records (1) generally, reports of abused children or vulnerable adults which are received by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) are confidential and exempt from disclosure, except See as expressly provided by statute. ss. 39.202(1) and 415.107(1), F.s. Thus, a union representative may not attend that portion of an investigatory interview between the DCF inspector general and an employee requiring the discussion of information taken from a child abuse investigation that is confidential under s. 39.202, F.s. ago 99-42. And tate Child a buse Death see s. 383.412(2)(b), F.s., providing that any information held by the s review Committee or a local committee which reveals the identity of a deceased child whose death has been reported to the central abuse hotline but determined not to be the result of abuse or neglect, or which reveals the identity of the surviving siblings, family members, or others living in the home of such deceased child is confidential and exempt from disclosure requirements. i n addition, the identity of the surviving siblings of a deceased child whose death occurred as the result of a verified report of abuse or neglect is confidential. s ection 383.412(2)(a), F.s. all records and reports of the child protection team of the Department of h ealth are confidential and exempt, and shall not be disclosed, except, upon request, to the state attorney, law enforcement, DCF, and necessary professionals in furtherance of the treatment or additional evaluative needs of the child, by court order, or to health plan payors, limited to that information used for insurance reimbursement purposes. s ection 39.202(6), F.s. (2) Release of abuse records section 39.2021(1), F.s., authorizes any person or organization, including DCF, to petition the court to make public DCF records relating to its investigation into alleged abuse, neglect, exploitation or abandonment of a child. The court shall determine if good cause exists for public access to the records and is required to balance the best interest of the child and the interests of the child’s siblings, together with the privacy rights of other persons identified in the reports against the public interest. Id. This “balancing process” thus “requires the trial court to weigh the harm to the child against the benefit to the public that would potentially result from the disclosure of the records In re Records of the Department of Children and Family Services, 873 s o. 2d 506, 513 at issue.” to perform this function, the trial court must conduct an in camera (Fla. 2d DCa 2004). review because “[i]t is impossible to judge the potential impact of the disclosure of information contained in records without knowing what that information is.” Id. at 514. But see Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Company, 582 s o. 2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991), holding that the trial court was not required to hold a hearing before finding good cause to release the department’s records relating to a child abuse investigation, where shortly after the department’s investigation, the individual who had been investigated killed the victim, the victim’s family, and himself. Cf. Records of the Children’s Advocacy Center of Southwest Florida Relating to Michele Fontanez, n o. 06-Dr-001850 (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct. June 16, 2006) (newspaper granted access to records of child protection team relating to child in care of DCF who died from injuries sustained from a sexual battery allegedly committed by her stepfather). in cases involving serious bodily injury to a child, DCF may petition the court for immediate public release of records pertaining to the protective investigation. s ection 39.2021(2), F.s. The court has 24 hours to determine if good cause exists for public release of the records. i f no action is taken by the court in that time, DCF may, subject to specified exceptions, release summary information including a confirmation that an investigation has been conducted concerning the victim, the dates and a brief description of procedural activities undertaken in the investigation, Id. and information concerning judicial proceedings. 70

88 government-in-the-sunshine-manual similar procedures are established in Ch. 415, F.s., for access to DCF records relating to See investigations of alleged abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult. s. 415.1071, F.s. The petitioner seeking public access to the records must formally serve DCF with the petition. Florida Department of Children and Families v. Sun-Sentinel, 865 s o. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2004). a “very narrow” exception to the home venue privilege applies when a petition is filed seeking to make DCF records public. at 1289, adopting the exception in See Sun-Sentinel, supra, cases “where a party petitions the court for an order to gain access to public records, and where the records sought are by law confidential and cannot be made public without a determination by the court, pursuant to the petition, that good cause exists for public access.” section 39.202(2)(o), F.s., provides that access to child abuse records shall be granted to any person in the event of the child’s death due to abuse, abandonment, or neglect. h owever, any information identifying the person reporting abuse, abandonment, or neglect, or any information that is otherwise made confidential or exempt by law shall not be released. s ection 415.107(3) Id. (l), F.s., provides for similar release of records in the event of the death of a vulnerable adult. And see s. 39.202(4), F.s., authorizing DCF and the investigating law enforcement agency to release certain identifying information to the public in order to help locate or protect a missing child under investigation or supervision of the department or its contracted service providers. in addition, “it is the intent of the legislature to provide prompt disclosure of the basic facts of all deaths of children from birth through 18 years of age which occur in this state and which are reported to the [DCF] central abuse hotline.” s ection 39.2022(1), F.s. Disclosure shall be posted on the DCF public website. Id. s ection 39.2022(2), F.s., lists the information about the child which must be posted. b. Foster home, licensure and quality assurance records records relating to licensure of foster homes, or assessing how the Department of Children and Families is carrying out its duties, including references to incidents of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, contained in such records, do not fall within the parameters of s. 39.202, F.s. ago such reports are in the nature of quality assurance reports that do not substitute for the 01-54. protective investigation of child abuse, abandonment, or neglect; to the extent that such incident reports reference an occurrence of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, identifying information Id. that reveals the identity of the victim contained in the reference should be redacted. s. Cf. 409.175(16), F.s., providing an exemption for certain personal information about licensed foster parents, foster parent applicants, and their families. And see Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 s o. 2d 627, 637 (Fla. 5th DCa 1983), approved, 467 s o. 2d 282 (Fla. 1985) (summary report compiled during a licensing investigation of a residential facility for developmentally disabled persons, subject to disclosure pursuant to statute [now found at s. 393.067(9), F.s.] providing for public access to inspection reports of such facilities). c. Guardians ad litem and court monitors section 39.0132(4)(a)2., F.s., establishes confidentiality for specified information held by a guardian ad litem. And see s. 744.2104(2), F.s. (confidentiality of records held by the office of Public and Professional g uardians relating to the medical, financial, or mental health of vulnerable adults, persons with a developmental disability, or persons with a mental illness); s. 744.1076(1) (b), F.s. (except as provided in the exemption, reports of court monitors or emergency court monitors which relate to the medical condition, financial affairs, or mental health of the ward are confidential); s. 744.2103 (2), F.s. (no disclosure of the personal or medical records of a ward of a public guardian shall be made, except as authorized by law); and s. 744.3701, F.s. (court records relating to settlement of a ward or minor’s claim). d. Status of abuse records held by law enforcement agencies For information regarding the status of abuse records held by law enforcement agencies 71

89 government-in-the-sunshine-manual in the course of a criminal investigation, please refer to the discussion in s. C. 15 relating to law enforcement records. 4. Direct-support organizations Direct-support organizations established by or pursuant to law to support the efforts of See s 92-53 public agencies have been found to be subject to the open government laws. ago useum of art Foundation, i nc., established pursuant to statute as a (John and m able ringling m not-for-profit corporation to assist the museum in carrying out its functions must comply with open government laws), 11-01 (nonprofit corporation created by municipality and described as its “fundraising arm” subject to open government laws); and 05-27 (s unshine law applies to Florida College s ystem institution [formerly community college] direct-support organization Cf. as defined in s. 1004.70, F.s.). s. 20.058, F.s., requiring that citizen support organizations or direct-support organizations created or authorized by law or executive order and created, approved, or administered by an agency must submit specified information to the agency which shall then post the information on the agency’s website. donors to however, the legislature has enacted exemptions for information identifying certain direct-support organizations. For example, the identity of donors to a direct-support organization of a district school board, and all information identifying such donors and prospective donors, are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1), F.s.; that See anonymity is required to be maintained in the auditor’s report. s. 1001.453(4), F.s. more commonly, however, the statutory exemption applies only to the identity of donors who wish to remain anonymous. See, e.g., s. 570.691(6), F.s. (identity of a donor or prospective donor to the direct-support organizations authorized to support programs in the Department of agriculture and Consumer s ervices “who desires to remain anonymous and all information identifying such donor or prospective donor” is confidential). Cf. s. 265.7015, F.s. (if the donor or prospective donor of a donation made for the benefit of a publicly owned performing arts center desires to remain anonymous, information that would identify the name, address, or telephone number of that donor or prospective donor is confidential and exempt). in addition to donor records, other records of certain direct-support organizations are all records of university direct-support organizations, other than made confidential by statute. the auditor’s report, management letter, and any supplemental data requested by the Board of governors, the a uditor general, board of trustees, and the office of Program Policy analysis and g ccountability [oPP aga] are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. overnment a section 1004.28(5), F.s. See Environmental Turf, Inc. v. University of Florida Board of Trustees, 83 so. 3d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCa 2012) (s. 1004.28[5] “exempts all documents that are created by a [university] Dso except for listed exceptions . . . .”). By contrast, s. 1004.70(6), F.s., provides that records of the Florida College s ystem institution direct-support organizations other than the auditor’s report, any information necessary any information related to the expenditure of funds , and any supplemental for the auditor’s report, data requested by the board of trustees, the a uditor g eneral, and oPP aga, are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. See Palm Beach Community College Foundation, Inc. v. WFTV, 611 s o. 2d 588 (Fla. 4th DCa 1993) (direct-support organization’s expense records are public records subject to deletion of donor-identifying information). For more information on exemptions for particular direct-support or citizen-support organizations, please consult a ppendix D or the i ndex. 5. Domestic violence and stalking records information about clients received by the Department of Children and Families or by authorized persons employed by or volunteering services to a domestic violence center, through files, reports, inspection or otherwise, is confidential and exempt from disclosure except as 72

90 government-in-the-sunshine-manual provided by statute. s nformation about the location of domestic violence ection 39.908, F.s. i Id. centers and facilities is also confidential. a petitioner seeking an injunction for protection against domestic violence may furnish the petitioner’s address to the court in a separate confidential filing for safety reasons. s ection And see ss. 741.30(8)(c)5. and 784.046(8)(c)5., F.s. i 741.30(3)(b), F.s. n addition, a petition for an injunction for protection against domestic violence, repeat violence, dating violence, sexual violence, stalking, or cyberstalking that is dismissed without a hearing, dismissed at an ex parte hearing due to a failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction, or dismissed for any reason having to do with the sufficiency of the petition itself without an injunction being issued on or after July 1, 2017, is exempt from disclosure. s ection 119.0714(1)(k)1., F.s. Prior to July 1, 2017, the petition is exempt only upon request by an individual named in the petition as a respondent. section 119.0714(1)(k)2., F.s. a victim of domestic violence or aggravated stalking may file a written request, accompanied by official verification that a crime has occurred, to have his or her home or employment address, home or employment telephone number, or personal assets exempted from disclosure. s ection 119.071(2)(j)1., F.s. For more information on this exemption, please refer to the discussion on pages 113-114. And see s. 741.313(7), F.s. (personal identifying information contained in records documenting an act of domestic violence or sexual violence that is submitted to an agency by an employee seeking to take leave under the requirements of s. 741.313, F.s., is confidential and exempt; a written request for leave submitted by an employee and an agency time sheet reflecting such request are confidential and exempt until 1 year after the leave has been taken). See also s. 787.03(6)(c), F.s. (current address and telephone number of the person taking the minor or incompetent person when fleeing from domestic violence and the current address and telephone number of the minor or incompetent person which are contained in the report made to a sheriff or state attorney under s. 787.03[6][b], F.s., are confidential and exempt from disclosure). The addresses, telephone numbers, and social security numbers of participants in the address Confidentiality Program for victims of Domestic violence Program [Program] are ection 741.465(1), F.s. exempt from disclosure, except as provided in the exemption. s a similar exemption is provided for the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of program participants contained in voter registration and voting records. s ection 741.465(2), F.s. And see s. 741.4651, F.s. (names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons who are victims of stalking or aggravated stalking are exempt from public disclosure requirements in the same manner that the names, addresses and telephone numbers of participants in the Program which are held by the a ttorney g eneral under s. 741.465, F.s, are exempt, provided that the victim files a sworn statement of stalking with the office of the a ttorney g eneral and otherwise complies with the procedures in ss. 741.401-741.409. F.s.). any information in a record created by a domestic violence fatality review team that reveals the identity of a domestic violence victim or the identity of the victim’s children is confidential ection 741.3165, F.s. and exempt from disclosure. s 6. Drafts and notes There is no “unfinished business” exception to the public inspection and copying requirements of Ch. 119, F.s. as the Florida s upreme Court stated in Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc., 379 s o. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980), the term “public record” means “any material prepared in connection with official agency business which is intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type.” s uch material is a “public record” regardless of whether it is in final form or the ultimate product of an agency. Id. Thus, “[i]nteroffice memoranda and intra-office memoranda communicating information from one public employee to another or merely prepared for filing, even though not a part of an agency’s later, formal public product, would nonetheless constitute public records inasmuch 73

91 government-in-the-sunshine-manual as they supply the final evidence of knowledge obtained in connection with the transaction of o. 2d at 640. See also Booksmart Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble College official business.” 379 s o. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 3d DCa 1998) (book selection forms completed by Bookstores, Inc., 718 s state university instructors and furnished to campus bookstore “are made in connection with official business, for memorialization and communication purposes” and are public records); and National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press, 18 s o. 3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 1st 37 s DCa 2009), review denied, o. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010) (transcript and response prepared as part of nCaa disciplinary proceeding involving state university were public records because the “the purpose of the transcript was to perpetuate the information presented to the infractions committee” and the response “was designed to communicate information to the body that would hear the appeal within the nCaa”). Compare Rogers v. Hood, 906 s o. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCa 2005), 919 s o. 2d 436 (Fla. 2005) (unused or unvoted Florida punch card review denied, ballots from 2000 election do not constitute public records because they do not “perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge,” but a ballot becomes a public record once it is voted because at that point “the voted ballot, as received by the supervisor of elections in a given county, has memorialized the act of voting”). accordingly, any agency record, if circulated for review, comment or information, is a public record regardless of whether it is an official expression of policy or marked “preliminary” or “working draft” or similar label. e xamples of such materials include interoffice memoranda, preliminary drafts of agency rules or proposals which have been submitted for review to anyone within or outside the agency, and working drafts of reports which have been furnished to a supervisor for review or approval. in each of these cases, the fact that the records are part of a preliminary process does not remove them from the definition of “public record.” When material falls within the statutory definition of “public record” in s. 119.011(12), F.s., and has been prepared to “perpetuate, communicate or formalize knowledge,” the record is subject to disclosure even if the agency believes that release of the nonfinal product could be detrimental. See, e.g., Gannett Corporation, Inc. v. Goldtrap, 302 s o. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCa 1974) (county’s concern that premature disclosure of a report could be harmful to the county does not make the document confidential). as with other public records, only the legislature has the authority to exempt preliminary or draft public records from disclosure. 372 s o. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979). Wait v. Florida Power & Light Company, s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s., providing a limited work product exemption for agency attorneys. See, e.g., While the broad definition of the term “public record” ensures that the public’s right of access includes preliminary and nonfinal records, the Shevin decision recognizes that not every record made or received in the course of official business is prepared to “perpetuate, communicate ccordingly, preliminary drafts or notes prepared for the personal use or formalize knowledge.” a of the writer may constitute mere “precursors” of public records they are not intended to be if the final evidence of the knowledge recorded. See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc. , 379 s o. 2d 633, 640 (Fla.1980). And see the discussion of “attorney notes” on pages 122-123. Thus, public employees’ notes to themselves “ which are designed for their own personal use in remembering certain things do not fall within the definition of ‘public record.’” (e.s.) Justice Coalition v. The First District Court of Appeal Judicial Nominating Commission, 823 s o. 2d 185, 192 (Fla. 1st DCa 2002). Accord Coleman v. Austin, 521 s o. 2d 247 (Fla. 1st DCa 1988), holding that preliminary handwritten notes prepared by agency attorneys and intended only See also ago 10-55 (handwritten for the attorneys’ own personal use are not public records. personal notes taken by city manager to assist in remembering matters discussed during manager’s interviews of city employees are not public records “if the notes have not been transcribed or shown to others and were not intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge”); and i nf. o p. to trovato, June 2, 2009 (to the extent city commissioner has taken notes for his own personal use and such notes are not intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize 74

92 government-in-the-sunshine-manual knowledge, personal notes taken at a workshop or during a commission meeting would not be Compare Barfield v. City of Sarasota, upp 874 (Fla. 12th considered public records). 21 F. l.W. s Cir. Ct. m ay 5, 2014) (those portions of police officer’s notes containing his research on homeless shelters became a public record when he made multiple references to them while answering questions during a presentation at a city commission meeting; however the unread portions of the notes did not become a public record because they were not disseminated). The relevant test is whether the records have been prepared to “perpetuate, communicate, See ago 05-23, stating that “it is only uncirculated or formalize knowledge of some type.” materials that are not in and of themselves intended to serve as the final evidence of the knowledge to be recorded that fall outside of the definition of a public record.” Accord ago s 10-55 (“nonfinal documents need not be communicated to anyone in order to constitute a public record”) and 04-15 (tape recordings of staff meetings made at the request of the executive director by a secretary for use in preparing minutes of the meeting are public records because “they are made at the request of the executive director as an independent record of the proceedings, and, unlike tapes or notes taken by a secretary as dictation, are intended to perpetuate the discussion at a staff meeting”). See also inf. op. to Yoder, n ovember 10, 2014 (video recording of a school board meeting which was made at the direction of a school board member “appears to be a record intended to perpetuate the discussion at the meeting”). For example, in Miami Herald Media Co. v. Sarnoff, 971 s o. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCa 2007), the court held that a memorandum prepared by a city commissioner after a meeting with a former city official, summarizing details of what was said and containing alleged factual information about possible criminal activity, was a public record subject to disclosure. The court determined that the memorandum was not a draft or a note containing mental impressions that would later form a part of a government record, but rather formalized and perpetuated his final knowledge o. 3d 193, 197 (Fla. 1st DCa gained at the meeting. See also Grapski v. City of Alachua, 31 s 2010), review denied, 47 s o. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010) (canvassing board minutes constitute “final City of Pinellas Park, Florida v. work product of the [b]oard, not a preliminary draft or note”); Times Publishing Company, n o. 00-008234Ci-19 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. January 3, 2001) (rejecting city’s argument that employee responses to survey are “notes” which are not subject to disclosure because “as to each of the employees, their responses were prepared in connection with their official agency business and they were ‘intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge’ that they had about their department”); and ago 05-23 (handwritten notes taken by an assistant city labor attorney during her interviews with city personnel that were reviewed by the city’s labor attorney, used to prepare a disciplinary action form, and then filed, constituted a public record). 7. Education records a. Charter schools section 1002.33(16)(b), F.s., provides that charter schools are subject to the Public records a ct and the s unshine law. The open government laws apply regardless of whether the charter school operates as a public or private entity. ago 98-48. The records and meetings of a not-for-profit corporation granted charter school status are subject to the requirements of Ch. 119, F.s., and s. 286.011, F.s., even though the charter school has not yet opened its doors to students. ago 01-23. And see ago 10-14 (records of team created by charter school to review personnel decisions subject to Ch. 119, F.s.). b. Student records Public access to student records is limited by statute. i n 2009, the legislature amended the state statutes relating to student records to incorporate the federal Family e ducation rights and Privacy a ct (FerP a). s ection 1002.221(1), F.s., provides that “[e]ducation records as defined in [FerP a], and the federal regulations issued pursuant thereto, are confidential and exempt” from ducation records” public disclosure and may be released only as authorized in the exemption. “e 75

93 government-in-the-sunshine-manual are defined by FerP a to mean “those records, files, documents, and other materials which contain information directly related to a student; and are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.” 20 u.s.C. s. 1232g(a)(4) (a). ago 10-04 (school board meeting at which student records may be discussed may not Cf. be closed to the public in the absence of a statutory exemption from the s unshine law; however, “school board should be sensitive to confidential student records that may be reviewed during such a meeting and protect these records to the extent that is possible to protect the privacy s. 1003.57(1)(c), F.s., providing an exemption from of the student involved . . . .”). Compare the s unshine law for hearings on exceptional student identification, evaluation, and eligibility determination; and s. 1006.07(1), F.s. (student expulsion hearings exempted). Public postsecondary educational institutions are also required to comply with FerP a with respect to the education records of students. s ection 1002.225(2), F.s. s ection 1006.52(1), F.s., authorizes a public postsecondary educational institution to prescribe the content and custody of records the institution maintains on its students and applicants for admission. a Id. See Knight student’s education records and applicant records are confidential and exempt. 200 s News, Inc. v. University of Central Florida, o. 3d 125, 128 (Fla. 5th DCa 2016) (personally identifiable information contained within records regarding alleged hazing incidents qualifies as confidential student disciplinary records; however, the names of student government officers charged with malfeasance in the performance of student government duties or alleged to have engaged in misconduct with regard to their election or appointment to their position are not a because “given the statutory scheme [relating to university student confidential under FerP government officers] student government officers know or reasonably should know” that they could be disciplined for misconduct in connection with their student government duties). National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press, 18 so. 3d 1201, 1211 (Fla. in review denied, 37 s o. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010), the court construed FerP a and the 1st DCa 2009), 2009 amendments to the Florida s tatutes. r ecognizing that under FerP a a record “qualifies as an educational record only if it ‘directly’ relates to a student,” the court found that a transcript of an nCaa hearing and an nCaa committee response pertained to allegations of misconduct by the university athletic department, and only tangentially related to students. Therefore, since the transcript and the response had been redacted to remove student-identifying information And see Rhea and thus did not disclose education records, they were not exempt from disclosure. v. District Board of Trustees of Santa Fe College, 109 s o. 3d 851 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013) (student’s unredacted email which criticized instructor’s classroom performance constituted an exempt education record). WFTV v. School Board of Seminole County, Florida, 874 s o. 2d Compare 48 (Fla. 5th DCa 2004), review denied, 892 s o. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2004), concluding that under prior student confidentiality laws (which did not incorporate FerP a), a school bus surveillance videotape was a confidential student record and could not be released to the media even with student-identifying information redacted). in ago 01-64 the a ttorney g eneral, in interpreting the former statutes, stated that a felony complaint/arrest affidavit created and maintained by school police officers for a juvenile or adult who is a student in the public schools is a law enforcement record subject to disclosure, provided that exempt information such as active criminal investigative information is deleted prior to release. See now 20 u.s.C. s. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) excluding “records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational agency or institution that were created by that law enforcement unit for the purpose of law enforcement” from the definition of “education records.” c. Children in government-sponsored recreation programs section 119.071(5)(c), F.s., exempts information that would identify or locate a child or the parent or guardian of a child, participating in a government-sponsored recreation program. a government-sponsored recreation program means “a program for which an agency assumes responsibility for a child participating in that program, including, but not limited to, after-school programs, athletic programs, nature programs, summer camps, or other recreational programs.” 76

94 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Id. Testing materials d. testing materials are generally exempt from the disclosure provisions of s. 119.07(1), F.s. See, e.g., s. 1008.23, F.s. (examination and assessment instruments, including developmental materials and workpapers directly related to such instruments, which are prepared or administered pursuant to cited statutes), and s. 1012.56(9)(g), F.s. (state-developed educator certification See ago 09-35, concluding that examination, developmental materials and workpapers). student assessment tests developed by teachers to measure student preparedness for college board advanced placement exams are confidential and exempt from the inspection and copying requirements of Ch. 119, F.s. Cf. s. 1008.24(4)(b), F.s. (identity of a school or postsecondary educational institution, personal identifying information of personnel of a school district or postsecondary educational institution, or specific allegations of misconduct obtained or reported in connection with an investigation of a testing impropriety conducted by the Department of education are confidential and exempt from disclosure until the investigation is concluded or becomes inactive). 8. Election records a. Ballots election records are generally open to public inspection. an individual or group is entitled to inspect the ballots and may take notes regarding the number of votes cast. ago 93-48. See also Rogers v. Hood, 906 s o. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCa 2005), review denied, 919 s o. 2d 436 (Fla. 2005) (voted ballots are public records because they have “memorialized the act of voting”). Cf. Trout v. Bucher , 205 s o. 3d 876 (Fla. 4th DCa 2016), stating that the supervisor of elections was not required to charge the hourly rate of the lowest paid person capable of providing ballots for inspection because s. 119.07[4][d], F.s., authorizes the agency to impose a reasonable charge based on labor costs “actually incurred by the agency or attributable to the agency” when extensive clerical or supervisory assistance is required). section 119.07(5), F.s., prohibits any person other than the supervisor of elections or the supervisor’s employees from touching the ballots. s. 101.572, F.s. (no persons other than And see the supervisor, supervisor’s employees, or the county canvassing board shall handle any official ballot or ballot card). h owever, this restriction does not prohibit the supervisor from producing copies of optically scanned ballots which were cast in an election in response to a public records request. ago 04-11. And see ago 01-37. information regarding requests for vote-by-mail ballots that is recorded by the supervisor of elections pursuant to s. 101.62(3), F.s., is confidential and exempt and shall be made available to or reproduced only for the individuals and entities set forth in the exemption, for political purposes only. s ection 101.62(3), F.s. b. Voter registration and voter records section 97.0585, F.s., states that the following information is confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements and may be used only for purposes of voter registration: declinations to register to vote; information relating to the place where a person registered to vote or updated a voter registration; the social security number, driver license number, and the Florida identification number of a voter registration applicant or voter. The signature of a voter registration Id. See also ss. 741.465(2), F.s. applicant or a voter is exempt from copying requirements. (identifying information concerning participants in the office of the a ttorney g eneral a ddress Confidentiality Program for victims of Domestic violence contained in voter registration and voting records is exempt); and 741.4651, F.s. (exemption for identifying information of stalking victims who have filed a sworn statement of stalking with the office of the a ttorney g eneral and otherwise comply with the procedures set forth in ss. 741.401-741.409, F.s.). And see ago 04-18, concluding that the supervisor of elections must maintain the exempt status of specified 77

95 government-in-the-sunshine-manual personal information for certain officers and employees which appears in petitions or campaign papers if the affected employee or officer or his or her employing agency has filed a written request for exemption with the supervisor as authorized by s. 119.071(4)(d)3., F.s. 9. Electronic and computer records Electronic databases and files a. information stored in a public agency’s computer “is as much a public record as a written 422 so. 2d 63, Seigle v. Barry, page in a book or a tabulation in a file stored in a filing cabinet . . . .” 431 s o. 2d 988 (Fla. 1983). And see National Collegiate 65 (Fla. 4th DCa 1982), review denied, 18 s o. 3d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCa 2009), review denied, Athletic Association v. Associated Press, 37 so. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010) (public records law is not limited to paper documents but applies to documents that exist only in digital form); ago 98-54 (application and disciplinary reports maintained in a computer system operated by a national securities dealers association which are received electronically by state agency for use in licensing and regulating securities dealers doing business in Florida are public records); ago 91-61 (agency must provide copy of computer disk in response to Ch. 119 request); and ago 85-03 (computer tape subject to disclosure). Thus, information such as electronic calendars, databases, and word processing files stored in agency computers, can all constitute public records because records made or received in the course of official business and intended to perpetuate, communicate or formalize knowledge of some type, fall within the scope of Ch. 119, F.s. ago 89-39. ago 85-87 (to the Compare extent that “machine-readable intermediate files” may be intended to “communicate” knowledge, any such communication takes place completely within the data processing equipment and in such form as to render any inspection pursuant to Ch. 119, F.s., unintelligible and, except perhaps to the computer itself, meaningless; therefore, these files are analogous to notes used to prepare some other documentary material, and are not public records). And see Grapski v. Machen, n o. 01-2005-Ca-4005 J (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. m ay 9, 2006), affirmed per curiam , 949 s o. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCa 2007) (spam or bulk mail received by a public agency does not necessarily constitute a public record). moreover, the definition of “public records” specifically includes “data processing software” and establishes that a record made or received in connection with official business is See s. a public record, regardless of physical form, characteristics, “or means of transmission.” 119.011(12), F.s. “ automation of public records must not erode the right of access to [public ection 119.01(2)(a), F.s. records].” s accordingly, electronic public records are governed by the same rule as written documents and other public records--the records are subject to public inspection unless a statutory exemption exists which removes the records from disclosure. Cf. ago 90-04, stating that a county official is not authorized to assign the county’s right to a public record (a computer program developed by a former employee while he was working for the county) as part of a settlement compromising a lawsuit against the county. And see the discussion on pages 123-124 noting that in evaluating whether a public official’s records were made or received in the course of official business for purposes of Ch. 119, the determining factor is the nature of the record, and not whether the record is located in a private or a government computer or communications device. b. Consideration of public access in design of electronic recordkeeping system When an agency is designing or acquiring an electronic recordkeeping system, the agency must consider whether the proposed system is capable of providing data in some common format such as, but not limited to, the american s tandard Code for i nformation i nterchange. section 119.01(2)(b), F.s. Cf. i nf. o p. to m oore, o ctober 19, 1993, noting that an agency considering the acquisition of computer software should be responsive to the need for preserving public access to the information through use of the computer’s software and that “[t]he design and development of the software, therefore, should ensure that the system has the capability 78

96 government-in-the-sunshine-manual of redacting confidential or exempt information when a public records request is made.” And s. 287.042(3)(h), F.s. (Department of m ervices responsible for development of see anagement s procedures to be used by state agencies when procuring information technology commodities and contractual services that ensure compliance with public records and records retention requirements). similarly, an agency may not enter into a contract for the creation or maintenance of a public records database if that contract impairs the ability of the public to inspect or copy the public records of that agency, including public records that are online or stored in an electronic recordkeeping system used by the agency. s ection 119.01(2)(c), F.s. The importance of ensuring public access to computer records is recognized by statute and in the electronic recordkeeping rules of the Division of library and i nformation s ervices of the Department of s tate. r ule 1B-26.003(6)(g), F.a.C., provides that each agency shall “[e]nsure that agency electronic recordkeeping systems meet state requirements for public access to records in accordance with Chapter 119, F.s.” c. E-Mail e-mail messages made or received by agency officers and employees in connection with official business are public records and subject to disclosure in the absence of an exemption. ago s 96-34 and 01-20. See Rhea v. District Board of Trustees of Santa Fe College, 109 so. 3d 851, 855 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013), noting that “electronic communications, such as e-mail, are covered [by the Public r ecords a ct] just like communications on paper.” Cf. s. 668.6076, F.s., requiring agencies that operate a website and use electronic mail to post the following statement nder Florida law, e-mail addresses are public in a conspicuous location on the agency website: “u records. i f you do not want your e-mail address released in response to a public records request, nstead, contact this office by phone or in writing.” do not send electronic mail to this entity. i similarly, e-mails sent by city commissioners in connection with the transaction of official business are public records subject to disclosure even though the e-mails contain undisclosed or “blind” recipients and their e-mail addresses. ago 07-14. Cf. Butler v. City of Hallandale Beach, 68 s o. 3d 278 (Fla. 4th DCa 2011) (affirming a trial court order finding that a list of recipients personal e-mail sent by mayor from her personal computer was not a public record). of a like other public records, e-mail messages are subject to the statutory restrictions on destruction of public records. See s. 257.36(6), F.s., stating that a public record may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of only in accordance with retention schedules established by the Division nformation s ervices (division) of the Department of s of library and i tate. Thus, an e-mail communication of “factual background information” from one city council member to another is a public record and should be retained in accordance with the retention schedule for other records relating to performance of the agency’s functions and formulation of policy. ago 01-20. d. Facebook The a ttorney g eneral’s office has stated that the placement of material on a city’s Facebook page presumably would be in connection with the transaction of official business and thus subject to Ch. 119, F.s., although in any given instance, the determination would have to be made based upon the definition of “public record” contained in s. 119.011(12), F.s. ago 09-19. to the extent that the information on the city’s Facebook page constitutes a public record, the city is under an obligation to follow the public records retention schedules established in accordance with s. 257.36(6), F.s. Id. And see ago 08-07 (city council members who post comments and emails relating to the transaction of city business on a privately owned and operated website “would be responsible for ensuring that the information is maintained in accordance with the ecords law”). Public r 79

97 government-in-the-sunshine-manual e. Text messages ttorney g eneral’s office advised the Department of s in 2010, the a tate (which is statutorily charged with development of public records retention schedules) that the “same rules that apply ins, sms to e-mail should be considered for electronic communications including Blackberry P communications (text messaging), mms communications (multimedia content), and instant p. to Browning, m arch 17, 2010. messaging conducted by government agencies.” i nf. o in response, the Department revised the records retention schedule to recognize that retention periods for text messages and other electronic messages or communications “are determined by the content, nature, and purpose of the records, and are set based on their legal, fiscal, administrative, and historical values, regardless of the format in which they reside or the method by which they are transmitted.” s tated another way, it is the content, nature and purpose of the electronic communication that determines how long it is retained, not the technology that is used to send the message. g eneral r ecords schedule gs1-sl for s tate and local See government agencies, e lectronic Communications, available online at http://dos.myflorida. com/library-archives. f. Twitter The determination as to whether a list or record of accounts which have been blocked from posting to or accessing an elected official’s personal twitter feed is a public record involves ttorney g mixed questions of law and fact which cannot be resolved by the a nf. eneral’s office. i op. to s halley, June 1, 2016. h owever, “if the tweets the public official is sending are public records [because they were sent in connection with the transaction of official business] then a list of blocked accounts, prepared in connection with those public records ‘tweets,’ could well be determined by a court to be a public record.” Id. Emergency records 10. Emergency “911” records a. section 365.171(12)(a), F.s., provides that any record, recording, or information, or portions thereof, obtained by a public agency for the purpose of providing services in an emergency which reveals the name, address, or telephone number or personal information about, or information which may identify any person requesting emergency service or reporting an emergency by accessing an emergency communications e911 system is confidential and owever, disclosure of the location of a coronary emergency exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. h to a private person or entity that owns an automated external defibrillator is authorized in some circumstances, as set forth in the exemption. s ection 365.171(12)(b), F.s. The exemption applies only to the name, address, telephone number or personal information about or information which may identify any person requesting emergency services or reporting an emergency while such information is in the custody of the public agency or public safety agency providing emergency services. s ection 365.171(12)(a), F.s. See ago 93- 60. There is no clear indication that the legislature intended to include the sound of a person’s ago 15-01. moreover, identifying information voice as information protected from disclosure. obtained or created independently of the 911 call, for example from a criminal investigation or offense report created as a result of such investigation, is not exempt under s. 365.171(12)(a), F.s. ago 11-27. a tape recording of a “911” call is a public record which is subject to disclosure after the deletion of the exempt information. ago 93-60. This does not, however, preclude the application of another exemption to such records. Thus, if the “911” calls are received by a law enforcement agency and the county emergency management department, information which is determined by the law enforcement agency to constitute active criminal investigative information may also be deleted from the tape prior to public release. ago 95-48. See also i nf. o p. to eptember 22, 1997 (while police department is not prohibited from entering into an Fernez, s 80

98 government-in-the-sunshine-manual agreement with the public to authorize access to its radio system, the department must maintain confidentiality of exempt personal information contained in “911” radio transmissions). moreover, an audio recording that records the killing of a law enforcement officer acting in accordance with his or her official duties is confidential and exempt and may not be listened to or copied except as authorized in the exemption. s ection 406.136, F.s. For more information on this exemption, please refer to the discussion on pages 116-117. b. Emergency evacuation plans section 119.071(3)(a), F.s., provides an exemption from disclosure for a security system plan of a private or public entity that is held by an agency. The term “security system plan” And see s. 119.071(2)(d), includes emergency evacuation plans and sheltering arrangements. F.s., providing an exemption from disclosure for “[a]ny comprehensive inventory of state and local law enforcement resources compiled pursuant to Part i, chapter 23 [Florida m utual aid act], and any comprehensive policies or plans compiled by a criminal justice agency pertaining to the mobilization, deployment, or tactical operations involved in responding to emergencies as defined in s. 252.34, F.s.; and s. 395.1056, F.s., providing an exemption for those portions of a comprehensive emergency management plan that address the response of a public or private hospital to an act of terrorism. c. Emergency medical services records Please refer to the discussion of this topic found on pages 89-90. d. Emergency notification any information furnished by a person to any agency for the purpose of being provided with emergency notification by the agency is exempt from disclosure requirements. s ection 119.071(5)(j)1., F.s. The e-mail addresses and corresponding home, school, and other “watched addresses of concern” provided for participation in the Florida Department of law e nforcement offender alert s ystem come within the scope of this exemption. ago 11-16. And see s. 119.0712(2)(d)1. and 2., F.s. (emergency contact information contained in a Department of h ighway s otor vehicles motor vehicle record is confidential and exempt, and, afety and m without the express consent of the person to whom such emergency contact information applies, may be released only to law enforcement agencies for purposes of contacting those listed in the event of an emergency). e. Emergency planning information furnished to Division of Emergency Management mergency management (Division) manages a statewide public awareness The Division of e program which encourages individuals, families, and businesses to develop disaster plans in preparation for and in response to natural or manmade disasters. See s. 2, Ch. 14-188, laws of Florida. any information furnished by a person or a business to the Division for the purpose of being provided assistance with emergency planning is exempt. s ection 252.905(1), F.s. f. Special needs registry section 252.355(1), F.s., states that the Division of e mergency m anagement, in coordination with each local emergency management agency in the state, shall maintain a registry of persons with special needs ( i.e. , persons who would need assistance during evacuations and sheltering because of physical, mental, cognitive impairment, or sensory disabilities), located within the jurisdiction of the local agency. The registration shall identify those persons in need of assistance and plan for resource allocation to meet those identified needs. r ecords relating to the registration of persons with special needs are confidential and exempt, except such information is available to other emergency response agencies, as determined by the local emergency management director. s ection 252.355(4), F.s. local law enforcement agencies shall be given Id. complete shelter roster information upon request. 81

99 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 11. Financial records many agencies prepare or receive financial records as part of their official duties and responsibilities. as with other public records, these materials are generally open to inspection ago 96-96 (financial information submitted unless a specific statutory exemption exists. See by harbor pilots in support of a pilotage rate increase application is not exempt from disclosure requirements). a. Audit reports (1) Auditor General audits The audit report prepared by the a uditor g eneral is a public record once finalized. section 11.45(4)(c), F.s. The audit workpapers and notes are not a public record; however, those workpapers necessary to support the computations in the final audit report may be made available by a majority vote of the legislative a uditing Committee after a public hearing showing proper Id. And see cause. ago 79-75 (“the term ‘audit work papers and notes’ should be construed narrowly and limited to such ‘raw data’ as is commonly considered to constitute the work papers Cf. of an accountant”). s. 11.51(4), F.s. (work papers held by the office of Program Policy analysis and g overnment a ccountability which relate to an authorized project or a research product are exempt from disclosure). uditor g at the conclusion of the audit, the a eneral provides the head of the agency being audited with a list of the findings so that the agency head may explain or rebut them before the report is finalized. s ection 11.45(4)(d), F.s. The list of audit findings is a public record. ago 79-75. (2) Local government audits The audit report of an internal auditor prepared for or on behalf of a unit of local government becomes a public record when the audit becomes final. s ection 119.0713(2)(b), F.s. The audit becomes final when the audit report is presented to the unit of local government; until the audit becomes final, the audit workpapers and notes related to such audit report are Id. confidential. Thus, a draft audit report of a county legal department prepared by the clerk of court, acting in her capacity as county auditor, did not become subject to disclosure when the clerk submitted copies of her draft report to the county administrator for review and response. Nicolai 715 s o. 2d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 5th DCa 1998). a v. Baldwin, ccording to the exemption, the report would become “final,” and hence subject to disclosure, when presented to the county commission. Id. And see Rushing v. Barfield, n o. 2011-Ca-5864-nC (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. a ugust 4, 2011), per curiam affirmed, 83 s o. 3d 718 (Fla. 2d DCa 2012) (even though an audit has been completed with regard to some matters, clerk authorized to redact those portions of workpapers and notes relating to additional matters under investigation until the audit relating to the additional matters is concluded). The term “internal auditor” is not defined for purposes of this exemption. h owever, the term would appear to encompass an official within county government who is responsible under the county code for conducting an audit. ago 99-07. Compare ago 04-33 (exemption does not apply to audit of guardianship files prepared by clerk of court because that audit “is not an internal audit performed by or on behalf of any of the specified units of local government”). (3) State agency inspector general audits section 20.055(2), F.s., establishes the office of inspector general in each state agency. Pursuant to s. 20.055(6), F.s., the inspector general is required to conduct audits of the agency and prepare audit reports of the findings. s uch audit reports and workpapers are public records to the extent that they do not include information which has been made confidential and exempt 82

100 government-in-the-sunshine-manual from disclosure. s ection 20.055(6)(b), F.s. Bids, proposals and financial statements b. section 119.071(1)(b)2., F.s., provides an exemption for “sealed bids, proposals, or replies received by an agency pursuant to a competitive solicitation” until such time as the agency provides notice of an intended decision or until 30 days after opening “the bids, proposals, or final Cf. s. 255.0518, F.s., providing that notwithstanding s. 119.071(1) replies,” whichever is earlier. (b), F.s., agencies receiving sealed bids pursuant to a competitive solicitation for construction or repairs of a public building or public work, must open the bids at a public meeting conducted in compliance with the sunshine law, and must also announce bidder and price information at that meeting; and s. 255.065(15), F.s., providing an exemption from public records requirements for a specified period for unsolicited proposals received by a public entity pursuant to the public- private partnership process established in s. 255.065, F.s. The term “competitive solicitation” means “the process of requesting and receiving sealed bids, proposals, or replies in accordance with the terms of a competitive process, regardless of the ection 119.071(1)(b)1., F.s. method of procurement.” s if an agency rejects all bids, proposals, or replies submitted in response to a competitive solicitation and the agency concurrently provides notice of its intent to reissue the competitive solicitation, the rejected bids, proposals, or replies remain exempt until such time as the agency provides notice of an intended decision concerning the reissued competitive solicitation or until the agency withdraws the reissued competitive solicitation. a bid, proposal, or reply is not exempt for longer than 12 months after the initial agency notice rejecting all bids, proposals, or replies. s ection 119.071(1)(b)3., F.s. any financial statement that an agency requires a prospective bidder to submit in order to prequalify for bidding or for responding to a proposal for a road or any other public works project is exempt from disclosure requirements. s ection 119.071(1)(c), F.s. See also s. 119.0713(3), F.s., limiting access to materials used by municipal utilities to prepare bids; s. 339.55(10)(a), F.s., providing an exemption for financial information of a private entity applicant which the transportation requires as part of the application process for loans or credit Department of enhancements from the state-funded infrastructure bank; and s. 337.168, F.s., providing restrictions on disclosure of Department of transportation cost estimates, persons requesting bid packages, and the bid analysis and monitoring system. c. Budgets Bay Budgets and working papers used to prepare them are normally subject to inspection. County School Board v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 382 so. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCa 1980); 340 s o. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCa 1976); and City of Gainesville v. State Warden v. Bennett, ex. rel. International Association of Fire Fighters Local No. 2157, 298 s o. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCa 1974). Accord inf. o p. to Pietrodangelo, n ov. 29, 1972 (financial operating budget of athletic department of state university constitutes a public record). Cf. News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. v. Carlson, 410 s o. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 2d DCa 1982), holding that the preponderant interest in allowing public participation in the budget process justified the inclusion of an agency’s internal budget committee within the provisions of the g overnment in the s unshine law. The exemption afforded by s. 447.605(3), F.s., for work products developed by the public employer in preparation for collective bargaining negotiations does not remove the working papers used in preparing an agency budget from disclosure. Warden v. Bennett, supra. See also ago 92-56 (budget of a public hospital would not, in and of itself, appear to constitute either a trade secret or marketing plan for purposes of a statutory exemption for documents revealing a hospital’s marketing plan or trade secrets). 83

101 government-in-the-sunshine-manual d. Economic development records Business location or expansion plans (1) if a private entity requests in writing before an economic incentive agreement is signed that an economic development agency maintain the confidentiality of information concerning the entity’s interest in or plans to locate or expand its business activities in Florida, the information is confidential and exempt from disclosure for 12 months after the date an economic development agency receives a request for confidentiality or until the information is otherwise disclosed, whichever occurs first. s ection 288.075(2)(a)1., F.s. Confidentiality may be extended for up to an additional 12 months upon the written request of the private entity if the agency finds that the private entity is still actively considering locating or expanding its business activities in f a final project order for a signed economic development ection 288.075(2)(a)2., F.s. i Florida. s agreement is issued, then the information remains confidential for 180 days after the final project order is issued, until a date specified in the final project order, or until the information is otherwise disclosed, whichever occurs first. h owever, such period of confidentiality may not extend beyond the period of confidentiality specified in s. 288.075(2)(a)1. or s. 288.075(2)(a)2., F.s. s. And see 288.075(2)(b), F.s., restricting public officials from entering into binding agreements with the private entity requesting confidentiality until 90 days after the information has been made public, unless certain conditions are met. The term “economic development agency” means the state Department of e conomic space Florida, the public economic opportunity, an industrial development authority, development agency of a county or municipality, or a research and development authority. also included are the county or municipal officers or employees assigned the duty to promote the general business interests or industrial interests of that county or municipality or the related responsibilities, if the county or municipality does not have a public economic development agency. The term also includes private persons or agencies authorized by the state, a county or a municipality to promote the general business interests of the state or that municipality or county. section 288.075(1)(a), F.s. The legislature’s designation of those entities which are considered economic development agencies for purposes of s. 288.075, F.s., precludes any other entities from falling under the definition. See t. a ugustine-s t. Johns County airport a uthority is not an “economic development ago 12-36 (s Cf. agency” as defined in s. 288.075, F.s.). nf. to r ooney, June 8, 2011 (if by amendment of the i county charter, the voters made the county commission a part of the county economic development agency by placing the executive director of the agency under the direct supervision of the county commission, then the provisions of s. 288.075, F.s., would apply to the county commission). a written request for confidentiality under s. 288.075(2), F.s., may constitute or contain information required to be held confidential under that statute; however, such a determination must be made by the custodian on a case-by-case basis as to whether a particular record or portion of a record falls within the scope of the exemption. ago 07-15. The section, however, may be cited by the records custodian as statutory authority for withholding information from public disclosure without violating the required confidentiality provisions of the statute. Id. Cf. ago 80-78 (county industrial development authority permitted to withhold access only to those records “clearly falling” within the exemption provided in s. 288.075; “policy considerations” do not justify nondisclosure of public records). Development plans, financial records, financial commitment letters and draft memoranda of understanding between the city and a developer considering expansion or relocation within the city appear to come within the scope of the exemption. ago 04-19. h owever, the burden is on the economic development agency “to carefully and in good faith distinguish between those documents clearly covered by the exemption and those not covered.” Id. trade secrets, as defined in s. 688.002, F.s., contained in the records held by an economic 84

102 government-in-the-sunshine-manual development agency are confidential and exempt from disclosure. s ection 288.075(3), F.s. Proprietary confidential business information held by an economic development agency is confidential and exempt until such information is otherwise publicly available or is no longer ection 288.075(4), treated by the proprietor as proprietary confidential business information. s F.s. Federal employer identification numbers, reemployment assistance account numbers, or Florida sales tax registration numbers held by an economic development agency are confidential ection 288.075(5), F.s. i and exempt. s n addition, certain information held pursuant to the administration of an economic incentive program is confidential and exempt for limited periods as specified in the exemption. s ection 288.075(6), F.s. (2) Convention center booking business records Booking business records of a public convention center, sports facility, or auditorium are exempt from public disclosure. s ection 255.047(2), F.s. The statute defines “booking business records” to include “client calendars, client lists, exhibitor lists, and marketing files.” section 255.047(1)(a), F.s. The term does not include “contract negotiation documents, lease agreements, rental rates, event invoices, event work orders, ticket sales information, box office records, attendance figures, payment schedules, certificates of insurance, accident reports, incident reports, or correspondence specific to a confirmed event.” Id. And see s. 125.0104(9) (d)1., F.s. (providing an exemption for information given to a county tourism promotion agency, which, if released, would reveal the identity of those who provide information in response to a sales promotion, advertisement, or research project or whose names, addresses, meeting or convention plan information or accommodations or other visitation needs become booking or reservation list data). e. Ownership records for registered public obligations records regarding ownership of, or security interests in, registered public obligations are not open to inspection. s ection 279.11, F.s. f. Personal financial records in the absence of a statutory exemption, financial information prepared or received by an agency is subject to Ch. 119, F.s. See Wallace v. Guzman, o. 2d 1351 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997) 687 s (personal income tax returns and financial statements submitted by housing finance authority members as part of the authority’s application to organize a bank are subject to disclosure). See inf. o p. to lovelace, a pril 3, 1992 (records identifying mortgage recipients held by a bank also acting as agent of a housing finance authority in granting mortgages funded by the authority are public records). (1) Bank account, debit and credit card numbers Bank account numbers, and debit, charge, and credit card numbers held by an agency are exempt from public disclosure. s ection 119.071(5)(b), F.s. See also s. 119.0714(1)(j), (2)(e) and 3(b), F.s., regarding confidentiality of bank account numbers and debit, charge, and credit card numbers contained in court and official records. (2) Consumer financial information There are statutes which exempt consumer financial information received by certain agencies. For example, property identifiers contained in unclaimed property reports held by the Department of Financial services are confidential. section 717.117(8), F.s. See also s. 624.23, F.s. (personal financial information of a consumer held by the Department of Financial services or the office of i nsurance r egulation, relating to a consumer’s complaint or inquiry); s. 627.351(6)(x)1., F.s. (claims and underwriting files of the Citizens Property i nsurance Corporation, except as provided in the exemption); s. 119.071(5)(f ), F.s. (health or property insurance information provided by applicants or participants in government housing assistance programs); and s. 655.057(1)(c), F.s. (personal financial information contained in investigation 85

103 government-in-the-sunshine-manual records of the office of Financial r egulation). Financial information submitted by state licensure applicants (3) in the absence of statutory exemption, financial information in a licensing file is subject ago 04-16. h to disclosure. owever, the legislature has enacted exemptions for financial See information held by certain licensing agencies. For example, credit history information and credit scores held by the office of Financial r egulation for purposes of licensing loan originators, mortgage brokers and mortgage lenders are confidential. s ection 494.00125(3) F.s. Financial ealth is also confidential. information submitted by license applicants to the Department of h section 456.014(1), F.s. And see s. 455.229(1), F.s. (Department of Business and Professional regulation license applicants). Temporary cash assistance program participant (4) except as provided in the exemption, personal identifying information of a temporary cash assistance program participant is confidential. s ection 414.295(1), F.s. Toll payment personal identifying information (5) section 338.155(6), F.s. provides an exemption for personal identifying information held by the Department of transportation, a county, a municipality, or an expressway authority for the purpose of paying, prepaying, or collecting tolls and associated charges due for the use of toll facilities. Utility payment records (6) See ago s 88- agency records of payments for utility services are subject to disclosure. 57 (county records of payments made by individuals for waste collection services are public records), and 92-09 (customer delinquency information held by a utilities commission is subject to disclosure). g. Taxpayer records There are a number of statutes providing for confidentiality of taxpayer records held by the Department of r See, e.g., s. 213.053(2)(a), F.s. (all information contained in returns, evenue. evenue, including investigative reports, accounts, or declarations received by the Department of r reports and information and letters of technical advice, is confidential except for official purposes and exempt from s. 119.07[1], F.s.); s. 213.21(3), F.s. (records of compromises of taxpayer liability not subject to disclosure); and s. 213.27(6), F.s. (confidential information shared by evenue with debt collection or auditing agencies under contract with the the Department of r department is exempt from public disclosure and such debt collection or auditing agencies are Cf. Wallace v. Guzman, 687 bound by the same confidentiality requirements as the department). so. 2d 1351 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997) (personal income tax returns submitted by housing finance authority members to state banking agency as part of the authority’s application to organize a bank are subject to disclosure). in addition, s. 193.074, F.s., provides for confidentiality of certain taxpayer information. in light of the position taken by the Department of r evenue that its form entitled “o riginal application for a tax e xemption” constitutes a “return,” such form should be treated d valorem as a “return” that is confidential pursuant to s. 193.074, F.s. ago 05-04. Accord ago 95-07. And see NYT Management Services, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, n o. 2006-Ca-0896 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. a pril 25, 2006) (declarations or written statements filed with the Department of revenue pursuant to the state’s revenue laws would be a return and thus confidential under s. 193.074, F.s.). a taxpayer’s e-mail address held by a tax collector for purpose of sending certain tax notices or obtaining the consent of a taxpayer for electronic transmission of certain tax notices, as 86

104 government-in-the-sunshine-manual provided in cited statutes, is exempt from public disclosure requirements. s ection 197.3225(1), F.s. however, taxpayer information that is confidential in the hands of certain specified officers ecords a ct when it has been under s. 193.074, F.s., is subject to disclosure under the Public r submitted by a taxpayer to a value adjustment board as evidence in an assessment dispute. ago Cf. i 01-74. p. to e cheverri, a pril 30, 2010 (while property appraiser may use confidential nf. o records submitted to the value adjustment board by the taxpayer, it is not clear whether property appraiser may independently submit confidential material to the board in the absence of a taxpayer’s submission although board may order production of confidential records). s imilarly, absent a specific statutory exemption for assessment rolls and public information cards, such documents made or received by the property appraiser are public records subject to the Public act, regardless of the confidentiality of a return that may contain information used in records their creation. ago 05-04. 12. Firearms records Personal identifying information of an individual who has applied for or received a license to carry a concealed weapon or firearm pursuant to s. 790.06, F.s., held by the Department of agriculture and Consumer s ervices is confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements. s ection 790.0601(1), F.s. The same information is also confidential when held by a tax collector appointed by the Department. s ections 790.0601(2), and 790.0625(4), F.s. information made confidential by s. 790.0601, F.s., shall be disclosed with the express written consent of the applicant or licensee or his or her legally authorized representative, by court order upon a showing of good cause, or upon request by a law enforcement agency in connection with the performance of lawful duties. s ection 790.0601(3), F.s. Cf. Times Publishing Company v. o. 2002-2053 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. n City of Pensacola, n 869 ovember 13, 2002), per curiam affirmed, so. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCa 2004), concluding that police department records of weapons assigned to law enforcement officers and described as “specialty weapons utilized for surveillance and defensive purposes, by surveillance personnel” were exempt from disclosure under s. 119.071(3) (a), F.s., relating to security system plans and terrorist threat assessments, and the exemption for surveillance personnel, techniques, and procedures, now found at s. 119.071(2)(d), F.s. 13. Hospital and medical records a. Communicable or infectious disease reports See, e.g., a number of exemptions exist for communicable or infectious disease reports. ealth s. 381.0031(6), F.s. (information submitted in public health reports to Department of h is confidential and is to be made public only when necessary to public health); s. 384.29, F.s. (sexually transmissible diseases). See Ocala Star-Banner v. State, 697 s o. 2d 1317 (Fla. 5th DCa 1997) (upholding court order sealing portions of a battery prosecution case file pertaining to transmission of sexually transmissible diseases to victims due to s. 384.29, F.s., confidentiality requirements). h owever, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the Department of health, the Department of Children and Families, and the agency for Persons with Disabilities may share confidential information on any individual who is or has been the subject of a program within the jurisdiction of each agency. s ection 402.115, F.s. The shared information remains confidential or exempt as provided by law. Id. s ee ago 98-52. results of screenings for sexually transmissible diseases conducted by the Department of health in accordance with s. 384.287, F.s., may be released only to those persons specified in the exemption. s ection 384.287(5), F.s. notification to an emergency medical technician, paramedic or other person that a patient they treated or transported has an infectious disease must be done in a manner to protect the confidentiality of patient information and shall not include the patient’s name. s ection 395.1025, F.s. 87

105 government-in-the-sunshine-manual There are strict confidentiality requirements for test results for hiv infection; such See ss. 381.004, and information may be released only as expressly prescribed by statute. 384.287(6), F.s. any person who violates the confidentiality provisions of s. 381.004, F.s., and ection 381.004(5)(b), F.s. s. s. 951.27, F.s., is guilty of a first degree misdemeanor. s And see 381.004(5)(c), F.s., establishing felony penalties for disclosure in certain circumstances. Thus, information received by the clerk of court indicating that an individual has complied with an order to be tested for hiv and the attendant test results “would appear to be confidential and should be maintained in that status.” ago 00-54. Cf. Florida Department of Corrections v. Abril, 969 s o. 2d 201 (Fla. 2007) (an entity that negligently violates a patient’s right of confidentiality in disclosing the results of hiv testing may be held responsible in a negligence action). results of hiv and hepatitis tests performed on persons charged with certain offenses may ection 960.003, F.s. See also not be disclosed except as authorized in the exemption. s s. 951.27, F.s. (limited disclosure of infectious disease test results, including hiv testing pursuant to s. 775.0877, F.s., of inmates as provided in statute). b. Hospital records (1) Public hospitals like other governmental agency records, public hospital records are subject to disclosure in the absence of a statutory exemption. For example, the court in Tribune Company v. Hardee n Memorial Hospital, ugust 19, 1991), held that a settlement o. Ca 91-370 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. a agreement entered in a lawsuit against the public hospital alleging that the hospital had swapped babies was a public record. The court held that the agreement was subject to disclosure despite a confidentiality provision contained within the agreement and claims by the hospital that it constituted work product. Cf. Bert Fish Foundation, Inc. v. Southeast Volusia Hospital District, no. 10-20801-Cins (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. December 22, 2010) (governing boards of hospital district and medical center violated the s unshine law when they held numerous closed meetings to discuss an affiliation or merger with a healthcare corporation). For information on exemptions applicable to public hospitals, please refer to a ndex. Cf. ago 14-10, noting that an ppendix D and the i exemption in s. 395.3035(5), F.s., for certain records and meetings relating to a “strategic plan” for operation of a hospital must be narrowly construed and would not apply to an evaluation conducted pursuant to s. 155.40(5), F.s., for purposes of the sale or lease of a public hospital. Private hospitals/private organizations operating public hospitals (2) a private organization leasing the facilities of a public hospital is acting on behalf of a public agency and thus constitutes an agency subject to open records requirements in the absence of statutory exemption. See Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corporation, 729 s o. 2d 373 (Fla. 1999). section 395.3036, F.s., however, provides that records of a private entity that leases a public hospital or other public health care facility are confidential and exempt from disclosure when the public lessor complies with the public finance accountability provisions of s. 155.40(18), F.s., with respect to the transfer of any public funds to the private lessee and when the private lessee meets at least three of five criteria set forth in the exemption. See Indian River County Hospital District v. Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., 766 s o. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCa 2000) (nonprofit corporation leasing hospital from hospital district). And see Baker County Press, Inc. v. Baker County Medical Services, i nc., 870 s o. 2d 189 (Fla. 1st DCa 2004), upholding the constitutionality of the exemption. Cf. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corporation, 927 so. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th DCa 2006) (private corporation that purchased hospital from public hospital authority not subject to Public r ecords a ct); and s. 155.40(21), F.s., describing and construing the term “complete sale” as applied to a purchase of a public hospital by a private entity. 88

106 government-in-the-sunshine-manual c. Patient and clinical records Patient and clinical records generally (1) Patient records are generally protected from disclosure. For example, patient records in hospitals and surgical facilities licensed under Ch. 395, F.s., are confidential and may not be disclosed without the consent of the patient, or the patient’s legal representative, except as ection 395.3025(4), (5), (7) and (8), F.s. And see s. 119.0712(1), F.s. provided in the statute. s (personal identifying information contained in records relating to an individual’s personal health or eligibility for health-related services held by the Department of h ealth); and s. 400.022(1)(m), F.s. (nursing home residents’ medical and personal records). Patient clinical records are also protected. See, e.g., s. 393.13(4)(i)1., F.s. (central client records of persons with developmental disabilities); s. 394.4615(1), F.s. (clinical records of persons subject to “The Baker a ct”); and s. 397.501(7), F.s. (individuals receiving services from substance abuse service providers). And see s. 397.6760(1), F.s. (petitions for involuntary assessment and stabilization and related court records filed with a court under Part v of Ch. 397, F.s.[substance abuse]). Cf. s. 381.987, F.s. (patient caregiver identifying information in the medical marijuana use registry). (2) Disclosure of patient records Patient medical records made by health care practitioners may not be furnished to any person other than the patient, his or her legal representative or other health care practitioners and providers involved in the patient’s care and treatment without written authorization, except as provided by ss. 440.13(4)(c) and 456.057, F.s. s ection 456.057(7)(a), F.s. See State v. Johnson, o. 2d 390 (Fla. 2002) (state attorney’s subpoena power under s. 27.04, F.s., cannot override 814 s notice requirements of s. 395.3025[4][d], F.s., which provides for disclosure of confidential patient records upon issuance of subpoena and upon proper notice to the patient or the patient’s Cf. legal representative). s. 408.051(3), F.s., permitting a health care provider to release or access an identifiable health record of a patient without the patient’s consent for use in the treatment of the patient for an emergency medical condition, as defined in s. 395.002(8), F.s., when the health care provider is unable to obtain the patient’s consent or the consent of the patient representative due to the patient’s condition or the nature of the situation requiring immediate medical attention. The recipient of patient records, if other than the patient or the patient’s representative, may use such information only for the purpose provided and may not disclose any information to any other person or entity, unless expressly permitted by the written consent of the patient. See ss. 395.3025(7) (hospital patient records) and 456.057(11), F.s. (health care practitioner patient records). Thus, predeath medical records in the possession of the medical examiner are not subject to public inspection. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. v. Wood, no. 97- 688Ci-07 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. February 27, 1997). similarly, clinical records maintain their confidentiality even when disclosed to another agency such as the clerk of the circuit court. ago 91-10. And see Sarasota Herald-Tribune v. Department of Children and Families, n o. 2001-Ca-002445 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. a pril 8, 2002) (confidentiality of clinical record is maintained even though Department of Children and Families may have filed portions of the records in court proceedings throughout the state; department has no authority to waive confidentiality of clinical records). Cf. ago 01-69 (documents submitted to the statewide provider and managed care organization claim dispute resolution program pursuant to s. 408.7057, F.s., found to be subject to disclosure after redaction of patient-identifying information). d. Emergency medical services With limited exceptions, s. 401.30(4), F.s., provides, in relevant part, that “[r]ecords of emergency calls which contain patient examination or treatment information are confidential and 89

107 government-in-the-sunshine-manual exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and may not be disclosed without the consent of the uch records may be released only in certain circumstances and person to whom they pertain.” s only to the persons and entities specified in the statute. ago 86-97. Thus, a city commissioner is not authorized to review records of an emergency call by the city’s fire-rescue department when those records contain patient examination and treatment information, except with the consent of the patient. ago 04-09. See Lee County v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 634 s o. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d DCa 1994), upholding the county’s right to require the patient’s notarized signature on all release forms, to ensure that these confidential records are not ago 09-30 (entire record of emergency call containing patient improperly released. And see examination and treatment information which is maintained as required by s. 401.30[1], F.s., is confidential and exempt; reports containing statistical data, required by the Department of health, are public records and must be made available for inspection and copying following redaction of any patient-identifying information). however, s. 401.30(4), is not violated by the city attorney, or an attorney under contract to the city, and other city officials having access to the city fire-rescue department’s records of emergency calls that contain patient information when such access is granted to such individuals in carrying out their official duties to advise and defend, or assess the liability of, the city in a possible or anticipated claim against the city arising out of the provision of such care. ago 95- 75. And see ago 08-20 (s. 401.30[4], F.s., permits emergency medical services transportation licensee to release records of emergency calls including patient’s name, address, and pertinent medical information to local law enforcement agency that does not provide regulatory or supervisory responsibility over licensee). e. Hospital employees section 395.3025(10), F.s., establishes that the home addresses, telephone numbers, and photographs of hospital or surgical center employees who provide direct patient care or security services, as well as specified information about the spouses and children of such employees, are confidential and exempt from disclosure requirements. The same information must also be held confidential by the facility upon written request by other employees who have a reasonable belief, based upon specific circumstances that have been reported in accordance with the procedure adopted by the facility, that release of the information may be used to threaten, intimidate, harass, ection inflict violence upon, or defraud the employee or any member of the employee’s family. s 395.3025(11), F.s. 14. Investigative records of non-law enforcement agencies a. Investigative records generally in the absence of a specific legislative exemption, investigative records made or received by public agencies are open to public inspection pursuant to Ch. 119, F.s. See State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 s o.2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCa 1977), cert. denied, 360 s o. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978) (report prepared by assistant city attorney for the city council concerning suspected irregularities in the city’s building department is a public record). See also Caswell v. Manhattan Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 399 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1968) (ordering that certain investigative records of the state insurance agency be produced for inspection under Ch. 119, F.s.). Accord ago 91-75 (documents containing information compiled by school board employees during an investigation of school district departments are open to inspection in the absence of statutory exemption); ago 85-79 (interoffice memoranda, correspondence, inspection reports of restaurants, grocery stores and other such public premises, nuisance complaint records, and notices of violation of public health laws maintained by county public health units are subject to disclosure in the absence of any statutory exemption); and ago 71-243 (inspection reports made or received by a school board in connection with its official investigation of the collapse of a school roof constitute public records). Cf. Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 s o. 2d 260 (Fla. unshine law applies to boards acting in a “quasi-judicial” capacity). 1973) (s 90

108 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Disclosure of records of investigative proceedings upon completion of a preliminary investigation is not violative of privacy rights arising under the state or federal Constitutions. See Garner v. Florida Commission on Ethics, so. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCa 1982), review denied, 415 424 s o. 2d 761 (Fla. 1983) (public’s right to view commission files prepared in connection with investigation of alleged violations of the Code of e thics outweighs an individual’s disclosural privacy rights). The investigative exemptions now found in paragraphs (2)(c) through (f ), (h) and (i) of s. 119.071(2), F.s., limit disclosure of specified law enforcement records, and thus do not apply to investigations conducted by agencies outside the criminal justice system. See Douglas v. Michel, 410 s o. 2d 936, 939 (Fla. 5th DCa 1982), questions answered and approved , 464 s o. 2d 545 (Fla. 1985) (exemption for “information revealing surveillance techniques or procedures or See personnel” [now found at s. 119.071(2)(d)] does not apply to a hospital’s personnel files). also ago 91-75, stating that the active criminal investigation and intelligence exemption does not apply to information compiled in a school board investigation into the conduct of certain school departments; and ago 87-51, concluding that complaints from state labor department employees relating to departmental integrity and efficiency do not constitute criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information. Thus, the contents of an investigative report compiled by the i nspector g eneral for a state agency in carrying out his or her duty to determine program compliance are not converted into criminal intelligence information merely because the Florida Department of law enforcement also conducts an investigation or because such report or a copy thereof has been transferred to the nf. o department. i ugust 5, 1993. p. to s lye, a b. Statutory exemptions a number of exemptions exist for investigative records. For a more complete listing, please refer to a ppendix D and the i ndex. (1) Discrimination investigations Complaints and other records in the custody of any agency which relate to a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status in connection with hiring practices, position classifications, salary, benefits, discipline, discharge, employee performance evaluation, or related activities are exempt from 119.07(1), F.s., until a probable cause finding is made, the investigation becomes inactive, or the complaint or other record is made part of the record of a hearing or court proceeding. section 119.071(2)(g)1., F.s. See ago 96-93 (prior to completion of an investigation and a finding of probable cause, records Cf. s. 119.071(2)(k), F.s., of a county equal opportunity board are exempt from disclosure). providing for confidentiality of complaints and investigative records of employee misconduct until the investigation is no longer active or has been concluded as set forth in the exemption. section 119.071(2)(g)1., F.s., was found to be inapplicable to a complaint filed against a county commissioner which listed many examples of alleged abusive behavior that would be inappropriate for one in the commissioner’s position, because the complaint did not assert any form of discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap or marital status. Schweickert v. Citrus County Florida Board, 193 s o. 3d 1075, 1080 (Fla. 5th DCa 2016). The appellate court also rejected the county’s argument that it could delay producing the complaint until after the investigation was completed because the investigator might have discovered or generated records during her investigation that could have related to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap or marital status which would have qualified for the exemption. section 119.071(2)(g)2., F.s., provides that when the alleged victim chooses not to file a complaint and requests that the records of the complaint remain confidential, all records ago 09- relating to an allegation of employment discrimination are confidential. But see 91

109 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 10, stating that when an agency has reached a settlement with an individual who has filed a discrimination complaint, the claimant is considered to have pursued the claim and may not request confidentiality pursuant to the exemption. Complaints and other records in the custody of any unit of local government which relate to a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, marital status, sale or rental of housing, the provision of brokerage services, or the financing of housing, are exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s., until a probable cause finding is made, the investigation becomes inactive, or the complaint or other record is made part of the record of any hearing or court proceeding. s ection 119.0713(1), F.s. Personal identifying information of the alleged victim in an allegation of sexual harassment is confidential and exempt. The information may be disclosed to another governmental entity in the furtherance of its official duties and responsibilities. s ection 119.071(2)(n), F.s. (2) Employee misconduct investigations For information about the exemption for complaints and active investigations of employee misconduct contained in s. 119.071(2)(k), F.s., please refer to the discussion on page 126. (3) Ethics investigations The complaint and records relating to the preliminary investigation conducted by the thics or other specified entities are confidential and exempt until the complaint Commission on e is dismissed as legally insufficient, the alleged violator requests in writing that the records be made public, or until the Commission or other listed entity determines whether probable cause exists to ection 112.324(2)(a) and (e), F.s. See also s. 112.3215(8) believe that a violation has occurred. s thics Commission (b) and (d), F.s. (providing confidentiality for certain records relating to e investigation of alleged violations of lobbying laws). however, a police report of an investigation of a public employee that has been concluded and is in the possession of the police department is not made confidential by the fact that the same issue and the same individual are the subject of an ethics complaint pursuant to Part iii, Ch. 112, F.s., or because a copy of the police report may be included in information obtained by the ethics Commission pursuant to its powers to investigate ethics complaints. ago 96-05. And see Gay v. City of Madeira Beach , ay 26, 2017) (city must permit no. 16-004836 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. m thics Commission and received by the inspection and copying of complaints filed with the e ttorney). Cf. s. 112.324(2)(b), F.s. (written referrals to the e thics Commission submitted City a pursuant to s. 112.324[1][b], F.s., records relating to such referrals held by the commission, the nforcement, or a state attorney, and records relating to any governor, the Department of law e preliminary investigation of such referrals held by the commission, are confidential and exempt except as provided in s. 112.324[2][e], F.s.) (4) Local government inspector general investigations The investigative report of the inspector general prepared for or on behalf of a unit of local government becomes a public record when the investigation becomes final. s ection 119.0713(2) (b), F.s. an investigation becomes final when the investigative report is presented to the unit of local government, as defined in the exemption. Id. Cf. Nicolai v. Baldwin, 715 s o. 2d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 5th DCa 1998), noting that a draft audit report prepared by the clerk of court did not become “final” when it was reviewed by the county administrator; the report became “final” and subject to disclosure when presented to the county commission. i nformation received, produced, or derived from an investigation is confidential and exempt until the investigation is complete or when the investigation is no longer active, as defined in the exemption. Id. (5) State inspector general investigations audit workpapers and reports of state agency inspectors general appointed in accordance 92

110 government-in-the-sunshine-manual with s. 20.055, F.s., are public records to the extent that they do not include information which ection 20.055(6)(b), F.s. has been made confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. s however, when the inspector general or a member of the staff receives from an individual a complaint or information that falls within the definition provided in s. 112.3187(5), F.s. [whistle- blower], the name or identity of the individual shall not be disclosed to anyone else without the written consent of the individual, unless the inspector general determines that such disclosure is Id. And see unavoidable during the course of the audit or investigation. page 126, discussing the exemption for complaints alleging employee misconduct found in s. 119.071(2)(k), F.s. section 112.31901(2), F.s., authorizes the g overnor, in the case of the Chief i nspector general, or agency head, in the case of an employee designated as the agency inspector general under s. 112.3189, F.s., to certify that an investigatory record of the Chief i nspector g eneral or an agency inspector general requires an exemption in order to protect the integrity of the f so investigation or avoid unwarranted damage to an individual’s good name or reputation. i certified, the investigatory records are exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s., until the investigation ceases to be active, or a report detailing the investigation is provided to the g overnor or the agency head, or 60 days from the inception of the investigation for which the record was made or received, whichever first occurs. section 112.31901(1), F.s. The provisions of this section do not apply to whistle-blower investigations conducted pursuant to the whistle-blower act. s ection 112.31901(3), F.s. (6) State licensing investigations Pursuant to s. 455.225(10), F.s., complaints against a licensed professional filed with the state licensing board or the Department of Business and Professional r egulation are confidential and exempt from disclosure until 10 days after probable cause has been found to exist by the probable cause panel of the licensing board or by the Department of Business and Professional regulation, or the professional waives his or her privilege of confidentiality, whichever occurs first. a similar exemption applies to complaints and investigations conducted by the Department ealth and licensing boards within that department as provided in s. 456.073(10), F.s. of h Complaints filed by a municipality against a licensed professional are included within the confidentiality provisions. ago 02-57. h owever, while the complaint filed by the municipality with the state licensing agency is exempt, the exemption afforded by the statute does not extend to other records held by the city related to the nature of the alleged offense by the licensed Id. professional. Whistle-blower investigations (7) (a) Whistle-blower identity The Whistle-blower’s a ct, ss. 112.3187-112.31895, F.s., “is intended to prevent agencies, or independent contractors of agencies, from taking retaliatory action against an employee who reports violations of law on the part of a public employer or an independent contractor.” ago 12- 20. i t provides, with limited exceptions, for the confidentiality of the identity of a whistle-blower who discloses in good faith to the Chief i nspector g eneral, an agency inspector general, a local chief executive officer, or other appropriate local official information that alleges that an employee or agent of an agency or independent contractor has violated or is suspected of having violated any federal, state, or local law, rule or regulation, thereby creating and presenting a substantial and specific danger to the public’s health, safety, or welfare; or has committed or is suspected of having committed an act of gross mismanagement, malfeasance, misfeasance, gross waste of public funds, or gross neglect of duty. s ection 112.3188(1), F.s. See also s. 20.055(6)(b), F.s. a complainant may waive the right to confidential treatment of his or her name or identity. ago 95-20. h owever, an individual may not be required to sign a waiver of confidentiality as a condition of processing a complaint. ago 96-40. 93

111 government-in-the-sunshine-manual in order to qualify as a whistle-blower complaint, particular information must be disclosed to an “appropriate local official” or other statutorily designated officials; a general complaint of wrongdoing or a complaint to officials other than those specifically named in s. 112.3188(1), ago F.s., does not entitle the complainant to whistle-blower protection. ago 98-37. And see 99-07 (county inspector general qualifies as an “appropriate local official” for purposes of the whistle-blower law); and ago 96-40 (town ethics commission may constitute “appropriate local official” for purposes of processing complaints under the whistle-blower law). ago 12-20 Cf. (while county transportation board may be designated as an “appropriate local official” under s. 112.3188, F.s., such designation “may not be advisable” because board must comply with the sunshine law and, “[a]bsent a statutory exemption, the handling of confidential information or records during the course of public meetings does not otherwise allow meetings of the board to be closed”). (b) Active investigations section 112.3188(2)(a), F.s., states that except as specifically authorized in s. 112.3189, nspector g F.s., all information received by the Chief i eneral or an agency inspector general or information produced or derived from fact-finding or other investigations conducted by the Florida Commission on h elations or the Department of law e nforcement is confidential uman r and exempt if the information is being received or derived from allegations as set forth in s. 112.3188(1)(a) or (b), F.s., and an investigation is “active” as defined s. 112.3188(2)(c), F.s. “Thus, the act protects the identity of employees and persons who disclose information that can serve as the basis for a whistle-blower complaint, as well as information received in the course of a whistle-blower investigation.” ago 10-48. information received by an appropriate local official or local chief executive officer or produced or derived from fact-finding or investigations by local government pursuant to s. 112.3187(8)(b), F.s. [authorizing administrative procedures for handling whistle-blower complaints filed by local public employees] is confidential and exempt, provided that the information is being received or derived from allegations set forth in s. 112.3188(1) and an investigation is “active” as defined in the section. section 112.3188(2)(b), F.s. The exemption applies to records received by a municipality conducting an active investigation of a whistle- blower complaint, and is not limited to records received as part of an active investigation of owever, while the name a complaint of retaliation against a whistle-blower. ago 98-37. h or identity of the individual disclosing this information is confidential, the initial report of wrongdoing received by a municipality is not covered by the exemption since that information Id. was received before an investigation began. But see s. 119.071(2)(k), F.s. (2013), providing that complaints alleging “employee misconduct” are confidential until the investigation is no longer active or has concluded as provided in the exemption. The exemption applies whether the allegations of wrongdoing were received from an anonymous source or a named individual; in either case information received or generated during the course of the investigation is subject to the exemption. ago 99-07. And see ago 10-48 (confidential information received by the county’s inspector general pursuant to the county’s whistle-blower act may be shared with the county’s ethics commission only for the purpose of carrying out the commission’s whistle-blower functions). 15. Law enforcement records a. Arrest and crime reports and the exemption for active criminal investigative and active criminal intelligence information (1) Arrest and crime reports arrest and crime reports are generally considered to be open to public inspection. ago s 91-74 and 80-96. And see ago 08-23 (officer trip sheets revealing identity of officer, location and hours of work and locations to which officers have responded for emergency and non- emergency purposes are public records); and ago 12-07, discussing requirements for recording 94

112 government-in-the-sunshine-manual telephone conversations set forth in Ch. 934, F.s., Florida’s security of Communications law, but noting that “any recordings of telephone conversations made by [a police department] in the usual course of business would be public records,” subject to the access and confidentiality ecords a ct. provisions of the Public r however, statutory exemptions for active criminal investigative and intelligence information, confessions, juvenile offender records and certain victim information may apply to crime reports and other law enforcement records. a discussion of these and other exemptions pertaining to law enforcement records follows; for additional information regarding exemptions, please refer to a ndex, infra. ppendix D and the i (2) Purpose and scope of exemption section 119.071(2)(c)1., F.s., exempts active criminal intelligence information and active criminal investigative information from public inspection. to be exempt, the information must be both “active” and constitute either “criminal investigative” or “criminal intelligence” information. See Woolling v. Lamar, 764 s o. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000), review denied, 786 s o. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2001). Thus, if a crime report contains active criminal investigative information, the criminal investigative information may be excised from the report. ago 91-74. See also Palm Beach Daily News v. Terlizzese, n o. Cl-91-3954-aF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. a pril 5, 1991), holding that a newspaper was not entitled under Ch. 119, F.s., to inspect the complete and uncensored incident report (prepared following a reported sexual battery but prior to the arrest of a suspect), including the investigating officer’s narrative report of the interview with the victim, since such information was exempt from inspection as active criminal investigative information and as information identifying sexual battery victims. See s. 119.071(2)(c) and (h), F.s. The active criminal investigative and intelligence exemption is limited in scope; its purpose is to prevent premature disclosure of information when such disclosure could impede an ongoing investigation or allow a suspect to avoid apprehension or escape detection. See Tribune Company v. Public Records, review denied sub nom., Gillum v. 493 s o. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. 2d DCa 1986), Tribune Company, 503 s o. 2d 327 (Fla. 1987). moreover, the active criminal investigative and intelligence information exemption does not the disclosure of the information by the criminal justice agency; the information is prohibit exempt from and not subject to the mandatory inspection requirements in s. 119.07(1), F.s., as the court stated in Williams v. City of Minneola, which would otherwise apply. o. 575 s 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 5th DCa), review denied, 589 s o. 2d 289 (Fla. 1991), “[t]here are many situations in which investigators have reasons for displaying information which they have the option not to display.” And see ago 90-50. Cf. s. 838.21, F.s., providing that it is unlawful for a public servant, with intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent a criminal investigation or a criminal prosecution, to disclose active criminal investigative or intelligence information or to disclose or use information regarding either the efforts to secure or the issuance of a warrant, subpoena, or other court process or court order relating to a criminal investigation or criminal prosecution when such information is not available to the general public and is gained by reason of the public servant’s official position. The law enforcement agency asserting the exemption has the burden of proving that it is entitled to it. Christy v. Palm Beach County Sheriff ‘s Office, 698 s o. 2d 1365 (Fla. 4th DCa 1997); and Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Dempsey, 478 s o. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCa 1985). (3) Definition of active criminal investigative or intelligence information “Criminal intelligence information” means information concerning “an identifiable person or group of persons collected by a criminal justice agency in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or ection 119.011(3)(a), F.s. monitor possible criminal activity.” s 95

113 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Criminal intelligence information is considered “active” as long “as it is related to intelligence gathering conducted with a reasonable, good faith belief that it will lead to detection of ongoing or reasonably anticipated criminal activities” or “is directly related to pending prosecutions or appeals.” s ection 119.011(3)(d), F.s. “Criminal investigative information” is defined as information relating to “an identifiable person or group of persons compiled by a criminal justice agency in the course of conducting a criminal investigation of a specific act or omission, including, but not limited to, information derived from laboratory tests, reports of investigators or informants, or any type of surveillance.” 380 s section 119.011(3)(b), F.s. See Rose v. D’Alessandro, o. 2d 419 (Fla. 1980) (complaints and affidavits received by a state attorney in the discharge of his investigatory duties constitute criminal intelligence or criminal investigative information). s imilarly, an autopsy report may See constitute criminal investigative information. ago 78-23. such information is considered “active” as long “as it is related to an ongoing investigation which is continuing with a reasonable, good faith anticipation of securing an arrest or prosecution in the foreseeable future” or “is directly related to pending prosecutions or appeals.” section 119.011(3)(d), F.s. “Criminal justice agency” is defined to mean any law enforcement agency, court, prosecutor or any other agency charged by law with criminal law enforcement duties or any agency having custody of criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information for the purpose of assisting such law enforcement agencies in the conduct of active criminal investigation or prosecution or for the purpose of litigating civil actions under the racketeer influenced and Corrupt o rganization a ct, during the time that such agencies are in possession of criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information pursuant to their criminal law enforcement duties. The term also includes the Department of Corrections. s ection 119.011(4), F.s. (4) not considered to be criminal investigative or intelligence Information that is information and must be released unless some other exemption applies section 119.011(3)(c), F.s., states that the following information is not criminal investigative or criminal intelligence information: The time, date, location and nature of a reported crime; 1. The name, sex, age, and address of a person arrested (but see pages 106-109 regarding 2. confidentiality of certain juvenile crime records) or the name, sex, age and address of the victim of a crime, except as provided in s. 119.071(2)(h), F.s. s ection 119.071(2)(h), F.s., provides confidentiality for information revealing the identity of a victim of a sexual offense, child abuse, or a child victim of human trafficking. For more information, please refer to the discussion of exemptions pertaining to certain crime victims found on pages 112-117. The time, date and location of the incident and of the arrest; 3. 4. The crime charged; 5. Documents given or required to be given to the person arrested, except as provided in s. 119.071(2)(h) or (m), F.s., unless the court finds that release of the information prior to trial would be defamatory to the good name of a victim or witness or jeopardize the safety of such victim or witness; and would impair the ability of the state attorney to locate or prosecute a codefendant; 6. i nformations and indictments except as provided in s. 905.26, F.s. [prohibiting disclosure of finding of indictment against a person not in custody, under recognizance or under arrest]. accordingly, since the above information does not fall within the definition of criminal intelligence or criminal investigative information, it is always subject to disclosure unless some 96

114 government-in-the-sunshine-manual other specific exemption applies. For example, the “time, date, and location of the incident and of the arrest” cannot be withheld from disclosure since such information is expressly exempted from the definitions of criminal intelligence and criminal investigative information. s. 119.011(3) See (c)3., F.s. See Barfield v. City of Tallahassee, 171 s o. 3d 239 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015) (while “active criminal investigative information” is exempt from public disclosure requirements, the statute expressly excludes the time, date, location, and nature of a reported crime from the exemption). Records released to the defendant (5) except in limited circumstances, records which have been given or are required to be given to the person arrested cannot be withheld from public inspection as criminal investigative ee s. 119.011(3)(c)5., F.s. i n other words, once the material has or intelligence information. s been made available to the defendant as part of the discovery process in a criminal proceeding, the material is ordinarily no longer considered to be exempt criminal investigative or criminal intelligence information. See, e.g., Staton v. McMillan , 597 s o. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992), review dismissed sub nom. , Staton v. Austin , 605 s o. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1992) (active criminal investigation exemption does not apply to information for which disclosure was previously Accord Tribune Company v. Public Records , 493 s o. 2d 480, required under the rules of discovery). 485 (Fla. 2d DCa 1986), review denied sub nom. , Gillum v. Tribune Company , 503 s o. 2d 327 (Fla. 1987) and Accord Times Publishing Company v. State , 903 s o. 2d 322, 325 (Fla. 2d DCa 2005). Cf. State v. Buenoano , 707 s o. 2d 714 (Fla. 1998) (restricted access documents provided to state attorney by federal government pursuant to a loan agreement retained their confidential status under a Florida law providing an exemption for out-of-state criminal investigative information that is shared with Florida criminal justice agencies on a confidential basis, even though the documents erroneously had been given to the defendant and placed in the court record). For example, in 407 s o. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCa 1981), review denied, Satz v. Blankenship, so. 2d 877 (Fla. 1982), the court ruled that a newspaper reporter was entitled to access 413 to tape recordings concerning a defendant in a criminal prosecution where the recordings had been disclosed to the defendant. The court concluded that a reading of the statute reflected the legislature’s belief that once the information was released to the defendant, there was no longer any need to exclude the information from the public. Thus, the tape recordings were no longer See also “criminal investigative information” that could be withheld from public inspection. n o. 96-2743-Ca-r WP (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct. a pril News-Press Publishing Co. Inc. v. D’Alessandro, 24, 1996) (once state allowed defense counsel to listen to portions of a surveillance audiotape involving a city councilman accused of soliciting undue compensation, those portions of the audiotape became excluded from the definition of “criminal investigative information,” and were subject to public inspection). Cf. City of Miami v. Post-Newsweek Stations Florida, Inc., 837 so. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCa 2002), review dismissed, 863 so. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2003) (where defendant filed request for discovery, but withdrew request before state attorney provided such materials, requested materials were not “given or required by law . . . to be given to the person arrested” and thus did not lose their exempt status as active criminal investigative information). similarly, in Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 476 s o. 2d 775 (Fla. 4th DCa 1985), review denied, 488 s o. 2d 67 (Fla. 1986), the court upheld a trial judge’s order requiring the state attorney to release to the news media all information furnished to the defense counsel in a criminal investigation. While the state attorney argued that the documents could be withheld because the criminal investigation was still “active” and thus exempt from disclosure, the court rejected this contention by concluding that once the material was given to the defendant pursuant to the rules of criminal procedure, the material was excluded from the statutory definition of criminal investigative information. Therefore, it was no longer relevant whether the investigation was active or not and the documents could not be withheld as active criminal investigative information. Id. at 779n.1. Chapter 119’s requirement of public disclosure of records made available to the defendant does not violate the attorney disciplinary rule prohibiting extrajudicial comments about 97

115 government-in-the-sunshine-manual defendants as long as the state attorney does not put an interpretation on the record that prejudices Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 476 s the defendant or exposes witnesses. o. 2d at 780. The only circumstances where criminal intelligence or investigative information can retain that status even though it has been made available to the defendant are: 1) f the information would reveal identifying information of a victim of a sexual offense, i child abuse, or certain human trafficking crimes pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(h), F.s.; or identifying information of a witness to a homicide for a specified period as provided in s. 119.071(2)(m), F.s., or f a court order has been issued finding that release of the information prior to trial would: 2) i be defamatory to the good name of a victim or witness or jeopardize the safety of a a) victim or witness; and b) impair the ability of a state attorney to locate or prosecute a codefendant. in all other cases, material which has been made available to the defendant cannot be deemed criminal investigative or intelligence information and must be open to inspection unless e.g., some other exemption applies ( s. 119.071[2][e], F.s., exempting all information “revealing the substance of a confession” by a person arrested until there is a final disposition in the case); or the court orders closure of the material in accordance with its constitutional authority to take such measures as are necessary to obtain orderly proceedings and a fair trial or to protect constitutional privacy rights of third parties. See Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Lewis, o. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. McCrary, 520 s o. 2d 32 (Fla. 426 s Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida Inc. v. Doe, 612 s o. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992). And see Morris 1988); Communications Company LLC v. State, 844 s o. 2d 671, 673n.3 (Fla. 1st DCa 2003) (although documents turned over to the defendant during discovery are generally public records subject to disclosure under Ch. 119, the courts have authority to manage pretrial publicity to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights as described in Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Lewis, ); Times Publishing Co. v. State, o. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCa 2005) (while the criminal supra 903 s discovery rules authorize a nonparty to file a motion to restrict disclosure of discovery materials based on privacy considerations, where no such motion has been filed, the judge is not authorized Cf. Rameses, Inc. v. Demings, 29 so. 3d 418, to prevent public access on his or her own initiative). 423 (Fla. 5th DCa 2010) (“disclosure to criminal defendant during discovery of unredacted versions of undercover police surveillance recordings does not destroy, in a public records context, the exemptions contained in section 119.071 for information relating to the identity of undercover law enforcement personnel”). (6) Active versus inactive criminal investigative or intelligence information (a) Active criminal investigative information Criminal investigative information is considered active (and, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to s. 119.071[2][c], F.s.) “as long as it is related to an ongoing investigation which is continuing with a reasonable, good faith anticipation of securing an arrest or prosecution in the foreseeable future.” s ection 119.011(3)(d)2., F.s. i nformation in cases barred from prosecution by a statute of limitation is not active. Id. The definition of “active” requires “a showing in each particular case that an arrest or prosecution is reasonably anticipated in the foreseeable future.” Barfield v. City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department 639 s o. 2d 1012, 1016 (Fla. 4th DCa), review denied, 649 s o. 2d 869 (Fla. 1994). Thus, “once the investigations are concluded, if no charges are filed, the records would cease to be ‘active’ and thus subject to disclosure.” Id. at 1018. There is no fixed time limit for naming suspects or making arrests other than the applicable statute of limitations. See Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Dempsey, 478 s o. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCa 1985). The fact that investigators might not yet have decided upon a suspect does not 98

116 government-in-the-sunshine-manual necessarily imply that the investigation is inactive. at 1131. The legislature did not intend Id. that confidentiality be limited to investigations where the outcome and an arrest or prosecution was a certainty or even a probability. at Barfield v. City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department 1016-1017. Thus, an investigation will be deemed to be “active,” even though there is no immediate anticipation of an arrest, so long as the investigation is proceeding in good faith, and the state Barfield v. City of Fort attorney or grand jury will reach a determination in the foreseeable future. a ccordingly, a police department’s criminal investigation Lauderdale Police Department, supra. into a shooting incident involving its officers continued to be “active” even though pursuant to department policy, all police shooting cases were sent to the state attorney’s office for review by the grand jury and the department did not know if there would be an arrest in this particular case. Id. similarly, in News-Press Publishing Co., Inc. v. Sapp, 464 s o. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCa 1985), the court held that in view of an ongoing investigation by the state attorney and the convening of a grand jury in the very near future to consider a shooting incident by deputy sheriffs during an undercover drug transaction, documents consisting of the sheriff’s completed internal investigation of the incident constituted “active criminal investigative information” and were, therefore, exempt from disclosure. See also Wells v. Sarasota Herald Tribune Company, Inc., 546 s o. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCa 1989) (investigative files of the sheriff and state attorney were not inactive where an active prosecution began shortly after the trial judge determined that the investigation was inactive and ordered that the file be produced for public inspection). additionally, a circuit court held that a criminal investigative file involving an alleged 1988 sexual battery which had been inactive for three years, due in part to the death of the victim from unrelated causes, could be “reactivated” and removed from public view in 1992 when new developments prompted the police to reopen the case. The court found that it was irrelevant that the 1988 file could have been inspected prior to the current investigation; the important considerations were that the file apparently had not been viewed by the public during its “inactive” status and the file was now part of an active criminal investigation and therefore exempt from disclosure as active criminal investigative information. News-Press Publishing Co., Inc. v. McDougall, o. 92-1193Ca-WCm (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct. February 26, 1992). n in another case, however, the appellate court upheld a court order unsealing an arrest warrant affidavit upon a showing of good cause by the subject of the affidavit. The affidavit had been quashed and no formal charges were filed against the subject. The court held that the affidavit did not constitute active criminal investigative information because there was no reasonable, good faith anticipation that the subject would be arrested or prosecuted in the near future. i n addition, most of the information was already available to the subject through grand jury transcripts, the subject’s perjury trial, or by discovery. Metropolitan Dade County v. San 632 s o. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCa 1994). Pedro, , 24 m ed. And see Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Witt l. rptr. 2336, no. 95-06324 Ca Ce (13) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. m ay 21, 1996) (ordering that files in a 1981 unsolved murder be opened to the public because, despite recent reactivation of the investigation, the case had been dormant for many years and no arrest or prosecution had been initiated or was imminent). Active criminal intelligence information (b) in order to constitute exempt “active” criminal intelligence information, the information must “be of the type that will lead to the ‘detection of ongoing or reasonably anticipated criminal activities .’” Christy v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 698 s o. 2d 1365, 1367 (Fla. 4th DCa 1997), quoting s. 119.011(3)(d)1., F.s. See Barfield v. Orange County, Florida, no. Ci92-5913 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. a ugust 4, 1992) (denying a petition for writ of mandamus seeking access to gang intelligence files compiled by the sheriff’s office). See also ago 94-48 (information contained in the statewide integrated violent crime information system established by the Florida 99

117 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Department of law e nforcement constitutes active criminal intelligence information; even though some of the information may have come from closed investigations, the information is collected to “anticipate, prevent, and monitor criminal activity and to assist in the conduct of ongoing criminal investigations”). Christy v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, supra, the court ruled that By contrast, in records generated in connection with a criminal investigation conducted 13 years earlier did not constitute “active” criminal intelligence information. The court noted that the exemption “is not intended to prevent disclosure of criminal files forever on the mere possibility that other potential criminal defendants may learn something from the files.” Id. (c) Pending prosecutions or appeals Criminal intelligence and investigative information is also considered to be “active” while ection 119.011(3) such information is directly related to pending prosecutions or direct appeals. s (d), F.s. See News-Press Publishing Co., Inc. v. Sapp, supra ; and Tal-Mason v. Satz, 614 s o. 2d 1134 review denied, 624 s o. 2d 269 (Fla. 1993) (contents of prosecutorial case file (Fla. 4th DCa), must remain secret until the conclusion of defendant’s direct appeal). once the conviction and sentence have become final, criminal investigative information 562 s o. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 1990) See State v. Kokal, can no longer be considered to be “active.” and 34 s o. 3d 98 (Fla. 3rd DCa 2010). Accord Tribune Company v. Public Osario v. State, 493 s o. 2d 480, 483-484 (Fla. 2d DCa 1986), review denied sub nom., Gillum v. Tribune Records, 503 s o. 2d 327 (Fla. 1987) (actions for postconviction relief following affirmance of Company, the conviction on direct appeal are not pending appeals for purposes of s. 119.011[3][d]2., F.s. See also Christy v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, o. 2d 1365, 1367 (Fla. 4th DCa 1997) 698 s (the term “pending prosecutions or appeals” in s. 119.011[3][d], F.s., applies only to ongoing prosecutions or appeals which have not yet become final). moreover, the determination as to whether investigatory records related to pending only prosecutions or appeals are “active” is relevant to those records which constitute criminal intelligence or investigative information. i n other words, if records are excluded from the definition of criminal intelligence or investigative information, as in the case of records given or required to be given to the defendant under s. 119.011(3)(c)5., F.s., it is immaterial whether See Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 476 the investigation is active or inactive. so. 2d 775, 779n.1 (Fla. 4th DCa 1985), review denied, 488 s o. 2d 67 (Fla. 1986) (“s omething that is not criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information cannot be active criminal intelligence information or active criminal investigative information.”). Accord Staton v. McMillan, 597 s o. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992), r eview dismissed sub nom., Staton v. Austin, 605 so. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1992) (active criminal investigation exemption does not apply to information for which disclosure was previously required under discovery rules even though there is a pending direct appeal). (7) Criminal defendant’s public records request section 119.07(8), F.s., states that the public access rights set forth in s. 119.07, F.s., “are not intended to expand or limit the provisions of r ule 3.220, Florida r ules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the right and extent of discovery by the state or by a defendant in a criminal prosecution or in collateral postconviction proceedings.” Thus, a criminal defendant’s public records request for nonexempt law enforcement records relating to the defendant’s pending prosecution constitutes an election to participate in discovery and triggers a reciprocal discovery obligation. Henderson v. State, 745 s o. 2d 319 (Fla. 1999). (8) Disclosure of active criminal investigative information to the public it has been held that the criminal investigative exemption does not apply if the information o. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992), has already been made public. Staton v. McMillan, 597 s 100

118 government-in-the-sunshine-manual review dismissed sub nom., Staton v. Austin, o. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1992). See also Downs v. Austin, 605 s o. 2d 931, 935 (Fla. 1st DCa 1988) (once state has gone public with information which 522 s ecords a ct exemptions, could have been previously protected from disclosure under Public r Cf. State v. no further purpose is served by preventing full access to the desired information). Buenoano, o. 2d 714, 717 (Fla. 1998) (confidential documents furnished to a state attorney 707 s by the federal government remained exempt from public inspection even though the documents inadvertently had been given to the defendant and placed in the court record in violation of the conditions of the federal loan agreement. however, the voluntary disclosure of a non-public record does not automatically waive the exempt status of other documents. Arbelaez v. State, 775 s o. 2d 909, 918 (Fla. 2000). Accord Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. v. Wood, n o. 97-688Ci-07 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. February 27, 1997) (release of the autopsy report and the medical examiner’s public comments about the report did not mean that other records in the possession of the medical examiner relating to an active criminal investigation into the death were public; “[i]t is not unusual for law enforcement and criminal investigatory agencies to selectively release information relating to an ongoing criminal investigation in an effort to enlist public participation in solving a crime”). (9) Disclosure of active criminal investigative information to another criminal justice agency exempt active criminal investigative information may be shared with another criminal justice agency and retain its protected status; in “determining whether or not to compel disclosure of active criminal investigative or intelligence information, the primary focus must be on the statutory classification of the information sought rather than upon in whose hands the information rests.” City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, 642 s o. 2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCa 1994), review denied, 651 s o. 2d 1192 City of Riviera Beach (Fla. 1995). The court held that exempt records of the West Palm Beach police department’s active criminal investigation concerning a shooting incident involving a police officer from riviera Beach police department for use in a simultaneous riviera Beach could be furnished to the Accord administrative internal affairs investigation of the officer without losing their exempt status. 720 s o. 2d 203, 206 (Fla. 1998) (applicability of a particular exemption is determined Ragsdale v. State, by the document being withheld, not by the identity of the agency possessing the record). additionally, a police department may enter into a contract with a private company that compiles raw police data and then provides informational reports to law enforcement. The release of the exempt information to the corporation for this purpose would not cause such records to lose their exempt status. ago 96-36. however, while the courts have recognized that active criminal investigative information may be forwarded from one criminal justice agency to another without jeopardizing its exempt status, “[t]here is no statutory exemption from disclosure of an ‘ongoing federal prosecution.’” Woolling v. Lamar, 764 s o. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000), review denied, 786 s o. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2001). i n Woolling , the court held that a state attorney bore the burden of establishing that state attorney files in a case which were furnished to the federal government for nolle prossed prosecution of a defendant constituted active criminal investigative information; the fact that the federal government was actively prosecuting the case was not sufficient, standing alone, to justify imposition of the exemption. moreover, the exemption for active criminal intelligence and investigative information does not exempt other public records from disclosure simply because they are transferred to a law enforcement agency. See, e.g., Tribune Company v. Cannella, 438 s o. 2d 516, 523 (Fla. 2d DCa 1983), reversed on other grounds , 458 so. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom., Deperte v. Tribune Company, 105 s.Ct. 2315 (1985) (assistant state attorney could not withdraw public records from public scrutiny by asserting that he “compiled” the records simply because he subpoenaed them; thus, law enforcement personnel records compiled and maintained by the employing agency prior to a criminal investigation did not constitute criminal intelligence or 101

119 government-in-the-sunshine-manual criminal investigative information). n o. 92-5795 Civ 25 (Fla. And see New Times, Inc. v. Ross, arch 17, 1992) (papers in a closed civil forfeiture file which subsequently became 11th Cir. Ct. m part of a criminal investigation were open to inspection as the materials could not be considered criminal investigative information because the file was closed prior to the commencement of the criminal investigation). Thus, public records maintained and compiled by the office of the Capital Collateral representative cannot be transformed into active criminal investigative information by merely transferring the records to the Florida Department of law e nforcement (FDle). ago 88-25. inf. o p. to slye, august 5, 1993, concluding that the contents of an investigative report Accord compiled by a state agency inspector general in carrying out his or her duty to determine program compliance are not converted into criminal intelligence information merely because FDle also conducts an investigation or because such report or a copy thereof has been transferred to that department. 815 s o. And see Sun-Sentinel, Inc. v. Florida Department of Children and Families, 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCa 2002). similarly, in ago 92-78, the a eneral’s office concluded that otherwise ttorney g disclosable public records of a housing authority are not removed from public scrutiny merely because the records have been subpoenaed by and transferred to the state attorney’s office. i nf. op. to Theobald, november 16, 2006, stating that while an individual would be prohibited from obtaining records from the internal investigation file pursuant to s. 112.533(2), F.s., while the investigation is active, public records such as overtime slips created prior to the investigation and maintained in the law enforcement officer’s personnel file would not become confidential simply because copies of such records are being used in the investigation. however, the exemption for active criminal investigative information may not be subverted by making a public records request for all public records gathered by a law enforcement agency in the course of an ongoing investigation; to permit such requests would negate the purpose of the exemption. ago 01-75. in addition, a request made by a law enforcement agency to inspect or copy a public record that is in the custody of another agency and the custodian’s response to the request, and any information that would identify whether a law enforcement agency has requested or received that public record are exempt from disclosure requirements, during the period in which the information constitutes active criminal investigative or intelligence information. s ection 119.071(2)(c)2.a., F.s. The law enforcement agency that made the request must give notice to the custodial agency when the criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information is no longer active, so that the custodian’s response to the request and information that would identify the public record requested are available to the public. s ection 119.071(2) (c)2.b., F.s. Thus, while agency records are not exempt merely because they have been submitted to FDle, s. 119.071(2)(c)2.a., F.s., exempts FDle’s request to inspect or copy records, as well as the agency’s response, or any information that would identify the public record that was requested by FDle or provided by the agency during the period in which the information constitutes criminal intelligence or criminal investigative information that is active. ago 06-04. although a request may be made for the agency’s records, such a request may not be phrased, or responded to, in terms of a request for the specific documents asked for and received by FDle during the course of any active criminal investigation. Id. Cf. i nf. o p. to Theobald, n ovember 16, 2006, stating that while the records in a personnel department were subject to disclosure, the personnel department was precluded from identifying which of its records had been gathered by a law enforcement agency in the course of its active internal investigation. 102

120 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (10) Records containing both active criminal investigative information and non-exempt information The fact that a crime or incident report may contain some active criminal investigative or intelligence information does not mean that the entire report is exempt from disclosure. section 119.07(1)(d), F.s., requires the custodian of the document to redact only that portion of the record for which an exemption is asserted and to provide the remainder of the record for See, e.g., City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, 642 s o. 2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. inspection and copying. 4th DCa 1994), 651 s o. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1995), in which the court held that a city review denied, was authorized to withhold exempt active criminal investigative records but “must comply with the disclosure requirements of sections 119.07(2) [now s. 119.07(1)(d)] and 119.011(3)(c) by making partial disclosure of certain non-exempt information contained in the records including, inter alia , the date, time and location of the incident.” (11) Criminal investigative or intelligence information received from other states or the federal government Pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(b), F.s., criminal intelligence or investigative information received by a Florida criminal justice agency from a non-Florida criminal justice agency on a confidential or similarly restricted basis is exempt from disclosure. See State v. Wright, 803 so. 2d 793 (Fla. 4th DCa 2001), review denied, 823 so. 2d 125 (Fla. 2002) (state not required to disclose criminal histories of civilian witnesses which it obtained from the Federal Bureau of i nvestigation). The purpose of this statute is to “encourage cooperation between non-state and state criminal justice agencies.” State v. Buenoano, 707 s o. 2d 714, 717 (Fla. 1998). Thus, confidential documents furnished to a state attorney by the federal government remained exempt from public inspection even though the documents inadvertently had been given to the defendant Id. and placed in the court record in violation of the conditions of the federal loan agreement. (12) Criminal investigative or intelligence information received prior to January 25, 1979 Criminal intelligence or investigative information obtained by a criminal justice agency prior to January 25, 1979, is exempt from disclosure. s See Satz v. Gore ection 119.071(2)(a), F.s. Newspapers Company, 395 s o. 2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCa 1981) (“ all criminal intelligence and criminal investigative information received by a criminal justice agency prior to January 25, 1979, is specifically exempt from the requirements of public disclosure.”). “Baker Act” reports prepared by law enforcement officers b. Part i, Ch. 394, F.s., is the “Baker a ct,” Florida’s mental health act. The Baker a ct provides for the voluntary or involuntary examination and treatment of mentally ill persons. Pursuant to s. 394.463(2)(a)2., F.s., a law enforcement officer must take a person who appears to meet the statutory criteria for involuntary examination into custody and deliver that person, or have that person delivered, to the nearest receiving facility for examination. section 394.463(2)(a)2., F.s., requires the officer to “execute a written report detailing the circumstances under which the person was taken into custody, and the report shall be made a part a patient’s clinical record is confidential. section 394.4615(1), of the patient’s clinical record.” F.s. Thus, the report prepared by the officer pursuant to this statute is part of the patient’s clinical record and is confidential. Cf. Lake v. State, 193 s o. 3d 932 (Fla. 4th DCa 2016) (legislature has not made records of a sexually violent predator confidential in the same way as the clinical records of a Baker a ct patient). however, in ago 93-51, the a ttorney g eneral’s office advised that a separate written incident or event report prepared after a specific crime has been committed which contains information given during the initial reporting of the crime, is filed with the law enforcement agency as a record of that event, and is not made a part of the patient’s clinical record, is not confidential pursuant to Ch. 394, F.s. The opinion noted that the incident report in question was not the confidential law enforcement report required by s. 394.463(2)(a)2., but was a separate 103

121 government-in-the-sunshine-manual written incident or event report prepared by a deputy sheriff for filing with the sheriff’s office as an independent record of the deputy’s actions. Body camera recordings c. a body camera recording is confidential and exempt from public disclosure when taken inside a private residence, inside a health care, mental health care, or social services facility, or in a place that a reasonable person would expect to be private. s ection 119.071(2)(l)2., F.s. The term “body camera” is defined to mean a “portable electronic recording device that is worn on a law enforcement officer’s body and that records audio and video data in the course of the officer performing his or her official duties and responsibilities.” s ection 119.071(2)(l)1.a., F.s. a law enforcement agency may disclose the recording in furtherance of its official duties and responsibilities or to another governmental agency in furtherance of that agency’s duties and responsibilities. s ection 119.071(2)(l)3., F.s. The recording must be disclosed to certain individuals as set forth in the statute, including the person recorded, or pursuant to court order. s ection 119.071(2)(l)4., F.s. And s. 943.1718(2)(d), F.s. h owever, the exemption does not supersede any other public records see exemption that existed before or is created after the effective date of the exemption. Those portions of a recording which are protected from disclosure by another public records exemption ection 119.071(2)(l)7., F.s. shall continue to be exempt or confidential and exempt. s a law enforcement agency must retain a body camera recording for at least 90 days. section 119.071(2)(l)5., F.s. The exemption applies retroactively. s ection 119.071(2)(l)6., F.s. d. Confessions section 119.071(2)(e), F.s., exempts from disclosure any information revealing the substance of a confession by a person arrested until such time as the case is finally determined by See Times Publishing Co. v. Patterson, 451 s o. adjudication, dismissal, or other final disposition. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCa 1984) (trial court order permitting state attorney or defendant to designate affidavits, depositions or other papers which contained “statements or substance of statements” to be sealed was overbroad because the order was not limited to those statements revealing the substance of a “confession”). in ago 84-33, the a ttorney g eneral’s office advised that only such portions of the complaint and arrest report in a criminal case file which reveal the “substance of a confession,” i.e. , the material parts of a statement made by a person charged with the commission of a crime in which that person acknowledges guilt of the essential elements of the act or acts constituting the entire criminal offense, are exempt from public disclosure. But see Times Publishing Company 827 s v. State, o. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 2d DCa 2002), in which the appellate court held that a trial judge’s order sealing portions of records of police interviews with the defendant did not constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law; however, portions of the interview transcript and tape which did not “directly relate to [the defendant’s] participation in the crimes” did not contain the substance of a confession pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(e), F.s., and must be released. e. Confidential informants section 119.071(2)(f ), F.s., exempts information disclosing the identity of confidential informants or sources. This exemption applies regardless of whether the informants or sources Christy v. Palm are still active or may have, through other sources, been identified as such. Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 698 s o. 2d 1365, 1368 (Fla. 4th DCa 1997); Salcines v. Tampa Television, 454 s o. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCa 1984); and Rameses, Inc. v. Demings, 29 s o. 3d 418 (Fla. 5th DCa 2010). And see State v. Natson, 661 s o. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995) (private citizen who provided police with tip information which led to defendant’s arrest may be afforded o. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCa 2005) (where confidential informant status). Cf. Doe v. State , 901 s 104

122 government-in-the-sunshine-manual citizen provided information to state attorney’s office which led to a criminal investigation and was justified in inferring or had a reasonable expectation that he would be treated as a confidential source, the citizen is entitled to have his identifying information redacted from the closed file, State even though there was no express assurance of confidentiality by the state attorney’s office); v. Bartholomew, n o. 08-5656CF10a (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., a ugust 7, 2009) (even if Crimestoppers Council of Broward County were an agency for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s., information relating to the identity of informants and persons from whom they received information would be confidential under s. 119.071[2][f ], F.s.). however, in Ocala Star Banner Corporation v. McGhee, 643 s o. 2d 1196 (Fla. 5th DCa 1994), the court held that a police department should not have refused to release an entire police report on the ground that the report contained some information identifying a confidential informant. a ccording to the court, “[w]ithout much difficulty the name of the informant, [and] the sex of the informant (which might assist in determining the identity) . . . can be taken out of the report and the remainder turned over to [the newspaper].” at 1197. Accord Christy v. Id. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 698 s o. 2d at 1368. And see Holley v. Bradford County Sheriff’s Department, 171 so. 3d 805 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015) (trial court must conduct an in camera inspection of the records to determine whether they could be redacted to remove information identifying confidential informants). Cf. Althouse v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 92 so. 3d 899 (Fla. 4th DCa 2012), disapproved on other grounds , Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & o. 3d 120 (Fla. 2016) (agency conceded that its initial response Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, 189 s denying public records request for “rules, regulations, operating procedures and policies regarding the recruitment and use of confidential informants” was “incorrect”; records were subsequently produced after portions were redacted pursuant to s. 119.071[2][d], F.s.). moreover, in 719 s o. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 2d City of St. Petersburg v. Romine ex rel. Dillinger, DCa 1998), the court ruled that information regarding payments to a confidential informant (who had been previously identified as a confidential informant during a criminal trial) is subject to disclosure as long as the records are sufficiently redacted to conceal the specific cases on which ecords a ct may not be used the informant worked. The court acknowledged that the Public r in such a way as to obtain information that the legislature has declared must be exempt from disclosure, but said that “this is not a situation where someone has alleged that they know or suspect the identity of a confidential informant and the production of records involving that informant would confirm the person’s information or suspicion.” Id. f. Criminal history information (1) Criminal history information generally except where specific exemptions apply, criminal history information is a public record. ago 77-125; i p. to l ymn, June 1, 1990. And see ago 97-09 (a law enforcement agency nf. o may, without a request, release nonexempt information contained in its public records relating to sexual offenders; the agency’s authority to release such information is not limited to those offenders who are designated as “sexual predators”). section 943.046, F.s., states: (1) any state or local law enforcement agency may release to the public any criminal history information and other information regarding a criminal offender, including, but not limited to, public notification by the agency of the information, unless the information is confidential and exempt [from disclosure]. h owever, this section does not contravene any provision of s. 943.053 which relates to the method by which an agency or individual may obtain a copy of an offender’s criminal history record. (2) a state or local law enforcement agency and its personnel are immune from civil liability for the release of criminal history information or other information regarding a criminal offender, as provided by this section. 105

123 government-in-the-sunshine-manual section 943.053(2), F.s., referenced in the above statute, provides restrictions on the federal criminal justice information dissemination of criminal justice information obtained from systems and other states by stating that such information shall not be disseminated in a manner inconsistent with the laws, regulations, or rules of the originating agency. Thus, criminal history record information shared with a public school district by the Federal Bureau of i nvestigation retains its character as a federal record to which only limited access is provided by federal law and is not subject to public inspection. ago 99-01. section 943.053(3)(a), F.s., states that criminal history information compiled by the nforcement from Criminal Justice i nformation Program of the Florida Department of law e intrastate sources shall be provided to law enforcement agencies free of charge and to persons in And see the private sector upon payment of fees as provided in the subsection. pages 108-109 relating to dissemination of criminal history information relating to juveniles. Sealed and expunged records (2) access to criminal history records sealed or expunged by court order in accordance with s. 943.059 or s. 943.0585, F.s., is strictly limited. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Reno, 587 s o. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d DCa 1991) (g oderich, J., specially concurring) (state attorney report and any other information revealing the existence or contents of sealed records is not a public record and cannot, under any circumstances, be disclosed to the public). a law enforcement agency that has been ordered to expunge criminal history information or records should physically destroy or obliterate information consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrest, detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal charges and the disposition of those charges. ago 02-68. h owever, criminal intelligence information and criminal investigative information do not fall within the purview of s. 943.0585, F.s. Id. ago 00-16 (only those records maintained to formalize the petitioner’s arrest, detention, And see indictment, information, or other formal criminal charge and the disposition thereof would be subject to expungement under s. 943.0585). There are exceptions allowing disclosure of information relating to the existence of an expunged criminal history record to specified entities for their respective licensing and employment purposes, and to criminal justice agencies for their respective criminal justice purposes. s ection 943.0585(4), F.s. s imilar provisions exist relative to disclosure of sealed criminal history records. section 943.059(4), F.s. And see s. 943.0583(10)(a), F.s. (expunged criminal history record of human trafficking victim). a records custodian who has received information relating to the existence of an expunged or sealed criminal history record is prohibited from disclosing the existence of such record. ago 94-49. g. Fingerprint records Biometric identification information is exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. s ection 119.071(5) (g), F.s. The term “biometric identification information” means any record of friction ridge detail, fingerprints, palm prints, and footprints. Id. h. Forensic behavioral health evaluations a forensic behavioral health evaluation filed with the court pursuant to Ch. 916, F.s. (mentally deficient and mentally ill defendants) is confidential and exempt. s ection 916.1065(1), F.s. i. Juvenile offender records (1) Confidentiality and authorized disclosure Juvenile offender records traditionally have been considered confidential and treated differently from other records in the criminal justice system. With limited exceptions, s. 106

124 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 985.04(1)(a), F.s., provides, in relevant part, that: except as provided in subsections (2), (3), (6), and (7) and s. 943.053, in the all information obtained under this chapter discharge of official duty by any judge, any employee of the court, any authorized agent of the department [of Juvenile Justice], the Florida Commission on offender r eview, the Department of Corrections, the juvenile justice circuit boards, any law enforcement agent, or any licensed professional or licensed community agency representative participating in the assessment or treatment of a juvenile is confidential and exempt [from public disclosure]. This exemption applies to information obtained before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. (e.s). section 985.04(1)(b), F.s., states that the confidential and exempt information may be disclosed only to the authorized personnel of the court, the department and its designees, the Department of Corrections, the Florida Commission on offender r eview, law enforcement agents, school superintendents and their designees, any licensed professional or licensed community agency representative participating in the assessment or treatment of a juvenile, and others entitled under this chapter to receive that information, or upon court order. Cf. ago 96-65 (subject of juvenile offense records may authorize access to such records to others [such as a potential employer] by means of a release). similarly, s. 985.04(7)(a), F.s., limits access to records in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice. With the exception of specified persons and agencies, juvenile records in the custody of that agency “may be inspected only upon order of the s ecretary of Juvenile Justice or his or her authorized agent by persons who have sufficient reason and upon such conditions for their use and disposition as the secretary or his or her authorized agent deems proper.” i f a juvenile prosecuted as an adult is transferred to serve his or her sentence in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice, the department’s records relating to that juvenile are not open to o. 03-46- public inspection. New York Times Company v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice , n Ca, 2003 Wl 22723464 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. m arch 20, 2003). See, e.g. nf. o p. Thus, as a general rule, access to records of juvenile offenders is limited. , i to g albraith, a pril 8, 1992 (city’s risk manager and attorney representing city in unrelated civil nf. o lawsuit not among those authorized to have access); and i pril 7, 1992 p. to Wierzbicki, a (domestic violence center not among those authorized to receive juvenile information). And see ago 07-19 (confidentiality provisions preclude public release of the names and addresses of the parents of juvenile arrested for a misdemeanor). And see s. 985.045(2), F.s., providing, with limited exceptions, for confidentiality of juvenile court records. Cf. ago 97-28 (juvenile confidentiality requirements do not apply to court records of a case in which a juvenile is prosecuted as an adult, regardless of the sanctions ultimately imposed in the case). Confidential photographs of juveniles taken in accordance with s. 985.11, F.s, “may be shown by a law enforcement officer to any victim or witness of a crime for the purpose of identifying the person who committed such crime.” s ection 985.11(1)(b), F.s. This statute authorizes a law enforcement officer to use photographs of juvenile offenders in a photographic lineup for the purpose of identifying the perpetrator of a crime, regardless of whether those juvenile offenders are suspects in the crime under investigation. ago 96-80. Cf. Barfield v. Orange County, Florida , n o. Ci92-5913 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. a ugust 4, 1992) (denying petitioner’s request to inspect gang intelligence files compiled by the sheriff’s office). (2) Exceptions to confidentiality (a) Child traffic violators all records of child traffic violations shall be kept in the full name of the violator and shall 107

125 government-in-the-sunshine-manual be open to inspection and publication in the same manner as adult traffic violations. s ection 985.11(3), F.s. (b) Felony arrests and adult system transfers until o ctober 1, 1994, law enforcement agencies generally could release only the name and address of juveniles 16 and older who had been charged with or convicted of certain crimes. in 1994, the juvenile confidentiality laws were modified to eliminate the age restriction and provide enhanced disclosure. s ection 985.04(2), F.s., was amended again in 2016 and now provides: notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, the name, photograph, address, and crime or arrest report of a child: (a) t aken into custody by a law enforcement officer for a violation of law which, if committed by an adult, would be a felony; (b) Charged with a violation of law which, if committed by an adult, would be a felony; Found to have committed an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be a (c) felony; or ransferred to adult court pursuant to part X of Chapter 985, are not considered (d) t confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) solely because of the child’s age. ttorney g The a eneral’s office has stated that the expanded disclosure provisions originally enacted in 1994 apply only to juvenile records created after o ctober 1, 1994, the effective date of the 1994 amendments to the juvenile confidentiality laws. ago 95-19. Confidential information on juveniles arrested prior to o ctober 1, 1994, is available by court order upon a showing of good cause. Id. See G.G. v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 97 s o. 3d 268, 274 (Fla. 1st DCa 2012) (“it is clear that only the arrest records of those juveniles who the legislature has designated in section 985.04[2] have lost their confidential status and are available See also pages 108-109, discussing the dissemination of criminal history to the public . . . .”). information relating to juveniles. a public records custodian may choose not to electronically publish on the custodian’s website the arrest or booking photographs of a child which are not confidential and exempt under this section or otherwise restricted from publication by law; however, this subparagraph does not restrict public access to records as provided by s. 119.07, F.s. s ection 985.04(2)(a)2., F.s. (c) Mandatory notification to schools section 985.04(4)(b), F.s., provides that when the state attorney charges a juvenile with a felony or a delinquent act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the state attorney must notify the superintendent of the juvenile’s school that the juvenile has been charged with such felony or delinquent act. a similar directive applies to a law enforcement agency that takes a juvenile into custody for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult, or a crime of violence. s ection 985.04(4)(a), F.s. And see s. 1006.08(2), F.s. (notification by court to school superintendent); and s. 985.04(4)(c), F.s. (notification by school superintendent to certain school personnel). Cf. s. 985.04(4)(d), F.s. (notification by Department of Juvenile Justice of the presence of a juvenile sex offender in the care and custody or under the jurisdiction and supervision of the department). (d) Criminal history information relating to juveniles section 943.053(3)(c)1., F.s., provides that criminal history information relating to juveniles, including information that is confidential pursuant to s. 943.053(3)(b), F.s., shall be available to: 108

126 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (a) a criminal justice agency for criminal justice purposes on a priority basis and free of charge; The person to whom the record relates, or his or her attorney; (b) (c) The parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the person to whom the record relates, provided such person has not reached the age of majority, been emancipated by a court, or been legally married; or (d) an agency or entity specified in s. 943.0585(4) or s. 943.059(4), F.s., for the purpose specified therein, and any person within such agency or entity who has direct responsibility for employment, access authorization, or licensure decisions. (e) Victim access section 985.036(1), F.s., allows the victim, the victim’s parent or guardian, their lawful representatives, and, in a homicide case, the next of kin, to have access to information and proceedings in a juvenile case, provided that such rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the juvenile offender. Those entitled to access “may not reveal to any outside party any confidential information obtained under this subsection regarding a case involving a juvenile offense, except as is reasonably necessary to pursue legal remedies.” Id. And see s. 960.001(8), F.s., authorizing similar disclosures to victims. in addition, s. 985.04(3), F.s., states that a “law enforcement agency may release a copy of the juvenile offense report to the victim of the offense.” Cf. Harvard v. Village of Palm Springs, 98 so. 3d 645 (Fla. 4th DCa 2012), noting that the authorization in s. 985.04(3), F.s., is permissive not mandatory; thus, a local government was not required to produce a juvenile offense report to the victim’s mother. j. Motor vehicle records (1) Automated license plate recognition system records images and data containing or providing personal identifying information obtained through use of an automated license plate recognition system are confidential and exempt. section 316.0777, F.s. (2) Crash reports motor vehicle crash reports are confidential for a period of 60 days after the report is filed. s owever, such reports may be made immediately available ection 316.066(2)(a), F.s. h to the parties involved in the crash, their legal representatives, their insurance companies and agents, prosecutorial authorities, law enforcement agencies, the Department of transportation, county traffic operations, victim services programs, and certain print and broadcast media as described in the exemption. s ection 316.066(2)(b), F.s. n evertheless, certain “free newspapers of general circulation,” as specified in the exemption, may not have access to the home, cellular, employment, or other telephone number or the home or employment address of any of the parties involved with the crash if the newspaper requests ten or more crash reports within a 24 hour period before the 60 day period has ended. s ection 316.066(2)(f ), F.s. The owner of a vehicle involved in a crash is among those authorized to receive a copy of the crash report immediately. ago 01-59. i n addition, the statute provides that any local, state, or federal agency that is authorized to have access to crash reports by any provision of law shall be granted such access in the furtherance of the agency’s statutory duties. s ection 316.066(2)(c), F.s. Cf. ago 06-11 (fire department that is requesting crash reports in order to seek reimbursement from the at-fault driver does not fall within the scope of this provision authorizing immediate access to the reports). “as a condition precedent to accessing a crash report within 60 days after the date the report is filed, a person must present a valid driver’s license or other photographic identification, proof 109

127 government-in-the-sunshine-manual of status or identification that demonstrates his or her qualifications to access that information, and file a written sworn statement with the state or local agency in possession of the information stating that information from a crash report made confidential and exempt by this section will not be used for any commercial solicitation of accident victims, or knowingly disclosed to any third party for the purpose of such solicitation, during the period of time that the information ection 316.066(2)(d), F.s. remains confidential and exempt.” s The written statement must be completed and sworn to by the requesting party for each individual crash report that is being requested within 60 days after the report is filed. Id. r eports may be released without the sworn statement to third-party vendors under contract with one or more insurers, but only if the conditions set forth in the statute are stated in the contract. Id. Third-degree felony penalties are established for knowing unauthorized disclosure or use of confidential information in violation of this statute. See s. 316.066(3)(b), (c), and (d), F.s., for more information. (3) Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles motor vehicle records section 119.0712(2)(b), F.s., provides that personal information, including highly restricted personal information as defined in 18 u.s.C. s. 2725, contained in a motor vehicle record is confidential pursuant to the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection a ct of 1994, 18 u.s.C. et seq a). s uch information may be released only as authorized by that act. The ss. 2721 (DPP term “motor vehicle record” is defined to mean any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by ighway s the Department of h otor vehicles (Dhsmv ). s ection 119.0712(2)(a), F.s. afety and m And see s. 119.0712(2)(c)1. and 2., F.s., providing that emergency contact information contained in a motor vehicle record is confidential. e-mail addresses collected by Dhsmv pursuant to cited statutes [motor vehicle record and driver license transactions] are exempt from public disclosure requirements. s ection 119.0712(2) (d), F.s. (4) Law enforcement agency records The attorney general’s office has stated that while Dhsmv motor vehicle records are confidential in the hands of a law enforcement agency, to the extent information is taken from Dhsmv records and used in preparing other records of the law enforcement agency or its agent, the confidentiality requirements of s. 119.0712(2)(b), F.s., do not reach those records created by subsequent users. Thus, a driver’s license number that is included in a law enforcement officer’s report is not confidential or exempt from disclosure and copying. ago 10-10. similarly, DPP a does not prohibit a city from disclosing to a newspaper, in response to a public-records request, the violation notices the city sent to vehicle owners based on images captured by red-light cameras. City of Tallahassee v. Federated Publications, Inc., n o. 4:11cv395- rh/Cas (n.D. Fla. a ugust 9, 2012). Cf. s. 316.0777, F.s. (2014). k. Pawnbroker records all records relating to pawnbroker transactions delivered to appropriate law enforcement officials pursuant s. 539.001, F.s., the Florida Pawnbroking a ct, are confidential and exempt from disclosure and may be used only for official law enforcement purposes. s ection 539.003, F.s. h owever, law enforcement officials are not prohibited from disclosing the name and address of the pawnbroker, the name and address of the conveying customer, or a description of the pawned property to the alleged owner of pawned property. Id. And see ago 01-51. l. Polygraph records The a ttorney g eneral’s office is not aware of any statutory provision barring access to See, otherwise public records, simply because the records are in the form of polygraph charts. 110

128 government-in-the-sunshine-manual e.g., Wisner v. City of Tampa Police Department, so. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d DCa 1992) (polygraph 601 materials resulting from polygraph examination that citizen took in connection with a closed internal affairs investigation were public records); and 522 so. 2d 931 (Fla. Downs v. Austin, 1st DCa 1988) (because state had already publicly disclosed the results of polygraph tests administered to defendant’s accomplice, the tests were not exempt criminal investigative or intelligence information and were subject to disclosure to the defendant). however, the s. 119.071(1)(a), F.s., exemption for questions and answers used in employment examinations applies to questions and answers contained in pre-employment Rush v. High Springs, 82 s o. 3d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCa 2012). This polygraph examinations. exemption applies to examination questions and answers but does not include the “impressions and grading of the responses” by the examiners. See Dickerson v. Hayes, 543 s o. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1st DCa 1989). See also Gillum v. Times Publishing Company, n o. 91-2689-Ca (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. July 10, 1991) (newspaper entitled to access to employment polygraph records “to the extent such records consist of polygraph machine graph strips and examiners’ test results, including the bottom portion of the machine graph denoted ‘Findings and Comments’ or similar designation”; however, agency could redact “any examinee’s actual answers to questions or summaries thereof ”). m. Prison and inmate records in the absence of statutory exemption, prison and inmate records are subject to disclosure under the Public r ecords a ct. Cf. Williams v. State , 741 s o. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d DCa 1999) (order imposing offender’s habitual offender sentence and documents showing his qualifying convictions, subject to disclosure under Ch. 119). subject to limited exceptions, s. 945.10, F.s., states that the following records and information held by the Department of Corrections are confidential and exempt from public inspection: mental health, medical (including hiv tests) or substance abuse records of inmates or offenders; preplea, pretrial intervention, presentence or postsentence investigative records; information regarding a person in the federal witness protection program; confidential or exempt Parole Commission records; information which if released would jeopardize someone’s safety; information concerning a victim’s statement and identity; information which identifies an executioner; and records that are otherwise confidential or exempt by law. See Correll v. State , o. 3d 478 (Fla. 2015), in which the Court summarized prior precedent upholding the 184 s constitutionality of s. 945.10, F.s., and again rejected claims that an inmate has the right to know See also Roberts v. Singletary, n o. 96-603 (Fla. 2d Cir. the identity of execution team members. xecution Procedures m anual Ct. July 28, 1997) (portions of the Department of Corrections e Cf. s. 951.27, containing “highly sensitive security information” not subject to disclosure). F.s. (limited disclosure of infectious disease test results, including hiv testing pursuant to s. 775.0877, F.s., of inmates in county and municipal detention facilities). The Public r ecords a ct applies to a private corporation which has contracted to operate and maintain the county jail. Times Publishing Company v. Corrections Corporation of America, no. 91-429 Ca 01 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. December 4, 1991), 611 s o. 2d 532 per curiam affirmed, (Fla. 5th DCa 1993). See also Prison Health Services, Inc. v. Lakeland Ledger Publishing Company, 718 s o. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d DCa 1998), review denied, 727 s o. 2d 909 (Fla. 1999) (records of private company under contract with sheriff to provide health care to jail inmates are subject to Ch. 119 just as if they were maintained by a public agency). n. Resource inventories and emergency response plans section 119.071(2)(d), F.s., exempts “[a]ny comprehensive inventory of state and local law enforcement resources compiled pursuant to part i, chapter 23, and any comprehensive policies or plans compiled by a criminal justice agency pertaining to the mobilization, deployment, or tactical operations involved in responding to emergencies, as defined in s. 252.34 . . . .” See o. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d DCa 2005), in Timoney v. City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel, 917 s 111

129 government-in-the-sunshine-manual which the court held that a city police department’s o perational Plan prepared in response to intelligence reports warning of possible violence surrounding an economic summit remained exempt from disclosure after the summit ended. The court found that the city planned to use portions of the Plan for future events and the “language of [the exemption] leads us to believe that the legislature intended to keep such security information exempt after an immediate emergency Id. And see s. 119.071(3)(a)1., F.s., which includes “emergency evacuation at 887. passes.” plans” and “sheltering arrangements” within the definition of a “security system plan” that is confidential and exempt from public disclosure. o. Surveillance techniques, procedures or personnel information revealing surveillance techniques, procedures or personnel is exempt from See Rameses, Inc. v. Demings, 29 s o. 3d public inspection pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(d), F.s. 418 (Fla. 5th DCa 2010) (disclosure to criminal defendant of unredacted undercover police surveillance recordings does not destroy exemption in s. 119.071[2][d], F.s.; therefore, sheriff is only required to provide redacted recording in response to a public records request); and State n ed.l.rptr. 2592 (Fla. 9th Cir. v. Bee Line Entertainment Partners Ltd., o. Cio 00-5358, 28 m Ct. october 25, 2000) (videotapes created with hidden camera by law enforcement investigation showing result of investigative activity but that do not reveal confidential surveillance methods must be released once investigation is no longer active). And see Althouse v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, so. 3d 899 (Fla. 4th DCa 2012), disapproved on other grounds, Board of Trustees, 92 Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, 189 s o. 3d 120 (Fla. 2016) noting that the agency had conceded that its initial response denying althouse’s request for “rules, regulations, operating procedures and policies regarding the recruitment and use of confidential informants” was “incorrect” and that the agency had subsequently produced the records after redacting portions pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(d), F.s. p. Undercover personnel section 119.071(4)(c), F.s., provides that any information revealing undercover personnel of any criminal justice agency is exempt from public disclosure. But see Ocala Star Banner Corporation v. McGhee, 643 s o. 2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCa 1994)(police department should not have refused to release an entire police report containing some information that could lead to an undercover person’s identity, when, without much difficulty, the name or initials and identification numbers of the undercover officer and that officer’s supervisor could be taken out of the report and the remainder released). 698 Accord Christy v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, so. 2d 1365 (Fla. 4th DCa 1997). information regarding law enforcement officers who are assigned to undercover duty and whose names appear on personnel rosters or other lists of all law enforcement officers of the city without regard to whether the record reveals the nature of their duties may constitute “[a]ny information revealing undercover personnel of any criminal justice agency[.]” ago 15-02. The legislature’s determination that such information is exempt from public inspection, rather than confidential, conditions the release of exempt information upon a determination by the custodian that there is a statutory or substantial policy need for disclosure. Id. q. Victim information although s. 119.071(2)(c), F.s., exempts active criminal investigative information from disclosure, the “name, sex, age, and address of . . . the victim of a crime, except as provided in s. 119.071(2)(h),” are specifically excluded from the definition of criminal investigative or intelligence information. See s. 119.011(3)(c)2., F.s. a ccordingly, victim information is considered to be public record in the absence of a statutory exemption. Cf. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office v. Sun-Sentinel Company , LLC , 42 F.l.W. D1954 (Fla. 4th DCa s eptember 6, 2017) (s. 119.071[2][m], F.s., providing an exemption for the identity of homicide witnesses for 2 years after the date on which the murder is observed by the witness shields the identity of witnesses to a highway shooting who became victims when the perpetrator shot at their vehicle). 112

130 government-in-the-sunshine-manual a discussion of the exemptions which apply to crime victims generally, and those which apply to the victims of certain crimes, follows. (1) Amount of stolen property Pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(i), F.s., criminal intelligence or investigative information that reveals the personal assets of a crime victim, which were not involved in the crime, is exempt from disclosure. h owever, this exemption does not apply to information relating to the amount ote, however, that s. of property stolen during the commission of a crime. ago 82-30. n 119.071(2)(j)1., F.s., provides that victims of certain crimes may file a written request to exempt information revealing their “personal assets.” (2) Commercial solicitation of victims section 119.105, F.s., provides that police reports are public records except as otherwise made exempt or confidential and that every person is allowed to examine nonexempt or nonconfidential police reports. h owever, a person who comes into possession of exempt or confidential information in police reports may not use that information for commercial solicitation of the victims or relatives of the victims and may not knowingly disclose such information to a third party for the purpose of such solicitation during the period of time that information remains exempt or confidential. Id. The statute “does not prohibit the publication of such information to the general public by any news media legally entitled to possess that information or the use of such information for any other data collection or analysis purposes by those entitled to possess that information.” Id. a willful and knowing violation of this statute is a third-degree felony. s ection 119.10(2)(b), F.s. (3) Documents regarding victims which are received by an agency section 119.071(2)(j)1., F.s., exempts from disclosure any document that reveals the identity, home or employment telephone number or address, or personal assets of the victim of a crime and identifies that person as the victim of a crime, if that document is by an agency received that regularly receives information from or concerning the victims of crime. h owever, this provision is limited to documents received by agencies which regularly receive information from or concerning victims of crime; it does not apply to records generated or made by these agencies. ago 90-80. a ccordingly, this exemption does not apply to police reports. Id. a dditionally, the exemption does not apply to documents revealing the identity of a victim of crime which are contained in a court file not closed by court order. ago 90-87. section 119.071(2)(j)1., F.s., also provides that “[a]ny state or federal agency that is authorized to have access to such documents by any provision of law shall be granted such access in the furtherance of such agency’s statutory duties, notwithstanding this section.” See inf. op. to m cCabe, n ovember 27, 1995 (state attorney authorized to release materials received during an investigation of a domestic violence incident to a police department for use in the department’s internal affairs investigation). (4) Home or employment address, telephone number, assets victims of specified crimes listed in s. 119.071(2)(j)1., F.s., are authorized to file a written request for exemption of their addresses, telephone numbers and personal assets as follows: any information not otherwise held confidential or exempt [from disclosure] which reveals the home or employment telephone number, home or employment address, or personal assets of a person who has been the victim of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated stalking, harassment, aggravated battery, or domestic violence is exempt [from disclosure], upon written request by the victim which must include official verification that uch information shall cease an applicable crime has occurred. s 113

131 government-in-the-sunshine-manual to be exempt 5 years after the receipt of the written request. (e.s.) by an agency, but exempts specified received This exemption is not limited to documents information in records--whether generated or received by--an agency. Thus, a victim of the enumerated crimes may file a written request and have his or her home or employment telephone number, home or employment address, or personal assets, exempted from the police report of the crime, provided that the request includes official verification, such as a copy of the incident ago or offense report for one of the listed crimes, that an applicable crime has occurred. See 96-82. The exemption is limited to the victim’s address, telephone number, or personal assets; it City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Company, does not apply to the victim’s identity. no. 96-3425-Ca (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. o ctober 28, 1996). The exemption applies to records created prior to, as well as after, the agency’s receipt of the t applies to any records held by an agency victim’s written request for exemption. ago 96-82. i Id. “[a]n examination of the legislative and is not limited to those records relating to the offense. history surrounding the adoption of this exemption indicates that the legislature intended that the exemption not be limited to those documents identifying the individual as a victim of crime but rather be applied to any document revealing the personal information held by any agency.” ago 02-50, in which the a ttorney g eneral’s office advised that s. 119.071(2) Id. And see (j)1., F.s., does not contain an exception for copies of the police report that are sent to domestic violence centers pursuant to s. 741.29, F.s., if the victim has made a written request for exempt status of the personal information specified in s. 119.071(2)(j)1., F.s. in addition, the requirement that the victim make a written request for exemption applies only to information not otherwise held confidential by law; thus, the exemption supplements, but does not replace, other confidentiality provisions, such as s. 119.071(2)(h), F.s., that may be applicable to certain crime victims. ago 96-82 For more information on exemptions pertaining to domestic violence or stalking victims, please see the discussion on pages 72-73. Information identifying or depicting victims of sex offenses and of child abuse (5) Law enforcement and prosecution records (a) section 119.071(2)(h)1.a., F.s., provides confidentiality for criminal investigative and intelligence information that reveals the identity of a victim of the crime of child abuse, as defined by Ch. 827, F.s., or that reveals the identity of a person under the age of 18 who is a victim of the crime of human trafficking proscribed in s. 787.06(3)(a), F.s. i nformation which may reveal the identity of a victim of a sexual offense, including a sexual offense prohibited in s. 787.06(3)(b), (d), (f ), or (g), or Chs. 794, 796, 800, 827, or 847, F.s., is also confidential. s ection 119.071(2) (h)1.b., F.s. in addition, the photograph, videotape, or image of any part of the body of a victim of a sexual offense prohibited under ss. 787.06(3)(b), (d), (f ), or (g) or 810.145, or Chs. 794, 796, 800, 827, or 847, F.s., is confidential and exempt, regardless of whether the photograph, videotape, or image identifies the victim. s See Harvard v. Village ection 119.071(2)(h)1.c., F.s. of Palm Springs, 98 s o. 3d 645, 647 (Fla. 4th DCa 2012), rejecting a mother’s assertion that there is “no law prohibiting her” from obtaining a copy of her son’s videotaped interview, because s. 119.071(2)(h)1.a-c, F.s., “provides that a video of a victim is exempt from a public records request if it is taken during the course of one of several enumerated types of criminal investigations.” Thus, the a ttorney g eneral’s office advised that information revealing the identity of victims of child abuse or sexual battery must be deleted from the copy of the report of domestic violence which is sent by a law enforcement agency to the nearest domestic violence center pursuant to s. 741.29(2), F.s. ago 92-14. And see Palm Beach County Police Benevolent o. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCa 2001), applying exemption to Association v. Neumann, 796 s 114

132 government-in-the-sunshine-manual information identifying a child abuse victim which was contained in files prepared as part of an internal investigation conducted in accordance with s. 112.533, F.s. section 119.071(2)(h)2.a-c, F.s., sets forth circumstances which permit a law enforcement oreover, the a ttorney g eneral’s office has agency to disclose the confidential information. m advised that the confidentiality provisions do not apply to the identity of a child abuse victim died from suspected abuse. ago 90-103. who section 119.071(2)(j)2.a., F.s., provides that identifying information in a videotaped statement of a minor who is alleged to be or who is a victim of a sexual offense prohibited in the cited laws which reveals the minor’s identity, including, but not limited to, the minor’s face; the minor’s home, school, church, or employment telephone number; the minor’s home, school, church, or employment address; the name of the minor’s school, church, or place of employment; or the personal assets of the minor; and which identifies the minor as a victim, held by a law enforcement agency, is confidential. a ccess shall be provided, however, to authorized governmental agencies when necessary to the furtherance of the agency’s duties. Id. a public employee may not willfully and knowingly disclose videotaped information that reveals the ection minor’s identity to anyone other than the designated individuals, including the defendant. s 119.071(2)(j)2b., F.s. Cf. State v. Ingram, 170 s o. 3d 727 (Fla. 2015) (J. Pariente concurring) (s. 119.071[2][j]2.b. does not authorize disclosure to a convicted incarcerated inmate of videotaped information that reveals the minor victim’s identity). a public employee or officer having access to the photograph, name, or address of a person alleged to be a victim of an offense described in Ch. 794 (sexual battery); Ch. 800 (lewdness, indecent exposure); s. 827.03 (abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child); s. 827.04 (contributing to delinquency or dependency of a child); or s. 827.071 (sexual performance by a child) may not willfully and knowingly disclose it to a person not assisting in the investigation or prosecution of the alleged offense or to any person other than the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, a person specified in a court order entered by the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense, to organizations authorized to receive such information made exempt by s. 119.071(2) (h), F.s., or to a rape crisis center or sexual assault counselor, as defined in s. 90.5035(1)(b), F.s., who will be offering services to the victim. s ection 794.024(1), F.s. a violation of this section constitutes a second degree misdemeanor. s ection 794.024(2), F.s. Cf. State v. Globe 648 s Communications Corporation, o. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 1994) (statute mandating criminal sanctions for printing, publishing or broadcasting “in any instrument of mass communication” information identifying a victim of a sexual offense, ruled unconstitutional). an entity or individual who communicates to others, prior to open judicial proceedings, the name, address, or other specific identifying information concerning the victim of any sexual offense under Ch. 794 or Ch. 800 shall be liable to the victim for all damages reasonably necessary ection to compensate the victim for any injuries suffered as a result of such communication. s 794.026(1), F.s. The victim, however, may not maintain a cause of action unless he or she is able to show that such communication was intentional and was done with reckless disregard for the highly offensive nature of the publication. s ection 794.026(2), F.s. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 95 s.Ct. 1029 (1975); and Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 so. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989), appeal dismissed, 110 s.Ct. 296 (1989). The Crime victims’ s ervices office in the a ttorney g eneral’s office is authorized to receive confidential records from law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies. s ection 960.05(2)(k), F.s. And see ago 92-51 (city victim services division, as a governmental agency which is part of the city’s criminal justice system, may receive identifying information about victims of sex offenses, for the purpose of advising the victim of available services pursuant to s. 960.001, F.s., requiring distribution of victim support information). 115

133 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (b) Court records section 92.56, F.s., provides that criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information made confidential pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(h), F.s., must be maintained in court records and in court proceedings, including witnesses’ testimony. if a petition for access to these records is filed with the trial court with jurisdiction over alleged offense, the status of the information must be maintained by the court if the state or the victim demonstrates certain factors as set forth in the statute. s ection 92.56(1), F.s. a person who willfully and knowingly violates section 92.56, F.s., or any court order issued under this section is subject to contempt See also ago 03-56 and s. 119.0714(1)(h), F.s. proceedings. s ection 92.56(6), F.s. (c) Department of Children and Families abuse records as discussed on pages 70-71, there are statutory exemptions set forth in Ch. 415, F.s., which relate to records of abuse of vulnerable adults. s imilar provisions relating to child abuse records are found in Ch. 39, F.s. The a ttorney g eneral’s office has concluded that the confidentiality provisions in these laws, 415.107 and 39.202, F.s., apply to records of the Department i.e., ss. of Children and Families [DCF] and do not encompass a law enforcement agency’s arrest report of persons charged with criminal child abuse, after the agency has deleted all information which would reveal the identity of the victim. ago 93-54. Accord inf. o p. to o’Brien, January 18, See Cf. 1994. 626 so. 2d 1314 (Fla. 1993), holding that a sheriff’s Times Publishing Company v. A.J., incident report of alleged child abuse that was forwarded to the state child welfare department for investigation pursuant to Ch. 415, F.s. 1990 [see now Part ii, Ch. 39, F.s., entitled “r eporting Child a buse”], should not be released. The Court noted that the department had found no probable cause and that child protection statutes accommodate privacy rights of those involved in these cases “by providing that the supposed victims, their families, and the accused should not be subjected to public scrutiny at least during the initial stages of an investigation, before probable Id. cause has been found.” at 1315. section 39.202(1) and (2)(b), F.s., authorizes criminal justice agencies to have access to confidential abuse, abandonment, or neglect records held by DCF and provides that the exemption from disclosure for DCF abuse records also applies to DCF records and information See i nf. o p. to r ussell, o in the possession of the agencies granted access. ctober 24, 2001. (6) Homicide victims and witnesses section 406.136(2), F.s., provides confidentiality for a photograph, video or audio recording that depicts or records the killing of a law enforcement officer acting in accordance with his or her official duties. The term “killing of a law enforcement officer who was acting in accordance with his or her official duties” is defined to mean “all acts or events that cause or otherwise relate to the death of a law enforcement officer who was acting in accordance with his or her official duties, including any related acts or events immediately preceding or subsequent to the acts or events immediately preceding or subsequent to the acts or events that were the proximate cause of death.” s ection 406.136(1), F.s. The law creating the current version of the exemption took effect on o ctober 1, 2016. See Ch. 16-214, laws of Florida. The prior version of s. 406.136, F.s., enacted in 2011, applied more broadly to a photograph, video, or audio recording that depicts or records the “killing of a person” and was held to apply to crime scene photographs of the victims. See State v. Schenecker, no. 11-CF-001376a (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. a ugust 3, 2011), cert. denied sub nom., Media General Operations v. State, 71 so. 3d 124 (Fla. 2d DCa 2011). And see page 69 discussing the confidentiality of autopsy photographs. Criminal investigative or intelligence information that reveals the personal identifying information of a witness to a murder, as described in s. 782.04, F.s., is confidential for 2 years after the date on which the murder is observed by the witness. s ection 119.071(2)(m)1., F.s. a criminal justice agency may disclose this information in the furtherance of its official duties and 116

134 government-in-the-sunshine-manual responsibilities; to assist in locating or identifying the witness if the agency believes the witness to be missing or endangered; to another governmental agency for use in the performance of its official duties and responsibilities; to the parties in a pending criminal prosecution as required Id. And see Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office v. Sun-Sentinel Company , ll C, 42 F.l.W. by law. D1954 (Fla. 4th DCa s ept. 6, 2017) (applying exemption to shield the identity of witnesses who observed a homicide on the highway and whose vehicle was hit by bullets fired by the perpetrator as the witnesses attempted to follow the suspect’s car). (7) Human trafficking victims Criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information that may reveal the identity of a person who is a victim of human trafficking whose criminal history record has been expunged pursuant to s. 943.0583, F.s., is confidential. s ection 943.0583(11)(a), F.s. Disclosure is authorized under certain circumstances. s ection 943.0583(11)(b), F.s. And see s. 119.071(2)(h), F.s., relating to victims of the crime of human trafficking proscribed in s. 787.06, F.s., discussed on page 114. information about the location of a safe house, safe foster home, or other residential facility serving child victims of commercial sexual exploitation, as defined in s. 409.016, F.s., is confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements. s ection 409.1678(6)(a), F.s. information may be provided to an agency as necessary to maintain health and safety standards and to address emergency situations in the house or facility. s ection 409.1678(6)(b), F.s. (8) Relocated victim or witness information information held by a law enforcement agency, prosecutorial agency or the victim and Witness Protection r eview Committee which discloses the identity or location of a victim or witness (or their immediate family) who has been identified or certified for protective or relocation services is confidential and exempt from disclosure. s ection 914.27, F.s. Litigation records 16. a. Attorney-client communications ecords a The Public r ct applies to communications between attorneys and governmental agencies; there is no judicially created privilege which exempts these documents from disclosure. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Company, 372 s o. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979) (only the legislature and not the judiciary can exempt attorney-client communications from Ch. 119, F.s.). See also City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, o. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985) (although s. 468 s 90.502, F.s., of the e vidence Code establishes an attorney-client privilege for public and private entities, this evidentiary statute does not remove communications between an agency and its attorney from the open inspection requirements of Ch. 119, F.s.). moreover, public disclosure of these documents does not violate the public agency’s constitutional rights of due process, effective assistance of counsel, freedom of speech, or the supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over The Florida Bar. City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, supra. And see Seminole County, Florida v. Wood, o. 2d 1000, 512 s 1001 (Fla. 5th DCa 1987), review denied, 520 s o. 2d 586 (Fla. 1988) (the rules of ethics provide that an attorney may divulge a communication when required by law; the legislature has plenary authority over political subdivisions and can require disclosure of otherwise confidential materials); and ago 98-59 (records in the files of the former city attorney, who served as a contract attorney for the city, which were made or received in carrying out her duties as city attorney and which communicate, perpetuate, or formalize knowledge constitute public records and are required to be turned over to her successor). on the other hand, the Florida s upreme Court has ruled that files in the possession of the Capital Collateral r epresentative (CCr) in furtherance of its representation of an indigent client are not subject to public disclosure under Ch. 119, F.s. The Court noted that the files are not 117

135 government-in-the-sunshine-manual governmental records for purposes of the public records law but are the “private records” of the Kight v. Dugger, 574 s And see Times Publishing Company CCr client. o. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990). o. 99-8304 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. n n v. Acton, ovember 5, 1999) (private attorneys retained by individual county commissioners in a criminal case were not “acting on behalf ” of a public ct, even though the board of county agency so as to become subject to the Public r ecords a commissioners subsequently voted to pay the commissioners’ legal expenses in accordance with a county policy providing for reimbursement of legal expenses to individual county officers who successfully defend criminal charges filed against them arising out of the performance of their official duties). b. Attorney work product supreme Court has ruled that the legislature and not the judiciary has exclusive The Wait v. Florida Power & authority to exempt litigation records from the scope of Ch. 119, F.s. 372 See also Edelstein v. Donner, 450 so. 2d 562 (Fla. Light Company, so. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979). approved, 471 s o. 2d 26 (Fla. 1985), noting that in the absence of legislation, 3d DCa 1984), Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. a work product exemption is “non-existent;” and Azzarelli Construction Company, 436 s o. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 2d DCa 1983), stating that the supreme Court’s decision in Wait “constituted a tacit recognition that work product can be a public record.” With the enactment of s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s., the legislature created a narrow statutory exemption for certain litigation work product of agency attorneys. See City of Orlando v. 493 s Desjardins, o. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 1986), in which the Court noted that the exemption was enacted because of “developing case law affording public entities no protection under either the work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege . . . .” See also City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 468 s o. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1985) (noting application of exemption to “government agency, attorney-prepared litigation files during the pendency of litigation”); and 472 s o. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCa 1985) (opposing City of Miami Beach v. DeLapp, counsel not entitled to city’s legal memoranda as such material is exempt work product). section 119.071(1)(d)1., F.s., states, in relevant part: a public record that was prepared by an agency attorney (including an attorney employed or retained by the agency or employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect or represent the interests of the agency having custody of the record) or prepared at the attorney’s express direction, that reflects a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the agency, and that was prepared exclusively for civil or criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings, or that was prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal litigation or imminent adversarial administrative proceedings, is exempt [from disclosure] until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. . . . note that this statutory exemption applies to attorney work product that has reached the status of becoming a public record; as discussed more extensively on pages 122-123, certain preliminary trial preparation materials, such as handwritten notes for the personal use of the attorney, are not considered to be within the definitional scope of the term “public records” and, therefore, are outside the scope of Ch. 119, F.s. See Johnson v. Butterworth, 713 s o. 2d 985 (Fla. 1998). under the terms of the statute, the work product exemption “is not waived by the release of such public record to another public employee or officer of the same agency or any person consulted by the agency attorney.” s ection 119.071(1)(d)2., F.s. See also ago 94-77 (work product exemption continues to apply to records prepared by the county attorney when these 118

136 government-in-the-sunshine-manual records are transferred to the city attorney pursuant to a transfer agreement whereby the city is substituted for the county as a party to the litigation). an agency asserting the work product exemption must identify the potential parties to ection 119.071(1)(d)2., F.s. i n the event of litigation disputing the litigation or proceedings. s the claimed work product exemption, the court must conduct an in camera inspection of the Environmental Turf, Inc. v. University of Florida Board of Trustees, 83 s o. 3d 1012 (Fla. records. 1st DCa 2012). if a court finds that the record was improperly withheld, the party seeking the record shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in addition to any other remedy ordered by the court. s ection 119.071(1)(d)2., F.s. as one court has noted, the inclusion of an attorney’s fee sanction “was prompted by the legislature’s concern that government entities might claim the work product privilege whenever public access to their records is demanded.” Smith & Williams, P.A. v. West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority, 640 s o. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 2d DCa 1994). (1) Scope of exemption (a) Attorney bills and payments only those records which reflect a “mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory” are included within the parameters of the work product exemption. a ccordingly, in ago 85-89, the a ttorney g eneral’s office concluded that a contract between a county and a private law firm for legal counsel and documentation for invoices submitted by such firm to the county do not fall within the work product exemption. Accord ago 00-07 (records of outside attorney fee bills for the defense of the county, as well as its employees who are sued individually, for alleged civil rights violations are public records subject to disclosure). if the bills and invoices contain some exempt work product-- i.e. , “mental impression[s], conclusion[s], litigation strateg[ies], or legal theor[ies],”--the exempt material may be deleted and owever, information such as the hours worked or the the remainder disclosed. ago 85-89. h hourly wage clearly would not fall within the scope of the exemption. Id. And see Herskovitz n bviously, an entry on a [billing] v. Leon County, o. 98-22 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 9, 1998) (“o statement which identifies a specific legal strategy to be considered or puts a specific amount of settlement authority received from the client, would fall within the exemption. o n the other hand, a notation that the file was opened, or that a letter was sent to opposing counsel, would not.”). Thus, an agency which “blocked out” most notations on invoices prepared in connection with services rendered by and fees paid to attorneys representing the agency, “improperly withheld” nonexempt material when it failed to limit its redactions to those items “genuinely reflecting its ‘mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory.’” Smith & Williams, P.A. v. West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority, 640 s o. 2d at 218. And see Davis v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board, 480 s o. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d DCa 1985), review denied, 488 s o. 2d 829 (Fla. 1986), holding in part that a citizen seeking to examine records of a public hospital board concerning the payment of legal fees was entitled to examine actual records, not merely excerpts taken from information stored in the hospital’s computer. (b) Records prepared prior to litigation or for other purposes unlike the open meetings exemption in s. 286.011(8), F.s., for certain attorney-client discussions between a governmental board and its attorney, s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s., is not limited to records created for pending litigation before a court or administrative agency, but may also apply to records prepared “in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal litigation or imminent adversarial administrative proceedings . . . .” (e.s.) See ago 98-21, discussing the differences between the public records work product exemption in s. 119.071(1)(d) and the s unshine law exemption in s. 286.011(8), F.s. 119

137 government-in-the-sunshine-manual however, s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s., does not create a blanket exception to the Public r ecords act for all attorney work product. ago 91-75. The exemption is narrower than the work product privilege recognized by the courts for private litigants. ago 85-89. i n order to qualify for the work product exemption, the records must have been prepared exclusively for litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings, or prepared in anticipation of imminent litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings; records prepared for other purposes may not be converted See, e.g., into exempt material simply because they are also used in or related to the litigation. o. 2d 326, 333 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 553 u.s. 1059 (2008) Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 s (memoranda prepared by corrections department attorney regarding lethal injection procedures do not constitute exempt attorney work product because memoranda do not relate to any pending litigation nor appear to have been prepared exclusively for litigation); MHM Correctional Services, Inc. v. State, Department of Corrections, n o. 2009 Ca 2105 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 10, 2009) (department wrongfully withheld portions of an e-mail stream regarding the bid process as protected work product or privileged communications as none of the emails were prepared in contemplation of litigation as required by the statute). moreover, only those records which are prepared by or at the express direction of the agency attorney and reflect “a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the agency” are exempt from disclosure until the conclusion of the proceedings. 493 s o. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 1986) (trial court must examine See City of Orlando v. Desjardins, city’s litigation file in accident case and prohibit disclosure only of those records reflecting mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy or legal theory of attorney or city); Jordan v. School 531 s Board of Broward County, o. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 4th DCa 1988) (record did not constitute exempt work product because it “was not prepared at an attorney’s express direction nor did it reflect a conclusion and mental impression of appellee”); and Lightbourne v. McCollum, supra (exemption inapplicable to records that conveyed specific factual information rather than mental impressions or litigation strategies). Cf. Tober v. Sanchez, 417 s o. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCa 1982), review denied sub nom. , Metropolitan Dade County Transit Agency v. Sanchez, 426 s o. 2d 27 (Fla. 1983) (documents which are given by a client to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice are privileged in the attorney’s hands only if the documents were privileged in the client’s hands; thus, otherwise public records made or received by agency personnel do not become privileged merely by transferring them to the agency attorney). Thus, a circuit judge refused to apply the exemption to tapes, witness statements and interview notes taken by police as part of an investigation of a drowning accident at a city summer camp. See Sun-Sentinel Company v. City of Hallandale, n o. 95-13528(05) (Fla. 17th ctober 11, 1995). s Cir. Ct. o ttorney general’s office advised imilarly, in ago 05-23, the a that notes taken by the assistant city attorney during interviews with co-workers of certain city employees in order to ascertain if employee discipline was warranted are not exempt from disclosure. See also ago 91-75 (work product exemption not applicable to documents generated or received by school district investigators, acting at the direction of the school board to conduct an investigation of certain school district departments). Cf. City of Avon Park v. State, 117 s o. 3d 470 (Fla. 2d DCa 2013) (recognizing that where no charges were filed against any of the parties mentioned in a state attorney investigator’s report, the report was a public record and the s. 119.071[1][d], F.s., exemption was inapplicable). (c) Settlement records a circuit court held that draft settlement agreements furnished a state agency by a federal to agency were public records despite the department’s agreement with the federal agency to keep such documents confidential. Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation , n o. 91-2108 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. s eptember 20, 1991), per curiam affirmed , 606 s o. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992). And see Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Regulation , n o. 91-4218 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 5, 1992) (technical documents or data which were not prepared for the purpose of carrying litigation forward but rather were jointly authored among adversaries to promote settlement are not exempted as attorney work 120

138 government-in-the-sunshine-manual product); and i p. to g astesi, a ugust, 27, 2015 (settlement demand furnished by plaintiff to nf. o Cf. Prison Health Services, Inc. v. Lakeland Ledger Publishing Company o. 2d 204, agency). , 718 s review denied , 727 s o. 2d 909 (Fla. 1999) (private company under 205 (Fla. 2d DCa 1998), contract with sheriff to provide medical services for inmates at county jail must release records relating to a settlement agreement with an inmate because all of its records that would normally ecords a ct if in the possession of the public agency, are likewise covered be subject to the Public r by that law, even though in the possession of the private corporation). in addition, if the state settles a claim against one company accused of conspiracy to fix prices, the state has concluded the litigation against that company. Thus, the records prepared in anticipation of litigation against that company are no longer exempt from disclosure even though the state has commenced litigation against the alleged co-conspirator. State v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Miami, Inc., 582 s o. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCa 1990). And see Tribune Company v. Hardee Memorial Hospital, o. Ca-91-370 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. a ugust 19, 1991) (settlement agreement n not exempt as attorney work product even though another related case was pending, and agency attorneys feared disclosure of their assessment of the merits of the settled case and their litigation strategy would have a detrimental effect upon the agency’s position in the related case (2) Duration of exemption The exemption from disclosure provided by s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s., is temporary and limited in duration. City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., supra. The exemption exists only until the “conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings” even if disclosure of the information in the concluded case could negatively impact the agency’s position in related cases or claims. See State v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Miami, Inc., 582 s o. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCa 1990); Seminole County v. Wood, 512 s o. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCa 1987), review 520 s denied, (rejecting a “continuing o. 2d 586 (Fla. 1988); and Lightbourne v. McCollum, supra exemption” claim by the state). And see unshine law exemption for certain ago 13-13 (s attorney-client meetings found in s. 286.011[8], F.s., “does not recognize a continuation of the exemption for ‘derivative claims’ made in separate, subsequent litigation”). Cf. State v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Miami, Inc., supra (although state cannot claim work product exemption for litigation records after conclusion of litigation, Ch. 119 does not cover oral testimony; thus, opposing counsel not entitled to take depositions of state representatives regarding the concluded litigation). Thus, a school board failed to meet its burden of showing that items contained in a school board litigation report were exempt from disclosure where there was no evidence that the cases in question were pending and open when the board received the public records request. Barfield v. School Board of Manatee County, 135 s o. 3d 560 (Fla. 2d DCa 2014). however, the phrase “conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings” encompasses post-judgment collection efforts such as a legislative claims bill. Wagner v. Orange County, 960 s o. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCa 2007). And see ago 94-33, concluding that for purposes of the attorney-client exemption from the s unshine law in s. 286.011(8), F.s., a pending lawsuit is concluded when the suit is dismissed with prejudice or the applicable statute of limitations has run; “[t]o allow a plaintiff who has voluntarily dismissed a suit to gain access to transcripts of strategy or settlement meetings in order to obtain an advantage in the refiling of a lawsuit would subvert the purpose of the statute.” 161 s o. 3d 521 (Fla. Cf. Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 2d DCa 2014) (rejecting city’s argument that because an agreement settling a quiet title action provided for further mediation should a dispute arise regarding the meaning of the agreement, the case was still pending for purposes of the s unshine law exemption in s. 286.011[8], F.s). in addition, the exemption extends “through prosecution of appeals.” i nf. o p. to Boutsis, December 13, 2012. Cf. s. 119.071(1)(d)1., F.s. (“For purposes of capital collateral litigation as set forth in s. 27.7001, the a ttorney g eneral’s office is entitled to claim this exemption for those public records prepared for direct appeal as well as for all capital collateral litigation after direct 121

139 government-in-the-sunshine-manual appeal until execution of sentence or imposition of a life sentence.”). c. Other statutory exemptions relating to litigation records section 768.28(16)(b), F.s., provides an exemption for claims files maintained by agencies pursuant to a risk management program for tort liability until the termination of all litigation 960 and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident. See Wagner v. Orange County, so. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCa 2007), stating that the phrase “settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident” included a legislative claims bill. The exemption afforded by s. 768.28(16), F.s., is limited to tort claims for which the agency may be liable under s. 768.28, F.s., and does not apply to federal civil rights actions under And see Sun-Sentinel Company v. City of Hallandale, 42 u.s.C. s. 1983. ago s 00-20 and 00-07. ctober 11, 1995) (exemption now found at s. 768.28[16] no. 95-13528(05) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. o [b], F.s., for risk management files did not apply to tapes, witness statements and interview notes taken by police as part of an investigation of a drowning accident at a city summer camp). moreover, the exemption does not include outside attorney invoices indicating hours worked and amount to be paid by the public agency, even though the records may be maintained by the ago 00-07. And see agency’s risk management office pursuant to a risk management program. ago 92-82 (open meetings exemption provided by s. 768.28, F.s., applies only to meetings held after a tort claim is filed with the risk management program). section 624.311(2), F.s., provides that the “records of insurance claim negotiations of any state agency or political subdivision are confidential and exempt [from disclosure] until termination of all litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident.” a county’s self-insured workers compensation program is the legal equivalent of “insurance” for Herskovitz v. Leon County, n o. 98-22 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 9, purposes of this exemption. And see ago 85-102 (s. 624.311, F.s., exemption includes correspondence regarding 1998). insurance claims negotiations between a county’s retained counsel and its insurance carriers until termination of litigation and settlement of claims arising out of the same incident). Compare s. 284.40(2), F.s. (claim files maintained by the risk management division of the Department of Financial s ervices are confidential, shall be only for the use of the department, and are exempt from disclosure); and s. 1004.24(4), F.s. (claims files of self-insurance program adopted by Board of g overnors, or the board’s designee, are confidential and exempt). Attorney notes d. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc. , 379 relying on its conclusion in so. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980), the Florida supreme Court has recognized that “not all trial preparation State v. Kokal , 562 s materials are public records.” n Kokal , the Court o. 2d 324, 327 (Fla. 1990). i approved the decision of the Fifth District in Orange County v. Florida Land Co., 450 s o. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 5th DCa 1984), review denied, 458 s o. 2d 273 (Fla. 1984), which described certain documents as not within the term “public records” because they were not used to perpetuate, formalize, or communicate knowledge: Document n o. 2 is a list in rough outline form of items of evidence which may be needed for trial. Document no. 9 is a list of questions the county attorney planned to ask a witness. Document n o. 10 is a proposed trial outline. Document n o. 11 contains handwritten notes regarding the county’s sewage system and a meeting with Florida land’s attorneys. Document n o. 15 contains notes (in rough form) regarding the deposition of an anticipated witness. These documents are merely notes from the attorneys to themselves designed for their own personal use in remembering certain things. They seem to be simply preliminary guides intended to aid the attorneys when they later formalized legislature, in the knowledge. We cannot imagine that the 122

140 government-in-the-sunshine-manual enacting the Public r ct, intended to include within the ecords a mphasis supplied term ‘public records’ this type of material. [e by Court] similarly, in Johnson v. Butterworth, 713 s o. 2d 985, 987 (Fla. 1998), the Court ruled that “outlines, time lines, page notations regarding information in the record, and other similar items” in the case file, do not fall within the definition of public record, and thus are not subject See also Braddy v. State to disclosure. o. 3d 803. 821 (Fla. 2017) (“handwritten attorney , 219 s notes, draft documents, and annotated copies of decisional law . . . do not constitute public records”); Patton v. State, 784 s o. 2d 380, 389 (Fla. 2000) (prosecutor’s personal notes, i.e. , handwritten details of specific questions to ask jurors during voir-dire, notes on potential jurors, a time-line of events, or specific detailed questions for witnesses, are not public records); Scott v. Butterworth, 734 so. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. 1999) (handwritten notes and drafts of pleadings are not public records); Ragsdale v. State, 720 s o. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1998) (“attorney’s notes and other such preliminary documents are not public records and are never subject to public records disclosure”); Valle v. State, 705 s o. 2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 1997) (prosecutors’ notes to themselves for their own personal use, including outlines of opening and closing arguments and notes of witness depositions are not public records); Lopez v. State, 696 s o. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. 1997) (handwritten notes dealing with trial strategy and cross-examination of witnesses are not public records); and Atkins v. State , 663 s o. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1995) (notes of state attorney’s investigations and annotated photocopies of decisional case law are not public records). By contrast, documents prepared to communicate, perpetuate, or formalize knowledge constitute public records and are, therefore, subject to disclosure in the absence of statutory 379 s o. 2d 633, 640 See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Associates, Inc., exemption. (Fla. 1980), stating that “[i]nter-office memoranda and intra-office memoranda communicating information from one public employee to another or merely prepared for filing, even though not a part of an agency’s later, formal public product, would nonetheless constitute public records inasmuch as they supply the final evidence of knowledge obtained in connection with the transaction of official business.” Coleman v. Austin, 521 s o. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1st DCa 1988), the court observed Thus, in that “although notes from attorneys to themselves might not be public records when intended for their own personal use, inter-office and intra-office memoranda may constitute public records even though encompassing trial preparation materials.” And see Orange County v. Florida Land Company, supra, in which the court concluded that trial preparation materials consisting of interoffice and intraoffice memoranda communicating information from one public employee to another or merely prepared for filing, even though not part of the agency’s formal work product, were public records although such circulated trial preparation materials might be exempt from disclosure pursuant to s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s., while the litigation is ongoing. See also ago 05- 23 (handwritten notes prepared by city’s assistant labor attorney during her interviews with city employees are public records “when those notes are made to perpetuate and formalize knowledge and to communicate that information to the city’s labor attorney”). 17. Personal records not made or received in the course of official business as noted in ago 04-33, the broad definition of “public record” makes it clear that the “form of the record is irrelevant; the material issue is whether the record is made or received by the public agency in connection with the transaction of official business.” See s. 119.011(12), F.s., defining the term “public records” to mean materials “made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency.” See also Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc. , 379 s o. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980), stating that in order to constitute “public records” for purposes of Ch. 119 disclosure requirements, the records must have been prepared “in connection with official agency business” and be intended to “perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type.” made or received in connection with the transaction of accordingly, records which are not 123

141 government-in-the-sunshine-manual official business do not constitute public records for purposes of Ch. 119 disclosure requirements. o. 3d 278 (Fla. 4th DCa 2011) (e-mail sent by 68 s See e.g. Butler v. City of Hallandale Beach, mayor from her personal account using her personal computer and blind copied to friends and supporters did not constitute a public record because the e-mail was not made pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business). in evaluating whether a record is made or received in connection with the official business of an agency, “the determining factor is the nature of the record, not its physical location.” State v. o. 2d 149, 154 (Fla. 2003). i n City of Clearwater, , the Court held that personal 863 s Clearwater e-mails between government employees on government-owned computers which were not made or received in the course of official business did not constitute public records. See also Bent v. State, 46 s o. 3d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCa 2010) (recordings made by sheriff’s office of personal telephone calls between minors in jail awaiting trial and third parties are not public records when Media contents of the phone calls do not involve criminal activity or a security breach); and 849 s General Operations, Inc. v. Feeney, o. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCa 2003) (records of personal or private calls of legislative employees using cellular phone service provided by a political party do not constitute official business of the legislature and are not subject to public disclosure). however, in concluding that the location of e-mails on a government computer does not control the application of Public act, the Clearwater court also cautioned that the case records before it did not involve e-mails “that may have been isolated by a government employee whose State v. City of job required him or her to locate employee misuse of government computers.” Clearwater, at 151n.2. And see Miami-Dade County v. Professional Law Enforcement Association, 997 s o. 2d 1289 (Fla. 3d DCa 2009) (personal flight log of pilots paid by county which are City required as part of pilots’ administrative duties are distinguishable from personal e-mails in of Clearwater case and are subject to disclosure). See also ago 09-19 (because the creation of a city Facebook page must be for a municipal, not private purpose, the “placement of material on the city’s page would presumably be in furtherance of such purpose and in connection with the transaction of official business and thus subject to the provisions of Chapter 119, Florida statutes”), similarly, the mere fact that an e-mail is sent from a private e-mail account using a personal computer is not the determining factor as to whether it is a public record; it is whether the e-mail was prepared or received in connection with official agency business. See Butler v. City For example, if a public employee sends a proposed agency budget of Hallandale Beach, supra. to his or her supervisor for review, the report is a public record, regardless of whether the report was sent from the employee’s agency e-mail account using a government computer, or from his or her home computer using a personal e-mail account. And see ago 08-07 (individual council members who post comments and emails relating to transaction of city business on a privately-owned and operated website “would be responsible for ensuring that the information is maintained in accordance with the Public r ecords law”). Cf. ag0 16-16 (hospital district not authorized to reimburse a board member for attorney fees incurred in responding to a public records request for records relating to her board service which were stored in her private computer and telephone when no suit, claim, charge or action was instituted against the commissioner when the fees were incurred). Thus, in Bill of Rights, Inc. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, n o. 2009-20218-Cins (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. a pril 8, 2010), the court concluded that billing documents regarding personal calls made and received by city employees on city-owned or city-leased cellular telephones are public records, when those documents are received and maintained in connection with the transaction of official business; “and, the ‘official business’ of a city includes paying for telephone service and obtaining reimbursement from employees for personal calls.” See also ago 77-141 (copies of letters or other documents received by the mayor in his official capacity constitute records received “in connection with the transaction of official business” and therefore are public records). Compare eneral’s office, inf. o p. to Burke, a pril 14, 2010 (while the licensing board, and not a ttorney g 124

142 government-in-the-sunshine-manual must determine whether a letter, allegedly sent to the board by mistake, had been received by the board in connection with the transaction of official business, the board “may wish to consider whether circumstances characterize how the document was received, such as does the letter relate to a past, existing, or potential investigation by the board”). 18. Personnel records The general rule with regard to personnel records is the same as for other public records; unless the legislature has expressly exempted certain personnel records from disclosure or authorized the agency to adopt rules limiting access to such records, personnel records are subject See Michel v. Douglas, to public inspection and copying under s. 119.07(1), F.s. o. 2d 545 464 s (Fla. 1985). a. Annuity or custodial account activities records identifying individual participants in any annuity contract or custodial account under s. 112.21, F.s. (relating to tax-sheltered annuities or custodial accounts for employees of governmental agencies) and their personal account activities are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. s ection 112.21(1), F.s. b. Applications for employment, references, and resumes applications and resumes are subject to disclosure, after redaction of statutorily exempt information such as social security numbers. See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc. , 379 so. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980); and ago s 15-10 and 77-48. similarly, communications from third parties are subject to disclosure. See Douglas v. Michel, 410 s o. 2d 936 (Fla. 5th DCa 1982), questions answered and approved, 464 s o. 2d 545 (Fla. 1985). a written employment contract is a public record. ago 13-14. c. Collective bargaining Relationship of collective bargaining agreement to personnel records (1) a collective bargaining agreement between a public employer and its employees may not validly make the personnel records of public employees confidential or exempt the same from the Public r ct. ago 77-48. Thus, employee grievance records are disclosable even though ecords a classified as confidential in a collective bargaining contract because “to allow the elimination of public records from the mandate of Chapter 119 by private contract would sound the death ct.” Mills v. Doyle, 407 s o. 2d 348, 350 (Fla. 4th DCa 1981). Cf. Palm Beach knell of the a 411 s County Classroom Teacher’s Association v. School Board of Palm Beach County, o. 2d 1375, 1376 (Fla. 4th DCa 1982) (collective bargaining agreement cannot be used “to circumvent the requirements of public meetings” in s. 286.011, F.s.). similarly, a city may not remove and destroy disciplinary notices, with or without the employee’s consent, during the course of resolving collective bargaining grievances, except in accordance with retention schedules established by the Division of library and i nformation services of the Department of s tate. ago 94-75. Accord ago 94-54. (2) Collective bargaining work product exemption section 447.605(3), F.s., provides: all work products developed by the public employer in preparation for negotiations, and during negotiations, shall be confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1), F.s. The exemption is limited and does not remove budgetary or fiscal information from the purview of Ch. 119, F.s. See Bay County School Board v. Public Employees Relations Commission, o. 2d 747, 749 (Fla. 1st DCa 1980), noting that records which are prepared for other 382 s 125

143 government-in-the-sunshine-manual purposes do not, as a result of being used in negotiations, come within the s. 447.605(3) Warden v. Bennett, 340 exemption; and so. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCa 1976), ordering that working papers used in preparing a college budget be produced for inspection by a labor organizer. Thus, proposals and counter proposals presented during the course of collective bargaining would appear to be subject to public disclosure. h owever, written notes taken by the representative of a fire control district during collective bargaining sessions for use in preparing for subsequent bargaining sessions which reflect the impressions, strategies and opinions of the district representative p. to Fulwider, June 14, 1993. are exempt pursuant to s. 447.605(3), F.s. i nf. o Complaints against employees d. section 119.071(2)(k), F.s., provides that a complaint of misconduct filed with an agency against an agency employee and all information obtained pursuant to an investigation by the agency of the complaint is confidential and exempt until the investigation ceases to be active, or until the agency provides written notice to the employee who is the subject of the complaint, either personally or by mail, that the agency has either: Concluded the investigation with a finding not to proceed with disciplinary action or a. file charges; or Concluded the investigation with a finding to proceed with disciplinary action or file b. charges. Prior to the enactment of this statute in 2013, there was no general exemption from public disclosure for complaints and investigative records based on alleged misconduct by See e.g., ago 04-22 (anonymous letter sent to city officials containing agency employees. allegations of misconduct by city employees is a public record). instead, the legislature enacted exemptions pertaining to specific types of complaints and investigations. See e.g. s. 943.03(2), F.s., providing for confidentiality of Florida Department of law e nforcement records relating to an active investigation of misconduct, in connection with their official duties, of public officials and employees and of members of public corporations and authorities subject to suspension or overnor. removal by the g For information on the exemptions for whistleblower, discrimination and ethics complaints directed against public officials and employees, please refer to the discussion on pages 91-94. a discussion of exemptions addressing complaints against law enforcement officers and educators follows: Law enforcement officers and correctional officers (1) (a) Scope of exemption and duration of confidentiality in the absence of an express legislative exemption, law enforcement personnel records are open to inspection just like those of other public employees. See Tribune Company v. Cannella, 438 s o. 2d 516, 524 (Fla. 2d DCa 1983), quashed on other grounds, 458 s o. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1984), 105 s.Ct. 2315 (1985) (law appeal dismissed sub nom., Deperte v. Tribune Company, enforcement personnel records compiled and maintained by the employing agency “can never constitute criminal investigative or intelligence information within the meaning of the Public records a ct even if subpoenaed by another law enforcement agency at some point after their original compilation by the employing agency”). however, section 112.533(2)(a), F.s., provides that complaints filed against law enforcement officers and correctional officers, and all information obtained pursuant to the agency’s investigation of the complaint, are confidential until the investigation is no longer active or until the agency head or his or her designee provides written notice to the officer who is the subject of the complaint that the agency has concluded the investigation with a finding to either proceed or not to proceed with disciplinary action or the filing of charges. 126

144 government-in-the-sunshine-manual The term “law enforcement officer” is defined as any person, other than a chief of police, who is employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state; and includes any person who is appointed by the sheriff as a deputy sheriff pursuant to s. 30.07, F.s. s ection 112.531(1), F.s. Complaints filed with the employing agency by any person, whether within or outside the agency, are subject to the exemption. ago 93-61. h owever, the complaint must be in writing in order for the confidentiality provisions to apply. 579 s o. 2d City of Delray Beach v. Barfield, 315 (Fla. 4th DCa 1991). Cf. Fraternal Order of Police v. Rutherford, 51 s o. 3d 485, 488 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010) (written complaint not necessary to trigger confidentiality afforded by s. 112.532[4] [b], F.s., as that statute provides a broader confidentiality for ongoing investigations whenever a law enforcement or correctional officer faces possible dismissal, demotion, or suspension without pay until the investigating agency “completes or abandons its investigation”). While s. 112.533, F.s., applies to complaints and records obtained pursuant to the law enforcement agency’s investigation of the complaint, it does not transform otherwise public records (such as crime or incident reports) into confidential records simply because the actions which are described in the crime report later form the basis of a complaint filed pursuant to s. 112.533, F.s. ago 96-27. Thus, a circuit judge ordered a police department to provide the media with a copy of an unredacted incident report that identified a police officer involved in the shooting of an armed suspect. Morris Publishing Group, LLC v. Thomason, n o. 16-2005-Ca-7052- XXXX-ma (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. o ctober 14, 2004). And see ago 08-33 (list of law enforcement officers who have been placed on administrative duty by their employer is not confidential under s. 112.533[2][a], F.s., but is subject to inspection and copying even if information on the list will identify officers who are the subject of internal investigation). if the officer resigns prior to the agency’s completion of its investigation, the exemption from disclosure provided by s. 112.533(2), F.s., no longer applies, even if the agency is still actively investigating the complaint. ago 91-73. h owever, if the complaint has generated i.e. information which qualifies as active criminal investigative information, , information compiled by a criminal justice agency while conducting an ongoing criminal investigation of a specific act, such information would be exempt while the investigation is continuing with a Id. See good faith anticipation of securing an arrest or prosecution in the foreseeable future. s. 112.533(2)(b), F.s., providing that the disclosure provisions do not apply to any public record [such as active criminal investigative information exempted in s. 119.071(2)(c), F.s.] which is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Ch. 119, F.s. The exemption is of limited duration. s ection 112.533(2), F.s., establishes that the complaint and all information gathered in the investigation of that complaint generally become public records at the conclusion of the investigation or at such time as the investigation becomes inactive. ago 95-59. Thus, a court ruled that the exemption ended once the sheriff’s office provided the accused deputy with a letter stating that the investigation had been completed, the allegations had been sustained, and that the deputy would be notified of the disciplinary action to be taken. Neumann v. Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Association, 763 so. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCa 2000). however, the mere fact that written notice of intervening actions is provided to the officer under investigation does not signal the end of the investigation nor does such notice make this information public prior to the conclusion of the investigation. ago 95-59. s imilarly, the exemption remains in effect if an agency schedules a pre-disciplinary determination meeting with an officer to hear and evaluate the officer’s side of the case because “[d]iscipline is not an accepted fact at this point.” Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Association v. Neumann, 796 s o. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCa 2001). 127

145 government-in-the-sunshine-manual a complaint is presumed to be inactive, and hence subject to disclosure, if no finding is ection 112.533(2)(b), F.s. See City of Delray made within 45 days after the complaint is filed. s o. 2d at 318 (trial court’s finding that complaint was inactive, despite Beach v. Barfield, 579 s contrary testimony of law enforcement officers conducting the investigation, comes to appellate court “clothed with its own presumption of correctness--especially, as here, where there is other record evidence which sustains it”). (b) Limitations on disclosure section 112.533(2)(b), F.s., states that the inspection provisions in that subsection do not apply to any public record which is exempt from public disclosure under Ch. 119, F.s. For example, active criminal investigative or intelligence information which is exempt pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(c), F.s., remains exempt notwithstanding the disclosure provisions set forth in s. 112.533(2)(a), F.s. Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Association v. Neumann, 796 s o. 2d And see ago 91-73. Thus, in such cases, the information would 1278 (Fla. 4th DCa 2001). be subject to disclosure when the criminal investigative information exemption ends, rather than as provided in s. 112.533(2), F.s. 642 s o. 2d 1135 (Fla. 4th Cf. City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, review denied, o. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1995) (exempt active criminal investigative DCa 1994), 651 s information may be shared with another criminal justice agency for use in a simultaneous internal affairs investigation and retain its protected status). similarly, information that would reveal the identity of the victim of child abuse or the victim of a sexual offense is not subject to disclosure since the information is exempt pursuant to Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Association v. Neumann, supra . s. 119.071(2)(h), F.s. however, the state attorney’s records of a closed criminal investigation are not made confidential by s. 112.533, F.s., even though an internal investigation conducted by the police department remains pending concerning the same complaint. ago 00-66. Cf. ago 96-05, noting that a police report of an agency’s criminal investigation of a police officer is a public record in the hands of the police department after the investigation is over regardless of whether tandards and a copy of the report is forwarded to the Criminal Justice s training Commission or to the Commission on e thics. (c) Unauthorized disclosure penalties section 112.533(4), F.s., makes it a first degree misdemeanor for any person who is a participant in an internal investigation to willfully disclose any information obtained pursuant to the agency’s investigation before such information becomes a public record. h owever, the subsection “does not limit a law enforcement or correctional officer’s ability to gain access to information under paragraph (2)(a).” s ection 112.533(4), F.s. i n addition, a sheriff, police chief or other head of a law enforcement agency, or his or her designee, may acknowledge the existence of a complaint, and the fact that an investigation is underway. Id. The a ttorney g eneral’s office has issued several advisory opinions interpreting this statute. See, e.g., ago 03-60 (while public disclosure of information obtained pursuant to an internal investigation prior to its becoming a public record is prohibited, s. 112.533[4], F.s., “would not preclude intradepartmental communications among those participating in the investigation). Cf. ago 97-62 (confidentiality requirements prevent the participation of a citizens’ board in resolving a complaint made against a law enforcement officer until the officer’s employing agency has made its initial findings). But see Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F. 3d 1208, 1218-1219 (11th Cir. 2005), in which the 11th Circuit Court of a ppeals ruled that s. 112.533(4), F.s., was unconstitutional “[b]ecause the curtailment of First amendment freedoms by Fla. s tat. ch. 112.533(4) is not supported by a compelling state interest, the statute fails to satisfy strict scrutiny and unconstitutionally abridges the rights to speak, publish, and petition government.” 128

146 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (2) Public school system employees The complaint and material relating to the investigation of a complaint against a public school system employee are confidential until the preliminary investigation is either concluded ection 1012.31(3)(a)1., F.s. See ago 91-75 (while exemption applies or ceases to be active. s when a complaint against a district employee has been filed and an investigation against that employee ensues, it does not provide a basis for withholding documents compiled in a general Cf. Johnson v. Deluz, investigation of school departments). o. 2d 1,3 (Fla. 4th DCa 2004) 875 s (because “legislature had no intention of permitting confidential student information to be made public,” student-identifying information must be redacted from public report of investigation of school principal); and Rhea v. District Board of Trustees of Santa Fe College, 109 s o. 3d 851 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013) (student’s unredacted e-mail complaining about an college instructor’s classroom behavior qualifies as an exempt “education record”). While s. 1012.31(1)(b), F.s., prohibits placing anonymous letters and material in a school district employee’s personnel file, the statute does not prevent a school board from investigating the allegations contained in an anonymous letter nor does it permit the school board to destroy the anonymous material absent compliance with statutory restrictions on destruction of public records. ago 87-48. m oreover, the personnel file is open at all times to school board members, the superintendent, or the principal, or their respective designees in the exercise of their duties, and to law enforcement personnel in the conduct of a lawful criminal investigation. s ection 1012.31(3)(b) and (c), F.s. (3) State university and Florida College System institution employees For information on statutory exemptions for complaints filed against state university or Florida College s ystem institution (formerly community college) employees, please refer to the discussion of employee evaluations on pages 132-133. e. Conditions for inspection of personnel records an agency is not authorized to unilaterally impose special conditions for the inspection of personnel records. an automatic delay in the production of such records is invalid. Tribune appeal dismissed sub nom., DePerte v. Tribune Company v. Cannella, 458 s o. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1984), Company, And 105 s.Ct. 2315 (1985) (automatic 48 hour delay unauthorized by Ch. 119, F.s.). see Alterra Healthcare Corporation v. Estate of Shelley, 827 s o. 2d 936, 940n.4 (Fla. 2002) (“only the custodian of such records can assert any applicable exemption; not the employee”). Thus, while an agency is not precluded from notifying an employee that a request has been made to inspect his or her personnel records, in the absence of express legislative authority, the production of personnel records may not be delayed in order to allow the employee to be notified Compare s. or present during the inspection of the public records relating to that employee. public school employee may be 1012.31(3)(a)3., F.s., providing that no material derogatory to a inspected until 10 days after the employee has been notified by certified mail or personal delivery as provided in s. 1012.31(2)(c), F.s. (1) Privacy issues The courts have rejected claims that constitutional privacy interests operate to shield agency personnel records from disclosure. See Michel v. Douglas, 464 s o. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 1985), holding that the state constitution “does not provide a right of privacy in public records” and that a state or federal right of disclosural privacy does not exist. “absent an applicable statutory exception, pursuant to Florida’s Public r ecords a ct (embodied in chapter 119, Florida statutes), public employees (as a general rule) do not have privacy rights in such records.” Alterra Healthcare Corporation v. Estate of Shelley, 827 s o. 2d 936, 940n.4 (Fla. 2002). See also Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc. , 379 s o. But see Fadjo v. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980); and Mills v. Doyle, 407 s o. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCa 1981). 129

147 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175n.3 (5th Cir. 1981), noting that “it is clear that the legislature cannot authorize by statute an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.” additionally, the judiciary has refused to deny access to personnel records based on claims that the release of such information could prove embarrassing or unpleasant for the employee. o. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2d DCa 1980) See e.g., News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. v. Gadd, 388 s (absent a statutory exemption, a court is not free to consider public policy questions regarding the relative significance of the public’s interest in disclosure and damage to an individual or institution resulting from such disclosure). Public employers should note, however, that a court has held that an agency must provide a discharged employee with an opportunity for a post-termination name-clearing hearing when stigmatizing information concerning the employee is made a part of the public records or is otherwise published. Buxton v. City of Plant City, Florida, 871 F.2d 1037 (11th Cir. 1989). 563 s o. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d DCa 1990), review denied, See also Garcia v. Walder Electronics, Inc., o. 2d 287 (Fla. 1990) (public employer has an affirmative duty to inform a discharged 576 s Cf. Cannon v. City of employee of his right to seek a post-termination name-clearing hearing). 250 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (failure to provide name-clearing hearing West Palm Beach, to employee who alleged that he was denied a promotion due to stigmatizing information in his personnel file does not violate the employee’s due process rights, because “in this circuit a ‘discharge or more’ is required”). (2) Sealed records an agency is not authorized to “seal” disciplinary notices and thereby remove such notices from disclosure under the Public r ecords a ct. ago 94-75. n or may an agency, absent a statutory exemption for such records, agree to remove counseling slips and written reprimands from an employee’s personnel file and maintain such documents in a separate disciplinary file for the purpose of removing such records from public access. ago 94-54. Accord ago 11- 19 (superintendent’s failure to comply with a statutory requirement to discuss a performance evaluation with the employee before filing it in the employee’s personnel file, does not change the public records status of the evaluation; the evaluation is a public record and may not be removed from public view or destroyed). And see ago 15-10 (agency may not “seal” job applications or request that they be submitted as “sealed” records to foreclose public access). Criminal history information f. except where specific exemptions apply, criminal history information is a public record. ago 77-125; i nf. o p. to l ymn, June 1, 1990. in some cases, criminal or juvenile records information obtained by specific agencies as part of a background check required for certain positions has been made confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s., or use of the information is restricted. See, e.g., s. 110.1127(2)(d) and (e), F.s. (agency positions designated or specified as provided in s. 110.1127, F.s.); s. 1002.36(7) (d) and (e), F.s. (school for the Deaf and the Blind); and s. 39.821(1) F.s. (guardian ad litem). Federal confidentiality provisions also apply to criminal history information received from the u.s. government. For example, criminal history information shared with a public school district by the Federal Bureau of i nvestigation retains its character as a federal record to which only limited access is provided by federal law and is not subject to public inspection under Florida’s Public r ecords a ct. ago 99-01. h owever, information developed by the school district from further inquiry into references in the federal criminal history record information is a public record which should be included in a school district employee’s personnel file. Id. sections 943.0585 and 943.059, F.s., prohibit a records custodian who has received information relating to the existence of an expunged or sealed criminal history record from disclosing the existence of such record. ago 94-49. 130

148 government-in-the-sunshine-manual g. Deferred compensation all records identifying individual participants in any deferred compensation plan under the government e ct and their personal account activities mployees’ Deferred Compensation Plan a shall be confidential and exempt. s ection 112.215(7), F.s. Direct deposit h. ctober 1, 1986, are exempt from s. 119.07(1), Direct deposit records made prior to o F.s. With respect to direct deposit records made on or after o ctober 1, 1986, the names of the authorized financial institutions and the account numbers of the beneficiaries are confidential and exempt. s ection 17.076(5), F.s. i. Drug test results Drug test results and other information received or produced by a state agency employer as a result of a drug-testing program in accordance with s. 112.0455, F.s., the Drug-Free Workplace act, are confidential and exempt, and may not be disclosed except as authorized in the statute. section 112.0455(11), F.s. See also s. 112.0455(8)(l) and (t), F.s. While the provisions of s. 112.0455, F.s., are applicable to state agencies and not to municipalities, ss. 440.101-440.102, F.s., may be used by a municipality or other entity that is an “employer” for purposes of these statutes, to establish a drug-free workplace program. See ago 98-38. s ection 440.102(8), F.s., provides for confidentiality of drug test results or other information received as a result of a drug-testing program implemented pursuant to Ch. 440, F.s. ago 13-19. Cf. ago 94-51 (city not authorized to delete or remove consent forms or records of disciplinary action relating to city employees’ drug testing from personnel records p. to m when drug testing was not conducted pursuant to s. 440.102, F.s.); and i nf. o cCormack, may 13, 1997 (s. 440.102[8], F.s., applies to public employees and not to drug test results of public assistance applicants). s. 443.1715(3), F.s., relating to confidentiality of drug And see test information and limited disclosure in proceedings conducted for purposes of determining compensability under the reemployment assistance law. ttorney g eneral’s office advised that the medical director for a city in ago 96-58, the a fire and rescue department may submit drug test results to the state health department pursuant to s. 401.265(2), F.s., requiring a medical director to report to the department any emergency medical technician or paramedic who may have acted in a manner constituting grounds for discipline under the licensing law. The tests were conducted during routine pre-employment and annual fitness for duty examinations and not pursuant to ss. 440.101-440.102, F.s. j. Employee assistance program an employee’s personal identifying information contained in records held by the employing agency relating to that employee’s participation in an employee assistance program is confidential and exempt from disclosure. See ss. 110.1091 (state employees), 125.585 (county employees), and 166.0444 (municipal employees), F.s. Employment search or consultant records k. “[D]ocuments provided to a consultant in relation to his acting on behalf of a public agency are public documents.” Wallace v. Guzman, 687 s o. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997). Thus, if an agency uses a recruitment company to conduct an employment search for the agency, records made or received by the private company in connection with the search are public records. ago 92-80. See also Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, 379 s o. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980) (firm of consultants hired to conduct an employment search for position of managing director of a public agency was “acting on behalf of ” a public agency and thus letters, memoranda, resumes, and travel vouchers made or received by consultants as part of search were public records). 131

149 government-in-the-sunshine-manual l. Evaluations of employee performance evaluations of public employee performance are generally subject to disclosure. as the upreme Court pointed out in 345 s o. 2d 646, Florida s News-Press Publishing Company v. Wisher, 648 (Fla. 1977): no policy of the state protects a public employee from the embarrassment which results from his or her public employer’s discussion or action on the employee’s failure to perform his or her duties properly. however, there are statutory restrictions on access to evaluations of employee performance for public school system employees. s ection 1012.31(3)(a), F.s. s imilarly, there are exemptions for evaluations contained in limited-access records prescribed by a hospital or other facility licensed under Ch. 395, F.s., for employees of the facility, s. 395.3025(9), F.s.; prescribed by the ducation for Florida College s ystem institution employees, s. 1012.81, F.s.; or state Board of e prescribed by a university board of trustees for its employees, s. 1012.91, F.s. a discussion of each of these exemptions follows: (1) Hospital employees section 395.3025(9), F.s., authorizes hospitals to prescribe the content of limited-access uch employee records which are not available for disclosure for 5 years after such designation. s records are limited to evaluations of employee performance, including records forming the basis for evaluation and subsequent actions. See Times Publishing Company v. Tampa General Hospital, no. 93-03362 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. m ay 27, 1993) (s. 395.3025[9] exemption does not apply to list of terminated hospital employees; hospital ordered to allow newspaper to inspect list and personnel files of those persons named in list after “limited-access” documents have been removed). (2) Public school employees employee evaluations of public school system employees prepared pursuant to cited statutes are confidential until the end of the school year immediately following the school year during which the evaluation was made; however, no evaluations made prior to July 1, 1983, shall be made public. s ection 1012.31(3)(a)2., F.s. h owever, the exemption applies only to the See Morris Publishing Group, LLC v. Department of Education, “employee evaluation.” o. 133 s 3d 957, 960 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013), review denied, 157 s o. 3d 1046 (Fla. 2014) (“While section 1012.31[3][a]2 provides that the evaluation of a public school teacher is not subject to disclosure under the public records law, it does not follow that any information or data used to prepare the evaluation is likewise exempt from disclosure”). moreover, information obtained from evaluation forms circulated by the local teacher’s union to its members that is provided unsolicited to the superintendent is not exempt under this statute. ago 94-94. i n addition, written comments and performance memoranda prepared by individual school board members regarding an appointed superintendent are not exempt from disclosure. ago 97-23. Cf. ago 11-19, concluding that a superintendent’s failure to comply with a statute requiring that a performance evaluation be discussed with an employee before it is filed in the employee’s personnel file, does not change the public records status of the evaluation; the evaluation is a public record and may not be removed from public view or destroyed. (3) State university and Florida College System institution employees limited-access records maintained by a state university on its employees are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s., and may be released only upon authorization in writing from the employee or upon court order. Without such authorization, access to the records is limited ection 1012.91, F.s. to university personnel as specified in the statute. s 132

150 government-in-the-sunshine-manual “limited-access records” are limited to: information reflecting academic evaluations of employee performance that are open to inspection only by the employee and university officials responsible for supervision of the employee; records relating to an investigation of employee misconduct which records are confidential until the conclusion of the investigation or the investigation ceases to be active as defined in the exemption; and records maintained for the purpose of any disciplinary proceeding against the employee or records maintained for any grievance proceeding brought by an employee for enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement or contract until a final decision is made. s ection 1012.91(1), F.s. For sexual harassment investigations of university personnel, portions of records that identify or reasonably could lead to the identification of the complainant or a witness also constitute limited-access records. records which comprise the section 1012.91(2), F.s. common core items contained in the s tate u niversity s ystem s tudent assessment of i nstruction instrument may not be prescribed as limited-access records. s ection 1012.91(4), F.s. regarding Florida College system institution employees, s. 1012.81, F.s., states that rules of the s ducation shall prescribe the content and custody of limited-access records tate Board of e maintained by a Florida College s ystem institution on its employees. s uch records are limited to information reflecting academic evaluations of employee performance and certain disciplinary and grievance records as described in the exemption. limited access records are confidential and exempt and may not be released except as authorized in the exemption. Cf. Rhea v. District Board of Trustees of Santa Fe College, 109 s o. 3d 851 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013) (student’s unredacted e-mail complaining about an instructor’s classroom behavior qualifies as an exempt “education record”). m. Examination questions and answer sheets examination questions and answer sheets of examinations administered by governmental entities for the purpose of licensure, certification, or employment are exempt from mandatory o. 2d 836, 837 Dickerson v. Hayes, 543 s See disclosure requirements. s ection 119.071(1)(a), F.s. (Fla. 1st DCa 1989) (applying exemption to portions of rating sheets used by promotion board which contained summaries of applicants’ responses to oral examination questions where the oral questioning “was a formalized procedure with identical questions asked of each applicant [which] ‘tested’ the applicants’ response both as to style and content”). 82 And see Rush v. High Springs, so. 3d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCa 2012) (exemption applies to questions and answers contained in pre- employment polygraph examinations). The exemption from disclosure in s. 119.071(1)(a), F.s., applies to examination questions and answers, and does not include the “impressions and grading of the responses” by the examiners. at 837. Compare s. 455.229(1), F.s., providing See Dickerson v. Hayes, supra confidentiality for “examination questions, answers, papers, grades, and grading keys” used in licensing examinations administered by the Department of Business and Professional r egulation. a person who has taken an examination has the right to review his or her own completed examination. s ection 119.071(1)(a), F.s. See ago 76-210, stating that an examinee has the right to inspect the results of a completed civil service promotional examination, including owever, the examinee question and answer sheets, after the examination has been completed. h possesses only the right to review his or her own completed examination and may not make or obtain copies of that examination. ago 81-12. n. Home addresses, telephone numbers and other personal information in the absence of statutory exemption, home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, and dates of birth of public officers and employees are not exempt from disclosure. See ago 96-88 (home addresses and telephone numbers and business addresses and telephone numbers of members of state and district human rights advocacy committees are public records); Browning v. Walton, 351 s o. 2d 380 (Fla. 4th DCa 1977) (city cannot refuse to allow inspection of records containing the names and addresses of city employees who have filled out forms requesting that 133

151 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the city maintain the confidentiality of their personnel files). And see United Teachers of Dade o. 92-17803 (01) (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. n v. School Board of Dade County, ov. 30, 1992) (home n telephone numbers and addresses of school district employees not protected by constitutional right to privacy; only the legislature can exempt such information). Cf. ago 85-03 (list containing names and addresses of subscribers to state magazine is a public record). (1) Listing of public officers and employees covered by exemptions The home addresses, telephone numbers, and other specified personal information pertaining to certain public officers and employees and their spouses and children have been exempted in ss. 119.071(4)(d) and 119.071(5)(i) and (k), F.s. With the exception of county tax collectors, the exemptions apply to former as well as current officers and employees. For purposes of s. 119.071(4)(d), F.s., the term “telephone numbers” includes “home telephone numbers, personal cellular telephone numbers, personal pager telephone numbers, ection 119.071(4) and telephone numbers associated with personal communications devices.” s (d)1., F.s. (a) Abuse investigators for Department of Children and Families and Department of Health a. scope of exemption: a ctive or former personnel of the Department of Children and Families whose duties include the investigation of abuse, neglect, exploitation, fraud, theft or other criminal activities; and active or former personnel of the Department of health whose duties are to support the investigation of child abuse or neglect b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, c. photographs, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.a., F.s. tatutory reference: s (b) Code enforcement officers a. scope of exemption: Current or former code enforcement officers i nformation exempted: h b. ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.i., F.s. tatutory reference: s (c) County tax collectors a. scope of exemption: County tax collectors b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of birth c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.n., F.s. Domestic violence and other specified crime victims (d) 134

152 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Please refer to the discussion on pages 72-73. Emergency medical technicians or paramedics (e) a. scope of exemption: Current or former emergency medical technicians or paramedics certified under Ch. 401, F.s. b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.q., F.s. (f ) Firefighters a. scope of exemption: Current or former firefighters certified in compliance with s. 633.408, F.s. b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, photographs, and places of employment of spouses and children of such firefighters; and the names and locations of the schools and day care facilities attended by the children of the firefighters d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.d., F.s. (g) Guardians ad litem a. scope of exemption: Current or former guardians ad litem, as defined in s. 39.820, F.s. ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, places of b. i nformation exempted: h employment, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of spouses and children of such persons; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such persons tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.j., F.s. d. s (h) Hospital employees Please refer to the discussion on page 90. (i) Human resource managers (local governments) scope of exemption: Current or former human resource, labor relations, or employee a. relations directors, assistant directors, managers, or assistant managers of any local government agency or water management district whose duties include hiring and firing employees, labor contract negotiation, administration, or other personnel-related duties b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel ection 119.071(4)(d)2.h., F.s. d. s tatutory reference: s 135

153 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (j) Impaired practitioner consultants a. scope of exemption: Current or former impaired practitioner consultants retained by an agency or current or former employees of an impaired practitioner consultant whose duties result in a determination of a person’s skill and safety to practice a licensed profession ome addresses, telephone numbers dates of birth, and b. i nformation exempted: h photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such consultants or their employees; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such consultants or employees d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.p., F.s. Inspectors general and internal auditors performing specified duties (k) a. scope of exemption: Current or former personnel employed in an agency’s office of inspector general or internal audit department whose duties include auditing or investigating waste, fraud, abuse, theft, exploitation, or other activities that could lead to criminal prosecution or administrative discipline ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and b. i nformation exempted: h photographs ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of c. Family information exempted: n birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.r., F.s. (l) Investigators and inspectors of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation a. scope of exemption: Current or former investigators or inspectors of the Department egulation of Business and Professional r i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and b. photographs Family information exempted: n c. ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.m., F.s. (m) Investigators of the Department of Financial Services and Office of Financial Regulation with specified duties a. scope of exemption: Current or former nonsworn investigative personnel of the Department of Financial s ervices and office of Financial r egulation whose duties include the investigation of fraud, theft, workers’ compensation coverage requirements and compliance, other related criminal activities, or state regulatory requirement violations b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel. 136

154 government-in-the-sunshine-manual d. s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.b., and c., F.s. tatutory reference: s Judges, magistrates, and hearing officers (state) (n) Administrative law judges, magistrates, and child support hearing officers I. a. scope of exemption: g eneral magistrates, special magistrates, judges of compensation dministrative h earings, and child claims, administrative law judges of the Division of a support enforcement hearing officers b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, dates of birth, and telephone numbers c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.g., F.s. II. Court justices and judges a. scope of exemption: Current or former Justices of the supreme Court, district court of appeal judges, circuit court judges, and county court judges b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, dates of birth, and telephone numbers c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of current or former justices and judges; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such justices and judges tatutory reference: s d. s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.e., F.s. (o) Juvenile Justice juvenile probation and detention officers and counselors scope of exemption: Current or former juvenile probation officers and supervisors, a. detention superintendents and assistant superintendents, juvenile justice detention officers and supervisors, juvenile justice residential officers and supervisors, juvenile justice counselors, supervisors, and administrators, human services counselor administrators, rehabilitation therapists and social services counselors of the Department of Juvenile Justice i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and b. photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.k., F.s. (p) Law enforcement and correctional personnel a. scope of exemption: a ctive or former sworn or civilian law enforcement personnel, including correctional and correctional probation officers b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel ection 119.071(4)(d)2.a., F.s. d. s tatutory reference: s 137

155 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (q) Personnel of the Department of Health with specified duties scope of exemption: Current or former personnel of the Department of health whose a. duties include, or result in, the determination or adjudication of eligibility for social security disability benefits, the investigation or prosecution of complaints filed against health care practitioners, or the inspection of health care practitioners or health care ealth facilities licensed by the Department of h b. i nformation exempted: h omes addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of Family information exempted: n c. birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.o., F.s. d. s. 119.071(4)(d)2.a., F.s. See also (child abuse or neglect investigators). Prosecutors and judges (federal) (r) scope of exemption: Current or former u nited s tates attorneys, assistant u nited s tates a. attorneys, judges of the u tates Courts of a ppeal, u nited s tates district judges nited s or u nited s tates magistrates if the individual submits to the agency having custody of such information a written request to exempt such information from public disclosure as well as a written statement that he or she has made reasonable efforts to protect such information from being accessible through other means available to the public nformation exempted: h b. i ome address, telephone number and photograph c. Family information exempted: h ome address, telephone number, photograph, and place of employment of the spouse or child; and the name and location of the school or day care facility attended by the child of such attorney, judge or magistrate tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(5)(i), F.s. d. s Prosecutors (state) (s) a. scope of exemption: Current or former state attorneys, assistant state attorneys, statewide prosecutors, or assistant statewide prosecutors b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.f., F.s. (t) Public defenders and other specified counsel a. scope of exemption: Current or former public defenders, assistant public defenders, criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, and assistant criminal conflict and civil regional counsel b. i nformation exempted: h ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel 138

156 government-in-the-sunshine-manual d. s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.l., F.s. tatutory reference: s Revenue collection and enforcement or child support enforcement (u) scope of exemption: a ctive or former personnel of the Department of r evenue or a. local governments whose duties include revenue collection and enforcement or child support enforcement nformation exempted: h b. i ome addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs c. Family information exempted: n ames, home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel d. s tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(4)(d)2.a., F.s. note: i ttorney g eneral’s office concluded that this exemption should n ago 96-57, the a be construed as including personnel whose duties include both revenue collection and enforcement, as opposed to those personnel whose duties include only revenue collection or only revenue enforcement. (v) U.S. military servicemembers a. scope of exemption: Current or former members of the armed Forces of the u nited states, a reserve component of the armed Forces of the u nited s tates, or the n ational guard who served after s eptember 11, 2001, if the servicemember has submitted to the custodial agency a written request to exempt the information; and a written statement that he or she has made reasonable efforts to protect the information from being accessible through other means available to the public b. i nformation exempted: h ome address, telephone number, and date of birth of a servicemember, and the telephone number associated with a servicemember’s personal communication device c. Family information exempted: h ome address, telephone number, date of birth, and place of employment of a spouse or dependent of a servicemember, and the telephone number associated with such spouse’s or dependent’s personal communication device; and the names and location of schools attended by the spouse of a servicemember, or a school or day care facility attended by a dependent of a servicemember tatutory reference: s ection 119.071(5)(k), F.s. d. s (2) Authority to release protected information The purpose of the s. 119.071(4)(d), F.s., exemption is to protect the safety of the enumerated individuals and their families by removing certain information relating to such individuals from the mandatory disclosure requirements of Ch. 119, F.s. ago 10-37. And see ago s 90-50 and 96-57. The statute makes these records exempt from mandatory disclosure requirements, not confidential; thus, an agency is not prohibited from disclosing the information owever, in determining whether to disclose the information, in all circumstances. ago 10-37. h the agency should consider the underlying purpose of the statute, i.e., safety of the listed individuals and their families. ago 90-50. See also ago 08-24. Cf. ago 90-50, noting that the exemption does not prohibit an agency from “access to, and maintaining information on, its employees, including their names and addresses.” in other words, a police department, in deciding whether to publicly release photographs of law enforcement personnel, should determine whether there is a statutory or substantial policy need for disclosure. ago 07-21. i n the absence of a statutory or other legal duty to be accomplished by disclosure, the agency should consider whether the release of such information For example, is consistent with the purpose of the exemption afforded by s. 119.071(4)(d)2. Id. 139

157 government-in-the-sunshine-manual a posting of the names, i.D. numbers and photographs of police officers in the hallway of the police department for public display would appear to be counter to the purpose of the exemption. ago 90-50. By contrast, information from the city personnel files which reveals the home ttorney’s office for addresses of former law enforcement personnel may be disclosed to the s tate a p. nf. o the purpose of serving criminal witness subpoenas by mail pursuant to s. 48.031, F.s. i pril 25, 1989. eese, a to r ttorney g Thus, in ago 08-24, the a eneral’s office noted that the home addresses and other protected personal information of the spouses of law enforcement officers who are employed by the school board are exempt from disclosure under s. 119.071(4)(d)2., F.s., and therefore, the school board was not required to report such information to the certified bargaining And see Henderson v. Perez, representative. o. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 2d DCa 2003) (trial court 835 s order compelling sheriff to produce exempt home addresses and photographs of 10 active law enforcement officers in a civil lawsuit filed by Perez predicated on his arrest, quashed because “Perez has not shown that the photographs and home addresses of the law enforcement officers are essential to the prosecution of his suit”). The s. 119.071(4)(d)2. exemption applies to public agencies, not private entities unless nf. o p. to g omez, n the private entity is acting on behalf of a public agency. i Cf. ov. 3, 2008. s. 843.17, F.s., making it a misdemeanor to maliciously publish or disseminate, with intent to obstruct the due execution of the law or with the intent to intimidate, hinder, or interrupt any law enforcement officer in the legal performance of his or her duties, the residence address or telephone number of any law enforcement officer while designating the officer as such, without authorization of the agency which employs the officer. But see Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, Fla., 709 F. s upp. 2d 1244 (n.D. Fla. 2010), holding that s. 843.17, F.s., was unconstitutional on its face. (3) Records held by agencies that are not the employer of the designated officers or employees an agency that is the custodian of personal information specified in s. 119.071(4)(d)2., F.s., but is not the employer of the officer or employee, may maintain the exempt status of that information only if the officer or employee or the employing agency of the designated employee submits a written request for maintenance of the exemption to the custodial agency. s ection 119.071(4)(d)3., F.s. See ago s 97-67 (official r ecords maintained by clerk of court), 04-18 (applying exemption when requested to petitions and campaign papers filed with supervisor of elections), and 04-20 (property appraiser). And see ago 05-38 (request made to the property appraiser for an exemption from disclosure of personal information would follow the property value appraiser’s records when they are relayed to the clerk of courts carrying out duties for the adjustment Board). The provisions of s. 119.071(4)(d), F.s., should not be read “to impose a burden on employers to know the past law enforcement employment status of employees who may work for them in other capacities.” ago 10-37. Thus, a former law enforcement officer from one municipality who is currently employed by another municipality in a non-law enforcement capacity must make a written request pursuant to s. 119.071(4)(d)3., F.s., that his or her personal information be maintained as exempt by the current employer. Id. a request made pursuant to s. 119.071(4)(d)3., F.s., for maintenance of exempt information in court records or the official records must specify the document type, identification number, and page number of the court record or official record that contains the exempt information. section 119.0714(2)(f ) and (3)(f ), F.s. (4) Application of exemption to: Telephone numbers of cellular telephones issued by agencies (a) 140

158 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Cellular telephone numbers of telephones provided by the agency to law enforcement nf. o officers and used in performing law enforcement duties are not exempt from disclosure. i p. to laquidara, July 17, 2003. i n 2012, the legislature amended s. 119.071(4)(d), F.s., to define the term “telephone numbers” as used in the exemption to include “home telephone numbers, personal cellular telephone numbers, personal pager telephone numbers, and telephone numbers See s. 119.071(4)(d)1., F.s., as amended by associated with personal communications devices.” Ch. 2012-149, laws of Florida. as originally introduced, the 2012 legislation would have also included “telephone numbers associated with agency cellular telephones” within the definition of “telephone numbers.” See hB 629, filed n ovember 10, 2011. h owever, this proposed language was removed from the original bill during the legislative process. (b) List of names of designated officers and employees While s. 119.071(4)(d)2., F.s., exempts home addresses and other personal information of names of these officers and the designated public officers and employees, it does not exempt the employees from public disclosure (although typically the names of the spouses and children are exempt). See, e.g., s. 119.071(4)(d)2.i., F.s. (names of spouses and children of code enforcement officers are exempt). accordingly, if the property appraiser maintains a list of the names of officers and employees who have requested the exemption of their home addresses as authorized by s. 119.071(4)(d)3., F.s., this list is not exempt. ago 08-29. however, as noted elsewhere in this manual, the property appraiser is not required to create or reformat records in order to comply with a request under Ch. 119; the duty of the public records custodian is to provide access to existing records. see the discussion on pages 154-155. (c) Prior home addresses section 119.071(4)(d)2., F.s., applies only to the current home address or addresses (including a current vacation home address) of the designated individuals. ago 10-37. Maps showing physical location of homes (d) a property appraiser is precluded from making technology available to the public that would enable a user to view a map on the i nternet showing the physical location of a law enforcement officer’s home, even though the map does not contain the actual home address of the officer, if the property appraiser has received a written exemption request from the officer. ago 04-20. Home addresses of persons who are not the owner of the property (e) The exemption applies to the home addresses, telephone numbers, and other personal information relating to the specified individuals “without regard to whether or not they own the real property at which they reside.” ago 14-07. (f ) Booking photographs section 119.071(4)(d), F.s., exempts the photograph of a current or former law enforcement officer, whether held by the employing agency or by a nonemploying agency which has received a written request to maintain the exempt status of the record. i nf. o p. to amunds, June 8, 2012. Thus, the agency should determine whether there is a statutory or substantial Id. i n the absence of a policy need for disclosure before releasing the booking photograph. statutory or other legal duty to be accomplished by disclosure, an agency should consider whether the release of such information is consistent with the purpose of the exemption, i.e. , the safety of law enforcement officers and their families. Id. See also ago s 90-50 and 07-21. Cf. ago 94-90 (statute did not preclude release of booking photograph of deputy who was not an undercover officer whose identity would otherwise be protected by s. 119.071[2][c], F.s.). 141

159 government-in-the-sunshine-manual o. Medical information and health insurance participant information (1) Medical information and medical claims records medical information pertaining to a prospective, current, or former officer or employee of an agency which, if disclosed, would identify that officer or employee is exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. s ection 119.071(4)(b)1., F.s. s uch information may be disclosed if the person or the person’s legal representative provides written permission or pursuant to court order. Id. See ago 98-17 (exemption “appears to extend to governmental employees the protection for personal medical records that is generally enjoyed by private sector employees”). Public school system employee medical records, including psychiatric and psychological records, are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. s ection 1012.31(3)(a)5., F.s. every employer who provides or administers health insurance benefits or life insurance benefits to its employees shall maintain the confidentiality of information relating to the medical uch information is exempt condition or status of any person covered by such insurance benefits. s ection 760.50(5), F.s. from s. 119.07(1), F.s. s Patient medical records and medical claims records of current or former employees and eligible dependents enrolled in group insurance plans of specified governmental entities are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s.; such records shall not be furnished to any person other than the employee or the employee’s legal representative, except as authorized in the subsection. s ections 110.123(9) (state employees), 112.08(7) (county or municipal employees), and 112.08(8) (water See ago 91-88, citing to News-Press Company, Inc. v. Kaune, management district employees), F.s. o. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCa 1987), stating that the exemption applies broadly and is not 511 s limited solely to medical records filed in conjunction with an employee’s participation in a group insurance plan; rather, the exemption applies to all medical records relating to employees enrolled And see ago in a group insurance plan. s 01-33 (confidentiality of patient records at medical clinic owned and operated by city for the use and benefit of its employees); 94-78 (monthly printout of medical claims paid under city group health insurance plan that identifies the public employees who obtained medical services and the amounts of the claims, together with some account information, is exempt from public inspection), and 94-51 (agency “should be vigilant in its protection of the confidentiality provided by statute for medical records of [its] employees”). (2) Health insurance participant information While “information relating to an insurance program participant’s medical condition is protected from disclosure . . . there is no clear statement that such protection extends to the nf. o name, address, age, or other non-medical information of such participants.” i p. to Dockery, november 10, 2008. subsequent to the issuance of this opinion, the legislature enacted an exemption for personal identifying information of a dependent child of a current or former officer or employee of an agency, whose dependent child (as defined in s. 409.2554, F.s.) is insured by the agency’s group insurance plan. s ection 119.071(4)(b)2., F.s. h owever, while personal identifying information relating to the dependent child’s participation in an agency’s group insurance plan is now confidential, personal identifying information relating to the current or former officer’s or employee’s participation in such plan is subject to disclosure. Cf. s. 110.12301(3), F.s., providing confidentiality for records collected for purposes of dependent eligibility verification services conducted for the state group insurance program and held by the Department of m anagement services. p. Payroll deduction records There is no general exemption from disclosure that applies to agency payroll deduction records. h owever, public school system employee payroll deduction records are confidential. tax section 1012.31(3)(a)4., F.s. See ago 09-11 (tax information [such as Federal Withholding 142

160 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Deduction, FiCa edicare tax Deduction] of a public school system tax Deduction and the m employee would appear to constitute payroll deduction records and would be confidential and exempt from disclosure pursuant to s. 1012.31[3][a]4., F.s.). Retiree lists q. The names and addresses of retirees are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s., to the extent that no state or local governmental agency may provide the names or addresses of such persons in aggregate, compiled or list form except to public agencies engaged in official business, to collective bargaining agents or to retiree organizations for official business use. section 121.031(5), F.s. “ any person may view or copy any individual’s retirement records at the Department of m anagement s ervices, one record at a time, or may obtain information by a separate written request for a named individual for which information is desired.” Id. Cf. s. 121.4501(19), F.s. (personal identifying information of members in the investment plan contained in Florida system records held by the s tate Board of administration or the retirement Department of m anagement s ervices is exempt). section 121.021(60), F.s., defines the term “retiree” to mean “a former member of the Florida r etirement s ystem or an existing system who has terminated employment and is receiving benefit payments from the system in which he or she was a member.” accordingly, the s. 121.031(5) exemption does not apply to employees who are participants in the Deferred retirement o ption Program (DroP); DroP participants “are not retirees since they have not terminated their employment.” Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. School Board of Palm Beach ovember 28, 2007). Cir. Ct. n o. 502007Ca020000XXXXmB (Fla. 15th n County, Salary records r. Lewis v. salary and other information relating to compensation is subject to disclosure. Schreiber, n o. 92-8005(03) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. June 12, 1992), per curiam affirmed, 611 s o. 2d 531 (Fla. 4th DCa 1992). ago 73-30. Accord s. Travel records travel vouchers are open to public inspection, after redaction of exempt material such as credit card account numbers (s. 119.071[5][b], F.s.) or social security numbers (ss. 119.071[4] a] and [5][a]F.s). See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, 379 s o. 2d 633 (Fla. ago 72-356 (travel itineraries and plane reservations for use of state aircraft are 1980). See also public records). t. Undercover personnel of criminal justice agencies Please refer to the discussion of this topic on page 112. 19. Security system information and blueprints a. Blueprints section 119.071(3)(b)1., F.s., exempts building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings, and diagrams of government buildings. e xempt information may be disclosed to another governmental entity, to a licensed professional performing work on the building, or upon a showing of good cause to a court. s ection 119.071(3)(b)3., F.s. exempt documents may also be released in order to comply with competitive bidding requirements. ago 02-74. h owever, the entities or persons receiving such information must maintain its exempt status. Id. And see s. 119.071(3)(c)1., F.s. (exemption for building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings and diagrams of various attractions, retail, resort, office, and industrial complexes and developments when the records are held by an agency). The exemption afforded by this statute, however, does not apply to comprehensive plans or site plans, or amendments thereto, which are submitted for approval or which have been approved under 143

161 government-in-the-sunshine-manual local land development regulations, local zoning regulations, or development of regional impact ection 119.071(3)(c)4., F.s. review. s b. Security system records information relating to the security systems for property owned by or leased to the ection state or any of its political subdivisions is confidential and exempt from disclosure. s xempt information includes all records, information, photographs, audio and 281.301, F.s. e visual presentations, schematic diagrams, surveys, recommendations, or consultations or portions The exemption thereof relating directly to or revealing such security systems or information. Id. extends to information relating to or revealing the security systems for property owned or leased by the state or its political subdivisions, and also to security information concerning privately owned or leased property which is in the possession of an agency. ago s 01-75 and 93-86. See also ss. 331.22, F.s. (airport security plans); s. 311.13, F.s. (seaport security plans); and 1004.0962(2), F.s. (campus emergency response of postsecondary education institution). section 119.071(3)(a), F.s., provides a similar exemption from disclosure for a security system plan of a private or public entity that is held by an agency. The information may be disclosed to the property owner or leaseholder; in furtherance of the official duties and responsibilities of the agency holding the information; to another local, state or federal agency in furtherance of that agency’s official duties and responsibilities; or upon a showing of good cause before a court. The term “security system plan” includes: records relating directly to the physical security of the facility or revealing security systems; threat assessments conducted by an agency or private entity; threat response plans; emergency evacuation plans; sheltering arrangements; or security Id. manuals. 107 s o. 3d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013), in which Cf. Marino v. University of Florida, the court rejected a university’s contention that it could withhold the location of animal research facilities based on a determination that the nature of the public activities occurring at the facility subjects them to physical threats. (1) Security system (alarm) permits and applications sections 281.301 and 119.071(3)(a), F.s., prohibit public disclosure of the name and address of applicants for security system permits, of persons cited for violations of alarm ordinances, and of individuals who are the subject of law enforcement dispatch reports for verified or false alarms “because disclosure would imperil the safety of persons and property.” Critical Intervention Services, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, o. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 2d DCa 908 s 2005). Accord ago 04-28. Surveillance video recordings (2) video footage captured by city bus cameras “directly relates to and reveals information about a security system” and thus was determined to be confidential and exempt from disclosure by ss. 281.301 and 119.071(3)(a), F.s. Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority v. Post- Newsweek Stations, Orlando, Inc. , 157 so. 3d 401 (Fla. 5th DCa 2015). The videos “reveal the capabilities—and as a corollary, the vulnerabilities” of the security system. Id. at 405. And see Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority , and applying the ago 15-06, relying on exemption to surveillance tapes from a security system for a public transit authority building. c. Security issues relating to electronic records section 119.01(2)(a), F.s., states that agencies “must provide reasonable public access to records electronically maintained and must ensure that exempt or confidential records are not disclosed except as otherwise permitted by law.” And see rule 1B-26.003(6)(g)3., F.a.C, adopted by the Division of library and i nformation s ervices of Department of s tate pursuant to its records management rulemaking authority in s. 257.14, F.s. The rule states that “[i]n providing access to electronic records, agencies shall ensure that procedures and controls are in place to maintain confidentiality for information which is exempt from public disclosure.” 144

162 government-in-the-sunshine-manual accordingly, an agency is not required to provide direct access to the agency’s electronic records through a hard drive provided by a requestor, but must otherwise allow inspection and copying of such records in a manner which will accommodate the request, but protect from And see Rea v. Sansbury, 504 s o. 2d disclosure exempt or confidential materials. ago 13-07. review denied, 513 s o. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1987) (while 1315, 1317-1318 (Fla. 4th DCa 1987), county possesses statutory authority to facilitate inspection of public records by electronic means, this “does not mean that every means adopted by the county to facilitate the work of county employees ipso facto requires that the public be allowed to participate therein”). Compare ago 05-12 (city may not require use of a code to review e-mail correspondence of city police department and human services department). section 282.318(4), F.s., requires state agencies, as defined in the statute, to conduct risk assessments, conduct internal audits, and develop procedures to address information technology security issues. This section also contains exemptions for records relating to these functions. For example, written internal policies and procedures that, if disclosed, could facilitate the unauthorized modification, disclosure, or destruction of data or information technology resources are confidential. section 282.318(4)(e), F.s. Cf. s. 119.0713(5)(a), F.s., (records relating to security of information technology systems of local government owned or operated utilities); and s. 1004.055(1), F.s. (security of data and information technology in state postsecondary education institutions). 20. Social security numbers section 119.071(5)(a)5., F.s., states that social security numbers held by an agency are confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements; however, the exemption does not supersede any federal law prohibiting the release of social security numbers or any other applicable public records exemptions for such numbers. See, e.g., s. 193.114(5), F.s. (social security number submitted on an application for a tax exemption is confidential); and s. 119.071(4)(a), F.s. (social security numbers of current and former employees held by the employing agency are confidential and exempt from disclosure). s. 119.0714, F.s., regarding confidentiality of social security And see numbers in court records and in the official records. section 119.071(5)(a)6., F.s, authorizes disclosure of social security numbers under certain Cf. Florida Department of Education v. NYT Management Services, Inc., 895 s o. 2d conditions. 1151 (Fla. 1st DCa 2005) (federal law does not authorize newspaper to obtain social security numbers in state teacher certification database). in addition, s. 119.071(5)(a)7.b., F.s., states that an agency may not deny a commercial entity engaged in “commercial activity,” as defined in the exemption, access to social security numbers, “provided the social security numbers will be used only in the performance of a commercial activity and provided the commercial entity makes a written request for the social security numbers.” “Commercial activity” does not include the display or bulk sale of social security numbers to the public or the distribution of such numbers to any customer not identifiable by the commercial entity. s ection 119.071(5)(a)7.a.(i), F.s. See i nf. o p. to Carland, January 12, 2012 (teacher union’s access to social security numbers maintained by school district limited to those social security numbers which will be used to verify the accuracy of numbers which the union has already received in the normal course of business). See also ago 10-06 (agency authorized to request additional information that is reasonably necessary to verify the identity of the commercial entity and the specific purposes for which the social security numbers will be used). 21. Telephone records records of telephone calls made from agency telephones are subject to disclosure in the absence of statutory exemption. See Gillum v. Times Publishing Company, n o. 91-2689- Ca (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. July 10, 1991). See also Media General Operation, Inc. v. Feeney, 849 s o. 2d 3, 6 (Fla. 1st DCa 2003), rejecting the argument that redaction of telephone numbers for calls made in the course of official business could be justified because disclosure could result in 145

163 government-in-the-sunshine-manual “unreasonable consequences” to the persons called. s. 119.071(5)(d), F.s. (all records supplied Cf. by a telecommunications company, as defined by s. 364.02, F.s., to an agency which contain the name, address, and telephone number of subscribers are confidential and exempt). nf. to And see i michelson, January 27, 1992 (cellular telephone company which provided city with statements reflecting amount of usage of cell phones by city staff rather than listing individual calls, did not appear to be an “agency” for purposes of Ch. 119, F.s., making company’s records of individual calls subject to disclosure). n in Bill of Rights, Inc. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, o. 2009-20218-Cins (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. april 8, 2010), the court stated that “as a matter of law, . . . billing documents regarding personal calls made and received by city employees on city-owned or city-leased cellular telephones are public records, when those documents are received and maintained in connection with the transaction of official business; and, the ‘official business’ of a city includes paying for telephone service and obtaining reimbursement from employees for personal calls.” Compare Media General in which the court held that under the circumstances of that case Operation, Inc. v. Feeney, supra, (involving access to records of cellular phone service provided by a political party for legislative employees), records of personal or private calls of the employees fell outside the definition of public records. additionally, in responding to a question from a police department regarding the provisions ttorney g eneral’s office of Ch. 934, F.s., (interception of wire and oral communications), the a advised that recordings of telephone conversations made by the police department in the usual course of business would be public records subject to the inspection, copying, and retention requirements of Ch. 119, F.s. ago 12-07. “ any such public records would likewise be subject to the exemption and confidentiality provisions of the Public r ecords law.” Id. And see Morris Publishing Group, LLC v. State, 154 s o. 3d 528, 532 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015), review denied, 163 so. 3d 512 (Fla. 2015) (“n o one disputes” that phone recordings of telephone calls made by the Compare defendant while incarcerated and provided in criminal discovery were public records). 46 s o. 3d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCa 2010) (recordings of personal telephone calls between Bent v. State, minors in jail awaiting trial and third parties made by sheriff’s office are not public records when contents of the phone calls do not involve criminal activity or a security breach). 22. Trade secrets and proprietary confidential business information a. Trade secrets (1) Statutory exemptions for specific trade secrets (a) Trade secrets held by specified agencies The legislature has created a number of specific exemptions from Ch. 119, F.s., for trade secrets. See, e.g., s. 1004.22(2), F.s. (trade secrets produced in research within state universities); and s. 570.544(8), F.s. (trade secrets contained in records of the Division of Consumer s ervices of the Department of agriculture and Consumer s ervices). Please refer to the listing of exemptions in a ppendix D for more information on statutes providing confidentiality for trade secrets held by specific agencies. (b) Computer systems and software trade secrets Data processing software which has been obtained by an agency under a licensing agreement prohibiting its disclosure and which is a trade secret as defined in s. 812.081, F.s., is exempt. s ection 119.071(1)(f ), F.s. i n order for the exemption to apply, two conditions must be present: The licensing agreement must prohibit disclosure of the software and the software must meet the statutory definition of “trade secret” found in s. 812.081, F.s. See ago s 90-104 and 90-102. section 815.04(3), F.s., provides that data, programs, or supporting documentation that is a trade secret as defined in s. 812.081, F.s., that is held by an agency, and that resides or exists 146

164 government-in-the-sunshine-manual internal or external to a computer, computer system, computer network or electronic device is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), F.s. (2) Trade secrets identified as confidential and submitted to an agency as noted in the preceding discussion, the legislature has enacted statutes that expressly require certain agencies to maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets submitted to or held by that agency, and has also enacted exemptions for computer trade secrets. however, even in the absence of a statutory exemption for particular trade secrets, s. 815.045, F.s., “should be read to exempt from disclosure as public records all trade secrets as defined in [s. 812.081(1)(c), F.s.] . . . .” 839 s o. 2d 781, 785- Sepro Corporation v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 787 (Fla. 1st DCa 2003), review denied sub nom., Crist v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 911 s o. 2d 792 (Fla. 2005). (e.s.) a ccording to the court, while “a conversation with a [public] employee is not enough to prevent [alleged trade secrets] from being made available to anyone who makes a public records request,” documents submitted by a private party which constitute trade secrets as defined in s. 812.081, and which are stamped as confidential at the time of submission to an agency, are not subject to public access. at 784. And see Seta Corporation of Id. 756 s Boca, Inc. v. Office of the Attorney General, But see Cubic o. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCa 2000). Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 899 s o. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 3d DCa 2005) (company, which supplied documents to an agency and failed to mark them as “confidential” and which continued to supply them without asserting even a legally ineffectual post-delivery claim to confidentiality for some thirty days, failed adequately to protect an alleged trade secret claim). in addition, the claimed trade secrets must actually constitute trade secrets as defined by law. See s. 812.081, F.s. For example, in James, Hoyer, Newcomer, Smiljanich, & Yanchunis, P.A., v. Rodale, Inc., 41 s o. 3d 386, 389 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010), the court rejected a company’s claim that information in customer complaints and company responses were trade secrets; noting ago 09- that such information “is not secret and is not [the company’s] to control.” Cf. 02 (authorized representatives of Division of Plant i ndustry in Department of agriculture and services prohibited from disclosing trade secrets obtained in carrying out their duties Consumer under Ch. 581 to any unauthorized person, provided such trade secrets fall within the statutory definition in s. 812.081, F.s., and owner of trade secrets has taken measures to maintain the information’s secrecy). And see Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. v. Office of Ins. Regulation, 981 s o. 2d review denied, 987 s o. 2d 79 (Fla. 2008) (to the extent allstate believed 617 (Fla. 1st DCa 2008), nsurance r egulation were privileged as trade secrets, any documents sought by the office of i allstate was required to timely seek a protective order in circuit court); and i nf. o p. to Brown, march 11, 2016 (if an agency has received material that the sender has identified as “trade secret” and the material does not appear to meet the statutory definition of trade secret or has not been protected as in Sepro , the agency should advise the sender “that it has a received a public request and will release the records and allow the sender to seek a protective order for those materials”). The trial court’s conclusion as to whether specific information constitutes a trade secret “rests on factual determinations that are assailable on appeal only if unsupported by competent, substantial evidence.” Sepro , 839 s o. 2d at 785. See Office of Insurance Regulation v. State Farm Florida Insurance Company , 213 s o. 3d 1104 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017) (trial court’s conclusion that insurance policy statistics submitted to the office of i nsurance r egulation had “independent economic value” within the meaning of the statutory definition of trade secret was supported by competent, substantial evidence). Cf. Surterra Florida, LLC v. Florida Department of Health , 223 so. 3d 376 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017) (affirming trial court’s finding that identities of investors and partners listed in applications to dispense medical cannabis were not trade secrets because the applicants “did not prove” that this information constituted a trade secret). b. Proprietary confidential business information While there is no generic exemption for information claimed to be “proprietary legislature has created a number of exemptions from Ch. confidential business information,” the 147

165 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 119, F.s., for proprietary confidential business information held by certain agencies. The term is generally defined by the statute creating the exemption and frequently includes trade secrets. See, e.g., s. 288.075, F.s. (economic development agency); s. 288.9626, F.s. (Florida o pportunity Cf. ervice Commission). Fund); and ss. 364.183, 366.093, 367.156, and 368.108, F.s. (Public s 31 s o. 3d 860 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010) Florida Power & Light Company v. Public Service Commission, (listed categories of proprietary confidential business information in s. 366.093, F.s., as exempt are not exhaustive; information relating to employees’ compensation warranted confidential classification as it would have impaired utility’s competitive interests). Southern Bell Compare 597 s o. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992) (Public Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Beard, service Commission’s determination that statutory exemption for proprietary confidential business information should be narrowly construed and did not apply to company’s internal self- analysis was “consistent with the liberal construction afforded the Public r ct in favor of ecords a open government”). ago 08-14 (lease payment amount made by a private company to And see the city does not constitute “proprietary confidential business information”). D. PROVIDING PUBLIC RECORDS 1. Validity of agency conditions on access section 119.07(1)(a), F.s., establishes a right of access to public records in plain and unequivocal terms: every person who has custody of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and copied by any person desiring to do so, at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the public records. The term “reasonable conditions” as used in s. 119.07(1)(a), F.s., “refers not to conditions which must be fulfilled before review is permitted but to reasonable regulations that would permit the custodian of records to protect them from alteration, damage, or destruction and also to ensure that the person reviewing the records is not subjected to physical constraints designed to preclude review.” Wait v. Florida Power & Light Company, 372 s o. 2d 420, 425 (Fla. 1979). See also Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 s o. 3d 1080, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCa 2014) (noting the Tribune Company v. Cannella, narrow interpretation of the phrase “reasonable conditions”); and o. 2d 1075, 1078 (Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom., DePerte v. Tribune Company, 458 s 105 s.Ct. 2315 (1985) (the sole purpose of custodial supervision is to protect the records from alteration, damage, or destruction). accordingly, the “reasonable conditions” do not include a rule or condition of inspection which operates to restrict or circumvent a person’s right of access. ago 75-50. “The courts of this state have invalidated measures which seek to impose any additional burden on those seeking to exercise their rights to obtain records” under Ch. 119, F.s. i nf. o p. to Cook, m ay 27, 2011. And see State v. Webb, 786 s o. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCa 2001) (requirement that persons with custody of public records allow records to be examined “at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions” is not unconstitutional as applied to public records custodian who was dilatory in responding to public records requests). The Public r ecords a ct “embodies important public policy” and “is designed to provide citizens with a simple and expeditious method of accessing public records.” Orange County v. Hewlings, 152 s o. 3d 812, 817 (Fla. 5th DCa 2014). Thus, an agency violated the a ct when instead of complying with hewlings’ “simple request” for records, it “chose to interpose the additional bureaucratic hurdles of forcing her to come to its offices, comb through the records, mark the records in a certain manner, wait for a written estimate of costs, then, after paying the costs, wait again for the records to be mailed to her.” Id. The custodian “is at all times responsible for the custody of the [public] records but when a citizen applies to inspect or make copies of them it is his duty to make provision for this to 148

166 government-in-the-sunshine-manual be done in such a manner as will accommodate the applicant and at the same time safeguard Fuller v. State ex rel. O’Donnell, o. 2d 607 (Fla. 1944). Thus, the right of the records.” 17 s inspection may not be frustrated or circumvented through indirect means such as the use of a code book. State ex rel. Davidson v. Couch, 158 s o. 103, 105 (Fla. 1934) (right of inspection was “hindered and obstructed” by city “imposing conditions to the right of examination which were Accord ago 05-12 (city may not require the not reasonable nor permissible under the law”). use of a code to review e-mail correspondence of city’s police department and human resources department). i nf. o p. to Cook, m ay 27, 2011, noting that “[a] policy requiring a And see physical address for mailing copies of requested public records or the personal appearance of the requestor would not appear to relate to the custodian’s duty to protect public records from alteration or destruction, but to impose additional constraints on the requestor.” moreover, any local enactment or policy which purports to dictate additional conditions or restrictions on access to public records is of dubious validity since the legislative scheme of the Public r ecords a ct has preempted any local regulation of this subject. Tribune Company v. Cannella, supra at 1077. a policy of a governmental agency cannot exempt it from the application of Ch. 119, F.s., a general law. Douglas v. Michel, 410 s o. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 5th DCa 1982), questions answered and approved, 464 s o. 2d 545 (Fla. 1985). And see ago 90-04 (county official not authorized to assign county’s rights to a public record as part of a settlement Cf. Herbits v. City of Miami , 207 s o. 3d agreement compromising a lawsuit against the county). 274, 275 (Fla. 3d DCa 2016) (claim based on alleged concealment of information in violation of transparency mandates established in local enactments is preempted by the Florida Public records a ct, because the “Florida legislature has so pervasively legislated regarding this subject area that a local government is precluded from legislating in the same area.”). 2. Individuals authorized to inspect and receive copies of public records section 119.01, F.s., provides that “[i]t is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person. ” (e.s.) a state citizenship requirement was deleted from the law in 1975. a public employee is a person within the meaning of Ch. 119, F.s. and, as such, possesses the same right of inspection as any other person. ago 75-175. likewise, a county is “any person” who is allowed to seek public records no. under Ch. 119, F.s. Hillsborough County, Florida v. Buccaneers Stadium Limited Partnership, , 758 s o. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d 99-0321 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. February 5, 1999), affirmed per curiam DCa 2000). Thus, “the law provides any member of the public access to public records, whether he or Church of Scientology Flag she be the most outstanding civic citizen or the most heinous criminal.” n o. 97-688Ci-07 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. February 27, 1997). “[a]s long Service Org., Inc. v. Wood, as the citizens of this state desire and insist upon ‘open government’ and liberal public records disclosure, as a cost of that freedom public officials have to put up with demanding citizens even State v. Colby, n o. mm96-317a-XX when they are obnoxious as long as they violate no laws.” (Fla. h ighlands Co. Ct. m ay 23, 1996). “e ven though a public agency may believe that a person or group are fanatics, harassers or are extremely annoying, the public records are available to all of the citizens of the s Salvadore v. City of Stuart, n o. 91-812 Ca (Fla. 19th tate of Florida.” Cir. Ct. December 17, 1991). 811 s o. 2d 736, 741 (Fla. 4th DCa 2002) And see Curry v. State, (defendant’s conduct in making over 40 public records requests concerning victim constituted a “legitimate purpose,” and thus cannot violate the stalking law “because the right to obtain the records is established by statute and acknowledged in the state constitution”). Cf. James v. Loxahatchee Groves Water Control District, 820 s o. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCa 2002), concluding that a trial court erred when it failed to hold a hearing before denying a request to require a district to permit inspection at the district offices, rather than at an off-premises location. The agency argued that it would be “disruptive” to require that the records inspection be conducted at its offices. Id. however, the appeals court ruled that a hearing should have been held to determine whether the requestor, who was in litigation with the district, should be allowed to view the Id. records at the district offices, and if so, under what conditions. 149

167 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 3. Purpose of request The requester is not required to explain the purpose or reason for a public records request. “The motivation of the person seeking the records does not impact the person’s right to see them under the Public 811 so. 2d 736, 742 (Fla. 4th DCa 2002). act.” records Curry v. State, o. 3d 560, 562 (Fla. 2d DCa 2014) 135 s See also Barfield v. School Board of Manatee County, (“an individual’s reason for requesting a public record is irrelevant”); Timoney v. City of Miami o. 2d 885, 886n.3 (Fla. 3d DCa 2005) (“generally, a person’s 917 s Civilian Investigative Panel, 597 s o. 2d 940, 941 motive in seeking access to public records is irrelevant”); Staton v. McMillan, review dismissed sub nom., Staton v. Austin, 605 s o. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1992) (Fla. 1st DCa 1992), Lorei v. Smith , 464 (petitioner’s reasons for seeking access to public records “are immaterial”); review denied, so. 2d 1330, 1332 (Fla. 2d DCa 1985), 475 s o. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985) (legislative objective underlying the creation of Ch. 119 was to insure to the people of Florida the right freely to gain access to governmental records; the purpose of such inquiry is immaterial); and News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. v. Gadd, 388 s o. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2d DCa 1980) (“the newspaper’s motives [for seeking the documents], as well as the hospital’s financial harm and public harm defenses, are irrelevant in an action to compel compliance with the Public r ecords Cf. Town of Gulfstream v. O’Boyle, 654 F. a pp’x 439 (11th Cir. 2016) (alleged filing of act”). large numbers of frivolous public records requests which are then followed by lawsuits when the requests are not addressed does not constitute a predicate act under the racketeer i nfluenced Corrupt o rganizations a ct). Thus, an agency is not authorized to impose conditions or limit access to public records p. to Cook, m nf. o ay based on a suspicion that the request may be for an improper purpose. i 27, 2011. h owever, as noted in that opinion, Florida s tatutes impose criminal penalties for the unauthorized use of personal identification information for fraudulent or harassment purposes and for the criminal use of a public record or public records information. ss. 817.568 and See 817.569, F.s. similarly, “the fact that a person seeking access to public records wishes to use them in a commercial enterprise does not alter his or her rights under Florida’s public records law.” 889 so. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 2d DCa 2004), review denied, Microdecisions, Inc. v. Skinner, so. 902 2d 791 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 126 s.Ct. 746 (2005). See also State ex rel. Davis v. McMillan, 38 so. 666 (Fla. 1905) (abstract companies may copy documents from the clerk’s office for their own use and sell copies to the public for a profit); Booksmart Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble College Bookstores, Inc., 718 s o. 2d 227, 228n.2 (Fla. 3d DCa 1998), review denied, 729 s o. 2d 389 (Fla. 1999) (“Booksmart’s reason for wanting to view and copy the documents is irrelevant to the issue of whether the documents are public records”). Role of the records custodian 4. section 119.011(5), F.s., defines the term “custodian of public records” to mean “the elected or appointed state, county, or municipal officer charged with the responsibility of maintaining the office having public records, or his or her designee.” The custodian of public records, or a person having custody of public records, may designate another officer or employee of the agency to permit the inspection and copying of public records, but must disclose the identity of the designee to the person requesting to inspect or copy public records. s ection 119.07(1) (b), F.s. Cf. s. 119.0701(2), F.s. (discussed more fully on pages 60-61) requiring that certain agency contracts for public services must contain contact information pertaining to the agency’s custodian of public records; and s. 119.12(1)(b) and (2), F.s., mandating that the complainant in a public records lawsuit must provide written notice identifying the public records request to the custodian at least 5 business days prior to filing a civil action, but stipulating that the notice is not required if the agency fails to prominently post the contact information for the agency’s custodian in the manner prescribed in the statute. however, the courts have concluded that the statutory reference to the records custodian who has does not alter the “duty of disclosure” imposed by s. 119.07(1), F.s., upon “ [e]very person 150

168 government-in-the-sunshine-manual custody of a public record.” 678 s o. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCa 1996). Puls v. City of Port St. Lucie, [e mphasis supplied by the court]. Thus, the term “custodian” for purposes of the Public r ct refers to all agency ecords a personnel who have it within their power to release or communicate public records. Mintus 711 s o. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th DCa 1998) (citing Williams v. City of v. City of West Palm Beach, 575 s o. 2d 683, 687 [Fla. 5th DCa 1991]). But, “the mere fact that an employee of Minneola, a public agency temporarily possesses a document does not necessarily mean that the person has custody as defined by section 119.07.” Id. at 1361. i n order to have custody, one must have supervision and control over the document or have legal responsibility for its care, keeping or guardianship. Id. Cf. Remia v. City of St. Petersburg Police Pension Board of Trustees, 14 F.l.W. supp. 854a (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. July 17, 2007), 996 s o. 2d 860 (Fla. 2d DCa 2008) cert. denied, (since city clerk’s responsibility to provide public records was ministerial, city was not entitled to protective order prohibiting attorney in litigation with the city from directly contacting the clerk with a public records request without first contacting the city attorney). Questions relating to the application of the r ules of Professional Conduct should be addressed to The Florida Bar. See Florida Bar e thics o pinion 09-01, issued December 10, 2010. The custodian of public records and his or her designee must acknowledge requests to section 119.07(1) inspect or copy records promptly and respond to such requests in good faith. (c), F.s. See Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, 189 s o. 3d 120, 128 (Fla. 2016), noting that the “good faith language” was intended “to strengthen the responsibilities of records custodians by imposing an explicit requirement on public agencies that they act in good faith in responding to public records requests.” a good faith response includes making reasonable efforts to determine from other officers or employees within the agency whether such a record exists and, if so, the location at which the record can be accessed. Id. upp 243a (Fla. 11th Cf. SDE Media LLC v. City of Doral , 25 F.l.W. s Cir. Ct. m ay 5, 2017) (city violated the Public r edia ecords law by “misrepresenting to sDe m C that all responsive records had been located and produced when, in fact, [the city] knew ll that a good faith search had not been made and that additional responsive records may not have been produced”). The duty of “good faith” imposed on public officers who are charged with the responsibility of complying with the law is “subjective.” Consumer Rights, LLC v. Union County, 159 s o. 3d 882, review denied, 885 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015), o. 3d 1264 (Fla. 2015). “Whether a governmental 177 s entity acted in ‘good faith’ in the manner in which it responded to a request for disclosure of public records is necessarily a question for the court to decide based on the circumstances of a case.” Id. 5. Requests for copies versus requests to inspect public records “i t is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person.” (e.s.) s ection 119.01(1), F.s. i n addition, s. 119.07(1)(a), F.s., provides that “[e]very person who has custody of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and copied by any person desiring to do so . . . .” Finally, s. 119.07(4), F.s., requires the custodian to “furnish a copy or a certified copy of the record upon payment of the fee prescribed by law . . . .” And see Fuller v. State ex rel. O’Donnell, 17 s o. 2d 607 (Fla. 1944) (“The best-reasoned authority in this country holds that the right to inspect public records carries with it the right to make copies”); and Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Department, 352 s o. 2d 1230, 1232n.2 (Fla. 4th DCa 1977) (Public r ecords a ct requires custodian to furnish copies). Cf. Wootton v. Cook, 590 s o. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991) (if the requestor identifies a record with sufficient specificity to permit the agency to identify it and forwards the appropriate fee, the agency must furnish by mail a copy of the record). 6. Records maintained by more than one agency The fact that a particular record is also maintained by another agency does not relieve the 151

169 government-in-the-sunshine-manual custodian of the obligation to permit inspection and copying in the absence of an applicable statutory exemption. ago 86-69. i f information contained in the public record is available from other sources, a person seeking access to the record is not required to make an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the information from those sources as a condition precedent to gaining access 340 s o. 2d 977, 979 (Fla. 2d DCa 1976). to the public records. Warden v. Bennett, Records not in physical possession of agency 7. an agency is not authorized to refuse to allow inspection of public records it made or received in the course of official business on the grounds that the documents are in the actual See Wallace v. Guzman, possession of another agency or official other than the records custodian. 687 so. 2d 1351 (Fla. 3d DCa 1997) (public records cannot be hidden from the public by transferring physical custody of the records to the agency’s attorneys); Tober v. Sanchez , 417 s o. review denied sub nom., Metropolitan Dade County Transit Agency v. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCa 1982), 426 s Sanchez, o. 2d 27 (Fla. 1983) (official charged with maintenance of records may not transfer actual physical custody of records to county attorney and thereby avoid compliance with request for inspection under Ch. 119, F.s.); and ago 92-78 (public housing authority not authorized to withhold its records from disclosure on the grounds that the records have been subpoenaed by the state attorney and transferred to that office). “g iven the aggressive nature of the public’s right to inspect and duplicate public records, a governmental agency may not avoid a public records request by transferring custody of its records to another agency.” Chandler v. City of Sanford, 121 so. 3d 657, 660 (Fla. 5th DCa 2013). Barfield v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, no. 93-1701 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Thus, in may 19, 1994), the court held that an agency that received records from a private entity in the course of official business and did not make copies of the documents could not “return” them to the entity following receipt of a public records request. The court ordered the agency to demand the return of the records from the private entity so they could be copied for the requestor. similarly, in Times Publishing Company v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 s o. 2d 487, 492-493 (Fla. 2d DCa 1990), the court found that both the city and a private entity violated the Public records a ct when, pursuant to a plan to circumvent Ch. 119, F.s., the city avoided taking possession of negotiation documents reviewed and discussed by both parties and instead left them with the private entity’s attorney. The court determined that although city officials may have intended merely to “avoid” the law, the effect of their actions was to “evade the broad policy of open government.” And see Wisner v. City of Tampa Police Department, 601 s o. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 2d DCa 1992) (city may not allow a private entity to maintain physical custody of public records [polygraph chart used in internal investigation] “to circumvent the public records chapter”); and 18 s o. 3d 1201 (Fla. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press, 1st DCa 2009), review denied, 37 s o. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010) (records on private entity’s secure website that were viewed and used by a state university in carrying out its official duties were public records even though the university did not take physical possession); and ago 98-54 (registration and disciplinary records stored in a computer database maintained by a national securities association which are used by a state agency in licensing and regulating securities dealers doing business in Florida are public records). 8. “Overbroad” public records requests in Lorei v. Smith , 464 s o. 2d 1330, 1332 (Fla. 2d DCa 1985), review denied, 475 s o. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985), the court recognized that the “breadth of such right [to gain access to public records] is virtually unfettered, save for the statutory exemptions . . . .” a ccordingly, in the absence of a statutory exemption, a custodian must produce the records requested regardless of the number of records involved or possible inconvenience. n ote, however, s. 119.07(4)(d), F.s., authorizes a custodian to charge, in addition to the cost of duplication, a reasonable service charge for the cost of the extensive use of information technology resources or of personnel, if such extensive use is required because of the nature or volume of public records to be inspected ago 92-38. or copied. See 152

170 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Thus, a person seeking to inspect “all” financial records of a municipality may not be required State ex rel. Davidson v. Couch, to specify a particular book or record he or she wishes to inspect. o. 297, 300 (Fla. 1934). i n Davidson , the Florida s upreme Court explained that if this were 156 s the case, “one person may be required to specify the book, while another and more favored one, because of his pretended ignorance of the name of the record might be permitted examination of all of them.” s uch a result would be inconsistent with the mandate in the Public r ecords a ct Id. that public records are open to all who wish to inspect them. Id. Cf. Salvadore v. City of Stuart, no. 91-812 Ca (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. December 17, 1991), stating that if a public records request is insufficient to identify the records sought, the city has an affirmative duty to promptly notify the requestor that more information is needed in order to produce the records; it is the responsibility of the city and not the requestor to follow up on any requests for public records. Compare Woodard v. State, 885 s o. 2d 444, 446 (Fla. 4th DCa 2004) (records custodian must furnish copies of records when the person requesting them identifies the portions of the record with sufficient specificity to permit the custodian to identify the record and forwards the statutory fee). 9. Written request or form requirements Chapter 119, F.s., does not authorize an agency to require that requests for records be in writing. See Dade Aviation Consultants v. Knight Ridder, Inc., 800 s o. 2d 302, 305n.1 (Fla. 3d DCa 2001) (“There is no requirement in the Public r ecords a ct that requests for records must be in writing”). as noted in ago 80-57, a custodian must honor a request for copies of records which is sufficient to identify the records desired, whether the request is in writing, over the telephone, or in person, provided that the required fees are paid. “i n sum, the city could not properly condition disclosure of the public records, to the then-anonymous requester on filling out the city’s form . . . .” Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 s o. 3d 1080, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCa 2014). if a public agency believes that it is necessary to provide written documentation of a request for public records, the agency may require that the complete an appropriate custodian form or document; however, the person requesting the records cannot be required to provide such documentation as a precondition to the granting of the request to inspect or copy public See Sullivan v. City of New Port Richey, n ay 22, 1987), records. o. 86-1129Ca (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. m 529 s per curiam affirmed, o. 2d 1124 (Fla. 2d DCa 1988), noting that a requestor’s failure to complete a city form required for access to documents did not authorize the custodian to refuse to honor the request to inspect or copy public records. however, a request for records of the judicial branch (which is not subject to Ch. 119, F.s., 660 s o. 2d 255 [Fla. 1995]), must be in writing. see Times Publishing Company v. Ake, rule 2.420(m)(1), Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. i n its commentary accompanying the rule change that incorporated this requirement, the Court said that the “writing requirement is not intended to disadvantage any person who may have difficulty writing a request; if any difficulty exists, the custodian should aid the requestor in reducing the request to writing.” In re Report of the Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Records, 825 s o. 2d 889, 898 (Fla. 2002). 10. Identification of requester a person requesting access to or copies of public records may not be required to disclose his or her name, address, telephone number or the like to the custodian, unless the custodian is required by law to obtain this information prior to releasing the records. ago s 92-38 and 91- 76. Accord inf. o p. to Cook, m ay 27, 2011. See also Bevan v. Wanicka, 505 s o. 2d 1116 (Fla. 2d DCa 1987) (production of public records may not be conditioned upon a requirement that the person seeking inspection disclose background information about himself or herself ). Cf. s. 1012.31(2)(f ), F.s., providing that the custodian of public school employee personnel files shall maintain a record in the file of those persons reviewing an employee personnel file each time it is reviewed. Thus, a city may not require an anonymous requestor who made a public records request 153

171 government-in-the-sunshine-manual via e-mail to provide an “address or other identifiable source for payment of the associated costs.” 140 s o. 3d 1080, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCa 2014). i Chandler v. City of Greenacres, nstead, “the city could have sent an estimate of costs through e-mail to the requester just as it could through Id. Cf. Consumer regular mail, had the request been made via paper by an anonymous requester.” 159 s o. 3d 882, 886 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015), review denied , Rights, LLC v. Union County, Florida, 177 s o. 3d 1264 (Fla. 2015) (“We know of no law that requires a governmental entity to provide public records to a generic email address, at least not until such time as it is made clear that the Citizens Awareness Foundation, Inc. v. Wantman Group, Inc., address belongs to a person”); and 195 s o. 3d 396, 402 (Fla. 4th DCa 2016) (“There is a difference between allowing anonymous public records requests and evaluating an agency’s response when such requests are justifiably handled with caution”). Remote access 11. section 119.07(2)(a), F.s., states that “[a]s an additional means of inspecting or copying public records, a custodian may provide access to public records by remote electronic means, And see s. 119.01(2)(e), F.s. Thus, provided exempt or confidential information is not disclosed.” an agency is authorized but not required to permit remote electronic access to public records. similarly, access to public records by remote electronic means is merely an additional means of inspecting or copying public records; this “additional means of access, however, is insufficient where the person requesting the records specifies the traditional method of access via Lake Shore Hospital Authority v. Lilker, 168 s o. 3d 332, 333 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015). paper copies.” section 119.07(2)(b), F.s., requires the custodian to provide safeguards to protect the contents of the public records from unauthorized electronic access or alteration and to prevent the disclosure or modification of those portions of the records which are exempt from disclosure. unless otherwise required by law, the custodian may charge a fee for remote electronic access, granted under a contractual arrangement with a user, which fee may include the direct and indirect costs of providing such access. h owever, fees for remote electronic access provided to ection 119.07(2) the general public must be in accordance with the provisions of s. 119.07, F.s. s (c), F.s. 12. Requests to create new records, answer questions about the records, or reformat existing records The statutory obligation of the custodian of public records is to provide access to, or copies of, public records “at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions, and under supervision by ection 119.07(1) the custodian of the public records” provided that the required fees are paid. s owever, a custodian is not required to give out information from the records (a) and (4), F.s. h of his or her office. ago 80-57. The Public r ecords a ct does not require a town to produce an employee, such as the financial officer, to answer questions regarding the financial records of the town. ago 92-38. Cf. In re Report of the Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Records , 825 so. 2d 889, 898 (Fla. 2002) (the custodian of judicial records “is required to provide access to or copies of records but is not required either to provide information from records or to create new records in response to a request”). in other words, Ch. 119, F.s., provides a right of access to inspect and copy an agency’s existing public records; it does not mandate that an agency create new records in order to accommodate a request for information from the agency. Thus, the clerk of court is not required to provide an inmate with a list of documents from a case file which may be responsive to some forthcoming request. Wootton v. Cook, 590 s o. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991). See also ago 08- 29. Cf. s. 120.53, F.s., relating to maintenance of final orders by agencies subject to Ch. 120, F.s. however, in order to comply with the statutory directive that an agency provide copies of public records upon payment of the statutory fee, an agency must respond to requests by mail 154

172 government-in-the-sunshine-manual for information as to copying costs. See also Woodard v. State, 885 s o. 2d Wootton v. Cook, supra. 444, 445n.1 (Fla. 4th DCa 2004), remanding a case for further proceedings where the custodian forwarded only information relating to the statutory fee schedule rather than the total copying Cf. Gilliam v. State, 996 s o. 2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCa 2008) (clerk, cost of the requested records. as custodian of judicial records, had a legal duty to respond to g illiam’s request for information regarding costs) and Blackshear v. State, 115 s o. 3d 1093 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013) (clerk is “duty- bound to respond to a request about copying costs for the records sought”). similarly, as stated in Seigle v. Barry, 422 s o. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCa 1982), review denied, o. 2d 988 (Fla. 1983), the intent of Ch. 119, F.s., is “to make available to the public 431 s information which is a matter of public record, in some meaningful form, not necessarily that which the applicant prefers.” a ccordingly, an agency is not ordinarily required to reformat its records and provide them in a particular form as demanded by the requestor. ago 08-29. as explained in Seigle : if the health department maintains a chronological list of dog-bite incidents with rabies implications [a] plaintiff, bitten by a suspect dog, may not require the health department to reorder that list and furnish a record of incidents segregated by geographical areas. nothing in the statute, case law or public policy imposes such a burden upon our public officials. 422 s o. 2d at 65. eneral’s office concluded that a school district was Thus, in ago 97-39, the a ttorney g not required to furnish electronic public records in an electronic format other than the standard format routinely maintained by the district. Seigle Despite the general rule, however, the court recognized that an agency may be required to provide access through a specially designed program, prepared by or at the expense of the requestor, where: 1) available programs do not access all of the public records stored in the computer’s data banks; or 2) the information in the computer accessible by the use of available programs would include exempt information necessitating a special program to delete such exempt items; or for any reason the form in which the information is proffered does not fairly and 3) meaningfully represent the records; or 4) the court determines other exceptional circumstances exist warranting this special remedy. 422 s o. 2d at 66-67. For the purpose of satisfying a public records request, the fee to be charged by an agency if it elects to provide a copy of a public record in a medium that is not routinely used by the agency, or if it elects to compile information that is not routinely developed or maintained by the agency or that requires a substantial amount of manipulation or programming, must be in accordance with s. 119.07(4), F.s. (authorizing imposition of a special service charge if extensive information technology resources or labor are required). s ection 119.01(2)(f ), F.s. 13. Records available in more than one medium an agency must provide a copy of the record in the medium requested if the agency maintains the record in that medium, and the agency may charge a fee which shall be in accordance with Ch. 119, F.s. s ection 119.01(2)(f ), F.s. See ago 13-07. a ccordingly, an agency violated the Public records act when it referred the requester to a website instead of providing paper copies as the requester asked. Lake Shore Hospital Authority v. Lilker, 168 s o. 3d 332 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015). similarly, a custodian of public records must, if asked for a copy of a computer software 155

173 government-in-the-sunshine-manual disk used by an agency, provide a copy of the disk in its original format; a typed transcript would not satisfy the requirements of s. 119.07(1), F.s. ago 91-61. See also Miami-Dade 997 s County v. Professional Law Enforcement Association, o. 2d 1289 (Fla. 3d DCa 2009) (fact that pertinent information may exist in more than one format is not a basis for exemption or Cf. denial of the request). ago 06-30, stating that an agency may respond to a public records request requiring the production of thousands of documents by composing a static web page where the responsive public documents are posted for viewing if the requesting party agrees to the procedure and agrees to pay the administrative costs, in lieu of copying the documents at a much greater cost. Amount of time allowed for response to public records requests 14. a. Duty to acknowledge requests promptly The custodian of public records or his or her designee is required to acknowledge requests to inspect or copy records promptly and to respond to such requests in good faith. s ection Cf. Hewlings v. Orange County, 87 s o. 3d 839 (Fla. 5th DCa 2012) (mere fact 119.07(1)(c), F.s. that county quickly responded to public records request by voicemail and fax is not dispositive of whether county’s 45-day delay in with the request was unjustified for purposes of complying s. 119.12, F.s., authorizing an award of attorney’s fees to a party who succeeds in a civil action resulting from an unlawful refusal to provide public records). b. Automatic delay impermissible a policy which provides for an automatic delay in the production of public records is Tribune Company v. Cannella, 458 s o. 2d 1075, 1078-1079 (Fla. 1984), appeal impermissible. 105 s.Ct. 2315 (1985). And see Lake Shore dismissed sub nom., Deperte v. Tribune Company, Hospital Authority v. Lilker, 168 s o. 3d 332, 333-334 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015) (agency not authorized to automatically delay production by imposing a 24-hour notice requirement). Thus, an agency is not authorized to delay inspection of personnel records in order to allow the employee to be present during the inspection of his or her records. Tribune Company v. Cannella, 458 s Compare s. 1012.31(3)(a)3., F.s., in which the legislature has o. 2d at 1078. expressly provided that no material derogatory to a public school employee may be inspected until 10 days after the employee has been notified as prescribed by statute. ttorney g eneral’s office has advised that a board of trustees of a police similarly, the a pension fund may not delay release of its records until such time as the request is submitted to And see Grapski v. City of Alachua, the board for a vote. ago 96-55. o. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st 31 s DCa 2010), review denied, 47 s o. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010) (city may not delay public access to board meeting minutes until after the city commission has approved the minutes). more recently, in Johnson v. Jarvis, 74 s o. 3d 168 (Fla. 1st DCa 2011), the appellate court reviewed a state attorney’s policy requiring that certain records requests be directed to the state attorney’s main office rather than produced at a branch office where the records were located. The court said that the trial judge must hold a hearing to determine whether there was a delay to produce the requested records to the petitioner, and if so, whether the delay was reasonable under the facts of the case. c. Unjustified delay The Public r ecords a ct does not contain a specific time limit (such as 24 hours or 10 days) for compliance with public records requests. h owever, “delay in making public records available is permissible under very limited circumstances.” Promenade D’Iberville, LLC v. Sundy, 145 s o. 3d 980, 983 (Fla. 1st DCa a ugust 28, 2014). i n Promenade , the court noted that a records custodian could delay production to determine whether the records exist, s. 119.07[1] [c], F.s.; if the custodian believes the some or all of the record is exempt, s. 119.07[1][d]-[e]; or if otherwise, the only the requesting party fails to forward the appropriate fees, s. 119.07[4], F.s. 156

174 government-in-the-sunshine-manual delay in producing records permitted under Ch. 119, F.s., “is the limited reasonable time allowed the custodian to retrieve the record and delete those portions of the record the custodian asserts Tribune Company v. Cannella, 458 s o. 2d 1075, 1078 (Fla. 1984), at 983, citing are exempt.” Id. 105 s.Ct. 2315 (1985). appeal dismissed sub nom., DePerte v. Tribune Company, Thus, an agency’s unjustified delay in producing public records constitutes an unlawful refusal to provide access to public records. 133 See Lilker v. Suwannee Valley Transit Authority, so. 3d 654, 655 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014) (“u nlawful refusal under section 119.12 includes not only affirmative refusal to produce records, but also unjustified delay in producing them”). See also Rechler v. Town of Manalapan, n o. Cl 94-2724 aD (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. n ovember 21, 1994), affirmed , 674 s o. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCa 1996), review denied, 684 s o. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1996), finding that the town engaged in a “pattern of delays” by taking months to fully comply with the petitioner’s public records requests; and 786 s o. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 1st DCa 2001) State v. Webb, (error for a lower court judge to vacate a misdemeanor conviction of a records custodian [Webb] who had been found guilty of willfully violating s. 119.07(1)(a), F.s., based on her “dilatory” response to public records requests). For example, in Promenade D’Iberville, LLC v. Sundy, supra, the appellate court determined that an agency violated the Public r ecords a ct by refusing to provide non-exempt public records until a court denied its motion for a protective order to block the requestor (an adversary in ct. m oreover, the agency’s production of the records on out-of-state litigation) from using the a the eve of the public records enforcement hearing “did not cure its unjustified delay” because “unjustifiable delay to the point of forcing the requestor to file an enforcement action is by itself tantamount to an unlawful refusal to provide public records in violation of the a ct.” Id. at 984. imilarly, a trial judge erred by granting the agency’s motion [emphasis supplied by the court]. s to dismiss on the grounds that the agency ultimately provided the record three months after the request was made and two weeks after the request for mandamus relief had been filed. Consumer , 153 s o. 3d 394, 398 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014). i Rights, LLC v. Bradford County, Florida nstead, the Id. judge should have conducted a hearing to determine whether the delay was justified. Lang v. Reedy Creek Improvement District, n o. CJ-5546 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. By contrast, in affirmed per curiam , 675 october 2, 1995), so. 2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCa 1996), the circuit court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the agency should have produced requested records within 10, 20 and 60-day periods. The court determined that the agency’s response to numerous (19) public records requests for 135 categories of information and records filed by the opposing party in litigation was reasonable in light of the cumulative impact of the requests and the fact that the requested records contained exempt as well as nonexempt information and thus required a considerable amount of review and redaction. n o. 98-22 And see Herskovitz v. Leon County, (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 9, 1998), in which the court said that in view of the “nature and volume of the materials requested [over 9000 pages], their location, and the need for close supervision by some knowledgeable person of the review of those records for possible exemptions,” the amount of time expended by the county to produce the records (several weeks) to opposing counsel was not unreasonable. moreover, recent cases have emphasized that in order for a delay to constitute an “unlawful refusal” for purposes of the award of attorney’s fees under s. 119.12, F.s., the delay must be “unjustified.” See e.g. , Consumer Rights, LLC v. Union County, 159 so. 3d 882, 885 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015), review denied, 177 s o. 3d 1264 (Fla. 2015) and Citizens Awareness Foundation, Inc. v. Wantman Group, Inc., o. 3d 396, 401 (Fla. 4th DCa 2016). See also the discussion 195 s on pages 180-183 relating to attorney’s fees awarded under s. 119.12, F.s., for an “unlawful refusal” to provide access to public records. Cf. Florida Agency for Health Care Administration v. Zuckerman, Spaeder, LLP , 221 s o. 3d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017) (trial court abused its discretion by issuing a writ of mandamus requiring health care agency to produce a large number of public records within 48 hours when the records could not be reviewed for redaction of exempt information within this “compressed time period;” trial court also erred by requiring the agency 157

175 government-in-the-sunshine-manual to produce the records prior to the requester’s payment of the agency’s invoices associated with production of the records). d. Arbitrary time for inspection ct authorizes inspection and copying of public records “at any The Public r ecords a ection 119.07(1)(a), F.s. While the custodian may reasonably restrict reasonable time.” s inspection to those hours during which his or her office is open to the public, an agency policy that restricts inspection of public records to the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., m onday through act. Lake Shore Hospital Authority Friday with 24-hour advance notice violates the Public records o. 3d 332 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015). Accord ago 81-12 (custodian not authorized to 168 s v. Lilker, establish an arbitrary time period during which records may or may not be inspected). There may be instances where, due to the nature or volume of the records requested, a delay based upon the physical problems in retrieving the records and protecting them is necessary; however, the adoption of a schedule in which public records may be viewed only during certain hours is impermissible. i p. to riotte, m ay 21, 1990, concluding that an nf. o agency policy which permits inspection of its public records only from 1:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., ecords a monday through Friday, violates the Public r ct. e. Standing requests The a ttorney g eneral’s office has stated that upon receipt of a public records request, the agency must comply by producing all non-exempt documents in the custody of the agency that are responsive to the request, upon payment of the charges authorized in Chapter 119, F.s. however, this mandate applies only to those documents in the custody of the agency at the time of the request; nothing in the Public r ecords act appears to require that an agency respond to a so-called “standing” request for production of public records that it may receive in the future. See inf. o p. to Worch, June 15, 1995. 15. Confidentiality agreements an agency “cannot bargain away its Public r ecords a ct duties with promises of confidentiality The Tribune Company v. Hardee Memorial Hospital, o. Ca-91-370 (Fla. in settlement agreements.” n 10th Cir. Ct. a ugust 19, 1991) (confidentiality provision in a settlement agreement which resolved litigation against a public hospital did not remove the document from the Public r ecords a ct). National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press, Thus, in o. 3d 1201, 1207 18 s (Fla. 1st DCa 2009), review denied, 37 s o. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010), the court held that a confidentiality agreement entered into by a private law firm on behalf of a state university with the nCaa that allowed access to records contained on the nCaa ’s secure custodial website that were used by the university in preparing a response to possible nCaa sanctions, had no impact on whether such records were public records, stating that “[a] public record cannot be transformed into a private record merely because an agent of the government has promised that it will be kept private.” See no. 00-008234Ci-19 (Fla. 6th also City of Pinellas Park, Florida v. Times Publishing Company, Cir. Ct. January 3, 2001) (“there is absolutely no doubt that promises of confidentiality [given to employees who were asked to respond to a survey] do not empower the Court to depart from Gadd v. News-Press Publishing Company, 412 s o. 2d 894 (Fla. 2d the public records law”); and DCa 1982) (records of a county hospital’s utilization review committee were not exempt from Ch. 119, F.s., even though the information may have come from sources who expected or were promised confidentiality). Times Publishing Company v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 s o. 2d 487, 494 (Fla. 2d similarly, in DCa 1990), the court determined that a baseball organization and a city improperly attempted to circumvent the Public r ecords a ct by agreeing to keep negotiation documents relating to use of a municipal stadium confidential and in the exclusive custody of the organization. n oting the dangers that exist if private entities “are allowed to demand that they retain custody [and 158

176 government-in-the-sunshine-manual prevent inspection] of documents as a condition of doing business with a governmental body,” ecords a ct. the court ruled that both the organization and the city violated the Public r Cf. DCa 2011) (trial court may not require media to so. 3d 1191 (Fla. 5th 61 WPTV-TV v. State, enter into confidentiality agreement in order to receive advance notice of information relating to jury selection in criminal case). additionally, s. 69.081(8), F.s., part of the s ct, provides, subject to unshine in litigation a limited exceptions, that any portion of an agreement which has the purpose or effect of concealing information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim or action against an agency is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced. s ettlement records must be maintained in compliance with Ch. 119, F.s. See i nf. o p. to Barry, June 24, 1998 (agency not authorized to enter into a settlement agreement authorizing the concealment of information relating to an adverse personnel decision from the remainder of a personnel file). Cf. s. 215.425(5), F.s. (any agreement or contract, executed on or after July 1, 2011, which involves extra compensation between a unit of government and an officer, agent, employee, or contractor may not include provisions that limit the ability of any party to the agreement or contract to discuss the agreement or contract). moreover, to allow the maker or sender of records to dictate the circumstances under which the records are to be deemed confidential would permit private parties as opposed to the legislature to determine which public records are subject to disclosure and which are not. s uch a result would contravene the purpose and terms of Ch. 119, F.s. Browning v. Walton, 351 s o. 2d 380 (Fla. 4th DCa 1977) (city cannot refuse to allow inspection of records containing the names and addresses of city employees who filled out forms requesting that city maintain the confidentiality of all material in their personnel files); ago 97-84 (architectural and engineering plans under seal pursuant to s. 481.221 or s. 471.025, F.s., that are held by a public agency in connection with the transaction of official business are subject to public inspection); and i nf. op. to e cheverri, a pril 30, 2010 (taxpayer may not request that records submitted to value adjustment board be kept confidential). accordingly, it is clear that the determination as to when public records are to be deemed confidential rests exclusively with the legislature. See Sepro Corporation v. Florida Department of 839 review denied sub nom., Crist v. Environmental Protection, so. 2d 781 (Fla. 1st DCa 2003), Department of Environmental Protection, 911 s o. 2d 792 (Fla. 2005) (private party cannot render public records exempt from disclosure merely by designating as confidential the material it furnishes See also ago 90-104 (desire of data processing company to maintain “privacy” to a state agency). tate is of no consequence unless such materials fall of certain materials filed with Department of s within a legislatively created exemption to Ch. 119, F.s.). And see Hill v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 701 s o. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCa 1997), review denied, 717 s o. 2d 536 (Fla. 1998) (materials obtained by state agency from anonymous sources during its investigation of an insurance company were public records subject to disclosure in the absence of statutory exemption, notwithstanding the company’s contention that the records were “stolen” or “misappropriated” privileged documents that were delivered to the state without the company’s permission). Therefore, unless the legislature has expressly authorized the maker of records received by an agency to keep the material confidential, the wishes of the sender or the agency in this regard cannot supersede the requirements of Ch. 119, F.s. , e.g. , s. 377.2409(1), F.s. Compare (information on geophysical activities conducted on state-owned mineral lands received by Department of e nvironmental Protection shall, on the request of the person conducting the activities, be held confidential and exempt from Ch. 119, F.s., for 10 years). And see Morris v. Whitehead, 588 s o. 2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 2d DCa 1991) (upholding the nondisclosure of confidential records received by housing authority from the federal government pursuant to agreement authorized by state housing law). Cf. Doe v. State, 901 s o. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCa 2005) (where citizen provided information to state attorney’s office which led to a criminal investigation was justified in inferring or had a reasonable expectation that he would be treated as 159

177 government-in-the-sunshine-manual a confidential source in accordance with statutory exemption now found at s. 119.071[2][f ], F.s., the citizen was entitled to have his identifying information redacted from the closed file, even though there was no express assurance of confidentiality by the state attorney’s office). Redaction of confidential or exempt information 16. if the custodian asserts that an exemption applies to part of the record, the custodian “shall redact that portion . . . and shall produce the remainder of such record for inspection section 119.07(1)(d), F.s. 643 so. 2d 1196 and copying.” Ocala Star Banner Corp. v. McGhee, (Fla. 5th DCa 1994) (city may redact information identifying confidential informant from 642 City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, police report but must produce the rest for inspection); so. 2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCa 1994), review denied, 651 s o. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1995) (police department authorized to withhold statutorily exempt criminal investigative information but ago 95-42 (statute providing must allow inspection of nonexempt portions of the records); and for confidentiality of certain audit information did not make the entire report confidential and exempt from disclosure; the portions of the report which do not contain exempt information 171 s o. 3d 805 (Fla. 1st Cf. Holley v. Bradford County Sheriff’s Department, must be released). DCa 2015) (trial court could not conclude that records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to statutory exemption for information identifying confidential informants without conducting an in camera inspection to determine whether they could be redacted to remove this information). The fact that an agency believes that it would be impractical or burdensome to redact confidential information from its records does not excuse noncompliance with the mandates of ecords a ct. ago 99-52. See also Florida Agency for Health Care Administration v. the Public r , 221 s o. 3d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017) (trial court order mandating that Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP agency produce a large number of public records within 48 hours “effectively requires ahCa Cf. ago 02-73 (agency must to ignore its statutory duty to redact exempted information”). redact confidential and exempt information and release the remainder of the record; agency not authorized to release records containing confidential information, albeit anonymously). a custodian of records containing both exempt and nonexempt material may comply with s. 119.07(1)(d), F.s., by any reasonable method which maintains and does not destroy the And exempted portion while allowing public inspection of the nonexempt portion. ago 84-81. see ago s 97-67 and 05-37 (official r ecords). section 119.011(13), F.s., defines the term “redact” to mean “to conceal from a copy of an original public record, or to conceal from an electronic image that is available for public See ago viewing, that portion of the record containing exempt or confidential information.” 02-69 (statute providing for redaction of certain information in court records available for public inspection does not authorize clerk of court to permanently remove or obliterate such information from the original court records). section 119.07(1)(e), F.s., states that a custodian of a public record who contends that a record or part of a record is exempt from inspection must state the basis for the exemption, including the statutory citation to the exemption. a dditionally, upon request, the custodian must state in writing and with particularity the reasons for the conclusion that the record is ection 119.07(1)(f ), F.s. See Weeks v. Golden, 764 s o. 2d 633 (Fla. exempt or confidential. s 1st DCa 2000) (agency’s response that it had provided all records “with the exception of certain information relating to the victim” deemed inadequate because the response “failed to identify with specificity either the reasons why records were believed to be exempt, or the statutory basis for any exemption”); and Langlois v. City of Deerfield Beach, Florida, 370 F. s upp. 2d 1233 (s.D. Fla. 2005) (city fire chief ’s summary rejection of request for employee personnel file violated the Public r ecords a ct because the chief gave no statutory reason for failing to produce the records). however, in City of St. Petersburg v. Romine ex rel. Dillinger, 719 so. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 2d ct “may not be used in such a way DCa 1998), the court cautioned that the Public r ecords a 160

178 government-in-the-sunshine-manual to obtain information that the legislature has declared must be exempt from disclosure.” Thus, a request for agency records may not be phrased or responded to in terms of a request for the specific documents asked for and received by a law enforcement agency during the course of ago 08-33 (list of law enforcement an active criminal investigation. ago 06-04. Compare officers who have been placed on administrative duty is a public record; the list is not confidential pursuant to section 112.533[2][a], F.s., providing for confidentiality of complaints filed against a law enforcement officer). however, s. 119.07(1)(e), F.s., “requires only record-by-record—not redaction-by- redaction—identification of the exemptions authorizing the redactions in each record.” Jones v. Miami Herald Media Company, o. 3d 1143 (Fla. 1st DCa 2016). The court upheld the 198 s agency’s use of a form with checkboxes identifying the various statutory exemptions relied upon for the redactions in the records and rejected the petitioner’s contention that the agency should have specified which exemption applied to which redaction. And see Lopez v. State, 696 so. 2d 725 (Fla. 1997) (state attorney’s contention that requested records were work product and not subject to public records disclosure was sufficient to identify asserted statutory exemptions). federal agency subject to the federal Freedom of i nformation a ct, it has been held that a 5 u.s.C. s. 552, must, in addition to providing a detailed justification of the basis for claimed exemptions under the a ct, specifically itemize and index the documents involved so as to show which are disclosable and which are exempt. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-828 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 94 s.Ct. 1564 (1974). h owever, a Florida court refused to apply the cert. denied, Vaughn o. 2d 1330, 1332 ecords a ct. See Lorei v. Smith, 464 s requirements to the state Public r o. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985). (Fla. 2d DCa 1985), review denied, 475 s 17. Privacy rights it is well established in Florida that “neither a custodian of records nor a person who is the subject of a record can claim a constitutional right of privacy as a bar to requested inspection of a public record which is in the hands of a government agency.” 575 Williams v. City of Minneola, so. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 5th DCa), o. 2d 289 (Fla. 1991). review denied, 589 s in reaching the conclusion that public records must be open to public inspection unless the legislature provides otherwise, the courts have rejected claims that the constitutional right of privacy bars disclosure. article i, s. 23, Fla. Const., provides: every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as This section shall not be construed to otherwise provided herein. limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as (e.s.) provided by law. accordingly, the Florida Constitution “does not provide a right of privacy in public records” and a state or federal right of disclosural privacy does not exist. 464 Michel v. Douglas, so. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 1985). See also Forsberg v. Housing Authority of City of Miami Beach, 455 so. 2d 373 (Fla. 1984); and ago 09-19 (to extent that information on an agency’s Facebook page constitutes a public record within the meaning of Ch. 119, F.s., art. i, s. 23, Fla. Const., “is not implicated”). “[i]n Florida the right to privacy is expressly subservient to the Public records act.” Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County v. D.B., 784 so. 2d 585, 591 (Fla. 4th DCa 2001). But see Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida Inc. v. Doe, 612 s o. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992) (public’s right of access to pretrial criminal discovery materials must be balanced against a nonparty’s constitutional right to privacy). 18. Liability for disclosure nothing in Ch. 119, F.s., indicates an intent to give private citizens a right to recovery for an agency negligently maintaining and providing information from public records. City of Friedberg v. Town of Longboat Tarpon Springs v. Garrigan, 510 s o. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCa 1987); 161

179 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Key, o. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCa 1987). Cf. Layton v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and 504 s 676 s o. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCa 1996) (agency has no common law or statutory Motor Vehicles, 730 s duty to citizen to maintain accurate records). Accord Hillsborough County v. Morris, o. 2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCa 1999). however, a custodian is not protected against tort liability resulting from that person intentionally communicating public records or their contents to someone outside the agency which is responsible for the records unless the person inspecting the records has made a bona fide request to inspect the records or the communication is necessary to the agency’s transaction of its official business. Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 s o. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCa 1991), 589 s o. 2d 289 (Fla. 1991). o n appeal, after remand, the Fifth District held review denied, Williams v. City of the claim against the city was barred on the basis of sovereign immunity. 619 s o. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th DCa 1993). Cf. ago 97-09 (law enforcement agency’s Minneola, release of sexual offender records for purposes of public notification is consistent with its duties and responsibilities). STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS E. Creation of exemptions 1. records “Courts cannot judicially create any exceptions, or exclusions to Florida’s Public act.” 784 s o. 2d 585, 591 (Fla. Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County v. D.B., 4th DCa 2001). Accord Wait v. Florida Power and Light Company, 372 s o. 2d 420, 425 (Fla. 1979) (Public r ecords a ct “excludes any judicially created privilege of confidentiality;” only the legislature may exempt records from public disclosure). See s. 119.011(8), F.s., defining the term “exemption” to mean “a provision of general law which provides that a specified record or meeting, or portion thereof, is not subject to the access requirements of s. 119.07(1), s. 286.011, tate Constitution.” or s. 24, art. i of the s article i, s. 24(c), Fla. Const., authorizes the Legislature to enact general laws creating exemptions provided that such laws “shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law.” 729 s o. 2d 373, 380 (Fla. 1999), See Memorial Hospital-West Volusia v. News-Journal Corporation, in which the Court refused to “imply” an exemption from open records requirements, stating “we believe that an exemption from public records access is available only after the legislature has followed the express procedure provided in article i, section 24(c) of the Florida Constitution.” And see Campus Communications, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 s o. 2d 388, 395 (Fla. 5th DCa 2002), review denied, 848 s o. 2d 1153 (Fla. 2003) (statutory exemption for autopsy photographs serves identifiable public purpose and is no broader than necessary to meet that public purpose); Bryan v. State, 753 s o. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2000) (statute exempting from public disclosure certain prison records satisfies the constitutional standard because the legislature set forth the requisite public necessity [personal safety of prison officials and inmates] for the exemption). Compare Halifax 724 s o. 2d 567 (Fla. 1999) (statute providing Hospital Medical Center v. News-Journal Corporation, an exemption from the s unshine law for portions of hospital board meetings is unconstitutional because it does not meet the constitutional standard of specificity as to stated public necessity and it is broader than necessary to achieve its purpose). laws enacted pursuant to art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const., shall relate to one subject and must contain only exemptions or provisions governing enforcement. Cf. State v. Knight, 661 so. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCa 1995) (while exemptions when enacted must contain a public necessity statement, exceptions to an exemption are not required to contain such a statement; thus, a trial judge erred in overturning a statute providing a limited exception to the public records exemption for grand jury materials). article i, s. 24(c) also requires that laws providing exemptions from public records or public meetings requirements must be passed by a two-thirds vote of each house. The two- 162

180 government-in-the-sunshine-manual thirds vote requirement applies when an exemption is readopted in accordance with the o pen unset r eview a government s ct, s. 119.15, F.s., as well as to the initial creation of an exemption. ago 03-18. in accordance with s. 24(d), all statutory exemptions in effect on July 1, 1993, are grandfathered into the statutes and remain in effect until they are repealed. r ules of court in ovember 3, 1992, that limit access to records remain in effect until repealed. See r ule effect on n r. Jud. admin. (originally adopted by the Florida supreme Court on october 29, 2.420, Fla. ule 2.051, and subsequently renumbered in 2006 as r 1992, as r ule 2.420 may be ule 2.420). r accessed online at www.floridabar.org. ct, codified at s. 119.15, F.s., provides for overnment s The o eview a pen g unset r the review and repeal or reenactment of an exemption from s. 24, art. i, Fla. Const., and s. 119.07(1), or s. 286.011, F.s. The act does not apply to an exemption that is required by federal law or applies solely to the legislature or the s tate Court s ystem. s ection 119.15(2)(a) and (b), F.s. Pursuant to the a ct, in the fifth year after enactment of a new exemption or expansion of ctober 2 of the fifth year, unless the an existing exemption, the exemption shall be repealed on o ection 119.15(3), F.s. legislature acts to reenact the exemption. s 2. Strict construction The general purpose of Ch. 119, F.s., “is to open public records to allow Florida’s citizens Christy v. Palm Beach County Sheriff ‘s Office, 698 to discover the actions of their government.” so. 2d 1365, 1366 (Fla. 4th DCa 1997). The Public records act is to be liberally construed in favor of open government, and exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed so they are limited to their stated purpose. See National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press, 18 so. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla.1st DCa 2009), review denied, 37 so. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010); Krischer v. D’Amato, 674 s o. 2d 909, 911 (Fla. 4th DCa 1996); Seminole County v. Wood, 512 s o. 2d 1000, 520 s 1002 (Fla. 5th DCa 1987), review denied, Tribune Company v. Public o. 2d 586 (Fla. 1988); Records, 493 s o. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. 2d DCa 1986), review denied sub nom., Gillum v. Tribune o. 2d 327 (Fla. 1987). 503 s Company, an agency claiming an exemption from disclosure bears the burden of proving the right to See Barfield v. School Board of Manatee County, 135 s o. 3d 560, 562 (Fla. 2d DCa an exemption. Woolling v. Lamar, 764 s o. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000), review denied, 786 s o. 2d 2014); Barfield v. City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department, o. 2d 1012, 1015 639 s 1186 (Fla. 2001); review denied, 649 s o. 2d 869 (Fla. 1994); and Florida Freedom Newspapers, (Fla. 4th DCa), 478 s o. 2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCa 1985). See also Bludworth v. Palm Beach Inc. v. Dempsey, 476 s o. 2d 775, 780n.1 (Fla. 4th DCa 1985), Newspapers, Inc., review denied, 488 s o. 2d 67 (Fla. 1986); Tribune Company v. Public Records, supra, stating that doubt as to the applicability of an And see Times Publishing exemption should be resolved in favor of disclosure rather than secrecy. Company v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 s o. 2d 487, 492, noting that the judiciary cannot create a privilege of confidentiality to accommodate the desires of government and that “[a]n open government is crucial to the citizens’ ability to adequately evaluate the decisions of elected and appointed officials”; rather the “right to access public documents is virtually unfettered, save only the statutory exemptions designed to achieve a balance between an informed public and the ability of the government to maintain secrecy in the public interest.” Accord ago 80-78 (“policy considerations” do not, standing alone, justify nondisclosure of public records). Retroactive application of new exemptions 3. access to public records is a substantive right. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corporation, 784 s o. 2d 438 (Fla. 2001). Thus, a statute affecting that right is presumptively prospective and there must be a clear legislative intent for the statute to apply retroactively. Id. g enerally, the critical date in determining whether a document is subject to disclosure is the date the public records request is made; the law in effect on that date applies. so. 2d 189, 192-193 (Fla. 1st DCa Baker County Press, Inc. v. Baker County Medical Services, 870 163

181 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 2004). however, if the legislature is “clear in its intent,” an exemption may be applied retroactively. 821 s review Campus Communications, Inc. v. Earnhardt, o. 2d 388, 396 (Fla. 5th DCa 2002), denied, 848 s o. 2d 1153 (Fla. 2003) (statute exempting autopsy photographs from disclosure is remedial and may be retroactively applied). See also Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office v. Sun- eptember 6, 2017); City of Orlando Sentinel Company, LLC, 42 F.l.W. D1954 (Fla. 4th DCa s o. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 1986); and v. Desjardins, 668 s o. 2d 580 493 s Roberts v. Butterworth, 614 s o.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCa 1993) (Fla. 1996). Cf. Cebrian By and Through Cebrian v. Klein, (amendment to child abuse statute limiting access to unfounded reports was remedial in nature and therefore applied retroactively); ago 11-16 (applying exemption to a public records request received before the statute’s effective date because the legislation creating the exemption states that it “applies to information held by an agency, before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption”); and ago 94-70 (amendment to expungement statute appears to be remedial and, therefore, should be retroactively applied to those records ordered expunged prior to the effective date of the amendment). 4. Retroactive application of statutes eliminating confidentiality in 697 s o. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCa 1997), the court held that Baker v. Eckerd Corporation, an amendment eliminating protection against disclosure of any unfounded reports of child abuse See also ago 95-19 (expanded applies prospectively from the effective date of the amendment. disclosure provisions for juvenile records apply only to records created after the effective date of the amendment); and Coventry First, LLC v. Office of Insurance Regulation, 30 so. 3d 552 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010) (although intended to apply retroactively, statutory amendment imposing a time limitation on the exempt status of certain records submitted to an agency applied prospectively since retroactive application improperly deprived company of its vested property rights in records already submitted to the agency). records made before the date of a repeal of an exemption under s. 119.15, F.s., the o pen government s unset r ct, “may not be made public unless otherwise provided by law.” eview a section 119.15(7), F.s. 5. Difference between exempt and confidential records a. Confidential records There is a difference between records the legislature has determined to be exempt from the ecords a ct and those which the legislature has determined to be exempt from the a ct Public r and confidential WFTV, Inc. v. School Board of Seminole County, 874 s o. 2d 48, 53 (Fla. 5th DCa . 2004), review denied, 892 s o. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2004). i f information is made confidential in the statutes, the information is not subject to inspection by the public and may be released only to those persons and entities designated in the statute. Id. And see s 08-24, 04-09 and 86 -97. ago however, a statute restricting release of confidential emergency call information does not prevent the city’s attorneys or other city officials who are responsible for advising the city regarding the provision of emergency medical services or for defending the city against a possible claim arising from such services, from reviewing the records related to such emergency calls that contain patient examination or treatment information. ago 95-75. an agency is authorized to take reasonable steps to ensure that confidential records are not improperly released. Lee County v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 634 so. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 2d DCa 1994) (county policy requiring the patient’s notarized signature on all release forms for emergency services medical records “not unreasonable or onerous;” requirement was a valid means of protecting records made confidential by s. 401.30[4], F.s.). Accord ago 94-51 (agency “should be vigilant in its protection of the confidentiality provided by statute for medical records of [its] employees”). Cf. Florida Department of Revenue v. WHI Limited o. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCa 2000) (administrative law judge [alJ] not authorized Partnership, 754 s 164

182 government-in-the-sunshine-manual to mandate that agency disclose confidential records because alJ is not a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction for purposes of statute permitting disclosure of confidential records in response “to an order of a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction”); and ago 94-86 (if custodian of confidential library circulation records believes that such records should not be disclosed in response to a subpoena because the subpoena is not a “proper judicial order” as provided in s. 257.261, F.s., custodian may assert the confidentiality provisions in a motion to quash the subpoena but should not ignore the subpoena for production of such records). b. Exempt records if records are not made confidential but are simply exempt from the mandatory disclosure requirements in s. 119.07(1), F.s., the agency is not prohibited from disclosing the documents in See Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 s all circumstances. review o. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 5th DCa), denied, 589 so. 2d 289 (Fla. 1991), in which the court observed that pursuant to s. 119.07(3) (d), F.s. [now s. 119.071(2)(c), F.s.], “active criminal investigative information” was exempt from the requirement that public records be made available for public inspection. h owever, as stated by the court, “the exemption does not prohibit the showing of such information. There are many situations in which investigators have reasons for displaying information which they have the option not to display.” [e mphasis supplied by the Court] ago 07-21 (while statute See also makes photographs of law enforcement personnel exempt rather than confidential, custodian, in deciding whether such information should be disclosed, must determine whether there is a statutory or substantial policy need for disclosure and in the absence of a statutory or other legal duty to be accomplished by disclosure, whether release of such information is consistent with the exemption’s purpose). Accord ago 08-24. once an agency has gone public with information which could have been previously protected from disclosure under Public r ecords a ct exemptions, no further purpose is served by preventing full access to the desired information. Downs v. Austin, 522 s o. 2d 931, 935 (Fla. 1st DCa 1988). Cf. ago 01-74 (taxpayer information that is confidential in the hands of certain specified officers under s. 193.074, F. s., is subject to disclosure under the Public r ecords act when it has been submitted by a taxpayer to a value adjustment board as evidence in an assessment dispute). however, in City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, 642 s o. 2d 1135 (Fla. 4th DCa 1994), so. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1995), the court held that when a criminal justice agency 651 review denied, transfers exempt criminal investigative information to another criminal justice agency, the And see Ragsdale v. State, 720 s o. 2d 203, 206 (Fla. 1998) information retains its exempt status. (“the focus in determining whether a document has lost its status as a public record must be on the policy behind the exemption and not on the simple fact that the information has changed Alice P. v. Miami Daily News, nc., 440 s o. 2d 1300 (Fla. 3d DCa 1983), i agency hands”); 467 s o. 2d 697 (Fla. 1985) (confidential birth information contained in license review denied, ago 04-44 (if the prison application submitted to state health agency not subject to disclosure); industry agency sends exempt proprietary confidential business information to the s ecretary of the Department of Corrections in his capacity as a member of the board of directors of the prison industry agency, that information does not lose its exempt status by virtue of the fact that it was sent to the secretary’s office in the department); and ago 94-77 (work product exception authorized in former s. 119.07[3][l], F.s. [now s. 119.071(1)(d), F.s.], will be retained if the work product is transferred from the county attorney to the city attorney pursuant to a substitution of parties to the litigation). 6. Discovery of exempt or confidential records an exemption from disclosure under the Public records act does not render the document automatically privileged for purposes of discovery under the Florida r ules of Civil Procedure or in administrative proceedings. See Department of Health v. Poss, 45 so. 3d 510 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010); Department of Professional Regulation v. Spiva, 478 s o. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCa 1985). ct may overlap in certain areas, “although the r ules of Civil Procedure and the Public r ecords a 165

183 government-in-the-sunshine-manual they are not coextensive in scope.” Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Kropff , See also Department of Highway Safety and Motor o. 2d 1068, 1069n.1 (Fla. 3d DCa 1984). 445 s 570 s o. 2d 1322 (Fla. 2d DCa 1990), review denied, 576 s o. 2d Vehicles v. Krejci Company Inc., 286 (Fla. 1991) (records which are exempt from public inspection may be subject to discovery in a civil action upon a showing of exceptional circumstances and if the trial court takes all precautions to ensure the confidentiality of the records). Cf. League of Women Voters v. Florida House of Representatives, 132 s o. 3d 135, 153 (Fla. 2013) (“if the circuit court concludes, after undertaking an in camera review of any disputed documents, that draft [apportionment] plans are exempt from public records disclosure, the circuit court should still require the legislature to produce the draft apportionment maps and supporting documents under appropriate litigation discovery rules, to the extent these documents do not contain information regarding individual legislators’ or legislative staff members’ thoughts or impressions”). B.B. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 731 s o. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th For example, in DCa 1999), the court ruled that as a party to a dependency proceeding involving her daughters, a mother was entitled to discovery of the criminal investigative records relating to the death of her infant. The court found that the statutory exemption for active criminal investigative information did not “override the discovery authorized by the r ules of Juvenile Procedure.” at 34. Compare Henderson v. Perez, 835 s o. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 2d DCa 2003) (trial court Id. order compelling sheriff to produce exempt home addresses and photographs of 10 active law enforcement officers in a civil lawsuit filed by Perez predicated on his arrest, quashed because “Perez has not shown that the photographs and home addresses of the law enforcement officers are essential to the prosecution of his suit”). E. FEDERAL LAW AND THE FLORIDA PUBLIC RECORDS LAW 1. Application of federal confidentiality requirements to Florida public records The general rule is that records which would otherwise be public under state law are unavailable for public inspection only when there is an absolute conflict between federal and state law relating to confidentiality of records. i f a federal statute requires particular records to be closed and the state is clearly subject to the provisions of such statute, then pursuant to the supremacy Clause of the u tates Constitution, art. vi, u.s. Const., the state must keep nited s State ex rel. Cummer v. Pace, o. 679 (Fla. 1935); ago s 90-102, the records confidential. 159 s See also Wallace v. Guzman, 687 s o. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 3d 85-03, 81-101, 80-31, and 74-372. DCa 1997) (exemptions from disclosure set forth in federal Freedom of i ct apply nformation a to federal agencies but not to state agencies). Compare Florida Department of Education v. NYT Management Services, Inc., 895 s o. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCa 2005) (federal law prohibits public disclosure of social security numbers in state teacher certification database). Thus, tenant records of a public housing authority are not exempt, by reason of the Federal Privacy act, from disclosure otherwise required by the Florida Public records act. Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach v. Gomillion, so. 2d 117 (Fla. 5th DCa 1994). 639 rejecting the housing authority’s argument that it was an agency of the federal government and thus subject to the Federal Privacy a ct, the court concluded that while the authority received federal funds and was subject to some oversight, the federal government was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the authority and the records produced and submitted to the federal government were simply “monitoring devices.” See now s. 119.071(5)(f ), F.s., providing confidentiality for medical history records and certain insurance information provided by applicants for or participants in government housing assistance programs. similarly, since federal law did not clearly require that documents received by a state agency in the course of settlement negotiations to resolve a federal lawsuit be kept confidential, such documents were found to be open to inspection under Ch. 119, F.s. Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, no. 91-2108 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. s eptember Accord Lakeland Ledger 20, 1991), per curiam affirmed, 606 s o. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992). 166

184 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Publishing Corporation v. School Board of Polk County, o. gC-g-91-3803 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. n november 21, 1991) (map prepared by u.s. Justice Department concerning desegregation of lakeland schools and given to school district employees was a public record and open to Cf. Morris v. Whitehead, 588 so. 2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 2d DCa 1991) (upholding inspection). nondisclosure of confidential records received by housing authority from the federal government City of Miami v. Metropolitan Dade pursuant to agreement authorized by state housing law); and County, upp. 683 (s.D. Fla. 1990) (while the actions of the s tate of Florida in releasing 745 F. s documents are subject to the mandates of Ch. 119, F.s., the actions of the federal government in a criminal prosecution undertaken by the office of the u nited s tates a ttorney are not). 2. Copyrighted records a. Copyrights held by agencies in the absence of statutory authorization, a public official is not empowered to obtain a copyright for material produced by his or her office in connection with the transaction of official business. Microdecisions, Inc. v. Skinner, 889 s o. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCa 2004), review denied, 902 so. 2d 791 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 126 s.Ct. 746 (2005) (property appraiser not authorized to assert copyright protection for the g eographic i nformation system maps created by his office). Accord ago s 03-42, 88 -23, and 86-94. Cf. ago 00-13 (in the absence of express statutory authority, state agency not authorized to secure a trademark). section 119.084(2), F.s., however, specifically authorizes agencies to hold a copyright for data processing software created by the agency. The agency may sell the copyrighted software s. 24.105(10), F.s., See also to public or private entities or may establish a license fee for its use. authorizing the Department of the lottery to hold patents, copyrights, trademarks and service marks; and see ss. 286.021 and 286.031, F.s., prescribing duties of the Department of s tate with respect to authorized copyrights obtained by state agencies. b. Copyrighted material obtained by agencies The federal copyright law vests in the owner of a copyright, subject to certain limitations, the exclusive right to do or to authorize, among other things, the reproduction of the copyrighted work and the distribution of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership. See ago 97-84, citing to pertinent federal law and interpretive cases. however, the attorney g eneral’s office has concluded that the fact that material received by a state agency may be copyrighted does not preclude the material from constituting a public record. For example, ago 90-102 advised that copyrighted data processing software which was not specifically designed or created for the county but was being used by the county in its official capacity for official county business fell within the definition of “public record.” moreover, in State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Southpointe Pharmacy, 636 s o. 2d 1377, 1382-1383 (Fla. 1st DCa 1994), the court rejected a state agency’s argument that a transcript of a hearing that had been copyrighted by the court reporter and filed with the agency should not be copied without the copyright holder’s permission. The court stated that the agency was under a statutory obligation to preserve all testimony in the proceeding and make a transcript available in accordance with the fees set forth in Ch. 119, F.s. And see ago 75-304 (agency may not enter into agreement with court reporter to refer all requests for copies of agency proceedings to court reporter who originally transcribed proceedings; agency must provide copies of transcripts in accordance with charges set forth in Public r ecords a ct). The federal copyright law, when read together with Ch. 119, F.s., authorizes and requires the custodian of records of the Department of s tate to make maintenance manuals supplied to that agency pursuant to law, available for examination and inspection purposes. ago 03-26. “With regard to reproducing, copying, and distributing copies of these maintenance manuals which are protected under the federal copyright law, state law must yield to the federal law on The custodian should advise individuals seeking to copy such records of the the subject.” Id. 167

185 government-in-the-sunshine-manual limitations of the federal copyright law and the consequences of violating its provisions; such notice may take the form of a posted notice that the making of a copy may be subject to the copyright law. ago s 03-26 and 97-84. h owever, it is advisable for the custodian to refrain 14 F.l.W. s But see State v. Allen, from copying such records himself or herself. ago 03-26. upp. 172a (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. n ovember 2, 2006) (defendant entitled to inspect and copy copyrighted operating manual for the radar unit and speedometer used by the police under art. i, s. 24, Fla. Const.; if police department declined to make copies, defendant or his representative must be allowed reasonable access to the documents and a copy machine to make copies). State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services moreover, as noted by the court in v. Southpointe Pharmacy, supra, once a transcript of an administrative hearing conducted by or on behalf of an agency has been filed with the agency, the transcript becomes a public record, without regard to who ordered the transcription or bore its expense. The agency which is under a statutory obligation to preserve all testimony can charge neither the parties nor the public more than the charges authorized by Ch. 119, F.s., regardless of the fact that the court reporter may have copyrighted the transcript. G. FEES FOR INSPECTING AND COPYING PUBLIC RECORDS 1. Inspection of public records Providing access to public records is a statutory duty imposed by the legislature upon all record custodians and should not be considered a profit-making or revenue-generating operation. ago 85-03. Thus, public information must be open for inspection without charge unless otherwise expressly provided by law. State ex rel. Davis v. McMillan, 38 s o. 666 (Fla. 1905). See See also ago s 84-03 and 76-34 (only those fees or charges which are authorized by statute may be imposed upon an individual seeking access to public records). Cf. ago 75-50 (the fact that the record sought to be inspected is a tape recording as opposed to a written document is of no import insofar as the imposition of a fee for inspection is concerned). section 119.07(4)(d), F.s., however, authorizes the imposition of a special service charge when the nature or volume of public records to be inspected is such as to require extensive use extensive clerical or supervisory assistance, or both. The of information technology resources, or charge must be reasonable and based on the labor or computer costs actually incurred by the agency. See Board of County Commissioners of Highlands County v. Colby, 976 s o. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCa 2008) (special service charge applies to requests for both inspection and copies of public records when extensive clerical assistance is required). in addition, an agency may adopt a policy imposing a reasonable special service charge based on the actual labor cost for clerical personnel who are required, due to the nature or volume of a public records request, to safeguard such records from loss or destruction during their ago 00-11. For example, in ago 00-11, the requested records were described inspection. as “original documents that have no recorded or maintained counterparts, such that, by their nature, they would need a heightened degree of protection from alteration or destruction.” a determination of whether the nature or volume of the public records requires such extensive assistance must be made on a case-by-case basis; the special service charge may not be routinely imposed. Id. moreover, it would be difficult to justify the imposition of a fee for extensive clerical or supervisory assistance if the personnel providing such assistance were simultaneously performing regular duties. Id. And see Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, 189 s o. 3d 120 (Fla. 2016) (affirming trial court finding that two conditions—an hourly photocopying fee and an hourly supervisory fee—were imposed in violation of s. 119.07, F.s.). 2. Copies of public records if no fee is prescribed elsewhere in the statutes, s. 119.07(4)(a)1., F.s., authorizes the 168

186 government-in-the-sunshine-manual custodian to charge a fee of up to 15 cents per one-sided copy for copies that are 14 inches by 81/2 inches or less. an agency may charge no more than an additional 5 cents for each two- sided duplicated copy. And see s. 119.011(7), F.s., defining the section 119.07(4)(a)2., F.s. term “duplicated copies” to mean “new copies produced by duplicating, as defined in s. 283.30,” F.s. “Duplicating” means “the process of reproducing an image or images from an original to a final substrate through the electrophotographic, xerographic, laser, or offset process or any combination of these processes, by which an operator can make more than one copy without rehandling the original.” s ection 283.30(3), F.s. a charge of up to $1.00 per copy may be assessed for a certified copy of a public record. section 119.07(4)(c), F.s. For other copies, the charge is limited to the actual cost of duplication of the record. section 119.07(4)(a)3., F.s. The phrase “actual cost of duplication” is defined to mean “the cost of the material and supplies used to duplicate the public record, but does not include the labor cost and overhead cost associated with such duplication.” s ection 119.011(1),F.s. an exception, however, exists for copies of county maps or aerial photographs supplied by county constitutional officers which may include a reasonable charge for the labor and overhead associated with their ection 119.07(4)(b), F.s. Cf. ago 13-03 (while agency may charge “actual cost duplication. s of duplication” if it sends public records via e-mail, agency did not identify any actual costs of duplication involved in forwarding copies of electronic mail in lieu of photocopying and “the definition [of actual cost of duplication] does not allow for the imposition of labor costs or associated overhead costs”). 3. Special service charge for extensive use of clerical or supervisory labor or extensive information technology resources section 119.07(4)(d), F.s. provides that if the nature or volume of public records to be inspected or copied requires the extensive use of information technology resources or extensive clerical or supervisory assistance, or both, the agency may charge, in addition to the actual cost of duplication, a reasonable service charge based on the cost actually incurred by the agency for such extensive use of information technology resources or personnel. When warranted, the special service charge applies to requests for both inspection and copies of public records. Board 976 s o. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCa 2008). of County Commissioners of Highlands County v. Colby, Thus, while an agency may not refuse to allow inspection or copying of public records based upon the amount of records requested or the span of time which is covered by the public records request, if extensive use of information technology resources or clerical or supervisory personnel is needed in order to produce the requested records, the agency may impose a reasonable special service charge that reflects the actual costs incurred for the extensive use of such resources or See ago s 92-38 and 90-07. Cf. Trout v. Bucher, 205 s o. 3d 876 (Fla. 4th DCa 2016) personnel. (supervisor of elections authorized to charge a reasonable fee based on the labor costs “actually incurred” to comply with trout’s request to inspect ballots in accordance with s. 119.07[5], F.s.). a. Meaning of the term “extensive” section 119.07(4)(d), F.s., “does not identify the legislature’s intent as to what may n 1991, constitute ‘extensive use’ and provides no definition of that term.” ago 13-03. i a divided First District Court of a ppeal upheld a hearing officer’s order rejecting an inmate challenge to a Department of Corrections rule that defined “extensive” for purposes of the special service charge to mean that it would take more than 15 minutes to locate, review for confidential information, copy and refile the requested material. Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. v. Florida Department of Corrections, 579 s o. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991), review denied, 592 s o. 2d 680 (Fla. 1991). The court agreed with the hearing officer that the burden was on the challenger to show that the administrative rule was invalid under Ch. 120, F.s, and the record did not indicate that the officer’s ruling was “clearly erroneous” in this case. 169

187 government-in-the-sunshine-manual in light of the lack of clear direction in the statute as to the meaning of the term “extensive,” ttorney g eneral’s office has suggested that agencies implement the service charge the a ct and that authorization “in a manner that reflects the purpose and intent of the Public r ecords a does not constitute an unreasonable infringement upon the public’s statutory and constitutional right of access to public records.” ago 13-03. i n addition, the a ttorney g eneral’s office also strongly encourages agencies to adopt a public records procedure that addresses imposition of special service charge. Id. See Carden v. moreover, the statute mandates that the special service charge be “reasonable.” Chief of Police, 696 s o. 2d 772, 773 (Fla. 2d DCa 1996), in which the court reviewed a challenge to a service charge that exceeded $4,000 for staff time involved in responding to a public records request, and said that an “excessive charge could well serve to inhibit the pursuit of rights conferred ecords a ct.” a by the Public r ccordingly, the court remanded the case and required the agency to “explain in more detail the reason for the magnitude of the assessment.” Id. And see Board of 189 s Trustees, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, o. 3d 120, 129 (Fla. 2016), noting that “excessive, unwarranted special service charges deter individuals seeking public records from gaining access to the records to which they are entitled.” b. Meaning of the term “information technology resources” “i nformation technology resources” is defined as data processing hardware and software and services, communications, supplies, personnel, facility resources, maintenance and training. section 119.011(9), F.s. The term does not include a videotape or a machine to view a videotape. ago 88-23. The fact that the request involves the use of information technology resources is not sufficient to incur the imposition of the special service charge; rather, extensive use of such resources is required. ago s 13-03 and 99-41. c. Cost to review records for exempt information an agency is not ordinarily authorized to charge for the cost to review records for statutorily exempt material. ago 84-81. h owever, the special service charge may be imposed for this work if the volume of records and the number of potential exemptions make review and redaction of the records a time-consuming task. See Florida Institutional Legal Services v. Florida Department 579 s And see Agency for Health Care Administration v. Zuckerman of Corrections, o. 2d at 269. Spaeder, LLP , 221 s o. 3d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017) (prior court decisions as well as the language in s. 119.07[4], F.s., dictate that the requester, who had submitted several voluminous public records requests for records which included confidential information “should be required to pay for the cost of searching, review, and redaction of exempted information prior to production”). d. Calculation of labor cost in Board of County Commissioners of Highlands County v. Colby, 976 so. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCa 2008) , the court approved a county’s special service charge pursuant to s. 119.07(4), F.s., which included both an employee’s salary and benefits in calculating the labor cost for the special service charge, recognizing, however, that the charge must be reasonable and based upon the actual labor costs incurred by or attributable to the county. 205 s o. 3d 876 See Trout v. Bucher, (Fla. 4th DCa 2016) (supervisor of elections not required to charge the lowest hourly rate of the employee capable of doing the work needed to comply with trout’s request to inspect ballots in accordance with s. 119.07[5], F.s., because s. 119.07[4][d] allows the agency to charge the labor cost of the personnel that is “actually incurred” by the agency where extensive assistance is required). The term “supervisory assistance” has not been widely interpreted. See Herskovitz v. Leon County, no. 98-22 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 9, 1998), concluding that an appropriate charge for supervisory review is “reasonable” in cases involving a large number of documents that contain some exempt information. i n State v. Gudinas, n o. Cr 94-7132 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. June 1, 1999) , the circuit judge approved a rate based on an agency attorney’s salary when the attorney was 170

188 government-in-the-sunshine-manual required to review exempt material in a voluminous criminal case file. The court noted that “only an attorney or paralegal” could responsibly perform this type of review because of the “complexity of the records reviewed, the various public record exemptions and possible prohibitions, and the necessary discretionary decisions to be made with respect to potential exemptions.” e. Reasonable deposit or advance payment section 119.07(4)(a)1., F.s., states that the custodian of public records shall furnish a copy or a certified copy of the record “upon payment of the fee prescribed by law . . . .” See Wootton 590 s v. Cook, o. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCa 1991) (if a requestor “identifies a record with sufficient specificity to permit [the agency] to identify it and forwards the appropriate fee , [the agency] must furnish by mail a copy of the record.”) (e.s.); and Promenade D’Iberville, LLC v. Sundy 145 s o. 3d 980, 983 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014) (a records custodian may delay production “if the requesting party fails to remit the appropriate fees”). accordingly, an agency’s policy of requiring the payment of a deposit prior to redaction and delivery of hundreds of telephone recordings related to a criminal trial was determined to be “facially reasonable.” Morris Publishing Group, LLC v. State, 154 s o. 3d 528, 534 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015), review denied, 163 s o. 3d 512 (Fla. 2015). Accord Board of County Commissioners of Highlands County v. Colby, 976 s o. 2d 31, 37 (Fla. 2d DCa 2008), noting that a “policy of requiring an advance deposit seems prudent given the legislature’s determination that taxpayers should not shoulder the entire expense of responding to an extensive request for public records.” “[t]he reasonableness of a policy and its application — based on the facts in a particular case — guides whether an abuse of discretion is shown.” Morris Publishing Group, LLC at 534. And see o. 3d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCa Agency for Health Care Administration v. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP , 221 s 2017) (lower court abused its discretion by ordering the agency to produce a large number of responsive public records within 48 hours of the issuance of the order without requiring advance payment of the agency’s invoices associated with production of the records). an agency may refuse to produce additional records if the fees for a previous request See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 995 s o. for records have not been paid by the requestor. 2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCa 2008) (s. 119.07[4], F.s., “does not require the City to do any more than what it did in this case,” i.e. , require lozman to pay the bill for the first group of records he requested before the city would make any further documents available). ago 05-28 Cf. (custodian authorized to bill the requestor for any shortfall between the deposit and the actual cost of copying the public records when the copies have been made and the requesting party subsequently advises the city that the records are not needed). 4. Requests for information regarding costs to obtain public records in order to comply with the statutory directive that an agency provide copies of public records upon payment of the statutory fee, an agency must respond to requests for information as to copying costs. Wootton v. Cook, supra. See also Woodard v. State, 885 s o. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th DCa 2004), remanding a case for further proceedings where the custodian forwarded only information And relating to the statutory fee schedule rather than the total cost to copy the requested records. see, Herskovitz v. Leon County, n o. 98-22 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 9, 1998), in which the court said that if an agency is asked for a large number of records, the fee should be communicated to the requestor before the work is undertaken. “i f the agency gives the requesting party an estimate of the total charge, or the hourly rate to be applied, the party can then determine whether it appears reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. 5. Requests for free copies of public records an agency is not precluded from choosing to provide informational copies of public records without charge. ago 90-81. however, chapter 119, F.s., does not contain a provision that prohibits agencies from charging indigent persons or inmates the applicable statutory fee to obtain copies of public 171

189 government-in-the-sunshine-manual records. 633 s o. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993) (indigent inmate not entitled to receive See Roesch v. State, copies of public records free of charge nor to have original state attorney files mailed to him in prison; prisoners are “in the same position as anyone else seeking public records who cannot pay” 869 s o. 2d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCa 2004) (no merit to inmate’s the required costs); Potts v. State, contention that Ch. 119, F.s., entitles him to free copies of all records generated in his case); 150 s Bennett v. Clerk of Circuit Court Citrus County, o. 3d 277 (Fla. 5th DCa 2014) (authority providing indigent criminal defendants with free copies does not extend beyond the direct appeal of judgment and sentence and transcripts of evidentiary hearings held on postconviction claims); o. 3d 569 (Fla. 4th DCa 2016) (indigent prisoners are not entitled to free Milner v. State , 196 s ct); and Yanke v. State, 588 s o. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCa ecords a copies of records under the Public r review denied, 595 s 1991), cert. denied, 112 s.Ct. 1592 (1992) (prisoner o. 2d 559 (Fla. 1992), must pay copying and postage charges to have copies of public records mailed to him). And see 636 s State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Southpointe Pharmacy, o. 2d 1377, 1382n.7 (Fla. 1st DCa 1994) (indigent person “is not relieved by his indigency” from paying statutory costs to obtain public records). similarly, a labor union must pay the costs stipulated in Ch. 119, F.s., for copies of documents it has requested from a public employer for collective bargaining purposes because “[a] labor union seeking information from the employer with whom it is locked in collective bargaining negotiations is not exempt from the Florida Public r ct.” City of Miami ecords a Beach v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 937 s o. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCa 2006). And see inf. o p. to g arganese, a pril 14, 1998 (authority to charge city council member for copies of public records). a school district is under no statutory obligation to provide copies of public records free of charge to individual members of a school advisory council, but a school district may formulate a policy for the distribution of such records. ago 99-46. i advisory council f it is found that the needs certain school records in order to carry out its statutory functions, such records should be provided to the council in the same manner that records related to agenda items are provided to Id. Cf. i school board members. p. to m artin, n ovember 21, 2006 (school board policy nf. o requiring that a request for information by an individual board member requiring more than sixty minutes of staff time to prepare must be presented to the school board for approval would be invalid if the school board member is asking under public records law; however, the school board member would be subject to any charges allowed by Chapter 119, F.s.). 6. Authority to charge for development, travel or overhead costs an agency should not consider the furnishing of public records to be a “revenue-generating operation.” ago 85-03. See also ago 89-93 (city not authorized to sell copies of its growth management book for $35.00 each when the actual cost to reproduce the book is $15.10 per copy; city is limited to charging only the costs authorized by Ch. 119, F.s.). ecords a ct does not authorize the addition of overhead costs such as utilities The Public r or other office expenses to the charge for public records. ago 99-41. s imilarly, an agency may not charge for travel time to obtain public records stored off-premises. ago 90-07. For example, if municipal pension records are stored in a records storage facility outside city limits, the city may not pass along to the public records requestor the costs to retrieve the records. i nf. op. to s ugarman, s eptember 5, 1997. Cf. Cone & Graham, Inc. v. State, n o. 97-4047 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. october 7, 1997) (an agency’s decision to “archive” older e-mail messages on tapes so that they could not be retrieved or printed without a systems programmer was analogous to an agency’s decision to store records off-premises in that the agency rather than the requestor must bear the costs for retrieving the records). an agency may not assess fees designed to recoup the original cost of developing or producing the records. ago 88-23 (state attorney not authorized to impose a charge to recover part of costs incurred in production of a training program; the fee to obtain a copy of 172

190 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the videotape of such program is limited to the actual cost of duplication of the tape). And 636 s see State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Southpointe Pharmacy, o. 2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. 1st DCa 1994) (once a transcript of an administrative hearing is filed with the agency, the transcript becomes a public record regardless of who ordered the transcript or paid for the transcription; the agency can charge neither the parties nor the public a fee that exceeds ecords a ct). the charges authorized in the Public r s. 119.07(4)(b), F.s., providing that the Cf. charge for copies of county maps or aerial photographs supplied by county constitutional officers may also include a reasonable charge for the labor and overhead associated with their duplication. Therefore, unless a specific request for copies requires extensive clerical or supervisory assistance or extensive use of information technology resources so as to trigger the special service charge authorized by s. 119.07(4)(d), F.s., an agency may charge only the actual cost of duplication for copies of computerized public records. ago 99-41. The imposition of the service charge, however, is dependent upon the nature or volume of records requested, not on the cost to either develop or maintain the records or the database system. Id. 7. Fees to obtain agency records held by private companies although an agency may contract with private companies to provide information also obtainable through the agency, it may not abdicate its duty to produce such records for inspection and copying by requiring those seeking public records to do so only through its designee and then paying whatever fee that company may establish for its services. ago 02-37. The agency is the custodian of its public records and, upon request, must produce such records for inspection and copy such records at the statutorily prescribed fee. Id. Accord ago 13-03. And see ago 05- 34 (while the property appraiser may provide public records, excluding exempt or confidential information, to a private company, the property appraiser may receive only those fees that are authorized by statute and may not, in the absence of statutory authority, enter into an agreement with the private company where the property appraiser provides such records in exchange for either in-kind services or a share of the profits or proceeds from the sale of the information by the private company). s. 119.0701(2)(b)2., F.s., requiring that certain contracts contain a Cf. provision stipulating that upon request from the public agency’s custodian of public records, the contractor must provide the public agency with a copy of the requested records or allow the records to be inspected or copied within a reasonable time at a cost that does not exceed the cost provided in ch. 119 or as otherwise provided by law. Sales tax 8. attorney general’s office advised that the sales tax imposed pursuant in ago 86-83, the to s. 212.05, F.s., is not applicable to the fee charged for providing copies of records under s. 119.07, F.s. See s. 5(a) of Department of r evenue r ule 12a-1.041, F.a.C., stating that “[t]he fee prescribed by law, or the actual cost of duplication, for providing copies of public records . . . under Chapter 119, F.s., is exempt from sales tax.” 9. Confidential records unless another fee to obtain a particular record is prescribed by law, an agency may not charge fees that exceed those in Ch. 119, F.s, when providing copies of confidential records to persons who are authorized to obtain them. For example, in ago 03-57, the a ttorney g eneral’s office advised that persons who are authorized by statute to obtain otherwise confidential autopsy photographs should be provided copies in accordance with the provisions of the Public records a ct, i.e., s. 119.07(4), F.s. The medical examiner is not authorized to charge a fee that exceeds those charges. Id. 10. Requester makes his/her own copies section 119.07(3)(a), F.s., provides a “right of access to public records for the purpose of 173

191 government-in-the-sunshine-manual making photographs of the record while such record is in the possession, custody, and control of the custodian of public records.” This subsection “applies to the making of photographs in the conventional sense by use of a camera device to capture images of public records but excludes the duplication of microfilm in the possession of the clerk of the circuit court” if the clerk can provide a copy of the microfilm. s ection 119.07(3)(b), F.s. The photographing is to be done in the room where the public records are kept. s ection 119.07(3)(d), F.s. h owever, if in the custodian’s judgment, this is impossible or impracticable, the copying shall be done in another room or place, as close as possible to the room where the Where provision of another room or place is necessary, the expense of public records are kept. Id. The custodian Id. providing the same shall be paid by the person who wants to copy the records. may charge the person making the copies for supervision services. s ection 119.07(4)(e)2., F.s. in such cases the custodian may not charge the copy charges authorized in s. 119.07(4)(a), F.s., See but may charge only the supervision service charge authorized in s. 119.07(4)(e)2., F.s. ago 82-23. 189 s o. 3d 120, 122 Cf. Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, (Fla. 2016) (affirming trial court finding that two conditions—“an hourly photocopying fee and an hourly supervisory fee”—were imposed in violation of s. 119.07, F.s.). Fee issues relating to specific records 11. a. Clerk of court records County records (1) Pursuant to s. 125.17, F.s., the clerk of the circuit court serves as the ex officio clerk to the board of county commissioners. r ecords maintained by the clerk which relate to this function ( e.g. , county resolutions, budgets, minutes, etc.) are public records which are subject to the copying fees set forth in Ch. 119, F.s., and not the service charges set forth in Ch. 28, F.s. ago 85-80. Accord ago 94-60 (documents such as minutes of public meetings, which are in the custody of the clerk as ex officio clerk of the board of county commissioners, are not subject to the $1.00 per page charge prescribed in Ch. 28). ago 82-23 (when members of the See also public use their own photographic equipment to make their own copies, the clerk is not entitled to the fees prescribed in s. 28.24, F.s., but is entitled only to the supervisory service charge now found in s. 119.07[4][e]2., F.s.). (2) Judicial records article v of the Constitution, When the clerk is exercising his or her duties derived from Times Publishing Company v. Ake, 660 s o. 2d 255 the clerk is not subject to legislative control. (Fla. 1995). Thus, when the clerk is acting in his or her capacity as part of the judicial branch of government, access to the judicial records under the clerk’s control is governed exclusively by Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.420, Public a ccess to and Protection of Judicial r ecords. Id. s ee Fla. r. Jud. admin. 2.420(b)(2), defining the term “judicial branch” for purposes of the rule, to include “the clerk of court when acting as an arm of the court.” Florida rule of Judicial administration 2.420(m)(3) states that “[f ]ees for copies of records in all entities in the judicial branch of government, except for copies of court records , shall be the same as those provided in section 119.07, Florida s tatutes.” (e.s.). The fees to obtain copies of court records are set forth in s. 28.24, F.s. This statute establishes fees that are generally higher than those in Ch. 119, F.s. For example, the charge to obtain copies of court records is $1.00 per page, rather than 15 cents per page as established in s. 119.07(4)(a)1., F.s. See also WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 s o. 2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCa 1996) (the $1.00 per page copying charge in s. 28.24, F.s., applies to all court documents, whether unrecorded or recorded). b. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles crash reports in the absence of statutory provision, the charges authorized in s. 119.07(4), F.s., govern 174

192 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the fees to obtain copies of crash reports from law enforcement agencies. h owever, there are ighway specific statutes which apply to fees to obtain copies of reports from the Department of h otor vehicles. s ection 321.23(2)(a), F.s., provides that the fee to obtain a copy safety and m of a crash report from the department is $10.00 per copy. a copy of a homicide report is $25 ection 321.23(2)(b), F.s. s eparate charges are provided for photographs. s ection per copy. s 321.23(2)(d), F.s. H. REMEDIES AND PENALTIES 1. Voluntary mediation program section 16.60, F.s., establishes an informal mediation program within the office of the a ttorney general as an alternative for resolution of open government disputes. For more information about the voluntary mediation program, please contact the office of the attorney general at the following address: The office of the a ttorney g eneral, Pl-01, The Capitol, tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050; telephone (850)245-0140; or you may visit the office of the attorney g eneral website: www.myfloridalegal.com. Civil action 2. a. Remedies a person denied the right to inspect and/or copy public records under the Public r ecords act may bring a civil action against the agency to enforce the terms of Ch. 119, F.s. Cf. s. 119.07(8), F.s. (s. 119.07, F.s., may not be used by an inmate as the basis for failing to timely litigate any postconviction action). Before filing a lawsuit, the petitioner must have furnished a public records request to the agency. Villarreal v. State, 687 s o. 2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCa 1996), review denied, 694 s o. 2d 741 118 s.Ct. 316 (1997) (improper to order agency to produce records (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, before it has had an opportunity to comply); and Maraia v. State, o. 2d 851 (Fla. 2d DCa 685 s 1995) (public records action dismissed where petitioner failed to file a request for public records with the records custodian before filing suit). Cf. Coconut Grove Playhouse, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 935 s o. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCa 2006) (trial court order departed from essential requirements of law by requiring defendant in a public records action to produce its records as a sanction for failure to respond to a discovery subpoena). Where a multi-agency law enforcement task force had been created by a mutual aid agreement and the agreement did not indicate an intent to create a separate legal entity capable of being sued in its own name, a requestor could not sue the task force for production of records; however, as the agreement did not specify which agency would be responsible for responding to public records requests, an action could be brought against any of the member agencies to Ramese’s, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bureau of produce records in the possession of the task force. Investigation, 954 s o. 2d 703 (Fla. 5th DCa 2007). (1) Mandamus mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce compliance with the Public r ecords a ct. See Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 s o. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCa 2014); Weeks v. Golden, 764 s o. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCa 2000); 696 s o. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCa 1997); Smith v. State, Donner v. Edelstein, o. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCa 1982). See also Farmer v. State, 927 s o. 415 s 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCa 2006) (trial court should treat motion to compel production of public records as petition for writ of mandamus); Major v. Hallandale Beach Police Department , 219 so. 3d 856 (Fla. 4th DCa 2017) (petition for writ of mandamus filed against a governmental agency must attach a copy of any record that supports the petition). Cf. Agency for Health Care Administration v. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP , 221 so. 3d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCa 2017) (mandamus relief ordering agency to produce records within 48 hours and prior to requester’s payment of invoices or agency’s opportunity to review and redact exempt material was improper because 175

193 government-in-the-sunshine-manual agency’s duty was not “ministerial” and requester’s right to the records was not “indisputable”). if the requestor’s petition presents a prima facie claim for relief, an order to show cause should be issued so that the claim may receive further consideration on the merits. Staton v. o. 2d 940 (Fla. 1st DCa 1992). 697 s o. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st McMillan Accord Gay v. State, , 597 s 914 s o. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCa 2005) (trial judge dismissal of DCa 1997). See Radford v. Brock, a writ of mandamus directed to clerk of court and court reporter who were alleged to be records custodians was erroneous because trial judge did not issue an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the clerk and court reporter to show cause why the writ should not be issued, and because there was no sworn evidence refuting the petitioner’s allegations). Thus, a petition for writ of mandamus should not have been dismissed based on the agency’s response that the requested records “would have been destroyed” in accordance with Brown v. State, 152 so. 3d 739, 741 (Fla. 4th DCa 2014). similarly, the trial agency policy. judge erred in dismissing a petition seeking records relating to the chain of custody for a weapon without issuing an alternative writ of mandamus. , 219 s o. 3d 958 (Fla. 1st DCa Tracy v. State 2017). The agency had produced an evidence card showing that the weapon in question had been destroyed; accordingly, the trial court concluded that dismissal was appropriate as there were owever, because the petitioner contended that additional records were no records to produce. h available, the appellate court found that “factual disputes remain.” on remand, “if the [agency] fails to provide sworn evidence that all available information has been provided, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue prior to denying the claim.” mandamus is a “one time order by the court to force public officials to perform their legally designated employment duties.” 674 s o. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 4th DCa 1996), review denied, 684 s o. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1996). Thus, a trial court erred when it retained continuing jurisdiction to oversee enforcement of a writ of mandamus granted in a public records case. Id. See also Stone v. Ward, 752 s o. 2d 100, 101 (Fla. 2d DCa 2000) (“i t is well-settled that mandamus is not appropriate to control or regulate a general course of conduct for an unspecified period of time”). Cf. Areizaga v. Board of County Commissioners of Hillsborough 935 s review denied, 958 s o. 2d 918 (Fla. 2007) (circuit County, o. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCa 2006), courts may not refer extraordinary writs to mediation; thus, trial judge should not have ordered mediation of petition for writ of mandamus seeking production of public records). (2) Injunction injunctive relief may be available upon an appropriate showing for a violation of Ch. 119, F.s. See Daniels v. Bryson, o. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCa 1989) (injunctive relief appropriate where there 548 s is a demonstrated pattern of noncompliance with the Public r ecords a ct, together with a showing of likelihood of future violations; mandamus would not be an adequate remedy since mandamus would not prevent future harm). h owever, an injunction is not appropriate if the acts complained of have already been committed and there is not a well-grounded probability of similar future conduct. Id. See Promenade D’Iberville, LLC v. Sundy, 145 s o. 3d 980, 984 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014). (3) Declaratory relief sought by agencies agency , faced with a demand for public records, seeks guidance from the occasionally an court in the form of a complaint for declaratory judgment instead of complying with the request for public records or asserting an exemption. 68 s o. 3d See Butler v. City of Hallandale Beach, 278, 279 (Fla. 4th DCa 2011) (“m ichael Butler appeals from a final judgment in a declaratory action filed by The City of hallandale Beach [the City] . . . which sought a declaration that a list of recipients of a personal email . . . was not sent in connection with the discharge of any ecords law”). Cf. municipal duty and therefore, is not a public record under Florida’s Public r Sarasota Herald-Tribune Company, Inc. v. Schaub, n o. Ca87-2949 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. July 20, 1988), per curiam affirmed, 539 s o. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCa 1989) (state attorney cannot litigate a declaratory judgment action to obtain judicial advice on how to perform his public duties under 176

194 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the Public r ct); Wille v. McDaniel, 18 m ed. l. rptr. 2144, n o. Cl-91-154-ae (Fla. ecords a 15th Cir. Ct. February 18, 1991) (sheriff’s stated purpose in litigating declaratory judgment action [to avoid being assessed attorney fees under the Public act] is insufficient to records See also Askew v. City of Ocala, 348 support a declaratory action). so. 2d 308 (Fla. 1977) (trial court properly dismissed complaint for declaratory relief for failure to state a cause of action where public officials disagreed with a ttorney g eneral’s advisory opinion and sought different judicial opinion). in WFTV, Inc. v. Robbins, 625 s o.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCa 1993), the court held that a supervisor of elections who denied a public records request to inspect certain election results on the grounds that a court order entered in another case involving the election prohibited disclosure, “unlawfully refused” access to public records. The court determined that the supervisor herself had sought the confidentiality order by means of a motion seeking “directions” from the court in the election lawsuit. The supervisor was thus liable for payment of attorney fees incurred by the requestor in the subsequent public records action pursuant to s. 119.12, F.s., providing for an assessment of attorney fees and costs if an agency unlawfully refuses to permit examination and inspection of documents under the Public records act. See also City of St. Petersburg v. St. Petersburg Junior College, n o. 93-0004210-Ci-13, o rder a warding a ttorney’s Fees (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. m arch 25, 1994), in which a city that had initially filed an action for declaratory relief as to whether records requested under Ch. 119 were confidential under federal law was ultimately determined to be liable for attorney fees under s. 119.12, F.s., after the party seeking the records filed a counterclaim and the judge determined that the records were not exempt. (4) Damages section 119.12, F.s. does not create a private right of action authorizing the award of monetary damages for a person who brings an action to enforce the provisions of Ch. 119, F.s. section 119.12(4), F.s. Payments by the responsible agency may include only the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney fees, directly attributable to a civil action Id . brought to enforce the provisions of Ch. 119, F.s. b. Procedural issues (1) Discovery in the absence of an evident abuse of power, the trial court’s exercise of discretion in matters associated with pretrial discovery in a public records action will not be disturbed. Lorei v. Smith, so. 2d 1330, 1333 (Fla. 2d DCa 1985), review denied, 475 s o. 2d 695 464 (Fla. 1985). i n Lorei , the appellate court upheld the trial judge’s denial of a request to permit discovery pertaining to the agency’s procedures for maintaining public records. Id. The court noted that the interrogatories related to “the mechanics associated with the department’s record maintenance, the internal policies or actions which lead to the development of files,” and other matters which were not relevant to the question of whether the requested records were exempt from disclosure. Id. The court cautioned, however, that “discovery in a context such as the one at hand may well be appropriate in the circumstance where a good faith belief exists that the public agency may be playing ‘fast and loose’ with the requesting party or the court, once its statutorily delegated authority is activated.” Id. Cf. Lopez v. State, 696 s o. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. 1997) (trial court’s denial of motion to depose custodian affirmed because there were “no allegations that any documents had been removed”); and Johnson v. State, 769 s o. 2d 990, 995 (Fla. 2000) (discovery not warranted based on “bare allegations” that additional records “should” exist). (2) Hearing section 119.11(1), F.s., mandates that actions brought under Ch. 119 are entitled to an 177

195 government-in-the-sunshine-manual immediate hearing and take priority over other pending cases. See Board of Trustees, Jacksonville so. 3d 120, 124 (Fla. 2016), in which the Court observed Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, 189 ecords a ct that “an accelerated civil action plays a critical role in the enforcement of the Public r as is reflected in the title of section 119.11— ‘ accelerated hearing; immediate compliance.’” See Matos v. Office of the State Attorney for the 17th Judicial Circuit, 80 s also o. 3d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCa 2012) (an “immediate hearing does not mean one scheduled within a reasonable time, but means what the statute says: immediate”); and Woodfaulk v. State, 935 s o. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCa 2006) (s. 119.11, F.s., does not place specific requirements on a party requesting public records to obtain an accelerated hearing except the filing of an action to enforce the public records law). The purpose of the hearing “is to allow the court to hear argument from the parties and resolve any dispute as to whether there are public records responsive to the request and whether Kline v. an exemption from disclosure applies in whole or in part to the requested records.” , 200 s University of Florida o. 3d 271 (Fla. 1st DCa 2016). For example, an order dismissing a public records complaint filed against a sheriff was overturned on appeal because the judge failed although the sheriff may ultimately not be able to hold a hearing before entering the order. “ to retrieve these records, because of their age or another reason, the order in this case, entered without an evidentiary hearing, was premature.” 855 s o. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 4th Grace v. Jenne, DCa 2003). The failure to hold a hearing may be remedied by a petition for writ of certiorari. 969 s o. 2d 1174, 1174-75 (Fla. 5th DCa 2007). See Martinez v. State, “a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint and does not resolve factual issues.” Clay County Education Association v. Clay County School Board, 144 s o. 3d 708, 709 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014). Therefore, the trial judge erred when he granted the agency’s motion to dismiss based on the agency’s “unsworn response . . . that it either had already provided the documents, did not have the information in the format requested, or could not produce the documents Id. The appellate court remanded the case “for an immediate hearing because they did not exist.” under section 119.11[1] and, if necessary, further proceedings to resolve any factual disputes that remain between the parties’ complaint and answer.” See also Ferrier v. Public Defender’s Id. 171 s Office, Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, o. 3d 744 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015) (circuit court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing “on the contested issue of whether [the agency] had the requested materials in its possession”); Holley v. Bradford County Sheriff’s Department, 171 so. 3d 805 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015) (because petitioner disputed the agency’s “unsworn claim that it did not possess the requested records, the trial court could not deny [the] petition without Williams v. State, 163 s o. 3d 618 (Fla. 4th conducting an evidentiary hearing on this issue”); and DCa 2015) (where petitioner asserted that the record produced by the agency was not the record he requested, trial judge erred by denying prison inmate’s petition for writ of mandamus without issuing an alternative writ to show cause and failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issues of fact). Cf. Morgan v. Wagner, 73 s o. 3d 815 (Fla. 4th DCa 2011), in which the Fourth District said it was “compelled to affirm” the lower court order dismissing the petitioner’s public records action because there was no transcript or documentation in the appendix to show that petitioner had preserved “what may have been a valid procedural argument.” In camera inspection (3) section 119.07(1)(g), F.s., provides that in any case in which an exemption is alleged to exist pursuant to s. 119.071(1)(d) or (f ), (2)(d), (e), or (f ), or (4)(c), F.s., the public record or part of the record in question shall be submitted to the trial court for an in camera examination. See City of St. Petersburg v. Romine ex. rel. Dillinger, 719 s o. 2d 19 (Fla. 2d DCa 1998) (in camera review mandated when confidential informant exemption now found at s. 119.071[2][f ], F.s., is asserted); Walton v. Dugger, 634 s o. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1993); Lopez v. Singletary, 634 s o. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1993) (records claimed by state attorney to constitute exempted work product must be produced for an in camera inspection); and Environmental Turf, Inc. v. University of Florida Board of Trustees, 83 s o. 3d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCa 2012) (in camera inspection required where university claimed that records were exempt pursuant to s. 119.071[1][d], F.s. [attorney work product] and o. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st s. 1004.22, F.s. [proprietary research records]). And see Weeks v. Golden, 764 s 178

196 government-in-the-sunshine-manual DCa 2009) (“We fail to see how the trial court can [determine whether an agency is entitled to Cf. Agrosource, Inc. v. Florida Department a claimed exemption] without examining the records”). 148 s o. 3d 138 (Fla. 2d DCa 2014) (trial court finding after in camera review that of Citrus, certain prelitigation emails were exempt attorney work product was supported by competent substantial evidence). an in camera inspection is also required so that the trial judge can determine whether the See Holley v. Bradford County Sheriff’s records can be redacted to remove exempt information. 171 s o. 3d 805 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015) (trial court must conduct an in camera Department, inspection of the records to determine whether they could be redacted to remove information identifying confidential informants). While s. 119.07(1)(g), F.s., states that an in camera inspection is “discretionary” in cases where an exemption is alleged under s. 119.071(2)(c), F.s. (the exemption for active criminal investigative or intelligence information), it has been held that an in camera inspection is necessary in order for the court to determine whether the exemption applies to the records at issue. For example, in Woolling v. Lamar, 764 s o. 2d 765, 768-769 (Fla. 5th DCa 2000), review denied, o. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2001), the Fifth District noted that the state attorney had not 786 s presented “evidence to meet its burden that the records are exempt” under s. 119.071(2)(c), F.s.; therefore, an “in camera inspection by the lower court is . . . required so that the trial judge will have a factual basis to decide if the records are exempt. . . .” See also Garrison v. Bailey, 4 s o. 3d 683 (Fla. 1st DCa 2009). Compare Althouse v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 89 s o. 3d 288, 289 (Fla. 4th DCa 2012) (while trial court’s failure to conduct an in camera inspection usually constitutes reversible error, in this case petitioner objected to an inspection and thereby precluded judge from conducting “an intelligent review of the documents;” accordingly, appellate court was “compelled to affirm” trial court’s denial of a petition seeking documents relating to a pending criminal investigation). Cf. Jordan v. School Board of Broward County, 531 so. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCa 1988) (trial court’s failure to conduct an in camera inspection of a file containing alleged exempt attorney work product was deemed to be an invalid basis for a new trial when neither party requested an in camera inspection, and the agency’s attorney made no objection at trial). (4) Mootness in o. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCa 1996), the court, noting Puls v. City of Port St. Lucie, 678 s that “[p]roduction of the records after the [public records] lawsuit was filed did not moot the issues raised in the complaint,” remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether there See also Times Publishing Company v. City was an unlawful refusal of access to public records. 558 s o. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 2d DCa 1990) (while courts do not ordinarily of St. Petersburg, resolve disputes unless a case or controversy exists, “since the instant situation is capable of repetition while evading review, we find it appropriate to address the issues before us concerning ecords a ct for future reference”); Mazer v. Orange County, applicability of the Public r o. 811 s 2d 857, 860 (Fla. 5th DCa 2002) (“the fact that the requested documents were produced in the instant case after the action was commenced, but prior to final adjudication of the issue by the trial court, does not render the case moot or preclude consideration of [the petitioner’s] entitlement to fees under the statute”); Grapski v. City of Alachua, 31 s o. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCa 2010), review denied, 47 s o. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010) (because damage occurred when city refused to produce canvassing board minutes until approved by city commission, production after the fact did nothing to mollify appellants’ injury and therefore issue was not moot as city’s refusal “denied any realistic access for the only purpose appellants sought to achieve--review of the m inutes before the Commission meeting.”); and Schweickert v. Citrus County , Florida Board, 193 so. 3d 1075, 1079 (Fla. 5th DCa 2016) (“We agree that a ppellant’s case was not rendered moot simply because the Board produced the requested documents after the filing of the initial complaint but prior to filing the amended complaint”). Compare, State v. Ingram, 170 s o. 3d 727 (Fla. 2015) (opinion of district court of appeal holding that prison inmate was entitled to unredacted version of videotaped statement of minor victim vacated following s tate’s uncontested representation at upreme Court that the videotape does not exist). oral argument before the s 179

197 government-in-the-sunshine-manual similarly, in 889 s o. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCa 2004), review Microdecisions, Inc. v. Skinner, 902 s o. 2d 791 (Fla. 2005), 126 s.Ct. 746 (2005), the court found that denied, cert. denied, a public records lawsuit over a custodian’s requirement that a commercial company obtain a licensing agreement before using the records did not become moot when the custodian provided the company with the requested data after the lawsuit was filed. Because the data was delivered subject to a condition that it was for personal use only, a controversy remained concerning the validity of the custodian restriction on the use of the data. And see Southern Coatings, Inc. v. City o. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCa 2005) (federal court’s dismissal of pendent claims based of Tamarac, 916 s in a res judicata on state public records law is not a judgment on the merits and, therefore, not subsequent lawsuit in state court). (5) Stay if the person seeking public records prevails in the trial court, the public agency must comply with the court’s judgment within 48 hours unless otherwise provided by the trial court or such determination is stayed within that period by the appellate court. s ection 119.11(2), F.s. an automatic stay shall exist for 48 hours after the filing of a notice of appeal for public records and public meeting cases, which stay may be extended by the lower tribunal or the court on pp. P. 9.310(b)(2). motion. Fla. r. a c. Attorney fees and costs section 119.12, F.s., provides authority for an award of attorney fees and reasonable costs records act, provided that certain in civil actions filed to enforce the provisions of the Public conditions are met. 574 s o. 2d Cf. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Martin, 1223 (Fla. 3d DCa 1991) (error to award attorney’s fees where order requiring production of records was entered pursuant to a dult Protective s ervices a ct, rather than the Public r ecords act); and Downs v. Austin, 559 so. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCa 1990), review denied, 574 so. 2d 140 (Fla. 1990) (s. 119.12, F.s., does not constitute authority for the award of attorney’s fees for efforts expended to obtain the fee provided by that statute). And see State, Department of Economic 181 s Opportunity v. Consumer Rights, LLC, o. 3d 1239 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015), rejecting appellee’s argument that the requirements in s. 284.30, F.s. (establishing procedures to be followed by those seeking to have attorney’s fees paid by the state or any of its agencies) are inapplicable to public Cf . ago 16-16 (hospital district not authorized to reimburse an individual records cases. board member’s attorney fees incurred by her in responding to a public records request pertaining to her board service when no suit, claim, charge or action has been instituted against the commissioner during the time the attorney fees were incurred). a successful pro se litigant may recover reasonable costs under this section. Weeks v. Golden, 764 s o. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCa 2000); Wisner v. City of Tampa Police Department , 601 s o. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d DCa 1992). 846 s o. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1st DCa 2003) (awarding And see Weeks v. Golden, costs associated with postage, envelopes and copying, as well as filing and service of process fees, incurred by inmate who prevailed in public records lawsuit). Accord Yasir v. Forman, 149 s o. 3d 107 (Fla. 4th DCa 2014). as amended in 2017, s. 119.12(1), F.s., provides that, if a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of this chapter the court shall assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement including reasonable attorney fees against the responsible agency if the court determines that the agency unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be inspected or copied and the complainant provided written notice of the public records request to the agency’s custodian of public records at least 5 business days before filing the civil action. however, notice is not required if the agency fails to prominently post the contact information for the agency’s custodian of public records in the agency’s primary administrative building in which public records are routinely created, sent, received, maintained, and requested ection 119.12(2), F.s. and on the agency’s website, if the agency has a website. s 180

198 government-in-the-sunshine-manual The court must also determine whether the complainant made the public records request section 119.12(3), F.s. or participated in the civil action for an improper purpose. if the court determines that there was an improper purpose, the court may not award attorney fees or the costs of enforcement, to the complainant, and shall assess and award against the complainant and to the agency the reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by the agency in responding to the civil action. Id . The term “improper purpose” means “a request to inspect or copy a public record or to participate in the civil action primarily to cause a violation of this Id chapter or for a frivolous purpose.” . section 119.12, F.s., is designed to encourage voluntarily compliance with the requirements f public agencies are required to pay attorney’s fees and costs to parties who of Ch. 119, F.s. “i are wrongfully denied access to the records of such agencies, then the agencies are less likely to deny proper requests for documents.” New York Times Company v. PHH Mental Health Services, Inc., 616 s o. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1993). s tated another way, the statute “has the dual role of both deterring agencies from wrongfully denying access to public records and encouraging individuals to continue pursuing their right to access public records.” Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & , 189 so. 3d 120, 125 (Fla. 2016). There is no additional requirement Fire Pension Fund v. Lee that the court find that the “public agency did not act in good faith, acted in bad faith or acted unreasonably.” , 189 s o. 3d at 122. h owever, as noted previously, s. 119.12, F.s., was Lee amended in 2017, to add other conditions which must be met prior to an award of fees and costs under this statute. an “unlawful refusal” may include unlawful conditions or requirements for obtaining nlawful conditions or excessive, upreme Court explained in Lee : “u public records. as the s unwarranted special service charges deter individuals seeking public records from gaining access to the records to which they are entitled . . . . e ven if not malicious or done in bad faith, the Pension Fund’s actions—which were found be unlawful--had the effect of frustrating lee’s constitutional right to access public records and required him to turn to the courts to vindicate Lee that right.” o. 3d at 129-130. , 189 s an “unjustified failure to respond to a public records request until after an action has been commenced to compel compliance amounts to an unlawful refusal” for purposes of s. 119.12, , 764 so. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCa 2000). See also Mazer v. Orange County, Weeks v. Golden F.s. 811 s t]he fact that the requested documents were o. 2d 857, 860 (Fla. 5th DCa 2002) (“[ produced in the instant case after the action was commenced, but prior to final adjudication of the issue by the trial court, does not render the case moot or preclude consideration of [the Barfield v. Town of Eatonville , 675 s o. 2d 223, petitioner’s] entitlement to fees under the statute.); 224 (appellant entitled to attorney’s fees because “[t]he evidence clearly establishes that it was only after the appellant filed a lawsuit that the documents he had previously sought by written request to the town were finally turned over to him); Promenade D’Iberville, LLC v. Sundy , 145 so. 3d 980, 984 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014) “) (an agency’s “production of the records on the eve of the enforcement hearing did not cure its unjustified delay”); and Schweickert v. Citrus County, Florida Board o. 3d 1075, 1080 (Fla. 5th DCa 2016) (county’s failure to produce a , 193 s complaint alleging inappropriate conduct by a county commissioner until litigation was filed was an unlawful refusal because the exemption for records relating to an investigation of alleged discrimination did not apply to the complaint; court rejected the county’s argument that the delay was justified because the investigation into the complaint might have ultimately produced records which related to discriminatory behavior). stated another way, a delay in disclosing records can rise to the level of a refusal if “there was no good reason for the delay.” Consumer Rights, LLC v. Union County , 159 s o. 3d 882, 885 (Fla. 1st DCa 2015), review denied , 177 s o. 3d 1264 (Fla. 2015). For example, in Barfield v. Town of Eatonville , 675 s o. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCa 1996), the court held that a town was liable for attorney’s fees even if the delay in providing records was due to either the intentional wrongdoing And see Office of the State Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of or ineptitude of its clerk. 181

199 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Florida v. Gonzalez o. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCa 2007) (attorney’s fees authorized even if failure , 953 s Cf. Hewlings v. Orange County, to turn over the records was due to a mistake or ineptitude). o. 3d 839 (Fla. 5th DCa 2012) (the mere fact that a county quickly responded to Florida , 87 s public records request via voicemail and fax is not dispositive of whether the county’s 45-day delay in complying with the request was justified). “h owever, it is equally clear that a delay does not in and of itself create liability under , 159 s o. 3d at 885. s. 119.12, F.s.” Consumer Rights, LLC v. Union County See also Lilker v. , 133 s o. 3d 654, 655 (Fla. 1st DCa 2014) (where delay is the Suwannee Valley Transit Authority issue, the court must determine whether the delay was justified under the facts of the particular Cf. Citizens Awareness Foundation, Inc. v. Wantman Group, Inc. , 195 s o. 3d 396, 401 case). (Fla. 4th DCa 2016) (“The public records law should not be applied in a way that encourages the manufacture of public records requests designed to obtain no response, for the purpose of generating attorney’s fees.”). as to calculation of the reasonable costs of enforcement including reasonable attorney fees to which the prevailing party is entitled, “the trial judge is in a better position than the appellate court to make “a factual determination regarding the objectives sought by the [prevailing party], the extent of statutory enforcement obtained, and the time expended in achieving those results.” Daniels v. Bryson , 548 s o. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 3d DCa 1989). h owever, where the contract between the client and attorney provided that the attorney would be compensated on a flat hourly basis regardless of the outcome at trial, the trial court erred in awarding an enhanced fee Id. And see Grapski v. City of Alachua , 134 s o. 3d 987 based upon a contingency risk multiplier. (Fla. 1st DCa 2012), review denied, 118 so. 3d 220 (Fla. 2012) (the trial court’s findings of fact on the issue of attorney’s fees are presumed correct; the standard of review is abuse of discretion). a different rule has been applied when it is unclear whether a private corporation is an “agency” for purposes of the Public r ecords a ection 119.12, F.s., “was not intended to ct. s force private entities to comply with the inspection requirements of chapter 119 by threatening to award attorney’s fees against them.” New York Times Company v. PHH Mental Health Services, , 616 so. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1993). Accord Fox v. News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. , 545 s o. Inc. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCa 1989). Thus, attorney fees “are not warranted when the [private] entity in charge of the public records at issue was reasonably and understandably unsure of its status as an agency.” Lee v. Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund , 113 s o. 3d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCa 2013), approved , 189 s o. 3d 120 (Fla. 2016). And see Economic Development Commission v. Ellis, 178 s o. 3d 118, 123 (Fla. 5th DCa 2016) (“attorney’s fees should not be awarded in those cases where the party refusing to provide documents acted on the good-faith belief that it was not an agent, ecords] a ct”). But see s. 119.0701, F.s. subject to compliance with the [Public r attorney fees may also be awarded for a successful appeal of a denial of access, provided that at the time of appeal a motion is filed in accordance with the appellate rules. Downs v. Austin, supra . And see Office of the State Attorney v. Gonzalez, supra (where motion seeking appellate attorney fees is granted by appellate court and remanded only for calculation of such fees, lower court required to follow court’s mandate without further consideration). Cf. Johnson v. Jarvis , 107 s o. 3d 428 (Fla. 1st DCa 2012) (trial court erred in denying motion for costs based on appellant’s failure to comply with the notice requirement in s. 284.30, F.s; “[f ]or purposes of appellate costs, the appellant was the prevailing party . . . and is entitled to an award of his costs incurred therein”). 3. Criminal and noncriminal infraction penalties section 119.10(1)(b), F.s., states that a public officer who knowingly violates the provisions of s. 119.07(1), F.s., is subject to suspension and removal or impeachment and commits a 182

200 government-in-the-sunshine-manual misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable by possible criminal penalties of one year in prison, See State v. Webb, o. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCa 2001) (s. 119.10[1][b] or $1,000 fine, or both. 786 s authorizes a conviction for violating s. 119.07 only if a defendant is found to have committed such violation “knowingly”; statute cannot be interpreted as allowing a conviction based on mere negligence). section 119.10(1)(a), F.s., provides that a violation of any provision of Ch. 119, F.s., Cf. by a public officer is a noncriminal infraction, punishable by fine not exceeding $500. s. 838.022(1)(b), F.s. (unlawful for a public servant or public contractor, to knowingly and intentionally obtain a benefit for any person or to cause unlawful harm to another, by concealing, covering up, destroying, mutilating, or altering any official record or official document, except as authorized by law or contract, or causing another person to perform such an act). a state attorney may prosecute suits charging public officials with violations of the Public records a ct, including those violations which may result in a finding of guilt for a noncriminal infraction. ago 91-38. I. MAINTENANCE, STORAGE AND RETENTION REQUIREMENTS 1. Maintenance and storage of records all public records should be kept in the buildings in which they are ordinarily used. section 119.021(1)(a), F.s. m oreover, insofar as practicable, a custodian of public records of vital, permanent, or archival records shall keep them in fireproof and waterproof safes, vaults, or rooms fitted with noncombustible materials and in such arrangement as to be easily accessible for convenient use. s ection 119.021(1)(b), F.s. r ecords that are in need of repair, restoration, or rebinding may be authorized by the head of the governmental entity to be removed from the building or office in which such records are ordinarily kept for the length of time required to repair, restore, or rebind them. s ection 119.021(1)(c), F.s. Thus, public records may not routinely be removed from the building or office in which such records are ordinarily kept except for official purposes. ago 93-16. The retention of such records in the home of a public official would appear to circumvent the public access ecords a requirements of the Public r ct and compromise the rights of the public to inspect and copy such records. Id. And see all and ago 04-43 (mail addressed to city officials at City h all should not be forwarded unopened to the private residences of the officials, received at City h but rather the original or a copy of the mail that constitutes a public record should be maintained at city offices); and ago 07-14 (“ although the Public r ecords law does not prescribe a location at which public records must be maintained, it does suggest that such records be kept where they are ordinarily used”). i nf. o p. to s ola, m arch 9, 2010 (municipal election records Cf. are municipal records which should be maintained by city even though election conducted by county supervisor of elections) and ago 88-26 (while Ch. 119, F.s., does not require a county to transport microfilmed copies of public records maintained in a storage facility outside the county to the county courthouse when the originals are available at the courthouse, the microfilmed copies must be available for copying at their location outside the county). 2. Delivery of records to successor section 119.021(4)(a), F.s., provides that whoever has custody of public records shall deliver such records to his or her successor at the expiration of his or her term of office or, if there is no successor, to the records and information management program of the Division of library and information services of the Department of state. See Maxwell v. Pine Gas Corporation, 195 so. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCa 1967) (state, county, and municipal records are not the personal property of a public officer); ago 98-59 (records in the files of the former city attorney which were made or received in carrying out her duties as city attorney and which communicate, perpetuate, or formalize knowledge constitute public records and are required to be turned over to her successor); and ago 75-282 (public records regardless of usefulness or relevancy must 183

201 government-in-the-sunshine-manual be turned over to the custodian’s successor in office or to the Department of s And see tate). s. 119.021(4)(b), F.s., providing that “[w]hoever is entitled to custody of public records shall demand them from any person having illegal possession of them, who must forthwith deliver the same to him or her.” in the absence of contrary direction in the legislation dissolving a special taxing district, tate. ago 95-03. Compare the district’s records should be delivered to the Department of s ago 09-39, stating that in light of a court order holding that an independent special district is the successor-in-interest to the powers and duties of a municipal services benefit unit [msB u], Cf. the records of the msB u should be delivered to the special district. s. 257.36(2)(b), F.s., specifying procedures for disposition of agency records stored in the state records center in the event that the agency is dissolved or its functions are transferred to another agency. 3. Transition records of certain officers-elect section 119.035(4), F.s., states that “upon taking the oath of office, the officer-elect shall, as soon as practicable deliver to the person or persons responsible for records and information management in such office all public records kept or received in the transaction of official business during the period following election to public office.” The term “officer-elect” for purposes of this governor, the governor, the attorney general, the Chief Financial section means the lieutenant officer, and the Commissioner of agriculture. s ection 119.035(5), F.s. Retention and disposal of records 4. Retention schedules a. section 119.021(2)(a), F.s. requires the Division of library and i nformation s ervices (division) of the Department of s tate to adopt rules establishing retention schedules and a disposal process for public records. each agency must comply with these rules. s ection 119.021(2)(b), F.s. See generally Chs. 1B-24 and 1B-26, Florida a dministrative Code. The approved records retention schedule for state and local governmental entities is located online at http://dlis.dos. state.fl.us/barm/genschedules/gs1-sl.pdf Cf. L.R. v. Department of State, Division of Archives, . , 488 s History and Records Management o. 2d 122 (Fla. 3d DCa 1986) (an affected party seeking to challenge an agency’s approved records retention schedule may be entitled to a hearing pursuant to Ch. 120, F.s). See Fla. r. retention schedules for judicial branch records are established by court rule. dmin. 2.430 (court records) and Fla. r. Jud. a dmin. 2.440 (judicial branch administrative Jud. a records). s imilarly, procedures for maintenance and destruction of legislative records are established in legislative rules. legislative rules may be accessed online at www.flsenate.gov (Florida s enate) and www.myfloridahouse.gov (Florida h ouse of r epresentatives). b. Disposal of records section 257.36(6), F.s., states that a “public record may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of only in accordance with retention schedules established by the division.” s ection 119.021(2) (c), F.s., provides that public officials must “systematically dispose” of records no longer needed, subject to the consent of the division in accordance with s. 257.36, F.s. Compare s. 119.021(3), F.s., stating that notwithstanding the provisions of Chs. 119 or 257, F.s., certain orders that comprise final agency action must be permanently maintained. Thus, for example, a municipality may not remove and destroy disciplinary notices, with or without the employee’s consent, during the course of resolving collective bargaining grievances, except in accordance with the statutory restrictions on disposal of records. ago 94-75. See also ago s 09-19 (city must follow public records retention schedules established by law for information on its Facebook page which constitutes a public record); 96-34 (e-mail messages are subject to statutory limitations on destruction of public records); and 75-45 (tape recordings of proceedings before a public body must be preserved in compliance with statutory 184

202 government-in-the-sunshine-manual record retention and disposal restrictions). similarly, registration and disciplinary records stored in a national association securities dealers database and used by state banking department for regulatory purposes are public records and may not be destroyed merely because an arbitration panel of the national association has ordered that they be expunged; such records are subject to statutory mandates governing destruction of records. ago 98-54. Accord inf. o p. to h ernandez, July 1, 2003 (agency not authorized to purge or expunge documents it created while carrying out what it perceived to be its official duty based upon an accusation that the agency may have been mistaken in such an assessment). Cf. ago 91-23 (clerk of court not authorized to expunge a court order from the official r ecords, in the absence of a court order directing such action). c. Exempt records The statutory restrictions on destruction of public records apply even if the record is exempt from disclosure. For example, in ago 81-12, the a ttorney g eneral’s office concluded that the City of h ollywood could not destroy or dispose of licensure, certification, or employment examination question and answer sheets except as authorized by statute. And see ago 87-48 (statutory prohibition against placing anonymous materials in the personnel file of a school district employee did not permit the destruction of such materials received in the course of official school business, absent compliance with statutory restrictions on destruction of records). an exemption only removes the records from public access requirements, it does not exempt the records from the other provisions of Ch. 119, F.s., such as those requiring that public records be kept in a safe place or those regulating the destruction of public records. ago 93-86. See s. 119.021, F.s. moreover, if an assertion is made by the custodian that a requested record is not a public record subject to public inspection or copying, the requested record may not be disposed of for a period of 30 days after the date on which a written request to inspect or copy the record was made to the custodian; if a civil action is instituted within the 30-day period to enforce the provisions of this section with respect to the requested record, the custodian may not dispose of the record ection except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction after notice to all affected parties. s 119.07(1)(h), F.s d. Evidence obtained by law enforcement agencies Documentary evidence obtained by a police department is a public record subject to retention schedules approved by the division. ago 04-51. inf. o p. to Blair, a ugust Accord 24, 2011 (evidence that constitutes a public record may be destroyed only in accordance with retention schedules established by the division and noting that the division has adopted a g eneral records schedule gs2 for law enforcement agencies). however, “the disposition of evidence not constituting a public record within the meaning of Chapter 119, Florida s tatutes, would appear to be dependent upon an agency’s determination that it is no longer needed.” i nf. o p. to Blair, a ugust 24, 2011. (e.s.) Cf. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. v. Wood, o. 97-688Ci-07 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. February 27, 1997) (physical n specimens relating to an autopsy are not public records because in order to constitute a “public record” for purposes of Ch. 119, “the record itself must be susceptible of some form of copying”). e. Duplicate records section 257.36(6), F.s., requires the division to adopt rules which, among other things, establish “[s]tandards for the reproduction of records for security or with a view to the disposal of the original record.” For example, the division is responsible for determining whether an agency may dispose of an audiotape of a witness statement without regard to the retention schedule, if there is also a transcript of the statement. inf. op. to mathews, July 12, 2004. Cf. ago 91-09 (if a facsimile document is subsequently copied by the receiving agency, the facsimile document is considered an intermediate document which may be destroyed; the copy of the facsimile then 185

203 government-in-the-sunshine-manual is retained as a public record). ago 92-85, stating that individual school board members See also are not required to retain copies of public records which are regularly maintained in the course of business by the clerk of the school board in the school board administrative offices. APPENDICES A. PUBLIC RECORDS AND MEETINGS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT Article I, Section 24, Florida Constitution Section 24. Access to public records and meetings. (a) e very person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution. all meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government or (b) of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school district, or special district, at which official acts are to be taken or at which public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, shall be open and noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall be open and noticed as provided in article iii, s ection 4(e), except with respect to meetings exempted pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution. (c) This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may provide by general law passed by a two-thirds vote of each house for the exemption of records from the requirements of subsection (a) and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of subsection (b), provided that such law shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws governing the enforcement of this section, including the maintenance, control, destruction, disposal, and disposition of records made public by this section, except that each house of the legislature may adopt rules governing the enforcement of this section in relation to records of the legislative laws enacted pursuant to this subsection shall contain only exemptions from the branch. requirements of subsections (a) or (b) and provisions governing the enforcement of this section, and shall relate to one subject. (d) all laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the legislative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. r ules of court that are in effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit access to records shall remain in effect until they are repealed. B. GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE LAW AND RELATED STATUTES 286.011 Public meetings and records; public inspection; criminal and civil penalties.-- ( 1) all meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, including meetings with or attended by any person elected to such board or commission, but who has not yet taken office, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting. The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of all 186

204 government-in-the-sunshine-manual such meetings. The minutes of a meeting of any such board or commission of any such state agency or (2) authority shall be promptly recorded, and such records shall be open to public inspection. The circuit courts of this state shall have jurisdiction to issue injunctions to enforce the purposes of this section upon application by any citizen of this state. (a)any public officer who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a noncriminal (3) infraction, punishable by fine not exceeding $500. (b) any person who is a member of a board or commission or of any state agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision who knowingly violates the provisions of this section by attending a meeting not held in accordance with the provisions hereof is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (c) Conduct which occurs outside the state which would constitute a knowing violation of this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (4) Whenever an action has been filed against any board or commission of any state agency or authority or any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision to enforce the provisions of this section or to invalidate the actions of any such board, commission, agency, or authority, which action was taken in violation of this section, and the court determines that the defendant or defendants to such action acted in violation of this section, the court shall assess a reasonable attorney’s fee against such agency, and may assess a reasonable attorney’s fee against the individual filing such an action if the court finds it was filed in bad faith or was frivolous. any fees so assessed may be assessed against the individual member or members of such board or commission; provided, that in any case where the board or commission seeks the advice of its attorney and such advice is followed, no such fees shall be assessed against the individual member or members of the board or commission. h owever, this subsection shall not apply to a state attorney or his or her duly authorized assistants or any officer charged with enforcing the provisions of this section. Whenever any board or commission of any state agency or authority or any agency or (5) authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision appeals any court order which has found said board, commission, agency, or authority to have violated this section, and such order is affirmed, the court shall assess a reasonable attorney’s fee for the appeal against such board, commission, agency, or authority. any fees so assessed may be assessed against the individual member or members of such board or commission; provided, that in any case where the board or commission seeks the advice of its attorney and such advice is followed, no such fees shall be assessed against the individual member or members of the board or commission. (6) all persons subject to subsection (1) are prohibited from holding meetings at any facility or location which discriminates on the basis of sex, age, race, creed, color, origin, or economic status or which operates in such a manner as to unreasonably restrict public access to such a facility. (7) Whenever any member of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision is charged with a violation of this section and is subsequently acquitted, the board or commission is authorized to reimburse said member for any portion of his or her reasonable attorney’s fees. (8) n otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), any board or commission of any state agency or authority or any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, and the chief administrative or executive officer of the governmental entity, may meet in private with the entity’s attorney to discuss pending litigation to which 187

205 government-in-the-sunshine-manual the entity is presently a party before a court or administrative agency, provided that the following conditions are met: (a) The entity’s attorney shall advise the entity at a public meeting that he or she desires advice concerning the litigation. The subject matter of the meeting shall be confined to settlement negotiations or strategy (b) sessions related to litigation expenditures. (c) The entire session shall be recorded by a certified court reporter. The reporter shall record the times of commencement and termination of the session, all discussion and proceedings, o the names of all persons present at any time, and the names of all persons speaking. n portion of the session shall be off the record. The court reporter’s notes shall be fully transcribed and filed with the entity’s clerk within a reasonable time after the meeting. The entity shall give reasonable public notice of the time and date of the attorney-client (d) session and the names of persons who will be attending the session. The session shall commence at an open meeting at which the persons chairing the meeting shall announce the commencement and estimated length of the attorney-client session and the names of the persons attending. a t the conclusion of the attorney-client session, the meeting shall be reopened, and the person chairing the meeting shall announce the termination of the session. The transcript shall be made part of the public record upon conclusion of the litigation. (e) related sections read as follows: 286.0105 Notices of meetings and hearings must advise that a record is required to appeal.-- each board, commission, or agency of this state or of any political subdivision thereof shall include in the notice of any meeting or hearing, if notice of the meeting or hearing is required, of such board, commission, or agency, conspicuously on such notice, the advice that, if a person decides to appeal any decision made by the board, agency, or commission with respect to any matter considered at such meeting or hearing, he or she will need a record of the proceedings, and that, for such purpose, he or she may need to ensure that a verbatim record of the proceedings is made, which record includes the testimony and evidence upon which the appeal is to be based. The requirements of this section do not apply to the notice provided in s. 200.065(3). 286.0111 Legislative review of certain exemptions from requirements for public meetings and recordkeeping by governmental entities.-- pen The provisions of s. 119.15, the o sunset review act, apply to the government provisions of law which provide exemptions to s. 286.011, as provided in s. 119.15. 286.0113 General exemptions from public meetings.-- (1) That portion of a meeting that would reveal a security system plan or portion thereof made confidential and exempt by s. 119.071(3)(a) is exempt from s. 286.011 and s. 24(b), art. tate Constitution. i of the s (2) (a) For purposes of this subsection: 1. “Competitive solicitation” means the process of requesting and receiving sealed bids, proposals, or replies in accordance with the terms of a competitive process, regardless of the method of procurement. 2. “team” means a group of members established by an agency for the purpose of conducting negotiations as part of a competitive solicitation. (b)1. any portion of a meeting at which a negotiation with a vendor is conducted pursuant 188

206 government-in-the-sunshine-manual to a competitive solicitation, at which a vendor makes an oral presentation as part of a competitive solicitation, or at which a vendor answers questions as part of a competitive solicitation is exempt from s. 286.011 and s. 24(b), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 2. any portion of a team meeting at which negotiation strategies are discussed is exempt from tate Constitution. s. 286.011 and s. 24(b), art. i of the s o portion of (c)1. a complete recording shall be made of any portion of an exempt meeting. n the exempt meeting may be held off the record. 2. The recording of, and any records presented at, the exempt meeting are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until such time as the agency provides notice of an intended decision or until 30 days after opening the bids, proposals, or final replies, whichever occurs earlier. 3. i f the agency rejects all bids, proposals, or replies and concurrently provides notice of its intent to reissue a competitive solicitation, the recording and any records presented at the exempt meeting remain exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until such time as the agency provides notice of an intended decision concerning the reissued competitive solicitation or until the agency withdraws the reissued competitive solicitation. a recording and any records presented at an exempt meeting are not exempt for longer than 12 months after the initial agency notice rejecting all bids, proposals, or replies. 286.0114 Public meetings; reasonable opportunity to be heard; attorney fees.— (1) For purposes of this section, “board or commission” means a board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of a county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision. (2) embers of the public shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on a proposition m before a board or commission. The opportunity to be heard need not occur at the same meeting at which the board or commission takes official action on the proposition if the opportunity occurs at a meeting that is during the decisionmaking process and is within reasonable proximity in time before the meeting at which the board or commission takes the official action. This section does not prohibit a board or commission from maintaining orderly conduct or proper decorum in a public meeting. The opportunity to be heard is subject to rules or policies adopted by the board or commission, as provided in subsection (4). (3) The requirements in subsection (2) do not apply to: (a) an official act that must be taken to deal with an emergency situation affecting the public health, welfare or safety, if compliance with the requirements would cause an unreasonable delay in the ability of the board or commission to act; (b) an official act involving no more than a ministerial act, including, but not limited to, approval of minutes and ceremonial proclamations; (c) a meeting that is exempt from s. 286.011; or (d) a meeting during which the board or commission is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. This paragraph does not affect the right of a person to be heard as otherwise provided by law. (4) r ules or policies of a board or commission which govern the opportunity to be heard are limited to those that: (a) Provide guidelines regarding the amount of time an individual has to address the board or commission; (b) Prescribe procedures for allowing representatives of groups or factions on a proposition to address the board or commission, rather than all members of such groups or factions, at 189

207 government-in-the-sunshine-manual meetings in which a large number of individuals wish to be heard; Prescribe procedures or forms for an individual to use in order to inform the board or (c) commission of a desire to be heard; to indicate his or her support, opposition, or neutrality on a proposition; and to indicate his or her designation of a representative to speak for him or her or his or her group on a proposition if he or she so chooses; or (d) Designate a specified period of time for public comment. f a board or commission adopts rules or policies in compliance with this section and (5) i follows such rules or policies when providing an opportunity for members of the public to be heard, the board or commission is deemed to be acting in compliance with this section. (6) a circuit court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction for the purpose of enforcing this section upon the filing of an application for such injunction by a citizen of this state. Whenever an action is filed against a board or commission to enforce this section, the (7)(a) court shall assess reasonable attorney fees against such board or commission if the court determines that the defendant to such action acted in violation of this section. The court may assess reasonable attorney fees against the individual filing such an action if the court finds that the action was filed in bad faith or was frivolous. This paragraph does not apply to a state attorney or his or her duly authorized assistants or an officer charged with enforcing this section. (b) Whenever a board or commission appeals a court order that has found the board or commission to have violated this section, and such order is affirmed, the court shall assess reasonable attorney fees for the appeal against such board or commission. (8) an action taken by a board or commission which is found to be in violation of this section is not void as a result of that violation. 286.01141 Criminal justice commissions; public meetings exemption.— (1) as used in this section, the term: “Duly constituted criminal justice commission” means an advisory commission created by (a) municipal or county ordinance whose membership is comprised of individuals from the private sector and the public sector and whose purpose is to examine local criminal justice issues. (b) “active” has the same meaning as provided in s. 119.011. (c) “Criminal intelligence information” has the same meaning as provided in s. 119.011. (d) “Criminal investigative information” has the same meaning as provided in s. 119.011. (1) That portion of a meeting of a duly constituted criminal justice commission at which members of the commission discuss active criminal intelligence information or active criminal investigative information that is currently being considered by, or which may foreseeably come before, the commission is exempt from s. 286.011 and s. 24(b), art. tate Constitution, provided that at any public meeting of the criminal justice i of the s commission at which such matter is being considered, the commission members publicly disclose the fact that the matter has been discussed. (2) This section is subject to the o pen g overnment s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2018, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. 286.012 Voting requirement at meetings of governmental bodies.-- 190

208 government-in-the-sunshine-manual a member of a state, county, or municipal governmental board, commission, or agency who is present at a meeting of any such body at which an official decision, ruling, or other official act is to be taken or adopted may not abstain from voting in regard to any such decision, ruling, or act; and a vote shall be recorded or counted for each such member present, unless, with respect to any such member, there is, or appears to be, a possible conflict of interest under s. 112.311, s. 112.313, s. 112.3143, or additional or more stringent standards of conduct, if f there is, or appears to be, a possible conflict under s. any, adopted pursuant to s. 112.326. i 112.311, s. 112.313, or s. 112.3143, the member shall comply with the disclosure requirements of s. 112.3143. if the only conflict or possible conflict is one arising from the additional or more stringent standards adopted pursuant to s. 112.326, the member shall comply with any disclosure requirements adopted pursuant to s. 112.326. if the official decision, ruling, or act occurs in the context of a quasi-judicial proceeding, a member may abstain from voting on such matter if the abstention is to assure a fair proceeding free from potential bias or prejudice. 286.26 Accessibility of public meetings to the physically handicapped.-- (1) Whenever any board or commission of any state agency or authority, or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision, which has scheduled a meeting at which official acts are to be taken receives, at least 48 hours prior to the meeting, a written request by a physically handicapped person to attend the meeting, directed to the chairperson or director of such board, commission, agency, or authority, such chairperson or director shall provide a manner by which such person may attend the meeting at its scheduled site or reschedule the meeting to a site which would be accessible to such person. (2) i f an affected handicapped person objects in the written request, nothing contained in the provisions of this section shall be construed or interpreted to permit the use of human physical assistance to the physically handicapped in lieu of the construction or use of ramps or other mechanical devices in order to comply with the provisions of this section. C. THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT CHAPTER 119, FLORIDA STATUTES 119.01 General state policy on public records.-- t is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records are open for (1) i personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access to public records is a duty of each agency. (2)(a) a utomation of public records must not erode the right of access to those records. as each agency increases its use of and dependence on electronic recordkeeping, each agency must provide reasonable public access to records electronically maintained and must ensure that exempt or confidential records are not disclosed except as otherwise permitted by law. (b) When designing or acquiring an electronic recordkeeping system, an agency must consider whether such system is capable of providing data in some common format such as, but not limited to, the american s nformation i nterchange. tandard Code for i (c) an agency may not enter into a contract for the creation or maintenance of a public records database if that contract impairs the ability of the public to inspect or copy the public records of the agency, including public records that are online or stored in an electronic recordkeeping system used by the agency. (d) s ubject to the restrictions of copyright and trade secret laws and public records exemptions, agency use of proprietary software must not diminish the right of the public to inspect and copy a public record. Providing access to public records by remote electronic means is an additional method of (e) 191

209 government-in-the-sunshine-manual access that agencies should strive to provide to the extent feasible. i f an agency provides access to public records by remote electronic means, such access should be provided in the most cost-effective and efficient manner available to the agency providing the information. (f ) each agency that maintains a public record in an electronic recordkeeping system shall provide to any person, pursuant to this chapter, a copy of any public record in that system which is not exempted by law from public disclosure. an agency must provide a copy of the record in the medium requested if the agency maintains the record in that medium, and the agency may charge a fee in accordance with this chapter. For the purpose of satisfying a public records request, the fee to be charged by an agency if it elects to provide a copy of a public record in a medium not routinely used by the agency, or if it elects to compile information not routinely developed or maintained by the agency or that requires a substantial amount of manipulation or programming, must be in accordance with s. 119.07(4). i f public funds are expended by an agency in payment of dues or membership contributions (3) for any person, corporation, foundation, trust, association, group, or other organization, all the financial, business, and membership records of that person, corporation, foundation, trust, association, group, or other organization which pertain to the public agency are public records and subject to the provisions of s. 119.07. 119.011 Definitions.- - as used in this chapter, the term: (1) “actual cost of duplication” means the cost of the material and supplies used to duplicate the public record, but does not include labor cost or overhead cost associated with such duplication. “agency” means any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, department, (2) division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government created or established by law including, for the purposes of this chapter, the Commission on e thics, the Public s ervice Commission, and the office of Public Counsel, and any other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency. “Criminal intelligence information” means information with respect to an identifiable (3)(a) person or group of persons collected by a criminal justice agency in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor possible criminal activity. (b) “Criminal investigative information” means information with respect to an identifiable person or group of persons compiled by a criminal justice agency in the course of conducting a criminal investigation of a specific act or omission, including, but not limited to, information derived from laboratory tests, reports of investigators or informants, or any type of surveillance. (c) “Criminal intelligence information” and “criminal investigative information” shall not include: 1. The time, date, location, and nature of a reported crime. 2. The name, sex, age, and address of a person arrested or of the victim of a crime except as provided in s. 119.071(2)(h). 3. The time, date, and location of the incident and of the arrest. 4. The crime charged. 5. Documents given or required by law or agency rule to be given to the person arrested, except as provided in s. 119.071(2)(h) or (m), and, except that the court in a criminal case may order that certain information required by law or agency rule to be given to the person arrested be maintained in a confidential manner and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) until released at trial if it is found that the release of such information would: Be defamatory to the good name of a victim or witness or would jeopardize the safety of a. 192

210 government-in-the-sunshine-manual such victim or witness; and i b. mpair the ability of a state attorney to locate or prosecute a codefendant. 6. i nformations and indictments except as provided in s. 905.26. The word “active” shall have the following meaning: (d) Criminal intelligence information shall be considered “active” as long as it is related to 1. intelligence gathering conducted with a reasonable, good faith belief that it will lead to detection of ongoing or reasonably anticipated criminal activities. 2. Criminal investigative information shall be considered “active” as long as it is related to an ongoing investigation which is continuing with a reasonable, good faith anticipation of securing an arrest or prosecution in the foreseeable future. i n addition, criminal intelligence and criminal investigative information shall be considered “active” while such information is directly related to pending prosecutions or appeals. The word “active” shall not apply to information in cases which are barred from prosecution under the provisions of s. 775.15 or other statute of limitation. (4) “Criminal justice agency” means: (a) any law enforcement agency, court, or prosecutor; (b) any other agency charged by law with criminal law enforcement duties; (c) any agency having custody of criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information for the purpose of assisting such law enforcement agencies in the conduct of active criminal investigation or prosecution or for the purpose of litigating civil actions ct, during the time that such under the racketeer i nfluenced and Corrupt o rganization a agencies are in possession of criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information pursuant to their criminal law enforcement duties; or The Department of Corrections. (d) (5) “Custodian of public records” means the elected or appointed state, county, or municipal officer charged with the responsibility of maintaining the office having public records, or his or her designee. (6) “Data processing software” means the programs and routines used to employ and control the capabilities of data processing hardware, including, but not limited to, operating systems, compilers, assemblers, utilities, library routines, maintenance routines, applications, and computer networking programs. (7) “Duplicated copies” means new copies produced by duplicating, as defined in s. 283.30. (8) “e xemption” means a provision of general law which provides that a specified record or meeting, or portion thereof, is not subject to the access requirements of s. 119.07(1), s. 286.011, or s. 24, art. i of the s tate Constitution. (9) “i nformation technology resources” means data processing hardware and software and services, communications, supplies, personnel, facility resources, maintenance, and training. (10) “Paratransit” has the same meaning as provided in s. 427.011. (11) “Proprietary software” means data processing software that is protected by copyright or trade secret laws. (12) “Public records” means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing software, or other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or means of transmission, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency. edact” means to conceal from a copy of an original public record, or to conceal from an (13) “r 193

211 government-in-the-sunshine-manual electronic image that is available for public viewing, that portion of the record containing exempt or confidential information. (14) “s ensitive,” for purposes of defining agency-produced software that is sensitive, means only those portions of data processing software, including the specifications and documentation, which are used to: (a) Collect, process, store, and retrieve information that is exempt from s. 119.07(1); (b) Collect, process, store, and retrieve financial management information of the agency, such as payroll and accounting records; or (c) Control and direct access authorizations and security measures for automated systems. “u tility” means a person or entity that provides electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, (15) water, chilled water, reuse water, or wastewater. 119.021 Custodial requirements; maintenance, preservation, and retention of public records.-- (1) Public records shall be maintained and preserved as follows: (a) all public records should be kept in the buildings in which they are ordinarily used. (b) i nsofar as practicable, a custodian of public records of vital, permanent, or archival records shall keep them in fireproof and waterproof safes, vaults, or rooms fitted with noncombustible materials and in such arrangement as to be easily accessible for convenient use. (c)1. r ecord books should be copied or repaired, renovated, or rebound if worn, mutilated, damaged, or difficult to read. 2. Whenever any state, county, or municipal records are in need of repair, restoration, or rebinding, the head of the concerned state agency, department, board, or commission; the board of county commissioners of such county; or the governing body of such municipality may authorize that such records be removed from the building or office in which such records are ordinarily kept for the length of time required to repair, restore, or rebind them. any public official who causes a record book to be copied shall attest and certify under oath 3. that the copy is an accurate copy of the original book. The copy shall then have the force and effect of the original. The Division of library and i (2)(a) ervices of the Department of s tate shall adopt nformation s rules to establish retention schedules and a disposal process for public records. (b) each agency shall comply with the rules establishing retention schedules and disposal processes for public records which are adopted by the records and information management program of the division. each public official shall systematically dispose of records no longer needed, subject to the (c) consent of the records and information management program of the division in accordance with s. 257.36. (d) The division may ascertain the condition of public records and shall give advice and assistance to public officials to solve problems related to the preservation, creation, filing, and public accessibility of public records in their custody. Public officials shall assist the division by preparing an inclusive inventory of categories of public records in their custody. The division shall establish a time period for the retention or disposal of each series of records. u pon the completion of the inventory and schedule, the division shall, subject to the availability of necessary space, staff, and other facilities for such purposes, make space available in its records center for the filing of semicurrent records so scheduled and in its archives for noncurrent records of permanent value, and shall render such other assistance as needed, including the microfilming of records so scheduled. 194

212 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (3) agency final orders rendered before July 1, 2015, that were indexed or listed pursuant to s. 120.53, and agency final orders rendered on or after July 1, 2015, that must be listed or copies of which must be transmitted to the Division of a earings pursuant dministrative h to s. 120.53, have continuing legal significance; therefore, notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any provision of chapter 257, each agency shall permanently maintain records of such orders pursuant to the applicable rules of the Department of state. Whoever has custody of any public records shall deliver, at the expiration of his or her (4)(a) term of office, to his or her successor or, if there be none, to the records and information management program of the Division of library and i nformation s ervices of the Department of s tate, all public records kept or received by him or her in the transaction of official business. Whoever is entitled to custody of public records shall demand them from any person (b) having illegal possession of them, who must forthwith deliver the same to him or her. any person unlawfully possessing public records must within 10 days deliver such records to the lawful custodian of public records unless just cause exists for failing to deliver such records. 119.035 Officers-elect.-- (1) i t is the policy of this state that the provisions of this chapter apply to officers-elect upon their election to public office. such officers-elect shall adopt and implement reasonable measures to ensure compliance with the public records obligations set forth in this chapter. (2) Public records of an officer-elect shall be maintained in accordance with the policies and procedures of the public office to which the officer has been elected. (3) f an officer-elect, individually or as part of a transition process, creates or uses an online or i electronic communication or recordkeeping system, all public records maintained on such system shall be preserved so as not to impair the ability of the public to inspect or copy such public records. (4) pon taking the oath of office, the officer-elect shall, as soon as practicable, deliver to the u person or persons responsible for records and information management in such office all public records kept or received in the transaction of official business during the period following election to public office. (5) overnor, the lieutenant as used in this section, the term “officer-elect” means the g governor, the attorney general, the Chief Financial officer, and the Commissioner of agriculture. 119.07 Inspection and copying of records; photographing public records; fees; exemptions.-- (1)(a) e very person who has custody of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and copied by any person desiring to do so, at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the public records. (b) a custodian of public records or a person having custody of public records may designate another officer or employee of the agency to permit the inspection and copying of public records, but must disclose the identity of the designee to the person requesting to inspect or copy public records. (c) a custodian of public records and his or her designee must acknowledge requests to inspect or copy records promptly and respond to such requests in good faith. a good faith response includes making reasonable efforts to determine from other officers or employees within the agency whether such a record exists and, if so, the location at which the record can be accessed. 195

213 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (d) a person who has custody of a public record who asserts that an exemption applies to a part of such record shall redact that portion of the record to which an exemption has been asserted and validly applies, and such person shall produce the remainder of such record for inspection and copying. f the person who has custody of a public record contends that all or part of the record (e) i is exempt from inspection and copying, he or she shall state the basis of the exemption that he or she contends is applicable to the record, including the statutory citation to an exemption created or afforded by statute. f requested by the person seeking to inspect or copy the record, the custodian of public (f ) i records shall state in writing and with particularity the reasons for the conclusion that the record is exempt or confidential. i (g) n any civil action in which an exemption to this section is asserted, if the exemption is alleged to exist under or by virtue of s. 119.071(1)(d) or (f ), (2)(d),(e), or (f ), or (4)(c), the public record or part thereof in question shall be submitted to the court for an inspection in camera. i f an exemption is alleged to exist under or by virtue of s. 119.071(2)(c), an inspection in camera is discretionary with the court. i f the court finds that the asserted exemption is not applicable, it shall order the public record or part thereof in question to be immediately produced for inspection or copying as requested by the person seeking such access. (h) e ven if an assertion is made by the custodian of public records that a requested record is not a public record subject to public inspection or copying under this subsection, the requested record shall, nevertheless, not be disposed of for a period of 30 days after the date on which a written request to inspect or copy the record was served on or otherwise made to the custodian of public records by the person seeking access to the record. i f a civil action is instituted within the 30-day period to enforce the provisions of this section with respect to the requested record, the custodian of public records may not dispose of the record except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction after notice to all affected parties. (i) The absence of a civil action instituted for the purpose stated in paragraph (g) does not relieve the custodian of public records of the duty to maintain the record as a public record if the record is in fact a public record subject to public inspection and copying under this subsection and does not otherwise excuse or exonerate the custodian of public records from any unauthorized or unlawful disposition of such record. (2)(a) as an additional means of inspecting or copying public records, a custodian of public records may provide access to public records by remote electronic means, provided exempt or confidential information is not disclosed. (b) The custodian of public records shall provide safeguards to protect the contents of public records from unauthorized remote electronic access or alteration and to prevent the disclosure or modification of those portions of public records which are exempt or confidential from subsection (1) or s. 24, art. i of the s tate Constitution. (c) u nless otherwise required by law, the custodian of public records may charge a fee for remote electronic access, granted under a contractual arrangement with a user, which fee may include the direct and indirect costs of providing such access. Fees for remote electronic access provided to the general public shall be in accordance with the provisions of this section. (3)(a) any person shall have the right of access to public records for the purpose of making photographs of the record while such record is in the possession, custody, and control of the custodian of public records. (b) This subsection applies to the making of photographs in the conventional sense by use of a camera device to capture images of public records but excludes the duplication of 196

214 government-in-the-sunshine-manual microfilm in the possession of the clerk of the circuit court where a copy of the microfilm may be made available by the clerk. (c) Photographing public records shall be done under the supervision of the custodian of public records, who may adopt and enforce reasonable rules governing the photographing of such records. (d) Photographing of public records shall be done in the room where the public records are kept. i f, in the judgment of the custodian of public records, this is impossible or impracticable, photographing shall be done in another room or place, as nearly adjacent as possible to the room where the public records are kept, to be determined by the custodian of public records. Where provision of another room or place for photographing is required, the expense of providing the same shall be paid by the person desiring to photograph the public record pursuant to paragraph (4)(e). (4) The custodian of public records shall furnish a copy or a certified copy of the record upon payment of the fee prescribed by law. i f a fee is not prescribed by law, the following fees are authorized: (a)1. u p to 15 cents per one-sided copy for duplicated copies of not more than 14 inches by 8½ inches; 2. n o more than an additional 5 cents for each two-sided copy; and 3. For all other copies, the actual cost of duplication of the public record. (b) The charge for copies of county maps or aerial photographs supplied by county constitutional officers may also include a reasonable charge for the labor and overhead associated with their duplication. (c) an agency may charge up to $1 per copy for a certified copy of a public record. f the nature or volume of public records requested to be inspected or copied pursuant to (d) i this subsection is such as to require extensive use of information technology resources or extensive clerical or supervisory assistance by personnel of the agency involved, or both, the agency may charge, in addition to the actual cost of duplication, a special service charge, which shall be reasonable and shall be based on the cost incurred for such extensive use of information technology resources or the labor cost of the personnel providing the service that is actually incurred by the agency or attributable to the agency for the clerical and supervisory assistance required, or both. (e)1. Where provision of another room or place is necessary to photograph public records, the expense of providing the same shall be paid by the person desiring to photograph the public records. 2. The custodian of public records may charge the person making the photographs for supervision services at a rate of compensation to be agreed upon by the person desiring to make the photographs and the custodian of public records. i f they fail to agree as to the appropriate charge, the charge shall be determined by the custodian of public records. (5) When ballots are produced under this section for inspection or examination, no persons other than the supervisor of elections or the supervisor’s employees shall touch the ballots. if the ballots are being examined before the end of the contest period in s. 102.168, the supervisor of elections shall make a reasonable effort to notify all candidates by telephone or otherwise of the time and place of the inspection or examination. all such candidates, or their representatives, shall be allowed to be present during the inspection or examination. (6) an exemption contained in this chapter or in any other general or special law shall not limit the access of the a uditor g eneral, the office of Program Policy analysis and g overnment accountability, or any state, county, municipal, university, board of community college, school district, or special district internal auditor to public records when such person states in writing that such records are needed for a properly authorized audit, examination, or uch person shall maintain the exempt or confidential status of that public investigation. s 197

215 government-in-the-sunshine-manual record and shall be subject to the same penalties as the custodian of that record for public disclosure of such record. (7) an exemption from this section does not imply an exemption from s. 286.011. The exemption from s. 286.011 must be expressly provided. The provisions of this section are not intended to expand or limit the provisions of r (8) ule 3.220, Florida r ules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the right and extent of discovery by the state or by a defendant in a criminal prosecution or in collateral postconviction proceedings. This section may not be used by any inmate as the basis for failing to timely litigate any postconviction action. 119.0701 Contracts; public records.— (1) For purposes of this section, the term: (a) “Contractor” means an individual, partnership, corporation, or business entity that enters into a contract for services with a public agency and is acting on behalf of the public agency as provided under s. 119.011(2). (b) “Public agency” means a state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, or department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government created or established by law. 2) CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS-- i n addition to other contract requirements provided ( by law, each public agency contract for services entered into or amended on or after July 1, 2016, must include: (a) The following statement, in substantially the following form, identifying the contact information of the public agency’s custodian or public records in at least 14-point boldfaced type: IF THE CONTRACTOR HAS QUESTIONS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 119, FLORIDA STATUTES, TO THE CONTRACTOR’S DUTY TO PROVIDE PUBLIC RECORDS RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT, CONTACT (telephone number, e-mail address, THE CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC RECORDS AT and mailing address). (b) a provision that requires the contractor to comply with public records laws, specifically to: Keep and maintain public records required by the public agency to perform the service. 1. u pon request from the public agency’s custodian of public records, provide the public 2. agency with a copy of the requested records, or allow the records to be inspected or copied within a reasonable time at a cost that does not exceed the cost provided in this chapter or as otherwise provided by law. 3. e nsure that public records that are exempt or confidential and exempt from public records disclosure requirements are not disclosed except as authorized by law for the duration of the contract term and following completion of the contract if the contractor does not transfer the records to the public agency. 4. u pon completion of the contract, transfer, at no cost, to the public agency all public records in possession of the contractor or keep and maintain public records required by the public agency to perform the service. i f the contractor transfers all public records to the public agency upon completion of the contract, the contractor shall destroy any duplicate public records that are exempt or confidential and exempt from public records disclosure requirements. i f the contractor keeps and maintains public records upon completion of the contract, the contractor shall meet all applicable requirements for retaining public records. all records stored electronically must be provided to the public agency, upon request from the public agency’s custodian of public records, in a format that is compatible with the information technology systems of the public agency. REQUEST FOR RECORDS; NONCOMPLIANCE. — (3) 198

216 government-in-the-sunshine-manual (a) a request to inspect or copy public records relating to a public agency’s contract for services f the public agency does not possess the must be made directly to the public agency. i requested records, the public agency shall immediately notify the contractor of the request, and the contractor must provide the records to the public agency or allow the records to be inspected or copied within a reasonable time. i f a contractor does not comply with a public agency’s request for records, the public (b) agency shall enforce the contract provisions in accordance with the contract. (c) a contractor who fails to provide the public records to the public agency within a reasonable time may be subject to penalties under s. 119.10. (4) CIVIL ACTION. — (a) i f a civil action is filed against a contractor to compel production of public records relating to a public agency’s contract for services, the court shall assess and award against the contractor the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney fees, if: 1. The court determines that the contractor unlawfully refused to comply with the public records request within a reasonable time; and 2. a t least 8 business days before filing the action, the plaintiff provided written notice of the public records request, including a statement that the contractor has not complied with the request, to the public agency and to the contractor. (b) a notice complies with subparagraph (a)2., if it is sent to the public agency’s custodian of public records and to the contractor at the contractor’s address listed on its contract with the public agency or to the contractor’s registered agent. s uch notices must be sent by common carrier delivery services or by registered, g lobal e xpress g uaranteed, or certified mail, with postage or shipping paid by the sender and with evidence of delivery, which must be in an electronic format. (c) a contractor who complies with a public records request within 8 business days after the notice is sent is not liable for the reasonable costs of enforcement. 119.071 General exemptions from inspection or copying of public records.-- (1) AGENCY ADMINISTRATION.-- e xamination questions and answer sheets of examinations administered by a governmental (a) agency for the purpose of licensure, certification, or employment are exempt from s. tate Constitution. a person who has taken such an 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s examination has the right to review his or her own completed examination. (b)1. For purposes of this paragraph, “competitive solicitation” means the process of requesting and receiving sealed bids, proposals, or replies in accordance with the terms of a competitive process, regardless of the method of procurement. 2. s ealed bids, proposals, or replies received by an agency pursuant to a competitive solicitation are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art i of the s tate Constitution until such time as the agency provides notice of an intended decision or until 30 days after opening the bids, proposals, or final replies, whichever is earlier. 3. i f an agency rejects all bids, proposals, or replies submitted in response to a competitive solicitation and the agency concurrently provides notice of its intent to reissue the competitive solicitation, the rejected bids, proposals, or replies remain exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until such time as the agency provides notice of an intended decision concerning the reissued competitive solicitation or until the agency withdraws the reissued competitive solicitation. a bid, proposal, or reply is not exempt for longer than 12 months after the initial agency notice rejecting all bids, proposals, or replies. (c) any financial statement that an agency requires a prospective bidder to submit in order to prequalify for bidding or for responding to a proposal for a road or any other public works 199

217 government-in-the-sunshine-manual project is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. (d)1. a public record that was prepared by an agency attorney (including an attorney employed or retained by the agency or employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect or represent the interests of the agency having custody of the record) or prepared at the attorney’s express direction, that reflects a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the agency, and that was prepared exclusively for civil or criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings, or that was prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal litigation or imminent adversarial administrative proceedings, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. ttorney g eneral’s For purposes of capital collateral litigation as set forth in s. 27.7001, the a office is entitled to claim this exemption for those public records prepared for direct appeal as well as for all capital collateral litigation after direct appeal until execution of sentence or imposition of a life sentence. This exemption is not waived by the release of such public record to another public 2. employee or officer of the same agency or any person consulted by the agency attorney. When asserting the right to withhold a public record pursuant to this paragraph, the agency shall identify the potential parties to any such criminal or civil litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. if a court finds that the document or other record has been improperly withheld under this paragraph, the party seeking access to such document or record shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in addition to any other remedy ordered by the court. any videotape or video signal that, under an agreement with an agency, is produced, made, (e) or received by, or is in the custody of, a federally licensed radio or television station or its agent is exempt from s. 119.07(1). (f ) Data processing software obtained by an agency under a licensing agreement that prohibits its disclosure and which software is a trade secret, as defined in s. 812.081, and agency- produced data processing software that is sensitive are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. The designation of agency-produced software as sensitive shall not prohibit an agency head from sharing or exchanging such software with another public agency. This paragraph is subject to the o overnment s unset r eview pen g october 2, 2021, unless act in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS.-- (2) (a) all criminal intelligence and criminal investigative information received by a criminal justice agency prior to January 25, 1979, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. (b) Whenever criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information held by a non-Florida criminal justice agency is available to a Florida criminal justice agency only on a confidential or similarly restricted basis, the Florida criminal justice agency may obtain and use such information in accordance with the conditions imposed by the providing agency. (c)1. a ctive criminal intelligence information and active criminal investigative information are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 2.a. a request made by a law enforcement agency to inspect or copy a public record that is in the custody of another agency and the custodian’s response to the request, and any information that would identify whether a law enforcement agency has requested or received that public record are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution, during the period in which the information constitutes active criminal intelligence information or active criminal investigative information. The law enforcement agency that made the request to inspect or copy a public record b. 200

218 government-in-the-sunshine-manual shall give notice to the custodial agency when the criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information is no longer active so that the request made by the law enforcement agency, the custodian’s response to the request, and information that would identify whether the law enforcement agency had requested or received that public record are available to the public. c. This exemption is remedial in nature, and it is the intent of the legislature that the exemption be applied to requests for information received before, on, or after the effective date of this paragraph. any information revealing surveillance techniques or procedures or personnel is exempt (d) from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. any comprehensive inventory of state and local law enforcement resources compiled pursuant to part i, chapter 23, and any comprehensive policies or plans compiled by a criminal justice agency pertaining to the mobilization, deployment, or tactical operations involved in responding to an emergency, as defined in s. 252.34, are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution and unavailable for inspection, except by personnel authorized by a state or local law enforcement agency, the office of the governor, the Department of legal affairs, the Department of law e nforcement, or the Division of e mergency m anagement as having an official need for access to the inventory or comprehensive policies or plans. (e) any information revealing the substance of a confession of a person arrested is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution, until such time as the criminal case is finally determined by adjudication, dismissal, or other final disposition. (f ) any information revealing the identity of a confidential informant or a confidential source is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. (g)1. all complaints and other records in the custody of any agency which relate to a complaint of discrimination relating to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status in connection with hiring practices, position classifications, salary, benefits, discipline, discharge, employee performance, evaluation, or other related activities are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. state Constitution until a finding is i of the made relating to probable cause, the investigation of the complaint becomes inactive, or the complaint or other record is made part of the official record of any hearing or court proceeding. This exemption does not affect any function or activity of the Florida Commission on a. human r elations. b. any state or federal agency that is authorized to have access to such complaints or records by any provision of law shall be granted such access in the furtherance of such agency’s statutory duties. 2. i f an alleged victim chooses not to file a complaint and requests that records of the complaint remain confidential, all records relating to an allegation of employment discrimination are tate Constitution. confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s (h)1. The following criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution: a. any information that reveals the identity of the victim of the crime of child abuse as defined by chapter 827 or that reveals the identity of a person under the age of 18 who is the victim of the crime of human trafficking proscribed in s. 787.06(3)(a). b. any information which may reveal the identity of a person who is a victim of any sexual offense, including a sexual offense proscribed in s. 787.06(3)(b), (d), (f ), or (g), chapter 794, chapter 796, chapter 800, chapter 827, or chapter 847. c. a photograph, videotape, or image of any part of the body of the victim of a sexual offense prohibited under s. 787.06(3)(b), (d), (f ), or (g), chapter 794, chapter 796, chapter 800, s. 810.145, chapter 827, or chapter 847, regardless of whether the photograph, videotape, 201

219 government-in-the-sunshine-manual or image identifies the victim. Criminal investigative information and criminal intelligence information made confidential 2. and exempt under this paragraph may be disclosed by a law enforcement agency: i n the furtherance of its official duties and responsibilities. a. b. For print, publication, or broadcast if the law enforcement agency determines that such release would assist in locating or identifying a person that such agency believes to be missing or endangered. The information provided should be limited to that needed to identify or locate the victim and not include the sexual nature of the offense committed against the person. c. t o another governmental agency in the furtherance of its official duties and responsibilities. 3. This exemption applies to such confidential and exempt criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information held by a law enforcement agency before, on, or after the effective date of the exemption. ct in accordance with This paragraph is subject to the o pen g overnment s unset r 4. eview a s. 119.15, and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, 2020, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. (i) any criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information that reveals the personal assets of the victim of a crime, other than property stolen or destroyed during the commission of the crime, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. (j)1. any document that reveals the identity, home or employment telephone number, home or employment address, or personal assets of the victim of a crime and identifies that person as the victim of a crime, which document is received by any agency that regularly receives information from or concerning the victims of crime, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. any information not otherwise held confidential or exempt from s. 119.07(1) which reveals the home or employment telephone number, home or employment address, or personal assets of a person who has been the victim of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated stalking, harassment, aggravated battery, or domestic violence is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution, upon written request by the victim, which must include official verification that an applicable crime has occurred. s uch information shall cease to be exempt 5 years after the receipt of the written request. any state or federal agency that is authorized to have access to such documents by any provision of law shall be granted such access in the furtherance of such agency’s statutory duties, notwithstanding this section. 2.a. any information in a videotaped statement of a minor who is alleged to be or who is a victim of sexual battery, lewd acts, or other sexual misconduct proscribed in chapter 800 or in s. 794.011, s. 827.071, s. 847.012, s. 847.0125, s. 847.013, s. 847.0133, or s. 847.0145, which reveals that minor’s identity, including, but not limited to, the minor’s face; the minor’s home, school, church, or employment telephone number; the minor’s home, school, church, or employment address; the name of the minor’s school, church, or place of employment; or the personal assets of the minor; and which identifies that minor as the victim of a crime described in this subparagraph, held by a law enforcement agency, is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. any governmental agency that is authorized to have access to such statements by any provision of law shall be granted such access in the furtherance of the agency’s statutory duties, notwithstanding the provisions of this section. b. a public employee or officer who has access to a videotaped statement of a minor who is alleged to be or who is a victim of sexual battery, lewd acts, or other sexual misconduct proscribed in chapter 800 or in s. 794.011, s. 827.071, s. 847.012, s. 847.0125, s. 847.013, s. 847.0133, or s. 847.0145 may not willfully and knowingly disclose videotaped information that reveals the minor’s identity to a person who is not assisting 202

220 government-in-the-sunshine-manual in the investigation or prosecution of the alleged offense or to any person other than the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, or a person specified in an order entered by the court having jurisdiction of the alleged offense. a person who violates this provision commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (k)1. a complaint of misconduct filed with an agency against an agency employee and all information obtained pursuant to an investigation by the agency of the complaint of misconduct is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until the investigation ceases to be active, or until the agency provides written notice to the employee who is the subject of the complaint, either personally or by mail, that the agency has either: Concluded the investigation with a finding not to proceed with disciplinary action or file a. charges; or b. Concluded the investigation with a finding to proceed with disciplinary action or file charges. 2. s ubparagraph 1. is subject to the o pen g overnment s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2018, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. (l)1. as used in this paragraph, the term: (a) “Body camera” means a portable electronic recording device that is worn on a law enforcement officer’s body and that records audio and video data in the course of the officer performing his or her official duties and responsibilities. (b) “law enforcement officer” has the same meaning as provided in s. 943.10. (c) “Personal representative” means a parent, a court-appointed guardian, an attorney, or an agent of, or a person holding a power of attorney for, a person recorded by a body f a person depicted in the recording is deceased, the term also means the personal camera. i representative of the estate of the deceased person; the deceased person’s surviving spouse, parent, or adult child; the deceased person’s attorney or agent; or the parent or guardian of a surviving minor child of the deceased. an agent must have written authorization of the recorded person to act on his or her behalf. 2. a body camera recording, or a portion thereof, is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution if the recording: a. i s taken within the interior of a private residence; i s taken within the interior of a facility that offers health care, mental health care, or social b. services; or c. i s taken in a place that a reasonable person would expect to be private. 3. n otwithstanding subparagraph 2., a body camera recording may be disclosed by a law enforcement agency: a. n furtherance of its official duties and responsibilities; or i b. t o another government agency in the furtherance of its official duties and responsibilities. 4. a body camera recording, or a portion thereof, shall be disclosed by a law enforcement agency: a. t o a person recorded by a body camera; however, a law enforcement agency may disclose only those portions that are relevant to the person’s presence in the recording. b. t o the personal representative of a person recorded by a body camera; however, a law enforcement agency may disclose only those portions that are relevant to the represented person’s presence in the recording; o a person not depicted in a body camera recording if the recording depicts a place in c. t 203

221 government-in-the-sunshine-manual which the person lawfully resided, dwelled, or lodged at the time of the recording; however, a law enforcement agency may disclose only those portions that record the interior of such a place. d. Pursuant to a court order. n addition to any other grounds the court may consider in determining whether to order i (i) that a body camera recording be disclosed, the court shall consider whether: (a) Disclosure is necessary to advance a compelling interest; (B) The recording contains information that is otherwise exempt or confidential and exempt under the law; (C) The person requesting disclosure is seeking to obtain evidence to determine legal issues in a case in which the person is a party; (D) Disclosure would reveal information regarding a person that is of a highly sensitive personal nature; (e) Disclosure may harm the reputation or jeopardize the safety of a person depicted in the recording; Confidentiality is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the fair, impartial, (F) and orderly administration of justice; (g) The recording could be redacted to protect privacy interests; and (h) There is good cause to disclose all or portions of a recording. (ii) i n any proceedings regarding the disclosure of a body camera recording, the law enforcement agency that made the recording shall be given reasonable notice of hearings and shall be given an opportunity to participate. 5. a law enforcement agency must retain a body camera recording for at least 90 days. 6. The exemption provided in subparagraph 2. applies retroactively. 7. This exemption does not supersede any other public records exemption that existed before or is created after the effective date of this exemption. Those portions of a recording which are protected from disclosure by another public records exemption shall continue to be exempt or confidential and exempt. 8. This paragraph is subject to the o pen g overnment s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2020, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. (m)1. Criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information that reveals the personal identifying information of a witness to a murder, as described in s. 782.04, is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the state Constitution for 2 years after the date on which the murder is observed by the witness. a criminal justice agency may disclose such information: a. i n the furtherance of its official duties and responsibilities. b. t o assist in locating or identifying the witness if the agency believes the witness to be missing or endangered. c. o another governmental agency for use in the performance of its official duties and t responsibilities. d. t o the parties in a pending criminal prosecution as required by law. 2. This paragraph is subject to the o pen g overnment s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. (n) Personal identifying information of the alleged victim in an allegation of sexual harassment tate Constitution. is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s 204

222 government-in-the-sunshine-manual such information may be disclosed to another governmental entity in the furtherance of pen g its official duties and responsibilities. This paragraph is subject to the o overnment sunset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. SECURITY.-- (3) (a)1. as used in this paragraph, the term “security system plan” includes all: a. r ecords, information, photographs, audio and visual presentations, schematic diagrams, surveys, recommendations, or consultations or portions thereof relating directly to the physical security of the facility or revealing security systems; b. Threat assessments conducted by any agency or any private entity; c. Threat response plans; d. e mergency evacuation plans; e. s heltering arrangements; or f. m anuals for security personnel, emergency equipment, or security training. 2. a security system plan or portion thereof for: a. any property owned by or leased to the state or any of its political subdivisions; or b. any privately owned or leased property held by an agency is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This exemption is remedial in nature, and it is the intent of the legislature that this exemption apply to security system plans held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this paragraph. 3. i nformation made confidential and exempt by this paragraph may be disclosed: t a. o the property owner or leaseholder; b. i n furtherance of the official duties and responsibilities of the agency holding the information; c. o another local, state, or federal agency in furtherance of that agency’s official duties and t responsibilities; or d. u pon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. Building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings, and diagrams, including draft, preliminary, (b)1. and final formats, which depict the internal layout and structural elements of a building, arena, stadium, water treatment facility, or other structure owned or operated by an agency are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 2. This exemption applies to building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings, and diagrams, including draft, preliminary, and final formats, which depict the internal layout and structural elements of a building, arena, stadium, water treatment facility, or other structure owned or operated by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this act. 3. i nformation made exempt by this paragraph may be disclosed: a. t o another governmental entity if disclosure is necessary for the receiving entity to perform its duties and responsibilities; b. t o a licensed architect, engineer, or contractor who is performing work on or related to the building, arena, stadium, water treatment facility, or other structure owned or operated by an agency; or c. u pon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. 4. The entities or persons receiving such information shall maintain the exempt status of the information. Building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings, and diagrams, including draft, preliminary, (c)1. 205

223 government-in-the-sunshine-manual and final formats, which depict the internal layout or structural elements of an attractions and recreation facility, entertainment or resort complex, industrial complex, retail and service development, office development, or hotel or motel development, which records are held by an agency are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 2. This exemption applies to any such records held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this act. 3. i nformation made exempt by this paragraph may be disclosed to another governmental entity if disclosure is necessary for the receiving entity to perform its duties and responsibilities; to the owner or owners of the structure in question or the owner’s legal representative; or upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. This paragraph does not apply to comprehensive plans or site plans, or amendments 4. thereto, which are submitted for approval or which have been approved under local land development regulations, local zoning regulations, or development-of-regional-impact review. 5. as used in this paragraph, the term: “attractions and recreation facility” means any sports, entertainment, amusement, or a. recreation facility, including, but not limited to, a sports arena, stadium, racetrack, tourist attraction, amusement park, or pari-mutuel facility that: For single-performance facilities: (i) Provides single-performance facilities; or (a) (B) Provides more than 10,000 permanent seats for spectators. (ii) For serial-performance facilities: (a) Provides parking spaces for more than 1,000 motor vehicles; or (B) Provides more than 4,000 permanent seats for spectators. b. “e ntertainment or resort complex” means a theme park comprised of at least 25 acres of land with permanent exhibitions and a variety of recreational activities, which has at least 1 million visitors annually who pay admission fees thereto, together with any lodging, dining, and recreational facilities located adjacent to, contiguous to, or in close proximity to the theme park, as long as the owners or operators of the theme park, or a parent or related company or subsidiary thereof, has an equity interest in the lodging, dining, or recreational facilities or is in privity therewith. Close proximity includes an area within a 5-mile radius of the theme park complex. c. “i ndustrial complex” means any industrial, manufacturing, processing, distribution, warehousing, or wholesale facility or plant, as well as accessory uses and structures, under common ownership that: (i) Provides onsite parking for more than 250 motor vehicles; (ii) e ncompasses 500,000 square feet or more of gross floor area; or (iii) o ccupies a site of 100 acres or more, but excluding wholesale facilities or plants that primarily serve or deal onsite with the general public. “r etail and service development” means any retail, service, or wholesale business establishment d. or group of establishments which deals primarily with the general public onsite and is operated under one common property ownership, development plan, or management that: (i) e ncompasses more than 400,000 square feet of gross floor area; or (ii) Provides parking spaces for more than 2,500 motor vehicles. e. “office development” means any office building or park operated under common ownership, development plan, or management that encompasses 300,000 or more square 206

224 government-in-the-sunshine-manual feet of gross floor area. “h f. otel or motel development” means any hotel or motel development that accommodates 350 or more units. (4) AGENCY PERSONNEL INFORMATION.-- (a)1. The social security numbers of all current and former agency employees which are held by the employing agency are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 2. The social security numbers of current and former agency employees may be disclosed by the employing agency: a. i f disclosure of the social security number is expressly required by federal or state law or a court order. b. o another agency or governmental entity if disclosure of the social security number is t necessary for the receiving agency or entity to perform its duties and responsibilities. c. i f the current or former agency employee expressly consents in writing to the disclosure of his or her social security number. (b)1. m edical information pertaining to a prospective, current, or former officer or employee of an agency which, if disclosed, would identify that officer or employee is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. h owever, such information may be disclosed if the person to whom the information pertains or the person’s legal representative provides written permission or pursuant to court order. 2.a Personal identifying information of a dependent child of a current or former officer or employee of an agency, which dependent child is insured by an agency group insurance tate Constitution. For plan, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s purposes of this exemption, “dependent child” has the same meaning as in s. 409.2554. b. This exemption is remedial in nature and applies to personal identifying information held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. (c) any information revealing undercover personnel of any criminal justice agency is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. (d)1. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “telephone numbers” includes home telephone numbers, personal cellular telephone numbers, personal pager telephone numbers, and telephone numbers associated with personal communications devices. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of active 2.a. or former sworn or civilian law enforcement personnel, including correctional and correctional probation officers, personnel of the Department of Children and Families whose duties include the investigation of abuse, neglect, exploitation, fraud, theft, or other criminal activities, personnel of the Department of h ealth whose duties are to support the investigation of child abuse or neglect, and personnel of the Department of r evenue or local governments whose responsibilities include revenue collection and enforcement or child support enforcement; the home addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, photographs, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel are exempt from s. 119.07(1). and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the o pen g overnment sunset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. b. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former nonsworn investigative personnel of the Department of Financial s ervices whose duties include the investigation of fraud, theft, worker’s compensation coverage requirements and compliance, other related criminal activities, or state regulatory 207

225 government-in-the-sunshine-manual requirement violations; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel state Constitution. This sub- art. are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), i of the overnment s eview a ct in accordance with pen g subparagraph is subject to the o unset r s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2021, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. c. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former nonsworn investigative personnel of the office of Financial r egulation’s Bureau of Financial investigations whose duties include the investigation of fraud, theft, other related criminal activities, or state regulatory requirement violations; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended art. by the children of such personnel are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), i of the government sunset state Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the open ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, 2022, review a unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or d. former firefighters certified in compliance with s. 633.408; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such firefighters; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such firefighters are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24, art. i of the state Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the o pen government s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. e. The home addresses, dates of birth, and telephone numbers of current or former justices of the s upreme Court, district court of appeal judges, circuit court judges, and county court judges; the home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of current or former justices and judges; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of current tate or former justices and judges are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24, art. i of the s open g overnment sunset review Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the act in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. f. The home addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former state attorneys, assistant state attorneys, statewide prosecutors, or assistant statewide prosecutors; the home addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, photographs, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of current or former state attorneys, assistant state attorneys, statewide prosecutors, or assistant statewide prosecutors; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of current or former state attorneys, assistant state attorneys, statewide prosecutors, or assistant statewide prosecutors are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. g. The home addresses, dates of birth, and telephone numbers of general magistrates, special magistrates, judges of compensation claims, administrative law judges of the Division of administrative h earings, and child support enforcement hearing officers; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of general magistrates, special magistrates, judges of compensation claims, administrative law judges of the Division of a dministrative h earings, and child support enforcement hearing officers; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of general magistrates, special magistrates, judges of compensation earings, and child claims, administrative law judges of the Division of a dministrative h 208

226 government-in-the-sunshine-manual support enforcement hearing officers are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), i of art. tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the o overnment s unset the s pen g ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, 2022, review a unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. h. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former human resource, labor relations, or employee relations directors, assistant directors, managers, or assistant managers of any local government agency or water management district whose duties include hiring and firing employees, labor contract negotiation, administration, or other personnel-related duties; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the art. i of the state children of such personnel are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Constitution. i. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former code enforcement officers; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. j. The home addresses, telephone numbers, places of employment, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former guardians ad litem, as defined in s. 39.820; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such persons; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such persons are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s pen tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the o government s unset r ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed eview a october 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the on legislature. k. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former juvenile probation officers, juvenile probation supervisors, detention superintendents, assistant detention superintendents, juvenile justice detention officers i and ii, juvenile justice detention officer supervisors, juvenile justice residential officers, juvenile justice residential officer supervisors i and ii, juvenile justice counselors, juvenile justice counselor supervisors, human services counselor administrators, senior human services counselor administrators, rehabilitation therapists, and social services counselors of the Department of Juvenile Justice; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. l. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former public defenders, assistant public defenders, criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, and assistant criminal conflict and civil regional counsel; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such defenders or counsel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such defenders or counsel are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. m. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former investigators or inspectors of the Department of Business and Professional regulation; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such current or former investigators and inspectors; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such current or former investigators and inspectors are exempt from s. tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s 209

227 government-in-the-sunshine-manual to the o overnment s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand pen g ctober 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment repealed on o by the legislature. n. The home addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of birth of county tax collectors; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such tax collectors; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such tax collectors are exempt from s. 119.071(1) and s. 24(a), art. i. of the s tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the o unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand pen g overnment s ctober 2, 2022, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment repealed on o by the legislature. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or o. ealth whose duties include, or result in, the former personnel of the Department of h determination or adjudication of eligibility for social security disability benefits, the investigation or prosecution of complaints filed against health care practitioners, or the inspection of health care practitioners or health care facilities licensed by the Department of h ealth; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel are exempt from tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s to the o overnment s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand pen g repealed on o ctober 2, 2019, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. p. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former impaired practitioner consultants who are retained by an agency or current or former employees of an impaired practitioner consultant whose duties result in a determination of a person’s skill and safety to practice a licensed profession; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such consultants or their employees; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such consultants or employees are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject pen g overnment s unset r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand to the o ctober 2, 2020, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment repealed on o by the legislature. q. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former emergency medical technicians or paramedics certified under chapter 401; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of the spouses and children of such emergency medical technicians or paramedics; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such emergency medical technicians or paramedics are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24, art. i of the s tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the o pen g overnment sunset r ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, eview a 2021, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. r. The home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of current or former personnel employed in an agency’s office of inspector general or internal audit department whose duties include auditing or investigating waste, fraud, abuse, theft, exploitation, or other activities that could lead to criminal prosecution or administrative discipline; the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and places of employment of spouses and children of such personnel; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of such personnel are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This sub-subparagraph is subject to the o pen g overnment r eview a ct in accordance with s. 119.15 and shall stand ctober 2, 2021, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment repealed on o 210

228 government-in-the-sunshine-manual by the legislature. an agency that is the custodian of the information specified in subparagraph 2. and that 3. is not the employer of the officer, employee, justice, judge, or other person specified in subparagraph 2. shall maintain the exempt status of that information only if the officer, employee, justice, judge, other person, or employing agency of the designated employee submits a written request for maintenance of the exemption to the custodial agency. 4. The exemptions in this paragraph apply to information held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of the exemption. (5) OTHER PERSONAL INFORMATION.-- (a)1.a. The legislature acknowledges that the social security number was never intended to be used for business purposes but was intended to be used solely for the administration of the federal s ocial s ecurity s ystem. The legislature is further aware that over time this unique numeric identifier has been used extensively for identity verification purposes and other legitimate consensual purposes. The legislature recognizes that the social security number can be used as a tool to b. perpetuate fraud against an individual and to acquire sensitive personal, financial, medical, and familial information, the release of which could cause great financial or personal harm to an individual. c. The legislature intends to monitor the use of social security numbers held by agencies in order to maintain a balanced public policy. 2.a. an agency may not collect an individual’s social security number unless the agency has stated in writing the purpose for its collection and unless it is: (i) s pecifically authorized by law to do so; or (ii) i mperative for the performance of that agency’s duties and responsibilities as prescribed by law. b. an agency shall identify in writing the specific federal or state law governing the collection, use, or release of social security numbers for each purpose for which the agency collects the social security number, including any authorized exceptions that apply to such collection, each agency shall ensure that the collection, use, or release of social security use, or release. numbers complies with the specific applicable federal or state law. c. s ocial security numbers collected by an agency may not be used by that agency for any purpose other than the purpose provided in the written statement. 3. an agency collecting an individual’s social security number shall provide that individual with a copy of the written statement required in subparagraph 2. The written statement also shall state whether collection of the individual’s social security number is authorized or mandatory under federal or state law. 4. each agency shall review whether its collection of social security numbers is in compliance with subparagraph 2. i f the agency determines that collection of a social security number is not in compliance with subparagraph 2., the agency shall immediately discontinue the collection of social security numbers for that purpose. 5. s ocial security numbers held by an agency are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This exemption applies to social security numbers held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. This exemption does not supersede any federal law prohibiting the release of social security numbers or any other applicable public records exemption for social security numbers existing prior to m ay 13, 2002, or created thereafter. 6. s ocial security numbers held by an agency may be disclosed if any of the following apply: a. The disclosure of the social security number is expressly required by federal or state law or a court order. 211

229 government-in-the-sunshine-manual b. The disclosure of the social security number is necessary for the receiving agency or governmental entity to perform its duties and responsibilities. c. The individual expressly consents in writing to the disclosure of his or her social security number. ct d. The disclosure of the social security number is made to comply with the usa Patriot a xecutive o rder 13224. of 2001, Pub. l. n o. 107-56, or Presidential e The disclosure of the social security number is made to a commercial entity for the e. permissible uses set forth in the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection a ct of 1994, 18 eporting a ct, 15 u.s.C. ss. 1681 et seq.; or the u.s.C. ss. 2721 et seq., the Fair Credit r Financial s ervices m ct of 1999, 15 u.s.C. ss. 6801 et seq., provided that odernization a the authorized commercial entity complies with the requirements of this paragraph. f. The disclosure of the social security number is for the purpose of the administration of health benefits for an agency employee or his or her dependents. g. The disclosure of the social security number is for the purpose of the administration of a pension fund administered for the agency employee’s retirement fund, deferred compensation plan, or defined contribution plan. The disclosure of the social security number is for the purpose of the administration of the h. uniform Commercial Code by the office of the s ecretary of s tate. 7.a. For purposes of this subsection, the term: (i) “Commercial activity” means the permissible uses set forth in the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection act of 1994, 18 reporting act, 15 u.s.C. u.s.C. ss. 2721 et seq.; the Fair Credit ervices m ct of 1999, 15 u.s.C. ss. 6801 ss. 1681 et seq., or the Financial s odernization a et seq., or verification of the accuracy of personal information received by a commercial entity in the normal course of its business, including identification or prevention of fraud t does not include the display or bulk or matching, verifying, or retrieving information. i sale of social security numbers to the public or the distribution of such numbers to any customer that is not identifiable by the commercial entity. (ii) “Commercial entity” means any corporation, partnership, limited partnership, proprietorship, sole proprietorship, firm, enterprise, franchise, or association that performs a commercial activity in this state. b. an agency may not deny a commercial entity engaged in the performance of a commercial activity access to social security numbers, provided the social security numbers will be used only in the performance of a commercial activity and provided the commercial entity makes a written request for the social security numbers. The written request must: (i) Be verified as provided in s. 92.525; (ii) Be legibly signed by an authorized officer, employee, or agent of the commercial entity; (iii) Contain the commercial entity’s name, business mailing and location addresses, and business telephone number; and (iv ) Contain a statement of the specific purposes for which it needs the social security numbers and how the social security numbers will be used in the performance of a commercial activity, including the identification of any specific federal or state law that permits such use. c. an agency may request any other information reasonably necessary to verify the identity of a commercial entity requesting the social security numbers and the specific purposes for which the numbers will be used. 8.a. any person who makes a false representation in order to obtain a social security number pursuant to this paragraph, or any person who willfully and knowingly violates this paragraph, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. 212

230 government-in-the-sunshine-manual b. any public officer who violates this paragraph commits a noncriminal infraction, punishable by a fine not exceeding $500 per violation. 9. any affected person may petition the circuit court for an order directing compliance with this paragraph. (b) Bank account numbers and debit, charge, and credit card numbers held by an agency are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This exemption applies to bank account numbers and debit, charge, and credit card numbers held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. For purposes of this paragraph, the term: (c)1. a. “Child” means any person younger than 18 years of age. b. “g overnment-sponsored recreation program” means a program for which an agency assumes responsibility for a child participating in that program, including, but not limited to, after-school programs, athletic programs, nature programs, summer camps, or other recreational programs. 2. i nformation that would identify or locate a child who participates in a government- sponsored recreation program is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 3. i nformation that would identify or locate a parent or guardian of a child who participates in a government-sponsored recreation program is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 4. This exemption applies to records held before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. (d) all records supplied by a telecommunications company, as defined by s. 364.02, to an agency which contain the name, address, and telephone number of subscribers are tate Constitution. confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s (e) any information provided to an agency for the purpose of forming ridesharing arrangements, which information reveals the identity of an individual who has provided his or her name for ridesharing, as defined in s. 341.031, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. (f ) m edical history records and information related to health or property insurance provided conomic opportunity, the Florida housing Finance Corporation, a to the Department of e county, a municipality, or a local housing finance agency by an applicant for or a participant in a federal, state, or local housing assistance program are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the state Constitution. governmental entities or their agents shall have access to such confidential and exempt records and information for the purpose of auditing federal, state, or local housing programs or housing assistance programs. s uch confidential and exempt records and information may be used in any administrative or judicial proceeding, provided such records are kept confidential and exempt unless otherwise ordered by a court. (g) Biometric identification information held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. as used in this paragraph, the term “biometric identification information” means: 1. any record of friction ridge detail; 2. Fingerprints; 3. Palm prints; and 4. Footprints. (h)1. Personal identifying information of an applicant for or a recipient of paratransit services which is held by an agency is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. tate Constitution. i of the s 213

231 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 2. This exemption applies to personal identifying information of an applicant for or a recipient of paratransit services which is held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. 3. Confidential and exempt personal identifying information shall be disclosed: With the express written consent of the applicant or recipient or the legally authorized a. representative of such applicant or recipient; i n a medical emergency, but only to the extent that is necessary to protect the health or life b. of the applicant or recipient; By court order upon a showing of good cause; or c. d. t o another agency in the performance of its duties and responsibilities. (i)1. For purposes of this paragraph, “identification and location information” means the: h ome address, telephone number, and photograph of a current or former u a. states nited attorney, assistant u tates attorney, judge of the u nited s tates Courts of a ppeal, nited s tates district judge, or u tates magistrate; united s nited s h ome address, telephone number, photograph, and place of employment of the spouse or b. child of such attorney, judge, or magistrate; and c. n ame and location of the school or day care facility attended by the child of such attorney, judge, or magistrate. 2. i dentification and location information held by an agency is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution if such attorney, judge, or magistrate submits to an agency that has custody of the identification and location information: a. a written request to exempt such information from public disclosure; and b. a written statement that he or she has made reasonable efforts to protect the identification and location information from being accessible through other means available to the public. (j)1. any information furnished by a person to an agency for the purpose of being provided with emergency notification by the agency is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This exemption applies to information held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. (k)1. For purposes of this paragraph, the term: a. “i dentification and location information” means the: (i) h ome address, telephone number, and date of birth of a servicemember, and the telephone number associated with a servicemember’s personal communication device. (ii) h ome address, telephone number, date of birth, and place of employment of the spouse or dependent of a servicemember, and the telephone number associated with such spouse’s or dependent’s personal communication device. (iii) n ame and location of a school attended by the spouse of a servicemember or a school or day care facility attended by a dependent of a servicemember. b. “s ervicemember” means a current or former member of the armed Forces of the u nited states, a reserve component of the armed Forces of the u nited s tates, or the n ational guard, who served after s eptember 11, 2001. 2. i dentification and location information held by an agency is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution if the servicemember submits to an agency that has custody of the identification and location information: a. a written request to exempt the identification and location information from public disclosure; and 214

232 government-in-the-sunshine-manual b. a written statement that he or she has made reasonable efforts to protect the identification and location information from being accessible through other means available to the public. This exemption applies to identification and location information held by an agency 3. before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. This paragraph is subject to the o pen g 4. unset r eview a ct in accordance with overnment s s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2020, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. 119.0711 Executive branch agency exemptions from inspection or copying of public records.-- When an agency of the executive branch of state government seeks to acquire real property by purchase or through the exercise of the power of eminent domain, all appraisals, other reports relating to value, offers, and counteroffers must be in writing and are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until execution of a valid option contract or a written offer to sell that has been conditionally accepted by the agency, at which time the exemption shall expire. The agency shall not finally accept the offer for a period of 30 days in order to allow public review of the transaction. The agency may give conditional acceptance to any option or offer subject only to final acceptance by the agency after the 30-day review period. i f a valid option contract is not executed, or if a written offer to sell is not conditionally accepted by the agency, then the exemption shall expire at the conclusion of the condemnation litigation of the subject property. an agency of the executive branch may exempt title information, including names and addresses of property owners whose property is subject to acquisition by purchase or through the exercise of the power of eminent domain, from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution to the same extent as appraisals, other reports relating to value, offers, and counteroffers. For the purpose of this subsection, the term “option contract” means an agreement of an agency of the executive branch of state government to purchase real property subject to final agency approval. This subsection has no application to other exemptions from s. 119.07(1) which are contained in other provisions of law and shall not be construed to be an express or implied repeal thereof. 119.0712 Executive branch agency-specific exemptions from inspection or copying of public records.-- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.-- all personal identifying information contained in (1) records relating to an individual’s personal health or eligibility for health-related services held by the Department of h ealth is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution, except as otherwise provided in this subsection. information made confidential and exempt by this subsection shall be disclosed: (a) With the express written consent of the individual or the individual’s legally authorized representative. i n a medical emergency, but only to the extent necessary to protect the health or life of the (b) individual. (c) By court order upon a showing of good cause. (d) t o a health research entity, if the entity seeks the records or data pursuant to a research protocol approved by the department, maintains the records or data in accordance with the approved protocol, and enters into a purchase and data-use agreement with the department, the fee provisions of which are consistent with s. 119.07(4). The department may deny a request for records or data if the protocol provides for intrusive follow-back contacts, has not been approved by a human studies institutional review board, does not plan for the destruction of confidential records after the research is concluded, is administratively burdensome, or does not have scientific merit. The agreement must restrict the release of 215

233 government-in-the-sunshine-manual any information that would permit the identification of persons, limit the use of records or data to the approved research protocol, and prohibit any other use of the records or data. Copies of records or data issued pursuant to this paragraph remain the property of the department. (2) DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES.-- (a) For purposes of this subsection, the term “motor vehicle record” means any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, afety and m otor vehicles. or identification card issued by the Department of h ighway s Personal information, including highly restricted personal information as defined in 18 (b) u.s.C. s. 2725, contained in a motor vehicle record is confidential pursuant to the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection a ct of 1994, 18 u.s.C. ss. 2721 et seq. s uch information may be released only as authorized by that act; however, information received pursuant to that act may not be used for mass commercial solicitation of clients for litigation against motor vehicle dealers. (c) ighway s afety and m otor vehicles e-mail addresses collected by the Department of h pursuant to s. 319.40(3), s. 320.95(2), or s. 322.08(9) are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This exemption applies retroactively. This open government sunset paragraph is subject to the act in accordance with s. review 119.15 and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, 2020, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. (d)1. e mergency contact information contained in a motor vehicle record is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. 2. Without the express consent of the person to whom such emergency contact information applies, the emergency contact information contained in a motor vehicle record may be released only to law enforcement agencies for purposes of contacting those listed in the event of an emergency. OFFICE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION. -- The following information held by the (3) egulation before, on, or after July 1, 2011, is confidential and exempt office of Financial r from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution: (a) any information received from another state or federal regulatory, administrative, or criminal justice agency that is otherwise confidential or exempt pursuant to the laws of that state or pursuant to federal law. (b) any information that is received or developed by the office as part of a joint or multiagency examination or investigation with another state or federal regulatory, administrative, or criminal justice agency. The office may obtain and use the information in accordance with the conditions imposed by the joint or multiagency agreement. This exemption does not apply to information obtained or developed by the office that would otherwise be available for public inspection if the office had conducted an independent examination or investigation under Florida law. 119.0713 Local government agency exemptions from inspection or copying of public records.-- (1) all complaints and other records in the custody of any unit of local government which relate to a complaint of discrimination relating to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, marital status, sale or rental of housing, the provision of brokerage services, or the financing of housing are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until a finding is made relating to probable cause, the investigation of the complaint becomes inactive, or the complaint or other record is made part of the official record of any hearing or court proceeding. This provision does not affect any function or activity of the Florida Commission on h uman r elations. any state or federal agency that is authorized to have access to such complaints or records by any provision of law shall be 216

234 government-in-the-sunshine-manual granted such access in the furtherance of such agency’s statutory duties. This subsection does not modify or repeal any special or local act. (2)(a) as used in this subsection, the term “unit of local government” means a county, municipality, special district, local agency, authority, consolidated city-county government, or any other local governmental body or public body corporate or politic authorized or created by general or special law. (b) The audit report of an internal auditor and the investigative report of the inspector general prepared for or on behalf of a unit of local government becomes a public record when the audit or investigation becomes final. an audit or investigation becomes final when the audit audit report or investigative report is presented to the unit of local government. workpapers and notes related to such audit and information received, produced, or derived from an investigation are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution until the audit or investigation is complete and the audit report becomes final or when the investigation is no longer active. an investigation is active if it is continuing with a reasonable, good faith anticipation of resolution and with reasonable dispatch. (3) any data, record, or document used directly or solely by a municipally owned utility to prepare and submit a bid relative to the sale, distribution, or use of any service, commodity, or tangible personal property to any customer or prospective customer is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. This exemption commences when a municipal utility identifies in writing a specific bid to which it intends to respond. This exemption no longer applies when the contract for sale, distribution, or use of the service, commodity, or tangible personal property is executed, a decision is made not to execute such contract, or the project is no longer under active consideration. The exemption in this subsection includes the bid documents actually furnished in response to the request for bids. h owever, the exemption for the bid documents submitted no longer applies after the bids are opened by the customer or prospective customer. (4)(a) Proprietary confidential business information means information, regardless of form or characteristics, which is held by an electric utility that is subject to chapter 119, is intended to be and is treated by the entity that provided the information to the electric utility as private in that the disclosure of the information would cause harm to the entity providing the information or its business operations, and has not been disclosed unless disclosed pursuant to a statutory provision, an order of a court or administrative body, or a private agreement that provides that the information will not be released to the public. Proprietary confidential business information includes, but is not limited to: 1. t rade secrets. i nternal auditing controls and reports of internal auditors. 2. s ecurity measures, systems, or procedures. 3. 4. i nformation concerning bids or other contractual data, the disclosure of which would impair the efforts of the electric utility to contract for goods or services on favorable terms. 5. i nformation relating to competitive interests, the disclosure of which would impair the competitive business of the provider of the information. Proprietary confidential business information held by an electric utility that is subject to (b) chapter 119 in conjunction with a due diligence review of an electric project as defined in s. 163.01(3)(d) or a project to improve the delivery, cost, or diversification of fuel or renewable energy resources is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. (c) all proprietary confidential business information described in paragraph (b) shall be retained for 1 year after the due diligence review has been completed and the electric utility has decided whether or not to participate in the project. ct in accordance with (d) This subsection is subject to the o pen g overnment s unset r eview a 217

235 government-in-the-sunshine-manual s. 119.15, and shall stand repealed on o ctober 2, 2018, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. (5)(a) The following information held by a utility owned or operated by a unit of local government is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution: 1. nformation related to the security of the technology, processes, or practices of a utility i owned or operated by a unit of local government that are designed to protect the utility’s networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage, or unauthorized access, which information, if disclosed would facilitate the alteration, disclosure, or destruction of such data or information technology resources. i nformation related to the security of existing or proposed information technology systems 2. or industrial control technology systems of a utility owned or operated by a unit of local government, which, if disclosed, would facilitate unauthorized access to, and alteration or destruction of, such systems in a manner that would adversely impact the safe and reliable operation of the systems and the utility. The exemption applies to such information held by a utility owned or operated by a unit (b) of local government before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. This subsection is subject to the o pen g overnment s (c) eview a ct in accordance with unset r s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on october 2, 2021, unless reviewed and saved from repeal through reenactment by the legislature. 119.0714 Court files; court records; official records.-- (1) COURT FILES.-- n othing in this chapter shall be construed to exempt from s. 119.07(1) a public record that was made a part of a court file and that is not specifically closed by order of court, except: a public record that was prepared by an agency attorney or prepared at the attorney’s (a) express direction as provided in s. 119.071(1)(d). (b) Data processing software as provided in s. 119.071(1)(f ). (c) any information revealing surveillance techniques or procedures or personnel as provided in s. 119.071(2)(d). any comprehensive inventory of state and local law enforcement resources, and any (d) comprehensive policies or plans compiled by a criminal justice agency, as provided in s. 119.071(2)(d). (e) any information revealing the substance of a confession of a person arrested as provided in s. 119.071(2)(e). (f ) any information revealing the identity of a confidential informant or confidential source as provided in s. 119.071(2)(f ). any information revealing undercover personnel of any criminal justice agency as provided (g) in s. 119.071(4)(c). (h) Criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information that is confidential and exempt as provided in s. 119.071(2)(h) or (m). (i) s ocial security numbers as provided in s. 119.071(5)(a). (j) Bank account numbers and debit, charge, and credit card numbers as provided in s. 119.071(5)(b). (k)1. a petition, and the contents thereof, for an injunction for protection against domestic violence, repeat violence, dating violence, sexual violence, stalking, or cyberstalking that is dismissed without a hearing, dismissed at an ex parte hearing due to failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction, or dismissed for any reason having to do with the sufficiency of the petition itself without an injunction being issued on or after July 1, 2017, is exempt from 218

236 government-in-the-sunshine-manual s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), art. i of the s tate Constitution. a petition, and the contents thereof, for an injunction for protection against domestic 2. violence, repeat violence, dating violence, sexual violence, stalking, or cyberstalking that is dismissed without a hearing, dismissed at an ex parte hearing due to failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction, or dismissed for any reason having to do with the sufficiency of the petition itself without an injunction being issued before July 1, 2017, is exempt from s. art. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), state Constitution only upon request by an individual i of the named in the petition as a respondent. The request must be in the form of a signed, legibly written request specifying the case name, case number, document hearing, and page number. The request must be delivered by mail, facsimile, or electronic transmission or in person to the clerk of court. a fee may not be charged for such request. (2) COURT RECORDS.-- (a) ntil January 1, 2012, if a social security number or a bank account, debit, charge, or u credit card number is included in a court file, such number may be included as part of the court record available for public inspection and copying unless redaction is requested by the holder of such number or by the holder’s attorney or legal guardian. (b) a request for redaction must be a signed, legibly written request specifying the case name, case number, document heading, and page number. The request must be delivered by mail, facsimile, electronic transmission, or in person to the clerk of the court. The clerk of the court does not have a duty to inquire beyond the written request to verify the identity of a person requesting redaction. (c) a fee may not be charged for the redaction of a social security number or a bank account, debit, charge, or credit card number pursuant to such request. (d) The clerk of the court has no liability for the inadvertent release of social security numbers, or bank account, debit, charge, or credit card numbers, unknown to the clerk of the court in court records filed on or before January 1, 2012. The clerk of the court must keep social security numbers confidential and exempt as (e)1. provided for in s. 119.071(5)(a), and bank account, debit, charge, and credit card numbers exempt as provided for in s. 119.071(5)(b), without any person having to request redaction. 2. s ection 119.071(5)(a)7. and 8. does not apply to the clerks of the court with respect to court records. a request for maintenance of a public records exemption in s. 119.071(4)(d)2. made (f ) pursuant to s. 119.071(4)(d)3. must specify the document type, name, identification number, and page number of the court record that contains the exempt information. (g) The clerk of the court is not liable for the release of information that is required by the Florida r ules of Judicial a dministration to be identified by the filer as confidential if the filer fails to make the required identification of the confidential information to the clerk of the court. (3) OFFICIAL RECORDS.-- a person who prepares or files a record for recording in the official records as provided in chapter 28 may not include in that record a social security number or a bank account, debit, charge, or credit card number unless otherwise expressly required by law. (a) i f a social security number or a bank account, debit, charge, or credit card number is included in an official record, such number may be made available as part of the official records available for public inspection and copying unless redaction is requested by the holder of such number or by the holder’s attorney or legal guardian. f such record is in electronic format, on January 1, 2011, and thereafter, the county 1. i 219

237 government-in-the-sunshine-manual recorder must use his or her best effort, as provided in paragraph (d), to keep social security numbers confidential and exempt as provided for in s. 119.071(5)(a), and to keep complete bank account, debit, charge, and credit card numbers exempt as provided for in s. 119.071(5)(b), without any person having to request redaction. ection 119.071(5)(a)7. and 8. does not apply to the county recorder with respect to 2. s official records. (b) The holder of a social security number or a bank account, debit, charge, or credit card number, or the holder’s attorney or legal guardian, may request that a county recorder redact from an image or copy of an official record placed on a county recorder’s publicly nternet website used by a county nternet website or on a publicly available i available i recorder to display public records, or otherwise made electronically available to the public, his or her social security number or bank account, debit, charge, or credit card number contained in that official record. 1. a request for redaction must be a signed, legibly written request and must be delivered by mail, facsimile, electronic transmission, or in person to the county recorder. The request must specify the identification page number of the record that contains the number to be redacted. The county recorder does not have a duty to inquire beyond the written request to verify 2. the identity of a person requesting redaction. a fee may not be charged for redacting a social security number or a bank account, debit, 3. charge, or credit card number. (c) a county recorder shall immediately and conspicuously post signs throughout his or her offices for public viewing, and shall immediately and conspicuously post on any i nternet website or remote electronic site made available by the county recorder and used for the ordering or display of official records or images or copies of official records, a notice stating, in substantially similar form, the following: 1. o n or after o ctober 1, 2002, any person preparing or filing a record for recordation in the official records may not include a social security number or a bank account, debit, charge, or credit card number in such document unless required by law. any person has a right to request a county recorder to remove from an image or copy of 2. nternet website or on a an official record placed on a county recorder’s publicly available i nternet website used by a county recorder to display public records, or publicly available i otherwise made electronically available to the general public, any social security number contained in an official record. s uch request must be made in writing and delivered by mail, facsimile, or electronic transmission, or delivered in person, to the county recorder. The request must specify the identification page number that contains the social security number to be redacted. a fee may not be charged for the redaction of a social security number pursuant to such a request. (d) i f the county recorder accepts or stores official records in an electronic format, the county recorder must use his or her best efforts to redact all social security numbers and bank account, debit, charge, or credit card numbers from electronic copies of the official record. The use of an automated program for redaction is deemed to be the best effort in performing the redaction and is deemed in compliance with the requirements of this subsection. (e) The county recorder is not liable for the inadvertent release of social security numbers, or bank account, debit, charge, or credit card numbers, filed with the county recorder. (f ) a request for maintenance of a public records exemption in s. 119.071(4)(d)2. made pursuant to s. 119.071(4)(d)3. must specify the document type, name, identification number, and page number of the official record that contains the exempt information. 220

238 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 119.084 Copyright of data processing software created by governmental agencies; sale price and licensing fee.-- as used in this section, “agency” has the same meaning as in s. 119.011(2), except that the (1) term does not include any private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business entity. (2) an agency is authorized to acquire and hold a copyright for data processing software created by the agency and to enforce its rights pertaining to such copyright, provided that the agency complies with the requirements of this subsection. (a) an agency that has acquired a copyright for data processing software created by the agency may sell or license the copyrighted data processing software to any public agency or private person. The agency may establish a price for the sale and a licensing fee for the use of such data processing software that may be based on market considerations. h owever, the prices or fees for the sale or licensing of copyrighted data processing software to an individual or entity solely for application to information maintained or generated by the agency that created the copyrighted data processing software shall be determined pursuant to s. 119.07(4). (b) Proceeds from the sale or licensing of copyrighted data processing software shall be deposited by the agency into a trust fund for the agency’s appropriate use for authorized purposes. Counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions of the state may designate how such sale and licensing proceeds are to be used. (c) The provisions of this subsection are supplemental to, and shall not supplant or repeal, any other provision of law that authorizes an agency to acquire and hold copyrights. 119.092 Registration by federal employer’s registration number.-- each state agency which registers or licenses corporations, partnerships, or other business entities shall include, by July 1, 1978, within its numbering system, the federal employer’s identification number of each corporation, partnership, or other business entity registered or licensed by it. any state agency may maintain a dual numbering system in which the federal employer’s identification number or the state agency’s own number is the primary identification number; however, the records of such state agency shall be designed in such a way that the record of any business entity is subject to direct location by the federal employer’s identification number. state shall keep a registry of federal employer’s identification numbers of all The Department of business entities, registered with the Division of Corporations, which registry of numbers may be used by all state agencies. 119.10 Violation of chapter; penalties.-- ( 1) any public officer who: (a) v iolates any provision of this chapter commits a noncriminal infraction, punishable by fine not exceeding $500. Knowingly violates the provisions of s. 119.07(1) is subject to suspension and removal or (b) impeachment and, in addition, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (2) any person who willfully and knowingly violates: (a) any of the provisions of this chapter commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (b) s ection 119.105 commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 221

239 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 119.105 Protection of victims of crimes or accidents.-- very Police reports are public records except as otherwise made exempt or confidential. e person is allowed to examine nonexempt or nonconfidential police reports. a person who comes into possession of exempt or confidential information contained in police reports may not use that information for any commercial solicitation of the victims or relatives of the victims of the reported crimes or accidents and may not knowingly disclose such information to any third party for the purpose of such solicitation during the period of time that information remains exempt or confidential. This section does not prohibit the publication of such information to the general public by any news media legally entitled to possess that information or the use of such information for any other data collection or analysis purposes by those entitled to possess that information. 119.11 Accelerated hearing; immediate compliance.-- (1) Whenever an action is filed to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the court shall set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases. Whenever a court orders an agency to open its records for inspection in accordance with (2) this chapter, the agency shall comply with such order within 48 hours, unless otherwise provided by the court issuing such order, or unless the appellate court issues a stay order within such 48-hour period. (3) a stay order shall not be issued unless the court determines that there is a substantial probability that opening the records for inspection will result in significant damage. (4) pon service of a complaint, counterclaim, or cross-claim in a civil action brought to u enforce the provisions of this chapter, the custodian of the public record that is the subject matter of such civil action shall not transfer custody, alter, destroy, or otherwise dispose of the public record sought to be inspected and examined, notwithstanding the applicability of an exemption or the assertion that the requested record is not a public record subject to inspection and examination under s. 119.07(1), until the court directs otherwise. The person who has custody of such public record may, however, at any time permit inspection of the requested record as provided in s. 119.07(1) and other provisions of law. 119.12 Attorney fees.-- i f a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the court (1) shall assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney fees, against the responsible agency if the court determines that: The agency unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be inspected or copied; and (a) (b) The complainant provides written notice identifying the public record request to the agency’s custodian of public records at least 5 business days before filing the civil action, except as provided under subsection (2). The notice period begins on the day the written notice of the request is received by the custodian of public records, excluding s aturday, sunday, and legal holidays, and runs until 5 business days have elapsed. The complainant is not required to provide written notice of the public record request to (2) the agency’s custodian of public records as provided in paragraph (1)(b) if the agency does not prominently post the contact information for the agency’s custodian of public records in the agency’s primary administrative building in which public records are routinely created, sent, received, maintained, and requested and on the agency’s website, if the agency has a website. (3) The court shall determine whether the complainant requested to inspect or copy a public record or participated in the civil action for an improper purpose. i f the court determines there was an improper purpose, the court may not assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney fees, to the complainant, and shall assess and 222

240 government-in-the-sunshine-manual award against the complainant and to the agency the reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by the agency in responding to the civil action. For purposes of this subsection, the term “improper purpose” means a request to inspect or copy a public record or to participate in the civil action primarily to cause a violation of this chapter or for a frivolous purpose. (4) This section does not create a private right of action authorizing the award of monetary damages for a person who brings an action to enforce the provisions of this chapter. Payments by the responsible agency may include only the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney fees, directly attributable to a civil action brought to enforce the provisions of this chapter. 119.15 Legislative review of exemptions from public meeting and public records requirements.-- (1) This section may be cited as the “o pen g overnment s unset r eview a ct.” (2) This section provides for the review and repeal or reenactment of an exemption from s. 24, art. i of the s tate Constitution and s. 119.07(1) or s. 286.011. This act does not apply to an exemption that: (a) i s required by federal law; or (b) a pplies solely to the legislature or the s tate Court s ystem. (3) i n the 5th year after enactment of a new exemption or substantial amendment of an existing exemption, the exemption shall be repealed on o ctober 2nd of the 5th year, unless the legislature acts to reenact the exemption. (4)(a) a law that enacts a new exemption or substantially amends an existing exemption must state that the record or meeting is: 1. e xempt from s. 24, art. i of the s tate Constitution; 2. e xempt from s. 119.07(1) or s. 286.011; and 3. epealed at the end of 5 years and that the exemption must be reviewed by the legislature r before the scheduled repeal date. (b) For purposes of this section, an exemption is substantially amended if the amendment expands the scope of the exemption to include more records or information or to include an exemption is not substantially amended if the amendment meetings as well as records. narrows the scope of the exemption. This section is not intended to repeal an exemption that has been amended following (c) legislative review before the scheduled repeal of the exemption if the exemption is not substantially amended as a result of the review. (5)(a) By June 1 in the year before the repeal of an exemption under this section, the office of legislative s ervices shall certify to the President of the s enate and the s peaker of the h ouse of r epresentatives the language and statutory citation of each exemption scheduled for repeal the following year. (b) an exemption that is not identified and certified to the President of the s enate and the speaker of the h ouse of r epresentatives is not subject to legislative review and repeal under this section. i f the office fails to certify an exemption that it subsequently determines should have been certified, it shall include the exemption in the following year’s certification after that determination. (6)(a) as part of the review process, the legislature shall consider the following: 1. What specific records or meetings are affected by the exemption? 2. Whom does the exemption uniquely affect, as opposed to the general public? What is the identifiable public purpose or goal of the exemption? 3. 223

241 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 4. Can the information contained in the records or discussed in the meeting be readily f so, how? obtained by alternative means? i 5. i s the record or meeting protected by another exemption? 6. are there multiple exemptions for the same type of record or meeting that it would be appropriate to merge? (b) an exemption may be created, revised, or maintained only if it serves an identifiable public purpose, and the exemption may be no broader than is necessary to meet the public an identifiable public purpose is served if the exemption meets one of purpose it serves. the following purposes and the legislature finds that the purpose is sufficiently compelling to override the strong public policy of open government and cannot be accomplished without the exemption: allows the state or its political subdivisions to effectively and efficiently administer a 1. governmental program, which administration would be significantly impaired without the exemption; Protects information of a sensitive personal nature concerning individuals, the release of 2. which information would be defamatory to such individuals or cause unwarranted damage to the good name or reputation of such individuals or would jeopardize the safety of such individuals. h owever, in exemptions under this subparagraph, only information that would identify the individuals may be exempted; or Protects information of a confidential nature concerning entities, including, but not limited 3. to, a formula, pattern, device, combination of devices, or compilation of information which is used to protect or further a business advantage over those who do not know or use it, the disclosure of which information would injure the affected entity in the marketplace. (7) r ecords made before the date of a repeal of an exemption under this section may not be made public unless otherwise provided by law. i n deciding whether the records shall be made public, the legislature shall consider whether the damage or loss to persons or entities uniquely affected by the exemption of the type specified in subparagraph (6)(b)2. or subparagraph (6)(b)3. would occur if the records were made public. notwithstanding s. 768.28 or any other law, neither the state or its political subdivisions nor any (8) other public body shall be made party to any suit in any court or incur any liability for the repeal or revival and reenactment of an exemption under this section. The failure of the legislature to comply strictly with this section does not invalidate an otherwise valid reenactment. Exempt and confidential records and meetings- exemption summaries. It is D. recommended that these summaries be used as a reference only--interested parties should refer to the full text in the Florida Statutes before drawing legal conclusions. NOTE: Due to space limitations, exemptions contained in Chs. 119 and 286, F.S., are not included in this Appendix; please refer to Appendix B (containing the text of s. 286.011, F.S., and related statutes) and Appendix C (containing the complete text of Ch. 119, F.S) for these exemptions. Section 11.0431(2), F.S. -- The text of s. 11.0431, F.s., relating to exemptions from disclosure for legislative records, is set forth in a ppendix e. Section 11.045(5)(b), F.S. -- The legislative committee responsible for ethical conduct of lobbyists shall make sufficient deletions in advisory opinions issued pursuant to this subsection to prevent disclosing the identity of persons in the decisions or opinions. Section 11.26(1), F.S. -- s ubject to s. 11.0431, legislative employees may not reveal to anyone outside the area of their direct responsibility the contents or nature of any request for services made by a legislator except with the consent of the member making the request. nterprise Section 11.45(3)(i), F.S. -- The identity of a donor or prospective donor to e 224

242 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Florida, i nc., who desires to remain anonymous is confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements and such anonymity shall be maintained in the auditor’s report. Section 11.45(3)(j), F.S. -- The identity of a donor or prospective donor to the capital development board who desires to remain anonymous is confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements and such anonymity shall be maintained in the auditor’s report. -- a Section 11.45(4)(c), F.S. uditor g eneral become public udit reports prepared by the a records when final. audit workpapers and notes are not public records; however, those materials necessary to support the computations in the final audit report may be made available by majority vote of the legislative a uditing Committee after a public hearing showing proper cause. Section 11.51(4), F.S . -- Work papers held by the office of Program Policy analysis and government a ccountability (oPP aga) which relate to an authorized project or a research product are exempt. Section 14.28, F.S. -- all records developed or received by a state entity relating to a Board of e xecutive Clemency investigation are exempt from disclosure; however, such records may be released upon the approval of the g overnor. Section 15.07, F.S. -- The journal of the executive session of the s enate shall be kept free from inspection or disclosure except upon order of the s enate or court of competent jurisdiction. xcept as otherwise provided by this section, information relative Section 17.0401, F.S. -- e to an investigation by the Chief Financial officer pursuant to s. 17.04 is confidential and exempt from disclosure until the investigation is complete or ceases to be active, or if the Chief Financial officer submits such information to a law enforcement or prosecutorial agency, until that agency’s investigation is complete or ceases to be active as that term is defined in the section. -- all direct deposit records made prior to o ctober 1, 1986, are Section 17.076(5), F.S. exempt from s. 119.07(1). With respect to direct deposit records made on or after o ctober 1, 1986, the names of the authorized financial institutions and the account numbers of the beneficiaries, as defined in the section, are confidential and exempt. Section 17.325(3), F.S. -- a caller on the governmental efficiency hotline established by the Chief Financial officer under this section may remain anonymous, and, if the caller provides his or her name, the name is confidential. Section 20.055(6)(b), F.S. -- i nspector general audit workpapers and reports are public records to the extent that they do not include information which has been made confidential and owever, when the inspector general or a member of the staff receives exempt from s. 119.07(1). h from an individual a complaint or information that falls within the definition provided in s. 112.3187(5), the name or identity of the individual shall not be disclosed to anyone else without the individual’s written consent, unless the inspector general determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the audit or investigation. Section 24.105(12)(a), F.S. -- The Department of the lottery shall determine by rule information, as set forth in the exemption, relating to the operation of the lottery which is confidential and exempt from disclosure. to be deemed confidential, the information must be necessary to the security and integrity of the lottery. Confidential information may be released to other governmental entities as needed in connection with the performance of their duties; such governmental entities shall retain the confidentiality of the information as provided for in the subsection. Section 24.105(12)(b), F.S. -- The Department of the lottery shall maintain the confidentiality of the street address and telephone number of a winner, in that such information 225

243 government-in-the-sunshine-manual is confidential and exempt from disclosure, unless the winner consents to the release of such information, or as provided for in s. 24.115(4) or s. 409.2577. Section 24.108(7)(b), F.S. -- The portion of the lottery Department’s security report that contains specific recommendations is confidential and exempt from disclosure and may be released only as authorized in the subsection. Section 27.151, F.S. -- an executive order assigning or exchanging state attorneys pursuant to s. 27.14 or s. 27.15, if designated by the g overnor to be confidential, is exempt from disclosure. The g overnor may make public any such executive order by a subsequent executive order and at the expiration of a confidential executive order or any extensions thereof, the executive order and all associated orders and reports shall be open to the public pursuant to Ch. 119 unless the information contained in the executive order is confidential pursuant to cited laws. -- Certified copies of death certificates authorized for issuance Section 28.222(3)(g), F.S. ealth which exclude information made confidential under s. 382.008 by the Department of h and certified death certificates issued by another state shall be recorded by the clerk of circuit court. -- The clerk of court is prohibited from placing certain records Section 28.2221, F.S. (military discharge or death certificate, and family law, probate, or juvenile court records) on a nternet website. Those records which have already been placed on the i publicly available i nternet must be removed if the subject of the record requests removal. Section 39.00145(4), F.S. -- notwithstanding any other provision of law, all state and local agencies and programs that provide services to children or that are responsible for a child’s safety, including the listed agencies, and any provider contracting with such agencies, may share with each other confidential records or information if the records or information are reasonably necessary to ensure access to appropriate services for the child. h owever, records or information made confidential by federal law may not be shared. also, this subsection does not apply to information concerning clients and records of certified domestic violence centers which are confidential under s. 39.908 and privileged under s. 90.5036. Section 39.0132(3), F.S. -- The clerk shall keep official records required by this chapter separate from other court records. The records may be inspected only upon court order by persons deemed to have a proper interest therein, except that, subject to the provisions of s. 63.162, a child and the parents of the child and their attorneys, guardian ad litem, law enforcement agencies, the Department of Children and Family s ervices and its designees shall have a right to inspect and copy records pertaining to the child. Section 39.0132(4)(a)1., F.S. -- all information obtained pursuant to this part in the discharge of official duty by any of the officials specified in the subsection is confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone other than persons entitled to receive such information under Ch. 39 or upon court order. Section 39.0132(4)(a)2., F.S. -- The following information held by a guardian ad litem is confidential and exempt: medical, mental health, substance abuse, child care, education, law enforcement, court, social services, and financial records; and any other information maintained by a guardian ad litem which is identified as confidential information under Ch. 39, F.s. such confidential and exempt information may not be disclosed to anyone except as authorized in the exemption. Section 39.201(1)(d), F.S. -- r eporters to the central abuse hotline in the designated occupation categories are required to provide their names to the hotline staff. The names of reporters shall be entered into the record of the report but shall be held confidential as provided in s. 39.202. 226

244 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Section 39.201(2)(h), F.S. a telephone number, fax number, or internet protocol (iP) -- address from which the report was received by the hotline which is included in the abuse report pursuant to this subsection shall enjoy the same confidentiality provided to the identity of the reporter pursuant to s. 39.202. -- all records held by the Department of Children and Family Section 39.202(1), F.S. services concerning reports of child abandonment, abuse or neglect including reports made to the central abuse hotline and all records generated as a result of such reports are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and shall not be disclosed except as specifically authorized by this chapter. s uch exemption from s. 119.07(1) applies to information in possession of those entities granted access pursuant to this section. Section 39.202(2)(o), F.S. -- a ccess to records concerning reports of child abuse or neglect shall be granted to any person in the event of the death of a child determined to be a nformation identifying the person reporting abuse, result of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. i abandonment, or neglect shall not be released, nor shall any information otherwise made confidential or exempt by law. Section 39.202(5), F.S. -- The name of any person reporting child abuse, abandonment, or neglect shall not be released to any person except as authorized in the subsection, without the written consent of the reporter. Section 39.202(6), F.S. -- all records and reports of the child protection team of the Department of h ealth are confidential and exempt from ss. 119.07(1) and 456.057, and shall not be disclosed, except as provided in the subsection. Section 39.301(18), F.S. -- When the initial interview with the child in a child protective investigation or criminal investigation is conducted at school in the presence of school staff, information received during the interview or from any other source regarding the alleged abuse or neglect of the child shall be confidential and exempt, except as otherwise provided by court order. Section 39.507(2), F.S. -- Dependency adjudicatory hearings are open to the public, unless by special order the court determines that the public interest or welfare of the child is best served by closing the hearing. -- The case on appeal in a dependency proceeding and any Section 39.510(4) and (5), F.S. papers filed in appellate court shall be entitled with child’s initials. The papers shall remain sealed and shall not be open to public inspection. The original order of the appellate court with papers filed in an appeal shall be sealed and not open to inspection except by order of the appellate court. Section 39.702(5)(d), F.S. -- an independent not-for-profit agency authorized to administer a citizen review panel established to make recommendations concerning foster care as provided in this section shall ensure that all panel members have read, understood, and signed an oath of confidentiality relating to written or verbal information provided to members for review hearings. Section 39.809(4), F.S. -- all hearings involving termination of parental rights are confidential and closed to the public. Section 39.814(3) and (4), F.S. -- all court records required by this part (termination of parental rights) shall be kept separate from other records. s uch records are not open to public inspection. all information obtained pursuant to this part by officials specified therein shall be confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and may not be disclosed to anyone other than the authorized officials and agencies, except by court order. an appeal in a case involving a termination of parental Section 39.815(4) and (5), F.S. -- 227

245 government-in-the-sunshine-manual rights must be docketed, and any papers filed in the appellate court must be titled with the initials, but not the name, of the child and the court case number, and the papers must remain sealed in the office of the appellate court clerk when not in use by the court and may not be open to public inspection. The original order of the appellate court, with all papers filed in the case on appeal, must remain in the clerk’s office, sealed and not open to inspection except by court order. -- i nformation collected pursuant to the security background Section 39.821(1), F.S. investigation for a guardian ad litem is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 39.827(4), F.S. -- The hearing for appointment of a guardian advocate is confidential. The court records are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and may be inspected only upon court order or by the persons and entities identified in the subsection. all information obtained pursuant to this part is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and shall not be disclosed to anyone other than authorized personnel of the court or the Department of ervices and its designees, except upon court order. Children and Family s -- information about clients received by the Department of Children Section 39.908, F.S. ervices or by authorized persons employed by or volunteering services to a domestic and Family s violence center, through files, reports, inspection or otherwise is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). e xcept as provided in the section, information about the location of domestic violence centers and facilities is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 40.50(2), F.S. -- The court should emphasize the confidentiality of notes taken by jurors as provided in this subsection. Section 44.102(3), F.S. -- all written communications in a court-ordered mediation proceeding, other than an executed settlement agreement, shall be exempt from the requirements of Ch. 119. Section 44.201(5), F.S. -- any information relating to a dispute which is obtained by any person while performing any duties for a Citizen Dispute settlement Center is exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 44.405(1), F.S. xcept as provided in the section, mediation communications, -- e as defined in the m ediation Confidentiality and Privilege a ct, are confidential. Section 61.1827, F.S. -- any information that reveals the identity of applicants for or recipients of child-support services, including the name, address, and telephone number of such persons, held by a non-t itle iv -D county child-support enforcement agency is confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements. Section 61.183(3), F.S. - - i nformation concerning mediation proceedings involving contested issues relating to custody parental responsibility, primary residence, access to, visitation with, or support of a child pursuant to this section which is obtained by any person performing mediation duties is exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 61.404, F.S. -- a guardian ad litem shall maintain as confidential all information and documents received from any source described in s. 61.403(2) and may not disclose such information or documents except, in the guardian ad litem’s discretion, in a report to the court or as directed by the court. Section 63.022(4)(i), F.S. -- The records of all proceedings concerning custody and adoption of a minor are confidential and exempt except as provided in s. 63.162. Section 63.0541, F.S. -- all information contained in the Florida Putative Father r egistry is confidential and exempt except as provided in the section. 228

246 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Section 63.089(8), F.S. xcept as provided in the exemption, all records relating to a -- e petition to terminate parental rights pending adoption are subject to the provisions of s. 63.162, F.s. -- e xcept for a joint petition for the adoption of a stepchild, a Section 63.102(1), F.S. relative, or an adult, any name by which the minor was previously known may not be disclosed in the petition for adoption, the notice of hearing, or the judgment of adoption, or the court docket as provided in s. 63.162(3). Section 63.162(1), F.S. -- h earings held in proceedings under the Florida a doption a ct are closed. Section 63.162(2), F.S. -- all papers and records pertaining to an adoption are confidential and subject to inspection only upon court order. adoption papers and records of the Department of Children and Family s ervices, a court, or any other governmental agency are exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 63.162(4), F.S. -- a person may not disclose from the records the name and identity of a birth parent, an adoptive parent, or an adoptee except as authorized in the subsection. Section 63.162(6), F.S. -- e xcept as provided in s. 63.162(4), identifying information regarding birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees may not be disclosed unless a birth parent, adoptive parent, or adoptee has authorized in writing the release of such information concerning himself or herself. xcept as provided in this section, information in the state Section 63.165(1), F.S. -- e registry of adoption information is confidential and exempt. Section 68.083(8), F.S. -- The complaint and information held by the Department of ct is confidential legal affairs pursuant to an investigation of a violation of the False Claims a and exempt and may not be disclosed until the investigation is complete, or as otherwise provided in the exemption. Section 69.081(8), F.S. -- any portion of an agreement which conceals information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim or action against an agency is void, contrary to public policy and may not be enforced. -- e xcept as provided in the exemption, specified business Section 73.0155, F.S. information provided by the owner of a business to a governmental condemning authority as part of an offer of business damages is confidential and exempt from disclosure requirements, if the owner requests in writing that the business information be held confidential and exempt. Section 90.502(5), F.S. -- Communications made by a person who seeks or receives services from the Department of r evenue under the child support enforcement program to the attorney representing the department shall be confidential and privileged and shall not be disclosed to anyone other than the agency except as provided in this section. Section 92.56, F.S. -- The confidential and exempt status of criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information made confidential and exempt pursuant to s. 119.071(2)(h) must be maintained in court records pursuant to s. 119.0714(1)(h) and in court proceedings, including testimony from witnesses. Section 97.057(2)(a)4. and 5., F.S. -- all declinations to register to vote pursuant to this section (relating to voter registration by the Department of highway safety and motor vehicles) will remain confidential and may be used only for voter registration purposes. The particular driver license office in which the person applies to register to vote or updates a voter registration 229

247 government-in-the-sunshine-manual record will remain confidential and may be used only for voter registration purposes. -- The following information is confidential and exempt and may be Section 97.0585, F.S. used only for purposes of voter registration: declinations to register to vote made pursuant to ss. 97.057 and 97.058; information relating to the place where a person registered to vote or where a person updated a voter registration; the social security number, driver license number, and Florida identification number of a voter registration applicant or voter. The signature of a voter registration applicant or a voter is exempt from the copying requirements. Section 98.045(3), F.S. -- each supervisor shall maintain for at least 2 years and make available for public inspection and copying, all records concerning implementation of registration list maintenance programs and activities conducted pursuant to cited statutes. The records must include lists of the name and address of each person to whom a notice was sent and information as to whether each such person responded to the mailing, but may not include any information lection Code. that is confidential or exempt from public records requirements under the e -- s Section 101.5607(1)(d), F.S. ection 119.071(1)(f ) which provides an exemption from s. 119.07(1) for data processing software designated as sensitive, applies to all software on file with the Department of s tate. -- i nformation regarding a request for a vote-by-mail ballot that Section 101.62(3), F.S. is recorded by the supervisor of elections pursuant to this subsection is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and shall be made available to or reproduced only for the individuals and entities set forth in the exemption, for political purposes only. Section 106.0706, F.S. -- all user identifications and passwords held by the Department of s tate pursuant to s. 106.0705 are confidential and exempt from disclosure. i nformation entered in the electronic filing system for purposes of generating a report pursuant to s. 106.0705 is exempt but is no longer exempt once the report is generated and filed with the Division of elections. except as otherwise provided in the subsection, sworn complaints Section 106.25(7), F.S. -- filed pursuant to Ch. 106 with the Florida e lections Commission, investigative reports or other papers of the commission relating to a violation of Chs. 106 or 104, and proceedings of the commission relating to a violation of said chapters are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 286.011. Section 110.1091(2), F.S. -- a state employee’s personal identifying information contained in records held by the employing agency relating to an employee’s participation in an employee assistance program is confidential and exempt. Section 110.1127(2)(d) and (e), F.S. -- it is a first degree misdemeanor to willfully use information contained in records obtained pursuant to employment screening required for certain positions for purposes other than background screening or investigation for employment, or to release such information to other persons for purposes other than preemployment screening or investigation. i t is a felony of the third degree for any person willfully, knowingly, or intentionally to use juvenile records information for any purpose other than those specified in this section or to release such information to other persons for purposes other than those specified in the section. Section 110.123(5)(a), F.S. -- a physician’s fee schedule used in the health and accident plan is not available for inspection or copying by medical providers or other persons not involved in the administration of the state group insurance program. Section 110.123(9), F.S. -- Patient medical records and medical claims records of state employees, former state employees, and their eligible covered dependents, in the custody or control of the state group insurance program are confidential and exempt. 230

248 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Section 110.12301(3), F.S. ecords collected for the purpose of dependent eligibility – r verification services conducted for the state group insurance program and held by the Department of m ervices are confidential and exempt. This subsection does not apply to records anagement s that are otherwise open for inspection and copying which are held by the Department for purposes other than for the performance of dependent eligibility verification services. Section 110.201(4), F.S. anagement -- all discussions between the Department of m services and the g overnor, and between the Department of m anagement s ervices and the administration Commission, or agency heads, or between any of their respective representatives, relative to collective bargaining, are exempt from s. 286.011 and all work products relative to collective bargaining developed in conjunction with such discussions are confidential and exempt. Section 112.0455(8)(l), F.S. -- all documentation relative to a state agency employer’s explanation as to why a job applicant or employee’s explanation of positive drug test results is unsatisfactory, along with the report of the positive test results, are confidential and exempt. Section 112.0455(8)(t), F.S. -- The documentation prepared by a state agency employer which formed the basis of the employer’s determination that reasonable suspicion existed to warrant drug testing under this section is confidential and exempt, except that a copy of this documentation shall be given to the employee upon request. Section 112.0455(11)(a), F.S. -- except as provided in the subsection, all information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, and drug test results, written or otherwise, received or produced as a result of a state agency’s drug testing program are confidential and are exempt from disclosure except as provided in this section. Section 112.08(7), F.S. edical records and medical claims records in the custody of -- m county or municipal government relating to county or municipal employees, former county or municipal employees, or eligible dependents of such employees enrolled in a county or municipal group insurance plan or self-insurance plan are confidential and are exempt from s. 119.07(1). such records shall not be furnished to any person other than the employee or the employee’s legal representative, except as provided in the subsection. Section 112.08(8), F.S. -- Patient medical records and medical claims records of water management district employees, former employees, and eligible dependents in the custody or control of a water management district under its group insurance plan established pursuant to s. uch records shall not be furnished to any person other 373.605 are confidential and exempt. s than the employee or the employee’s legal representative except as provided in the subsection. Section 112.21(1), F.S. -- all records identifying individual participants in any contract or account under s. 112.21 (relating to tax-sheltered annuities or custodial accounts for governmental employees) and their personal account activities are confidential and exempt. Section 112.215(7), F.S. -- all records identifying individual participants in any deferred compensation plan and their personal account activities shall be confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 112.3188(1), F.S. -- The identity of an individual who discloses in good faith to the Chief i nspector general, an agency inspector general, a local chief executive officer, or other appropriate local official information that alleges that an employee or agent of an agency or independent contractor has violated certain laws or committed, or is suspected of committing, specified acts may not be disclosed to anyone other than staff of the above officials without the written consent of the individual, unless such official determines that disclosure is authorized for the reasons specified in the subsection. xcept as specifically authorized by s. 112.3189, or this Section 112.3188(2), F.S. -- e 231

249 government-in-the-sunshine-manual subsection, all information received by the Chief i eneral or an agency inspector nspector g general or information produced or derived from fact-finding or other investigations conducted by the Department of law e relations, is nforcement or the Florida Commission on h uman confidential and exempt from disclosure if the information is being received or derived from allegations as set forth in subsection (1) and an investigation is active. all information received by a local chief executive officer or appropriate local official or information produced or derived from fact-finding or investigations conducted by a local government pursuant to s. 112.3187(8) (b), is confidential and exempt if the information is received or derived from allegations as set forth in s. 112.3188(1)(a) or (b) and the investigation is active. Section 112.31901, F.S. -- i f certified pursuant to the exemption, an investigatory record nspector g of the Chief i overnor or of the employee designated eneral within the office of the g by an agency head as the agency inspector general under s. 112.3189 is exempt from disclosure requirements for the time period specified in the exemption. The provisions of this section do not apply to whistle-blower investigations conducted pursuant to the whistle-blower act. -- all proceedings, the complaint, and other records relating Section 112.3215(8)(b), F.S. to the investigation of a sworn complaint of a violation of this section which relates to executive evision Commission lobbyists, and any meeting held pursuant to branch and Constitution r the investigation, are confidential and exempt from disclosure until the alleged violator requests in writing that such investigation and associated records and meetings be made public, or until the e thics Commission determines whether probable cause exists to believe that a violation has occurred. Section 112.3215(8)(d), F.S. -- r ecords relating to an audit of a lobbying firm lobbying the executive branch or the Constitution revision Commission or an investigation of violations of the lobbying compensation reporting laws and any meetings held pursuant to the investigation or at which such an audit is discussed are exempt from public records and meetings requirements either until the lobbying firm requests in writing that such records and meetings be made public or until the Commission on e thics determines there is probable cause that the audit reflects a violation of the reporting laws. -- The complaint and records relating to the complaint or to Section 112.324(2), F.S. thics Commission or other specified entities are any preliminary investigation held by the e confidential and exempt from public disclosure. Written referrals and records relating to such referrals held by the Commission and referring entities, and records relating to any preliminary investigation of such referrals held by the Commission are confidential and exempt. any portion of a proceeding conducted by the Commission or other specified entities pursuant to a complaint or referral are exempt from open meetings requirements. The above exemptions apply until: the complaint is dismissed as legally insufficient; the alleged violator requests in writing that such records and proceedings be made public; the Commission determines that it will not investigate a referral; or the Commission or other listed entity determines whether probable cause exists to believe that a violation has occurred. Section 112.532(4)(b), F.S. -- The contents of the complaint and investigation shall remain confidential until such time as the employing law enforcement agency makes a final determination whether or not to issue a notice of disciplinary action consisting of suspension with loss of pay, demotion, or dismissal. Section 112.533(2)(a), F.S. -- e xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, a complaint filed against a law enforcement officer or correctional officer with a law enforcement agency or correctional agency and all information obtained pursuant to the investigation of the complaint is confidential until the investigation ceases to be active, or until the agency head or agency head’s designee provides written notice to the officer who is the subject of the complaint, that the agency has either concluded the investigation with a finding not to proceed with disciplinary action or 232

250 government-in-the-sunshine-manual to file charges; or concluded the investigation with a finding to proceed with disciplinary action or to file charges. NOTE: DUE TO SPACE LIMITATIONS, THE EXEMPTIONS FROM DISCLOSURE FOUND IN CHAPTER 119 (THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT) ARE NOT SUMMARIZED IN THIS APPENDIX. PLEASE REFER TO APPENDIX C (CONTAINING THE COMPLETE TEXT OF CH. 119) FOR THE CH. 119 EXEMPTIONS. Section 121.031(5), F.S. -- The names and addresses of retirees are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) to the extent that no state or local governmental agency may provide the names or addresses of such persons in aggregate, compiled, or list form to any person except as authorized in the subsection. Section 121.4501(19), F.S. -- Personal identifying information of a member in the investment plan contained in Florida r etirement s ystem records held by the s tate Board of administration or the Department of m ervices is exempt from public disclosure anagement s requirements. Section 125.0104(3)(h), F.S. -- Department of r evenue records showing the amount of tourist development taxes collected, including the amount of taxes collected for and from each county in which the tourist development tax is applicable, are open for inspection except as provided in s. 213.053. Section 125.0104(9)(d)1., F.S. -- information given to a county tourism promotion agency which, if released, would reveal the identity of persons or entities who provide information as a response to a sales promotion effort, an advertisement, or a research project or whose names, addresses, meeting or convention plan information or accommodations or other visitation needs become booking or reservation list data, is exempt from disclosure. Section 125.0104(9)(d)2. and 3., F.S. -- When held by a county tourism promotion agency, the following are exempt from disclosure: booking business records, as defined in s. 255.047; trade secrets and commercial or financial information gathered from a person and privileged or confidential, as defined and interpreted under 5 u.s.C. s. 552(b)(4), as amended; and a trade secret, as defined in s. 812.081, F.s. -- Pursuant to authorization granted by this section concerning Section 125.012(26), F.S. certain transportation-related projects defined in s. 125.011, a board of county commissioners is empowered to maintain the confidentiality of trade information and data to the extent that such information is protected under applicable federal and federally-enforced patent and copyright laws. Section 125.025, F.S. -- Pursuant to authorization granted by this section concerning operation of export trading companies, a board of county commissioners is empowered to maintain the confidentiality of trade information to the extent such information is protected under applicable federal export trading company law, and under federal and federally enforced patent and copyright laws. Section 125.355(1), F.S. -- a ppraisals, offers, and counteroffers relating to a county’s purchase of real property pursuant to this section are not available for public disclosure and are exempt from s. 119.07(1) until an option contract is executed or, if no option contract is executed, until 30 days before a contract or agreement for purchase is considered for approval by the board of county commissioners. i f a contract or agreement for purchase is not submitted to the board for approval, then the exemption from s. 119.07(1) expires 30 days after the negotiations end. a county that does not utilize the exemptions provided in this section may follow any procedure not in conflict with Ch. 119 for the purchase of real property which is authorized in its charter 233

251 government-in-the-sunshine-manual or established by ordinance. -- a county employee’s personal identifying information Section 125.585(2), F.S. contained in records held by the employing county relating to that employee’s participation in an employee assistance program is confidential and exempt. -- Personal identifying information of a child or the parent Section 125.901(11), F.S. or guardian of the child, held by a council on children’s services, juvenile welfare board, or other similar entity created under this section or by special law, or held by a service provider or researcher under contract with such entity, is exempt from disclosure requirements. Section 163.01(15)(m), F.S. -- m aterial received by a public agency in connection with its joint ownership or right to the services, output, capacity, or energy of an electric project under the Florida interlocal Cooperation act, which is designated by the person supplying such material as proprietary confidential business information, as defined in the paragraph, or which a court of competent jurisdiction has designated as confidential or secret, shall be kept confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). -- an agency that participates in the creation or administration of Section 163.64, F.S. a collaborative client information system may share client information, including confidential client information, with other members of the collaborative system as long as the restrictions governing the confidential information are observed by any other agency granted access to the confidential information. Section 166.0444, F.S. -- a municipal employee’s personal identifying information contained in records held by the employing municipality relating to that employee’s participation in an employee assistance program is confidential and exempt. Section 166.045(1), F.S. -- a ppraisals, offers, and counteroffers relating to a municipality’s purchase of real property pursuant to this section are not available for public disclosure and are exempt from s. 119.07(1) until an option contract is executed or, if no option contract is executed, until 30 days before a contract or agreement for purchase is considered for approval by f a contract or agreement for purchase is not submitted the governing body of the municipality. i to the governing body for approval, then the exemption from s. 119.07(1) expires 30 days after the negotiations end. a municipality that does not utilize the exemptions from Ch. 119 provided in this section may follow any procedure not in conflict with Ch. 119 for the purchase of real property which is authorized in its charter or established by ordinance. Section 192.0105(4), F.S. taxpayers have the right to have information kept -- confidential, including those records set forth in the exemption. Section 192.105, F.S. -- Federal tax information obtained pursuant to 26 u.s.C. s. 6103 is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 193.074, F.S. -- all returns of property and returns required by former s. 201.022 submitted by the taxpayer pursuant to law shall be deemed to be confidential in the hands of the evenue, the tax collector, property appraiser, the clerk of the circuit court, the Department of r the a uditor g eneral, and the office of Program Policy analysis and g overnment a ccountability, and their employees and persons acting under their supervision and control, except upon court order or order of an administrative body having quasi-judicial powers in ad valorem tax matters. Section 193.114(5), F.S. -- For the purpose of furnishing copies of the tax roll under 119.07(1), the property appraiser is the custodian of the tax roll. The Department of r evenue or any state or local agency may use copies of the tax roll received by it for official purposes and shall permit inspection and examination thereof pursuant to s. 119.07(1), but is not required to furnish copies of the records. a social security number submitted under s. 196.011(1) (application for 234

252 government-in-the-sunshine-manual tax exemption) is confidential and exempt. -- Financial records produced by a taxpayer under this section Section 195.027(3), F.S. evenue, the tax shall be confidential in the hands of the property appraiser, the Department of r collector, and the a uditor g eneral and shall not be divulged to any person, firm, or corporation, except upon court order or order of an administrative body having quasi-judicial powers in ad valorem tax matters, and such records are exempt from s. 119.07(1). -- The information form disclosing unusual fees, costs and terms Section 195.027(6), F.S. of financing of the sale or purchase of property shall be filed with the clerk of the circuit court at the time of recording and shall be confidential and exempt in the hands of all persons after delivery to the clerk, except as provided in the subsection. Section 195.084(1), F.S. -- This section (authorizing the exchange of information among the Department of r evenue, the property appraisers, the tax collector, the a uditor g eneral, and the analysis and government accountability) shall supersede statutes office of Program Policy prohibiting disclosure only with respect to those entities, but the Department of r evenue may establish regulations setting reasonable conditions upon access to and custody of such information. The auditor general, the office of Program Policy analysis and government accountability, the tax collectors and the property appraisers shall be bound by the same requirements of confidentiality as the department. Section 195.096(2)(e), F.S. -- all data and samples developed or obtained by the Department of r evenue in the conduct of assessment ratio studies are confidential and exempt until a presentation of the study findings is made to the property appraiser. Section 196.101(4)(c), F.S. ecords of gross income produced by a taxpayer claiming -- r exemption for totally and permanently disabled persons are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and are confidential in the hands of the property appraiser, the Department of r evenue, the tax collector, overnment a ccountability, and the a uditor g eneral the office of Program Policy analysis and g and shall not be divulged to any person, firm, or corporation, except upon court order or order of an administrative body having quasi-judicial powers in ad valorem tax matters. Section 197.3225(1), F.S. – a taxpayer’s e-mail address held by a tax collector for sending specified tax notices or for obtaining the taxpayer’s consent to send notices is exempt from disclosure requirements. Section 202.195, F.S. -- Proprietary confidential business information, as defined in the exemption, which is obtained from a telecommunications company or franchised cable company for the purposes of imposing fees for occupying the public rights-of-way, assessing the local communications services tax, or regulating the public rights-of-way, held by a local government entity, is confidential and exempt from public disclosure requirements. m aps or other engineering data held by a local governmental entity that relate to the exact location and capacity of facilities for the provision of communications services shall be exempt from disclosure but only for 60 days after completion of construction of the facilities. Section 206.27(2), F.S. -- any information concerning audits in progress or those records or files of the Department of r evenue described in this section which are currently the subject of pending investigation by the Department of r evenue or the Florida Department of law enforcement are exempt from s. 119.07(1) and are considered confidential; and may not be released except as authorized in the subsection. Section 211.125(10), F.S. -- all returns and information filed with the Department of revenue under this part providing for a tax on production of oil and gas are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), and such returns or information shall be protected from unauthorized disclosures as provided in s. 213.053. 235

253 government-in-the-sunshine-manual Section 211.33(5), F.S. -- The use of information contained in any tax return filed by a producer (i.e., a person severing solid minerals from the soils and waters of the state) or in any books, records or documents of a producer shall be as provided in s. 213.053, and shall be confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). ecords of the Department of r Section 212.0305(3)(d), F.S. evenue showing the -- r amount of taxes collected, including taxes collected from each county in which a resort tax is levied, are subject to the provisions of s. 213.053, and are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 213.015(9), F.S. -- u nless otherwise specified by law, Florida taxpayers have the right to have taxpayer tax information kept confidential. Section 213.053(2)(a), F.S. -- all information contained in returns, reports, accounts, or declarations received by the Department of r evenue, including investigative reports and information and including letters of technical advice, is confidential except for official purposes and is exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 213.0532(8), F.S. any financial records obtained pursuant to this section -- evenue and relating to information-sharing arrangements between the Department of r financial institutions may be disclosed only for the purpose of, and to the extent necessary for, administration and enforcement of the tax laws of this state. Section 213.0535(5), F.S. -- a provision of law imposing confidentiality upon data shared egistration i under this section (providing for the r haring and e xchange Program nformation s within the Department of r evenue), including, but not limited to, a provision imposing penalties for disclosure, applies to recipients of this data and their employees. Data exchanged under this section may not be provided to a person or entity except as authorized in the exemption. Section 213.21(3)(a), F.S. -- The Department of r evenue shall maintain records of all compromises of a taxpayer’s liability; the records of compromises shall not be subject to disclosure pursuant to s. 119.07(1) and shall be considered confidential information governed by s. 213.053. -- The Department of r Section 213.22(2), F.S. evenue may not disclose, pursuant to s. 119.07(1), a technical assistance advisement or request therefor to any person other than the person requesting the advisement or his or her representative, or for official departmental purposes without deleting identifying details of the person to whom the advisement was issued. -- Confidential information shared by the Department of r evenue Section 213.27(6), F.S. with debt collection or auditing agencies under contract with the department is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and such debt collection or auditing agencies are bound by the same requirements of confidentiality as the department. Section 213.28(6), F.S. -- Certified public accountants entering into contracts with the Department of revenue are bound by the same confidentiality requirements and subject to the same penalties as the department under s. 213.053. any return, return information, or documentation obtained from the i nternal r evenue s ervice under an information-sharing agreement is confidential and exempt from disclosure and shall not be divulged or disclosed in any manner by any department officer or employee to any certified public accountant under a contract authorized by this section unless the department and the i nternal r evenue s ervice mutually agree to such disclosure. Section 215.4401(1), F.S. -- r ecords and information of the s tate Board of a dministration relating to acquiring, hypothecating, or disposing of real property or specified related interests are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) in order to achieve certain stated purposes. r ecords relating to value, offers, counteroffers, or negotiations are confidential and exempt until closing is ecords relating to tenants, leases, and other specified complete and all funds have been disbursed. r 236

254 government-in-the-sunshine-manual matters are confidential and exempt until the executive director determines that release would not be detrimental to the board’s interest or conflict with its fiduciary responsibilities. Section 215.4401(2), F.S. ecords and other information relating to investments made -- r by the s tate Board of a dministration are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) until 30 days after completion of an investment transaction. h owever, if in the executive director’s opinion, it would be detrimental to the board’s financial interests or cause a conflict with its fiduciary responsibilities, information concerning service provider fees may be kept confidential until 6 months after negotiations relating to such fees have been terminated. Section 215.4401(3)(b), F.S. -- “Proprietary confidential business information”, as defined in the exemption, that is held by the s tate Board of a dministration regarding alternative investments is confidential and exempt for a period of 10 years after the termination of the alternative investment unless disclosure is permitted under the circumstances set forth in the exemption. Section 215.555(4)(f ), F.S. -- i nformation described in 215.557 which is contained in an examination report conducted on an insurer pursuant to this subsection, is confidential and exempt, as provided in s. 215.557. Section 215.557, F.S. -- The reports of insured values under certain insurance policies by zip code submitted to the s tate Board of a dministration pursuant to s. 215.555 are confidential and exempt. Section 220.242, F.S. - - estimated tax returns filed under the Florida i ncome tax Code are confidential, and exempt from s. 119.07(1). Section 252.355(4), F.S. -- r ecords relating to the registration of persons with special needs for emergency management purposes pursuant to this section are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), except such information is available to other emergency response agencies, as determined by the local emergency management director. local law enforcement agencies shall be given complete shelter roster information upon request. Section 252.88(1), F.S. -- trade secret information which applicable federal law authorizes tate h an employer to exclude from materials submitted shall be furnished to the s azardous materials e mergency r esponse Commission upon request. h owever, such information shall be confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and shall not be disclosed by the Commission except as authorized in the subsection. -- When applicable law authorizes the withholding Section 252.88(2) and (3), F.S. of disclosure of the location of specific hazardous chemicals, such information is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). all information, including, but not limited to, site plans and specific location information on hazardous chemicals furnished to a fire department pursuant to applicable law, shall be confidential and exempt while in the possession of the fire department. Section 252.905(1), F.S. -- any information furnished by a person or a business to the Division of e mergency m anagement for the purpose of being provided assistance with emergency planning is exempt. -- i n accordance with the federal Clean air a ct, trade secret Section 252.943, F.S. information provided to the Division of e mergency m anagement by the owner or operator of a stationary source subject to the a ccidental r elease Prevention Program is confidential and exempt from disclosure, except as provided in the exemption. Section 253.025(8)(f ), F.S. – e xcept as provided in the exemption, appraisal reports prepared for the Board of trustees of the internal improvement trust Fund or an agency are confidential and exempt until an option contract is executed or, if no option contract is executed, 237

255 government-in-the-sunshine-manual until 2 weeks before a contract or agreement for purchase is considered for approval by the board of trustees. Section 253.025(9)(d), F.S. -- all offers or counteroffers shall be documented in writing and shall be confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) until an option contract is executed, or if no option contract is executed, until 2 weeks before a contract or agreement for purchase is considered for approval by the Board of mprovement trust Fund. trustees of the i nternal i -- a written valuation of land determined to be surplus Section 253.0341(8)(a), F.S. and related documents are confidential and exempt. The exemption expires 2 weeks before the contract or agreement regarding the disposition of the surplus land is first considered for approval trustees of the i nternal i mprovement by the Board of trust Fund. Prior to expiration of the exemption, disclosure of certain information is authorized under the circumstances described in the exemption. Section 255.047(2), F.S. -- The booking business records (as defined in the section) of a publicly owned or operated convention center, sports stadium, coliseum, or auditorium are exempt from disclosure. h owever, such facility shall furnish its booking business records and evenue upon the department’s request if necessary for related information to the Department of r the department to administer its duties. Section 255.065(15), F.S. – an unsolicited proposal received by a responding public entity is exempt until such time as the entity provides notice of an intended decision for a qualifying project, as defined in this section relating to public-private partnerships, or as otherwise provided in the exemption. any portion of a meeting of a responsible public entity during which an unsolicited proposal that is exempt is discussed is exempt from s. 286.011, F.s. a complete recording must be made of any portion of an exempt meeting. n o portion of the exempt meeting may be held off the record. The recording becomes public under the circumstances provided in the exemption. -- r Section 257.261, F.S. egistration and circulation records of public libraries, except statistical reports of registration and circulation are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). except as authorized by court order, a person may not make known in any manner any information contained in such records, except as provided in this section. violation of this section is a second degree misdemeanor. Section 257.38(2) and (3), F.S. -- Public records transferred to the Division of library and i nformation s ervices of the Department of s tate are subject to s. 119.07(1), except that any record provided by law to be confidential shall not be made accessible until 50 years after creation of the record. any nonpublic manuscript or other archival material which is placed in the keeping of the division under special terms and conditions, shall be made accessible only in accordance with such terms and conditions and shall be exempt from s. 119.07(1) to the extent necessary to meet the terms and conditions for a nonpublic manuscript or other archival material. Section 257.38(4), F.S. -- any nonpublic manuscript or other archival material that is donated to and held by an official archive of a municipality or county contingent upon special terms and conditions that limit the right to inspect or copy such material is confidential and exempt from disclosure requirements except as otherwise authorized in the special conditions. such nonpublic manuscript or archival material shall be made available for inspection and copying 50 years after the date of the creation of the nonpublic manuscript or material, at an earlier date specified in the special terms and conditions, or upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. Section 265.605(2), F.S. -- i nformation which, if released, would identify donors and amounts contributed by donors to the Cultural e ndowment Program trust Fund, or to the local organization’s matching fund, is, at the request of the donor, confidential and exempt from s. 238

256 government-in-the-sunshine-manual 119.07(1). i nformation which, if released, would identify prospective donors is confidential and exempt unless the name has been obtained from another organization or source. Section 265.7015, F.S. f a donor or prospective donor of a donation made for the -- i benefit of a publicly owned performing arts center, as defined in the exemption, desires to remain anonymous, information that would identify the name, address, or telephone number of that donor or prospective donor is confidential and exempt. -- i Section 265.703(3), F.S. useum of Florida h istory citizen support nformation of the m organization which is confidential and exempt pursuant to s. 267.17 shall retain its confidential and exempt status. Section 267.076, F.S. -- i nformation identifying a donor or prospective donor to a publicly owned house museum designated by the u nited s tates Department of the i nterior as a national h istoric landmark who desires to remain anonymous is confidential and exempt. Section 267.135, F.S. -- i nformation identifying the location of an archaeological site held by the Division of h istorical r esources of the Department of s tate is exempt from public disclosure if the division finds that disclosure will create a substantial risk of harm, theft, or destruction at such site. Section 267.17(3), F.S. -- The identity of donors who desire to remain anonymous shall be confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1), and that anonymity shall be maintained in the auditor’s report of a citizen support organization to the Division of h istorical r esources of the Department of s tate. Section 267.1732(8), F.S. -- The identity of a donor or prospective donor of property to a niversity of West Florida which is established to support the direct-support organization of the u historic preservation efforts of the university, who desires to remain anonymous, is confidential and exempt from disclosure; and that anonymity must be maintained in the auditor’s report. Section 267.1736(9), F.S. -- any information identifying a donor or prospective donor to the direct-support organization, authorized by the u niversity of Florida to assist it in the historic preservation of the City of st. augustine, who desires to remain anonymous, is confidential and exempt, and that anonymity must be maintained in the auditor’s report. Section 272.136(7)(a), F.S. -- The identity of a donor or prospective donor to the direct- support organization of the Florida h istoric Capitol m useum who desires to remain anonymous is confidential and exempt. Section 279.11(1), F.S. -- r ecords with regard to ownership of, or security interests in, registered public obligations are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1). -- any information contained in a report of a qualified public Section 280.16(3), F.S. depository required under this chapter or any rule adopted under this chapter, together with any information required of a financial institution that is not a qualified public depository, is, if made confidential by any law of the u nited s tates or of this state, confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and not subject to dissemination to anyone other than the Chief Financial officer under this chap